



Forsvarets stabsskole

Forsvarets stabsskole  
Skriftserie

The Evolution in Intelligence Support  
to Military Operations since 1991



Volume 1  
Issue 2  
2011

Volume 1, Issue 2

**FORSVARET**

The Evolution in Intelligence Support  
to Military Operations since 1991:

Why and How Did the New, Closer Cooperation  
between the Strategic, Operational  
and Tactical levels evolve?



Bjørn Aksel Sund

## The Evolution in Intelligence Support to Military Operations since 1991:

Why and How Did the New, Closer Cooperation  
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Forsvarets stabsskoles skriftserie har til formål å synliggjøre interessante og tidsriktige temaer knyttet til militær virksomhet, uten å fremstå som for teoretisk tung eller uten feste i militære operasjoner. Serien skal være et forum hvor militærteori møter operasjonell virksomhet, med tilgjengeliggjøring som formål. Skriftserien er tenkt å ha 4 utgivelser årlig og skal speile aktivitet og satsingsområder hos Stabsskolens forskjellige avdelinger. Opplaget er på ca 1400. Synspunktene som kommer til uttrykk i skriftserien står for forfatterens egen regning, og er således ikke et uttrykk for Forsvarets eller Forsvarets stabsskoles offisielle syn. Gjengivelse av innholdet i skriftserien, helt eller delvis, må kun skje med forfatterens samtykke. Redaksjonen oppfordrer militære og sivile som har manuskripter som kan passe til skriftseriens format og formål om å sende disse inn til vurdering. Ta gjerne kontakt med redaksjonen ved usikkerhet om manuskriptets egnethet.

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ISSN 1892-6126

Bilder: Forsvarets mediesenter

Grafisk design, layout & produksjon:

FAKT RSF-Oslo/Grafisk, Simen Grønseth

Trykk:

Br Fossum

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## Forord

Slutten på den kalde krigen og bortfallet av det mer statiske trusselbildet som Sovjetunionen og Øst-Blokken representerte, førte til store endringer i vestlige lands militære etterretningstjenester. I denne andre utgivelsen av Forsvarets stabsskoles skriftserie tar forfatteren for seg hvordan vestlig militær etterretning har utviklet seg etter Sovjetunionens sammenbrudd. Utgivelsen er en noe redigert versjon av Bjørn Aksel Sunds masteroppgave fra King's College, London.


Den kalde krigens slutt førte ikke til det den amerikanske statsviteren Francis Fukuyama i 1989 beskrev som "The end of History" med hensyn til menneskehetens ideologiske utvikling gjennom demokratiets endelige seier, og dermed en fredeligere verden. Tvert i mot blusset gamle latente konflikter opp igjen, og førte til en tilsynelatende mer konfliktfylt verden. Endringer i de internasjonale maktforholdene bidro til å øke forekomsten av militære intervensjoner, oftest gjennomført av vestlige land innen en NATO-, FN-, EU- eller koalisjonsramme. Utviklingen førte til et vesentlig endret og mer dynamisk behov for militær etterretningsstøtte både på strategisk, operasjonelt og taktisk nivå. Den gjorde seg i høy grad også gjeldende i Norge gjennom deltagelsen i operasjonene på for eksempel Balkan og i Afghanistan.

I følge forfatteren var vestlig etterretning dårlig rustet til å gi mer dynamisk støtte til de nye militære operasjonene. Etterretningsorganisasjonene var fra starten preget av statiske tankesett, liten oppfinnsomhet, svak innsikt i andre kulturer og deres tenkemåter samt utstrakt intern konkurranse. Gjennom en serie av casestudier søker han å dokumentere hvordan militær etterretningsstøtte har utviklet seg til dagens nivå, gjennom det han kaller en evolusjon over de siste 15 årene.

Den utvikling forfatteren beskriver kjenner vi igjen når det gjelder norsk etterretning. Gjennom enkelte medieoppslag er vi kjent med at norsk etterretning var aktive og gav tidsriktig og verdifull etterretning til alle nivåer fra et tidlig tidspunkt på Balkan ut over 1990-tallet. Vi vet at vår etterretningsorganisasjons innsats er avgjørende for effektiviteten av operasjonene vi gjennomfører i Afghanistan, og ikke minst sikkerheten til personellet som gjennomfører dem. I dette



perspektivet er utgivelsen av Bjørn Aksel Sunds masteroppgave fra King's College i London vel verdt å lese.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Håkon Tronstad', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Håkon Tronstad  
Sjef Forsvarets stabsskole

## Introduction

The end of the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was greeted by the 'Free World' as the ultimate triumph of the Western liberal democracies, yet despite this, the old Cold War was converted into new wars that were 'hot' rather than cold. When Francis Fukuyama hailed the arrival of 'the end of history'<sup>1</sup> (nothing less), swords began to be beaten into ploughshares<sup>2</sup> in both East and West. Friendship should now replace enmity; trust should succeed suspicion. And indeed: some former foes became friends (sort of), and former opponents opened up to the prospect of trade, trust and cooperation. Large, standing armies were to be substantially reduced, stockpiled arrays of weapons started to be scrapped, and defence-related activities were downsized – including intelligence. It seemed logical, especially to politicians who could see better use for the billions spent on intelligence,<sup>3</sup> to also cut intelligence budgets<sup>4</sup> in this new era of (expected) peace – and so they did.<sup>5</sup>

Alas, this idyll lasted for less than two years.<sup>6</sup> The Garden of Eden housed snakes, now free to pray under improved living conditions. As observed by former CIA director James Woolsey: '(...) the CIA had fought a dragon for forty years but now faced lots of poisonous snakes (...)'.<sup>7</sup> Now ancient ethnic and religious tensions and unsettled disputes that had been suppressed for decades re-emerged, whereas nationalism replaced communism in Eastern Europe. After decades of serving as battlegrounds for proxy wars, similar events took place in Africa and the Middle East, where Iraq's despotic ruler, Saddam Hussein (practically bankrupt after ten years of war with Iran) soon found it too tempting to resist invading the (rich) small neighbour of Kuwait. Adding to all this: hatred fermented among extreme Islamists, especially in Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Jordan, Yemen and Iran.

Consequently, the West has, either in the shape of NATO- or UN-mandated missions, or as multilateral coalitions, been engaged in a number of wars and conflicts since 1991 – and it still is.

The aim of this paper is to explore how intelligence Support to Military Operations (SMO) has performed since 1991, starting with a historical outline to define what Military Intelligence (MI) is. It will then, based on a sufficient understanding of intelligence/MI (its possibilities as well as limits) proceed in turn to investigate how MI has developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It will be argued that notions implying 'revolutionary' changes should be discarded, serving only to confuse what intelligence/MI is, how it should be used and what it may not be able to do. Rather, as will be demonstrated, an

evolution is ever ongoing, and the most important lessons learned for the craft of MI in the Post-Cold War era will be identified through selected case studies of the most important wars involving Western MI since 1991. Intelligence, by its nature 'secret', poses certain challenges to students and scholars who write UNCLASSIFIED works. Hence, the research for this paper has been carried out through an extensive literature review of the topics covered. Findings in the literature, reports and articles are supplemented (and controlled) by interviewing four military officers – two UK and two Norwegian – who in sum possess extensive, first-hand experience from not only a broad range of military service (MI included), but also active service in the operations analysed here.

It will be demonstrated that Western Intelligence – MI included – was poorly suited to meet the new Post-Cold War challenges, but even more disturbing: that it took most of the period in question before signs of real improvements were seen. It will be argued that the major reasons for these shortcomings are basically of a human, psychological nature: lack of cognition, imagination and insight into other cultures and hence into foreign mindsets (terrorist mindsets included), lack of timeliness and progress, combined with a destructive level of both intra- and inter-agency rivalry and hence a lack of will and ability to join forces and to co-operate.

Nevertheless, there are signs of improvements. The major research finding is that a closer cooperation between the strategic, operational and tactical intelligence levels is emerging, above all in the shape of a little known, little published MI activity called National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs) and a few, related units sharing the NIST attitude towards MI. This paper will conclude that NISTs are seemingly the best examples today, not only on how MI, but intelligence overall should work: drawing upon and combining the best resources available in both military and civilian intelligence, and from all levels.

# 1) The Foe Behind the Hill.

## A Historic Outline of Military Intelligence and its Role in Military Operations

*‘The Duke of Wellington was once asked what he did during the long, lonely hours of the night before a major battle was due to take place. He could not sleep, the Duke replied, because his mind was obsessed with one question. A question he asked himself over and over: “What’s on the other side of the hill?”’*<sup>8</sup>

Military Intelligence (MI) originates from a military commander’s need to have the crucial question of ‘what’s on the other side of the hill’ answered. The commander will always need to know as much as possible about his foe: its weaponry, strengths and weaknesses, capacities and capabilities.<sup>9</sup> All through history have military commanders asked themselves the same question, long before the Duke of Wellington, and they still do on today’s battlefields.<sup>10</sup> This demonstrates that the main characteristics of MI were known and practised centuries – even millennia ago. They were in use at least since the time of the biblical descriptions of the first mission to send selected tribesmen out to ‘go spy the land’.<sup>11</sup> That said, some scholars trace the heritage of MI even further back in history. The basic disagreements seem to swivel around the question of how rudimentary the craft of intelligence gathering can be and still be acknowledgeable as ‘MI’. There are scholars who see MI as old as the history of man.<sup>12</sup> Or in the words of the former inspector general of the CIA, Frederick P. Hitz:

*‘(...) Tribes, ethnicities, and other authorities have always wanted to know what their enemies or rivals were planning to do to them or how they might act to protect a perceived vital interest. If the rival power refused to share the information, it had to be stolen or suborned (...)’*<sup>13</sup>

Professor Arther Ferrill traces organised MI back to the very earliest stages of history, arguing that even prehistoric clans in the Neolithic period had developed a system of ‘spies and scouts’ which should be recognised as MI.<sup>14</sup> Peter Gudgin argues along the same lines, claiming that MI is ‘as old as warfare itself’,<sup>15</sup> as does Michael Handel.<sup>16</sup> To determine whether this is a plausible view, one needs to decide if the most basic principles of ‘scouting and spying’ are considered sufficient to be regarded as (early) MI. This is basically a matter of choice. The scholars mentioned above are among those who view the history

of MI along these lines, hence their stance that MI is as old as history itself – a perfectly sound perception.

However, other scholars may acknowledge the existence in principle of rudimentary MI since the earliest times, but rather regard a more developed level of the craft as being MI in the way the term is understood today. Among them is Christopher Andrew, who seems to regard medieval Europe as the cradle of ‘modern’ MI, since this was the era when spying and espionage became a profession in its own right.<sup>17</sup> Andrew cites Christopher Allmand, as the latter claims that the end of the Middle Ages was the time when espionage really became important, ‘(...) “this was the period when (spies) first really came into their own”’.<sup>18</sup> Christopher Andrew further underlines that the first ‘modern’ European intelligence branch emerged in Elizabethan England, under the Queen’s Spymaster Sir Francis Walsingham, who created an advanced spy network operating all over Europe.<sup>19</sup>

Nevertheless, there is one major obstacle to neglecting pre-Middle Ages MI as being too rudimentary to be viewed as MI: the detailed, ancient texts of (or at least attributed to) Sun Tzu going back to the 6th century BC. In ‘The Art of War’, the main principles and the core questions, as well as the crucial role of MI in any military campaign, are all outlined. This being so, it can be stated that the fundamentals of Military Intelligence were established more than 2,500 years ago. Sun Tzu says that without sufficient MI, no general should go to war, since MI is the prerequisite for victory: ‘One who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. (...)’.<sup>20</sup> Sun Tzu’s teachings on MI underline the importance of collecting intelligence on not only every vital aspect of the enemy: its lords and generals, and their skills, plans and intents, but also their soldiers, their fighting standard and level of motivation. He points out the importance of knowing the terrain and infrastructure (the land on which to advance, camp, defend or attack) and its importance for a successful outcome of the battle: the (...) ‘topography of mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wetlands and marshes (...)’,<sup>21</sup> in other words: terrain and climate.

But Sun Tzu does not stop there, because no MI teachings would be complete without emphasising the very means necessary to collect information and intelligence: spies, infiltrators and agents. After describing the main types of spies available to a military commander, Sun Tzu teaches that ‘(...) advance knowledge cannot be gained from ghosts and spirits, (...) but must be gained from men for it is the knowledge of the enemy’s true situation.’<sup>22</sup>

Finally, Sun Tzu even reflects upon the psychological bounds between a good agent and his/her master, as well as between intelligence professionals: ‘(...) no relationship is closer than with spies, no rewards are more generous than those given to spies, no affairs are more secret than those pertaining to spies’.<sup>23</sup> The importance of these words has (out of necessity) been rediscovered by Western Intelligence since 1991, as will be demonstrated in the final chapter of this paper.

However, there is one impediment to seeing Sun Tzu’s writings as evidence of an unbroken lineage of such an advanced MI worldwide: they were unknown outside the borders of China until they were translated into French in 1772.<sup>24</sup> That said, it may safely be assumed that the craft of MI was carried out pretty much along the lines described by Sun Tzu in every war, simply because of the nature of warfare.<sup>25</sup> As demonstrated, wherever and whenever there is a battle to be fought, the military commander will need to ask the same questions: where is the enemy? What are his strengths and weaknesses? How is the terrain? How should I best utilise my spies and agents? In other words: every major MI principle observed and described by Sun Tzu.

European writings on MI occurred much later, although European military commanders also relied upon MI throughout the history of warfare. But it was not until Carl von Clausewitz wrote his ‘On War’ and Baron de Jomini published his ‘The Art of War’ some 200 years after Walsingham’s efforts to create a ‘modern’ spy network in the 1570’s,<sup>26</sup> that major philosophical texts dealt with MI in a broader context. Von Clausewitz is traditionally viewed as rather sceptical of the usefulness of MI,<sup>27</sup> and admittedly he is seemingly less impressed by the level of certainty, accuracy, and hence usefulness, of the intelligence he had experienced himself.<sup>28</sup> It falls outside the limits of this paper to analyse this any deeper, but it should be underlined that even von Clausewitz does describe intelligence as being ‘(...) the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations.(...)’.<sup>29</sup> Bearing in mind that von Clausewitz regarded intelligence as being ‘(...) every sort of information about the enemy and his country (...)’,<sup>30</sup> which indicates that von Clausewitz acknowledged the need to possess this information (intelligence), but was sceptical towards the MI personnel available to military commanders in his days, and their (lack of) ability to provide their commanders with actionable intelligence. Von Clausewitz, like every military commander in history, was deeply concerned about the ‘fog and friction of war’.<sup>31</sup> What von Clausewitz does though is observe the difficulties implied in MI, and the caution any commander should take when dealing with the intelligence s/he is provided with:

*'The great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently—like the effect of a fog or moonshine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions and [an] unnatural appearance'.<sup>32</sup>*

This encapsulates yet another important aspect of intelligence: its incompleteness and hence its limitations. These words of warning from von Clausewitz are both timeless and timely, as repeatedly demonstrated through history. Christopher Andrew is among the many thinkers on intelligence to underline this, as he warns about three fundamental challenges when dealing with MI.<sup>33</sup> First, he states, MI should not be wholly entrusted to civilians. Military knowledge and experience is paramount to fully understanding and conducting MI. Second, Andrew underlines that MI cannot operate in isolation: a military threat cannot be understood without political as well as military intelligence. In his own words: '(...) Civil-military relations will never be free from tension. But intelligence, like warfare, works best when “frocks” and “brass hats” co-operate. (...)'.<sup>34</sup> Andrew's third point is simply that MI has its limitations, due to it being no exact science. MI is fundamentally both 'fallible and indispensable', as he states. These views correlate with any major works on intelligence today. MI can never be anything else, or anything more, than a 'best assessment' based on the sum of the information made available by its collectors, and the skills of the analysts processing it. Finally, it also depends on the skills of the users when being presented with it.<sup>35</sup> Colonel Hughes-Wilson has reflected on these matters, and has concluded that, in his own words:

*'(...) the great tasks of intelligence will remain. Information will still need to be collected. If the State is at risk – from whatever area – then some kind of defence is part of the contract between the governed and their government. (...) As long as there are nation states that compete and as long as those states harbour secrets, intelligence will remain a permanent fixture of foreign affairs, diplomacy and the relationship between states. Nations will always need to spy on each other. Intelligence will still be needed in the twenty-first century because human nature and human reactions will not change.'<sup>36</sup>*

That said, the importance of MI has never changed, even up until today, as best illustrated by an excerpt from today's US Manual on 'Military Intelligence'. Here it is firmly stated that:

*'The most important purpose of intelligence is to influence decisionmaking. Commanders must receive the intelligence, understand it (because it is tailored to the commander's requirements), believe it, and act on it. Through this doctrinal concept, intelligence drives operations'.<sup>37</sup>*

## **Developing MI: Through Steady Evolution or Occasional Revolutions?**

The title of this paper uses the term 'evolution'. This is a deliberate choice, based on a particular view on MI that disputes the notion that any 'revolutions' have happened within intelligence since 1991. But as outlined in the previous paragraph, MI's main aims and tasks have in principle not altered since the earliest stages of its existence. Yet despite this, even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, elements in the US defence establishments, politicians and officers alike, began talking about 'Revolutions in Military Affairs' (RMI).<sup>38</sup> Euphoric believers in the unlimited possibilities of new technology predicted 'push-the-button'-wars, where invisible bombers, smart weapons and remote controlled missiles guaranteed total, instant victories.<sup>39</sup> The First Gulf War in 1991 initially seemed to fuel this vision of a 'Television War' with precision guided weapons penetrating windows of choice instead of gory ground battles.<sup>40</sup> Nonetheless, it did not take long before it was realised that boots on the ground were required to gain some degree of control of the situation after the bombs had done the only thing bombs can do: kill and destroy.<sup>41</sup>

Visions like these had their days though, also within the field of intelligence. Some scholars even started to write about 'Revolutions in Intelligence Affairs'. Among these was William N. Nolte, who went from initial support of this notion to later rejecting such ideas.<sup>42</sup> Nolte concluded by acknowledging that there was nothing to justify the term 'revolution' in the development of MI. That said, as the shortcomings of mere air campaigns became obvious, the air went out of the RMA balloon. Scheuer states that RMA was 'both a failure and a hoax',<sup>43</sup> quoting Ralph Peters, who shares his views, because, as Peters has observed:

*'(...) The nature of warfare never changes, only its superficial manifestations. Joshua and David, Hector and Achilles would recognize the combat that our soldiers and Marines have waged in the alleys of Somalia and Iraq. The uniforms evolve, bronze gives way to titanium, arrows may be replaced by laser-guided*



*bombs, but the heart of the matter is still killing your enemies until any survivors surrender and do your will'.<sup>44</sup>*

Today the concept of 'RMA' is largely discarded; and old-fashioned soldiery, patrolling and fighting the enemy quarter by quarter if necessary, is again what meets soldiers. The 'revolutions' were, as observed by colonel Hammes, '(...) not revolutions at all. Rather they were the culmination of practical men seeking practical solutions to [the] tactical and operational problems of their day. (...)'.<sup>45</sup> Richard A. Best, Jr. takes a somewhat more moderate stance, acknowledging that the evolution of technology, including intelligence technology, has '(...) dramatically altered the relationship of the national intelligence agencies and the operating forces (...)'<sup>46</sup> but he still uses the term 'evolution'. So does Handel,<sup>47</sup> and it is in fact difficult today to find scholars or practitioners still prepared to defend the term 'revolutions' as a means of describing MI. This elucidates why this paper is deliberately called 'The *Evolution* in Intelligence Support (...)'.

This does not mean that the many technological inventions available to MI today are to be ignored, nor does this stance reduce the value of the Internet, new communication tools; and the full array of gadgets available to intelligence personnel today. But what it does mean is that Intelligence (MI included) should be viewed in a more sensible, down-to-earth way than both customers and laymen alike sometimes tend to do. MI has developed and evolved just like any other human activity – but never on a scale justifying the term 'revolution'. Such views only serve to create confusion about the nature of MI, its possibilities and limitations, and if unrealistic perceptions are allowed to manifest themselves, new intelligence failures are inevitable. Admittedly, the post-Cold War era has indeed seen historically unprecedented deeds and acts, but for MI personnel, even this era has essentially been a continuous, arduous struggle to answer the same commander's question: 'what is behind the hill?'

## 2) From Cold to Warmer Wars

### The State of Intelligence at the Collapse of the Soviet Union

In the concise yet comprehensive words of Peter Hennessy:

*'The Cold War kept a strange sort of peace for forty-five years. With enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other many times over, the United States and the Soviet Union glared at each other across an icy divide. Each guarded its own secrets and allowed the other to do the same. Given 'mutually assured destruction', regime change was not an option. Europe, East and West, froze, and stayed frozen'.*<sup>48</sup>

For 45 years, intelligence was – if not ‘easy’, so at least easily defined – univocal and manageable.<sup>49</sup> As described precisely by Sir Richard Dearlove:

*'(...) We knew who our enemies were, we knew where they were and we knew about the threats they presented. If we did not know all of our enemies' or opponents' secrets, and we seldom did, we could at least be confident that the secrets were there to be discovered (...)'.*<sup>50</sup>

For 45 years, Western Intelligence had ONE, major raison d'être: to prevent a surprise attack from the USSR by monitoring its capacities, capabilities and intentions, and hence enabling the West to meet any potential threat with Armed Forces capable of deterring any USSR military adventure.<sup>51</sup> The CIA was created for this major mission, and constructed to meet this task.<sup>52</sup> And for 45 years, this was basically what Western Intelligence did, with US and a few Major Powers (mainly UK and France) powerful enough to have a secondary focus on China, North Korea and a few other regions.<sup>53</sup> Billions of dollars spent, the vast amount of Western Intelligence expertise was directed solely towards these limited matters,<sup>54</sup> and whole institutional identities<sup>55</sup> were built on and around monitoring this sole, major foe.<sup>56</sup> And then, suddenly, most of this became obsolete overnight as the former foe of the USSR disappeared and a friendly (sort of) Russia emerged.<sup>57</sup>

Adding to this is the fact that new threats and new enemies had gathered strength while few had noticed, building up their capacities to attack the West.<sup>58</sup> But few knew, because radars, antennas and binoculars had mostly been directed towards the Soviet Union.<sup>59</sup> In sum: the state of the Western IC when the USSR collapsed was shambolic.<sup>60</sup> Western Intelligence in 1991 is

broadly described in reports and in the literature as having been incapable of dealing with the new threats from international terrorism; and poorly suited to support military operations in regions like the Middle East (Iraq), the former Yugoslavia,<sup>61</sup> Afghanistan and others. The array of intelligence shortcomings and failures that characterised this era elucidates this point.

The IC agencies and organisations were also marked by rivalry and closed minds as to co-operation across agency borders, and accordingly close-minded as to the understanding of topics like foreign cultures beyond Eastern Europe and other, traditional points of focus. In sum, this encapsulates why Western Intelligence was unprepared when the first of several new wars and conflicts started in 1991.

### **Intelligence Support in the First Gulf War 1991**

The ‘100-hour War’ between the US-led coalition and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1991 soon became highly debated, from political and military, as well as intelligence points-of-view. Numerous books, articles and reports have questioned the wisdom in the sudden abruption of the campaign, before Hussein was defeated and with much of his elite combat power still intact. Michael Scheuer claims that the US won nothing and in fact that the only true result was a substantial fuelling of the growing hate among Islamists against the US and the West.<sup>62</sup> That being so, the overall view on the intelligence support to the military commanders is that it was close to being a complete failure. Not surprisingly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (incidentally responsible for providing his commanders with the means required to win wars – intelligence included) highly prized the quality of the intelligence support to the Gulf War.<sup>63</sup> General Norman Schwarzkopf leaves in his own autobiography little doubt about his own views: this was apparently the most impressive and convincing military campaign in history (incidentally led by him). As for the quality and performance of the intelligence resources at his disposal, the General assures that ‘(...) I was blessed with an intelligence staff whose work was so good that the military intelligence community in Washington usually let Central Command take the lead, seconding our assessments of the developments in the Middle East. (...)’.<sup>64</sup> He goes on by insisting that ‘(...) our intelligence section – [was] already the best in the Middle East business (...)’.<sup>65</sup>

Nevertheless: his autobiography was already issued in 1992; shortly after the war ended and before the plethora of alternative narratives was published (including fellow generals’ views, more than touching upon elements of blame-

gaming).<sup>66</sup> This may serve as one explanation of this courteous treatment of the intelligence performance in Gulf War I, which substantially contrasts with public statements from the General himself soon after the war regarding certain shortcomings within the intelligence/MI field. Here, in a Congressional hearing, it became clear that the General saw the intelligence assessments he received as ‘belated and fudged’ to a level where, if he had relied on them to choose the right moment to attack, he would ‘(...) still be sitting over there waiting. (...)’.<sup>67</sup> It even appears that he was furious about Washington having thought that they were ‘(...) in a better position to judge battle damage assessments (than) the theatre commander (...)’.<sup>68</sup>

Noted scholar Marc Lowenthal observes four shortcomings regarding intelligence support to the troops in this war: 1) hedged and politicised analyses and estimates from Washington that were of little use to the Field Commanders; 2) differences in battle damage assessments between the two components; 3) ‘(...) an overall collection system more attuned to “national” tasks than to theatre requirements (...)’; and 4) ‘(...) the difficulties that service intelligence units had in sharing intelligence because of incompatible technical systems (...)’.<sup>69</sup>

Other scholars have observed even more severe faults and shortcomings in the intelligence support during the campaign. John Diamond is among the critics of the CIA’s (lack of) contributions to this war. Not only did the CIA refuse to become part of the joint intelligence efforts<sup>70</sup> to ensure that Schwarzkopf was provided with one common view on intelligence matters, but their contributions comprised ‘voluminous and sometimes conflicting raw information’.<sup>71</sup> The CIA defended itself by stating, in their own words, that they ‘(...) resisted requests that its Iraqi analysts be fully incorporated into the Pentagon’s Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), because the CIA did not want to dilute its base of analytical expertise (...)’.<sup>72</sup> The result, however, was that the military commanders had to choose whether to listen to one or the other major intelligence key players – a less than desirable situation to any military commander, regardless of level. How can s/he make a qualified choice between two or more intelligence agencies, offering differing views and analyses? S/he basically can’t, and this demonstrates the level of failure involved when intelligence agencies fail to co-operate, leaving their main clients with frustration, rather than relief. Schwarzkopf later underlined that timely, relevant and useful intelligence should be provided to any military commander at his will.<sup>73</sup>

Failures to make correct estimates are inevitable and understandable (on every topic and level), provided the collectors, analysts and briefers have all done their best. Less acceptable though are several of the shortcomings identified

above: 1) failure to prepare for plausible scenarios (including making sure that technological solutions are compatible); 2) policymakers interfering in strategic intelligence assessments; and 3) refusals of (or indeed artificial boundaries hampering) intelligence co-operation between agencies and organisations.<sup>74</sup>

That said, James Bamford has noticed that the Generals had two main intelligence assets: imagery and signals intelligence.<sup>75</sup> But as Ernest R. May and Gregory F. Treverton (among others) reveal: even though Washington had access to real-time images of the enemy's positions in Kuwait and Iraq, it took too long to get them to U.S. commanders in the field, to General Schwarzkopf's uttermost frustration.<sup>76</sup> Instead, much of the operational intelligence was produced by MI units and staffs based on what they got of tactical information and intelligence.<sup>77</sup>

But from a MI point of view, SIGINT and IMINT may tell the commander where the enemy is, and to a certain extent what kind of forces and entrenchments s/he will face. That is, provided s/he gets it in time. But the commander will still know little (if anything) about the enemy's plans and intentions, his moral and fighting spirit, provided good anti-SIGINT measures are taken, as Saddam did in this war. The US was practically without HUMINT in this war, leading to a failure to answer these fundamental questions when planning operations. Technology to ensure quick dissemination of intelligence was not at hand – resulting in commanders not knowing 'what [was] behind the hill'. (What General Schwarzkopf DID know though, was – at any given time – 'what had been behind the hill' – sadly enough, some 24 hours previously). The intelligence support for the coalition Commander in the first Gulf War – and subsequently to commanders on every level down through the ranks – was wanting.<sup>78</sup> Good intelligence – even crucial intelligence for the commanders at the front existed – but only in Washington, basically due to a lack of adequate preparations.

### **Intelligence Support in the Yugoslav Wars 1991 – 1995**

The first of several wars in Europe, following in the wake of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, broke out only a few months after the first Gulf War ended. Fighting started in Slovenia in June and in Croatia a few weeks later, after which the unrest spread to the rest of the Balkans.<sup>79</sup> The response from the outside world in terms of active intervention was initially reluctant and haphazard.<sup>80</sup> But when the media broadcasted more and more disturbing images of hordes of refugees, ethnic genocide and outright concentration camps, the public call for an intervention grew in strength in Europe and the US. The United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) was deployed in

January, 1992,<sup>81</sup> but soon proved ill-suited to prevent the fighting and killing.<sup>82</sup> Most notoriously, it proved unable to hinder the massacre of thousands of male Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995 by the Bosnian Serb forces.<sup>83</sup>

UNPROFOR, being the first attempt from the international society to interfere, suffered from its own peculiar intelligence challenges from Day 1: being a UN mission, there was no intelligence available!<sup>84</sup> It proved that UN had a culture and tradition of not even accepting the term ‘intelligence’ being used to describe information about the actors and conditions prevalent in any theatre of operations. Instead, this was labelled ‘information’ and has a long history of being disseminated openly and indiscriminately, with little attention paid to ‘classifications’ if classified.<sup>85</sup>

Dr. Cees Wiebes has researched the Western Intelligence efforts before and during the Yugoslav Wars of 1991 – 1995 with a special emphasis on the fighting in Bosnia. He concluded his in-depth research project by stating that there was a blunt ‘absence of a good intelligence structure within UNPROFOR’,<sup>86</sup> quoting several force commanders and their deputies in that there was ‘no usable and timely intelligence at their disposal’.<sup>87</sup> He sums up the war by stating that ‘The Western intelligence and security services appeared to be insufficiently prepared for the war in Bosnia (...)’.<sup>88</sup>

Dr. Wiebes’s overall conclusion leaves little doubt about the quality of Western intelligence support in the Yugoslav wars:

*‘(...) in 1992 (...) Western intelligence services were confronted with an intelligence structure that was generally geared towards the ‘old’ threat from the East, and not suited to the Balkans. The Western intelligence services had built up a complex set of warning indicators that enabled them to detect this threat from the East in good time. The complete capacity for gathering intelligence was therefore concentrated on analysing a large-scale conflict, which had little to do with the crisis in Yugoslavia (...)’.*<sup>89</sup>

Leapfrogging to 1999, after several UN-, EU-, bi- and multinational talks, diplomacy and other efforts with little achievement, the Yugoslav wars reached a level that forced NATO to intervene. Based on UN Security Council Resolution 1199, NATO finally decided to go to war against Serbia due to Slobodan Milošević’s refusal to end his policy of forcing the Kosovo Albanians out of Kosovo. It took 72 days of aerial bombardment to break Milošević’s determination to resist the

attacks. This was highly unexpected, and has in itself repeatedly been labelled as one of the ‘intelligence failures’ in the Yugoslav wars, as it was commonly expected that Serbia would surrender substantially quicker.<sup>90</sup>

This happened ten years after the Berlin Wall had collapsed and after several wars fought by the Western Military, but General Wesley Clark still bluntly admits the West’s ill-preparedness for this war.<sup>91</sup> This applies to every level, from political, strategic key players and national agendas, down to (non-existent) standardised military units, capacities and procedures. Only the US had the level of fighting capacity, as well as the SIGINT and IMINT, necessary to plan and fight a war like this. This also raises the question of how seriously the West, including the IC, had worked through these years to improve their Military and Intelligence capacities and capabilities.

In the words of General Wesley Clark, summing up his experiences after having commanded the NATO war against Kosovo in 1999:

*‘Where the American role was dominant was in planning the air operation. The reason was basic. NATO itself had no intelligence. NATO only received national intelligence and then disseminated it. It had no collection and little analytic capabilities. Nor did NATO possess the means to conduct battle damage assessments. Other NATO member countries also lacked intelligence collection and battle damage assessment capabilities. In fact, 99 percent of the target nominations came from U.S. intelligence sources. In this area, and in this area alone, due basically to lack of European capabilities, the operation assumed an excessively national character’.*<sup>92</sup>

Like the UN, NATO has no intelligence capacity of its own – only what is offered by its member states. The EU also lacks this capability, which was among the reasons why a ‘European’ solution proved impossible when fighting began and spread in the Balkans.<sup>93</sup> The US also lacked sufficient language skills, HUMINT and cultural understanding of the region, but this is where certain European partners proved valuable. In the words of A. Denis Clift: ‘Too many U.S intelligence professionals spoke only [in] the tongues of past conflicts’.<sup>94</sup> The U.S. Army, primarily trained to fight Russian troops, found it particularly confusing to adjust to a ‘peace keeping’ (or ‘peace building’) operation like that in Kosovo. American infantry soldiers were indeed capable of fighting a war, but knew little about the people, cultures, religions, expectations and fears, possibilities and prohibitions prevalent in Kosovo, and hence strived hard

to determine what to do.<sup>95</sup> This means that the commanders and the troops basically knew little about the enemy and the conditions prevalent where they were sent. The responsibility for providing this information lies in the hands of MI – and was hence another intelligence failure.

When analysing the role of MI in an aerial campaign like that of the Kosovo War, the differences between merely ‘winning a battle’ (bombing an opponent to the point of surrender) and ‘winning the war’ (convincing the population in the other state that your cause is the most righteous) becomes evident. In this war, MI succeeded to a certain degree in identifying targets of vital importance to the opponent, much of it built on IMINT.<sup>96</sup> But MI prepared the troops poorly for what they could expect to meet once the weapons had fallen silent, and the stage of truly winning the war began. In fact, most of the Western Intelligence community was ill-prepared for these wars, and even though on European soil, lacked most of the basics with which to conduct intelligence operations in a theatre: language skills, cultural expertise, etc.

This period also featured a rigid separation between the three levels of stately planning and execution. Strategic Intelligence related to their Political and Military counterparts on the same level, operational and tactical levels in Intelligence, and likewise with the Armed Forces. When asked about this observation, all four interviewees agreed. ‘William’ (UK) explains that, *‘In my experience, soldiers rarely interact with intelligence personnel from a national/strategic level’*. He supplies evidence by stating that, *‘The vast majority of work done in theatre by the British Intelligence Corps is at the tactical and operational level’*.<sup>97</sup>

‘John’ (UK) has had the same experience, explaining that *‘Strategic intelligence [officials] – (...) although present in some theatres, they only operate with high echelon headquarters – so most troops never see them’*.<sup>98</sup>

Both Norwegian officers expressed similar views, ‘Michael’ (NOR) explaining that: *‘I do share this view; my own experience is that the general flow of information was more a result of individual initiative at battalion level’*.<sup>99</sup>

Also, ‘Olav’ (NOR) agreed that *‘common soldiers, at least up until a few years ago, had little experience with intelligence personnel from a national/strategic level’*.<sup>100</sup>

‘Michael’ (who served in Kosovo shortly after Serbia surrendered), replies: *‘During my service in the Balkans, there were little or no intelligence updates*



*available to the rank and file, save the S-3 daily briefing. The only strategic “intelligence” I ever recall having received was an open-source briefing based on academic sources prior to deployment. Once deployed, it was more or less a personal initiative on both the “push” and “pull” side of getting a sufficient situational picture from national sources’.*<sup>101</sup>

When asked the same question in order to compare the situation in the Norwegian Armed Forces with UK experiences, ‘John’ (a member of the UK Defence Intelligence Community) replies that *‘In the Balkans most units continued to form their own tactical intelligence cells, although in some cases battle groups had intelligence corps personnel attached.’*<sup>102</sup>

The statements from these experienced officers serve to confirm that as recently as the late 1990’s, no real improvements had yet been achieved in order to bring about closer co-operation between the levels, and ensuring that troops on a tactical level could directly benefit from topic expertise prevalent at the national, strategic levels. NATO, having no intelligence on its own, relied on national intelligence provided by its member states – sadly though, this was often filtered according to national agendas and interests. Adding to this comes the problems of sharing between NATO- and non-NATO states in larger coalitions.<sup>103</sup> Stated plainly: Western Intelligence was basically ill-prepared not only for the region in structural terms, but also for this kind of warfare, still locked as it was on the Cold War as a source of expertise, and as a shaper of its mindset.

## **Intelligence Support Prior to 9/11 and in the Second Gulf War 2003**

When it became clear that the terrorist attacks against the Pentagon and World Trade Centre on 11 September, 2001 really were attacks, directed against US targets on the US mainland, the Commander-In-Chief (this time being the President of the US) asked the eternal Commanders’ questions about his enemy: ‘who, where, why’ – and ‘what will he do now’. In other words, ‘what’s behind the hill?’ again. The orders were clear and short: ‘Find them – and fight them, wherever they are.’<sup>104</sup> The CIA (and the rest of the US Intelligence Community) faced severe problems from the start, and as precisely observed by Ron Suskind:

*‘(...) Intelligence was the oxygen of the “war on terror”, with [the] CIA carrying burdens of collection, analysis, and operations beyond the capabilities of a seasoned, co-ordinated intelligence authority ten times its size. The agency, meanwhile, was*

*neither seasoned in the complexities of fighting both terrorism and weapons proliferation, nor particularly well co-ordinated (...)*.<sup>105</sup>

The October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq contained as much information as the US Intelligence services could scrape together at this time,<sup>106</sup> some of it pointing in the direction of Saddam Hussein's efforts to gain Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Even from the beginning of the planning process in the White House and the Pentagon, almost every piece of intelligence and information was basically building on 'assumptions' rather than verifiable facts and hard data.<sup>107</sup> Hence, and with the benefit of hindsight, most of what went wrong did so from the start.<sup>108</sup> Ali A. Allawi is among the most notable of the commentators on this process, underlining how much damage the US caused themselves (and Iraq) by their 'obsession with finding WMD',<sup>109</sup> where there were none.

It would go beyond the limits of this paper to further investigate the intelligence failures leading up to the terror attacks on 9/11, since the focus is on MI support to military operations. It should be stated, however, that not only did a number of failures occur prior to 9/11, but even the process leading to the decision of to invade Iraq was cluttered with intelligence failures. The Butler report, though focusing on UK experiences, acknowledges that a string of errors were made. Among the most fatal were the co-operation between UK intelligence agencies and police communities, both nationally and internationally (although the report indicates that this was the situation years ago, and that improvements are now seen).<sup>110</sup> Furthermore, the absence of good HUMINT in Iraq,<sup>111</sup> as well as the fact that '(...) the JIC's warnings on the limitations of the intelligence underlying its judgements were not sufficiently clear in the dossier (...)'.<sup>112</sup>

Stated plainly: UK intelligence saw that its primary customer, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, were steering towards war, and the JIC knew (as later admitted)<sup>113</sup> that their intelligence was given a role and function it shouldn't have had due to the poor quality of the indicators supporting the conclusions drawn by the PM. Yet the war was allowed to go ahead, which raises questions about the level of integrity among those witnessing this apparent misuse of intelligence, without raising their voices.<sup>114</sup>

The state of the intelligence support offered to the commanders of this war, when it started, was just as faulty as the process leading up to it. One of the sharpest critics was Ambassador Bremer, who complained in his memoirs about

the overall ‘lack of precise intelligence on the nature of the enemy’.<sup>115</sup> Bremer shares Allawi’s frustration over Washington’s obsession with finding evidence of WMDs, even to a level where lack of intelligence about the real enemy and the overall situation in the region started to cost US troops’ lives.<sup>116</sup> Bremer even outlines in substantial detail the level of rivalry and lack of co-operation between the different intelligence assets present in the theatre.<sup>117</sup>

All of this led him to a level of frustration where he demanded (on the basis of local intelligence advice) that an ‘All-Source, All-Agency Intelligence Cell’ be formed,<sup>118</sup> to ensure that the agencies really cooperated, as well as to reach a state where ONE voice spoke on behalf of the present IC. The overall judgement among scholars and commentators alike is that this war was based on an intelligence failure, and carried out without the most basic intelligence support for the commanders on the ground – not to mention the lack of preparation for the soldiers for the situation they were to meet.

Professor Steven K. O’Hern served in Iraq in 2005 as the director of the Strategic Counterintelligence Directorate, and he has delivered fierce criticism on the level of MI, even years after the initial stages of the war were over. He first stated that ‘(...) The United States military was not built to fight an insurgency, but has adapted new techniques and relearned forgotten lessons from past wars. The intelligence system that supports our military, however, has not [been] adapted (...). The chief lesson is that our military’s intelligence system does not work well for fighting an insurgency (...)’.<sup>119</sup> O’Hern sums up his major disappointments after his tour in Iraq as follows:

*‘Improvements in intelligence operations can be a large part of the solution for our problem of facing an insurgency, a type of war the United States historically does not like to fight. Improved intelligence can reduce casualties, shorten wars, and give our leaders more flexibility in our nation’s foreign relations. But there are many roadblocks in this path. Our intelligence operations are bureaucratic and severely hampered by turf wars. Nearly anyone who has worked in intelligence will admit that the “stovepipes” caused by a lack of co-operation among military units and intelligence agencies are common and hurtful. But the general public doesn’t understand how bad it is. Human intelligence is the most valuable intelligence tool we have against an insurgency. But it is poorly managed, it takes a back seat to the military’s fascination with technology, and it is ground zero for turf battles’.*<sup>120</sup>

Provided O'Hern is right, the state of US MI is (or at least was, when he served in the theatre) in remarkably bad shape. But held up against the vast majority of other books, reports and statements from scholars and commentators, his views corroborate the overall criticism well. In sum, the conclusion is that the intelligence support to the commanders in the Second Gulf War had improved little since the First Gulf War, and little has improved even after the initial stages of the war. The same basic problems experienced in 1991 remained unsolved in 2003: the highest echelons in the US directed intelligence resources in the theatre from afar, even to a level where the commander on the ground was stripped of his intelligence assets to serve political purposes, rather than the protection of the troops on the ground.

The absence of good HUMINT was, as demonstrated, crucial. This goes back to before 9/11, prior to the attack on Iraq, and during the war. Both of the major Commissions following the war have concluded that the absence of sufficient HUMINT was 'directly responsible in a direct way for these disasters'.<sup>121</sup> Again it should be noted that without HUMINT, few possibilities remain to keep track of what people really think and feel about matters of vital importance to any decision maker, planner or commander.

### **Lessons Learned for Intelligence After a Decade of Post-Cold War Wars**

Ten years after the dawn of the Post-Cold War era, it was broadly realised that Western intelligence was poorly prepared to meet post-Cold War challenges, and the 9/11 attack may be seen as the climax of ten years of repeated intelligence failures and shortcomings. As demonstrated in this chapter: even though the fundamental and institutional shortcomings were clear from the beginning, Western intelligence was slow at identifying exactly what needed to be done, and subsequently adapting with new shapes, strategies and techniques.

This elucidates that the most important lesson learned was that intelligence agencies really were in pressing need of restructuring and rethinking their relevance, and asking the classical questions regarding the need for their existence: what, why and how. When these questions are answered, any agency or service would know what they were expected to achieve, why their existence is important, and finally, how improvements and changes should be adapted.

The major intelligence shortcomings may be listed as follows, and they all apply to a degree to intelligence in general, as well as to MI:

- An insufficient level of co-operation between different intelligence agencies and organisations;
- An insufficient level of co-operation between intelligence agencies and other organisations: police and law enforcement, civilian resource pools of expertise like universities, think-tanks, NGOs, and others;<sup>122</sup>
- A severe lack of expertise on a broad range of vital topics; especially foreign cultures and religions and hence on history, social science, social anthropology etc.;
- A severe lack of linguistic skills on even the most important languages to Western Intelligence today: Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, Chinese, Korean etc.;
- Widespread groupthink, mirror imaging, and generally too few that are able to think 'out-of-the-box'. In short: a lack of both human format and professional integrity.

### 3) From Old to New Wars

#### Post-Cold War, Post-9/11 – New Terrorism, New Quagmires

Ernest R. May has summed up Western Intelligence's major post-Cold War challenges, including its lack of ability (at least initially) to adapt and to improve as follows:

*'Between the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. intelligence agencies faced a very different set of tests. Not only were they challenged to pass judgements on subjects other than the strategic nuclear threat from a rival superpower; they found themselves having to answer to a larger and more varied group of customers within the "policy community" and to do so during a period of dizzying technological change. (...) This changed with the Gulf War of 1991. From the beginning of time, operational military commanders have wanted to know what was "on the other side of the hill". Improvements in capacity to collect imagery from satellites, combined with improvements in communication between collectors of imagery and collectors of signals intelligence, made it technically possible by 1991 for the U.S. intelligence community to put together actual pictures of the enemy facing U.S. forces opposite Kuwait. The problem was that they could assemble these pictures in Washington but not get them quickly to U.S. commanders in the field (...)'*<sup>123</sup>

What followed has been labelled a new 'militarisation of intelligence',<sup>124</sup> although the renewed focus was on Support to Military Operations (SMO), which had already started under the Clinton administration.<sup>125</sup> Gregory Treverton has observed a vital aspect of this change of priority:

*'In an important sense, the renewed emphasis on SMO represents a movement toward the past; it marks a return to intelligence as primarily tactical after the long Cold War interlude when intelligence was preoccupied with the strategic imperative, understanding the Soviet threat. The ultimate issue SMO raises is one of mission and priority: should intelligence primarily support military planning and operations? (...)'*<sup>126</sup>

He also underlines that '(...) For most of history, when there has been intel-

ligence, its purpose has been supporting war fighters (...).<sup>127</sup> That said, lacking timely, relevant and reliable intelligence as precariously as General Schwarzkopf and his commanders did in 1991,<sup>128</sup> US SMO had by then clearly not come far in improving their abilities. As demonstrated in the two previous chapters of this paper, neither had they improved much when wars broke out in the Balkans shortly thereafter. Apparently, it was not until after the Second Gulf War (the US still shaken by the intelligence failures preceding 9/11), that both US Intelligence and Western Intelligence in general, seemed to undertake some serious measurements to think in new terms on SMO/MI.

In the words of ‘Olav’, who served in Iraq/Kuwait immediately after the First Gulf War: *‘It is my experience that the importance of a more systematic intelligence support to military operations was fully realized first after 9/11. Before my last international assignment to another theatre in 2008/2009, this had improved significantly. This time, topic experts from the Norwegian Intelligence Service briefed us on important matters on the conflict and region, and the information provided from them proved to be most useful when we deployed’.*<sup>129</sup>

‘Michael’, another Norwegian Military Officer, share these views, stating that: *‘As I re-enlisted in 1999, my personal opinion is that the information flow gradually got better around 2003 in respect to being fed by national intelligence assets’.*<sup>130</sup>

Statements from officers on the ground like these begs the question of ‘which major efforts were made then, between the Clinton administration and the Second Gulf War, in order to improve SMO?’ That said, and bearing in mind that there seems to have been limited improvement within the field of MI/SMO, another question is: ‘why did it take so long to achieve significant improvements?’ Seymour Hersh is among the fiercest critics of US efforts to improve its intelligence, underlining that the CIA had already created its ‘Counter Terrorism Center’ in 1986, after a ‘(...) wave of international bombings, airplane hijackings, and kidnappings. The idea was to bring together experts from every American police agency, including the Secret Service, into a “fusion center”, which would co-ordinate intelligence data on terrorism. (...)’.<sup>131</sup> But nevertheless, Hersh claims that this was little more than a ‘show-off’, achieving little and really not improving the capacity to meet the fundamental challenges.

Another US initiative was named the Defense HUMINT Service. According to Frederick P. Hitz, this organisation was ‘(...) created in 1993 after the 1991 Gulf War to organize the military’s effort to gather tactical intelligence around the battlefield for the purposes of aiding and protecting U.S. forces fighting

abroad (...).<sup>132</sup> Not much is known about the usefulness of this (and other) attempts to improve SMO, but given the level and amount of criticism on the overall lack of US HUMINT demonstrated in this paper, there is little reason to believe that much was accomplished. Author James Risen is very reluctant in this regard, simply stating that it '(...) had for years done some clandestine intelligence work, but it had never been involved in the kind of high-risk operations that Rumsfeld had in mind for the secret units that he created (...)'.<sup>133</sup> Consequently, even this initiative bears the marks of a half-hearted construction, hinting to the need to demonstrate good will rather than genuine ability.

Yet another attempt to improve US intelligence was seen in December 1993, when the US launched their 'Defence Counter-proliferation Initiative' (DCPI). The aim was to 'strengthening prevention' and 'protecting US interests',<sup>134</sup> but a roaring silence surrounded the relevance and usefulness of this initiative. And other attempts followed, so that the CIA saw in the following years an array of restructuring initiatives, among these the establishment of a special unit inside its Counterterrorist Center in 1996 to follow bin Laden and Al Qaeda.<sup>135</sup> This was the first time ever that a CIA station targeted a person rather than a country, and in an attempt to better co-ordinate itself, it drew its members from both the CIA and FBI.<sup>136</sup> Building on these experiences, the US opened the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2005. It is staffed with analysts from the CIA, FBI, National Security Agency and others, working together on common tasks. Behind it all lays the realisation that there really is a need to better share intelligence. This stance can hardly be countered: unless information and intelligence is distributed to those who need it, it is useless. But bearing in mind that after 9/11, President Bush described the failure to prevent the 9/11 hijackers as being 'systemic',<sup>137</sup> there are good reasons to assume that decades of suspicion and contempt towards 'rivalling' agencies had (and has) lived on. Author Ronald Kessler is remarkably positive, especially since few other independent scholars and authors seem to share his trust in them.<sup>138</sup> Ron Suskind delivers a blow to the optimism of the likes of Kessler, when quoting Donald Rumsfeld's contempt for the CIA. Rumsfeld noticed the success of the CIA-led, ad-hoc teams (involving Special Forces and a number of other topic experts) deployed to Afghanistan in 2001. Rather than rejoicing in their success, he stated that 'every CIA success is a DoD failure' – and that he never again wanted the 'US Army to arrive somewhere and meet the CIA on the ground'.<sup>139</sup> With attitudes like this, 'systemic' could indeed describe the level of rivalry in-built in the old structures.

The CIA was, as touched upon in the previous paragraph, thrown back in business again soon after 9/11, following President Bush's order to hunt the



culprits behind 9/11. As described by A. Denis Clift: ‘(...) Several CIA teams were formed. Each included paramilitary veterans, officers with Farsi and Dari language skills, counter terrorists, and communicators (...)’.<sup>140</sup> These teams seem to have been the greatest success so far in the US effort to find better ways of co-operating, and to ensuring better intelligence support to operations.

Mindsets do not change rapidly, and hence psychological factors have hampered intelligence improvements since 1991. A number of efforts have been made to meet the new challenges, and several new units and staffs have been created, but these have been half-hearted efforts overall, and have achieved little.

One team, or rather one type of intelligence team, has proved valuable though, being multi-skilled and multi-agency in composition. The CIA created a number of special teams to penetrate Afghanistan for the purpose of hunting down bin Laden and Al Qaeda, as well as preparing the ground for the US military presence. These hand-picked units, both combatant and ‘soft’ when possible, form a striking contrast to other attempts to meet the shortcomings in US intelligence, post-Cold War. What this could mean for MI as a whole will be the core subject for the remaining part of this paper.

## **Back to the Start? Rediscovering the Benefits of the World War II Spirit**

SAS Veteran Barry Davies offers a useful observation: ‘(...) In many ways, the terrorist organisations themselves are responsible for the growth and maintenance of the counterterrorist industry. In direct response to a spate of hijackings and the slaughter at the 1972 Munich Olympics, government ministers at the 1973 G7 talks recommended the formation of counter-terrorist units.(...)’.<sup>141</sup> Counterterrorist teams may indeed serve as an example of ‘Task-oriented Multiple Skills Units’, involving every capability needed, from shooters to dedicated (integrated) intelligence sections.<sup>142</sup> But this was nothing new to the 1970s. Most of today’s Western intelligence-, security-, and (later to be known as) counterterrorist agencies were established shortly before, or during the Second World War, and like the emerging counterterrorist organisations in the 1970s mentioned above: as a direct response to the needs of that time.<sup>143</sup> Intelligence collection often involves operations on occupied territory, meaning that the operators need to undergo military training, enabling them to defend themselves if necessary.

The distinction between intelligence and what are known as Special Forces today was often blurred during WW II, as seen with the UK Special Operations

Executives (SOE), Norwegian XU, and the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS), founded in 1942,<sup>144</sup> and later transformed partly into the CIA, but also partly into US Special Forces (Green Berets).<sup>145</sup> Characteristically, these were all units where combat soldiers, ‘doers’, intelligence collectors and ‘thinkers’ (analysts), all served in the same unit. Organisations like these focused on a few fundamental questions when considering new members of the group. These would most likely include whether the candidate was trustworthy, and whether he or she was skilled in one or more useful topics to the missions and operations carried out by the group. Since security is of outmost importance to clandestine groups like this, the group most probably would have considered whether the candidate had the overall stamina to carry out such work, ranging from ‘are you tough enough?’ to ‘are you able to blend in, without drawing unnecessary attention to yourself?’. Provided that these (and probably a few more) requirements were met, new candidates could hope to join the group.

That said, the British Secret Intelligence Service had already set up its own guerrilla warfare department in 1938 for (among other purposes) sabotage. This department later evolved into the ‘hell-raising’ Special Operations Executive, created to support resistance on occupied territory, and sabotage and espionage/intelligence collection behind enemy lines.<sup>146</sup> Important to note here is that we again see a plethora of skills and capacities in the same units, intelligence personnel and soldiers alike – and a mixture of civilian and military backgrounds. Even though the significance of this lack of prejudice as to the acceptance of candidates was fully seen later, some of the world’s best elite units today were built on these initiatives from Churchill to ‘raise hell by thinking in new, unlimited, and imaginative’ ways: the SAS, the SBS and others.<sup>147</sup>

Decades later, the same happened again in the US when they created their ‘Delta Force’ in 1977 on the basis of their experiences in the Vietnam War. The US had by then recognised a severe need for a ‘SAS’-style capacity for themselves: deep penetration raids, hostage/POW rescues, sabotage, and intelligence gathering for large operations.<sup>148</sup> However, units like Delta Force are (like any military unit) totally dependent on timely, relevant and reliable intelligence on the ground. After the disastrous US attempt to rescue their hostages from Iran in 1980, merely resulting in a humiliating stumbling over their own feet in the desert, the US realised (again) that without sufficient SMO, little could be done. Their answer was (again) to create new (ultra-) secret elite units – among them, a SOF organisation simply named ‘The Activity’ – yet another all-encompassing, multi-skilled SOF-and-intelligence-based special team.<sup>149</sup> Peter Harclerode reveals that another ‘(...) highly secret intelligence unit [...] formed to support counter-terrorist operations world-wide.(...)’ was created in the early 1980s.<sup>150</sup>

This unit was called the ‘Intelligence Support Activity’ (ISA), and its role was to ‘infiltrate, provide intelligence and support for other US counter-terrorist forces’ in any operation to follow.<sup>151</sup> Given the topic of this paper, is it important to notice that some two-thirds had a SOF-background, while the rest were intelligence personnel (especially HUMINT and SIGINT).<sup>152</sup> Open sources confirm the existence of a number of units of this character through the years, among them ‘Task Force 88’, an elite unit formed to fight Saddam Hussein in 2003. This particular unit was based on the SAS, and like those described in this paragraph it brought together the same core elements as the others: intelligence operators and analysts, as well as SOF capacities.<sup>153</sup>

The UK seems to have relied more on her existing, well-established units like the SAS, SBS, and the Royal Marines than following in the footsteps of the US – the above-mentioned Task Force being a rare example of the opposite. But there are a few other examples, stemming from perceived needs to combine every asset available to meet a complex situation – and a less than traditional foe. Expert and author Tony Geraghty has observed that the Irish war and the 1972 Munich massacre sparked a ‘(...) mutation in the Army. The SAS responded to Munich by creating a Counter Revolutionary Warfare cell. In Ireland, (...) the conventional “Green Army” (...) invented the Military Reconnaissance Force (...)’.<sup>154</sup> This unit was followed by a new team known by several names, among them ‘14 intelligence company’ and/or “The Dets”.<sup>155</sup> To them, a crucial success factor was to achieve the closest cooperation possible between all levels of intelligence, both military and civilian, as well as Police and any Armed Forces unit present at any given time. Their main focus was simple: combating terrorism in Northern Ireland – utilising the means and methods available to achieve this. And like the units described above, this unit also collected their own intelligence, analysed it and disseminated intelligence to others.<sup>156</sup> But with peace (sort of) and the absence of a PIRA to fight, this unit also adapted to new challenges. In 2004, and in the words of Tony Geraghty, ‘what had started life in Northern Ireland as 14 Intelligence Company became the Special Reconnaissance Regiment (...)’.<sup>157</sup> Among their main tasks was to follow Islamist fundamentalists. Several other units were created in the years to follow, and the last that was publicly known is the ‘Brigade Reconnaissance Force’, created in 2009.<sup>158</sup>

James Risen has described how strongly Rumsfeld opposed the CIA-led operations taking place in Afghanistan immediately after 9/11, and subsequently ‘(...) pushing for more aggressive activities by U.S. Special Forces and the even more secretive and elite special operations teams in the Joint Special Operations Command. In Afghanistan, CIA paramilitary personnel had joined

with special forces and special operations units to marry intelligence to muscle and firepower (...)' .<sup>159</sup>

The 'marriage between intelligence and muscle-and-firepower' that Risen describes is a brilliant summary of the main factors found prevalent in the major successes of intelligence support to military operations, whether the unit's main mission is to supply the commanders with intelligence directly, or to provide intelligence to higher echelons outside the Operational Theatre. Tony Geraghty concludes that the most important lesson learned after the unorthodox CIA-lead operations in Afghanistan 2001 were as follows: '(...) At the military level, the symbiosis of CIA paramilitary and intelligence combined with Special Operations Forces was the future war-fighting model (...)' .<sup>160</sup>

Also Henry A. Crumpton has observed the same success, and in his own words:

*'The formula for the application of power depended upon binary elements, CIA officers, and U.S Special Forces, which together created the glue that held the operation together. The CIA's paramilitary officers, with their deep knowledge of special operations and intelligence, provided the most adhesive element of this mixture. This was especially critical because there was no previous planning or training; the blended glue emerged from professionalism rooted in a sense of collective mission and personal relationships built on mutual respect. The result was a war of supreme coordination between Afghan tribal allies and U.S. airpower. The CIA delivered the HUMINT and the Afghan tribal armies. The Special Forces brought tactical skills and linked the ground to the air. Sensors and shooters emerged, producing teams that delivered uniquely accurate and awesome force.'*<sup>161</sup>

Extreme situations and needs tend to motivate unconventional thoughts and solutions. There is a long history in both peace and wartime of forming new, often unconventional teams and units to combat an unconventional foe. When the stakes are high enough, it seems easier to think in terms of 'what could work' rather than 'who-shall-have-the-honour-of-doing-whatever-may-work'. Thus, since before WW II, a number of multi-skilled, multi-sourced, military-civilian units have been formed in order to combat the most difficult of opponents – and mostly with intelligence personnel incorporated. Paradoxically enough, these

lessons-learned seem to be forgotten quite soon after the same units have done their job, and contributed heavily to the surrender of the foe.

## **National Intelligence Support Teams: Current Culmination and Future Role Model**

The rediscovery of WW II's lessons of looking for skills, guts and expertise, and not having the luxury of fighting each other as long as there are enemies to fight, proved successful. The concept is very simple and logical: bring together intelligence operators, analysts, collectors and topical experts from both civilian and military intelligence services, and even from the strategic, operational and tactical levels. National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST) is described in one of the few articles existing on this subject as follows:

*'(...) With this increased reliance on intelligence, intelligence officers at the theatre and tactical levels have looked to the national IC for support to fill the commander's information short-falls. Consequently, the IC has sought to provide support to the tactical commander with historically unprecedented vigour. One means of providing timely, tailored national intelligence support to deployed forces is through a NIST. (...) Teams are specifically configured to meet the needs of the deployed commander (...). A NIST is able to provide unique intelligence support to a JTF commander in several ways. First, and most frequently, the NIST provides a "reach-back" to national IC agencies and a thorough knowledge of each agency's resources and capabilities that normally does not exist at the JTF level (...). A second unique aspect of a NIST's intelligence support is that it provides a threat warning capacity to the JTF and enhances the commander's overall force protection capability (...). Third, a NIST offers several products from each of its parent agencies that may otherwise be unavailable to a JTF. These products may carry classifications that no JTF communications systems are cleared to handle, but that a NIST is able to disseminate via its agency-only systems (...). Fourth, a NIST enables a JTF commander to submit RFIs that require an answer from the national IC within 24 hours or less (...)' .<sup>162</sup>*

Bearing in mind that this article excerpt describes US views, many nations have formed and deployed NISTs to a number of military operational theatres since the 1990s. Details may vary, but the core concept remains. NISTs are the

culmination of the need to improve intelligence support to military operations. When asked about his views on how SMO could best improve, John's (UK) response, interestingly enough, sums up the core of the ideas behind the new, improved intelligence teams described in the previous paragraph:

*'Dissemination, dissemination, dissemination! Sharing and managing information – creating platforms where information can easily be accessed (including OSINT) or pulled, rather than pushed – but also ensuring that information overload does not take place. Furthermore: strategic reach back – national level analytical and collection assets providing real-time support to expeditionary operations. And finally: briefings and demonstration of intelligence capabilities to low-level formations, not just senior figures. Ensure that they know how they can be of value to them, how to use them and what they need to do to get the best out of them'.<sup>163</sup>*

'Michael' (NOR) adds that: *'What needs improvement is the involvement of strategic intelligence to the rank and file, but this may even reflect the lack of strategic overview at higher levels as well – if there is one at all. The demystifying of intelligence may perhaps have a relation to the democratisation of information through new information technology, and in this respect it is useful to create a broader understanding of the mission the soldiers do themselves. We still have a long way to go here, primarily on the staff level. There are a couple of cold war relics still setting their mark on the information flow, and this may in turn even endanger troop morale in the long run'.<sup>164</sup>*

Another article, this one being found in the Norwegian Army's publication 'HÆRFRA', dating from May 2005, and named, 'The Norwegian Intelligence Service Saved Lives', describes Norwegian experiences. Although the article is written by an army journalist and not by the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS), it still provides the reader with some interesting information about, as well as views upon, the importance of the concept behind units like the Norwegian NIST. According to the article in question,<sup>165</sup> the Norwegian NIST is a generic concept, meaning that some functions and capacities to be found in one specific mission may be replaced by some others in the next mission. Hence, a NIST may consist of management, intelligence collectors, linguists, and a variety of intelligence specialists, capacities and capabilities from any 'INT'.

The Commanding Officer (CO) of a Norwegian NIST (this particular NIST served in Iraq) is interviewed in the article, and he underlines how important,

but also how difficult it is, to find and to recruit well-suited candidates for a service as special as this. The basic requirement is a high level of experience, one or another sought-after specialist competence, as well as certain personal skills. Not only does every member need to be a well-educated and experienced professional, for example a graduate in social science, he or she also needs to be a highly trained soldier as well. The CO describes his own main task as being to co-ordinate the collection and analysis of information and turn this into products of intelligence relevance. According to the CO, fundamental to the quality of their work was both the co-operation with the multinational intelligence community in the theatre, but also with the Norwegian Intelligence Service Headquarters in Norway.

The CO further states that the NIST took an active part in training and educating the troops on the ground, based on their expertise on the region, culture, religion, symbols and holy days, rites and rituals, ethnicities, Iraqi security units and police, as well as politics. They also trained and informed the soldiers on the weapons, ammunition and explosives used against the Norwegian troops, all for the purpose of preparing the troops for any vital challenge likely to be faced as part of their duties in Iraq.

When confronted by the common notion that intelligence personnel are traditionally far less open than seen in this interview, the CO simply states that the presence of Norwegian Intelligence wherever Norway deploys troops is regulated by domestic laws, and thus commonly known in Norway. Still: exactly how they do their job is classified.

The Norwegian Company Commander, who received warnings and was constantly briefed by the NIST is also cited, being most grateful for this aid. He is very clear when attributing the absence of fatal incidents in this contingent to the 'aid provided by the Norwegian NIST'.<sup>166</sup>

The uniqueness of the information derived from this rare article lays in the fact that the Norwegian NIST-concept apparently (according to the officer interviewed), is three-fold. Firstly, the Norwegian NISTs have succeeded in bringing together personnel from both military and civilian fields of expertise. Secondly, its expertise ranges from the strategic to the tactical level, and thirdly, they are directly interacting with personnel, troops and units over the same range of levels: from the strategic to the tactical. A fourth characteristic could be added: all of this implies a wide range of allied (international) intelligence co-operation and sharing.

## **So What is Achieved – What Works – and Where Should MI Go From Here?**

This paper started by exploring MI's roots and roles and significance and limitations, in order to clarify the true nature of the topic being analysed. Successively, this paper has demonstrated how ill-prepared Western Intelligence was at the onset of the post-Cold War era. In short: backwardly and single-minded in aims and focus, narrow and limited in skills and capacities, and downright arrogant while permitting prestige to come before the common good.

MI was broadly regarded as an anachronism at the dawn of the post-Cold War era; hence states began downsizing their intelligence capacities. This further weakened the already disarrayed agencies, a significant factor behind the faulty contributions from US intelligence to the Military Commanders before and during the First Gulf War, in 1991. As demonstrated, this reached a level forcing the US Commander of the Coalition against Hussein to insist on having one voice and one person to deal with, responsible for the sum of intelligence available in the theatre, rather than dealing with the plethora of US (and other) intelligence units, agencies and organisations operating in the region. This paper has illustrated why this may be regarded as the 'birth' of a new level of intelligence support to military commanders, through the creation of units like the National Intelligence Support Teams. By compiling and analysing publicly available information on these units, this paper has demonstrated that the NIST concept is seemingly where Military Intelligence has come furthest in the improvement of skills, capacities and inter-agency intelligence co-operation.

Finally, this paper will state that the NIST teams may serve as a role model for the overall Intelligence Community, being teams of the best, handpicked topic experts available anywhere, professionals of integrity and dedication, fully focusing on MIs core task, being 'how can we best support commanders with timely, relevant and reliable intelligence?' Operating from that focus, rather than narrow-minded rivalry and barren bureaucracy, intelligence may indeed reach the utmost of its abilities. What it takes is professionalism, dedication, guts and above all: integrity. After all, intelligence without integrity is either prostitution – or science fiction.



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- R1: Interview with 'Michael' (NOR), a Norwegian Military Officer (written interview via Internet 2010-08-20).
- R2: Interview with 'Olav' (NOR), a Norwegian Military Officer (written interview via Internet 2010-08-21).
- R3: Interview with 'John' (UK), a member of the UK Defence Intelligence Community (written interview via Internet 2010-08-21).
- R4: Interview with 'William' (UK), a UK Military Officer (written interview via Internet 2010-08-23).

## Appendix B: Abbreviations and terms

This paper analyses *intelligence*, both generically – meaning ‘information collected’, ‘analysed (processed) information’ and similar (and so spelt with a lower-case ‘i’), and more specifically, meaning Intelligence Agencies (in which case spelt with a capital ‘I’). In the latter meaning, the preferred terms are either the ‘Intelligence Community’ (IC), meaning ‘Western intelligence agencies, organisations and units’,<sup>167</sup> or ‘Western Intelligence’ (WI), meaning the same.

GMI	General Military Intelligence
IC	Intelligence Community
MI	Military Intelligence
NIC	National Intelligence Cell
NIST	National Intelligence Support Team
SAS	Special Air Service
SBS	Special Boat Service
SMO	Support to Military Operations
SOF	Special Operations Forces (Special Forces)
WI	Western Intelligence

**Intelligence:** Observing that there is still no commonly agreed or accepted definition of the term ‘intelligence’ today among scholars, practitioners and topic writers, this author finds the definition (or rather description) used in the Butler Report to be quite comprehensive:

‘(...) Information acquired against the wishes and (generally) without the knowledge of its originators or possessors is processed by collation with other material, validation, analysis and assessments and finally disseminated as ‘intelligence’.(...)’<sup>168</sup>

**Military Intelligence (MI):** I have found the broad and all-encompassing definition provided by the US Army (though labelled General Military Intelligence (GMI)) to be useful:

*‘(...) intelligence concerning military capabilities of foreign countries or organizations or topics affecting potential (...) military operations relating to armed forces capabilities, including OB, organization, training, tactics, doctrine, strategy, and other factors bearing on military strength and effectiveness and area and terrain intelligence. (...)’*<sup>169</sup>

**National Intelligence Cell (NIC):** A generic term for any number of intelligence analysts/operators deployed to a multinational military operation, preferably configured as an all-source intelligence cell with experts from a range of intelligence disciplines, but may consist of just one or two.<sup>170</sup> Unlike NISTs, who primarily focus on the military commander and his/her needs, NICs tend to function more like extended arms for the domestic, national intelligence services contributing to a multinational military operation.

**National Intelligence Support Team:** Although the responsibility to compose, deploy and command NISTs may vary from one state to another, they are characterised by being all-source intelligence analysts/operators ‘(...), specifically configured to meet the needs of the deployed commander. (...)’<sup>171</sup> NISTs are generally the responsibility of a state’s national, strategic intelligence service, rather than its armed forces, although its members may come from any armed service, being experts in any given intelligence topic or matter, e.g., scholars, academics, police officers, SOF, etc.

**Operational Intelligence:** ‘Intelligence required for the planning and conduct of campaigns at the operational level’.<sup>172</sup> More specifically, it is the intelligence required for the planning, execution and support of campaigns and operations within a Joint Operations Area (JOA) by a Joint Headquarters (...).<sup>173</sup>

**Strategic Intelligence:** ‘Intelligence required for the formation of policy, military planning and the provision of indications and warning, at the national and/or international levels’.<sup>174</sup> This is the highest level of intelligence derived from information gathered over the widest possible area in response to requirements placed by national and international military, diplomatic, political and economic matters’.<sup>175</sup>

**Tactical Intelligence:** ‘Intelligence required for the planning and execution of operations at the tactical level’.<sup>176</sup> Intelligence used from the level of formation headquarters downwards which is produced within the formation’s area.’<sup>177</sup>

**HUMINT: Human Intelligence.** ‘A category of intelligence collected and provided by human sources’.<sup>178</sup>

**SIGINT: Signal Intelligence.** ‘Intelligence derived from the interception of communications (COMINT) and other electronic (ELINT) transmissions’.<sup>179</sup>

**IMINT: Imagery Intelligence.** ‘Intelligence derived from imagery acquired from sensors which can be ground-based, seaborne or carried by air or space platforms’.<sup>180</sup>

**OSINT: Open Source Intelligence.** ‘Intelligence derived from publicly available information, as well as other unclassified information that has limited public distribution or access’.<sup>181</sup>

# Appendix C: Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Fukuyama (1992), excerpt from the title of his book.
- <sup>2</sup> The Christian Bible, Isaiah 2:4 & Micah 4:3
- <sup>3</sup> Diamond (2008), p. 9; Finlan (2004); p. 63, Risen (2006), p. 5
- <sup>4</sup> Ernest R. May in Sims & Gerber (2005), p. 6
- <sup>5</sup> The 9/11 Commission Report (2004), p. 90, Zegart (2007), p. 71
- <sup>6</sup> Black (2005), p. 235
- <sup>7</sup> Risen (2006), p. 6
- <sup>8</sup> Volkman (2007), p. 6
- <sup>9</sup> Ernest R. May in Sims & Gerber (2005), p. 5
- <sup>10</sup> Franks (2004), p. 175, Hughes-Wilson (1999), p. 401
- <sup>11</sup> The Hebrew Bible, Book of Numbers 13:16. Frequently viewed by scholars as one of the oldest descriptions in history of an intelligence mission, see Neilson & McKercher (1992), p. ix, Stan A. Taylor in Collins (2010), p. 300 et al.
- <sup>12</sup> Stan A. Taylor in Collins (2010), p. 300, 315, Ferrill in Neilson & McKercher (1992), p. 17
- <sup>13</sup> Hitz (2008), p. 9
- <sup>14</sup> Ferrill in Neilson & McKercher (1992), p. 17
- <sup>15</sup> Gudgin (1999), p. 4
- <sup>16</sup> Handel in Neilson & McKercher (1992), p. 179
- <sup>17</sup> Andrew in Neilson & McKercher (1992), p. 1
- <sup>18</sup> Allmand quoted by Andrew in Neilson & McKercher (1992), p. 1
- <sup>19</sup> Andrew in Neilson & McKercher (1992), pp. 1-2
- <sup>20</sup> Sun Tzu (1994: Sawyer's translation), pp. 135, 179, 223
- <sup>21</sup> Sun Tzu (1994: Sawyer's translation), pp. 119, 141, 215, 223
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid, pp. 231-232
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid, p. 232
- <sup>24</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The\\_Art\\_of\\_War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Art_of_War)
- <sup>25</sup> Allmand (1985), pp. 9-31
- <sup>26</sup> Haynes (2004), p. xii
- <sup>27</sup> Handel in Neilson & McKercher (1992), p. 183
- <sup>28</sup> Von Clausewitz (1976: Howard and Paret translation), p. 117
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid, p. 117
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid, p. 117
- <sup>31</sup> Franks (2004), p. 175
- <sup>32</sup> Von Clausewitz (1976: Howard and Paret translation), p. 140
- <sup>33</sup> Andrew in Neilson & McKercher (1992), pp. 14-15
- <sup>34</sup> Andrew in Neilson & McKercher (1992), p. 14
- <sup>35</sup> Heazle (2010), p. 295
- <sup>36</sup> Hughes-Wilson (1999), p. 414
- <sup>37</sup> US Department of Defense FM 2-0, C1 (2004), p. 1-2
- <sup>38</sup> Scheuer (2008), p. 87
- <sup>39</sup> Hoge and Rose (2001), p. 243
- <sup>40</sup> Agüera (2001), p. 118
- <sup>41</sup> Fitzgerald and Lebow (2006), p. 888
- <sup>42</sup> William N. Nolte in Johnson (2010), pp. 406-407
- <sup>43</sup> Scheuer (2008), p. 88
- <sup>44</sup> Ralph Peters quoted in Scheuer (2008), p. 88
- <sup>45</sup> Hammes (2006), p. xi
- <sup>46</sup> Best in Johnson (2010), p. 427
- <sup>47</sup> Handel in Neilson and McKercher (1992), p. 188
- <sup>48</sup> Peter Hennessy in Isaacs & Downing (1998, 2008 edn.) p. 482
- <sup>49</sup> Nolte in Johnson (2010), p.405
- <sup>50</sup> Dearlove in Johnson (2010), p. 33
- <sup>51</sup> Ricks (2006), p. 32, Kagan & Kubik (2005), p. ix, Hitz (2008), pp. 13-14
- <sup>52</sup> Risen (2006), p. 5

- 53 Bamford (2004), p. 109
- 54 Suskind (2006), pp.30-31
- 55 Zegart (2007), pp. 2-3, 5
- 56 Hennessy (2010), pp. 4-5
- 57 Bamford (2004), p. 103, Lowenthal (1992), pp. xvi, 90
- 58 Steele (2000), p. 75
- 59 Suskind (2006), pp.30-31
- 60 Wiebes (2003), p. 51
- 61 Ibid, p. 54
- 62 Scheuer (2008), p. 41, to a certain extent also Black (2005), p. 239
- 63 A. Denis Clift in Johnson (2010), p. 220
- 64 Schwarzkopf (1992), p. 293
- 65 Ibid, p. 294
- 66 See Franks (2004), Powell (2006)
- 67 The New York Times, June 13, 1991
- 68 Ibid.
- 69 Lowenthal (1992), p. 93
- 70 Gordon and Trainor (1995), p. 334
- 71 Diamond (2008), p. 113
- 72 CIA Home > Library > Reports > General Reports > Persian Gulf War Task Force > 061997 > CIA Support to the US Military During the Persian Gulf War
- 73 Statements by Schwarzkopf from reports referred in Treverton (2003), pp. 69-70
- 74 Posner (2007), p. 101
- 75 Bamford (2005), p. 130
- 76 May in Sims and Gerber (2005), p. 6, Treverton (2003), pp. 69-70
- 77 Kagan and Kubik (2005), pp. 89-91
- 78 Diamond (2008), pp. 162-163
- 79 Finlan (2004), p. 11
- 80 Finlan (2004), pp. 8-9, Koutrakou (2004), p. 45; Black (2005), p. 247; Clark (2001), p. 19
- 81 Finlan (2004), p. 11
- 82 Priest (2003), p. 56
- 83 Glenny (1996), p. 168, O'Shea (2005), p. 62
- 84 Wiebes (2003), pp. 12, 27,
- 85 Michael and Kellen in Michael, Kellen & Ben-Ari (2009), p. 159, pp. 11-12, 26-27, 51, Wiebes (2003), p. 42
- 86 Wiebes (2003), pp. 48,
- 87 Wiebes (2003), pp. 49
- 88 Ibid, p. 74
- 89 Ibid, pp. 53-54
- 90 Black (2005), p. 246, Agüera (2001), pp. 117, 120
- 91 Clark (2001), p. 419
- 92 Clark (2001), p. 427
- 93 Hagman (2002), pp. 15, 19; Koutrakou (2004), p. 45
- 94 A. Denis Clift in Johnson (2010), p. 221
- 95 Priest (2003), p. 19
- 96 Clark (2001), p. 10
- 97 Interview with 'William', a UK Military Officer
- 98 Interview with 'John', a member of the UK Defence Intelligence Community
- 99 Interview with 'Michael', a Norwegian Military Officer
- 100 Interview with 'Olav', a Norwegian Military Officer
- 101 Interview with 'Michael', a Norwegian Military Officer
- 102 Interview with 'John', a member of the UK Defence Intelligence Community
- 103 Wiebes (2003), p. 32
- 104 Fitzgerald and Lebow (2006), p. 887
- 105 Suskind (2006), p. 172
- 106 Fitzgerald and Lebow (2006), p. 896

- 107 Suskind (2006), p. 173
- 108 Murray and Scales (2003), p. 41
- 109 Allawi (2007), p. 179; Heazle (2010), p. 298
- 110 Butler Report (2004: Coates edn.), p. 198,
- 111 Butler Report (2004: Coates edn.), pp. 200 – 202
- 112 *Ibid.*, p. 204
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- 115 Bremer (2006), p. 107
- 116 *Ibid.*, pp. 107, 141-142, 221.
- 117 *Ibid.*, pp. 141-142, 157
- 118 *Ibid.*, pp. 141-142, 157, 251
- 119 O'Hern (2008), p. 18
- 120 *Ibid.*, p. 32
- 121 Hitz (2008), p. 2; also Allawi (2007), p. 179; Murray and Schales (2003), p. 246; Ricks (2006), pp. 22, 193, 222-223
- 122 Strachan-Morris (2010), p. 261
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- 124 Treverton (2003), pp. 62-64
- 125 Ellis & Kiefer (2004), pp. 145 – 146
- 126 Treverton (2003), p. 15
- 127 *Ibid.*, p. 70
- 128 Hoge and Rose (2001), p. 157
- 129 Interview with 'Olav', a Norwegian Military Officer.
- 130 Interview with 'Michael', a Norwegian Military Officer.
- 131 Hersh (2004), p. 77
- 132 Hitz (2008), p. 18
- 133 Risen (2006), p. 70
- 134 Ellis & Kiefer (2004), pp. 146 – 147
- 135 Zegart (2007), p.77
- 136 *Ibid.*, p. 77
- 137 Kessler (2007), p. 62
- 138 Kessler (2007), pp. 4, and 160-161 where he argue against critics of the NCTC.
- 139 Suskind (2006), p. 77
- 140 A. Denis Clift in Johnson (2010), p. 212
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- 142 *Ibid.*, p. 139
- 143 Geraghty (2010), pp. xxii, xxv; May in Sims and Gerber (2005), p. 10
- 144 Cawthorne (2009), pp. ix-x
- 145 Bank (1986), p. 143
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- 147 Geraghty (2010), pp. xxv – xxvi; de B. Taillon (2001), p. 7
- 148 Davies (2003), p. 161; Cawthorne (2009), p. x
- 149 Smith (2006), pp. vii-viii
- 150 *Ibid.*, p. 427
- 151 *Ibid.*, p. 427
- 152 *Ibid.*, pp. 427-428
- 153 Cawthorne (2009), pp. 256-257
- 154 Geraghty (2010), p. 215
- 155 *Ibid.*, p. 216
- 156 Rennie (1996), pp. 14-15, 157-158
- 157 Geraghty (2010), p. 238
- 158 *Ibid.*, p. 239
- 159 Risen (2006), pp. 69 – 70
- 160 Geraghty (2010), p. xlix
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- <sup>162</sup> James M. Lose: National Intelligence Support Teams: CIA Home>Library>Center for Study of Intelligence>CSI Publications>Studies in Intelligence>studies>winter99-00>National Intelligence Support Teams
- <sup>163</sup> Interview with 'John', a member of the UK Defence Intelligence Community
- <sup>164</sup> Interview with 'Michael', a Norwegian Military Officer
- <sup>165</sup> HÆRFRA Nr. 10 – 2005, pp. 12-13 (the author's translation)
- <sup>166</sup> HÆRFRA Nr. 10 – 2005, p. 12 (the author's translation)
- <sup>167</sup> Basically following the example of Peter Gudgin (1999), p. 2
- <sup>168</sup> Butler Report (2004: Coates edn.), p. 3
- <sup>169</sup> US Department of Defense FM 2-0, C1 (2004), p. 2-6
- <sup>170</sup> NATO/PfP AJP 2 (2003), p. 2-4-2, 2403-3
- <sup>171</sup> Lose (2007), p. 1
- <sup>172</sup> AAP-6, as quoted in NATO/PfP AJP 2 (2003), p. 1-2-2, 1204. 1. b.
- <sup>173</sup> NATO/PfP AJP 2 (2003), p. 1-2-2, 1204. 1. b.
- <sup>174</sup> AAP-6, as quoted in NATO/PfP AJP 2 (2003), p. 1-2-2, 1204. 1. a.
- <sup>175</sup> NATO/PfP AJP 2 (2003), p. 1-2-2, 1204. 1. a.
- <sup>176</sup> AAP-6, as quoted in NATO/PfP AJP 2 (2003), p. 1-2-3, 1204. 1. c.
- <sup>177</sup> NATO/PfP AJP 2 (2003), p. 1-2-3, 1204. 1. c.
- <sup>178</sup> AAP-6, as quoted in NATO/PfP AJP 2 (2003), p. 1-2-5, 1207 1. c
- <sup>179</sup> AAP-6, as quoted in NATO/PfP AJP 2 (2003), p. 1-2-4, 1207 1. a
- <sup>180</sup> AAP-6, as quoted in NATO/PfP AJP 2 (2003), p. 1-2-4, 1207 1. b.
- <sup>181</sup> AAP-6, as quoted in NATO/PfP AJP 2 (2003), p. 1-2-5, 1207 1. D



## Om forfatteren:

Major Bjørn Aksel Sund var elev ved det første kullet som ble uteksaminert fra Forsvarets Stabsskoles Mastermodul i etterretning, høsten 2008. Etter dette var Sund Internasjonal Stipendiat ved Department of War Studies, King's College London og ble høsten 2010 uteksaminert med graden "Master of Arts in Intelligence and International Security" med best oppnåelig karakter ("Distinction"). Foruten ulike fagmoduler i etterretning tok Sund fordypning i trusler fra internasjonal terrorisme og opprørsbevegelser ("Insurgencies"). Herværende utgivelse i Forsvarets Stabsskoles Skriftserie er en bearbeidet utgave av Sunds Masteravhandling fra King's College.

I tillegg til sin Mastergrad fra King's College og sin militære yrkesutdannelse (BS, KS, FSTS) er Sund utdannet Cand. Mag. fra Universitetet i Trondheim, med fagkretsen statsvitenskap, internasjonal politikk, språk og historie. Major Bjørn Aksel Sund har syv kontingenters tjeneste fra internasjonale operasjoner i flere forskjellige innsatsområder, blant annet som kompanisjef i Telemark Bataljon og både S-3 "Plans & Operations" og S-2 i NORBN. Sund har således kunnet bruke mange av sine egne erfaringer som bakgrunn for en del av de problemstillinger som er analysert i dette skriftet. Major Sund har også tjenestegjort som Militær Assistent for Generalinspektøren for Hæren i perioden 1998 – 2001, og ved J-3/FOHK som Stabsoffiser Internasjonale Operasjoner.

Denne utgivelsen er Bjørn Aksel Sunds første større publisering, men flere andre manus er under utarbeidelse til ulike fagtidsskrifter og for andre fora.



For 45 years, Western Intelligence had ONE, major *raison d'être*: to prevent a surprise attack from the USSR by monitoring its capacities, capabilities and intentions, and hence enabling the West to meet any potential threat with Armed Forces capable of deterring any USSR military adventure. The major Western Intelligence agencies were created for this major mission, and constructed to meet this task – and for 45 years, this was basically what Western Intelligence did. But in 1991, most of this became obsolete overnight with the collapse of the USSR. Meanwhile, new threats and new enemies had gathered strength while few had noticed, building up their capacities to attack the West – culminating in the terror attacks upon the US on September 11, 2001. Few saw this coming, because radars, antennas and binoculars had mostly been directed towards the Soviet Union.

Since 1991, the West has been engaged in a number of wars and conflicts – and it still is. This paper will demonstrate that Western Intelligence was poorly suited to meet the new Post-Cold War challenges, but even more disturbing: that it took most of the period in question before signs of real improvements were seen. But Western Intelligence learned by trial-and-error, and gradually intelligence support to military operations improved. A closer cooperation between the strategic, operational and tactical intelligence levels has emerged, above all in the shape of a little known, little published MI activity called National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs). This paper will conclude that NISTs are seemingly the best examples today, not only on how MI, but intelligence overall should work: drawing upon and combining the best resources available in both military and civilian intelligence, and from all levels.