Norske kampfly i krig: Bombing på klare betingelser?
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- Militære studier 
This comparative study examines Norway’s use of fighter jets in four military campaigns after the Cold War. Using a foreign policy analysis model that incorporates variables from several analytical levels, the study aims to explain if, to what extent, and why Norwegian authorities have used political reservations – known as national caveats – on how their troops might be used. Investigating four F-16 contributions to NATO and/or US-led missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya, the study traces the development in air power as a foreign policy tool during the period 1999 to 2011. Key findings suggest that Norway went from being a reluctant and technologically backward contributor to the air campaign in Kosovo through long-standing contributions in Afghanistan to making «an enormous difference» in Libya, according to president Obama. This development has been facilitated by a softening in Norway’s use of caveats. Judging from the analysis, there are several causes behind this development, all of which are analyzed by means of the following three factors: the alliance security dilemma (Snyder), domestic interests that determine state preferences (Moravcsik), and the bureaucratic politics model (Allison). In the post-Cold War era, Norway’s relative dependence on the Alliance has increased, as have NATO’s expectations when it comes to burden-sharing. The number of domestic constraints on the use of the military in out-of-area operations has decreased accordingly. When in government, even smaller Norwegian centrist and left-wing parties have found justification for offensive contributions. Finally, in the absence of national caveats, Norwegian officers in Libya managed the Norwegian ROEs in a responsible manner by applying soft caveats themselves.