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Long-term defence planning

A comparative study of seven countries

INSTITUTT FOR FORSVARSSTUDIER

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SUMMARY

This study compares the long-term defence planning systems of the Nordic countries Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland, as well as France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Long-term defence planning is here understood as a process by which a given state arrives at a policy on the future development of their armed forces. It takes place at the interface between the political, military and civil service spheres. The study aims to identify the actors involved in long-term defence planning, and how the planning processes are carried out.

The clearest finding is that long-term defence planning is conducted in very different ways in all the countries studied. There is a wide variety of actors and institutions who initiate, control and contribute to the long-term planning process. For instance, in some countries the ministry of defence is in control, while in others it plays a subordinate role. When it comes to how the planning is carried out, there are differences in frequency, timing and outlook, as well as how methodical and structured the different systems are. Moreover, there is reason to believe that these differences are rooted in the constitutional traditions and long-established public management practices of each country, and therefore difficult to change. When considering future international cooperation on long-term defence planning, these differences should be kept in mind.



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ABBREVIATIONS

BPB	Policy, planning and budgeting procedure (Netherlands)
CHOD	Chief of Defence
CMS	Centre for Military Studies (University of Copenhagen)
DAS	Strategic Affairs Delegation (France)
DGA	Defence Procurement Agency (France)
EU	The European Union
FDF	Finnish Defence Forces
FMSI	Strategic Direction of the Armed Forces (Sweden)
FMUP	Armed Forces Development Plans (Sweden)
IFS	Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
LTDP	Long-term defence planning
MoD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDRE	Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
NORDEFKO	Nordic Defence Cooperation
NSS	National Security Strategy (UK)
SDSR	Strategic Defence and Security Review (UK)
SGDSN	General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (France)
UK	The United Kingdom
UN	The United Nations

Preface

Academic tradition dictates that when comparing the Nordic societies, the scholar initially remarks on how similar Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland are in general, and then expresses surprise at how different they turn out to be when examined in detail. First, the similarities of culture, climate, religion, politics and demography are discussed, as well as the shared historical heritage, stable politics, solid welfare systems and the strong sense of Nordic communality. The Nordic – and especially the Scandinavian – countries can often appear so similar that at first glance, they seem indistinguishable. After this initial assumption, many are surprised that such seemingly similar countries turn out to be very different, with varying school systems, public management, road building and defence policy. To those familiar with the many attempts at Nordic cooperation in one field or another, it will come as no surprise that this study on long-term defence planning (LTDP) does not depart from this trend of exploring similarities but ultimately finding differences.

In the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO) organisation, there has been an increasing awareness that long-term defence planning might be an area where the differences between countries are significant. This led NORDEFECO's working group, the Cooperation Area on Strategic Development, to begin work on the present study on long-term defence planning, with the support of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, which commissioned researchers and funded the project.

The overall goal of this study is to increase the knowledge and understanding of the long-term planning systems in the NORDEFECO countries. Little research has been done on this subject, and as far as we know, next to none in a comparative light. The study therefore has the modest but pioneering goal of mapping the basic geography of the LTDP landscape in the Nordic countries of Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland. To allow for a fuller understanding, it also includes the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom. In addition to mapping the basic features of LTDP in each of these cases, and highlighting key differences and similarities, the study hopes to identify more general

trends in the recent international development of LTDP. A recurring challenge has been the balance between breadth and depth. As this is a pilot study, we have generally opted for the former. In keeping with the modest level of ambition and the nature of the study, we have primarily looked at the formal processes involved in LTDP and the institutions involved in them.

The study is divided into three parts. First, we introduce the concepts, methods and research questions. Then, we describe the long-term defence planning system for each country in individual chapters. Finally, we summarise, compare and analyse the results and try to sketch out some implications for future cooperation in the field of long-term defence planning. The differences appear to be larger than the similarities, but the cases are not completely unique, and some interesting patterns can be found.

The study has been conducted as a joint effort between the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) at the Norwegian Defence University College and the Centre for Military Studies (CMS) in the Department of Political Sciences, at the University of Copenhagen. PhD scholar Kristian Knus Larsen at CMS and Research Fellow Magnus Håkenstad at IFS have conducted the research, analysis and writing. Marie Dørup Olesen, formerly at CMS, did valuable initial research on the French, British and Danish cases. The research process has been supervised by Assistant Professor Kjell Inge Bjerga at IFS and Professor Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen at CMS.

We would like to extend our gratitude to the numerous people who have made this project possible. As interviews have been our primary source of information, we are indebted to all of those who helped us gain access to the various officials and scholars. The informants themselves could not have been more forthcoming and helpful, and their contributions have been invaluable to the study. Any errors or omissions in the text are entirely our own.

It is our hope that this study will be useful to the officers, civil servants, scholars and politicians working on long-term defence planning and its related subjects, both as an accessible source of information and as an inspiration to further thought.

Kristian Knus Larsen and Magnus Håkenstad
September 2012

Introduction

Every year, vast amounts of resources, manpower and effort are expended in an attempt to create and sustain armed forces able to protect the vital interests of states and societies. The aim is to align national security interests, political feasibility, societal desires and military requirements – a process of long-term defence planning. Long-term defence planning takes into account a state’s strategic outlook, hard security requirements and resource base to improve the effectiveness of its armed forces and their ability to face tomorrow’s challenges. The size and shape of armies, navies and air forces are decided upon as a result of long-term defence planning. These are not trivial matters, and it is therefore surprising that the long-term defence planning systems of different states have attracted little attention from politicians, bureaucrats, officers or scholars. There is little reason to presume that long-term defence planning systems should be similar internationally. Nevertheless, this appears to have been a widespread, if tacit, assumption. But even among close neighbours or allies, there appears to be little awareness of each other’s approaches, methods and priorities in this field. This can be quite a problem because, as this study shows, the differences between even quite similar states can be huge when it comes to the conduct of long-term defence planning.

The goal of this study is to shed light on this previously overlooked aspect of defence policy affairs, specifically on the countries participating in the military cooperation in NORDEF: Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway. We have done this by describing and comparing the systems and procedures for long-term defence planning in these states, as well as those of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France.

NORDIC DEFENCE COOPERATION

Numerous developments in the past two decades have presented increasing challenges for the European officers, bureaucrats, politicians and others involved in planning for the future of armed forces. While the threat of large-scale conventional warfare has receded since the end of the Cold War, a plethora of new or revitalised threats, ranging from pira-

cy and terrorism to failed states and cyber sabotage now demand attention from military planners. Long-term defence planning was by no means a simple task during the Cold War, but the requirements of the armed forces were more predictable when the potential enemy was well known. Nowadays, the potential threats are more complex, diverse and unpredictable. At the same time as European defence budgets have decreased, (a trend which has drastically escalated following the financial crisis which began in 2008), the expense of military equipment has risen. Since the 1990s, these financial trends have prompted major defence reforms in most countries in Western Europe. Small states, such as the Nordic countries, have been particularly vulnerable to this two-fold erosion of funds.

In order to minimise the effect of this erosion of funds, there has been an increase in coordinated defence development, as the sharing of resources allows for costs to be reduced in capability development, procurement and education. Established international institutions like NATO and the European Union have done this, using catchphrases such as “pooling and sharing” or, recently “Smart Defence”. So too have smaller organisations, some of which have been specifically designed for the purpose. NORDEFECO (Nordic Defence Cooperation) was set up in 2009 and includes Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. The difficulties of maintaining balanced national defence forces have been a particular problem for small states, such as the Nordic countries (Saxi 2011, 15–21). The main purpose of NORDEFECO is to enable its members to maintain their national operational capabilities by cooperating in the fields of support structures, procurement, development and planning. The salient feature of NORDEFECO is that it demands close military cooperation between five states that are not all allies. Norway, Denmark and Iceland are founding members of NATO, while Sweden and Finland adhere to their long-standing non-alignment policies. In addition, Sweden, Finland and Denmark are members of the European Union, while Norway and Iceland are not. However, this has not prevented the NORDEFECO members from finding common ground.

While international cooperation, harmonisation and interoperability is on the increase in Western defence policy circles, most states still perceive that to some degree their own particular security situations demand unique considerations. This tendency towards independence is strong in all the Nordic countries. Moreover, the traditions, systems and customs of policy, law and public management differ between states, and have a significant impact on the ability to participate in military cooperation, particularly when it comes to initiatives affecting public investment and the formulation of national policy. Cooperation in long-term defence planning is one such contentious issue, and the NORDEFECO countries are no exception to this rule. A broader understanding of the different manifestations of the long-ignored phenomenon of long-term defence planning therefore seems more called for than ever.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The concept of long-term defence planning can be divided into two dimensions, namely content, what is meant by “defence planning”, and timeframe, what is meant by “long-term”. When approaching the cases, many aspects of long-term defence planning have been addressed, loosely grouped to form two overall research questions:

- *Who* is involved? Which institutions and actors are involved, and what is the relationship between them? Who is in charge of the process, and who has a supporting role?
- *How* is it carried out?

The primary questions of “who” and “how” are reflected in the main parameters for comparison, which have guided our detailed enquiries. These issues are dealt with in detail in the individual chapters. They include identifying workflows and participants, the main planning products, methods and procedures, the use of external assistance from research institutions and the like, the relationship between the military and the civilian processes, the degree of government-level involvement and ways of obtaining parliamentary approval.

It was initially hoped that the results of our comparisons would allow us to identify “models” of long-term defence planning, and to group the cases according to which models they fit. As it turned out, the variety was too great to allow for a clear identification and division into models.

As a pilot study into previously uncharted territory, we intend to cover matters of great complexity across seven different states. Therefore, the ambitions are modest; we are on a fact-finding mission. The intention is to outline and describe the main features of long-term defence planning in the various states and to enable a comparison between them to identify key differences, similarities and trends.

WHAT IS LONG-TERM DEFENCE PLANNING?

The *NATO Handbook on Long-Term Defence Planning* (NATO RTO 2003, hereafter the *NATO Handbook*) defines LTDP as dealing with “shaping tomorrow’s defence forces for an alliance or nation”, and notes that “LTDP usually focuses ten to thirty years into the future” (NATO RTO 2003, 1). Further, it places LTDP close to the highest levels of policy decision making, with “national security interests and objectives as inputs and [...] force structure development plans as output” (NATO RTO 2003, iii, 1).¹

All states included in this study have some official process for deciding the development of their armed forces, usually revolving around the production and approval of high-level policy document(s). However, it soon became apparent to us that the timeframes, methods, processes and institutions involved vary considerably. As a result of

this diversity, we have been obliged to adopt a rather broad definition of long-term defence planning.

In this study, long-term defence planning is understood as *a process by which a given state arrives at political decisions regarding the future development of the structure, organisation and capabilities of their armed forces*. This definition emphasises the political aspects of long-term defence planning. The “shaping of tomorrow’s defence forces” does not exclusively take place in military staffs and headquarters, but rather in the interface between the political, the military and the civil service spheres. This differs slightly from the definition in the *NATO Handbook*, which sees long-term defence planning as primarily a military staff process intimately connected to policy and politics. Rather, we argue that long-term defence planning is, first and foremost, a political phenomenon, albeit with a significant military component. Decisions about the future development of armed forces are, in all the cases studied, political decisions of the highest order. By describing the military aspects of long-term planning without regard for its connections to the political level, we run the risk of missing vital points. That being said, a key variable in our analysis has been to what degree the military professionals influence long-term defence planning, and in what ways and at what levels the military influence is found. Long-term defence planning is also delimited from the formulation of national (grand) strategy and policy on the one hand, and from purely military operational planning on the other. Keeping to the definition from the *NATO handbook*, we see these as separate inputs into the long-term defence planning processes.

When it comes to what timespan is covered by “long-term”, a flexible definition has also been necessary. The *NATO Handbook* notes that the boundaries between short-, medium- and long-term planning are vague, and sets the boundary at approximately ten to thirty years (NATO RTO, 1). In most of the cases in this study, the political documents and processes tended to have shorter or undefined time horizons, while the military plans tended to have longer outlooks. Some of the states studied do not make concrete plans with stated outlooks for as long as ten years. Rather, they integrate longer-term perspectives into their plans in a more or less structured way. In keeping with our emphasis on the political level, we have adopted a flexible approach to defining timeframes, and ten years and beyond has served only as a rough rule of thumb for what constitutes “long-term”. Thus, what exactly is understood as “long-term” planning by the actors themselves has become an important variable.

When comparing the planning processes across the countries one runs the risk of comparing things that are so different as to be effectively incomparable. Does defence planning mean the same thing in the different countries? In literature on comparative studies this problem is called *conceptual stretching* (Hague and Harrop 2004, 72). This problem might arise if the variation in long-term defence planning is due to differences in conceptualisation, rather than differences in practice. Therefore it has been an explicit ambition to identify planning processes that are *functionally equivalent*, that fulfil the same role within the different countries.

PARAMETERS FOR COMPARISON: ORGANISATION AND PROCESS

The findings of the study are presented in a two-part structure. This structure is based upon the guiding parameters that have been used for comparing the cases – *organisation* and *process*. Organisation covers the main and secondary actors and the relations between them. The labelling of institutions as either main or secondary actors is done according to our own analysis of who is in charge, and who supports their work. Process covers the *frequency*, *outlook*, *structures* and *products* of the planning processes.² The parameters have been chosen on the basis of the research question and the definition of long-term defence planning that is used in the study. When choosing the parameters it has been important to make sure that they were adequate, i.e. that they were covering the same aspects as set out in the definition of long-term defence planning.

LIMITATIONS

As a general rule, it has been necessary to sacrifice depth in order to gain the necessary breadth. This has led us to place some limits on what will be discussed, and on what conclusions we are able to draw.

First, the analysis is confined to *current* systems of long-term defence planning. This means that only brief attention will be given to the historical development of the systems under scrutiny, mostly when it is necessary to highlight features of the current systems. The research questions primarily address the how and the who of long-term defence planning. Less attention has been devoted to explaining the whys and the wherefores, although in most cases, we have felt confident enough to indicate some plausible explanations.

Second, and continuing our focus on the current long-term defence planning systems, we have not been able to study the implementation of the plans that are produced. This might be seen as a shortcoming in this study, given that even the most elegant and efficient planning system is useless if its products have no effect on actual developments. But given the time available and the broad and varied subject at hand, we have not been able to analyse implementation. However, while the long-term defence planning in itself is not often studied, the issue of implementation has been indirectly covered in much extant literature, in particular in the context of defence reforms (Næss 2011; Saxi 2010).

Third, the study focuses on the formal side of long-term defence planning. Long-term defence planning takes place in the interface between political, military and bureaucratic spheres, and the processes have turned out to be complex and diverse. In each case, we set out to identify the key institutions and actors involved, and the main workflows and processes that lead to the formulation of the main products (documents). In taking this approach, we risk missing the possible role of informal relationships and back-room decision making. Mapping these kinds of influences would be far too ambitious, and we believe that outlining the formal processes is a necessary starting point.

Finally, we do not intend to single out which system or country is “best” at conducting long-term defence planning. It would be feasible to set up some criteria for successful long-term planning (the ability to implement plans seems an obvious candidate) and rate the different systems with regard to these. But this would require a much deeper and more thorough analysis than is possible and desirable within the scope of this study.

CASE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

This study is based upon a comparative study of long-term defence planning in seven different countries. In general terms, the goal of a comparative study is to encompass the major similarities and differences between the cases investigated (Strøm 2004, 31). A comparative analysis is a powerful and versatile tool that enhances our ability to describe and understand political processes. By comparing the concepts, workflows and actors in the different cases, it is possible to identify similarities, differences and general trends. In a comparative analysis, what is constant within a single country is turned into a variable between the countries (Hague and Harrop 2004, 69). Thus, the aim of this study is to understand the mixture of constants and variables regarding long-term defence planning within the group of countries investigated.

The relevant NORDEFECO countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) are naturally included in the study since these are the countries the study aims to obtain a better understanding of. Iceland, though partner in the political levels of NORDEFECO, has been omitted, as it has neither armed forces to plan for nor institutions to conduct long-term defence planning. Iceland performs only a limited number of functions normally undertaken by the military (Utánríkisráðuneytið 2012). The Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom have been included in the study based on considerations of research design. Usually, case selection in a comparative study is based upon considerations of the independent variable(s) and the dependent variable (Strøm et al. 2004, 32). In this study, the dependent variable is long-term defence planning. When considering the independent variables it is important to remain clear that this study has no ambitions of explaining or drawing causal inference. It is therefore not our ambition to identify the distinct variables that determine the way defence planning is done in each country. However, it is our ambition to identify differences and similarities in *how* defence planning is done in the different countries. Therefore cases have been selected that overall, are both similar to and different from the NORDEFECO countries with regard to defence ambitions and spending. The Netherlands have been chosen as the similar case and France and the United Kingdom as the different cases. Thus, it is possible to look for differences between countries that are alike (within the group of NORDEFECO countries and between the NORDEFECO countries and the Netherlands) and for similarities between countries that are different (between the NORDEFECO countries and France and the United Kingdom).

SOURCES

The study is based on three types of sources: publicly available documents, research literature and interviews with officials and scholars. Public information dealing with long-term defence planning, whether in print or online, is usually few and far between. While some valuable research studies have been published dealing with national processes, their usefulness and number varies between the countries. So far, the comparative treatment of the subject has failed to attract much scholarly attention. Therefore, interviews have been the most important source for this study. While generally successful (and it should be acknowledged that all of our respondents have been forthcoming and helpful) this has led to some challenges. The diversity of the institutions involved and the procedures followed in the seven states studied, led to difficulties in locating and interviewing sources of comparable rank and position. In addition, the same diversity has obliged us to tailor the interviews for each case. Therefore, interviews have not been conducted on the basis of an identical interview guide, as would normally be desirable. However, the utmost effort has been exerted to ensure that the same, basic research questions have been covered in all of the interviews.

Norway: Integration and continuity

In Norway, as in most of the other small NATO states in Western Europe, the Armed Forces have taken big steps towards a modernised defence force with expeditionary capabilities in the last two decades. Due to its geostrategic location, proximity to Russia, and large sea domains, Norway has had more difficulty striking a balance between home and abroad than some of its North European neighbours, such as Denmark and the Netherlands. Financially, however, the Norwegian Armed Forces are in an enviable position compared to its neighbours. So far, Norway's public finances have remained relatively unaffected by the financial crisis, and uniquely among the states in this study, the Norwegian Armed Forces have seen its budgets grow steadily in the last few years.

In 2012, the Norwegian Armed Forces are emerging from a comprehensive transformation process, which started in the late 1990s. After the Cold War ended, the Norwegian Armed Forces were in dire straits, both structurally and financially. Its huge, conscription-based territorial defence force – which had a wartime strength of several hundred thousand soldiers – was unable to cope with the demands of the new security environment of the 1990s. At the same time, the inability to align defence ambitions with economic means meant that the Armed Forces faced several economic crises. Since 1999, drastic measures have been taken. Most aspects of the Armed Forces' wartime structure, peacetime establishment, central management and doctrines have changed dramatically. The major part of this transformation is now completed, and after more than a decade of reorganisation, the emphasis is now on consolidating the new structure (Sunde 2010; Norwegian MoD 2012, 12).

The completion (more or less) of the quite painful reform of the Norwegian military, and in particular its higher leadership, forms the immediate background for the introduction of the so-called continuous system of LTDP. In 2008 this continuous system, deemed more suitable for the consolidation and on-going adjustment of an established

structure, replaced a cyclical system of quadrennial reviews, which was seen as more appropriate for a period of wholesale reform. As the continuous LTDP system differs significantly from the others that are analysed in this study, it is necessary to devote space to the previous as well as the current system.

ORGANISATION

MAIN ACTOR: THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

LTDP in Norway is formulated and implemented through government documents which are produced by the Ministry of Defence and submitted for parliamentary debate and approval. For the last two decades, this process has revolved around the production and implementation of quadrennial documents known simply as long-term plans. In this section, emphasis will be placed on the process prior to the submission to Parliament, and the institutions involved in this process. The impact of the parliamentary process will be discussed later in this chapter.

Long-term defence planning for the Norwegian Armed Forces is carried out by the Ministry of Defence in Oslo. In 2003, the so-called Integrated Strategic Management (ISL) organisation replaced the old organisation, which had both military input in the huge, independent Defence Command (under the Chief of Defence) and civilian input in the civilian ministry. In the new organisation, the integrated Ministry of Defence carries out the political, strategic and management tasks of a government office and also the strategic functions associated with a military staff. As the name implies, the ISL organisation aims to integrate the strategic functions at the top levels of both the political management and the professional military leadership. The MoD has around 300 employees, a third of which are professional officers. The most relevant feature to this study is the intention to provide the civilian bureaucracy with professional military insight and to improve the understanding of political processes among the higher echelon of the officer corps (Ingebrigtsen 2012). As we shall see, this was a precondition for the implementation of the continuous LTDP system. With regards to LTDP, the MoD is responsible for the formulation and implementation of the overall defence policy of a given government, the assessment of security challenges, and the long-term development of suitable military capabilities to meet those challenges. The 2003 reorganisation centralised the responsibility for directing and producing long-term defence plans, placing it firmly within the Ministry of Defence.

Within the MoD, LTDP falls within the remit of the aptly named Fourth Department for Defence Policy and Long-term Planning. While other departments within the MoD, such as the Department of Security Policy and the Department of Management and Financial Governance, contribute heavily, ultimately it is the Fourth Department which is responsible for coordinating all of the various inputs to the long-term plans.

The two principal actors are the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Defence. The Minister is the constitutionally responsible head of the Ministry of Defence and in overall

charge of government policy with regards to defence. The Chief of Defence, the senior uniformed officer (a four-star general or admiral) has a dual role: he is both the chief of the military organisation and the chief military advisor to the Minister of Defence, and thus the government. His primary role in the LTDP process is to provide professional military assessments and strategic advice so that an informed decision can be made. At different stages of the LTDP process, both the ISL and the Fourth Department of Defence Policy and Long-term Planning assist the CHOD in formulating his military advice and, later, support the Minister in producing the Ministry's overall long-term plans. While this serves to maintain unity in policy and helps avoid overlap, preserving the CHOD's role as an autonomous military advisor requires careful management of the different steps of the process (Saga 2012 [interview]; Hermansen 2012 [interview]).

SECONDARY ACTORS

When formulating the CHOD's military advice and the government's long-term plans, the Fourth Department depends heavily on input from a large number of other actors within the military organisation. The military services and agencies affected by the LTDP provide recommendations and analysis regarding the development of their respective sectors (Hermansen 2011).

Outside of the ministry, the various agencies that make up the top levels of the military organisation are heavily involved in the long-term planning process. The Defence Staff supports the CHOD in his other main responsibility (besides providing the government with military advice), that of managing the military organisation. The Defence Staff have taken over the management responsibilities that were left when the strategic functions of the old Defence Command were moved to the MoD in 2003. While the Defence Staff is by no means an insignificant institution, and is heavily involved in the LTDP process, it does not have the independence of the old Defence Command. Put simply, the MoD draws up the long-term plans, and the Defence Staff implements and executes them (Ingebrigtsen 2012). Other important contributors are the chiefs of staff and staffs of the four services (Army, Navy, Home Guard and Air Force), as well as the other chiefs who make up the top levels of the Norwegian military leadership.

Outside of the uniformed military organisation, but still within the defence sector, one contributor should be specifically mentioned. The role played by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (NDRE) has long been a distinguishing feature of the Norwegian LTDP system. This is a large, (employing nearly 500 full-time researchers) public, semi-independent research institute, funded and administered by the MoD. The Fourth Department of the MoD functions as the point of contact between the Research Establishment and the Ministry. Since the early 1950s, the NDRE has been highly influential as a provider of scientific analysis of the technological, operational and economic developments affecting defence planning. In the previous incarnations of the Norwegian LTDP system, the NDRE had a significant influence on the quadrennial Defence Reviews

and on defence policy, almost on an equal footing with the Ministry and the old Defence Command. Since the late 1990s, its influence on the long-term planning process has waned (Næss 2011, 2; Hermansen 2012 [interview]; Røksund 2012 [interview]). It is still important as a provider of high-quality assessments, reviews, studies and reports which serve as input for the LTDP processes, but now in a subcontractor role, clearly subordinate to the Ministry and the Fourth Department for Long-term Planning.

From time to time, especially when external events call for a reappraisal of defence policy, independent defence commissions have been set up. Three such commissions have been convened since the Second World War, the last in 1990. Similar to their Danish counterparts, these are usually composed of scholars, professionals, civil servants and politicians. In preparation for the long-term plan of 2008, a “light” version was set up in the form of a so-called Defence Policy Panel. Its role was not primarily to inform the long-term plan, but rather to stimulate public debate and appreciation on the subject (Næss 2011, 62).

Agencies outside of the defence sector are also used on a consultative basis, especially in sensitive and expensive matters. One recent example is the extensive use of civilian consulting and accounting firms to provide external quality control of the procurement programme for new combat aircraft (Norwegian MoD 2012).

While a host of institutions and actors outside of the MoD contribute in important ways to the LTDP planning process, the Ministry remains firmly in charge of the end result. The increased concentration of power within the ministry has been a major trend in Norwegian LTDP in the last decade. Because the continuous system of LTDP increases the possibility of political initiative, it is likely that this trend will continue and increase in the future.

PROCESS

The continuous system of LTDP adopted by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence is not widely understood outside of, or even within, the Ministry. While the continuous system of LTDP has been touted as a major innovation in the field of strategic planning, the current practice does not appear, to an outside observer, to differ significantly from the old system. Since 2008, the Ministry has been gradually implementing the continuous approach, and in March 2012, the first major product of the new approach was submitted to Parliament as an official government proposal (Norwegian MoD 2012). Paradoxically, this document, and the process which produced it, looks rather similar to the old quadrennial long-term plans. However, there are some crucial differences that become apparent with closer scrutiny. In order to highlight these differences, it is necessary to carry out a brief cursory comparison of the old and the new systems.

THE OLD FOUR-YEAR CYCLE

The new continuous planning system is best explained as a reaction to the restraints imposed by the cyclical approach to LTDP which characterised Norwegian long-term defence planning until 2008 (Norwegian MoD 2008). The previous long-term defence planning system, in particular during the most intense reform period from 1999 to 2012, was built on a four-year cycle. Every fourth year, the Ministry submitted a new plan for parliamentary approval, which, when approved, primarily had a four-year time-frame (although elements of the plans had much longer perspectives). These plans were produced in a sequence of three steps.

The first step was a comprehensive document (variously known as a “recommendation”, “study” or “advice”) from the Chief of Defence in his capacity as military advisor to the government. This work was done outside of the Ministry, either by the Defence Command until it was closed in 2003, or by a temporary project organisation, as in the case of the CHOD’s *Defence Study* of 2007 (Hermansen 2012 [interview]; Røksund 2012 [interview]). The second step took place within the MoD, where the CHOD’s recommendations were processed and the actual long-term plan was written. This plan was then forwarded to Parliament as the government’s official long-term defence plan proposition for the next four-year term. The third step was parliamentary debate and approval of the government’s proposition. The degree to which the final long-term plans were altered by their passage through Parliament varied.

These long-term plans outlined strategic challenges, established the main tasks of the Armed Forces and set up a detailed plan for the development and funding of the defence structure throughout the coming four-year term. In the four-year plans all major and minor processes and decisions were worked out as elements of a complete “package”. Once approved by Parliament, the plan became the benchmark for the coming four-year period, and the possibilities for altering its contents or implementation were, in theory, small.

For a number of reasons, this process was seen as unsatisfactory. The main disadvantages were perceived to be the rigidity and short-sightedness of the four-year cycle, a lack of opportunity for political involvement at the ministerial level and the ad hoc nature of the organisations involved (Hermansen 2011). The reform was a joint initiative from the MoD’s Fourth Department of Defence Policy and Long-term Planning and the then Minister of Defence (Røksund 2012 [interview]).

First, important actors within the Ministry perceived the four-year cycle as a strait-jacket which sometimes forced decisions to be made prematurely, or to be postponed unnecessarily. Second, the fixed nature of the timeframes were also perceived as a hindrance to political involvement, as a new government or Defence Minister wanting to revise aspects of policy might be obliged to wait for several years while the sequential process ran its course. Third, the comprehensive nature of the four-year plans implied that the whole structure of the Armed Forces was up for revision every fourth year. This,

understandably, led to insecurity within the organisation, and also to unwise investment decisions. The fact that any decision would be reconsidered in four years meant that the implementation of unpopular decisions (such as closure of installations or decommissioning of units) might be obstructed until the next revision. This further decreased the latitude for central control and strategic direction (Skogrand 2012 [interview]; Hermansen 2012 [interview]). Fourth, in the cyclical system, long-term planning was carried out in short, intense spasms by temporary project organisations, often separated from the regular organisation in both the ministry and the Armed Forces at large, which might view the resulting plans as unpleasant surprises in which they had little say. Lastly, the rather heavy-going process demanded a lot of resources and was a heavy drain of manpower, money and time.

THE NEW CONTINUUM

The basic principle of the continuous LTDP system is that decisions should be needs-driven, as opposed to time-driven. Rather than having to wait for an arbitrary time limit (when all decisions have to come as part of one complete package), separate planning decisions, for instance, the procurement of new submarines or a revision of the officer education system, should be assessed individually and decisions made when necessary. This required a break from the rigid cycle of comprehensive quadrennial reviews. The desired outcome was a more fluid and flexible process, which could be carried out continuously by a leaner, permanent organisation, and with greater involvement from the military organisation at large.

Long-term planning would thus be broken up into smaller or larger distinct processes, and the separate decisions would not simply be valid until the next long-term plan, but for much longer timespans. These sub-processes would to some extent be miniatures of the larger planning process: they would include military advice, contributions from research institutions, units and other relevant agencies, but they would not need to be linked to a predetermined schedule. Rather, the timeframes would depend on the demands of the particular subject. In order for this process to be continuous, long-term planning could not depend on temporary organisations, but had to have a permanent presence within the Ministry (Hermansen 2011).

The continuous system, as originally conceived, included the idea of doing away with the previous regular, comprehensive long-term plan documents, and publishing plans on selected topics as necessary. It has since become clear that some form of overall long-term plan will still be needed. While the new system in principle allows the MoD to produce and present long-term plans on any subset of defence policy at any time they would like for parliamentary approval, there is also a clear expectation on the part of Parliament that a comprehensive defence policy document will be submitted within each four-year parliamentary session (Hermansen 2012 [interview]). In effect, this means that

the Ministry is still obliged to produce something not too unlike the old long-term plans more or less every fourth year (Skogrand 2012 [interview]).


The current Norwegian LTDP system can therefore be seen as a compromise between the old and the new. It introduces elements of flexibility and continuity, which softens up the rigour of the previous cycle. The foundation of Norwegian LTDP is still a comprehensive long-term plan, produced every four years. The recently submitted Prop 73 S (Norwegian MoD 2012), while supposed to be the flagship of the new way of LTDP, has a stated four-year scope, came four years after the last one, and its production followed the same main steps as the last three long-term plans: first, CHOD's recommendation, then, Ministry proposal and finally, parliamentary approval. However, this plan is not as comprehensive as the previous plans, and some subjects are given only cursory examination, while other elements are reserved for later treatment. The MoD has made it clear that important new plan elements will be introduced during the next few years.

CONCLUSION

The scope for political initiative and influence has increased with the introduction of the new system, which appears to give greater influence to the Fourth Department. However, it is not clear to what extent the military organisation, Parliament, and the public have acknowledged the main implication of the continuous system, namely that the long-term plans are less binding than before. It still remains to be seen how they will react when new, and possibly controversial, policy initiatives are introduced outside the accustomed schedule.

Whether the continuous LTDP system represents a true departure from the cyclical system is still up for debate. The system as practised now appears to be an adaptation of the old system, with some significant new elements. The new long-term plan, Prop 73 S, while representing a step in this direction, does not usher in a brave new world of continuous LTDP to the extent that its advocates might have wished. The differences that do exist between the old and the new systems are primarily to be found in the specifics of the process and the organisation. These differences are not insignificant, but it might well be argued that they are more like differences of degree, than of kind. However, these differences give rise to some new features. The most important result of the reform of the Norwegian LTDP system is that the increased opportunity for political and departmental initiative and control, aided by the permanent planning organisation, offers the opportunity for launching major policy initiatives at any time. This is no small adjustment, but not necessarily a revolution. Its full implications are not yet apparent.

Norway



LONG-TERM DEFENCE PLANNING IN NORWAY

- Long-term defence planning is centralised within the integrated Ministry of Defence, with the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Defence (CHOD) as the main actors. One of the four departments in the MoD, (the Fourth Department for Defence Policy and Long-term Planning) is dedicated to LTDP.
- In 2008, the Ministry of Defence changed the long-term planning system from a four-year cycle to a system of continuous planning.
- The continuous system implies that plans and policy decisions are made when necessary, rather than in accordance with a predetermined time schedule. The planning process is thus broken up into separate, parallel sub-plans.
- While Parliament-approved, quadrennial long-term plans still are the backbone of Norwegian LTDP, the new system allows for major decisions and adjustments to the route outside of the fixed, cyclical, four-year schedule.
- The capacity to constantly produce long-term plans is now a permanent feature of the MoD's organisation. Previously, this capacity depended on large, temporary ad hoc project organisations.

Sweden: Separation of powers

The most prominent feature of the Swedish system of long-term defence planning is the clear separation of the political and the military, both when it comes to organisation and process. This is a result of the Swedish system of government, which requires a clear separation between the political and the administrative levels. The political and the military parts of the process run independently of each other, but are connected through formalised links, mainly in the form of input from the military leadership to the political process, and of instructions and directions from the Cabinet to the military leadership.

Sweden has a long-standing tradition of non-alignment and neutrality. During the Cold War Swedish neutrality was rather West-leaning and the country was heavily armed, with a large reserve army, powerful air force and strong indigenous arms industry. After the Cold War, Sweden (like Finland) remained outside NATO, but has been an active participant in the Partnership for Peace programmes, and has contributed significant forces to operations with NATO forces in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Also like Finland, Sweden has been a supporter of the European Union efforts to create a common military capacity.

Like Norway, Sweden has moved away from the mobilisation-based territorial defence concept that Finland still retains. Several reductions and reforms have been conducted since the mid-1990s, drastically reducing the wartime forces and (to a lesser but still significant degree) peacetime establishment. In 2009, a new major reform was initiated, with the aim of completing the transition to a flexible, modern and professional force that is able to operate with international partners, including Nordic, EU and NATO forces, by 2019. Reforms include abandoning conscription and introducing an all-volunteer professional force, requiring an overhaul of most of the defence apparatus and its support structures. The chances of successfully completing this ambitious reform are improved by the fact that Sweden has not been too badly affected by the present

financial crisis. Hence, Sweden's Armed Forces do not face the acute crisis that trouble its counterparts in Finland and the Netherlands. Nonetheless, the steadily diminishing purchasing power of the defence budget remains a major source of concern in military circles.

ORGANISATION

The primary actors and institutions involved in Swedish long-term planning are clearly divided into two groups: the political and the military. On the political side, there are several actors, most notably the Cabinet, the Ministry of Defence and Parliament. On the military side, there is really only one actor – the Chief of Defence – in Sweden known as the Supreme Commander, with the Armed Forces Headquarters under his command.

At the heart of the Swedish system of government lies the clear separation of the political and the administrative levels. For our purposes, the political level consists of the Cabinet and the ministries. The administrative level consists of the government agencies (*myndigheterna*, also known as central government authorities), which are semi-autonomous entities with limited spheres of responsibility, within which they are highly independent. Examples of these are the tax agency, the police and the Armed Forces. The constitution prohibits cabinet ministers from intervening directly in the day-to-day operations of these agencies. Political control of the government agencies is held by the Cabinet collectively, and is conducted through laws, budgetary appropriations and formal directives and ordinances (Heidar 2008b, 61). Consequently, the heads of the government agencies (such as the Supreme Commander) tend to be major actors within their spheres of authority.

Because of this constitutional separation, the integrated model of defence leadership, as practiced in Norway and the Netherlands, is not likely to be an option for the Swedish Armed Forces (Modigs 2012 [interview]). Even a system similar to the Finnish model, with its physical co-location of the institutionally separate Ministry of Defence and Defence Command, and a large degree of personnel interchange and contact through formal and informal channels, would be in danger of violating long-standing constitutional principles in Sweden.

MAIN POLITICAL ACTORS

Cabinet

In principle, the Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, can only direct the government authorities by collective decisions through formal channels. It is the Cabinet as a body that is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, a position relinquished by the King after the constitutional reforms in 1975. Much of the authority is delegated to the Supreme Commander, but ultimately it is the Cabinet collectively who decide Swedish defence policy. The Minister of Defence, like other Swedish ministers, has a restricted role, especially compared to his Danish and Norwegian counterparts. Formally, the minister

is merely the head of the Ministry and the Cabinet member tasked with supervising the activities of the various government agencies under the Ministry of Defence. In practice, the Minister has a large say in decisions on defence matters made by the collective Cabinet, depending to some degree on the composition of the Cabinet and the personalities therein.

More specifically, the Cabinet has a variety of means available for guiding the activities of the Armed Forces. On the one hand, there is the clear system of Defence Bills (*Forsvarsbeslut*, literally, defence decisions), the budgets and laws, which require parliamentary approval. On the other hand, there is a variety of channels through which Cabinet can unilaterally (though collectively) instruct the Supreme Commander, such as ordinances and letters of regulation. Many of these documents are also significant in long-term defence planning.

Ministry of Defence

The Swedish Ministry of Defence is small compared with many of its Nordic and international equivalents, and it is positively dwarfed by the Armed Forces Headquarters. The MoD functions as an executive office for the Minister of Defence, issuing, implementing and following up the variety of formal policy guidelines through which the Armed Forces receive its political direction. It is responsible for formulating the Defence Bills which, when approved by Parliament, are the main means of political guidance and a primary vehicle of long-term defence planning. The Ministry's staff is almost entirely civilian, and given its limited capacity and the principle of ministerial non-involvement, the Ministry is dependent on the Armed Forces Headquarters for input when producing policy documents (Berg 2012 [interview]). However, the Ministry's role in long-term defence planning, particularly drafting the Defence Bills, give it significant influence on the process.

Parliament

As is to be expected, Parliament's primary role is supervision. The government's Defence Bills only come into effect when approved by Parliament. But in addition, the Parliament's Defence Committee has a role in the formulation of the Defence Bills. Prior to the introduction of a parliamentary Defence Bill by the Cabinet, the parliamentary committee on defence produces an advisory preparation study (*Forsvarsberedning*), which is forwarded to the MoD and forms the basis for the Defence Bills. Like the Ministry of Defence, the committee depends on the Headquarters for information and input to its defence study. In this institutionalised role, the Parliament's Defence Committee plays a role similar to the intermittent defence commissions found in other countries, but on a regular and more institutionalised basis.

MAIN MILITARY ACTORS

The Swedish Armed Forces are the largest of the eight government agencies under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. The others include important institutions like the

Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Defence Material Administration and the Coast Guard (Government Offices of Sweden 2012). However, the Armed Forces, and in particular the Armed Forces Headquarters, are the dominant military institution with regards to long-term planning, and so, the Armed Forces will be the focus of our attention here.

The Armed Forces Headquarters is located in central Stockholm, but is institutionally and physically separated from its political master, the Ministry of Defence. While to a degree comparable in function to the Danish and Finnish Defence Commands, it is large by Nordic standards, with close to 1100 employees, two-thirds of them career officers (Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters 2012). This is partly explained by the fact that the leadership of the Swedish Armed Forces is highly centralised, and the Headquarters is general staff, administrative hub and operational command in one. Due to the organisation of the Swedish government, it contains several functions usually found in the Defence Ministries of other countries, such as responsibility for security policy analysis (Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters 2012). Also, it contains several military functions which are usually located elsewhere in the other Nordic countries, such as the intelligence service and the operational command (Modigs 2012 [interview]).

The Headquarters is the repository of professional military knowledge and expertise, and the Ministry, with its more limited capacity, is highly dependent on the Headquarters for information in military matters. For the purposes of this study, the size and strength of the Headquarters relative to the Ministry of Defence is significant; it seems reasonable to infer that the much greater staff capacity of the Headquarters, and its monopoly on professional military competence give it a greater potential for influence than for instance its Danish counterpart.

The Swedish Chief of Defence is known as the Supreme Commander. A four-star general or admiral, he is head of the Armed Forces, chief military advisor to the Cabinet and has the Armed Forces Headquarters as his executive instrument. As reflected in his title, much of the Cabinet's formal authority as collective commander in chief has been delegated to the Supreme Commander. Formally, the Supreme Commander is the point of contact between the military establishment and their political masters (Berg 2012 [interview]). As head of a government agency, he is powerful within his own sphere of competence. However, his ability to influence national defence and security policy, and the development of the Armed Forces as laid down in the Defence Bills, is more limited.

When it comes to long-term defence planning, there are two units within the Headquarters that stand out. These are the Policy and Plans department and the Plans and Finance Department. Both are part of the central management staff of the Headquarters, the central executive and secretariat of the Supreme Commander (Berg 2012 [interview]).

The Policy and Plans Department is responsible for the long-term strategic outlook, concentrating on the military-strategic level, and typically looking 10–20 years ahead. It produces or is involved in producing documents including the perspective studies and

the directive FMSI (the Strategic Direction of the Armed Forces). It is involved in contributing input on strategic developments to the Ministry of Defence and Parliament, particularly in relation to the main political documents guiding long-term defence planning, the parliamentary advisory study and the Defence Bills (Modigs 2012 [interview]). The Plans and Finance Department deals with the Armed Forces Development Plans (FMUP), ten-year plans that form the mainstay of medium-term planning and implementation of the overall defence policies (Berg 2012 [interview]).

SECONDARY ACTORS

The military side of the long-term defence planning process is centralised in the Headquarters. The services and other military agencies provide some input at lower levels, but the Headquarters itself has the capacity to do most of the planning work. Here, the Swedish system differs from the Norwegian one, in which the quite small integrated ministry, as well as the Chief of Defence, depend on service staff and other agencies for much of the substance and details of its long-term plans. When it comes to the Swedish Defence Research Agency, however, we find similarities with the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. It contributes heavily to the activities of the Headquarters, providing scientific advice and expertise on a host of subjects, supporting the Plans and Policy and the Plans and Finance departments of the Headquarters by providing reports, advice and personnel (Modigs 2012 [interview]). But to a greater extent than its Norwegian counterpart, the Swedish Defence Research Agency's role is clearly supporting. All in all, the limited number and influence of supporting actors highlights the centralised tendency of the management of the Swedish Armed Forces.

PROCESS

Swedish long-term defence planning consists of two parallel processes, one political, the other military, which progress at different paces, but are connected through formalised links. The political process revolves around the Cabinet-initiated, Parliament-approved Defence Bills. The Cabinet can initiate such a process at any time, but the norm has been intervals of between 3 and 5 years. They mostly apply to the immediate four-year period, but also set parameters for future instalments. Carried out almost exclusively within the Armed Forces Headquarters, the military process is highly regular, with a continuously updated 10-year development plan as the foundation, embedded within a strategic outlook document with an even longer timeframe. The cycle of long-term plans within the Armed Forces runs independently of the political processes, but naturally the Defence Bills can require major adjustments to be made to the ten-year plans.

THE POLITICAL PROCESS

The most important documents in Swedish long-term defence plan are the parliamentary Defence Bills. These are formulated in a political process primarily involving the

Cabinet, the Ministry of Defence, and Parliament. A Defence Bill (*forsvarsbeslut*, literally defence decision) is a Cabinet proposition to Parliament dealing comprehensively with the development of defence policy and force development in the coming 3–5 year period. In composition they are quite similar to the former quadrennial Norwegian long-term plans. In producing this document, Parliament plays a larger role than in the other countries included in this study. The parliamentary Defence Committee produces the advisory document, the Defence Preparations, which is forwarded to the Ministry of Defence and forms an important part of the foundation for the Defence Bills. Both the preparatory study and the bill itself rely on the Armed Forces Headquarters as the source of much of their information.

The Defence Bill is prepared in the Ministry of Defence and submitted to Parliament as the Cabinet's collective recommendation. After debate, alteration and eventual approval, it becomes the main source of policy guidance for the Armed Forces. Its more detailed prescriptions are formally implemented through ordinances and the annual letters of regulation from the Cabinet to the Supreme Commander. In addition, there are the annual defence budgets.

THE MILITARY PROCESS

The military process is comprehensive, thorough and conscientious, emphasising regularity, accountability and predictability. The two primary documents are the Armed Forces Development Plan and the document known as the Armed Forces Strategic Direction. The former has a ten-year scope and details the concrete implementation of current government policy. It is made and continually updated in the Plans and Finance Department in the Headquarters, and also incorporates budget estimates for the coming three-year period. The Strategic Direction document is the product of the Policy and Plans Department, and acts as the main guiding document for military-strategic considerations.

Another feature of the military long-term planning process is the long timeframes. The medium-term Armed Forces Development Plans have a ten-year perspective, while the Armed Forces Strategic Direction looks beyond this. They are also fairly detailed, and elaborated in regular processes in which a host of detailed supporting documents are produced in regular cycles. The support documents then act as the foundation for different aspects of the main documents, building "brick upon brick" until the cycle and the document is complete. In this fashion, the plans become very detailed and comprehensive. While in most countries the military side of long-term planning usually (and necessarily) incorporates views up to 20 or 30 years, the Swedish system has a structured way of approaching planning beyond a ten-year perspective.

INTERACTION

Interestingly, the two parallel processes move forward at different paces and are not synchronised. This allows for the possibility that major new policy may arrive at any point in the ten-year cycle which is used for medium-term military process (Berg 2012 [inter-

view]). As the military level is usually informed of any upcoming policy changes well in advance, this need not be a big problem, but major reforms can come rather abruptly, as was the case with the discarding of national service and introduction of an all-volunteer recruitment system in 2009. Also, the long lifetime of the key documents makes them both a major source of the debate and ultimately the result of the major decisions of the Defence Bill deliberations.

The apparent power of the military professionals, in particular the Supreme Commander, can be deceptive. While they are very significant within the Armed Forces, this does not necessarily translate into influence on the political process. The past few decades have shown an increasing trend towards attempts from the political level to ensure control of the decisions of government agencies, including the Armed Forces. With the high level of detail in the instructions in the end-of-year regulatory letters from the Cabinet, it appears that the Cabinet is pushing the envelope with regards to the autonomy of the Armed Forces as a government agency. This has also been the case with the current defence reform, which was primarily politically instigated in the current Defence Bill of 2009. While building on the recommendations of the Supreme Commander as delivered to the parliamentary committee and the Cabinet, it went further, in a shorter time, than many in the military establishment found comfortable. This seems to have stemmed in part from politicians' impatience with what was perceived as the slow pace of reform in the Armed Forces and its unwillingness to take political hints. Some military professionals have feared that the political expectations of quick results in the reform of such a large, complex and busy organization might be too high (Modigs 2012 [interview]). It remains to be seen whether the current reform will resolve these differences.


CONCLUSION

Compared to Norway and Denmark, the military part of the Swedish long-term planning system appears to be systematic and complicated, bordering on the cumbersome and inflexible. Conversely, it seems to encourage the advantages of thoroughness, reliability and accountability. Here, as we shall see in the next chapter, we find similarities with elements of the Finnish system. However, Finnish long-term planning fits rather neatly with the stable and predictable Finnish defence policy and so the restrictive order is not much of a problem. In the case of Sweden, it could be argued that there is something of a mismatch between the long-term defence planning system as currently conceived and the ambitious reform policy initiated by the current government, which seems to call for a greater degree of flexibility.

The Swedish long-term defence planning system is an interesting case which supports the notion that each country's long-term defence planning systems are to a large degree shaped by national political conditions, norms and structures. The political process in itself is not very different from what can be found in Norway and (as we shall see) Finland and the Netherlands, and the military process has clear similarities with Finland.

However, the constitutionally determined separation of the two processes defines Swedish long-term defence planning and sets Sweden apart from its Nordic cousins.

Sweden



LONG-TERM DEFENCE PLANNING IN SWEDEN

- Swedish long-term defence planning is highly influenced by the Swedish system of government, which demands a clear separation between the political level (the Cabinet and Ministry) and the administrative level (the government agencies, of which the Armed Forces is one). Direct intervention by ministers into the details of public management is prohibited by the constitution. Consequently, most ministries are small, and the autonomous government agencies are, traditionally, very influential within their sphere.
- Long-term defence planning takes place in two separate, parallel processes, a political and a military one. They run at different paces and are connected through formal links.
- The main policy guidance documents are the Defence Bills (*Försvarsbeslut*), which are passed by Parliament at irregular intervals of 3–5 years. The last bill, which prompted the current major defence reform, was passed in 2009, and a new one is projected for 2014.

Finland:

A different case

Finland is different. Its strategic outlook, defence posture and the composition of its Armed Forces have major differences to all the other countries in this study. Finland's Armed Forces have not undergone the kind of far-reaching transformation which has been the main trend in the other Nordic countries and most of continental Europe in the past two decades. The primary characteristics of Finnish defence and security policy since the end of the Cold War have been continuity and consistency.

As in the other states, Finland's national institutions, political customs and administrative traditions shape the policies and procedures which guide planning in the defence sector. However, with regard to capability planning and development, the Finnish military establishment (particularly the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Command) has taken steps to align its planning procedures with international partners, within the frameworks of NORDEFECO and NATO's partnership for peace programme (Ojala 2012 [interview]; Hirvonen 2012 [interview]).

Strategically, Russia remains the overshadowing concern in Finnish security policy, and Finnish officials are unusually clear and outspoken about this (Saxi 2011, 33). Detering, and if necessary defeating, possible (if at present unlikely) Russian military aggression is the dominant focus. In what the Finns term the "one-track-policy", the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) use and develop the same military capabilities to complete the three main tasks of the Armed Forces. The primary task is national defence, followed by support to civil authorities and international crisis management (Hirvonen 2012 [interview]; Saxi 2011, 33). To this end, Finland has maintained a large, balanced national defence force, based on general (male) conscription and the possibility of rapidly mobilising several hundred thousand reservists in wartime (Finnish MoD 2011, 10-14). However, for the last few years it has been clear that the structure of the Finnish Defence

Forces is no longer sustainable, and a comprehensive defence reform was launched in February 2012.

This clear prioritisation has given Finnish defence policy (and long-term defence planning) a direction and consistency of purpose not found among the other countries in this study. The stability of security and defence policy appears to have given Finnish long-term defence planning a greater aspect of “calculation from known variables” than is found elsewhere, and allows for planning within longer timeframes than usual.

ORGANISATION

Due to its governmental system and the organisation of the military leadership, Finland has more institutions involved at the higher levels of long-term defence planning than most of the other states studied. In addition to the usual actors of government, defence ministry and Parliament, Finland has an independent military staff, the Defence Command and a President, both of whom have significant influence in military matters. The strength of these two actors means that, while the Finnish government and the Ministry of Defence naturally have a very important role in defence planning, they are not as dominant as in other states, for instance, Norway or the Netherlands.

In addition, some of the documents guiding defence planning and management encompass the whole of Finnish society in its total-defence concept. Consequently, the policy-making level of long-term defence planning includes other ministries and government agencies to a much larger degree than in most other states in this study, further adding to the number of actors involved. This chapter will concentrate on the defence sector and not delve into the details of society-wide total defence planning.

MAIN ACTORS

Notwithstanding the somewhat greater complexity at the top of the Finnish long-term defence planning landscape, the system as a whole follows the usual scheme of overall policy and resource guidelines from the political level, concretisation and implementation by military professionals, and approval, budgetary control and overall supervision by Parliament.

Traditionally, the executive branch of government has been dominant in defence policy decision making in Finland (Gilberg 1985, 52). The President of the Republic of Finland, as head of state and Supreme Commander of the Finnish Defence Forces, still retains a significant influence over security and defence policy. The President's authority in defence matters is particularly tied to the exercise of power during national emergencies, but the President is also regularly involved in setting the overall goals and direction of defence policy. Policy directives do not come directly from the President's office, but the President's will is implemented through several channels, most notably through governmental declarations, of which more below (Ojala 2012 [interview]). Also, the influential Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, which consists of the

key ministers, convenes meetings with the President. This involvement from the head of state sets Finland, along with France, apart from the other states in this study. In the constitutional monarchies, the heads of state might (as in Norway, Denmark and the UK) or might not (as in the Netherlands and Sweden) have a symbolic role as heads of the Armed Forces, but little real influence.

The Council of State (Cabinet), led by the Prime Minister, shares executive powers with the President. A government's defence policy is initially set out in the governmental declaration at the forming of a new Cabinet. Two of the three main political guidance documents that are central to long-term planning, are published by the Prime Minister's office. These are the *Government Report on Security and Defence Policy* and the *Security Strategy for Society* documents.

The Ministry of Defence is the government ministry responsible for translating overall defence policy into more concrete policy guidelines for the military organisation. The Ministry is predominately civilian, and quite small, with about 150 employees. Within the Ministry, long-term defence planning is the responsibility of the Defence Policy Department, in particular its Strategic Planning Unit, a small outfit with a permanent staff of five (Vilén 2012 [interview]). With the assistance of the rest of the department as well as Defence Command representatives, this unit coordinates the formulation of the *Ministry of Defence Strategy*, the most important document for guiding defence policy in the long term.

The translation of political guidelines into concrete plans for developing military capabilities is the responsibility of the Defence Command. Led by the Chief of Defence, this predominately military institution has some 300 employees, and a greater planning capacity than the Ministry of Defence. The Defence Command is involved on a consultative basis early in the political parts of the process, and works closely with the MoD when the guiding political documents are produced. While the Ministry and the Defence Command are separate institutions with different (albeit sometimes overlapping) roles in the planning process, they work closely together (Ojala 2012 [interview]; Hirvonen 2012 [interview]). This is facilitated by their co-location in the same building complex in central Helsinki, and a large degree of personnel exchange.

Parliament is involved primarily in the roles of approval, overall supervision and budgetary allocation. The Finnish public takes an interest in military issues, and the defence committee in Parliament often involves itself in debates on the subject. In the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the current defence reform, a special parliamentary committee has been established to oversee the process, but its role is restricted to observation and advice (Hirvonen 2012 [interview]). The MoD is currently looking into reforms that might increase the scope for parliamentary involvement in defence policy making. Traditionally, Parliament has been less influential than both the executive branch and the military establishment (Ojala 2012 [interview]).

SECONDARY ACTORS

Other Ministries are also quite heavily involved, most notably the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior, particularly when it comes to the parts of defence policy that encompass Finnish society as a whole. Most other sectors of society are involved at some level in the total defence planning, but the fact that only the defence sector plans ahead for as far as 20–30 years leads to difficulties in aligning the different components involved in such a society-encompassing strategy (Hirvonen 2012 [interview]).

When formulating the concrete plans for structure and capability development, the Defence Command relies on the service level of the military to provide detailed analysis and input, most notably from the heads of the three services, the Army, Navy and Air Force. The collaboration of these actors and other major elements of the military organisation has a very significant role and is viewed as essential in producing and implementing development plans in the short, medium and long term (Hirvonen 2012 [interview]).

The comparatively small size of the MoD, and especially the Strategic Planning Unit, requires a variety of research institutions and think tanks to provide a broad range of input to the MoD's strategic analysis. The MoD plans to increase their reliance on such institutions in the future, allowing the MoD to concentrate on more specific matters regarding security and defence (Ojala 2012 [interview]; Vilén 2012 [interview]).

PROCESS

The political actors, the Cabinet and the Ministry of Defence, decide on the “what” of long-term planning, namely what strategic tasks the Finnish Defence Forces should be able to accomplish in the long term, and what resources will be available. This is done primarily through the *Ministry of Defence Strategy* document, which is based on the governmental white paper on defence and the *Security Strategy for Society*. The *MoD Strategy* document has a 10- to 20-year perspective.

Based on this, the military actors, the Chief of Defence and the Defence Command, decide the “how”, that is what military capabilities are necessary to accomplish the goals set forth in the *MoD Strategy*. This is done in the Finnish Defence Forces' *Strategic Plan*, which includes the 20-year goals of the Armed Forces and, importantly, the *Capability Development Plan*, which details this in a 12 year perspective. The FDF's *Strategic Plan* is presented to the President as the Supreme Commander (Hirvonen 2012 [interview]). It should also be noted that these long timeframes are a distinguishing feature of Finnish long-term defence planning (Ojala 2012 [interview]; Hirvonen 2012 [interview]).

THE “WHAT” OF LONG-TERM PLANNING: POLITICS AND POLICY

The starting point of Finnish defence planning is the government programme issued by an incoming Cabinet, which outlines the new government's security and defence policy in very broad strokes. The programme is soon expanded to become the main political

document for political guidance of Finnish defence planning: the *Government report on Security and Defence Policy* (hereafter, the white paper). New white papers are issued approximately every four years, and have a eight- to ten-year outlook. Although issued by the Prime Minister's office, key ministries (Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior) as well as Parliament are heavily involved in its formulation. This serves to build a strong political consensus around the main features of security and defence policy, which is seen as vital (Ojala 2012 [interview]; Vilén 2012 [interview]).

The white paper forms the basis for the two other political guidance documents in Finnish LTDP. The government's *Security Strategy for Society* deals with a broad spectre of threats to the stability and security of Finnish society and its citizens in a total-defence perspective. It lays out the principles for unified crisis management across different sectors, and integrates military readiness with political, economic and mental preparedness (Finnish MoD 2010). The other document formulated on the basis of the governmental white paper is the *Ministry of Defence Strategy*. This is arguably the most important document for policy guidance of the LTDP process. Based on the political guidance found in the white paper, the *MoD Strategy* employs a much longer outlook, up to 20 years. Written in the MoD under the supervision of the Strategic Planning Unit, it outlines the main tasks of the FDF and the main lines of its future development, still on a rather general level. The *MoD Strategy* defines the desired end state of the FDF 20 years in to the future, and serves as a rough "road map" of how to get there (Ojala 2012 [interview]). This desired end state forms the basis for the planning done by the military professionals in the Defence Command (Ojala 2012 [interview]).

THE "HOW": CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

The translation of the overall defence policy and the general, long-term guidelines found in the three documents outlined above is the responsibility of the Defence Command. At this stage, policy guidelines and financial frameworks are turned into concrete plans for the development of the Finnish Defence Forces. Based on the desired end state outlined in the *MoD Strategy*, the Defence Command develops its own strategic plan, which includes the capability development plans. Within the Defence Command, it is the Section for Strategic Planning which manages the process. As its starting point, this section (in close cooperation with the headquarters of the three military services) outlines the tasks that the FDF should be able to perform in order to achieve this end state in a 20 years perspective. This in turn determines the required combination of operational capabilities, which forms the basis for a 12 year capability development programme (as a road map to the desired end state). The 12 year (medium-term) programme is broken up further, into three four-year programmes. As the timeframes become shorter and shorter, the capabilities development programmes become progressively more definite and detailed. Specific areas under development are reviewed and assessed more or less continually, while the FDF's structure as a whole is reviewed in every four-year programme (Hirvonen 2012 [interview]).

THE DEFENCE REFORM

It has been clear for some time that the structure of the Finnish Defence Forces is no longer economically sustainable. By keeping a large, territorial defence force, similar to the ones abandoned by the Swedes and the Norwegians in the early 2000s, the Finnish Defence Forces have incurred escalating costs in personnel and infrastructure. A comprehensive downsizing of both the wartime and peacetime structure was on the horizon even before the financial crisis forced serious cuts in the public budgets (Hirvonen 2012 [interview]). The financial crisis has led to a deepening and quickening of the planned reform. In the current plan, the defence budget will be cut by about 10 per cent in the period up to 2015. Large cuts will be made to the wartime forces, which will be reduced from around 350,000 soldiers in 2011 to around 230,000 in 2015 (Chief of Defence, Finland 2012). The peacetime establishment of garrisons, bases and training facilities will also be reduced accordingly. However, the main themes of Finnish security and defence policy, its concern with Russia and emphasis on a balanced territorial defence force based on conscription and reserve units, will remain.


While the defence reform has had a major impact on the content of the long-term defence planning process, it has not affected its conduct significantly. The main effect on LTDP has been the postponement of the *White Paper on Defence* from the Katainen government, which took office in April 2011 (Hirvonen 2012 [interview]). At the time of writing, this document is still in production, and it remains to be seen whether it will differ from previous instalments. Overall, it seems highly likely that the main institutions and procedures of Finland's long-term defence planning system will remain in place.

CONCLUSION

With its large number of actors and guiding documents, Finnish LTDP appears rather complicated. It is also highly methodical. The regularity of the system, with its long-term perspectives and carefully integrated structure of overlapping cycles, along with the clear division of responsibility between the different institutions, create the impression that it runs like clockwork. It seems reasonable to suppose that both the stability and predictability of Finland's security policy, along with the clear priorities in capability development stemming from the "one-track-policy", have given Finnish LTDP this feature of calculation from known variables. If Denmark and the UK, with their more fluid and ad-hoc systems, are at one end of the scale, the systematic and regular Finnish approach appears to be at the other.

It is arguable that this kind of approach to planning provides stability and continuity, and allows planning to take place within timeframes that others consider so long as to be unusable. While it may lack some of the flexibility found in other systems, this does not appear to be much of a problem for the Finns, who consider other qualities to be more important. In this way, it appears that the Finnish system of long-term planning is well suited to Finland's defence policy in general.

Finland



LONG-TERM DEFENCE PLANNING IN FINLAND

- The Finnish LTDP system has many moving parts, both when it comes to the number of actors involved and the number of documents produced.
- Politically, both the President, and the Cabinet play a significant part in formulating overall guidance and policy.
- The upper leadership of the Finnish Defence Forces consists of the organisationally separated but physically co-located Ministry of Defence, and the Defence Command. The Chief of Defence and the Defence Command have a stronger and more independent role vis-à-vis the Ministry of Defence than is usual in the other countries studied, with the exception of Sweden.
- The timeframes of this comprehensive planning are long, up to 20-30 years. For medium-term capability development planning, a twelve-year timeframe consisting of three four-year cycles is used. The strong continuity and consistency of Finnish

security and defence policy has permitted this regular and systematic form of planning.

- Steps have been taken recently to enable elements of the LTDP system (especially at the level of military capability development) to integrate more closely with international partners, especially within the frameworks of NORDEFECO and NATO (Programmes for Peace). This trend is expected to continue in the future.

Denmark: Ongoing negotiation

Defence planning in Denmark is primarily carried out through parliamentary “defence agreements”, which are prepared in a negotiation process involving both government and opposition parties and address defence budgets, force structure and defence organisation. This chapter will focus on the negotiation process and the preparations for it.

Public administration and organisational culture in Denmark is often described as “negotiated” (Pedersen 2005). Policy is settled by negotiations between the parties involved, making it possible to reach a common understanding of problems and challenges, creating a solid basis for conflict resolution and development of policy solutions. In Denmark, negotiated solutions are made on long-term defence planning in parliamentary defence agreements (Forsvarsministeriet 2011). The defence agreements are best seen as the result of a negotiation process in which policymakers engage in deliberation on how to solve problems, challenges and threats relating to defence (Mosgaard 2012 [interview]).

In the last 10–15 years Danish defence planning has been highly influenced by the political ambition of being an active international actor. This “activism” has been the main driver in the transformation of the Danish Armed Forces (Heurlin 2004). Since the end of the Cold War, in the absence of a conventional threat to Danish territory, the Armed Forces have been subject to an extensive transformation from a traditional defence, based on mobilisation to a modern, professional and deployable force.

The policy of “activism” is often linked to the “footnote policy” of the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1988 an alternative parliamentary majority forced the government to adopt specific Danish positions in the NATO defence community on nuclear issues and in relation to arms control (Pierson 1996). In the aftermath of the Cold War, Danish politicians tried to remedy the damage done by the footnote policy by being internationally active. Consequently, in the 1990s “activism” became a way for Denmark to avoid

marginalisation in a unipolar world (Wivel 2005; Rasmussen 2005). It is not the objective of this chapter to explain this change in Danish foreign policy, although we do note that the change demanded a significant transformation of the Danish Armed Forces. Throughout the transformation process special emphasis was put on improving the ability to participate in extended international operations (Forsvarsforliget 2010).

In terms of current military power status, Denmark can be characterised as a small, allied and activist country (Sikkerhedspolitik reddegørelse 2011), and Danish membership of NATO is a cornerstone of Danish security and defence policy. Denmark's sovereignty is secured through NATO's Article 5, and furthermore the NATO membership provides a framework for Danish participation in international operations. Yet, this study shows that the membership of the alliance does not have a decisive impact when it comes to Danish long-term defence planning. Although a member of the European Union, Denmark has an opt-out clause concerning European defence policies.³ However, the recent Danish defence agreement states that Denmark must be able to participate in EU-led operations on territory outside the European Union (Forsvarsforliget 2010).

ORGANISATION

The organisation of long-term defence planning in Denmark is centralised around the tradition of making defence agreements through negotiations in Parliament (Forsvarsministeriet 2011). By law, the Minister of Defence is responsible for conducting defence planning but it has become political tradition to engage Parliament in these workings. Along with the rest of the government, the Minister of Defence prepares an initial draft for an agreement that can function as the basis for the negotiation process. In preparing this text the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Command and the operational commands play a supporting role in supplying analysis and figures. Danish long-term defence planning is therefore primarily organised around the parliamentary negotiation process, which is facilitated by the government, who include input from the Defence Command and the Ministry of Defence.

MAIN ACTORS

Long-term defence planning is the responsibility of the Minister of Defence. *Forsvarsloven* (Law on Defence) states that it is for the Minister of Defence to decide on the overall size and dimensions of the Danish Armed Forces.⁴ The law outlines the tasks and purposes of the Armed Forces, and the Minister of Defence must conduct defence planning in accordance with this. *Forsvarsloven* states that the Danish Armed Forces are to: prevent conflicts and war; preserve the sovereignty of Denmark; secure the continuing existence and integrity of an independent Denmark; and support a peaceful development in the world with respect to human rights (Forsvarsloven 2001). The Minister of Defence can only mobilise the Armed Forces for a reason not strictly connected to the defence of Danish territory with the support and consent of Parliament.⁵ Whilst the Danish Chief

of Defence is head of the Armed Forces, this command is under the responsibility of the Minister of Defence, and so, the Minister of Defence is technically the supreme authority.

Despite the Law of Defence clearly allocating responsibility and authority to the Minister of Defence, for the last 25 years the tradition has been for LTDP to be a negotiated process, through parliamentary “defence agreements” (Lentfer 2012 [interview]). The agreements are multi-year (most often covering five years) and supported by a wide parliamentary majority including opposition parties. The current defence agreement covers the years 2010–2014, and was signed by seven of the eight parties represented in Parliament (Forsvarsforliget 2010).

Before parliamentary negotiations, and in cooperation with other ministers (most often the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance and Minister of Foreign Affairs) the Minister of Defence prepares a proposal that can be presented to the parties in Parliament. The proposal is discussed in government committees and finally the Minister of Defence is given a mandate to formally initiate the negotiations (Lentfer 2012 [interview]). Thus, the minister is free to negotiate with the other parties and does not need to keep the Prime Minister and the rest of the government continually informed of developments in the negotiations. The Minister of Defence is in charge of the negotiations and the involvement of other ministers will most likely be at the invitation of the Minister of Defence.

SECONDARY ACTORS

The Defence Command and the Ministry of Defence are engaged in the planning process before the negotiations begin, as they are involved in preparing the Minister of Defence (Mosgaard 2012 [interview]). On their own initiative, or requested by the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Command carries out analysis on future military challenges and needs. These only address military issues, and do not touch upon financial or foreign policy related questions (Lentfer 2012 [interview]). However, internally the Defence Command do attempt to recognise the political and financial context by incorporating the political and financial constraints in the analysis. Analysis is also produced in the operational command of the Army, Navy and Air Force. These are reported to the Defence Command who, after some editorial work, send them on to the Ministry of Defence.

Prior to the negotiation process the Ministry of Defence helps the Minister of Defence and the government to prepare the initial draft for an agreement (Jensen 2012 [interview]). In order to do this, the MoD is in a continuous dialogue with the Defence Command, collecting input and advice. While preparing the draft, the government will ask the Ministry of Defence to do analysis based on government priorities and intentions, which is then shared with the Defence Command (Lentfer 2012 [interview]). During this process, struggles occur between the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Command, concerning military professionalism and to the issue of which of the two bodies is

responsible for giving military advice to the minister. The military personnel employed in the Ministry give military advice, thus moving into the domain of the Defence Command and the operational commands.

Besides the defence agreements, long-term defence planning in Denmark has also been conducted in “defence commissions”. These have typically been established in relation to major strategic changes or changing political systems. Recent defence commissions took place in 1988, 1997 and 2008.⁶ The most recent defence commissions have included a broad range of participants including scholars, military professionals, civil servants and politicians. Historically, the defence commissions have gathered and summarised already established interpretations and analysis, and to a lesser extent produced new input to Danish defence planning (Heurlin 2004). The chapter will therefore focus on the parliamentary defence agreements.

PROCESS

The defence planning process in Denmark is dominated by the negotiations in Parliament. In general terms the process is best described as a political melting pot in which the parties involved try to reach an agreement through negotiations (Lentfer 2012 [interview]). This means that the process is not set in fixed structures and is difficult to map precisely. Instead the process is best described chronologically, thus avoiding the risk of emphasising the influence of structures and institutions.

Most often the defence agreements cover a five-year period. During the early years the actors involved are preoccupied with implementation and during the later years they are focused upon preparing the new agreement. Within the five year timespan two overall processes can be identified besides the implementation process: first, the research of the Defence Command and the Ministry of Defence in preparing the Minister of Defence and the government for the negotiation process, and second, the political process, in which the government and the opposition parties engage in negotiations on a defence agreement (Mosgaard 2012 [interview]; Lentfer 2012 [interview]).

The process of preparing the defence agreement commences around two or three years before the next defence agreement is due to be in place. At this point, the Defence Command independently initiates a range of studies that can function as input in the government’s initial drafting of a proposal before the negotiations. Information and analysis is collected by the Defence Command from the operational commands and from the other parts of the military that are not part of the Ministry of Defence. This analysis does not contain financial considerations. This omission is based upon an appreciation that it is for the members of Parliament to decide on the financial elements and prioritise between different elements. However, the inputs delivered by the Defence Command are made while taking into account current and future financial circumstances. Thus, financial considerations are implicitly included in the analysis by the Defence Command (Lentfer 2012 [interview]).

In the third and fourth year of the agreement the Ministry of Defence takes a more active role in the gathering of information and analysis, reducing the influence of the Defence Command. In a continuous process, partly controlled by the demands of the government and the Minister of Defence, the Ministry of Defence asks of the Defence Command to contribute on key issues. These are then collated by the Ministry who pass them on to the relevant persons and bodies in the government and in other ministries. Hence, the process is inclusive across government and across ministries, although in an informal manner (Lentfer 2012 [interview]). At this stage the process is centralised around the preparation of a draft for an agreement that can function as a basis for the forthcoming negotiation process. Key ministers (often the Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence) discuss and prepare the text in government committees, thus including non-military considerations. Consequently, the draft includes input from a wide range of fields, including the financial, military and diplomatic. When the draft is accepted by the two major government committees (the coordination committee and the financial committee) the Minister of Defence is given a mandate to negotiate a defence agreement with the parties outside government.

In the fifth year of the defence agreement negotiations are initiated between the parties in Parliament. This often takes place in May and the beginning of June (if the old agreement expires with the end of the year) and an agreement is often reached before Parliament concludes its ordinary legislative work in June. The research prepared by the Defence Command and Ministry of Defence holds a central position in the negotiating process, but several other aspects also influence the process. Often local policy has a major impact, and it is not uncommon to see politicians fighting intensely to avoid the closure of barracks in the district from which they are elected. The process is not set in fixed structures or timetables – it is best described as being ad hoc in character and open to a variety of actors with a variety of motivations. This creates an arena in which the parties and peoples involved can reach a common understanding of the problems, threats and challenges the defence agreement must address.

The content of the defence agreements varies (Forsvarsministeriet 2011). Generally, the agreements set out the objectives, structures and finances of the Armed Forces. The level of detail in the agreements differs, some areas are only briefly touched on whereas others are subject to thorough regulation. In this way the agreements are very much a political product negotiated among the political parties.


NATO long-term defence planning does not have a significant impact on the Danish planning process. This becomes obvious when looking at the defence agreements, as NATO defence planning is not included at all in these (Forsvarsforliget 2010). Thus, considerations other than coordination and cooperation with Brussels seem to take centre stage when Danish parliamentarians participate in defence planning.

CONCLUSION

Long-term defence planning in Denmark is done in parliamentary defence agreements. These are negotiated and signed by both government and opposition parties and address defence budgets, force structure and defence organisation. The Defence Command and the Ministry of Defence deliver input to the process, especially in relation to the government's preparation of a draft for an agreement before the negotiations are initiated. It is the Minister of Defence who is in charge of preparing the draft and initiating the negotiations. Both the preparations and the negotiations are ad hoc in character, and have no fixed structures or timetables guiding the process.

The tradition of negotiating agreements is a well-established practice in the Danish Parliament and covers a wide array of policy issues. The negotiation process creates space in which the negotiating parties can reach an established common understanding of problems and solutions. The lack of structure in the negotiations encourages deliberation throughout the process. In this way the negotiation process is as much about reaching common understanding as it is about signing an agreement. However, the unplanned character of the process can also lead to a lack of clarity and understanding. Neither the Defence Command, the Ministry of Defence nor the members of Parliament know the full story, and only the active participation of all the actors in the negotiation process will make sure that all policy challenges are addressed.

Denmark



LONG-TERM DEFENCE PLANNING IN DENMARK

- The Minister of Defence decides on the size, composition and organisation of the Danish Armed Forces. However, long-term defence planning is traditionally conducted in multi-year “defence agreements” negotiated in the Danish Parliament between government and opposition parties.
- In the years before the political negotiations, the Defence Command lead an investigation in to a variety of subjects, the results of which are fed in to the negotiation process.
- Before the negotiation process, the Minister of Defence, along with central ministers, prepares an initial draft for the defence agreement. This is done in the main government commissions and includes input from the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Command.
- The Minister of Defence uses the draft paper as a starting point in the negotiation process. The negotiations take place in Parliament and are often conducted just before the end of the parliamentary year.
- Neither the negotiations nor the preparations for these are conducted in well-established structures. Instead the processes are characterised by deliberation and the impromptu inclusion of persons, ministerial bodies and analytical input.

The Netherlands: Sound management

The current system of long-term planning defence planning in the Netherlands is highly centralised, well-established and adapted to the requirements of the national political system. Long-term planning follows a simple three-step scheme of policy, planning and budget, and takes place almost exclusively within the integrated Ministry of Defence. As the political scene is highly fluid, with frequent changes of governing coalitions, the integrated Ministry of Defence plays a significant role in maintaining a degree of continuity in the management of the Armed Forces.

The Kingdom of the Netherlands is an active NATO member which has come a long way in modernising its Armed Forces since the end of the Cold War. Somewhat similar to Denmark, the Netherlands has a small territory and a sheltered geographic position, and thus lesser requirements for territorial defence. For the past decade, the Netherlands Armed Forces have focused on developing professional and technologically capable forces, with emphasis on expeditionary operations, particularly in Afghanistan. Despite its relatively small size, the Netherlands has maintained a consistently ambitious defence policy over the last two decades. It is widely regarded as a committed and professional contributor to NATO (Bassford et al. 2010, xi).

The financial crisis and resulting public spending cuts have recently affected the Armed Forces, that have been obliged to take their share of the cuts. The defence budget was cut by 15 per cent in 2010 and total troop numbers are in the process of being reduced from 65,000 to 53,000 (Soeters 2012 [interview]). At the same time, the overall defence posture remains ambitious, and reconciling this defence policy with reduced budgets will be the main challenge for the Netherlands Armed Forces – and its long-term defence planning – in the coming years.

As the Ministry has recently been reorganised, the names of certain departments and documents have changed. The updated names have been used except when specifically referring to previous instances.

ORGANISATION

MAIN ACTOR: THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Long-term defence planning in the Netherlands is highly centralised. Since 2005, the political, administrative and military leadership of the Netherlands Armed Forces has been integrated in the Ministry of Defence. The core of the Ministry is the Central Staff, which is responsible for the management of the Armed Forces. It is led by the Secretary General, the highest-ranking civil servant in the Netherlands defence organisation. The most important tasks of the Central Staff are advising the government on military matters, implementing the government's defence policy, providing policy guidance and operational direction to the Operational Commands, and producing and accounting for the defence budgets. Within the Central Staff, the three departments that are most involved in long-term defence planning (and most significant to this study) are the Principal Directorate of Policy, The Chief of Defence (aided by his Defence Staff) and the Principal Directorate of Finance and Control (Netherlands Ministry of Defence 2006, 5; Netherlands Ministry of Defence 2011, 4-6; Reyn 2012 [interview]).

Each of these three departments is in charge of a separate element of the long-term planning process. The Principal Directorate of Policy (until 2012 known as the Directorate of General Policy Affairs) is responsible for the formulation of the overall defence policy of a given government. This directorate is a civilian department within the MoD's Central Staff, and has around 20 employees, mostly civilians (Reyn 2012 [interview]). The Chief of Defence is responsible for the second element; translating the overall defence policy into the more concrete *Defence Plan*. He has a dual role similar to that of his Norwegian colleague: embedded in the Ministry's Central Staff, he is the highest ranking officer and head of the Armed Forces, and the primary military advisor to the government. In producing the *Defence Plan*, he is supported by his Defence Staff, a predominately military institution integrated within the MoD. The *Defence Plan* details the concrete implementation of the defence policy in the *Policy Vision*, over a ten-year timeframe. Finally, the Principal Directorate of Finance and Control is responsible for producing and accounting for the annual defence budgets (Netherlands MoD 2011, 6-8). The longer-term aspects of the long-term planning process are mostly found in the first two steps, making the Principal Directorate of Policy and the Chief of Defence the main players in long-term planning within the Ministry.

Outside of the Central Staff, but still within the Ministry, a significant contribution to long-term planning comes from the Operational Commands of the Army, Navy and Air Force. These are heavily involved in shaping the concrete elements of the *Defence Plan*, and are also crucial to its implementation (Netherlands MoD 2006, 4). Other ministries, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Security and Justice, are also involved, but on a consultative basis (Reyn 2012 [interview]). However, a notable exception to this trend of general centralisation within the Ministry of Defence is the *Future Policy Survey* (see below).

The Ministry of Defence has not been exempt from the cuts in the defence budget. Its budget and staff have been reduced considerably (van Rooy 2012 [interview]). However, a reorganisation and reduction of the Ministry, though less severe, was planned before the financial crisis set in. These plans included a revision of the long-term planning system, which focuses on simplifying and streamlining the long-term planning system. However, the basic features of the system will be kept intact despite the significant downsizing of the organisation which carries it out (Netherlands MoD 2011; Reyn 2012 [interview]).

PROCESS

As in Finland, a new planning cycle is initiated by the forming of a new government. At the start of a new government term, two primary documents outline the course for the Armed Forces in the next four to ten years. These are the *Policy Vision* and the *Defence Plan*. Along with the financial situation, they form the framework for the annual planning and budgeting cycle known as the policy, planning and budgeting procedure (Netherlands MoD 2011, 4–5).

Long-term planning takes place in the Central Staff of the Ministry of Defence under the overall supervision of the Minister, and is coordinated by the Ministry's Secretary General. It follows a distinct "rhythm" – policy, plan, budget – with a separate ministry department responsible for each step. The Principal Directorate of Policy, the Chief of Defence and the Principal Directorate of Finance and Control are the main departments involved, and are responsible for, respectively, the *Policy Vision*, the *Defence Plan* and the annual budgets. These steps are not completely distinct or sequential, but overlap somewhat, and are formulated in close discussion between the departments. In addition, they cover different timespans: the *Policy Vision* primarily handles the (nominally) four-year government term, the *Defence Plan* has a ten-year timeframe, while the budgets are produced and accounted for in an annual cycle which is also aligned with the national budget year (Netherlands MoD 2011, 5).

This process is the primary instrument for turning the overall defence policy of a given government coalition into concrete policy, priorities and investments for the Armed Forces in the short and medium term (4–10 years). It has also served as the primary vehicle for its long-term strategic planning, but until 2010, strategic vision beyond the 10-year timeframe was widely perceived as lacking.

THE POLICY VISION

The first step is the formulation of the overall defence policy, which is set out in a document known as the *Policy Vision*. It is based on the coalitional government agreement issued by an incoming Cabinet. These coalition agreements are quite brief political statements that cover all policy areas, and which usually contain a few paragraphs outlining the broad strategic, political and financial guidelines for defence policy. They are rarely

very specific, except in the case of controversial (or expensive) subjects (Reyn 2012 [interview]). Building on this, the *Policy Vision* has to find a balance between being general enough to serve as guidelines for strategic policy, while being specific enough to facilitate the transformation of the government's overall guidelines into concrete priorities for the long-term development of military capabilities (Netherlands MoD 2011, 4).

The formulation of the *Policy Vision* is the sole responsibility of the Principal Directorate of Policy at the MoD (Netherlands MoD 2011, 3). The directorate takes its cues from the formal coalition agreement of the new coalition government when a new *Policy Vision* is formulated. As the government agreement is kept brief and general, while the *Policy Vision* based on it has to be rather more concrete, the *Policy Vision* is formulated in close discussion with both the Cabinet and Parliament. The Minister of Defence has a substantial role in the process, and takes the final decisions. The finished document is approved by Cabinet, and submitted as a letter to Parliament (Reyn 2012 [interview]).

Two features of the national politics of the Netherlands have served to make recent *Policy Visions* more brief, general and flexible than the more comprehensive white papers that used to be the norm. The last defence white paper was published in 2000. First, the changes in governing coalitions have become more frequent. In principle, a government term in the Netherlands lasts for four years, but in the last decade most government coalitions did not complete their full term. Consequently, defence policy has been revised more often than was originally foreseen (Rozenburg 2012 [interview]). Second, negotiation and compromise is fundamental to the political culture of the Netherlands (Rozenburg 2012 [interview]; Heidar 2008a, 161; Henriksen 2010, 38). In particular, having broad popular and political support for the main direction of defence policy is seen as important both within and outside the Armed Forces (Soeters 2012 [interview]). As a result of these features, defence policy has tended to be adjusted rather than revolutionised by changes in the governing coalitions. Major revisions of defence policy have instead resulted from budget cuts brought on by major external events such as the end of the Cold War, or the current financial crisis (Reyn 2012 [interview]).

DEFENCE PLAN AND BUDGET

The *Policy Vision* forms the basis of the next step. In close contact with the Principal Directorate of Policy, the Chief of Defence, aided by the Defence Staff, produces a more specific and concrete document known as the *Defence Plan*. The service staffs and operational commands are also important contributors to this process. The purpose of the *Defence Plan* is to translate the overall policy goals of the *Policy Vision* into a "sustainable relationship between objectives, activities and resources" (Netherlands MoD 2011, 4). It contains detailed proposals for the development of the Armed Forces, and includes a directive for operational readiness, the Defence Investment Plan, and the Defence Divestment Plan (Netherlands MoD 2011, 5). While the *Policy Vision* for the most part focuses on the four-year government term, the *Defence Plan* maintains a ten-year per-

spective for implementing that policy. This is necessary, as many investment plans require a longer outlook. In effect, the *Defence Plan* is a ten-year plan that is revised at least every four years, and updated more or less continuously (van Rooy 2012 [interview]).

The third element of the long-term planning system is the annual policy, budgeting and planning (BPB) procedure. Once the *Policy Vision* and the *Defence Plan* have been established and approved by the Minister of Defence, they form the basis for the annual defence budget, which is aligned with the national budget cycle. The BPB procedure follows a fixed annual cycle and is the primary instrument for moving the defence policy and the defence plan from theory into practice, in the form of definite priorities and investments. This phase is the responsibility of the Principal Directorate of Finance and Control in the MoD, but involves most of the other departments of the Ministry (Netherlands MoD 2011, 5–8).

RECENT AND FUTURE CHANGES

The Netherlands system of long-term defence planning appears to be well-established and efficient. It is currently being streamlined and simplified as a result of the reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence, but looks set to retain its overall shape in the years to come. The most significant adjustments to LTDP will be a further consolidation of all policy-making responsibility in the Principal Directorate of Policy. The responsibility for resource allocation will be transferred from the Principle Directorate of Policy to the Chief of Defence (Netherlands MoD 2011, 3). With the reduction of the number of employees in the MoD, and in particular the Defence Staff, it seems likely that the military organisation outside the MoD will play a larger role as a provider of input to LTDP in the future.

Besides the adjustments following the reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence, there has been one recent innovation in Dutch LTDP that should be mentioned. A frequent criticism of the Netherlands' defence policy was that it lacked longer-term strategic perspectives. In a 2010 survey, one NATO observer said that "... I cannot put my hands on any strategic document that says what the Netherlands will do in the next 20–25 years" (Bassford et al. 2010, 26). By 2010, when that statement was made, the Netherlands military establishment had already acknowledged that the established LTDP procedure, focused as it was on the short- to medium-term requirements of the governmental, parliamentary and budgetary cycles, was not well suited to address longer-term issues. To rectify this tendency towards short-sightedness, the *Future Policy Survey* was initiated by the MoD in 2008 and published in 2010 (Netherlands MoD 2010).

The *Future Policy Survey* was a large, joint project with contributions from a large selection of ministries, other government agencies and academic institutions. Coordinated by the MoD's Principal Directorate of Policy (then known as the Directorate of General Policy Affairs), it addressed the impact of expected global and regional developments, and what these scenarios might require of the Netherlands Armed Forces in the 20-year period up until 2030. The process also sparked broad public discussion,

and ministry officials have been pleasantly surprised by the degree to which the survey encouraged broad debate on defence issues in Parliament and the general public (Reyn 2012 [interview]). The central feature of the final, public report was the presentation to Dutch politicians of four markedly different policy options for the future development of the Netherlands Armed Forces. The most ambitious (and also most expensive) of these options was explicitly chosen by the governing coalition of Mark Rutte, as the basis for its defence policy, in its government agreement of 2010 (Reyn 2012 [interview]). This so-called “agile force” option emphasised the requirements needed for a modern, balanced and flexible force to cope with various contingencies both at home and abroad. This approach was widely popular within the Armed Forces (Kleinreesink 2012 [interview]). However, the implementation of this rather ambitious option coincided with the demand for major budget cuts following the financial crisis. It remains to be seen how this will be resolved.


CONCLUSION

Responsibility for long-term defence planning is concentrated within the Ministry of Defence and the composition of governing coalitions changes quite frequently. It seems reasonable to assume that this would increase the influence of the MoD (particularly the permanent civil servants, but also the military professionals), vis-à-vis their political masters. More so than in Norway, for instance, where governments have been very stable, or in Finland, where numerous agencies outside of the MoD have a big say.

The form and content of the main policy documents (white papers, *Policy Visions* and *Defence Reviews*) have changed in the past decade, as it is taken more or less for granted that a given defence policy could soon be rendered obsolete. Given the vicissitudes of Dutch national politics, this might be necessary to enable sound and stable management of the Armed Forces over the long term. On the other hand, this does not necessarily mean that a brief policy document does not have an impact – as was the case with the *Policy Vision* of 2010 (Reyn 2012 [interview]). This was a very brief paper, but started several big processes, such as the long-term commitment to the “agile force” and the ongoing reduction of the Armed Forces, showing strong political measures are still possible.

Overall, the Netherlands appears to have a well-established, functioning system of long-term defence planning which places a high premium on the sound and efficient management of the Armed Forces. With its rhythm of policy, plans and budget, it seems suited to the integrated organisation of the Ministry, giving room for input from the political, military and bureaucratic levels. The overlapping timeframes of the different elements (four years for the *Policy Vision*, ten years for the *Defence Plan* and annual cycles for the budgets), ensures that both short- and medium-term perspectives are included, and provides opportunities for continual adjustment.

The Netherlands



LONG-TERM DEFENCE PLANNING IN THE NETHERLANDS

- Long-term planning is centralised within the integrated Ministry of Defence, which provides both the civilian and military expertise necessary for the formulation of defence policy, the transformation of this policy into development plans and the implementation of the plans through the annual defence budgets.
- Long-term defence planning is adapted to the requirements of the Dutch political system, with its frequently changing coalition governments and orientation towards negotiation and compromise.
- The planning consists of three principal elements. At the start of a new government term, the overall defence policy is set out in a document known as the Policy Vision. Based on this, a more concrete plan known as the Defence Plan is formulated. These two documents form the overall framework for the annual budget cycle known as the policy, planning and budget procedure. A separate department within the Ministry of Defence is responsible for each step.
- The Policy Vision covers a four-year government term, while the Defence Plan has a ten-year outlook. The budget process runs through an annual cycle that is aligned with the national budget process.
- To rectify what was perceived as a lack of long-term strategic perspectives in the regular planning system, an inter-agency strategic study known as the Future Policy Survey was published by the Ministry of Defence in 2010.

The United Kingdom: Political planning

British long-term defence planning is characterised by an absence of established structures and practices. Such an absence makes room for a strong political element in the planning process, since the initiation and preparation of the planning process is decided by the government. Thus, long-term defence planning is closely related to political will and political initiative. However, this “unstructured practice” could be due to change. The recent *Strategic Defence and Security Review*⁷ has been criticised in terms of both content and preparation and so there is currently a demand for greater transparency and a more structured process (Codner 2011; Dorman 2012 [interview]).

At a general level, British long-term defence planning is covered by two documents; the *National Security Strategy* (NSS) and the *Strategic Defence and Security Review* (SDSR). The NSS sets out objectives and the SDSR addresses the “ends, means and ways” (Ministry of Defence 2010a). Thus, long-term defence planning is primarily addressed and prepared in the SDSR, while general notions of national interests and threats are identified in the NSS. This chapter will therefore focus upon the formulation of the SDSR.

British military history is long and wide-ranging. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Britain’s military forces were among the largest in the world (Leifer 1972; Sked and Cook 1993; Keohane 2000). However, this changed during the twentieth century in the aftermath of the two world wars and with the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers. Today, Britain remains a major power with a nuclear capability and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Since the end of the Cold War, Britain has pursued an increasingly international role and has been engaged in UN and NATO peacekeeping missions and in a variety of coalitions. Thus, the British Armed Forces have been engaged in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya and have ongoing peacekeeping responsibilities in the Balkans and Cyprus. However, financial constraints and rising military expenditure are making it harder for Britain to maintain such a strong

military presence.⁸ The British defence establishment is facing significant cuts, which have led to a growing awareness among military professionals, public servants, scholars and members of Parliament of the need to transform the military and make it more suitable to the current challenges facing Britain (Dorman 2012 [interview]). In 2010 this transformation was initiated by conducting a major review (the SDSR) of the structure and composition of the British Armed Forces.

ORGANISATION

Describing the organisation of British long-term defence planning is difficult since no fixed structures, institutions or timetables were in place when the SDSR was prepared. When reading this chapter one should therefore keep in mind that the organisation for the most part was put in place *during* or *shortly before* the planning process. In the same way, the main actors were appointed shortly before the process was initiated and the secondary actors were included in the process in an ad hoc manner.

MAIN ACTORS

British constitutional convention has it that the commander in chief of the British Armed Forces is the monarch, who is currently Queen Elizabeth II. However, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence have the prerogative to make decisions on behalf of the Queen. The Prime Minister (acting with the support of the Cabinet) holds the power to make decisions on the use of the Armed Forces. The Secretary of State for Defence is head of the Ministry of Defence which formulates and executes defence policy. It was formerly the case that defence reviews were conducted by the Ministry of Defence and led by the Secretary of State for Defence (Ministry of Defence 1998). However, the 2010 defence review was not prepared in the Ministry of Defence but instead in the Cabinet Office.

Shortly after the 2010 parliamentary elections the new coalition government, led by the Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, announced that a defence review would be conducted in the coming months. This came as no surprise since the three major political parties had all committed themselves to conducting a review after the general election. The political parties agreed that this review should be the first in a series of regular and sequential exercises (Dorman 2012 [interview]; Ferguson 2012 [interview]). However, while there was broad agreement on the need for a regular review process, preparations were hampered by a lack of consensus and poor conceptual understanding of the task (Dorman 2012 [interview]).

The Ministry of Defence had prepared the review process by presenting a green paper in February which identified and highlighted the questions that needed to be answered in a forthcoming defence review (Ministry of Defence 2010b). The Ministry of Defence had prepared for the process, anticipating that they would be in charge of it. However, when the Prime Minister announced the review he included *security* in the

title and turned the review into a *Strategic Defence and Security Review*. During the election campaign the issue of whether or not to include the concept of security had been debated (Chalmers 2012 [interview]). Including the security element in the review would demand a much broader perspective, thus involving not just the Ministry of Defence but also other ministries holding a stake in the security agenda (for instance the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of the Interior and HM Treasury). As it turned out, the security question became the driver for the review and turned the SDSR into a rapid and politicised process.

After announcing the SDSR the Prime Minister established a National Security Council and appointed a National Security Advisor (HM Government 2010). The National Security Council was established as a Cabinet committee tasked with overseeing national security, intelligence and defence strategy. It became the task of the National Security Council and the National Security Advisor to conduct the 2010 defence review. The National Security Council was composed of permanent and non-permanent members. The permanent members were the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Crime and Security, Minister of State for Policy, Secretary of State for International Development, Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Secretary of State for Defence, Secretary of State for the Home Office, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, First Secretary of State and the Chief of the Defence Staff. Additionally, other government ministers, senior officials, military and intelligence officers, and civil servants could attend when necessary in meetings as non-permanent members. The structure of the council was to be decided by the National Security Advisor.

As previously mentioned, the Ministry of Defence had expected to lead the review process, but when the preparation process was finally initiated it was announced that the review process would take place in the Cabinet Office (Ferguson 2012 [interview]). By introducing considerations of security into the process the review became a cross-government undertaking. Thus, while the structure and finances of the Armed Forces was still key, input from the Ministry of Defence was supplemented by contributions from HM Treasury, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, among others. The National Security Advisor oversaw the process and engaged in the discussions in the National Security Council. During the review process it became clear that the inclusion of other government bodies (especially HM Treasury) meant that finances took center stage in the process (Codner 2011).

SECONDARY ACTORS

Before and during the review process, a number of actors were involved at a secondary level. This group of actors primarily supplied information and advice, some were invited to participate in the meetings of the National Security Council while others were engaged afterwards for briefings and discussions. The inclusion of these secondary actors did not

follow a set plan and the participants were included as and when they were needed (Dorman 2011 [interview]).

Alongside the discussions in the National Security Council, separate talks were held inside the Ministry of Defence (Ferguson 2012 [interview]; Storey 2012 [interview]). These talks concerned both ministerial affairs and contributions from the three armed services, represented in the National Security Council by the Chief of the Defence Staff. Inputs from the armed services were fed into the process either through the Ministry of Defence or through the Chief of the Defence Staff. Within the integrated Ministry of Defence the armed services had separate talks where they could submit their proposals for the reform process (Ferguson 2012 [interview]). Each service had to put forward a range of potential cuts which could be implemented in the defence review. The talks in the Ministry of Defence involved the heads of the three armed services, and they brought along research prepared by each service on how to make the necessary cuts. The research was then brought to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State for Defence.

Across government bodies different approaches and levels of preparation were evident. The Ministry of Defence prepared intensely for the review on the assumption that it would lead the process (Codner 2011; Ferguson 2012 [interview]). In contrast other departments only prepared minor contributions. All departments represented in the National Security Council prepared for the review process but there was a great deal of difference in ambition between the departments. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and HM Treasury were among the most engaged departments. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office was following an agenda set out by the Secretary of the State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, William Hague, who presented the foreign policy he would follow almost immediately upon taking office.⁹ Hague stressed the importance of having the necessary military capabilities if Britain wanted to maintain its status as a great power. HM Treasury was following a very different course in the review process; it was performing a spending review of government expenditure and the defence review was included as a part of this process (Codner 2011; HM Treasury 2010). Thus, HM Treasury's motivation was to secure the necessary cuts in defence expenditure. In this way the supporting government bodies performed very different roles and had very different agendas in the defence review process.

Think tanks and experts seem to have played only a minor role in the process (Chalmers 2012 [interview]; Dorman 2012 [interview]). Traditionally in Britain, think tanks and experts have been very closely linked to the government and its formulation of policy, a tradition that was not followed during the defence review. The Cabinet Office kept the process quiet and only included a few experts so they could present their remarks. Before the review was presented to the public, experts were invited for a briefing in which they were given an opportunity to ask questions and offer a critique. However, overall, experts and think tanks did not play an important part in the review process.

PROCESS

As described in the last section, the planning process did not take place within well-established structures, institutions or timetables. Instead the process was formed by the Cabinet Office. This is in line with former defence review processes conducted in the United Kingdom. Since the end of the Cold War three major defence reviews have been undertaken. The Conservative Government produced the “Options for Change Review” in 1990, seeking to benefit from a perceived post-Cold War “peace dividend”. In 1997 the Labour Government presented a defence review which was characterised as “foreign-policy-led” (Ministry of Defence 1998). The review recommended a force transformation that could support expeditionary operations. In 2004 the “Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities Review” was presented as a reaction to the terrorist attacks on New York on 11 September 2001. The review was not a “new” defence review but rather a revision of the 1997 defence review. Between 1997 and 2010 no new defence review was conducted, and so the 2010 *Strategic Defence and Security Review* was demanded by many.

The lack of structure and timetable is visible when examining the processes of the former defence reviews. The defence reviews seem to have been initiated for different reasons (primarily political or economic) and with different ambitions. A common feature of the reviews has been the publication of a policy document, a white paper, which has been presented in Parliament. This feature was also present in the 2010 *Strategic Defence and Security Review* but there were also many differences between this and the former reviews. Most importantly, the review was not conducted by the Ministry of Defence but by the Cabinet Office. Instead of focusing only on threats, the composition of the Armed Forces and capabilities, several other policy areas were taken into account (Codner 2011).

While announcing the *Strategic Defence and Security Review* the government also initiated a spending review, due to a growing deficit (Cabinet Office, UK 2010). A spending review is a Treasury-led process to allocate resources across government departments, according to the government’s priorities. Spending reviews set fixed spending budgets over several years for each department. It is then up to the departments to decide how best to manage and allocate their budget. Thus, the government initiated two major reviews in a time of austerity, one addressing the size and composition of the Armed Forces, and the other addressing public spending. By including “security” in the defence review the Prime Minister could take charge of the process and turn the review into a process focused upon reducing spending (Chalmers 2012 [interview]). By conducting the defence review in the National Security Council, the Prime Minister made sure that the deficit was taken into account while conducting the defence review. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had a seat in the National Security Council and so was engaged in the review process, while also performing his own review of public spending. In this way the defence review process ended up being intermingled with the spending review, and so the focus was on cuts in defence spending.

The defence review was conducted in the National Security Council and was not open to the public. Input was delivered by the armed services, the Ministry of Defence and other government departments. However, the discussions between the members of the National Security Council have not been disclosed to the public. Yet, it is clear from interviews and statements given by those involved that the process was highly influenced by the simultaneous spending review. Thus, the planning process was turned into a process focused upon financial constraints rather than defence capabilities.


Due to the criticism that followed the *Strategic Defence and Security Review* it is possible that long-term defence planning in Britain will be subject to change in the near future. Following the 2010 general election the three main parties agreed to conduct quadrennial defence reviews (tying in with parliamentary elections) and so a timetable does seem to be in place. However, this is only a political intention and no formal agreement has been reached. The lack of a written British constitution means that there is not a strong tradition for precedents and historically this has led to a significant level of “muddling through” (Dorman 2012 [interview]). Whether a more structured process will be established is, of course, still to be decided.

CONCLUSION

Overall, long-term defence planning in the UK is characterised by an absence of well-established structures, institutions and timetables. Long-term defence planning is conducted in *Strategic Defence (and Security) Reviews* which decide on the future shape and size of Britain’s Armed Forces. Defence reviews have been carried out in many different ways by different governments and the timing of the reviews has been shifting and illogical. Often reviews have been carried out after elections, but this has not established itself as a general practice. Instead it is for the government in power to decide when and how to conduct a defence review. Thus, British long-term defence planning seems political in both content and process.

The planning process used in the UK holds potential in that it gives the government room for manoeuvre. No structures or institutions which *must* be used in the planning process exist, and there are no obligations in relation to inclusion of different actors. The government is free to follow its own agenda and formulate policy as they see fit. In this way the government is very much in charge of the planning process and is able to implement its policy. This way to govern is common in political systems with majority governments and few political parties, and so the planning process is typical of the political system in which it is used.

The United Kingdom



LONG-TERM DEFENCE PLANNING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

- Long-term defence planning in the United Kingdom is characterised by the absence of established procedures, structures and timetables. Planning is mostly done in politically initiated defence reviews.
- The Ministry of Defence prepares the review process by drawing up a green paper which highlights the main questions and challenges that should be addressed in an upcoming defence review.
- Soon after the current coalition government took office in 2010, the *Strategic Defence Review* was turned into a *Strategic Defence and Security Review*, widening the scope of the review and making it possible to include other considerations, such as finance, climate or foreign relations. Thus, the Cabinet Office took charge of the process and the Ministry of Defence's role was reduced, so that they only gave their input to the process.
- Following the 2010 election, the coalition government established a National Security Council and appointed a National Security Advisor. When the defence review was initiated in the summer of 2010 it was carried out by the Cabinet Office, and the review was mainly executed by the National Security Council.

France: Vive le Président!

French long-term defence planning is primarily conducted in white papers (*livre blanc*) and military programme laws (*loi de programmation militaire*). The white papers are produced by a commission established by the President of the Republic. The commission undertakes a review of France's current defence and presents its findings in a white paper. On the basis of the white paper, the President initiates policy proposals on long-term defence planning. These proposals are gathered together in five-year Military Programme Laws which implement the defence and security strategy.

The French defence and security community regard the current world as unstable and unpredictable, but not necessarily increasingly dangerous (Brustlein 2011 [interview]). French national security is focused on national independence, nuclear deterrence and military self-sufficiency, and traditionally the military has played a significant role in French foreign affairs (Richou 2011 [interview]). After the Cold War, France undertook a reappraisal of its strategy and military force structure. In 1996 the decision was taken to move to an all-professional force structure, to dismantle surface-to-surface nuclear missiles and to build up a substantial force projection capability, in keeping with the new strategic situation (Foster 2006). The result of the transformation has been that the military is now smaller, more rapidly deployable and more tailored towards operations abroad (Gay 2011 [interview]).

Since 1994, France has extended its presence in NATO, and since 1995 has attended the NATO Defence Ministerial meetings and been a full member of the military committee. Following this, in 2009 France announced that it would resume its position as a full member of NATO, 43 years after Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from the alliance's military command and military bodies.

The military element of French foreign policy has been visible in UN and NATO operations where France has played an active role. Besides missions under NATO and

UN mandate, France has also been engaged in autonomous missions in Africa, where it has a strong political presence and influence because of its colonial history (Grand 2011 [interview]). However, it is not expected that France will continue its autonomous operations in Africa in the future. Instead, France will address its African interests through a common European framework involving other European countries.

ORGANISATION

A description of the organisation of long-term defence planning in France must focus upon the role of the President, but the Ministry of Defence is in charge of implementation and should not be overlooked. Focusing upon the preparation of white papers and the military programme laws, this section will address how the President interacts with the Ministry of Defence and other supporting actors. The President is the main actor but other actors are involved in giving advice or preparing documents which are fed in to the processes. Thus, the section will describe the actors involved in preparing the white paper, the military programme law, the *30 Year Prospective Plan* and the *Strategic Plan for Research and Technology*.

MAIN ACTORS

In the French political system the Presidency holds most of the power (Schain 2004, 211). Besides appointing the Prime Minister, chairing the Council of Ministers and being able to dismiss the National Assembly, the President of the Republic is Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Irondelle and Besancenot 2010). The President decides on the size and dimensions of the Armed Forces, thus prioritising and assigning resources between the different parts of the Armed Forces. The President must ensure that the Armed Forces are able to address threats and challenges against French sovereignty and national interests. The Minister of Defence monitors the funding, procurement and operations of the Armed Forces but it is the President who makes decisions on a larger scale. Long-term defence planning is therefore the responsibility of the President.

At the overall strategic level, defence planning is conducted by the President, who prepares policy on the basis of recommendations put forward in a *White Paper on Defence and National Security* (Richou 2011 [interview]). The establishment and composition of the white paper commission is decided by the President who also appoints a head of the commission. The commission is in charge of performing a review of French defence and security, on the basis of this, they then define objectives and recommend key decisions. Members of the commission include civil servants, military professionals and experts from the research community. The workings of the commission are comprehensive and the general public are invited to engage in the process on several occasions. When the commission has finalised its results and presented the white paper, the President must decide on the defence and security policy. Thus, the white paper and the findings of the

commission function as a reference for the President in the formulation of policy on long-term defence planning.

On the basis of the white paper and the President's policy preferences, the Ministry of Defence prepares five-year military programme laws (French MoD 2012a). These follow the directions of the white papers in broad terms and implement the policy set out by the President, addressing a wide array of different issues. In the first chapters, the purpose of the Armed Forces is set out with reference to the white paper. Following these general comments, policy is presented with regard to prioritising and assigning resources to different parts of the Armed Forces. In this way the military programme laws implement the long-term defence planning in a medium-term perspective. It is the Ministry of Defence that prepares the military programme law under the supervision of the Minister of Defence. The President is in charge of the overall direction of the defence planning process, but the Minister of Defence is in charge of day-to-day business in the planning process (Gay 2011 [interview]). Included in the military planning law are five annual budgets for the defence that need to be passed in the National Assembly and in the Senate every year, thus ensuring the National Assembly and the Senate are involved in more than just passing the military programme law every five years.

SECONDARY ACTORS

Although French defence planning is mainly a top-down process driven by the President, the procedure – either the long-term or the day-to-day decisions – has a dynamic element, in that the President engages a range of civil advisors, who have quite some influence (Grand 2011 [interview]; Brustlein 2011 [interview]). Think tanks, experts, academics, corporate experts, defence officials and intelligence services all feed in to the process. Moreover, there is a strong tradition for military involvement, which is conducted in the same manner as the involvement of the civilian advisors and experts. It is worth noting that the Chief of Defence has direct access to the President. Since the President is head of the Armed Forces the Chief of Defence is subordinate to the President (and not to the Minister of Defence). This means that information from the Armed Forces is delivered directly to the President and not through the Ministry of Defence. Thus, both the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces have access to the President and must compete for and share his attention while he is preparing policy.

A range of units from different ministries assist the President in preparing the policy to be implemented by the Ministry of Defence. The units are neutral political bodies occupied by equal numbers of military and civilian advisors. These units are the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN) and the Strategic Affairs Delegation (DAS). The SGDSN reports to the Prime Minister and works in close liaison with the President's office, and assists the head of government in fulfilling his responsibilities in matters of national defence and security. DAS is a body within the Ministry of Defence, which takes care of and streamlines input from research institutes and think tanks. The

SGDSN is, together with the Cabinet Office and the General Secretariat for European Affairs, one of the main bodies for inter-ministerial organisation and coordination. The different units feed input to the President, who then, on the basis of the information provided, takes the final decision.

Besides the preparation of the military programme law, the Ministry of Defence also prepares two other documents related to long-term defence planning, namely the *30 Year Prospective Plan* and the *Strategic Plan for Research and Technology* (French MoD 2012b). The *30 Year Prospective Plan* is prepared by the General Staff and the Directorate of General Armament (DGA 2010a). The plan is not published according to a fixed time schedule but is instead a document which is continuously altered (usually every year). The plan addresses French future needs with regard to technology and capabilities, identified on the basis of geopolitics, expected future military operations and current technological developments. Thus, a hypothesis for force equipment is prepared on the basis of an operational, a geostrategic and a technological prospective. With regard to long-term defence planning the General Staff and the Directorate of General Armament can use the *30 Year Prospective Plan* to influence the policy being prepared by the President. However, the plan is not considered as policy or implementation guidelines, instead it is used as stimulus when conducting long-term defence planning.

An internal document, the *Strategic Plan for Research and Technology* is also produced in the Defence Procurement Agency (DGA 2010b). The plan is an in-depth description of the management of the system, linking defence research with technological development. Taking the *30 Year Prospective Plan*, the white paper and the policy of the President as a point of reference, the *Strategic Plan for Research and Technology* acts as a guide for the Defence Procurement Agency in their internal planning. The plan describes how to support science and innovation and how to engage with civil research organisations to develop dual-use technology research. In effect, the *Strategic Plan for Research and Technology* describes how the Defence Procurement Agency must conduct the necessary research in order to master the technology required for building future equipment for the Armed Forces. The plan is not a part of the institutional setting explicitly related to the white paper or the military programme law with regard to French long-term defence planning. However, the plan acts as an internal document guiding the future direction of the workings of the Defence Procurement Agency.

PROCESS

As described, long-term defence planning is centred around the President of the Republic who initiates the white paper process, appoints the members of the white paper commission and finally develops the defence and security policy which is implemented in the military programme laws. A presentation of the defence planning process should therefore focus on the President. Since the production of white papers on defence in France has occurred at irregular intervals and furthermore has been subject to chang-

ing processes, it is difficult to give a general description of the white paper process. The chapter will therefore in the following focus on the latest white paper.

The 2008 *White Paper* shared a common feature with its predecessors of 1972 (which focused on nuclear deterrence) and 1994 (the era of intervention and the end of the Cold War), in that they were initiated to address changes in the security-political environment. In all three instances the process was subject to political temperament and was initiated and controlled by the President (Grand 2011 [interview]). The white papers have served as the foundation for multi-year planning and spending decisions. Based upon the recommendations presented in the white papers the President in office has decided on the future defence structure, allocation of resources and objectives of the Armed Forces.

In 2007 the French President appointed a member of the Council of State (Jean-Claude Mallet), to be head of a 35 member commission charged with a review of French defence. The commission issued its white paper in early 2008 (French MoD 2008). Acting upon its recommendations, the French President began making changes in French defence policy starting in the summer of 2008.

The preparation of the white paper started in August 2007. The French President established a commission entrusted with drafting of a *White Paper on Defence and National Security*. The members of the commission had a range of expertise and vocational backgrounds. In addition to representatives from relevant government agencies and the Armed Forces, parliamentarians and qualified scholars and experts were involved, along with industry representatives. The commission included publicly televised and on-line hearings of 52 personalities, from 14 countries and 5 continents. Members of the commission completed a range of field visits to defence facilities. Generally, the process could be defined as inclusive and dynamic, however, the process was coordinated and managed by the President who had the first -and the final - word.

The outcome of the process was the French *White Paper on Defence and National Security* which redefined French strategy, embracing both defence and security policy (Brustlein 2011 [interview]). The paper addressed questions of security in both the foreign and the domestic arena, and furthermore engaged both civilian and military instruments. In this way the paper responded to risks emanating from state and non-state actors. In an all-hazards approach, it dealt with active, deliberate threats but also with the security implications of major disasters and catastrophes of a non-intentional nature.

The 2008 *White Paper* holds a central position in French defence and security policy. The paper is currently being reviewed, and it is expected that the review will address the current financial constraints and so focus on how France can sustain its current military capabilities and ambitions for less money.

Following the 2008 *White Paper*, the Ministry of Defence prepared a military programme law for the years 2009-2014, in accordance with the President's policy proposals (French MoD 2012a). The law was passed in both chambers and so the de-

fence plans laid out by the President were begun. The budget for the Armed Forces needs to be passed by the legislature in each year of the five-year period covered by the military programme law. The Ministry of Defence prepares a document for these annual reviews, describing the previous implementation process and future projections. So the allocation of resources is decided in broad terms at the beginning of the five-year period and then adapted according to the implementation process and the financial situation. The Minister of Defence is responsible for the implementation process but the President decides if the general policy needs to be altered during the period of the military programme law.

In an effort to prepare for the future, the Ministry of Defence produces a document called the *30 Year Prospective Plan* (DGA 2010a). This document is continuously worked on by the General Staff and the Defence Procurement Agency. It is based on a forecasting process focusing upon operational, geostrategic and technological perspectives. The actors involved discuss potential threats to France and compare these to the potential technological progress. A central goal of this process is to identify those research areas that are essential for the acquisition of necessary capabilities. Thus, the result of the process is a document that can help the Ministry of Defence in making decisions regarding preparations for the future. After the presentation of the *2008 White Paper* and the 2009–2014 military programme law, the *30 Year Prospective Plan* was altered and adapted to the new policy guidelines. The plan is mainly used as a supporting element in the internal planning process, but historically it has also been used externally. When the Ministry of Defence prepared the 2003–2008 military programme law the *30 Year Prospective Plan* influenced the process. This was due to the lack of a white paper addressing the world post-September 11.

The white paper, the military programme law and the *30 Year Programme Plan* are converted into a *Strategic Plan for Research and Technology* by the Defence Procurement Agency (DGA 2010b). This document addresses how the agency will forecast and control the technologies that are necessary for French security. The *Strategic Plan for Research and Technology* is at the very end of the long-term defence planning process, and the plan is therefore primarily prepared for internal use. It suggests which areas should be prioritised and how research should be undertaken. It is therefore a way for the Defence Procurement Agency to plan the organisation and use of its resources in a long-term perspective.

The process of defence planning in France is greatly influenced by the President's position as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This means that the planning process is politically driven, most clearly demonstrated when examining the white papers and the ad hoc way in which they have been produced. The political element is also obvious when looking at how the recommendations of the white papers have been turned into policy. It is for the President to decide on the policy and the Ministry of Defence to then implement this in five-year programme laws. However, the process is completely confined to the highest political level, which can be seen by looking at the *30 Year Pro-*


spective Plan and the *Strategic Plan for Research and Technology*. Both of these documents are prepared by civil servants and military professionals, addressing threats, technological needs and geopolitical changes. This does not mean that the documents are apolitical but it does mean that parts of the defence planning process are taken out of the political cycle and focus on long-term perspectives.

CONCLUSION

In broad terms, long-term defence planning in France is the responsibility of the President of the Republic. The President is Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and it is therefore the President's responsibility to ensure that the necessary planning is done in relation to French national security. On a strategic level, planning is conducted in white papers prepared by commissions established by the President. The recommendations of the white papers are used as a reference point for the President, while the President prepares policy on defence and security. The policy of the President is implemented by the Ministry of Defence in five-year military programme laws that encompass one-year defence budgets that require legislative approval. A *30 Year Prospective Plan* addressing threats, geopolitics and technological developments is continuously (every year) updated by the General Staff and the Defence Procurement Agency. In the Defence Procurement Agency long-term planning is carried out by giving an in-depth description of the management of the system linking defence research to technological forecasting. Generally, long-term defence planning in France thus consists of different documents that address a broad array of issues with a variety of time perspectives.

The defence planning process in France is comprehensive and engages many different actors. Government and military bodies are involved in the process along with scholars, experts and representatives from industry. The process of preparing the different planning documents is often described as inclusive. However, before describing French long-term defence planning in general as inclusive, one should keep in mind that the way in which planning documents and processes are converted to actual policy is very much dependent upon the President.

France



LONG-TERM DEFENCE PLANNING IN FRANCE

- Long-term defence planning in France is primarily the responsibility of the President of the Republic, who is Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
- Long-term defence planning is carried out in white papers and in military programme laws. The preparation of white papers is not set in fixed terms but happens on an ad hoc basis.
- The white papers are prepared by commissions made up of scholars, military professionals and civil servants. The President establishes the commissions and appoints a head of the commissions.
- When the commissions have finalised their workings and published a white paper, the President then acts upon the recommendations of the white paper.
- Defence and security policy is implemented through five-year military programme laws that prioritise and assign resources. The military programme laws are prepared in the Ministry of Defence following the policy set by the President.

Conclusion:

Planning diversity

This study has identified and described the range of planning schemes used in long-term defence planning in the relevant NORDEFECO countries, as well as the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom. The goal was to outline the basic features of each case. Each country has been assessed in an individual chapter, and a two-part structure has been used within each chapter. The first part of the chapters focussed on the *organisation* of defence planning and the second part dealt with the *processes*. This concluding chapter will apply the same two-part structure in a comparison of the seven countries. First, we will compare the organisation of defence planning in the seven countries, and second compare the processes. Finally, the main conclusions of the study will be presented.

Three general conclusions will be drawn. First, within the seven countries there are differences in terms of the main actors, the secondary actors, the frequency, the outlook, the structures and the products. Second, the seven countries are similar on a very abstract level, in that policy is formulated at the political level, implemented at the military level and scrutinised in Parliament. However, this comes as no surprise since this is a general characteristic of modern Western democracies. Third, the most general and clear finding of our study is that the planning processes are formed by the constitutional, political and bureaucratic systems and traditions of each country. Each of the seven countries has different traditions, structures and workflows that influence the planning process. Some countries focus on sound bureaucracy, some focus on negotiation and compromise, others on different aspects altogether.

Following these general conclusions this chapter briefly addresses how the study could be utilised within NORDEFECO. Given the significant differences described above, the complete coordination of the national planning processes seems unlikely. However, there does seem to be room for cooperation on several issues, and it is to be hoped that a greater understanding of the prevailing diversity will prove to be an advantage in future coordination.

ORGANISATION

When looking at the organisation of long-term defence planning in the seven countries we have made a distinction between main actors and secondary actors. Doing so has emphasised that most often long-term defence planning is done by a few actors who are supported by a wider range of other actors. In the next two sections the distinction between main and secondary actors will be used as a structure for comparing the organisation of defence planning across the seven cases.

MAIN ACTORS

Overall, long-term defence planning within the group of NORDEFECO countries follows a common scheme: policy and resource guidelines are decided at a political level, and the plans are drawn up and implemented at a ministerial and military level. However, within this general organisational structure there are some major differences with regard to who initiates, controls and ultimately decides the results of long-term defence planning.

In Finland the planning process is closely embedded within the government and controlled by the Prime Minister and the President. Even though no policy is developed by the President, the President will be closely involved in the government's work on defence planning. In this way, the right to initiate and control the process is firmly placed at the highest political level. Input from supporting actors must be directed towards the government and the President, who then use this to make a decision. The Ministry of Defence and the Defence Command are in charge of translating and implementing the policy from the government and the President. The formulation of policy on long-term defence planning is carried out at the highest national political level.

Following the same lines as Finland, Sweden has a clear separation of powers between the political, ministerial and military levels. Within the Cabinet overall policy is developed by the Prime Minister, in collaboration with other relevant ministers. In the past, the policy developed by the Cabinet was of a very general nature, but recently the policy has become more detailed in some areas. The Ministry of Defence functions as an executive office for the Cabinet, responding to the policy guidelines produced by the Cabinet. In comparison to the Ministries of Defence in the other six countries, the Swedish Ministry of Defence is rather small and performs a more limited range of functions. This is due to the fact that the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters performs several functions which are elsewhere performed by the Ministry of Defence. Often, the Headquarters delivers input to both Parliament and the Cabinet. The Headquarters, and especially the Supreme Commander, hold a high degree of autonomy within their own domain of operation. In this way the separation of powers between the main actors in Sweden is comparable to the Finish case, although with substantial differences in the formalisation of the separation. Overall, the Swedish Defence Command holds a higher degree of autonomy than the Finish Defence Command.

In comparison with Finland and Sweden, long-term defence planning in Norway is conducted at the ministry level. In Norway, defence planning is primarily conducted in the Ministry of Defence. The Minister of Defence is in charge of the planning process and is responsible for the final long-term plan document, which is presented to Parliament for approval. While the Defence Command and the Ministry of Defence are separate units in Sweden and Finland, the two are integrated in Norway. By including the strategic functions of a Defence Command in the Ministry of Defence, it has been a worry that the professional integrity of the Chief of Defence might be compromised. But in relation to the long-term planning process, the role and function of the Chief of Defence is clear. His military advice is a public document, and it is clear to all what his advice is and whether it is followed by the government. In this way, while the relationship between the Chiefs of Defence and their political leadership differs in Norway, Sweden and Finland, their roles in long-term defence planning have similarities.

Within the group of NORDEFECO countries, Denmark stands out in terms of the main actors in the long-term defence planning process. This difference lies not so much the actors involved as in the relationship between them. As in Norway, defence planning is the responsibility of the Minister of Defence. It is the Minister who initiates and controls the planning process and who gathers input from relevant actors. The Minister of Defence must engage in two negotiating processes with regards to long-term defence planning. First, the Minister must negotiate and prepare a draft version of a defence agreement within the government. Other ministers, especially the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance, are given the opportunity to be included in the process. Second, the Minister must negotiate with the non-government parties in Parliament. The Minister of Defence brings to these negotiations a proposal for a defence agreement which has the support of the rest of the government. Thus, several actors are able to intervene in the planning process. As in Norway the planning process starts out at a the "working level" in the Ministry of Defence but is later moved to a higher stage. Generally, in relation to the main actors, the Danish planning process contains some elements which are similar to the Norwegian process, since the process is dominated by the Minister of Defence. However, there are also great differences, and in general terms the Danish planning process is different from the Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian process, in that many actors can be considered *potential* main actors, and the relations between these actors are loose and changeable.

Overall, within the group of NORDEFECO countries there are similarities and differences with regard to the main actors in the defence planning processes. The main similarity is that policy and resource guidelines are decided at a political level, whereas the implementation is performed at the ministerial and military level. Regarding differences, two factors seem to vary between the countries. First, who the main actors are, and the political level at which defence planning is conducted, and second the formalisation of the relations between the main actors.

To extend the comparison of the main actors in the planning processes, the next part of this chapter will focus on the main actors in the defence planning processes in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France.

The Dutch planning process is best described as focused on sound management, thus indicating a low level of political involvement. The process takes place in the integrated Ministry of Defence, and is primarily conducted by civil servants. Furthermore, the process is structured by formal institutions that regulate the participants. Three different units within the ministry are responsible for different parts of the planning process: first to produce a *Policy Vision*, second to translate the policy into a more concrete *Defence Plan* and third to produce and account for the annual defence budget. The three processes are carried out by the Central Staff and controlled by the Secretary General, who is the highest ranking civil servant in the defence organisation. The processes are linked to the political level through the *Policy Vision*, which is reformulated every fourth year in relation to general elections. When compared to the group of NORDEFECO countries the Dutch planning process seems to be very different. However, at least two similarities can be identified. First, the Dutch defence planning process is similar to the Norwegian process in that it is conducted within an integrated Ministry of Defence. Second, the Dutch defence planning process is similar to the Swedish planning process in that there is a formalised regulation of the participants. Generally, however, the Dutch planning scheme is quite different from the planning processes in the NORDEFECO countries.

In comparison to the planning schemes in NORDEFECO countries and the Netherlands, defence planning in the United Kingdom is very different. The major actors are senior members of the government, and the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Command only hold secondary positions in the process. Furthermore, the relations between the actors are not subject to formal regulation, and therefore the actors engaged in the process are subject to change. Defence planning in the United Kingdom is done in defence reviews, which are initiated and controlled by the government. Former reviews have been conducted by the Ministry of Defence and controlled by the Minister of Defence, but the last review was initiated and conducted in the newly established National Security Council within the Cabinet Office. Members of the National Security Council were central ministers, and the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs all participated in the review process. Thus, the Minister of Defence was only one among a group of major actors participating in the process. The Ministry of Defence prepared for the review process expecting to be in charge of it. However, when the process was initiated, the ministry, including the Chief of the Defence Staff, had to accept a secondary role in the process. In general terms, defence planning in the United Kingdom is characterised by being conducted at a high political level, engaging senior members of government.

As in the United Kingdom, defence planning in France is centralised at the highest political level. The President is the main actor, accompanied by the Prime Minister and

the Minister of Defence. Before formulating and implementing major changes in policy, a white paper is prepared by a commission. The white paper commission is made up of politicians, civil servants, scholars and military professionals. Based on this the French defence planning process is often characterised as open and inclusive. However, the white paper only functions as an agenda setting document, and policy is prepared close to the President. Thus, the members of the commission are not to be considered major players in the defence planning process. Once the policy has been prepared by the President, it is operationalised and implemented by the Ministry of Defence. In this regard the Minister of Defence plays an important role in translating the President's policy into concrete decisions on the shape and composition of the French Armed Forces. Inside the Ministry of Defence military professionals deliver input and prepare documents that can be used in the preparation and implementation of policy. Generally, it is the President and to a lesser extent the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence who are the main actors in French long-term defence planning. This is in some ways comparable to the British planning process. When looking at the NORDEFECO countries, only Finland seems comparable, primarily because of the presence of a President who is Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

SECONDARY ACTORS

A range of different bodies, units and persons function as secondary actors in the defence planning processes in the seven countries. Most of the secondary actors are connected to the military and deliver input to the process. However, some secondary actors are involved in giving advice on topics such as finances and international development. In all of the seven cases, the military functions as a supplier of information. Across the cases there is a great variety with regard to the formalisation and institutionalisation of this supply of information and also at what stage in the process the military information is supplied.

In Sweden, Finland and Norway military information is delivered to the political level in a formalised setting. In the Swedish case a military planning process runs parallel to the political planning process. Military input is given to the parliamentary committee that prepares the advisory document on defence, and military input is also given to the Ministry of Defence while this prepares its proposition to Parliament. In Finland, military input is given to the political level while the government programme, the government white paper and the MoD Strategy are being prepared. These inputs are given from the Defence Command. Thus, in both Sweden and Finland there is a need for military input and advice in the initial stages of the planning process. In both cases the autonomous Defence Command delivers these inputs. In Norway, the Defence Command is integrated into the Ministry of Defence, and this leads to a different delivery of military information into the political defence planning process. In the Norwegian process, the Minister of Defence sets out parameters for the planning process for the Chief of Defence who then produces

military advice. While doing this, the Chief of Defence receives military input from the services and the Defence Staff. Overall, Sweden, Finland and Norway are very similar in terms of military input into the defence planning process.

Denmark departs from the other Scandinavian countries in how military input is delivered into the planning process. While the delivery of military input is formalised in Sweden, Finland and Norway, it occurs in a more informal way in Denmark. The Danish military is engaged in two negotiating processes, but the engagement has no fixed structures, timetables or institutions. The Defence Command carries out and delivers analysis to the Ministry of Defence, the government committees and the political parties. Furthermore, analysis is produced at the Defence Command's own initiative and delivered to the different actors. Thus, military input is given at all stages of the planning process, but this is not set in formal structures. Instead, it is given when the negotiating actors ask for it. In preparation for the negotiations, the actors ask for analysis on specific subjects which the Defence Command then produces, gathering information from the operational command. This is different from the Swedish, Norwegian and Finnish cases in which the military input is set up in formalised structures. Compared to Sweden, Finland and Norway, the Danish case is not characterised by less military input but by fewer formal procedures for producing and delivering these inputs.

In the Dutch case, the military actors are engaged in the planning process in a rather formalised way. When the Policy Directorate in the Ministry of Defence finishes the *Policy Vision* the Defence Staff, including the Chief of Defence, updates the *Defence Plan*. While doing this, input is gathered from the Service Chiefs and the Operational Commands. Since the entire planning process is conducted within the integrated Ministry of Defence, the updating of the defence has a very formal structure. Thus, the inclusion of the military actors in the planning process is different from the Danish case and more like the Swedish, Finnish and Norwegian cases. Since the Dutch planning process is conducted within an integrated Ministry of Defence, the planning process can most closely be compared to the Norwegian process.

In the United Kingdom, the military actors are considered essential in delivering military advice into the planning process. In the previous defence reviews, military actors performed major roles in the preparation of policy, but this changed in the 2010 review. Military personnel did deliver input and expertise, but since the process was moved from the Ministry of Defence to the Cabinet Office, the military actors only gave advice when invited by the National Security Council. The Chief of the Defence Staff had a permanent seat in the Council. However, the process was not run by him but by the National Security Adviser and the Prime Minister. The green paper which initiated the review process was prepared in the Ministry of Defence, and military actors were engaged in this process. Thus, the military was engaged in the preparation for the review process through the integrated Ministry of Defence. This meant that the military were involved in the identification of the questions which needed to be answered. However, when the ques-

tions were answered the military were only included when invited by the National Security Council. In this way the British planning process is different from most of the other cases investigated. However, both the Danish and British processes are characterised by impromptu inclusion of military actors and advice. Thus, there is a slight resemblance between the British and Danish cases.

Unlike the British case, the military actors in France are included in the process in a formalised way. This is due to the direct link between the Armed Forces and the President. It is characteristic for the French planning process that the military is involved in the process at several stages. Since the President has the final say in the development of defence policy, it is very important that the Chief of Defence is secondary to the President and not to the Minister of Defence. In this way, the military input can be delivered into the process without the consent of the Ministry of Defence. If the President needs information, or the military actors wish to give the President information on some matter, this can quickly be arranged without interfering in the established procedures. When compared to the other cases, the greatest resemblance can be found in the Finnish case. However, this is mostly due to the fact that an extra political level, the President, is involved in the planning process. The French case is very different from the Swedish, Norwegian and Dutch cases in which the exchange of information is set in fixed structures. However, some elements of the French case can be viewed as similar to the Danish case, as the two cases share the informal exchange of information.

When looking at the seven cases included in the study, there is a difference in the role played by the defence ministries. In the Netherlands and Norway, the ministry is in charge of the process. In Sweden, Finland, Denmark and France, the ministries play a major role accompanied by other actors such as the cabinet, the Defence Command or the President. In the United Kingdom, the Ministry of Defence only plays a supporting role in the process, which is run by the Cabinet Office. Thus, the ministries of defence investigated in this study undertake different roles and have different kinds of influence on the defence planning processes. In countries where the planning processes are carried out at the highest political level (in the Cabinet, in government committees or by the President) the ministry of defence plays a supporting role or a role focused upon the concretisation and implementation of policy. This is the case in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, France and the United Kingdom. In Norway and the Netherlands, the planning process is carried out at the ministry level, primarily involving selected parts of the ministry and the minister. In both of these countries the civilian ministries and the military defence commands are integrated, thus making it possible to coordinate and plan the different stages of the process internally.

To a varying extent, the seven countries in the study all make use of experts, scholars and think tanks. Some countries, such as Norway, have a well-established tradition of using experts as consultants whereas for other countries this has been a recent addition to the planning processes. In most cases the use of experts is rather ad hoc and

informal. France is an obvious exception since experts and scholars are members of the white paper commission and therefore have more of an official role. However, the French white paper is a paper which passes recommendations to the President, who can then develop policy. In this way the inclusion of experts is more formalised in France, but the inclusion is primarily directed at giving input before the preparation of policy is initiated. In the countries where experts are not formally included, they often deliver advice and comment on the results but this can be through a variety of different roles, such as commentators in the media.

PROCESS

The process of defence planning takes a wide array of different forms in the seven countries. Some processes are long-lasting and inclusive whereas others are short and exclusive. In these sections the processes will be compared with regard to *frequency*, *outlook*, *structure* and *product*. Frequency is about the timing of the planning processes. How often is the planning process carried out and is the initiation of the processes controlled by a fixed timetable? The question of outlook addresses how far into the future planning is done for. Is the time horizon 4, 10 or 30 years? The notion of structure is about the institutions and working procedures that form the planning processes. Are certain working procedures established or is the planning carried out in a more ad hoc style? Finally, the products of the planning processes will be compared. This will primarily concern the number of planning documents and the role they play in the planning processes. By making use of these four analytical parameters it is possible to present a comparative overview of the planning processes in the seven countries.

FREQUENCY AND OUTLOOK

In the group of NORDEFECO countries there is a general trend that defence planning occurs at a political level approximately every fourth year. In Denmark it is every fifth year, in Finland it is every fourth year and in Sweden and Norway is around every fourth year. For Denmark and Finland the frequency is well established and no changes will happen unless influential exogenous events demand a reaction. In Sweden *Forsvarsbeslut* (defence bills) are passed at irregular intervals every third to fifth year. These are initiated and prepared by the Cabinet and then passed by Parliament. As for Norway, the newly introduced planning system is set up to be continuous. However, in reality, Parliament has proved to be unprepared to give up the production of four-year policy documents, and it is therefore expected that the Norwegian Ministry of Defence will keep producing policy document in a four-year cycle. Thus, some resemblance is visible within the NORDEFECO countries when looking at the frequency of policy documents. However, this should be considered in relation to the production of other planning documents such as defence plans produced by the military.

In the Netherlands the *Policy Vision* has a four-year outlook, but the document is closely linked to the government in power. This means that a new policy paper is made when a new government takes office, which in the Netherlands often happens more than once every four years. Thus, policy papers are prepared and presented more frequently in the Netherlands than in the group of NORDEFECO countries. However, this is not due to formal structures but to the political landscape and dynamics of the Netherlands.

Both France and the United Kingdom produce policy papers in a much more ad hoc fashion than in the group of NORDEFECO countries and the Netherlands. In neither the French nor the British case does any institution or structure determine the frequency of policy papers. It is therefore up to the political leadership to decide when a new policy paper is needed. In France, the 2008 *White Paper* followed white papers of 1972 and 1994. As for the United Kingdom, the 2010 Defence and Security Review followed the 1990 and 1997 defence reviews. Some policy papers have remained in use for long periods of time, while others have had a much shorter lifespan. Though it seems plausible to suggest that the production of policy papers in France and the United Kingdom is linked to exogenous changes this might be a premature conclusion. Neither France nor the United Kingdom produced a new policy paper after the terrorist attacks on New York, London and Madrid or the engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead other considerations seemed to guide the defence planning processes. However, determining these considerations is outside of the scope of this study.

The production of a policy paper on long-term defence planning is often closely linked to one or more military documents. These documents often have a longer outlook than the policy documents. While the policy documents are prepared within the political landscape of elections, political negotiations and critical medias, the military is able to do planning in a more technical fashion. As seen in the cases this requires a dual production of a policy paper and a defence plan that are distinct but interlinked.

Within the group of NORDEFECO countries, Norway, Sweden and Finland produce defence plans made by the military professionals, the Norwegian document is better defined as professional advice to the government. Thus, it is closely linked to the policy document (the proposition made by the Ministry of Defence) and does not contain different outlooks for the future than those in the policy document. The continuous planning style recently adopted by Norway is partly based on the assumption that there are limits to how far into the future it is possible to plan. Therefore it is necessary to continuously adapt military planning. In Sweden and Finland the four-year (or three- to five-year) policy documents are closely linked to the military documents that have a much longer outlook. In Sweden the defence planning process runs in two parallel lines. The first line is the political process where the Ministry prepares a proposition to Parliament, and Parliament then pass a defence decision (*Forsvarsbeslut*). The second line is carried out in the military headquarters and encompasses a medium- and a long-term outlook. The medium-term outlook is done by the Plans and Finance Department in ten-year devel-

opment plans. In the Policy and Plan Department the long-term outlook is addressed in military-strategic assessments and future studies, that have timeframes of up to 20 years. With regard to military outlook in the planning process, Finland shares some similarities with Sweden. While the policy documents (the *Government White Paper*), stating the objectives of the Finnish defence, are produced every four-years, the military documents, stating how the objectives are to be reached, are produced with an outlook of 12 (the *Defence Forces Strategy*) and 25–30 years (the Ministry of Defence Strategy). Hence, the fixed four-year frequency of the white papers is supplemented by the longer outlook of the military documents.

In comparison with defence planning in Norway, Sweden and Finland, the planning process in Denmark is characterised by a rather short-term outlook. This is primarily due to the tradition of defence planning being done through parliamentary *defence agreements*. These are five-year agreements between the political parties about resource allocation and development and use of the Armed Forces. The Defence Command, the Ministry of Defence and the Operational Commands deliver input into the negotiation of the agreements, but do not produce distinct documents with a longer outlook. Instead the long-term perspective is gained by making defence agreements with support from most of the parties in Parliament, thus ensuring that a new government will not turn the defence policy completely around. However, Denmark has no documents going beyond the five-year outlook that are formally linked to the defence agreements. Defence Commissions addressing the long-term perspective have been established in an ad hoc way, but these have not had a significant influence on the planning processes.

In the Netherlands, the four-year policy document (the *Policy Vision*) is supplemented by a ten-year Defence Plan. The plan sets out the relationship between objectives, activities and resources and is revisited every fourth year. Since governments in the Netherlands often change before the end of the four year period, the *Policy Vision* is often corrected. This means in practice that the Defence Plan is updated more than once every four years. In some ways, the updating of the Defence Plan has been an attempt to link the policy document with the long-term military perspective. Yet, as described in the chapter on the Netherlands this effort has only been partially successful, which means that the long-term perspective is lacking in Dutch defence planning.

In the French and the British cases, the long-term perspective is, as in the Swedish and Finnish cases, prepared and presented by the military. While the French white paper and the British *Strategic Defence and Security Review* do address the long-term perspective, they are infrequently produced at irregular intervals. Therefore there is a great need in the military for long-term defence planning. In terms of outlook the British and the French cases are very different from the Danish and the Dutch planning processes and a bit more similar to the Norwegian, the Swedish and the Finnish. However, it is also clear that the planning processes in France and the United Kingdom occur on a much larger

scale. This means that the informally produced policy documents are supplemented by a wide array of military documents addressing the planning issue.

STRUCTURING OF THE PROCESSES

Within the group of NORDEFECO countries there is a clear divide with regard to the existence of structures that guide the planning processes. Sweden and Finland have clear and well-established structures, the structures in the Norwegian process have recently been adjusted, and the Danish process is almost without structures.

In both Sweden and Finland the planning processes take place within well-established structures, as is characteristic for the countries. A notable feature of the two planning processes is the production of several policy papers (*Defence Bills, White Paper*) and military documents (*FMSI, FMUP, Ministry of Defence Strategy*) that each perform a function in the ongoing process. The production of these documents is formalised, which means that the entire defence planning process centres on the development of these documents. Each sequence is based upon preceding documents and produces a basis for forthcoming sequences and documents. Generally this means that the defence planning processes in both Sweden and Finland are shaped by well-established structures that determine the workflow, the rhythm and the content of the different planning sequences. With regard to structure, the Norwegian planning process is to some degree comparable to the Swedish and the Finnish. This is primarily due to the workflow inside the integrated Ministry of Defence. The Minister initiates the process by giving the Chief of Defence parameters for the military part of the process. Based on these the Chief of Defence produces *military advice* upon which the Ministry of Defence produce a proposition for Parliament. Generally, the Norwegian planning process has some well-established structures concerning the workings of, and the relationship between, the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Defence and the Ministry of Defence. However, inside these broad structures the processes unfold in a less predetermined way than in Sweden and Finland.

As for Denmark, there are almost no well-established or fixed structures in the defence planning process. The process centres on the negotiation of a defence agreement in the government and in Parliament. Thus, the two structures forming the Danish planning process are the nature of the final product and the way that the final product has been shaped and agreed upon. This means that there are no well-established structures guiding the work of the Defence Command, the Ministry of Defence or the government. Instead each of these actors engage in the process based on former practices and experiences. In comparison to Sweden and Finland, the Danish process can appear completely unstructured, yet, this is not case. As in Norway, some structures are in place guiding the process with regard to content and workflow. However, Norway and Denmark differ as to the formalisation of these general structures. While Norway has a very clear separation and delegation of power between the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Defence, as

well as inside the integrated Ministry of Defence, Denmark only has a few broad structures in place, which says little about the roles of the different participants.

The Dutch planning process is similar to the Swedish and Finnish when looking at the structures guiding the processes. As in Sweden and Finland the planning process is composed of a range of different parts which follow sequentially. Inside the integrated Ministry of Defence, different ministerial departments are responsible for the different parts of the process (writing the *Policy Vision*, writing the *Defence Plan* and producing the annual budget). Embedding each part of the process in a ministry department ensures that the process is set to firm structures and that each actor has a specific role and workflow.

In terms of structure the French and the British planning processes are different from the group of NORDEFECO countries and the Netherlands. However, the French and British processes are also different from each other. While the French planning process is embedded within a few general structures, the British planning process seems to be almost without predetermined structures. In France the establishment of a white paper committee appointed by the President and the production of a white paper are well-established parts of the process. Since the production of a white paper is a rare occurrence, the French Ministry of Defence produces military programme laws in accordance with the policy set out by the President. The *30-year Perpetual Plan* and the Chief of Defence perform important roles in the drafting and preparation of the policy. Thus, the French planning process is highly influenced by structures but in a different way than in Sweden, Finland and Norway. While the planning processes in Sweden, Finland and Norway are structured in terms of workflow and roles, the French process is structured with regard to input. The development and preparation of policy is for the President to decide and these parts are not controlled by predetermined structures. The British defence planning process can be compared to the Danish process in terms of structure. Both countries conduct the planning process within a general structure (respectively defence agreements and defence reviews), but no structure seems to be in place besides these overall labels. In Denmark the process is shaped by the political tradition of parliamentary negotiations, which in some ways structure the process. In the United Kingdom no such traditions are in place, and the processes are subject to change in terms of workflow, roles and content. The last British defence review was carried out in a completely different way to the previous review, changing the setting, the actors and the content. In comparison to the other countries in the study the British planning process seems unstructured and changeable.

Based upon the varying degree of structures in the defence planning processes investigated in this study, it seems relevant to reflect on the reasons for this variation. However, this goes beyond the descriptive ambitions of the study. Yet, the interviews carried out in the different countries gave some indications of what the guiding logic or motivations were that had formed the structures (or lack of structures) in the planning processes. In

the countries with the most well-established structures there seems to be a considerable amount of attention paid to what is perceived as sound bureaucratic practice. The planning processes must be systematic and unbiased. This view of the process seems to be present in Sweden, the Netherlands and to some degree Norway. The Finnish planning process seems to be partly based on the same view but at least one other consideration is present. In Finland, the logic of good and sound bureaucracy is combined with a classical realist logic emphasising the threat from Russia. This threat is not expected to disappear within a short- or medium-term outlook. In Denmark the planning process seems to be guided by a logic focusing upon the beneficial aspects of the negotiations. The interviewees highlight the fact that deliberation and negotiation result in common understanding of problems, challenges and solutions. Based on this common understanding, agreements can be made which are well-crafted in terms of content, and which are also solid for the future, since most parties in Parliament support the agreements. Thus, the guiding logic in Denmark seems to be that the best decisions are made through informal deliberation and negotiation. In the United Kingdom and France the planning processes are initiated and controlled at the highest political level, by respectively the Cabinet and the President. In the United Kingdom the process seems to be formed by the notion that the executive must be able to act; a common feature in political systems with majority governments. The 2010 defence review followed this tradition in that the government took charge and chose a new format for the planning process. The French planning process on the other hand is highly influenced by the presence of the President who is Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The French President is often presented as being *above* the political parties representing the unity of the state. Since the President is directly elected by the people of France, the President holds a high degree of legitimacy and political authority within the political system. The presidential control and ownership of the defence planning process stems from this legitimacy and political authority.

PRODUCT

Following the definition of long-term defence planning presented in the introduction of this report, a final aspect of the planning process is the products (white papers, green papers, brief analyses etc.) which are prepared and presented. Based upon the presentations in the former chapters two aspects seem to be most relevant when looking at the products: first, how many official documents are produced, and second, for what purpose.

In all but one case (Denmark) several official documents are produced. In Sweden, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands and France documents are produced at both the political and military level and these are linked in the process before policy is decided upon and implemented. In the first four countries this happens sequentially, where a *Policy Vision* is developed by the executive and the Chief of Defence then updates or rewrites a *Defence Plan*. Thus, at least two documents are produced which are closely related. In

France, the document known as the PP30, (DGA 2010a) is continuously updated and used as input at the political level. In the UK no official documents are produced by the military alone. Instead three interlinked documents are produced at the political level. First, a green paper is presented by the integrated Ministry of Defence identifying and posing the questions that need to be answered. Second, the government (formerly the Ministry of Defence but most recently the Cabinet Office) produces a *National Security Strategy* and a *Strategic Defence and Security Review*. These documents answer the questions set out in the green paper. The former identifies the main threats to national security and the latter describes how the United Kingdom will handle these threats. In this context Denmark is the odd one out. Denmark only produces one document, and this is prepared in the government and negotiated in Parliament. Input is given from the military and the Ministry of Defence, but none of this is given in official documents. Thus, in the Danish case there is no established structure that ensures that the political level is informed by the military. Yet, this has not proved to be a problem since the negotiating process establishes a dialogue between the political and the military levels.

Lastly, it is worth looking at the way the official documents are used in the planning processes. Generally speaking, in all countries but France the main planning document is also a policy document. This means that the documents are the final product of the political planning process, which is then given to the military and the ministry of defence for implementation. In France the process is a bit different. The French white paper is not a policy document in the same way as the Danish *Defence Agreement* or the Dutch *Policy Vision*. Instead the French white paper is a recommendation to the President on which the President can then act. The white paper is followed by five-year military programme laws that are policy documents. Thus, the French planning process is largely centred on the production of a recommendation document which is turned into policy by the President. Overall, it is a general feature that the documents produced at the political level are policy documents which are turned into law. However, in France this is done in a two-part process where recommendations are first prepared before a final policy document is presented.

PLANNING DIVERSITY

The planning schemes used in the seven states are highly diverse. The differences apply to both the organisation and the processes of long-term defence planning. There are differences in who the main and secondary actors are, and also in the time schedules, outlooks, structures and products of the processes. Thus, overall our analysis shows that the planning schemes used are more different than they are alike.

The study has shown great variety regarding who the main actors in the planning processes are. In most of the countries the planning processes are carried out by several actors, most often with one actor being in charge of the process. When comparing the cases differences can be identified with regard to this one actor. The following have

been identified as main actors: the Minister of Defence, the Ministry of Defence, the Cabinet Office, the government, government committees and the President. Following this variety the secondary actors supporting the processes also differ between the cases. Furthermore it should be noted that the formalisation of the relations between the actors varies between the cases. In some countries the relations are highly formalised (Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and to some extent Norway) whereas the relations in other countries are much looser (Denmark, the United Kingdom and to some extent France).

The planning processes in the seven countries are also quite different in terms of frequency, outlook, structures and products. Some of the countries initiate a new planning process at fixed intervals (most notably Finland, Denmark and to some extent Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands), yet others initiate planning processes in an ad hoc fashion (France and the United Kingdom). The Norwegian “continuous system” is also centred on a more-or-less four year cycle, but with allowance for adjustments. The frequencies are to some extent related to the outlooks being used in the planning processes. In Norway and the Netherlands the outlook is shorter, and in Denmark the outlook seems to coincide with the four-year defence agreements. In the cases where the political and the military parts of the processes are separated, in Finland and particularly in Sweden, the military outlook tends to be much longer than the political one. Thus, there are differences in how far into the future the seven countries think it is possible to plan. In terms of the structures of the processes the seven countries can, in a very simplified way, be grouped as having either well-established structures (Finland, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands and to some degree France) or having structures which are established in an ad hoc manner (Denmark and the United Kingdom). In the countries without well-established structures the planning processes are conducted in varying ways. In comparison to this, the planning processes in the other countries are conducted in workflows where each stage is set in a fixed sequence. Finally, it is a common feature of the seven countries that the processes are aimed at producing a policy document (with France as the only exception). In most of the countries, military documents are also prepared, but this is primarily done either to support the production of the policy document or to implement it.

At a more abstract level, it is possible to identify three common features of the planning schemes in the seven countries. First, the major guidelines are decided at the political level. Second, the guidelines decided by the politicians are implemented by civil servants and military professionals. Third, parliaments are involved at the budgetary level and oversee the whole process. These features can come as no surprise since they are a general characteristic of modern Western democracies. It is still worth mentioning since the military is sometimes referred to as a “state within the state”. However, this study finds no indication of the military acting autonomously in the planning processes.

The clearest and most general finding of the study is that long-term defence planning is conducted within national entities with distinct political systems and constitu-

tional practices. The planning processes are to a large extent formed by the customs, traditions and workflows within the political and bureaucratic systems of each country. In some countries the notion of sound management seems to be steering the processes (Sweden and to some extent the Netherlands). Other countries seem to focus on threats and geopolitics (Finland), the positive value of deliberation and negotiations (Denmark and the Netherlands) or the ability to continuously adjust the planning (Norway). As shown in the former chapters, the planning processes in France and the United Kingdom are also clearly marked by the political landscape in which they unfold.

For the NORDEF countries the findings of the study should be taken into consideration when preparing and planning defence cooperation. Based upon the findings, it seems that it might be difficult to bring common planning processes into place. This is not only due to the actual practice but also to the ambitions and considerations that form and support the planning schemes. However, taking the differences into consideration there seems to be areas where there is room for cooperation, for example acquisition of capabilities, which would not challenge established practices. Yet, when contemplating further cooperation, the prevailing diversity should be kept in mind.

ENDNOTES

- 1 The NATO Handbook set out to describe a standardised approach to LTDP based on an analysis of “best practices”. As far as we can see, it does not appear that any of the NATO countries studied follow the approach recommended in the handbook.
It is also worth noting that the NATO Handbook uses the term “nation”, whereas we prefer the terms “state” and “country”, as the areas we have researched are all independent legal states.
- 2 “Frequency” – how often defence planning is conducted. In some countries the planning process unfolds in a cycle covering four to five years, in other countries the planning process unfolds in a continuous manner and in other countries the planning processes are initiated in an ad hoc manner. “Outlook” – the time horizon that is used in the planning process. “Structures” – specialised agencies, such as bureaucracies, administrative agencies, ministerial units or well-established political institutions, that perform functions that in turn enable the government to formulate, implement and enforce its policies (Strøm, 2004: 26). Products: Most defence planning is conducted by producing formal (to a greater or lesser degree) documents that identify and describe future challenges and provide recommendations and/or policy.
- 3 As a part of the four Danish opt-outs from the Maastricht treaty/Edinburgh Agreement 1992.
- 4 “Lov om Forsvarets formål, opgaver og organisation” (law nr. 122, 27 February 2001).
- 5 Constitutionally, commander in chief of the Danish Armed Forces is the Head of State which is the Queen (§19 of the constitution). However, the constitution also states (§12, §13, and §14 of the constitution) that the Government is exercising the authority of the Queen. In practical terms this means that the Government is to be considered commander in chief. The delegation of authority inside the Government is undecided in the Danish case, and so, both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence seem to hold authority. Furthermore, the Chief of Defence seems to hold a degree of operational autonomy, but it is unclear how far this autonomy can be stretched when Denmark engages in armed conflicts.
- 6 The first defence commission was established in 1866 following the loss of the southern duchies Schleswig and Holstein in the war of 1864. Since then Denmark has had seven defence commissions.
- 7 Predecessors to the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) were called Strategic Defence Reviews (SDR). By including the security element it was made possible to include ministries other than the Ministry of Defence and agendas other than force structure.
- 8 Britain has the fourth or fifth (depending on the exchange rate used) largest defence budget in the world. Only the United States of America, China and Russia have larger defence expenditures, while France has a comparable expenditure (SIPRI 2011).
- 9 This was done in the speech “Britain’s foreign policy in a networked world” held in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 1 July 2010.

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