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The Soviet Union and German unification during Stalin's last years

Stein Bjørnstad

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Abbreviations

AVPRF	Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation)
CDU	Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)
CFM	Council of Foreign Ministers
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States (document series)
GDR	The German Democratic Republic
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany)
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei (Liberal Democratic Party)
MID	Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics)
RTsKhIDNI	Rossiiskii Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History)
SCC	Soviet Control Commission in Germany
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)

Introduction: The Stalin note and the "lost-opportunity debate"

On 10 March 1952, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko summoned representatives from the French, British and American embassies in Moscow and handed them identical notes. This document, which later became known as the Stalin note, suggested that the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany should unite in an "independent democratic peace-loving state". The occupation powers should withdraw all troops from Germany and dismantle their military bases no later than one year after the peace treaty had been signed.¹

Seemingly, Moscow would allow Germany a liberal democracy. All persons under German jurisdiction, irrespective of race, sex, language or religion should enjoy "the rights of man and the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, press, religion, political conviction and assembly". There would be "no kind of limitations" on the German "peaceful economy". The country could trade with all nations, enjoy free access to the world markets and employ land, air and sea forces "essential for the defence of the country".²

The Stalin note placed only four restraints on Germany. The country could not "enter into any coalition or military alliance whatsoever directed against any power which has taken part with armed forces in the war against Germany". The unified state could not produce "war materials" in excess of her own needs. Furthermore, all signatories of the peace treaty had to accept the "borders established by the Potsdam Conference". That is, Germany could not claim back the Polish territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. Finally, Germany should not grant political rights to convicted war criminals or allow "organisations hostile to democracy and the cause of maintaining peace".³

The Stalin note struck a chord in the Federal Republic. It promised national unity as an alternative to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's policy of integration with the West. Integration was controversial in the early 1950s

and faced opposition from, among others, Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Schumacher detested integration and considered it a national self-denial.⁴

Years after the Stalin note was sent, the note continued to stir a controversy between those who had thought unification possible on acceptable terms and those who defended Adenauer's policy of alignment with the United States. On 23 January 1958, for example, when two members of Adenauer's 1952 cabinet debated the note at a *Bundestag* session, Bonn witnessed "...the most passionate and vehement debate the parliament had yet experienced".⁵

Due to the controversy it caused, an astonishing number of books and articles has debated the Stalin note.⁶ Most of this literature, however, has used American and German assessments to substitute for Soviet sources. When Rolf Steininger, for example, assumed that Stalin offered unification and liberal democracy, he cited the opinion of Western hard-liners who feared Stalin was becoming dangerously reasonable.⁷ Alas, contemporary Western observers had widely different opinions about the Stalin note. Hermann Graml, like Steininger, explains Soviet motives by citing the view of contemporary observers - but Graml's sources believed the Stalin note was propagandistic.⁸

The German academic debate about the Stalin note began in 1956, when Paul Sethe, a former co-editor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, published his book *Zwischen Bonn und Moskau* (Between Bonn and Moscow). Sethe forcefully argued that Stalin had offered a democratic German reunification back in 1952. This stand has since become known as the *lost opportunity thesis*.⁹

Unlike Sethe, who thought a united Germany would remain democratic, some historians think Stalin planned to unite Germany but somehow include the country in the Eastern Bloc. To support this view, they claim Stalin was unable to perceive non-alignment, but rather saw a world divided in two irreconcilable camps according to the scheme Andrei Zhdanov had outlined in 1947 at the founding assembly of the Cominform. If we interpret Zhdanov narrowly, there is no such thing as non-alignment in the

struggle between socialism and capitalism, and a united Germany would belong in one camp or the other. Hence, it would not make sense for Stalin to unite the country unless he foresaw a socialist Germany.¹⁰ For lack of a better name, we may call this theory the *trap thesis*.

Some researchers believe the Stalin note was written, not to advance the Soviet position in West Germany, but to secure the Soviet hold in East Germany. The legitimacy of East Berlin was threatened by the powerful idea that all Germans should belong to one nation state. Only if the great powers made the division of Germany permanent, could the German Communists concentrate on building their own state. If, however, the Soviet Union was seen to divide Germany, Moscow would compromise the national credentials of the German Communists and further weaken the legitimacy of the East German regime. Some researchers see the Stalin note as an attempt to solve this dilemma. If Stalin was convinced the Western powers would object to a united but non-aligned Germany, he could safely propose German unity and expect the Western powers to reject the idea. The foreseen Western rejection would give the Soviet Union a proper excuse for building a separate East German state. We may call this point of view the *alibi thesis*.¹¹

A fourth group, possibly the largest, argues that the Stalin note aimed, not to unite Germany under any condition, but to make people believe German unification was possible and imminent. While feeding the German desire for unification, Moscow would, as a side effect, create a popular sentiment against any move that could impede a united Germany - particularly West German membership in the Western alliance.¹² Adherents to the *propaganda thesis* claim the Stalin note was propaganda in the shape of a diplomatic note.

The latest supporter of the propaganda school is Gerhard Wettig. Wettig was the first researcher to examine the Stalin note by use of Russian archival sources.¹³ He argues that the Stalin note aimed to cause an upheaval in the Federal Republic; Stalin wanted to "mobilise the German 'masses' ... in an intense effort to oust Adenauer's government and to force the Western powers out of Germany".¹⁴ Several historians and former

politicians have supported Wettig, including Arnulf Baring, Alexander Fischer and Hermann Graml.¹⁵

Regardless of Wettig's attempt to examine the background of the Stalin note in Soviet archives, the debate continues. Historians Jochen Laufer and Elke Scherstjanoi have criticised Wettig's study in the journal *Deutschland Archiv*.¹⁶ The critics centre on three topics. First, several passages in Wettig's study resemble an attempt to collect ammunition for an old German controversy - in the words of Laufer - "a continuation of the cold war with other means".¹⁷ Scherstjanoi claims that Wettig uses ambiguous terms like "struggle for unity" as unambiguous evidence of an offensive Communist strategy. Second, the critics remark that Wettig has based his study on a narrow foundation - just two files in the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation. Third, the critics point out that Wettig applies a totalitarian model, sometimes taking for granted that the view of a bureaucrat reflects the view of Stalin himself and that the goals were identical in East Berlin and in Moscow.

The goal of this study is to recapitulate Soviet policy towards Germany in a fairly broad manner. Apart from a brief glance at the pre-history of occupied Germany, we shall also examine Soviet perceptions of the development in Germany. Hopefully, this background will add to our understanding as we examine the various and sometimes conflicting Soviet policies. At times, Moscow demanded a *status quo* in Germany and attempted to rally the Germans in support of Soviet goals; at times, Moscow considered negotiations with the Western powers. Although we will never know for sure what the outcome of such negotiations could have been, we may at least establish that part of the Soviet policy-making establishment tinkered with the idea of a united Germany, not Sovietised, but with strictly limited freedoms of action.

Two lines in Soviet policy towards Germany, 1945-1950

Soviet policy towards Germany was not coherent in the early years after the war. At times, the Soviet policy favoured unification and a single German state; at times, the Soviet occupation policy in effect deepened the division of the country. Frequently, the two lines collided, but they continued to co-exist. Even as the two German states were established in 1949, and Moscow supported the German Democratic Republic, the forces that favoured unification were still at work.

The legacy of Potsdam

At the outset, Soviet policy was clearly to keep Germany united. In July-August 1945 the Big Three met in Potsdam, outside Berlin, and agreed on a set of common principles to guide the occupation of Germany until a peace treaty could be signed with "a government suitable" for that purpose.¹⁸ Although the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union agreed that Germany should stay united, they divided the country into occupation zones for reasons of administrative convenience. The great powers agreed to treat Germany as one economic entity and to establish German political and administrative institutions. The plan was to establish municipal administration first. Later, when the occupation had uprooted Nazism, Germany should be granted a central government.¹⁹

Stalin had a number of reasons to support German unity. Like his allies, he knew the lesson of Versailles and hoped to avoid a political fragmentation that could provoke a future national resurgence. Second, a division of Germany would deny Moscow access to war reparations from the industrialised Western parts of Germany. Not only were the Western zones richer than the agrarian area east of the Elbe, but reparations from the Western

zones would also mean dismantling the Ruhr industries and Germany's capacity to produce arms. Finally, Stalin needed Germany to stay united in order to allow Soviet influence in the Western zones. A say in the running of the territories west of the Elbe was desirable, if not to spread Communism, then at least to check on the Western powers and prevent them from using the German resources in a campaign against the Soviet Union.²⁰

Stalin allowed a number of political parties in the Soviet Zone of Occupation. Already in July 1945, the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) put down roots in the zone. These parties were initially independent of the occupation power.²¹ The Soviet and the Western zones of occupation adopted a fairly similar structure of local government in 1945 and 1946.

In the early post-war years, France, not the Soviet Union, was the power most hostile to German unity. The French joined the Potsdam regime after the Potsdam Conference. Upon entering, Paris received an occupation zone in Germany and a voice in the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) - a permanent body set up at the Potsdam conference. A central task of the Council was to elaborate peace treaties with conquered enemies such as Italy, Finland, Austria, Japan and Germany. At the first (September 1945) and second (April-July 1946) CFM sessions, the French government proposed to partition Germany. Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov rejected the French proposals.²²

Although relations between the Allies rapidly deteriorated during 1946 and 1947, Moscow nevertheless hoped to continue co-operating with the West on Germany. When a group of East German Communists visited Moscow in January-February 1947, Stalin and Molotov objected to the establishment of a central administration in Eastern Germany unless "the [Western] partners refuse to create a Central government or a Central administration for Germany".²³ At the London CFM session in December 1947, Molotov pushed for a peace treaty, but in vain. After the Council meeting, he accused the Western powers of sabotage.²⁴

On 24 June 1948, the Soviet occupation authorities blocked all land routes between Berlin and Western Germany while insisting that the French, British

and American sectors of the city accept the monetary regime of the Soviet Zone. Moscow sought to force the Western powers to accept negotiations over Germany or else abandon Berlin.²⁵

The Berlin blockade did not mean the Soviet Union had settled for a division of Germany. At the onset of the Berlin crisis, a report to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party harshly criticised the ongoing Sovietisation in the Zone of Occupation, claiming that it imperilled Moscow's long-term interests in Germany. According to Norman Naimark, "a very strong current of opinion in the Central Committee" favoured a deal with the Western powers on Germany.²⁶ Stalin remained reluctant to establish a separate administration in the Soviet Zone of Occupation. In December 1948, the Soviet dictator again restrained an East German proposal to build a Communist state East of Elbe.²⁷

The Berlin blockade hardened the Western decision to set up a separate German state in the Western zones of occupation. The American response was decisive, the Western powers managed to supply West Berlin through an air-lift, and the anti-Communist sentiments grew in Western Germany.²⁸ Stalin, as a matter of fact, helped Adenauer win the West German elections in 1949.

The establishment of an East German police state

Whereas a lot of historical evidence points to the conclusion that Stalin hoped to keep Germany united, the actual Soviet policies on the ground in East Germany frequently added to the division of the country. Two recent books, *The Russians in Germany* by Norman Naimark and *Stalins ungeliebtes Kind* by Wilfried Loth, confirm the great uncertainty that surrounded Soviet policy-making in Germany. A group of Soviet and German Communists looked for ever new opportunities to build a strong East German state and fight capitalism. Loth even argues that these zealots, particularly SED General Secretary Walter Ulbricht, managed to build an East German state in conflict

with Stalin's wishes. Naimark's is the safer bet - he believes that Stalin "allowed a variety of Soviet policies to be followed".²⁹

Stalin was everywhere and nowhere. Most of the time he stayed in the background, sometimes he cracked down on this or the other development. But even when the dictator intervened directly, his signals were so vague that his subordinates could not establish a clear framework for action in Germany. Due to the lack of clear directions, much was left undecided. In the resulting power vacuum, people far below the ranks of the Politburo had to interpret the unclear directions and implement a policy. Naimark shows how Colonel Sergei Tiulpanov at the Soviet Military Administration in Germany moved to secure for the East German Communists a dominant role in the Soviet Zone of Occupation. The Colonel, who headed the Propaganda and Censorship Department,³⁰ seized upon the confusion in the Soviet occupation policy. In 1946, he spearheaded the creation of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) by forcefully uniting the Communists and the Social Democrats in the Zone. What the SED failed to accomplish in elections, Tiulpanov provided through pressures and manipulation. Gradually, he introduced a political system that resembled his native Leningrad.³¹

Not only did Tiulpanov and the East German Communists suppress political opposition, they moved on to Sovietise the SED itself. In the fall of 1948, the SED proclaimed to be a "party of the new type" which in effect meant that the party recognised the Soviet Union as a model for its policy.³² Meanwhile, the role of the East German "bourgeois" parties steadily diminished. In the run up to the GDR general elections in the fall 1950, the SED regime let the state security service quell all outspoken opposition.³³

The Sovietisation of East German politics coincided with a large-scale economic exploitation of the country. Moscow's quest for war reparations added to the division of the country because it contradicted the American policies in Germany. Whereas the Soviet Union hurried to remove property and resources, the American administration came about to support a German economic recovery that could bolster a wider West European recovery. Washington, however, was unwilling to pour Marshall aid and resources into West Germany only to see them disappear out of East

Germany in the shape of Soviet war reparations. Thus, in June 1948, the Western powers introduced a new currency in their zones of occupation and created a separate West German economy.³⁴

The lack of competent German speaking cadres forced the Soviet occupation authorities to let the Germans administer themselves. Likewise, the management of the zone's economy gave an impetus to set up a separate East German administration. On 20 March 1948, the Soviet Military Administration authorised the [East] German Economic Commission to issue binding decrees, which in turn allowed the Commission to act almost as a cabinet.³⁵ Gradually, a separate administration evolved, and, with time, it also developed a logic of its own.³⁶

Finally, confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West elsewhere, in Korea, in the Middle East and in the Balkans, spilt over on the situation in Germany. The climate of co-operation that once enabled the Potsdam agreement disappeared. The times favoured people like Ulbricht who hoped to build "socialism in half a country".³⁷

The nature of the GDR

Stalin waited until the Federal Republic was established, and until Adenauer had taken office in Bonn, before he allowed the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to be established on 7 October 1949.³⁸ Although the GDR had the institutions of any sovereign state, Moscow kept unification as an option; East German statehood was a hollow shell to be disposed of at Moscow's liking.

Officially, Moscow assured everyone that the East Germans were free to conduct their own business in every matter, save a few Soviet privileges like the right to secure reparations and the right to administer various four power agreements. In reality, however, there were few if any limits to Moscow's power. Wilfriede Otto has described the role of the Soviet Control Commission as a parallel cabinet (*Nebenregierung*) or even a super cabinet (*Überregierung*).³⁹ Behind the scenes, Soviet diplomats admitted being "more

involved" in the running of the GDR than provided for by official understandings.⁴⁰ East Berlin had less room for manoeuvre than Warsaw and other Soviet satellites, and the freedoms granted to Poland or Bulgaria did not necessarily apply to East Berlin. Polish President Boleslaw Bierut, for example, was free to visit the GDR - but his German colleague, Wilhelm Pieck, felt unable to receive him without a "correct evaluation" from Moscow.⁴¹

Initially, East Berlin lacked even the semblance of a popular mandate. To avoid a devastating loss at the polls, the SED regime did not conduct elections upon the establishment of the GDR, but postponed the elections and let Stasi quell all outspoken opposition.⁴² When elections were arranged on 15 October 1950, East Berlin presented the voters with Hobson's choice: a single list of candidates, arranged to guarantee a SED-controlled majority in the People's Chamber.⁴³ Frantic in its quest for legitimacy, the SED leadership then faked the results of the poll. The official figures held that fully 98.73 per cent of the East Germans had turned out to vote - 99.72 per cent of the electorate allegedly accepted the Communist-controlled unity list.⁴⁴

The quest for legitimacy explains the East German eagerness to participate in international political events. Since the United Nations and the Western powers did not recognise the GDR, the regime could only play a limited role on the international scene. The German comrades tried to escape from isolation and gain recognition by taking a correspondingly active role in activities within the Soviet bloc. The initiative to arrange the conference of Soviet-bloc foreign ministers to protest about German rearmament was East German.⁴⁵ To enable the newly elected GDR government to participate in the conference, Moscow decided to postpone the conference until the end of October 1950.⁴⁶

The Soviet foreign ministry carefully guarded the Soviet privileges in East Germany and struck down on every East German attempt to gain sovereignty. One such incident occurred in December 1951, when Ulbricht asked for a relaxation in the Soviet control on inter-German trade arguing that increased trade could strengthen the East German economy and place

unification higher on the public agenda in West Germany.⁴⁷ The Politburo declined; partly because Moscow honoured the Potsdam regime on trade, partly because the Kremlin did not trust the German comrades to conduct trade and border control. A Politburo memo argued that East Berlin might attempt to control the communication lines between West Berlin and the Federal Republic. This might provoke a dangerous incident since the "Western governments have located troops in Berlin".⁴⁸ As a rule of thumb, Moscow never allowed the SED a freedom unless Bonn had irreversibly received the privilege in question.

The Soviet idea of a Western conspiracy to exploit and militarise Germany

As we approach 1950 and 1951, it became ever more evident that the Western powers intended to abandon the Potsdam regime and incorporate the Federal Republic in the Western alliance. Soviet reports on Germany were coherent and equally pessimistic: the Western powers, primarily the United States, exploited German manpower and resources to prepare aggression against the Soviet Union. The Soviet assessment of the development was more alarming than a Western observer might expect. Not facts alone, but a powerful set of biases, helped to shape the image that Moscow received of Germany. Thus, it is hard to overestimate the Soviet worries about Germany.

Sources of Soviet perceptions

When Soviet observers explained what was happening in Germany, they knew the answer in advance. The Party had adopted a view on the development in the Federal Republic, and the diplomats were unwise to question this Party line. Nevertheless, the existence of a Party line does not fully explain the cohesion in the Soviet reports on Germany - we must also keep in mind the shared *ideological training* and the collective *historical experience* that shaped Moscow's view. Besides, knowing no other *frame of reference* than Stalin's Russia, the Soviet diplomats applied to the Federal Republic the logic of a totalitarian state; West Germany became the Soviet Union's mirror image - equal but reverse.

The intellectual frame of the Soviet diplomats was shaped by Lenin's work on imperialism. During the First World War, Lenin wrote that capitalist monopolies within each state had mostly managed to kill off their domestic

competition. Thus, in each state, the government represented a united class of capitalists, no longer in conflict with each other, but in conflict with the ruling monopolies of other countries. Because of the uneven development in capitalist economies, some states would gain in strength relative to others. To offset the profitability crisis in their economies, these rising powers sought new markets and more raw materials. This expansive drive would tempt the stronger power to change the territorial *status quo* - a development that would inevitably result in war. Applying Lenin's theories on imperialism in the peaceful 1920s, the Soviet diplomats predicted that the capitalist world would again experience crisis and war. Then came the crack of 1929, the great depression of the 1930s, Nazism and another war. The Soviet predictions from the 1920s had been stunningly accurate. At the onset of the Cold War, the Soviet diplomats deeply trusted their Leninist tool of analysis.⁴⁹

Historical experience strongly coloured the Soviet judgement on West German affairs. The Great Patriotic War was a present memory for the Soviet observers, and they relentlessly compared developments in the Federal Republic with developments in Nazi Germany. Soviet diplomats were particularly worried about the German monopolies with their inherent potential to breed fascism and *militarism*, that is a set of ideals - aggressive, efficient, disciplined, chauvinist and expansive - which predispose a nation to build, and use, large military forces.

As if ideological training and historic experience did not provide Soviet diplomats with enough worrisome images of Germany, Moscow also ascribed to the country the logic of a totalitarian state. Soviet observers knew what role the Soviet occupation authorities played in East Germany, and they assumed the Western powers ruled the Federal Republic in much the same way. Although central planning was not a major part of the West German economic recovery, Moscow assumed the great industrialists had somehow designed the German economic recovery to prepare for war with much the same unity of purpose as did the the Soviet planning agency (Gosplan). Moscow failed to grasp, not only the mechanisms of a market economy, but also the logic of pluralist politics. In their attempt to explain the working of opposition parties, for example, Soviet diplomats assumed the

Western powers "in reality" used the German Social Democratic Party to "fool" and split the progressive forces in the Federal Republic.⁵⁰

Soviet observers were strongly disposed to worry about Germany, and they generally erred on the side of caution; hence the urgency when developments in Germany took a truly alarming direction following the American decision to rearm the Federal Republic and integrate the country in the Western Alliance.

The bomb at the Waldorf Astoria

Worrying about Western Europe's vulnerability to Soviet pressure, American Secretary of State Dean Acheson had long played with the idea of German rearmament. The issue was highly emotional, however. Only after 25 June 1950, when North Korea attacked South Korea and created a war scare in the Atlantic Alliance, did Acheson proceed with the plan. In September, he broke the news to a North Atlantic Council meeting at the Waldorf Astoria in New York. Acheson promised to reinforce the American troops in Europe, but made the reinforcement dependent on an increased European contribution to the alliance. This demand would put considerable strains on the West European economies unless the Europeans agreed to let Adenauer shoulder the burden of rearmament.⁵¹ Everybody agreed except Paris. Due to the French objections, the communiqué from the foreign ministers on 19 September agreed only to raise "the problem of the participation of the German Federal Republic in the common defence of Europe".⁵² In reality, however, the stage was set for German rearmament.

The need for a German defence contribution improved Adenauer's bargaining position and enabled him to secure more freedom of action for the Federal Republic. If the New York Council expected West Germany to defend the Alliance, the Western powers could scarcely suppress Bonn's sovereignty and curb West Germany's industrial production. Thus, the North Atlantic Council agreed to revise the *Prohibited and Limited Industries Agreement* (PLI) - a regime established by the Potsdam Conference to limit

the output of war-related German industries. The PLI banned weapons production, limited the number, size and speed of German-built ships and the output of the German coal industry. After 1945, the Western powers had relaxed the PLI somewhat, but the regime was still in place.⁵³

The Soviet assessment of what happened in New York is summed up in two words: aggression and exploitation. The United States exploited Germany's resources to undertake an arms build-up directed at the Soviet Union. This was the basic message from the East European foreign ministers when they met in Prague from 20 to 22 October 1950 to protest the decisions of the North Atlantic Council. The Prague Declaration claimed that the Western powers were preparing "new military adventures in Europe". To realise this aim, the Atlantic Alliance was about to release the genie that had caused the Second World War.⁵⁴

Only yesterday the peoples of France, Great Britain and the United States of America waged a sanguinary struggle against [H]itlerite aggression, against German imperialism - yet today the ruling circles of these countries are with their own hands restoring the Western German Army, releasing condemned war criminals, restoring the war industrial potential of Western Germany, reviving Western German imperialism.⁵⁵

The Prague Declaration claimed the Western powers had introduced a war economy in Germany "instead of ... improving the material conditions of life of the working people." While the Western powers were enriching the West German imperialists, ordinary people would have to forsake the benefits of trade with Eastern Europe and pay higher taxes to finance "occupation troops".⁵⁶

The Schuman Plan to control German economic revival

In May 1950, fearful of unrestrained German production of coal and steel - the basic commodities of armament - French Foreign Minister Robert

Schuman proposed a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Rather than curb the German production of steel and coal, Schuman proposed trading these commodities on a common European market. The market resembled a cartel, inasmuch as Schuman proposed a supranational body (the *High Authority*) to regulate output and prices.⁵⁷

The ECSC negotiations were prolonged and heated. Although the rules of the Community would apply equally to all member countries, the new regime would particularly affect Germany. A common market would give non-German producers of steel, most notably the steel mills in French Lorraine, equal access to the rich coal deposits in the Ruhr region. To preserve its steel industry, Bonn fought to maintain two institutions that restricted foreign access to Ruhr coal: a sales agency known to charge higher prices from foreign than domestic consumers (*Deutsche Kohlen-Verkauf*), and a practice of coal mines producing exclusively for the steel mills that owned the pit (*Verbundwirtschaft*). Bonn gave in on both issues, partly because of American pressure, partly because Chancellor Adenauer hoped Bonn would gain respectability through participation in the Community. By the second week of March 1951, France, Italy, West Germany and the Benelux agreed to form a European Coal and Steel Community.⁵⁸

Moscow explained the ECSC as an attempt to exploit Germany in an aggressive campaign directed against the Soviet Union. The Prague declaration, for example, held the ECSC to be a "supra-monopolist concern" to "recreate the war industrial potential of Western Germany" at the "dictate of the United States" assisted by "the most reactionary groupings in Western Germany".⁵⁹ Soviet intelligence reports outlined five major goals that the United States attempted to achieve through the ECSC.⁶⁰ First, to give the West Germans the concessions they demanded in return for joining the Western camp: Bonn received "the outward appearance of independence and equal rights" in a manner acceptable to the French. Second, Washington had introduced the Community to prevent the Soviet Union from exercising its legal rights in Germany. Through the ECSC, the Americans removed the limitations on German industrial production

without Moscow's consent and frustrated the Soviet claim for war reparations from the Ruhr.⁶¹

Third, Moscow claimed that the supranational High Authority enabled the Americans to control much of the economic activity in the ECSC member countries. As for the nature of the American rule, the various memos differed somewhat. The Soviet Control Commission in Germany, on one hand, claimed the ECSC would mean "the final destruction of national sovereignty[...] and establishment of US hegemony in Western Europe". Monopolies from the New World would "in reality" hand-pick the members of the ECSC ruling body and use the Community's legal system to impose fines on firms and governments and "gather the power over all economic branches" in their hands.⁶² A memo to the Politburo was somewhat more sober and claimed only that the ECSC ran "contrary to the core national interests of the participating countries by undermining the economic foundation for independence and sovereignty".⁶³

Fourth, the Americans would use the Community to expand Germany's industrial production, exploit the country and enrich themselves.⁶⁴ Fifth, the Americans would use the ECSC to increase the "penetration of American capital into the European economy". These investments served as "a precondition for the development [...] of the West German military-industrial potential". The ECSC, that is, was a means to rearm Germany.⁶⁵

Soviet diplomats took particular interest in the heated ECSC negotiations that lasted from May 1950 to March 1951. Moscow knew that the negotiations had been "under the threat of failure" and would probably have fallen short had not the Americans intervened.⁶⁶ In explaining why the ECSC negotiations almost broke down, the Soviet analysis downplayed French security concerns, discarded Bonn's hopes for recognition and equality, and overlooked the British preoccupation with sovereignty.

Relying on the framework of Lenin's *Imperialism*, Moscow correctly explained the Schuman Plan as an attempt to secure markets and raw materials for French industry. Soviet diplomats, however, thought that the basic French motivation was profit rather than security worries. If we trust the Kremlin, the ECSC negotiations were about French monopolies fighting

American monopolies for control over the German economy. The French effort was futile, Soviet diplomats assured: the correlation of forces was such that the "American point of view will invariably win".⁶⁷ Likewise, London's decision not to participate in the ECSC was a result of lagging British competitiveness and fear of American economic superiority.⁶⁸

The Soviet Diplomatic Mission in Berlin observed how the German monopolies were "standing ever more upright on their feet". While the Western powers fought amongst themselves, Bonn became "ever more demanding".⁶⁹ The rise of Germany had resulted in a tactical alliance between Bonn and Washington to get rid of British and French control. The ECSC was a deal whereby the Ruhr industrialists would remain subordinate to the United States for a while - as "a necessary step on the road" to economic and political might. When the time was right, German monopolies would regain their supremacy in Europe.⁷⁰ Because the Federal Republic accounted for 52 per cent of ECSC coal production and 38 per cent of ECSC steel production, German monopolies would have a predominant role in the Community.⁷¹ Never did the idea occur in a Soviet memo that appointed politicians on the High Authority, one from each member country, could restrain industry by majority voting.

The Plevin Plan and how Moscow saw it

A few days before the New York Council meeting in September 1950, the French government learned of the American determination to rearm Germany. Paris tried to block that decision, but members of the French political elite, like Jean Monnet and Prime Minister René Plevin, realised that German rearmament was inevitable. On 26 October 1950, Plevin proposed accepting German soldiers, but not a German army. The French premier called for a complete assimilation (*une fusion complète*) of West European soldiers and equipment into a European army. Small national units, for example a German infantry battalion, would rely on other nationalities to provide transport, artillery support and intelligence. The charm of a European

Army organised according to Plevén's plan was that no member country (read Germany) could wage war against any other member country (read France). Besides, in an ordinary military alliance, any member country (read Germany) could withdraw to pursue its national interests. If the Federal Republic left the European army, however, she would find herself without equipment and without a military organisation. There would be but one European general staff under the surveillance of a European defence ministry.⁷²

A European army involved some disturbing implications for the nations involved. To avoid a new *Wehrmacht*, Paris would have to dissolve the French army - an idea that thoroughly upset the national sentiment. Since the British refused to take part, the West Germans could possibly become a dominating member of the EDC. Furthermore, the lack of American participation could possibly weaken the trans-Atlantic bounds. The most pressing problem, however, was the lack of cohesion in a future European army. The soldiers that were to fight alongside each other would need a common language and a degree of shared training. Thus, for the sake of military efficiency, the defence planners would like to make up the European army of units consisting of 10 - 15,000 soldiers from the same country. These divisions would be equipped and organised to undertake sustained operations without assistance from other units. German divisions, however, capable of independent action, were exactly what Plevén had set out to avoid.⁷³

Soviet diplomats failed to see how the Plevén Plan could contain Germany. The foreign ministry's annotation about Plevén's plan did not report the idea of a total assimilation to tie down Germany's potential. Soviet observers, on the contrary, portrayed the European army as a military alliance where each state was to submit "parts of their armed forces" to a joint structure.⁷⁴ Even the sober and accurate assessments from the Committee on Information failed to report on the worries about British and American non-participation in the EDC.⁷⁵ The British defence minister, Emmanuel Shinwell, thoroughly misread the Soviet sentiments when he predicted that the EDC structure "would excite laughter and ridicule" in the Soviet Union.⁷⁶

Although the Soviet Control Commission saw the Plevén Plan as "apparently unworkable in praxis", Soviet observers never rejoiced, but rather struggled to uncover in what sinister way the European army suited the American aggressors.⁷⁷ The Control Commission suggested that the EDC could serve as "a smoke screen for the more serious negotiations" to rearm the Federal Republic directly in the North Atlantic Alliance.⁷⁸ Possibly, the Americans preferred to sacrifice some military efficiency in return for greater obedience, so that the Soviet Union could no longer play on national sentiments to prevent the American war plans. Thus, "if the Plevén plan is carried through, it would without doubt be in the interests of the Americans, inasmuch as it foresees the elimination of the national armies and [ensures] their subordination to Eisenhower".⁷⁹ Soviet diplomats, that is, saw the EDC as an American attempt to impose German soldiers on Western Europe. Washington had picked the Federal Republic to be America's chief ally in Europe because "from an aggressor's point of view, she has better human resources than the other West European countries".⁸⁰

Moscow and the idea of German sovereignty

The Western occupation powers did not surrender the supreme authority in West Germany although they set up the Federal Republic in 1949. After Adenauer had been elected chancellor by the lower house of parliament on 15 September 1949, one of his first duties was to accept an Occupation Statute that gave the Western powers vaguely defined, but essentially unlimited, powers in the Federal Republic. The legal basis for the Occupation Statute was the unconditional German surrender in 1945. In terms of international law, the Western powers were at war with Germany until the summer of 1951, and their troops in the Federal Republic were legally occupation forces.⁸¹

The majority of West Germans wanted the troops to stay, but resented the idea of being occupied. Thus, in return for a West German defence contribution, the New York Council meeting promised to terminate the

state of war and review the Occupation Statute. The Western powers would retain certain well-defined privileges, such as the right to station troops in Germany, but these rights would be defined in an agreement negotiated with Bonn.⁸² Under the new regime, the soldiers would stay on, not as occupation forces, but for the "defence of the free world".⁸³ Soviet diplomats (correctly) linked the decision to terminate the state of war and the intention to rearm West Germany. Indeed, by formally ending the occupation, the Western powers resolved a legal subtlety: if the Potsdam regime remained in place, the future German soldiers would, in juridical terms, take part in the occupation of their own country.

In Soviet eyes, the "false phrases" about ending the occupation served only as "a screen" to conceal the Western intention "to prolong their rule in Western Germany as long as possible".⁸⁴ The Third European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry (hereafter 'the German desk') acknowledged that Adenauer received "concessions and indulgence"⁸⁵ from the Western powers, but refused to believe the Western powers would surrender real control just as they were about to exploit the country.

Soviet diplomats saw the presence of Western troops in Germany as the ultimate proof of Bonn's lack of freedom. In Soviet thinking, a country housing American soldiers could not be fully sovereign, and as long as the troops stayed on, the talk about West German independence was "hypocritical through and through".⁸⁶ A foreign ministry report on the decision to terminate the state of war concluded that the Western powers would continue to "control all the Bonn government's activities".⁸⁷ Another memo assured that the decision did not give the Federal Republic "even the slightest sovereignty".⁸⁸ Although Moscow continued to view the Federal Republic as an American dependency, Soviet diplomats kept an open eye on the political development west of the Elbe.

West German political culture and the shadow of Hitler

During Stalin's lifetime, in-depth analysis of Nazism was strangely absent from Soviet writing. Whenever Stalin's diplomats needed a definition of fascism, they turned to Marxist class struggle analysis. Hence, the foreign ministry defined fascism as a terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, chauvinistic and imperialist element of monopoly capitalism. The capitalists impose fascism in times of deep crisis, when the proletarian revolution draws near, and the ruling bourgeoisie can no longer cling to power through the mechanisms of parliamentary democracy.⁸⁹ This definition failed to mention totalitarianism, anti-Semitism, personality cult and other aspects of Nazism that coincided with developments in Stalin's Russia. For our purpose, it is important to note how the Soviet understanding of fascism encouraged Moscow to think of the Federal Republic as a Nazi regime under creation: fascism was not the antithesis of bourgeois democracy; fascism and bourgeois democracy were but different phases of class rule.

Suspecting that the Federal Republic and Nazi Germany had a lot in common, the Soviet diplomats looked carefully for a connection - and found what they set out to discover: the victory over Nazism in 1945 was not complete in West Germany. Numerous Soviet surveys of the Federal Republic found that the finance capital and the big industrialists, which Moscow believed to be the initiators of fascism, were alive and well. One report claimed that the West German government apparatus consisted "mainly of people representing big industry and banks, many of which have ties to American monopolies".⁹⁰ Moscow did not, however, claim that Nazis ruled in Bonn. Soviet diplomats rather described the West German government as "openly revanchist [and] imperialistic."⁹¹ As for Adenauer himself, he was an "outright enemy of the Soviet Union", but presumably not a Nazi.⁹²

The fight against Nazism and fascism was deadly serious, and Soviet diplomats declined from using the terms "Nazi" and "fascist" in common abuse. Certainly, Moscow despised people like Adenauer's minister of the interior, Robert Lehr, a former member of the August-Thyssen board of directors who now prosecuted Communists. Nevertheless, the Soviet

observers declined from calling Lehr a Nazi and settled for lesser insults like undercover agent, provocateur, protégé, reactionary figure, traitor, revanchist, Himmler of Bonn, prison warden, hangman, strangler of freedom, bloody dog of the militarists and police-method minister.⁹³

A favourite subject of memo writing in the Soviet foreign ministry was a group of 50 or so "fascist and nationalist" organisations.⁹⁴ The ex-soldier forum *Bruderschaft* and a few other right-wing organisations had some following. Nevertheless, Moscow did not terribly overstate the Nazi threat in West Germany - at least if we allow for a natural level of Nazi-scare common all over Europe after the Second World War. One report from the German desk admitted that nationalists and fascists were fringe groups with little support.⁹⁵ Occasionally, the Soviet Control Commission in Germany addressed the subject with ironic distance, taking delight, for example, in how one German right-winger had mistaken the SPD leader, Schumacher, for actually being a Marxist.⁹⁶

More pressing was the Soviet concern for revanchism among the seven to eight million Germans who had fled, or been expelled, from East Prussia, Sudetenland and the areas east of the Oder-Neisse line. The Soviet Control Commission claimed there were many land barons and Nazis among them and that their organisations were keen on spreading chauvinism and anti-Soviet propaganda. Worse, the Adenauer government willingly kept the refugees out of work to keep them hostile and available for service in a future West German army.⁹⁷ For the Soviet Union, the discontent among the German refugees provided opportunities as well as worries. Several memos argued that the German Communists should attempt to persuade these settlers to pursue their goals through an understanding with Moscow.⁹⁸

The Soviet Control Commission was deeply concerned about Adenauer's clamp-down on the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). On 11 September 1950, the *Bundestag* voted to remove several of the KPD's parliamentary privileges; eight days later, the government banished party members from the civil service (*Berufsverbot*). The Soviet Control Commission remarked that the clamp-downs coincided with the Atlantic Alliance's request for a German defence contribution.⁹⁹ Soviet diplomats

considered legal actions against Communists as yet another aspect of German rearmament.

The way Adenauer clamped down on the Communists added insult to injury. The chancellor branded Communists and Nazis together and used the *Berufsverbot* indiscriminately against both. Equally offensive was the legal action against *Freie Deutsche Jugend*. On 26 June 1951, Adenauer outlawed this Communist youth movement by invoking a constitutional ban against organisations that were either criminal, anti-constitutional or opposed to the idea of human understanding.¹⁰⁰

Expecting nothing from Adenauer - not even fairness - Soviet diplomats searched for allies in the West German opposition. In some matters of foreign policy, the Social Democratic line of policy corresponded with Soviet points of view: Schumacher opposed West German membership in Nato and European integration; he also accused Adenauer of relinquishing German sovereignty to please the Allies - "Chancellor of the Allies", he once barked during a parliamentary debate.¹⁰¹ In basic terms, however, the SPD leader was pro-Western. Schumacher wanted an American security guarantee for the Federal Republic backed by a large contingent of American troops; he even accepted West German rearmament - but with no strings attached.¹⁰² This nationalist touch made Soviet observers conclude that SPD supported German imperialism.¹⁰³ Besides, Schumacher loathed Communism. According to the Soviet Control Commission in Germany, he had a "beast-like hatred towards the Soviet Union".¹⁰⁴

The peaceful German public

Moscow hoped to exploit those in the SPD who opposed the "right-wing leadership".¹⁰⁵ Foreign policy split the Social Democrats. Some members of a left-wing faction within the party had made friendly overtures to the East,¹⁰⁶ and the SCC claimed to know "from reliable sources" that quite a few Social Democrats in parliament opposed rearmament but kept quiet to avoid an open split in the party.¹⁰⁷

Such information made Soviet diplomats conclude that the German Communists should intensify their work among the Social Democrat rank and file. The goal of these activities was "to achieve unity of the working class" - that is to have SPD supporters reject the SPD leadership and close ranks with the Communists.¹⁰⁸ Communist Party faithfuls fuelled Moscow's hopes. In September 1951, for example, an East German Communist visited his father in the West German city of Essen. According to the old man, the West German workers still relied on the SPD to express their discontent, but recently their attitude towards the Soviet Union and the GDR had "changed sharply in a positive direction". A report on this conversation made its way to the foreign minister's desk, and Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinskii underlined every word as he read.¹⁰⁹

The Soviet assessment of the KPD oscillated, however, between hopes for the future and frustration about the present. Several reports described the work of the West German Communists as "entirely inadequate"¹¹⁰ and "very feeble".¹¹¹ Communist influence "in the masses" remained "utterly weak".¹¹² According to Moscow, the cardinal failure of the KPD was *sectarianism* - that is, a preoccupation with work in closed groups rather than among the masses, frequently combined with ideological dogmatism.¹¹³

The Soviet foreign ministry recognised the fact that ordinary Germans did not want war. After the December 1950 meeting in the North Atlantic Council, the Soviet Diplomatic Mission in East Germany reported a strong public reaction against rearmament.

*The larger part of the population, including many former military people, is not supporting the remilitarisation policy because they fear that this policy might cause a war with the Soviet Union. This fear is made stronger by the fact that the fighting quality of the Americans is not held in high esteem in West Germany, particularly concerning the Korean war.*¹¹⁴


The citation above is interesting, not only because the author stressed the popular West German distaste of war, but also because the memo indicated why militarism lacked support. The strength of the Soviet Union and the

perceived weakness of the United States made the Germans abstain from arming their country. The Soviet foreign ministry noticed a West German opinion poll showing that fully 85 per cent of the West Germans opposed military service, 68.4 per cent opposed rearmament and 82 per cent opposed Nato membership.¹¹⁵ In September 1950, only five per cent of the West German male population would voluntarily serve in the army.¹¹⁶

The Wirtschaftswunder as the work of swordsmiths

After the currency reform in 1948, Western Germany experienced strong industrial growth. The surprising speed of the recovery made the Germans speak of a *Wirtschaftswunder* - an economic miracle. Industrial production

Chart 1 - developments in the West German economy, 1948-1953¹¹⁷



tripled from 1948 to 1953. During the last nine months of 1950 alone, production increased some 30 per cent and reached the level of 1938. Over the five-year period prior to 1953, wages jumped some 70 per cent, prices on capital goods rose about 20 per cent, but the cost of living hardly rose at all.

In 1950 and 1951, Soviet diplomats closely followed the official economic statistics from the Federal Republic. Except for the rise in wages, which Moscow tended to disregard, the foreign ministry acknowledged the developments in West Germany (see Chart 1). Particularly the rise in production made Soviet observers draw alarming conclusions. Such growth, they concluded, was "not a result of a normal process during peaceful post-war conditions". The rapid expansion of West German industry was an "accomplishment based on war preparations".¹¹⁸

What particularly alarmed the Soviet observers was the similarities in the growth rates during the first few years of the *Wirtschaftswunder* and the last few years before the war. In 1936, after the great depression, Hermann Göring became plenipotentiary of a four-year plan to make Germany ready for war by 1940. Although the growth rates in Nazi Germany and the Federal Republic were similar, the politico-economical systems of the two regimes differed. The Nazi regime aimed at self-sufficiency and military needs;¹¹⁹ Adenauer's minister of the economy, Ludwig Erhard pursued liberal economics and trade.¹²⁰ Soviet diplomats, however, were inclined to overlook the differences between Göring and Erhard because they saw capitalism as a bridge between the two periods. One way or the other, the same omnipotent German monopolies ruled - with the same unity of purpose and the same diabolic cunning. Hence, Soviet diplomats believed they were witnessing the silhouette of a military build-up, not unlike the one Hitler had undertaken in the late 1930s.¹²¹

In the wake of this arms build-up, Moscow saw signs of increasing exploitation of the West German workers. In September 1950, the Atlantic Council agreed to make use of West Germany's military potential. That fall, the Federal Republic also experienced a period of particularly high inflation. For a few months in late 1950 and early 1951, consumer prices rose faster than wages (see Chart 1). Thus, in May 1951, some nine months after the


New York Council meeting, the SCC concluded that "a prolonged reduction in the living standard of the workers has begun".¹²² Because the Western powers were allocating investments, manpower and rawmaterials to strategic industries rather than consumer industry, the cost of living rose and workers suffered.

The Soviet forecast predicted that the exploitation of the German workers would become ever more severe. Moscow believed American investments were the main catalyst for West German growth. Since the budget deficit, the war in Korea and the various aid programs starved Washington of funds, the United States would be unable to provide additional credits to Bonn.¹²³ On the contrary, the Americans would expect Bonn to pay for the occupation. Consequently, the *Wirtschaftswunder* would come to a halt, and only by exploitation of the German workers could Bonn rebuild the destroyed infrastructure, equip a new army and pay for the occupation troops. In trying to predict how severe the exploitation would be, Soviet diplomats assumed that the forthcoming arms build-up would be comparable in volume to that of Nazi Germany. The Federal Republic, however, had fewer resources and fewer people than Hitler possessed. Besides, the country had still not recovered from the Second World War. Therefore, the exploitation of the West German resources would be "considerably higher than the corresponding demands of the hitler state before the second world war".¹²⁴

Soviet diplomats struggled to explain away why the German economy continued to emphasise consumer industry. The Western powers still prohibited arms production, and the absence of a "scissors crisis" convinced Soviet observers that the West German growth was balanced and not centred around heavy industry.¹²⁵ Contrary to Soviet expectations, inflation hit the industrialists as hard as, or even harder than, the workers. Nevertheless, Moscow was convinced that the West German civilian production was part of an arms build-up. According to Soviet observers, the American war machine exploited West Germany by means of trade. Trade enabled the Americans to ship German products abroad and use them in military production elsewhere in the Atlantic Alliance. Even harm-

less consumer goods could be of use. Following the war in Korea, Washington had called upon German industry to “fulfil military orders (tailor army uniforms, produce boots for the army and so on)”.¹²⁶ Besides, German production could offset a fall in civilian production caused by arms production in the United States or elsewhere.

Chart 2 - West German international trade (in million D-marks)¹²⁷



A Western economist would object that German imports rose just as fast as exports (see Chart 2). Hence, there was no net tapping of German resources. Furthermore, the Western powers had not forced the Federal Republic to pay for the additional number of troops on her territory. On the contrary, Bonn paid less than before. Again, the SCC managed to find an explanation consistent with the theory that the United States exploited West Germany for military purposes: the Western powers refrained from putting additional burdens on Germany because they wanted “a healthy economic foundation” for a defence contribution.¹²⁸ Thus, the non-exploitation of West Germany was as worrying as the exploitation of the country. One was proof of German war preparations, the other was proof of American war preparations.

Soviet diplomats saw the effects of American imperialism, not only in the *Wirtschaftswunder*, but also in West Germany’s cultural life. A colourful

44memo from the SCC worried about the numerous American movies and the illustrated magazines that flooded Europe and influenced German popular culture. “Thieves, prostitutes, detectives, traitors and all kinds of ‘record-breakers’ have become heroes of the day”. the SCC observed.¹²⁹ Whereas Hollywood seduced the common man, Washington used “anti-scientific printing” and “abstract art” to dull the minds of the intellectuals and “harm the German national character”. Because militarisation had starved the cultural life of funds, the Yankees could “bribe” intellectuals to take part in “espionage, and destruction of the national resistance”. To prove the point, the report mentioned a “competition for the best poster to popularise the Marshall-plan”.¹³⁰

Moscow eyes threats and opportunities

In assessing the Soviet picture of Germany, it is useful to make some distinctions. Concerning *verifiable facts* - the strength of the German economy or the pace of European integration - the Soviet assessment was fairly sober. Moscow’s fear of a united and hostile brotherhood of monopolists was much exaggerated - but not entirely misperceived. In 1950, the United States pushed for West German rearmament with impressive power and capability. Thomas Schwartz has even argued that the Federal Republic “was effectively a part of the American political, economic and military system, more like a state such as California or Illinois than an independent sovereign nation or a colony or protectorate”.¹³¹

The Soviet assessment of Western *intentions*, however, erred badly on the militant side. Soviet diplomats saw the capitalist world as inherently aggressive. This assumption was not questioned. If the West failed to show aggression, the Soviet diplomats never rejoiced, but redoubled their efforts to uncover the Western plot.¹³² The *Wirtschaftswunder*, Hollywood, the German Social Democratic Party - everything was part of a great conspiracy aimed at the Soviet Union.

The foreign ministry saw the various efforts to contain West Germany as preparations to "get ready for the third world war that the imperialist circles [...] are preparing".¹³³ The Federal Republic could quickly be turned into a weapons mill for the Atlantic Alliance.¹³⁴ Besides, the Americans moved to strengthen their "bastion" of support: "the big monopolies, the reactionaries, and the revanchists and the fascist elements".¹³⁵ To subdue the "democratic organisations" in West Germany, the Americans applied "direct terror or terror through the hands of the bonn government".¹³⁶

Moscow did see, however, an opportunity inherent in the threat of German militarisation. In preparing for aggression, the Western powers suppressed political freedoms and neglected public welfare. The clamp-down on the German Communist Party and the inflation that hit Germany in the fall of 1950, signalled an ever more severe exploitation of the workers. In the end, this exploitation would provoke a popular discontent that the Soviet Union could draw upon. If the German Communists did their job properly, the German public would come out against rearmament and in favour of the Soviet Union.

A Soviet strategy aimed at public opinion, September 1950 - June 1951

Assuming that Western citizens would not accept German rearmament, Moscow devised a strategy aimed at public opinion. In late 1950 and early 1951, the Politburo accepted a diplomatic frontal attack against the Western plans to rearm the Federal Republic. In negotiations with London, Paris and Washington, Moscow demanded that Germany stay demilitarised. The Soviet Union did not aim to achieve Western acceptance of the *status quo* in Germany; instead Moscow hoped to use the limelight of the negotiating table to make the public aware of the grave developments in Germany.

In effect, Moscow set out to make the Western public aware of the grave danger of German militarism that Soviet observers had observed through a distorted ideological lens. The task of Soviet diplomacy, that is, was to "unmask" (*razoblahat*;) how the Western powers "fooled" (*obmanyvat*;) the people in order to militarise Germany. By showing how things worked "in reality" (*v su]nosti*), the Soviet diplomats hoped to create a strong popular reaction that could force the Western powers to abide by the Potsdam agreement and refrain from arming Germany.

Calling the Council of Ministers to discuss Germany

To attack German militarism and awake the public, Moscow needed a proper arena. Hence, on 3 November 1950, Moscow demanded a summit of the four great powers to discuss "the fulfilment of the Potsdam agreement regarding demilitarisation of Germany".¹³⁷

Because the decision to rearm the Federal Republic was controversial, the Western powers felt obliged to meet the Soviet demand for talks about the German problem. London and Paris believed that a refusal to discuss

the German question would come to be seen as eagerness in arming the Germans, and the two governments were inclined to accept the Soviet proposal.¹³⁸ British foreign minister Herbert Morrison, for example, liked the idea of an agreement with the Soviet Union. In early January 1951, the American ambassador in London, Walter Gifford, cabled that London might be willing to negotiate for a peace treaty and a neutral Germany: "Indeed they do not see how it would be possible from standpoint public opinion in West to reject such an offer if phrased in such manner as to give impression of sincerity."¹³⁹ Acheson, however, feared a Soviet agenda that focused strictly on the dangers of German militarism and hence prevented the Western powers from airing the various Soviet actions that allegedly justified the controversial plan to involve German soldiers in the defence of Europe. Before the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels, 18-19 December 1950, the three powers agreed both to push for German rearmament and pursue negotiations with the Soviet Union. Whereas the Soviet Union had called for a full CFM session, the three Western powers agreed only to a meeting of deputy foreign ministers to discuss the agenda of a possible CFM session.¹⁴⁰ Besides, London, Paris and Washington wanted the agenda to include both "the causes of the present international tensions" and "questions related to Germany and Austria".¹⁴¹

Within the Soviet foreign ministry there were different views about which questions to raise prior to the forthcoming negotiations. The German desk favoured a rather broad agenda that included not only "other questions concerning Germany" but questions related to Austria as well.¹⁴² Indeed, the German desk re-examined the Soviet position on Austria. A memo from January 1951 argued that the Soviet Union should relax its position somewhat in Austria. Moscow did not need to insist on forced repatriation of displaced persons, and there was room for compromise in questions regarding Austria's pre-1938 debts to the Western powers and the country's war-related debts to the Soviet Union.¹⁴³

Whereas the German desk was willing to consider the Austrian question, Molotov held a different view. Molotov had served as Soviet foreign minister from 1939 to 1949, and he still held a seat on the Politburo. The diplomats

were in no position to object as Molotov censored the Soviet reply note and removed the suggestion about discussing Austria. Consequently, the answer that the Soviet Union sent on 30 December 1950 demanded talks on German rearmament, not "consultations on one question or another".¹⁴⁴

After another round of notes, the Soviet Union relaxed its position somewhat and conceded the discussion of any questions related to the Potsdam treaty. Although the four powers still differed on the purpose of the great power talks, London, Paris and Washington agreed to let their deputy foreign ministers meet in Paris for exploratory talks about a possible CFM session.¹⁴⁵

Gromyko's quest for discretion

In planning for the forthcoming talks, Gromyko continued to consider the possibility of a broad agenda that would allow some discretion. Although the main Soviet focus was on German demilitarisation, Gromyko argued that a peace treaty with Germany should be a clear Soviet second priority. If the agenda for the CFM session was expanded to include questions apart from German demilitarisation, "the Soviet representative should insist that the question of a peace treaty with Germany be included on the agenda, including the adoption of a time table for the swift preparing of a peace treaty".¹⁴⁶

Gromyko hoped to make room for some Soviet concessions in order to extract Western promises. He considered the possibility that the Soviet Union might give in on the issue of all-German elections in order to have the Western powers discuss German unity.¹⁴⁷ Gromyko was willing, even eager, to discuss the Korean "incident". Ideally, the Soviet Union would prefer to involve Beijing in such talks, but he would agree to make Korea a subject for "unofficial consultations between the Ministers" even if the West refused to let the Chinese take part.¹⁴⁸ Gromyko's willingness to compromise was limited; he would not discuss arms limitations lest the Western powers

agreed to discuss nuclear weapons, and he would not discuss the peace treaties with Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria.¹⁴⁹

Negotiations à la Molotov

Whereas the leader of the German desk, Mikhail Gribanov, and Gromyko had considered a broad agenda for the Palais Rose, Molotov imposed a narrow focus: "insist that compliance with the Potsdam agreement in the question of German demilitarisation be considered first". This was the essence of the paper that the Politburo approved on 1 March 1951.¹⁵⁰

As long as demilitarisation was considered first, Molotov placed no conditions on the rest of the agenda; he simply did not expect the CFM session to survive the discussion on German demilitarisation. During this first session, Moscow seemingly aimed to disclose the Western aggressors in front of global public opinion. Although the Western powers would abandon the summit, the resulting public outcry would deter the Western powers from rearming Germany.

Moscow had reasons to believe their tactics would succeed. Most Germans were opposed to rearmament, and the neutrality movement was strong. Hence, Vyshinskii instructed the German desk to prepare for the Palais Rose with "the demands of the German population for neutrality" in mind.¹⁵¹ Moscow could also hope to exploit the disagreement between the United States, England and France on how to handle the Soviet Union. Soviet diplomats knew that Acheson opposed talks, but "certain circles" in France, Britain and the United States wanted to test the Soviet readiness to reach a compromise.¹⁵²

The picture of a hard-line Soviet negotiating strategy is further strengthened if we temporarily leave the Palais Rose exploratory meeting of deputies and instead examine what Moscow hoped to achieve if the Palais Rose meeting resulted in a summit of the foreign ministers. A raw draft of the Soviet negotiation strategy for a possible summit confirms that Moscow hoped to exploit the public resentment against German soldiers. If a

summit were to take place, the first task of the Soviet foreign minister should be to propose a declaration of intent to keep Germany demilitarised. "It will be hard for the Ministers of the three powers to reject our proposal", Gribanov argued. "If they nevertheless were to decline it," the Soviet Union would "gain politically in front of the world public".¹⁵³

Second, the Soviet Union should ask for a four-power exploratory commission. This commission would serve a dual purpose: make the Western powers observe the various paragraphs on demilitarisation in the Potsdam and Yalta agreements; and investigate the Western complaint about the East German barracked police. The Western powers claimed that these alert troops (*Bereitschaften*) formed a regular army camouflaged as police units. The German desk thought a closer examination could deprive the Western powers of this "propagandistic card" and disclose their "false allegation".¹⁵⁴

Third, the German desk wanted to write a number of regulations into a new treaty on German demilitarisation. This text should ban militaristic propaganda, forbid production and import of arms, restrict the number of people employed in the police and prohibit Germans from serving in the armed forces of foreign countries.¹⁵⁵

The Palais Rose meeting

On 5 March 1951, the exploratory talks between the deputy foreign ministers of the four powers began at the Palais Marbre Rose in Paris. The Soviet Union pressed hard to place demilitarisation first on the agenda. Moscow's second priority was a peace treaty with Germany. Third, Gromyko would like to discuss arms reductions. The Western powers, on the other hand, wanted to discuss reasons for the present international tension and measures to improve relations between East and West; second, an Austrian peace treaty; third, German unity and a peaceful settlement with the country. None of the Western powers would agree to discuss German

demilitarisation without a simultaneous debate about the international tensions that allegedly justified West German rearmament.¹⁵⁶

On 28 March, Gromyko softened the Soviet position somewhat. He agreed to discuss demilitarisation, not as a separate point, but as the first sub-point under the heading "international tensions".¹⁵⁷ Since the British and French delegations were inclined to accept the Soviet proposal, the Americans had to ask President Harry Truman for instructions. The president agreed that demilitarisation could be the first sub-point under item one, but only if that question was the sole remaining obstacle to achieving a CFM.¹⁵⁸ On 30 March, however, Gromyko demanded two additional points on the agenda: the Atlantic Treaty and American military bases in Europe and the Near East.¹⁵⁹ The Western powers could not possibly allow a discussion about the Alliance, but Gromyko was unyielding. London, Paris and Washington now felt they had given in on the question of German demilitarisation without receiving anything in return, and the Western powers decided to abandon the Palais Marbre Rose negotiations.¹⁶⁰ The conference ended inconclusively on 21 June 1951.

Moscow's failure to achieve a CFM was largely self-inflicted. Possibly, the Soviet demand for German demilitarisation might have been accepted back in 1947 when Secretary of State George Marshall had proposed a pact against German remilitarisation.¹⁶¹ By 1951, however, the Politburo's unyielding demand to keep Bonn unarmed was futile, and Moscow achieved nothing but uniting the Western powers. American advisor Perry Laukhuff rejoiced when he outlined the Soviet negotiation behaviour to Hank Byroade at the Bureau of German Affairs: "Gromyko again proved that the Russians are sometimes our best allies", the American advisor explained. During a two-hour speech, Gromyko "gave the plainest intimation that the Soviets desire to have a wording accepted which *will* tie the hands of the three Powers". A "delighted" Laukhuff concluded that Gromyko's speech "ought to make our discussions of tactics with the French and British much easier".¹⁶²

Soviet considerations about a German peace treaty

Behind Gromyko's barrage of accusations, and Moscow's unyielding, stubborn demand for German demilitarisation, the Soviet foreign ministry considered a different strategy. Ministry officials also considered a softer approach, preoccupied not with propaganda, but with the results that possible negotiations with the Western powers could yield. The German desk set out to review the Soviet negotiating position.

In preparing for a forthcoming CFM session, the German desk re-examined previous Soviet peace treaty proposals. Gribanov hoped to repeat a number of the suggestions that Molotov had made at the previous CFM session in December 1947, when Molotov had pushed for a four-power commission to prepare a treaty draft.¹⁶³ Since the Western powers had refused the Soviet proposal back in 1947, they were unlikely to accept it now. Hence, at a forthcoming CFM session, "the Soviet delegation cannot limit itself to repeating its previous suggestions only. It is necessary to take a step forward in this respect."¹⁶⁴ Thus, if the Western powers refused to let a commission propose a peace treaty, Moscow should request that each power submit separate drafts. Gribanov argued that this procedure was necessary in order to get a concrete topic on the table for the foreign ministers to consider.¹⁶⁵

The German desk probably began to work on a peace treaty sketch. On 7 February 1951, Gribanov told the foreign minister that the German desk had prepared a "draft of the foundations for a peace treaty with Germany".¹⁶⁶ We do not know exactly what kind of peace treaty Gribanov had in mind, but he asked for a "qualified commission" to revise the peace treaty proposal. In picking commission members, Gribanov chiefly looked for experience in international law. Gribanov hoped to enlist Sergei Golunskii who headed the foreign ministry's department for international law, Vsevolod Durdenevskii who helped prepare the Potsdam agreement and Vladimir Khvostov, a scholar on international relations.¹⁶⁷ Although Gribanov twice petitioned the foreign minister to establish an experts commission, it was apparently never formed.

I have not been able to uncover any draft agreement from the spring of 1951. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some assumptions about Soviet thinking by inferring conclusions from how Soviet diplomats looked upon the situation in Austria. Having been annexed by Hitler in March 1938, Austria took part in the Second World War as a part of Germany. After the war, the Allies split Austria from Germany and divided the country and its capital, Vienna, into four zones of occupation - one for each of the great powers. The Soviet Union obstructed the talks on an Austrian peace treaty from 1948 on, but at that time the occupying powers had already allowed the forming of a body that resembled a central government.¹⁶⁸ In the Austrian government, each party held a number of posts according to its strength in parliament.

In the winter of 1950-51, *The Economist* and *New York Times* argued that Austria might serve as a model for a German solution. Although Germany would probably remain divided and occupied, the great powers should nevertheless allow the German people to elect a parliament and form a unitary government with nation-wide authority. With time, the country could be allowed full sovereignty and a national army. This solution was dubbed *Austrianisation of Germany*.¹⁶⁹

The German desk considered German Austrianisation, but disapproved of the model because it failed to offer Moscow sufficient influence. The Austrian experience had shown that Communists would probably not be able to muster a blocking minority in parliament, far less a majority. Hence, if Moscow agreed to introduce the Austrian model in Germany, "the GDR Government would be left in a situation of permanent minority and would not be able to influence the decisions of the all-German government to any degree".¹⁷⁰ To offset the lack of Communist parliamentary influence in a united Germany, the Soviet Union would need some degree of direct control over German affairs, but not in this respect either did Austria offer a workable solution. The 1946 control agreement on Austria did not permit the Soviet Union to block regular laws and decisions by the Austrian government; Moscow could veto "constitutional laws" only.¹⁷¹ According to the German desk, this regime had prevented Soviet diplomats from

blocking legal actions that "every now and then directly contradicts, not only our interests, but also the decision taken earlier by the four powers".¹⁷²

The German desk concluded that "a transfer of the Austrian experience in its present form to Germany cannot be acceptable for the Soviet Union". The idea proposed by *The Economist* and *New York Times* would give the Western powers "a majority in all controlling organs, and also in the all-German government." The only efficient Soviet leverage of powers would be the use of military authority "which in its turn would aggravate our status as an occupation power".¹⁷³

Although the Austrianisation memo was preoccupied with what to avoid, the memo nevertheless offers some clues as to what kind of solution Moscow might have attempted in Germany. At one point the memo held Austrianisation to be unacceptable because "such a plan to re-establish German unity diverge from our thesis about German unification on a parity basis".¹⁷⁴ *Unification on a parity basis*, we must assume, would mean Soviet influence on par with the Western powers. Besides, the German desk complained about the inability of the Soviet Control Commission to stop undesirable actions of the Austrian government. Applying the logic in reverse, we must assume the Soviet foreign ministry would demand a *de facto* veto in important German political decisions if unification were to be attempted. Nothing, however, suggests that the German desk planned for a Sovietisation of Germany.

The decision to focus on a German peace treaty, July-September 1951

Prior to the Palais Rose conference, the Politburo had instructed Gromyko to negotiate like Moses in Egypt: Go see Pharaoh and wear him down with the righteousness of your demands. Moscow had hoped for a powerful public reaction against German rearmament, but the public stayed calm, and the Western powers stood firm. Despite this failure, the Soviet foreign ministry did not seem to undertake any critical examination of the previous strategy. This inability to admit mistakes, no doubt, is explained by the logic of totalitarianism. To question the wisdom of a Politburo decision was to question the infallibility of Stalin. Soviet diplomats only admitted having underestimated the aggressiveness of the Western powers and their determination to break with the Potsdam decisions.¹⁷⁵

Nevertheless, the Soviet foreign ministry learned a lesson from the failure at Palais Rose. One strategy had failed, hence the need for a new one. This logic offered an opportunity to those who thought Soviet interests would be best served through a negotiated deal with the Western powers. In September 1951, the Politburo approved a new strategy. Moscow should elaborate a concrete deal that convinced the Germans about the virtues of unification and a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Possibly, the Soviet suggestions might form the basis for negotiations with the West about German unification.

This chapter will also touch upon the qualms that followed this change of strategy. At the Palais Rose meeting, the Soviet Union had insisted only on German demilitarisation. The Politburo thought it unwise to drop the demand for German demilitarisation abruptly since a swift change in Soviet policy could make an impression of weakness in the face of a decisive Western policy. From fear of looking weak, and thus encouraging the Western powers to push even harder for rearmament, the Soviet Union chose not to draft a

peace treaty immediately, but rather to work on public opinion for a while. According to this logic, it would be better if the Germans themselves asked for a peace treaty, since a German plea would give Moscow an honourable excuse to offer a deal without appearing to be timid. Thus, to provide a proper pretext for the new Soviet policy, Moscow employed the East German Communists to create a popular demand for a peace treaty.

German rearmament approaches

In the summer of 1951, the schemes to include the Federal Republic in the Atlantic Alliance began to make headway. American decision-makers like the American high commissioner in Germany, John McCloy, and General Dwight Eisenhower, came round to support the European Defence Community; they knew the French fears of a revived Germany and believed in the long-term advantage of European political unity. The United States threw its support behind the EDC, and by the end of June 1951, the parties agreed on how to train, organise and supply a European army with German soldiers - although the French had not come along to support single-nation divisions. In return for West German participation in the EDC, the Western powers promised the Federal Republic sovereignty, and in July the United States and Great Britain terminated the state of war with Germany. The Western powers demanded a right to station troops in Germany, but these rights would be defined in an agreement negotiated with Bonn.

While the plans for military integration went on, Adenauer moved decisively to quell the Communist campaigns against rearmament. On 24 April 1951, the chancellor prohibited a KPD campaign to collect signatures against German rearmament and in favour of unification and a peace treaty. Several West German cities banned Communist rallies, and in early May, Bonn shut down thirteen Communist newspapers for a 90-day period.¹⁷⁶

Moscow saw both trouble and opportunities. The harsh treatment of the West German Communists convinced Soviet diplomats that the Communist policies were popular and hence dangerous to Adenauer.¹⁷⁷ On the other hand,

the Soviet Control Commission and the SED knew that the activities of the West German Communists in the spring of 1951 suffered from "grave failures".¹⁷⁸ The KPD fared badly in elections for the state-assemblies (*Landtag*) of Rhineland-Palatinate and Lower Saxony; local elections for the municipalities of Schleswig-Holstein gave no comfort either.¹⁷⁹ Despite the efforts of numerous East German activists, several resolutions ordering the KPD to redouble its efforts and a flood of brochures, the West German population still did not trust the Soviet Union. The ongoing campaign to collect signatures against rearmament was not making much headway, and local committees in charge of this "referendum" struggled. Pieck told the SCC leadership about "visual *Angst* and cowardice" in the campaign activities.¹⁸⁰

The plan to embarrass Adenauer by calling for an all-German assembly

In the early summer of 1951, the German desk continued to elaborate diplomatic initiatives in the spirit of the Soviet strategy at Palais Rose. The initiatives in question aimed only to stir German public opinion. The Soviet Union could, for example, propose a pact against German militarism - a pact the Western powers would never sign. Nevertheless, such a proposal could make the German public aware of the alleged militarisation that took place in West Germany. Likewise, Moscow could propose a pact against German remilitarisation or offer to discuss arms reductions "without preconditions". The German desk knew that the Western powers would "without doubt reject" these proposals. That did not matter, however, since these suggestions would nevertheless make the Soviet Union look good. Better still, they would expose the Western powers as "aggressors, aiming to exploit the material and human resources of Germany to prepare a new war".¹⁸¹

The most interesting of these propagandistic proposals, was a promise to let the Germans have a say in the unification process. Democratic

unification had previously been associated with Adenauer. The chancellor claimed that Germany was divided, not because the Federal Republic joined forces with the West, but because the Russians would not let the East Germans vote freely. Adenauer's insistence that unification must "grow out of the free decision of the entire German people" had a powerful appeal.¹⁸² Thus, Soviet diplomats felt obliged to face the issue, although they considered German unification an issue for the great powers to handle.

Indeed, Moscow had already promised the Germans a limited say in the unification process. The October 1950 Prague Declaration called for a Constituent Council where Germans from East and West could meet in equal numbers. This Council should form an all-German government, prepare elections and advise the four powers in drafting a peace treaty.¹⁸³ The East Germans used the slogan "Germans at one table" (*Deutsche an einen Tisch!*) in a broad campaign to support the Prague proposal.¹⁸⁴ Adenauer, however, rejected the very idea of a Constituent Council. He claimed that the East German people could not express their true opinion before East Berlin had introduced civil liberties "in harmony with the Federal Republic's constitution and its implementation".¹⁸⁵

Adenauer's belligerent reply delighted the German desk. Soviet observers believed Adenauer was afraid of an all-German council and that he deliberately made his answer unacceptable for the GDR government.¹⁸⁶ Adenauer, that is, preferred to side with the West rather than to attempt unification. If Moscow could disclose this national treachery, the public would oppose remilitarisation and demand unification.

The most efficient way to disclose Adenauer's anti-unification sentiment, was to have the chancellor reject a generous Soviet proposal. Hence, the East Germans should allow the more numerous West Germans a majority in an all-German council to prepare for unification ("[...]one might not make any mention of the representatives being split in an equal number from West Germany and from the GDR").¹⁸⁷ Bereft of his best argument against the Council, but nevertheless destined to side with the Americans, Adenauer would find himself between the devil and the deep blue sea. His arguments about democracy and elections would sound hollow. The German people

would see that Bonn was against unification, East Berlin in favour. Hence, "the GDR will stand to gain politically and will, as before, be a standard-bearer for unity in the eyes of the German public".¹⁸⁸

The Constituent Council proposal aimed narrowly to embarrass the chancellor. If Adenauer for some reason should appear to be reasonable and agree to negotiate, the East Germans should embitter the pill. They could demand "an end to the remilitarisation of West Germany" or raise other questions that Adenauer would not accept. Somehow Adenauer would be forced to abandon the negotiations and compromise himself.¹⁸⁹

Continued work on a German peace treaty

In the summer of 1951, the foreign ministry considered not merely proposals aimed at the German public, but also a possible strategy for real negotiations with the Western powers to solve the German question. In July, Gribanov elaborated a menu of foreign policy measures. This document contained a long section dubbed "On a peace treaty with Germany". Gribanov argued that the Soviet Union should prepare "a basic draft of a peace treaty with Germany". The text might form the basis for negotiations with the West. Therefore, Gribanov hoped to assemble a "qualified commission". The task of this commission should be to "work out the fundamental draft of a peace treaty with Germany in one month's time". The drafting commission should have assistance from "responsible agencies" and "scientific research institutes".¹⁹⁰

Gribanov portrayed the idea of a peace treaty as a continuation of a well-established Soviet policy - albeit one that Moscow had not pursued for three and a half years. To elaborate the text of a peace treaty, Gribanov argued, would "correspond with the position that the Soviet Government has always taken on sessions of the CFM, arguing in favour of preparing a peace treaty with Germany".¹⁹¹

Previously, Moscow had either insisted that a four-power commission should do the drafting or that each of the four powers presented peace

treaty drafts simultaneously. Because the Western powers were unlikely to cooperate, Gribanov now proposed that the Soviet Union should publish a peace treaty text alone. Presumably, Moscow would rather include the Western powers in the preliminary drafting of a peace treaty. Any peace treaty would include less than ideal solutions, and the Kremlin would prefer to let the Western powers take some responsibility for the resulting controversies. Consider the borders of a united Germany: if Moscow made Saar a German province, then the French would object; if the Soviet treaty text gave Saar a special international status, then the Germans would object. By venturing on its own, Moscow would be forced to defend the peace treaty text on its own merits, and not in comparison with other less-than-perfect proposals.

Enter the East Germans

On the evening of 30 July 1951, President Wilhelm Pieck, Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl and SED General Secretary Walter Ulbricht came to the headquarters of the Soviet Control Commission at Karlshorst to visit General Chuikov and his assistant political adviser, Ivan Ilichev. At this meeting, the German Communists proposed a broad public campaign in West Germany to weaken Adenauer and strengthen the standing of the GDR. To this end, they asked the Soviet Union for a concrete peace treaty initiative.

Regrettably, there are no available minutes of the Karlshorst meeting. We have to rely on the sparse hand-written notes of Pieck¹⁹² and two short, and largely similar, memos that the German desk prepared for Vyshinskii and Gromyko. The information for Gromyko reads:

*The German friends intend to conduct a series of measures aimed against the remilitarisation of West Germany. In particular, the Politburo of the SED Central Committee has decided to continue and to revive the drive to organise a referendum in West Germany against remilitarisation and in favour of a peace treaty with Germany.*¹⁹³

To get the campaign going, and to rally the faithful, the East Germans planned a series of conferences: one for the 750 or so Communist Party functionaries from all of Germany that would attend the mid-August international youth festival in Berlin, another for Communist trade union activists, a third for the members of the Communist youth organisation.¹⁹⁴ The campaign needed a focus. Hence, Grotewohl proposed an addition to the programme: a peace treaty before the end of 1951.¹⁹⁵

For the campaign purposes that the East Germans had in mind, the actual contents and suggestions of a treaty seemed to matter less than the very peace treaty idea. The German desk failed to mention specific East German requests about the contents of a peace treaty, and remarked only that the East Germans had asked for a proposal "in the spirit of the Soviet delegation's actions at the [1947] London CFM session".¹⁹⁶ Pieck's notes from the Karlshorst meeting imply that Ulbricht's prime concern was propaganda, not actual solutions. According to Pieck, Ulbricht wanted a Soviet initiative that would make the masses understand the "Soviet Union [wanted] peace, the United States war".¹⁹⁷ The SED leadership hoped to stir the West German public, not by clever diplomatic moves, but through street action and manifestations. By using the peace treaty issue as a rallying cry in their forthcoming campaign, East Berlin could also hope to link socialism with the question of national unity and thus rally the forces of patriotism in support for the GDR.

A show of indecisiveness in the foreign ministry

The foreign ministry embraced new initiatives only with reluctance. Indeed, the foreign ministry was expected to be subservient, execute orders and pursue established policies.¹⁹⁸ If foreign policy were a game of chess, the ministry should move the pieces, not determine the moves. In the late summer of 1951, however, as the Western powers moved rapidly to include the Federal Republic in the Western military co-operation, the German desk was forced to come up with some initiatives. The Soviet demands for German

demilitarisation at the Palais Rose Conference (March-June 1951) had not made any impact, and Moscow was in need of a new strategy. It was the task of the German desk to make the first proposal.

Gribanov, seemingly unable to guess what the Politburo might like to hear, decided to review the Soviet arsenal of foreign policy measures. The resulting policy papers failed to recommend a consistent line of action, either great power diplomacy or public campaigning, either the promise of a peace treaty or the threat of militarisation. Instead Gribanov composed policy papers with a mix of all the policies we have touched upon in this and the previous chapter. First, Gribanov asked for an experts' commission to draft the foundations of a peace treaty with Germany.¹⁹⁹ Second, he suggested a note to the Western powers to protest European integration and to demand German demilitarisation, a smaller number of troops in Germany and adherence to the Potsdam agreement. Third, the note should propose a peace treaty to provide momentum for the East German propaganda campaign for unity. Fourth, an all-German Constituent Council with a West German majority should be convened - in order for Adenauer to embarrass himself in rejecting it.²⁰⁰

In early August, Vyshinskii returned from medical leave, resumed his duties as foreign minister and began to oversee Gribanov's work.²⁰¹ Vyshinskii had been chief prosecutor during the Moscow Process in the late 1930s, and the image of a venomous procurator stuck to him ever since - seemingly with reason.²⁰² He devised an action plan against West German rearmament that was ripe with scorn, but contained even less substance and direction than Gribanov's original scheme. In a paper prepared for the Politburo, Vyshinskii proposed to send the Western powers a long note and describe in detail their responsibility for the continued division of Germany and the lack of a peace treaty. Vyshinskii declined to form an experts-commission and produce a peace treaty sketch, and he did not explicitly allow an East German grassroots campaign. Rather, he wanted the GDR to petition the great powers "not to allow the remilitarisation of Germany". Upon receiving this note, Moscow would express its general support for a peaceful settlement - nothing more. Vyshinskii did not want the Soviet Union to challenge the Western powers to produce a concrete peace treaty.²⁰³

Vyshinskii embraced, however, the plan to have Adenauer reject an all-German Constituent Council. Under his guidance, the German desk elaborated the Constituent Council idea in greater detail. Pieck should ask for a Constituent Council and combine the official proposal with "broad support from civil organisations in GDR and West Germany". As before, the surprise element in the plan was "not to demand representative parity as a precondition [...] in order not to give the Bonn government any [...] excuse to reject Pieck's proposal". Vyshinskii, however, maintained that the East Germans should uphold "the principle of equality between the parties".²⁰⁴ Thus, the foreign minister seemed ready to water down the constituent-council initiative as well.

The Politburo's rebuke

By the end of August 1951, Vyshinskii sent his plan to the *Instantsia* - the vague expression that applied to the top level of decision-making, the Politburo and ultimately Stalin himself. Vyshinskii, however, had misread the sentiments of his superiors. The Politburo now instructed him

*[...] to rework the proposed draft in three days time on basis of the exchange of views [in the Politburo], so as to draw up a proposal on the questions that were posed by comrades Pieck, Ulbricht and Grotewohl in the meeting with Chuikov and Illichev on 30 July.*²⁰⁵

Now, the foreign minister wasted no time in making up for his mistake. Apparently, the Politburo had asked for a concrete peace treaty; the very same day the Politburo turned down his suggestions, Vyshinskii finally let Gribanov form an experts commission to sketch a peace treaty. The foreign minister ordered the Commission to work with reckless speed; whereas the German desk had asked for a month to prepare a first draft, the foreign minister scribbled on his orders: "Period ten days - before 6/IX [6 September]".²⁰⁶ The commission convened three of the most competent Soviet experts on

international law (Golunskii, Krylov and Khvostov),²⁰⁷ three senior experts on Germany (Semenov, Pushkin and Gribanov) and V.N. Pavlov, a specialist on Western Europe. Vyshinskii approved the commission, but appointed his deputy, Aleksandr Bogomolov, as chairman. Gribanov had suggested Golunskii on this post.²⁰⁸

The Kremlin, moreover, ordered a new initiative to correspond with the "exchange of views" at the Politburo meeting. Vyshinskii ordered Pushkin, Semenov and Gribanov to spell out the opinion of the Politburo and prepare the text of a new resolution.²⁰⁹ The first key passage of the new Politburo draft resolution admitted that the East Germans had been "in principle correct" to propose a new peace treaty initiative in combination with a public campaign.²¹⁰

But whereas the East German idea was "in principle" correct, the foreign ministry, and presumably the Politburo, saw some trouble *in reality*. If the Kremlin asked for a German peace treaty, the Western powers might think the Soviet Union needed one, and hence raise their demands. The experts, and presumably the Politburo, feared that Moscow:

*[...] could create the impression that the Soviet Government, contrary to the position of the Soviet delegation on the preliminary meeting in Paris (March-June 1951) now suggests to call a CFM session to discuss only the question of a peace treaty with Germany.*²¹¹

We do not know the Politburo's arguments, but most likely the Soviet decision-makers reasoned that no other option stood much chance of success. The Western powers had managed to ward off the demand for German demilitarisation, and Adenauer had subdued the Communist grassroots campaign. In order to avoid the appearance of weakness, the Soviet Union should carefully consider "the timing and the form" of a peace treaty proposal. Rather than suggesting a peace treaty at once, as the East Germans had proposed, the Soviet Union should launch the treaty "somewhat later" after having "prepared the global public opinion for such a step".²¹²

Heeding the opinion of the Politburo, the three experts proposed a propaganda offensive to cover the Soviet retreat. The German comrades should create a broad public demand in Germany in favour of a deal. If the campaign were successful, the eventual Soviet proposal would look less like a withdrawal in the face of a determined Western policy and more like a generous offer to satisfy a demand of the German people. In effect, this reorientation turned the East German proposal on its head: whereas the East Germans would use the idea of a peace treaty to back an East German campaign, the foreign ministry would use an East German campaign to back the peace treaty proposal.

The Soviet plan changed the nature of the East German campaign activities. Whereas the SED general secretary hoped to attack German militarism and embarrass Adenauer; the foreign ministry hoped to win as many German souls as possible for a peace treaty - even black reactionary souls. Nothing would suit the Politburo better than to have Adenauer ask for a peace treaty. If the chancellor begged for a deal, nobody would suspect the Soviet Union of offering one out of weakness.

Since the primary aim was no longer to confront Bonn, but to have the West Germans join the plea for a peace treaty, the Constituent Council plan needed revising. The foreign ministry picked a new man for the task of inviting West Germans to participate in the Council. In the previous plans, this task was entrusted with East German President Pieck, who had been the figurehead of the Communist faction of the SED when the Soviet occupying power forcefully merged the Social Democrats with the Communists. The new plan proposed that Grotewohl, not Pieck, should invite the West Germans to participate in the Council.; Grotewohl was a former Social Democrat, who the Russians thought had a broader appeal.²¹³ Besides, if Adenauer agreed to take part in a Constituent Council, the East Germans should refrain from anything that could disrupt the proceedings. Previously, the foreign ministry had always suggested an agenda that Adenauer would never accept (demilitarisation and rejection of European integration). In the revised plan, these demands were no longer imperatives but issues that "might be launched". If Bonn agreed to talk, the East Germans should only

"insist on allowing democratic parties and organisations freedom of action in West Germany" and "a proportional voting system". Furthermore, the GDR should insist on "democratic demands" such as the right of "mass-organisations" to nominate candidates and form "electoral coalitions".²¹⁴

As the Politburo revised the proposal for an all-German Constituent Council, the scheme thoroughly changed character. To build broad support for a treaty with the Soviet Union, the East Germans should strive to be co-operative. It was fine if the GDR looked good compared with the Federal Republic, but it was more important to reach out to as many middle-class Germans as possible. Thus, whereas the initial plan for a Constituent Council sought to install East Germany as a "standard-bearer in the fight to re-establish German unity",²¹⁵ the eventual Politburo instructions ordered the SED to behave less like a standard-bearer and more like a cheerleader. Seductiveness rather than vigilance was the virtue in demand.

A conciliatory SED campaign for German unity

Whereas the German comrades had planned to attack Bonn, Moscow asked them to court Adenauer and the West German petty bourgeoisie. In the fall of 1951, the East Germans received orders from Moscow to evoke a broad German demand for a peace treaty. The initial move in this campaign for inter-German co-operation, was the call for a meeting to discuss unification. Thus, on 15 September, GDR Prime Minister Grotewohl held a speech in the People's Chamber and asked for an all-German Constituent Council. Grotewohl did not mind a West German majority in the Council, since the purpose of this body "would not be to vote somebody down" but to reconcile Germans from East and West. "The number of participants on such a conference is therefore not basically important," Grotewohl declared.²¹⁶

The Soviet Politburo ordered the Soviet high commissioner, General Chuikov, to support Grotewohl's message and emphasise that this initiative might bring about German unification.²¹⁷ In an interview on 20 September 1951, the general said the Constituent Council "could make a great contri-

bution" because "the powers which occupy West Germany [...] cannot disregard the opinion of the German people".²¹⁸ Meanwhile, the SED regime rallied its resources in support of the Constituent Council. On 16 September 1951, the National Front advocated a "fight" in West Germany "to fulfil the proposals of the People's Chamber"; simultaneously, the Communist youth organisation and the East German trade unions asked their Western counterparts to support the Constituent Council.²¹⁹

The SED regime also called upon the so-called bourgeois parties to take part in the Constituent Council campaign. Soviet diplomats hoped to "activate the fight for peace and unity" both in the GDR and in West Germany through "a wider use" of the East German CDU.²²⁰ The East German "bourgeois" parties were an oddity. Their leadership had been purged of all but submissive politicians, their activities were strictly regulated, but they were neither forbidden nor allowed to die. A team of compliant "bourgeois" politicians - like Foreign Minister Georg Dertinger (CDU) - continued to occupy high positions in the GDR. But although in office, these people were not in power. The SED Politburo dictated government policy.²²¹

Dertinger, however, sincerely believed he could advance the process of German unification. In October 1951, he arranged a meeting with Ernst Lemmer, a former East-CDU Deputy Chairman who, after having been purged in 1947, moved to West Berlin where he headed the local CDU organisation. In a meeting with Lemmer, Dertinger claimed that "the Soviet Union [was] willing to pay a high price for a neutral Germany; even willing to disinterest themselves in Germany". In conveying this message, Dertinger claimed to act with the "the explicit approval of Semenov and Grotewohl".²²²

Nothing in the available Soviet material suggests that Dertinger was on a secret mission from Moscow. The German desk's short summary of the Lemmer-Dertinger conversation stated only what Lemmer had told about a growing West German discontent with Adenauer's line.²²³ The Soviet foreign ministry did not trust Dertinger as a messenger. They suspected Dertinger of advocating German unification not to assist the Soviet Union, but as part of an internal struggle for power in the East-CDU. Dertinger further added

to the Russian suspicions through an attempt to lobby among the Russians as well. On 29 October 1951, the East German foreign minister told the head of the Soviet Diplomatic Mission in East Germany, Georgii Pushkin, that he hoped to elaborate "the principles of a peace treaty". Dertinger then offered to show Pushkin the eventual document - unofficially.²²⁴ Moscow was hypersensitive about fifth columns. Hence, Gribanov advised Pushkin to "carefully examine all facts" about Dertinger's activities.²²⁵

Although unapproved and unwanted, Dertinger's contacts with Lemmer turned out to be one of the Soviet Union's rare successes in influencing the West German CDU. Lemmer passed the information on to Adenauer's minister for all-German affairs, Jakob Kaiser. Unlike Lemmer, Kaiser believed that the Soviet Union would pay "a high price" to achieve unity; a few months later, when the West German cabinet met to discuss the Stalin note, Kaiser argued fiercely that the Stalin note was an opportunity the government should exploit.²²⁶

The East German campaign failed to rock Adenauer's opposition against talks with the East. Adenauer asked instead for democratic elections throughout Germany under international control.²²⁷ The Bundestag also passed a motion from the Social Democrats asking for a United Nations commission to examine the conditions for free-elections throughout Germany.²²⁸ Then, on 6 October, Adenauer accused Grotewohl of having "omitted from the idea of reunion the territory lying beyond the Oder-Neisse line". In Adenauer's opinion, a peace treaty should restore this territory to Germany.²²⁹

Despite Adenauer's adverse reaction, Moscow still pushed for co-operation between Bonn and Berlin to place a German peace treaty on the international agenda. On 10 October 1951, Grotewohl addressed the question of German unity in front of the East German parliament. "Does it help us to get any further by holding up to each other these different points of view?" he asked. "Or is it not rather an imperative necessity to sit down at one table in order seriously and objectively to deliberate on these things at all-German negotiations."²³⁰ A Soviet report on the incident claimed that the

People's Chamber held "the majority of the proposals made by the Federal Parliament [to be] acceptable".²³¹

Moscow aimed at German public opinion. In this respect, Bonn's offer to discuss German elections at the United Nations was less than ideal. According to Gribanov, the West used the United Nations to "bury the proposal of the People's Chamber".²³² Unlike a debate in an all-German Constituent Council, discussions behind closed doors in New York would not excite the German public. Hence, a discussion in the United Nations was a less than ideal pretext for the Soviet peace treaty initiative to come. On the other hand, the Soviet Union wished to make an appearance of reasonableness. The Politburo discussed how to respond, and ordered the East Germans to support the idea of a commission to investigate whether Germany was ready for free elections, but "such an investigation could best be conducted by the Germans themselves" in co-operation with the four powers rather than the United Nations.²³³

Regardless of Soviet opposition, the General Assembly voted to establish an *ad hoc* political commission to examine the conditions for free elections throughout Germany. On 4 December 1951, that commission decided to invite representatives from East and West Germany so that both parties could explain their position. The next day, UN Secretary General Trygve Lie forwarded an invitation to the GDR.²³⁴ The Politburo considered Lie's letter and decided to scale down the confrontation between East Berlin and the United Nations. Gromyko, who had written the Politburo's draft resolution on that issue, advised the East Germans not to appear before the UN commission.²³⁵ The Politburo, however, decided to send an East German delegation to New York.²³⁶ "For tactical reasons," the German comrades should not point out that the UN was "incompetent to consider the German question".²³⁷

Whereas Moscow pushed East Berlin to show token deference towards the UN and build support in Germany for the Soviet peace treaty proposal to come, the Soviet Union remained hesitant about making substantial sacrifices in order to court German public opinion. Although Gribanov argued that the publication of a list containing names of remaining German prisoners of

war in the Soviet Union could raise the West German hopes for an understanding with the Soviet Union about unification and a peace treaty, Gribanov was nevertheless not allowed to proceed.²³⁸ The Soviet sentiments about the war were strong, and the prevailing opinion was that Moscow did not owe Germany anything, not even a list of names. This Soviet sentiment was evident in high commissioner Chuikov's reaction when Bishop Otto Dibelius petitioned him to let prisoners return: the general brusquely discarded this concern for "war criminals".²³⁹

The Stalin note of 10 March 1952

In August 1951, the Politburo decided to allow time for a propaganda campaign in Germany before proceeding to reveal the Soviet offer as to what a peace treaty might contain. Preferably, the Kremlin would like the governments of both East and West Germany to plea for a peace treaty. When the Germans themselves asked for a peace treaty, Moscow could offer a deal from a position of strength, not weakness.

As the East Germans campaigned to build support for a peace treaty, the Soviet foreign ministry prepared a text that would satisfy the public demand for a treaty and put pressure on the Western powers to negotiate with the Soviet Union about German unification. This document, which eventually was published on 10 March 1952, has later become known as the Stalin note.

How the Stalin note was drafted

The challenge in drafting the Stalin note was how to maintain the Soviet negotiating position while compiling a document that Bonn and the Western powers could not refuse without being seen to sacrifice German unity. The first document to this end was written at the German desk, it was dated 15 September 1951 and carried the title "basic foundations of a peace treaty with Germany".²⁴⁰ For the next six months, the form and shape of the "basic foundations" evolved, and the document became increasingly similar to the note that Gromyko handed to the French, American and British representatives on 10 March 1952.

Compared to the eventual note, the first draft was modelled less on what the Western public would like to hear, and devoted more to actual Soviet views on what a peaceful settlement with Germany should imply. With regard to war

that Adenauer had inflicted, and proposed to include in a future peace treaty a number of passages about political freedom. Gribanov referred to legalisation of Communist activities as Germany's obligation "to remove all hindrances to the rebirth and the strengthening of democratic tendencies among the German population".³⁰⁶ Interestingly, the means Gribanov listed to prevent prosecution of Communists were the ideals of a liberal democracy; and he used the wording of article 15 in the 1947 peace treaty with Italy to describe the future order in a united Germany.³⁰⁷

*All persons, being under German jurisdiction, regardless of race, sex, language or religion, may enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, press and publishing, religious cult, political conviction and assembly.*³⁰⁸

2) The second aim of the peace treaty was to assure that a *united Germany would never allow fascism - whatsoever*. Gribanov recommended that the peace treaty ban "the resurgence of political, military or semi-military fascist and militaristic organisations, whose purpose it is to deprive the people of its democratic rights".³⁰⁹ Selianinov added a *Berufsverbot* that banished all "war criminals and all active Nazi-party members who committed Nazi crimes" from "state, public or semi-public offices and public positions".³¹⁰ Such passages, by the way, were not unique for the peace treaty that the Soviet diplomats elaborated in 1951. The anti-Nazi ban corresponded with article 17 in the peace treaty between the Allies and Italy.³¹¹

In connection with the passages about how to avoid fascism, the Soviet authors mentioned the word "democratic" several times. Gribanov wished to "guarantee that the development of the very German state, as well as the political and public life of the country, is based on peace and democracy".³¹² Selianinov's text proposed that a peace treaty should oblige a new German government to "strengthen and continue the democratic transformations that have been achieved in Germany".³¹³ In Soviet writing, the word "democratic" has a number of different connotations. It might mean the model

of society that existed in the German *Democratic* Republic or in the Soviet Union. Sometimes, however, "democratic" was used to describe any anti-fascist movement. Finally, Soviet authors used democracy more or less synonymously with independence. In November 1947, for example, Molotov spoke of a "democratic peace" as the opposite of "imperialist peace". A "democratic peace" meant "full restoration of independence"; imperialist peace meant "the domination of certain strong Powers over other nations, big and small, without consideration for their rights and national sovereignty". To judge from the examples above the term *democracy* was sufficiently elastic to encompass Communism, prevention of fascism and mere sovereignty.³¹⁴

3) The third political imperative in the schematic draft only underlines the second: *the general political freedoms of Germany must not be used to allow Nazi parties*. There was a possible contradiction between the first (liberal freedoms) and the second (no Nazism) commandments. To prevent any ambiguity, Gribanov stressed that German authorities could not interpret the political freedoms so as to permit Nazism. His text reads:

*Every action of organisations, be that political, military or paramilitary, and also the actions of separate individuals, regardless of their social position, aimed to deprive the people of its democratic rights, revive German militarism and fascism, or cultivate revanchist ideas, should be strictly forbidden and persecuted by law.*³¹⁵

Non-alignment

The schematic draft would oblige Germany "not to enter any political or military alliance, directed against any power that took part with its armed forces in the war against Germany". Demanding only a German obligation to refrain from entering alliances, the Soviet text did not mention the word "neutrality". Gribanov shunned the word neutrality because this was the term Moscow applied to those cowards who had abstained in the struggle against

fascism.³¹⁶ In practice, however, neutrality was what the Soviet Union asked for - and possibly what the German people demanded.

The neutrality movement was a potent force in Germany. In the early years of the Federal Republic, neutrality and disarmament attracted people across the political spectre. Both utopian Socialists and members of the patriotic bourgeoisie preached neutrality. Arguably the most influential of the pro-neutrality groups was the Nauheimer Circle, founded by a West German professor of history, Ulrich Noack, in the latter half of 1948.³¹⁷ The Soviet foreign ministry began to take more interest in the movement in early 1951 and translated Noack's pamphlet about German neutralisation.³¹⁸ The professor advocated a united, neutral and demilitarised Germany as a buffer between the superpowers. Besides, neutralisation was a necessary condition for German unification since neither global power could allow the other full control in the heart of Europe. On this point Noack delighted the Soviet foreign ministry with a Lenin quotation: "[He] who possesses Germany controls Europe."³¹⁹

The foreign ministry admitted to a "somewhat inconsistent" policy towards the neutrality movement in earlier times.³²⁰ In July 1950, for example, Ulbricht had argued for the necessity to fight "against 'the theory of neutrality' which delivers the German people to the aggressors".³²¹ Ulbricht thought neutrality could impede East Germany's orientation towards the Soviet Union and the people's democracies.³²² Prior to the Palais Rose Conference (March-June 1951), however, the foreign ministry began to view the movement as an ally.³²³

When Gribanov and Selianinov outlined provisions on neutrality, their main focus was placed on withdrawal of foreign troops from German territory. Gribanov recommended that all occupation forces be withdrawn from Germany no later than three months after the peace treaty had been signed, Selianinov set the deadline for the withdrawal to "one year's time after the peace treaty has been concluded".³²⁴ Besides, when the two diplomats contemplated military provisions, they included a number of decisions to prevent the Germans from military co-operation with foreigners.

Military provisions

Gribanov's schematic draft allowed a German army, navy and airforce, but rendered those forces "strictly limited in such a way as to answer only defence needs". The text restricted the number of German soldiers, fighter planes, transport aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces, etc. German bomber planes, missiles, weapons of mass destruction (atomic, nuclear, bacteriological) and most ordinary fortifications were to be banned, and there would be restrictions on the extent of compulsory military training and Germany's ability to provide others with military assistance; the text forbade German scientists from participating in military research or production abroad, it outlawed any German foreign legion, and it forbade Germans from serving in foreign armies.³²⁵ Besides, the schematic draft proposed to ban all production of "arms, military ammunition and war equipment" and render Germany dependent on others to provide weapons.³²⁶

Gribanov's colleague, Selianinov, on the other hand, proposed to ban every trace of the German military establishment (defence ministry, officer corps, institutionalised mobilisation, general staff). He allowed "a merchant navy and a fleet of civilian aircraft" to serve the needs of "a peace economy". Besides, to "secure the internal public order of the country and the guarding of the borders" Germany might "employ police forces in limited numbers (150-200 thousand people), with hand guns." This police force should be forbidden from employing former active Nazis and former members of the Gestapo, the SS (*Schutzstaffel*) and the SA (*Sturmabteilung*).³²⁷

In short, Gribanov would allow a German military establishment, but impose a number of limitations; Selianinov would forbid a German military establishment, but allow a few exceptions. The Stalin note sided with Gribanov. The note even allowed Germany to produce war materials for domestic needs - but not for export.³²⁸ When Gromyko gave Molotov a brief on these issues, he suggested German armed forces roughly equal to those of Italy.³²⁹ At that time, the Western powers honoured the punitive clauses in the Italian peace treaty that restricted the country's armed forces to 250,000 men with a limited weaponry.³³⁰

Economic provisions

A number of sections in the schematic draft and the treaty text concerned the German economy. The Soviet interests that mattered, however, were only three: to prevent an economic structure that would breed fascism, to prevent exclusive Western access to German resources, and to take as much goods and money as possible for use in the Soviet economy. Sovietisation of the German economy was not a priority.

1) *The German economy should not breed fascism.* Gribanov recommended what he called "a democratic transformation of the industry, agriculture and other branches of the [German] economy".³³¹ This could mean a Sovietisation of the German economy,³³² but the subsequent measures that Gribanov asked for suggested a more humble goal: Gribanov hoped to undo "German cartels, trusts, syndicates and other monopolistic associations"³³³ because of their capacity to breed fascism and militarism. To demolish the cartels was not synonymous with Communism; as late as 1950, London and Paris pursued a policy of dismantling German cartels.³³⁴ Besides, a mighty Germany was simply not advisable. A peace treaty should "prevent the resurrection of the [German] military-industrial potential and the elimination of excessive concentrations of economic power".³³⁵

Apart from dismantling cartels, the German desk hoped to write into the peace treaty a set of redistribution policies. The motivation behind this policy was neither social conscience nor an urge to Sovietise Germany. Rather Gribanov sought to reduce the power base of notorious Nazis and calm the revanchist sentiments of those Germans who had fled from their properties east of Oder-Neisse. To this end, Gribanov proposed a "transfer of assets from war and nazi criminals to the hands of the German people, land reform, etc."³³⁶ Selianinov added that the "German authorities are obliged to created normal conditions of livelihood" for those who had resettled in the Western parts of Germany.³³⁷

If Gribanov could crush German cartels, and preferably calm the refugees, he could accept a treaty that allowed competitive capitalism in Germany. The leader of the German desk tried to state this frankly in the schematic draft:

*Determine that the development of the peaceful branches of industry, agriculture, external trade and other branches of the economy may proceed without any limitations or hindrances on behalf of the Allied and United Powers.*³³⁸

If we return to the drafting of the Stalin note, the promise of a free economy was a central theme in the Soviet message to the West German population. The Stalin note promised, that "no kind of limitations" would be imposed upon the German "peaceful economy" - an economy that must "contribute to welfare growth" for the German people.³³⁹ In early December 1951, probably on Deputy Foreign Minister Valerii Zorin's advice, the German desk actually suggested writing into the Stalin note a promise to "secure the unrestrained development of private initiative and entrepreneurship".³⁴⁰ This passage, that failed to make it through the drafting process, reveals a Soviet dilemma: if Moscow were explicit about its intentions to allow capitalism, the text would not only exclude Communism, but exclude a number of Social Democratic policies as well.

2) The second economic imperative was to *prevent the Western powers from making exclusive use of the German economic potential*. The solution that Gribanov and Selianinov proposed was free trade - a suggestion that came naturally from Moscow's perceptions of forced trade as an American measure to exploit the German economy. No later than three to six months after the signing of the peace treaty, the occupation powers should remove all restrictions on trade with Germany and terminate their exclusive economic rights in the country. The reunified state was free to trade with everybody, as long as the government observed a most-favoured-nation regime and treated all trade partners equally. Germany, furthermore, should not grant any country exclusive rights to lend or lease commercial aircraft and other equipment.³⁴¹

3) Several large sections in the schematic draft and the treaty text outlined how Moscow should *secure war reparations for the Soviet economy*. Since Germany was guilty of initiating the Second World War, she should "compensate the losses inflicted through military actions [...] and occupation of territory".³⁴² To compensate Soviet and Polish losses during the war,

Selianinov demanded goods and services for a total of 6,829 million dollars in 1938 prices. If we take inflation into account, Selianinov asked for 15,400 million 1951 dollars.³⁴³ This sum was roughly equal to the total amount granted by the United States in Marshall aid (1948-1952), or 30 per cent of the West German gross domestic product in 1950.³⁴⁴ Gribanov and Selianinov foresaw a 20-year period of down payment.

The sections about war reparations were the most refined ones in the work of the German desk. The authors copied the technicalities from the Italian peace treaty and added some extra punitive clauses to prevent the German government from keeping any property that was seized during the war and from nationalising or taxing Allied property in Germany.³⁴⁵ The treaty text stated that "German obligations regarding reparations take priority over all other obligations". Hence, the reunified country could not use other obligations in the treaty, for example her obligation to care for settlers from Eastern Europe, as a pretext not to pay war reparations.³⁴⁶

Provisions regarding German sovereignty

A crucial issue was how the Soviet Union could hope to control the continued implementation of a peace treaty. Selianinov's treaty text outlined a four-power control regime.³⁴⁷ Although every country that took part in the war against Germany would be invited to sign the peace treaty, only the great powers should oversee "questions concerning fulfilment and interpretation of the peace treaty".³⁴⁸ If the great powers claimed Germany violated the peace treaty, then the matter should first be referred to a conciliation commission. If consultations failed, the parties should rely on arbitration. Selianinov did not describe how to appoint an arbitrator.³⁴⁹

For the Ruhr area, homeland of the notorious German cartels, Selianinov foresaw a "special organ" made up of representatives from Germany, the four great powers, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Benelux. To make sure the Ruhr industries served "peace purposes only", this commission should oversee the elimination of armaments industries, divide cartels and trusts in

cartels and trusts in the area, and nationalise the successor companies.³⁵⁰ This section about the Ruhr was the only part of the treaty text that mentioned nationalisation of German industries.

Selianiinov proposed one four-power commission to oversee reparations and one to oversee demilitarisation. The demilitarisation commission could "conduct inspections of any object in Germany at any time" and require any information it deemed necessary. The aim was not only to prevent Germany from equipping military forces, but also to check the German production of "metals, chemical products, machines and [...] other items that might be used directly for military purposes".³⁵¹

If Germany violated the decisions of the control commissions, the four powers should place "political and economic sanctions" on the country "according to agreement". Selianiinov was particularly anxious to avoid German militarism. Thus, if Germany broke its obligations in Ruhr, or if Germany broke the military provisions of the treaty, then the four powers must "reserve [for themselves] the right to send troops into [a territory] that resembles the former zones of occupation". In due time, however, the four powers could reconsider the control regime.³⁵²

The schematic draft and the treaty text contained a number of sections apart from those mentioned above, but these have mostly technical and juridical interest, such as a part on how to renew treaties with Germany from before the war. Another section stipulated a special regime to keep open the port of Hamburg and navigation on certain German rivers. Germany, of course, would have to recognise the post-war borders as they *de facto* existed in the early 1950s. The country must keep convicted war criminals in prison and extradite foreign citizens accused of "treason or co-operation with the enemy".³⁵³

The role of perceptions in the peace treaty proposals

When Gribanov sat down to formulate his idea of a peace treaty with Germany, perceptions guided his pen. The leader of the German desk formed the Soviet

negotiating position as if the Federal Republic were a country where aggressive monopolies were about to oppress small-scale capitalism, where political persecution was commonplace, and where foreign troops ruled the country and exploited the population by way of trade. Due to these perceptions, any bargaining between Moscow and the Western powers about a German peace treaty could easily have turned out to be somewhat absurd. What the Western powers would consider a Soviet concession, Moscow would consider a demand - and vice versa.

Ironically, Gribanov's thoroughly hostile and negative view of the West emboldened him to plan a peace treaty that might have been acceptable to a majority of the West Germans on most issues. When Gribanov wrote about the need to secure political freedoms in a united Germany, for example, he did not think of this as a surrender, but rather a prerequisite. Moscow, we must remember, exaggerated Adenauer's repression of the Communists. When Gribanov insisted on the rights of man in Germany, he did so in the belief that Adenauer could not militarise the country without violating these freedoms.

Likewise, when Moscow insisted that a united Germany be allowed to trade freely, the Soviet diplomats acted on a belief that trade in Western Europe was forced, not free, and distorted to serve the political purpose of arming the Atlantic alliance. In this perspective, the demand that a united Germany should practice free trade was not a Soviet concession, but a Soviet demand. By insisting on free trade, Gribanov thought he was dealing a blow to the American exploitation of Western Germany; he sincerely believed that Germany, when liberated from the American occupation troops and their protégés, would just as readily trade with the Soviet Union as the West Germans presently did with the United States.

The economic provisions in the two peace treaty drafts cannot be fully understood without taking into account the Soviet idea of how a capitalist economy develops. If monopolies were left unconstrained, they would again breed imperialism, revanchism, militarism and war - as they had done twice before. Since Soviet diplomats believed that fascism presupposes monopolies as a child presupposes a mother, Gribanov hoped the destruction of all German

monopolies would prevent a Nazi resurrection in the future. The need to avoid a new security threat against the Soviet Union, not any desire to assist the incompetent West German Communists, explains the various proposals in the peace treaty drafts that call for democratisation of the German economy. Likewise, on a few occasions Selianinov and Gribanov mentioned the need for economic redistribution, but their goal was not to create a Socialist society, but to prevent social discontent, particularly among the settlers that had fled from Eastern Europe. Such discontent, Moscow reasoned, could provoke revanchism.

The Stalin note vs. the actual Soviet bargaining position

Selianinov's treaty text and Gribanov's schematic draft of the foundations for a peace treaty with Germany both aimed to sketch the Soviet position in possible negotiations with the Western powers. Being ordinary diplomats, neither Selianinov nor Gribanov could afford to be generous on behalf of the Soviet Union. Their suggestions, were therefore likely to resemble the Soviet maximum position on a German peace treaty.

If we compare the Soviet peace treaty aspirations with the suggestions in the Soviet note of 10 March 1952, we find that the Stalin note was rife with omissions, but not with lies. In a hypothetical bargaining situation, Moscow might have accepted a united, capitalist and non-communist Germany. Moscow did not, however, intend to give the German state much sovereignty. Selianinov and Gribanov planned the return of war reparations, the dismantling of industries and great power privileges. For the West Germans, the peace treaty regime would resemble the occupation regime 1945-49, albeit without the presence of occupation troops.

The numerous restraints that Moscow hoped to place upon Germany confirm that the Soviet Union expected the future regime in Germany to resemble a bourgeois democracy. These restraints must mean that Moscow viewed a united Germany as a potential enemy rather than a potential ally. If given a free hand in Germany, the Russians would not hesitate to

introduce socialism - but the Soviet hand in Germany was forced, not free. Unable to obtain an ideal solution, the Soviet priority was to prevent a future German military threat, not to expand the East German model to Western Germany; the Soviet appetite for socialism, could not subdue the fear of German militarism. Hence, the peace treaty provisions that aimed to prevent Nazism were many and absolute, and the suggestions that could impose socialism from above were few and vague. The need to contain Germany, not socialism through Machiavellian tactics, explain the contents of Gribanov's and Selianinov's texts.

On a number of occasions, the German desk used the peace treaty with Italy as a model for its work. Italy, like Germany, had a prehistory of fascism. In 1947, the great powers signed a peace treaty with Italy that guaranteed political freedoms and ended the Western occupation of that country - whereupon Communism prospered. Possibly, Soviet diplomats hoped the development in Germany would resemble the development in Italy. At least, the peace treaty schemes contained a number of liberal guarantees that would allow the German Communist party to grow, prosper and prevail - when the forces of history permitted. The German desk did not, however, care to secure the Communists any prominent role in German politics, for example by imposing coalition governments upon a united Germany.

The internal planning work in the Soviet foreign ministry was broadly in agreement with the Stalin note. Both the Stalin note and the Soviet peace treaty schemes explicitly forbade the presence of foreign troops. Germany was to be neutral, and lightly armed. On this point, the various internal papers vary somewhat. The treaty text prepared by Selianinov propose only a German police force with hand guns. Gribanov's schematic draft allowed Germany armed forces with a strength roughly equal to those of Italy. With regard to economic principles, the internal papers confirm that Moscow was ready to accept a capitalist model for a united Germany. The German economy, however, would be restrained by war reparations. A wide range of products would be banned, and three control commissions would retain far-reaching authority.

Conclusions: Two tracks of Soviet foreign policy

At the onset of the cold war, the United States stopped treating West Germany as a foe and began to look at the country as an ally. At least from 1947, Washington aimed to revitalise the German economy. Two years later, in 1949, the three Western zones of occupation were granted statehood and became the Federal Republic of Germany. Still, West Germany was no ordinary country. Bonn had no army, and the occupation powers enjoyed vaguely defined, but essentially limitless, privileges. In legal terms, the Federal Republic was occupied territory.

Then, in the aftermath of the North Korean attack on South Korea, the Western powers agreed to let the Federal Republic rearm and prepared to make the country a regular member of the Atlantic Alliance. In return for Bonn's co-operation, the Western powers agreed to lift the remaining restrictions on West German heavy industry and grant the Federal Republic full sovereignty - within the framework of European integration. These developments would inevitably undo the Potsdam agreement and with it the Soviet Union's hope for war reparations. Worse, German soldiers would again confront the Red Army.

The urgency that Soviet observers felt about Germany is explained, not by facts alone, but by the distorted lens through which Moscow observed the developments in the Federal Republic. Moscow saw the German economic miracle as part of an arms build-up, and Soviet diplomats were convinced that the monopolistic Ruhr industries carried the seeds of revanchism, fascism and imperialism. Besides, the European integration process allegedly gave the United States direct control over many aspects of West German society.

In responding to the danger of German soldiers, the Soviet Union pursued two different strategies. One was advocated by Soviet diplomacy and involved

some kind of understanding with the Western powers; the other was spearheaded by East German Communists, embraced the Sovietisation of the Eastern zone and the struggle against Bonn and the Western powers. Stalin wavered between the two strategies; he failed to co-ordinate different policy initiatives and left confusion and disarray.

Detour Palais Rose

When first confronted with the danger of German soldiers, Moscow's response was to demand that the great powers maintain *status quo* in Germany and refrain from arming the country. Moscow wasted the winter of 1950 and the spring of 1951 with one long, head-on attack against a future German army. At the Palais Rose Conference (March-June 1951), Moscow challenged the Western powers to respect the Potsdam agreement; meanwhile, East Berlin arranged meetings and collected signatures against remilitarisation.

The Soviet strategy backfired. Although there was indeed discontent with rearmament both in the Federal Republic and among America's European allies, Moscow failed to exploit the opportunities. Rather, the direct and aggressive Soviet approach served to convince the Western powers about the need to rearm Germany.

Moscow considers unification and a treaty on Germany

The failure of the Palais Rose Conference brought about a shift in Soviet strategy. In the summer of 1951, as the Western powers moved undeterred to establish a European army and grant the Federal Republic sovereignty, the German desk proposed that the Soviet Union, irrespective of what the other great powers aimed to do, should elaborate the text of a peace treaty with Germany, excite the West German public and enter negotiations with the Western powers on how to solve the German problem.

Within the Soviet foreign ministry, Gribanov and the German desk were responsible for administering Soviet relations with the Western powers over Germany. Although Gribanov worked in a minefield of conflicting interests, his work showed a surprising consequence; he repeatedly tried to convince his superiors that a peace treaty with Germany could solve the Soviet Union's problems. The German desk continued to employ the logic of the Potsdam agreement and sought co-operation among the great powers to keep Germany down.

In advocating a peace treaty, Gribanov sought security, not revolution. His department, the German desk, produced a couple of unfinished peace treaty drafts that reveal how Soviet diplomats aimed to secure iron-clad guarantees against a Nazi revival and German militarism. The plans did not, however, include any strategy to place Communists in political positions or secure state ownership of German industries. Gribanov used Italy rather than the GDR as model for a united Germany, and he hoped to impose on Germany the same kind of punitive clauses that the wartime Allies had placed on Italy in 1947. Furthermore, Gribanov hoped to secure high war reparations, German non-alignment and far-reaching privileges for the four great powers. The foreseen regime to keep Germany demilitarised under supervision by a control commission would strictly limit German sovereignty.

To avoid unnecessary opposition in the West against negotiations, the foreign ministry decided to launch, not the full text of a peace treaty, but a document called "the foundations for a peace treaty with Germany". This document has since become known as the Stalin note of 10 March 1952. The note reflected the Soviet idea of a peace treaty, but presumably unpopular suggestions about war reparations and four-power privileges in a united Germany were removed.

In the fall of 1951, the Politburo approved of Gribanov's peace treaty strategy, but not without second thoughts. The Kremlin was haunted by the hard and unyielding Soviet strategy at the Palais Rose. For fear that the Western powers would interpret a new Soviet peace treaty proposal as a retreat and, consequently, a sign of weakness, the Politburo ordered a broad public campaign in Germany. The purpose of this campaign was to create a

demand in the West German population for negotiations with Moscow. When this demand was sufficiently strong, the Soviet Union could offer to discuss a peace treaty, and the move would appear, not as a retreat in the face of a determined Western policy, but as a generous Soviet concession to the German people.

Walter Ulbricht's mutiny

On Moscow's orders, the East German Communists spent the autumn of 1951 trying to tempt Adenauer to join in the plea for a peace treaty. East Berlin had standing orders to behave in a conciliatory way, avoid confrontation and stage the broadest possible German appeal for a peace treaty. Time and again, the SED leadership courted Bonn - only to be rejected by Adenauer. By January 1952, Ulbricht ran out of patience and proposed a change in tactics: he wanted to attack the Adenauer regime and the General Agreement. Ulbricht preferred to use the peace treaty as a battle cry. His hopes were to unite the national idea with the idea of socialism, and help spread the East German model of society to all of Germany.

Walter Ulbricht was a man of tremendous zeal. Having escaped Hitler's persecution, he fled to Moscow, and - as one of not too many exiled Communists, he escaped Stalin's purges as well. His life was a long stubborn fight for revolution, the Soviet Union and Communism.³⁵⁴ Ulbricht might have hoped for unification, and many SED officials indeed believed in unification well into the 1960s,³⁵⁵ but he never mixed his priorities: national unity was only Ulbricht's second priority, socialism his first. Like Colonel Tiulpanov before him, who ran the political life in the Soviet Zone of Occupation until 1949, Ulbricht anticipated the division of Germany and acted upon it.³⁵⁶ Later in life, he spearheaded the construction of the Berlin wall and built "socialism in half a country".³⁵⁷

Two lines of policy collide

Occasionally, Ulbricht's policies conflicted with the intentions of his Soviet masters. The memoirs of Vladimir Semenov, for example, confirm that the SED general secretary pushed for socialism and that the Soviet foreign ministry tried to restrain him.³⁵⁸ This study, as well, has touched several internal disputes that occurred as Walter Ulbricht stepped onto the turf of Mikhail Gribanov and the Soviet foreign ministry.

A first controversy was caused by the East German attempts to widen their field of competence. In their eagerness to help Moscow, the SED leaders - consciously or not - preferred actions that added to the sovereignty and prestige of East Berlin. In the autumn of 1950, for example, Dertinger proposed calling a conference of Soviet-bloc foreign ministers (the Prague Conference) not least because his government needed recognition and a place to show the flag.

The Soviet foreign ministry, on the other hand, carefully guarded the Potsdam agreement. The German desk opposed the East German attempts to enter parts of the field where only great powers should tread. When East Berlin proposed to undo this or the other part of the Potsdam agreement, the German desk reacted strongly - sometimes leaving the impression that Soviet diplomats identified themselves with the Allies of the Second World War rather than with their Communist brethren in East Berlin. Indeed, a Russian historian, Aleksei Filitov, sees the Stalin note as a Soviet effort to frighten the GDR establishment and make sure they stayed loyal to Moscow.³⁵⁹ Control in the Eastern zone was certainly a Soviet objective, but not the only one.

A second disagreement between the German desk and East Berlin concerned which tactics to apply against German militarisation. The Soviet foreign ministry hoped to solve Moscow's troubles by way of diplomacy; the SED hoped to confront the West with manifestations and campaigns. Ulbricht and Gribanov were different personalities. Individual conviction may have played a role in their choice of tactics, but we may as well point at institutional factors. Bureaucracies everywhere, in East Berlin, Washington

that Adenauer had inflicted, and proposed to include in a future peace treaty a number of passages about political freedom. Gribanov referred to legalisation of Communist activities as Germany's obligation "to remove all hindrances to the rebirth and the strengthening of democratic tendencies among the German population".³⁰⁶ Interestingly, the means Gribanov listed to prevent prosecution of Communists were the ideals of a liberal democracy; and he used the wording of article 15 in the 1947 peace treaty with Italy describe the future order in a united Germany:³⁰⁷

*All persons, being under German jurisdiction, regardless of race, sex, language or religion, may enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech, press and publishing, religious cult, political conviction and assembly.*³⁰⁸

2) The second aim of the peace treaty was to assure that a *united Germany would never allow fascism - whatsoever*. Gribanov recommended that the peace treaty ban "the resurgence of political, military or semi-military fascist and militaristic organisations, whose purpose it is to deprive the people of its democratic rights".³⁰⁹ Selianinov added a *Berufsverbot* that banished all "war criminals and all active Nazi-party members who committed Nazi crimes" from "state, public or semi-public offices and public positions".³¹⁰ Such passages, by the way, were not unique for the peace treaty that the Soviet diplomats elaborated in 1951. The anti-Nazi ban corresponded with article 17 in the peace treaty between the Allies and Italy.³¹¹

In connection with the passages about how to avoid fascism, the Soviet authors mentioned the word "democratic" several times. Gribanov wished to "guarantee that the development of the very German state, as well as the political and public life of the country, is based on peace and democracy".³¹² Selianinov's text proposed that a peace treaty should oblige a new German government to "strengthen and continue the democratic transformations that have been achieved in Germany".³¹³ In Soviet writing, the word "democratic" has a number of different connotations. It might mean the model

of society that existed in the German *Democratic* Republic or in the Soviet Union. Sometimes, however, "democratic" was used to describe any anti-fascist movement. Finally, Soviet authors used democracy more or less synonymously with independence. In November 1947, for example, Molotov spoke of a "democratic peace" as the opposite of "imperialist peace". A "democratic peace" meant "full restoration of independence"; imperialist peace meant "the domination of certain strong Powers over other nations, big and small, without consideration for their rights and national sovereignty". To judge from the examples above the term *democracy* was sufficiently elastic to encompass Communism, prevention of fascism and mere sovereignty.³¹⁴

3) The third political imperative in the schematic draft only underlines the second: *the general political freedoms of Germany must not be used to allow Nazi parties*. There was a possible contradiction between the first (liberal freedoms) and the second (no Nazism) commandments. To prevent any ambiguity, Gribanov stressed that German authorities could not interpret the political freedoms so as to permit Nazism. His text reads:

*Every action of organisations, be that political, military or paramilitary, and also the actions of separate individuals, regardless of their social position, aimed to deprive the people of its democratic rights, revive German militarism and fascism, or cultivate revanchist ideas, should be strictly forbidden and persecuted by law.*³¹⁵

Non-alignment

The schematic draft would oblige Germany "not to enter any political or military alliance, directed against any power that took part with its armed forces in the war against Germany". Demanding only a German obligation to refrain from entering alliances, the Soviet text did not mention the word "neutrality". Gribanov shunned the word neutrality because this was the term Moscow applied to those cowards who had abstained in the struggle against

fascism.³¹⁶ In practice, however, neutrality was what the Soviet Union asked for - and possibly what the German people demanded.

The neutrality movement was a potent force in Germany. In the early years of the Federal Republic, neutrality and disarmament attracted people across the political spectre. Both utopian Socialists and members of the patriotic bourgeoisie preached neutrality. Arguably the most influential of the pro-neutrality groups was the Nauheimer Circle, founded by a West German professor of history, Ulrich Noack, in the latter half of 1948.³¹⁷ The Soviet foreign ministry began to take more interest in the movement in early 1951 and translated Noack's pamphlet about German neutralisation.³¹⁸ The professor advocated a united, neutral and demilitarised Germany as a buffer between the superpowers. Besides, neutralisation was a necessary condition for German unification since neither global power could allow the other full control in the heart of Europe. On this point Noack delighted the Soviet foreign ministry with a Lenin quotation: "[He] who possesses Germany controls Europe."³¹⁹

The foreign ministry admitted to a "somewhat inconsistent" policy towards the neutrality movement in earlier times.³²⁰ In July 1950, for example, Ulbricht had argued for the necessity to fight "against 'the theory of neutrality' which delivers the German people to the aggressors".³²¹ Ulbricht thought neutrality could impede East Germany's orientation towards the Soviet Union and the people's democracies.³²² Prior to the Palais Rose Conference (March-June 1951), however, the foreign ministry began to view the movement as an ally.³²³

When Gribanov and Selianinov outlined provisions on neutrality, their main focus was placed on withdrawal of foreign troops from German territory. Gribanov recommended that all occupation forces be withdrawn from Germany no later than three months after the peace treaty had been signed, Selianinov set the deadline for the withdrawal to "one year's time after the peace treaty has been concluded".³²⁴ Besides, when the two diplomats contemplated military provisions, they included a number of decisions to prevent the Germans from military co-operation with foreigners.

Military provisions

Gribanov's schematic draft allowed a German army, navy and airforce, but rendered those forces "strictly limited in such a way as to answer only defence needs". The text restricted the number of German soldiers, fighter planes, transport aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces, etc. German bomber planes, missiles, weapons of mass destruction (atomic, nuclear, bacteriological) and most ordinary fortifications were to be banned, and there would be restrictions on the extent of compulsory military training and Germany's ability to provide others with military assistance; the text forbade German scientists from participating in military research or production abroad, it outlawed any German foreign legion, and it forbade Germans from serving in foreign armies.³²⁵ Besides, the schematic draft proposed to ban all production of "arms, military ammunition and war equipment" and render Germany dependent on others to provide weapons.³²⁶

Gribanov's colleague, Selianinov, on the other hand, proposed to ban every trace of the German military establishment (defence ministry, officer corps, institutionalised mobilisation, general staff). He allowed "a merchant navy and a fleet of civilian aircraft" to serve the needs of "a peace economy". Besides, to "secure the internal public order of the country and the guarding of the borders" Germany might "employ police forces in limited numbers (150-200 thousand people), with hand guns." This police force should be forbidden from employing former active Nazis and former members of the Gestapo, the SS (*Schutzstaffel*) and the SA (*Sturmabteilung*).³²⁷

In short, Gribanov would allow a German military establishment, but impose a number of limitations; Selianinov would forbid a German military establishment, but allow a few exceptions. The Stalin note sided with Gribanov. The note even allowed Germany to produce war materials for domestic needs - but not for export.³²⁸ When Gromyko gave Molotov a brief on these issues, he suggested German armed forces roughly equal to those of Italy.³²⁹ At that time, the Western powers honoured the punitive clauses in the Italian peace treaty that restricted the country's armed forces to 250,000 men with a limited weaponry.³³⁰

Economic provisions

A number of sections in the schematic draft and the treaty text concerned the German economy. The Soviet interests that mattered, however, were only three: to prevent an economic structure that would breed fascism, to prevent exclusive Western access to German resources, and to take as much goods and money as possible for use in the Soviet economy. Sovietisation of the German economy was not a priority.

1) *The German economy should not breed fascism.* Gribanov recommended what he called "a democratic transformation of the industry, agriculture and other branches of the [German] economy".³³¹ This could mean a Sovietisation of the German economy,³³² but the subsequent measures that Gribanov asked for suggested a more humble goal: Gribanov hoped to undo "German cartels, trusts, syndicates and other monopolistic associations"³³³ because of their capacity to breed fascism and militarism. To demolish the cartels was not synonymous with Communism; as late as 1950, London and Paris pursued a policy of dismantling German cartels.³³⁴ Besides, a mighty Germany was simply not advisable. A peace treaty should "prevent the resurrection of the [German] military-industrial potential and the elimination of excessive concentrations of economic power".³³⁵

Apart from dismantling cartels, the German desk hoped to write into the peace treaty a set of redistribution policies. The motivation behind this policy was neither social conscience nor an urge to Sovietise Germany. Rather Gribanov sought to reduce the power base of notorious Nazis and calm the revanchist sentiments of those Germans who had fled from their properties east of Oder-Neisse. To this end, Gribanov proposed a "transfer of assets from war and nazi criminals to the hands of the German people, land reform, etc."³³⁶ Selianinov added that the "German authorities are obliged to created normal conditions of livelihood" for those who had resettled in the Western parts of Germany.³³⁷

If Gribanov could crush German cartels, and preferably calm the refugees, he could accept a treaty that allowed competitive capitalism in Germany. The leader of the German desk tried to state this frankly in the schematic draft:

*Determine that the development of the peaceful branches of industry, agriculture, external trade and other branches of the economy may proceed without any limitations or hindrances on behalf of the Allied and United Powers.*³³⁸

If we return to the drafting of the Stalin note, the promise of a free economy was a central theme in the Soviet message to the West German population. The Stalin note promised, that “no kind of limitations” would be imposed upon the German “peaceful economy” - an economy that must “contribute to welfare growth” for the German people.³³⁹ In early December 1951, probably on Deputy Foreign Minister Valerii Zorin’s advice, the German desk actually suggested writing into the Stalin note a promise to “secure the unrestrained development of private initiative and entrepreneurship”.³⁴⁰ This passage, that failed to make it through the drafting process, reveals a Soviet dilemma: if Moscow were explicit about its intentions to allow capitalism, the text would not only exclude Communism, but exclude a number of Social Democratic policies as well.

2) The second economic imperative was to *prevent the Western powers from making exclusive use of the German economic potential*. The solution that Gribanov and Selianinov proposed was free trade - a suggestion that came naturally from Moscow’s perceptions of forced trade as an American measure to exploit the German economy. No later than three to six months after the signing of the peace treaty, the occupation powers should remove all restrictions on trade with Germany and terminate their exclusive economic rights in the country. The reunified state was free to trade with everybody, as long as the government observed a most-favoured-nation regime and treated all trade partners equally. Germany, furthermore, should not grant any country exclusive rights to lend or lease commercial aircraft and other equipment.³⁴¹

3) Several large sections in the schematic draft and the treaty text outlined how Moscow should *secure war reparations for the Soviet economy*. Since Germany was guilty of initiating the Second World War, she should “compensate the losses inflicted through military actions [...] and occupation of territory”.³⁴² To compensate Soviet and Polish losses during the war,

Selianinov demanded goods and services for a total of 6,829 million dollars in 1938 prices. If we take inflation into account, Selianinov asked for 15,400 million 1951 dollars.³⁴³ This sum was roughly equal to the total amount granted by the United States in Marshall aid (1948-1952), or 30 per cent of the West German gross domestic product in 1950.³⁴⁴ Gribanov and Selianinov foresaw a 20-year period of down payment.

The sections about war reparations were the most refined ones in the work of the German desk. The authors copied the technicalities from the Italian peace treaty and added some extra punitive clauses to prevent the German government from keeping any property that was seized during the war and from nationalising or taxing Allied property in Germany.³⁴⁵ The treaty text stated that “German obligations regarding reparations take priority over all other obligations”. Hence, the reunified country could not use other obligations in the treaty, for example her obligation to care for settlers from Eastern Europe, as a pretext not to pay war reparations.³⁴⁶

Provisions regarding German sovereignty

A crucial issue was how the Soviet Union could hope to control the continued implementation of a peace treaty. Selianinov’s treaty text outlined a four-power control regime.³⁴⁷ Although every country that took part in the war against Germany would be invited to sign the peace treaty, only the great powers should oversee “questions concerning fulfilment and interpretation of the peace treaty”.³⁴⁸ If the great powers claimed Germany violated the peace treaty, then the matter should first be referred to a conciliation commission. If consultations failed, the parties should rely on arbitration. Selianinov did not describe how to appoint an arbitrator.³⁴⁹

For the Ruhr area, homeland of the notorious German cartels, Selianinov foresaw a “special organ” made up of representatives from Germany, the four great powers, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Benelux. To make sure the Ruhr industries served “peace purposes only”, this commission should oversee the elimination of armaments industries, divide cartels and trusts in

cartels and trusts in the area, and nationalise the successor companies.³⁵⁰ This section about the Ruhr was the only part of the treaty text that mentioned nationalisation of German industries.

Selianinov proposed one four-power commission to oversee reparations and one to oversee demilitarisation. The demilitarisation commission could "conduct inspections of any object in Germany at any time" and require any information it deemed necessary. The aim was not only to prevent Germany from equipping military forces, but also to check the German production of "metals, chemical products, machines and [...] other items that might be used directly for military purposes".³⁵¹

If Germany violated the decisions of the control commissions, the four powers should place "political and economic sanctions" on the country "according to agreement". Selianinov was particularly anxious to avoid German militarism. Thus, if Germany broke its obligations in Ruhr, or if Germany broke the military provisions of the treaty, then the four powers must "reserve [for themselves] the right to send troops into [a territory] that resembles the former zones of occupation". In due time, however, the four powers could reconsider the control regime.³⁵²

The schematic draft and the treaty text contained a number of sections apart from those mentioned above, but these have mostly technical and juridical interest, such as a part on how to renew treaties with Germany from before the war. Another section stipulated a special regime to keep open the port of Hamburg and navigation on certain German rivers. Germany, of course, would have to recognise the post-war borders as they *de facto* existed in the early 1950s. The country must keep convicted war criminals in prison and extradite foreign citizens accused of "treason or co-operation with the enemy".³⁵³

The role of perceptions in the peace treaty proposals

When Gribanov sat down to formulate his idea of a peace treaty with Germany, perceptions guided his pen. The leader of the German desk formed the Soviet

negotiating position as if the Federal Republic were a country where aggressive monopolies were about to oppress small-scale capitalism, where political persecution was commonplace, and where foreign troops ruled the country and exploited the population by way of trade. Due to these perceptions, any bargaining between Moscow and the Western powers about a German peace treaty could easily have turned out to be somewhat absurd. What the Western powers would consider a Soviet concession, Moscow would consider a demand - and vice versa.

Ironically, Gribanov's thoroughly hostile and negative view of the West emboldened him to plan a peace treaty that might have been acceptable to a majority of the West Germans on most issues. When Gribanov wrote about the need to secure political freedoms in a united Germany, for example, he did not think of this as a surrender, but rather a prerequisite. Moscow, we must remember, exaggerated Adenauer's repression of the Communists. When Gribanov insisted on the rights of man in Germany, he did so in the belief that Adenauer could not militarise the country without violating these freedoms.

Likewise, when Moscow insisted that a united Germany be allowed to trade freely, the Soviet diplomats acted on a belief that trade in Western Europe was forced, not free, and distorted to serve the political purpose of arming the Atlantic alliance. In this perspective, the demand that a united Germany should practice free trade was not a Soviet concession, but a Soviet demand. By insisting on free trade, Gribanov thought he was dealing a blow to the American exploitation of Western Germany; he sincerely believed that Germany, when liberated from the American occupation troops and their protégés, would just as readily trade with the Soviet Union as the West Germans presently did with the United States.

The economic provisions in the two peace treaty drafts cannot be fully understood without taking into account the Soviet idea of how a capitalist economy develops. If monopolies were left unconstrained, they would again breed imperialism, revanchism, militarism and war - as they had done twice before. Since Soviet diplomats believed that fascism presupposes monopolies as a child presupposes a mother, Gribanov hoped the destruction of all German

monopolies would prevent a Nazi resurrection in the future. The need to avoid a new security threat against the Soviet Union, not any desire to assist the incompetent West German Communists, explains the various proposals in the peace treaty drafts that call for democratisation of the German economy. Likewise, on a few occasions Selianinov and Gribanov mentioned the need for economic redistribution, but their goal was not to create a Socialist society, but to prevent social discontent, particularly among the settlers that had fled from Eastern Europe. Such discontent, Moscow reasoned, could provoke revanchism.

The Stalin note vs. the actual Soviet bargaining position

Selianinov's treaty text and Gribanov's schematic draft of the foundations for a peace treaty with Germany both aimed to sketch the Soviet position in possible negotiations with the Western powers. Being ordinary diplomats, neither Selianinov nor Gribanov could afford to be generous on behalf of the Soviet Union. Their suggestions, were therefore likely to resemble the Soviet maximum position on a German peace treaty.

If we compare the Soviet peace treaty aspirations with the suggestions in the Soviet note of 10 March 1952, we find that the Stalin note was rife with omissions, but not with lies. In a hypothetical bargaining situation, Moscow might have accepted a united, capitalist and non-communist Germany. Moscow did not, however, intend to give the German state much sovereignty. Selianinov and Gribanov planned the return of war reparations, the dismantling of industries and great power privileges. For the West Germans, the peace treaty regime would resemble the occupation regime 1945-49, albeit without the presence of occupation troops.

The numerous restraints that Moscow hoped to place upon Germany confirm that the Soviet Union expected the future regime in Germany to resemble a bourgeois democracy. These restraints must mean that Moscow viewed a united Germany as a potential enemy rather than a potential ally. If given a free hand in Germany, the Russians would not hesitate to

introduce socialism - but the Soviet hand in Germany was forced, not free. Unable to obtain an ideal solution, the Soviet priority was to prevent a future German military threat, not to expand the East German model to Western Germany; the Soviet appetite for socialism, could not subdue the fear of German militarism. Hence, the peace treaty provisions that aimed to prevent Nazism were many and absolute, and the suggestions that could impose socialism from above were few and vague. The need to contain Germany, not socialism through Machiavellian tactics, explain the contents of Gribanov's and Selianinov's texts.

On a number of occasions, the German desk used the peace treaty with Italy as a model for its work. Italy, like Germany, had a prehistory of fascism. In 1947, the great powers signed a peace treaty with Italy that guaranteed political freedoms and ended the Western occupation of that country - whereupon Communism prospered. Possibly, Soviet diplomats hoped the development in Germany would resemble the development in Italy. At least, the peace treaty schemes contained a number of liberal guarantees that would allow the German Communist party to grow, prosper and prevail - when the forces of history permitted. The German desk did not, however, care to secure the Communists any prominent role in German politics, for example by imposing coalition governments upon a united Germany.

The internal planning work in the Soviet foreign ministry was broadly in agreement with the Stalin note. Both the Stalin note and the Soviet peace treaty schemes explicitly forbade the presence of foreign troops. Germany was to be neutral, and lightly armed. On this point, the various internal papers vary somewhat. The treaty text prepared by Selianinov propose only a German police force with hand guns. Gribanov's schematic draft allowed Germany armed forces with a strength roughly equal to those of Italy. With regard to economic principles, the internal papers confirm that Moscow was ready to accept a capitalist model for a united Germany. The German economy, however, would be restrained by war reparations. A wide range of products would be banned, and three control commissions would retain far-reaching authority.

Conclusions: Two tracks of Soviet foreign policy

At the onset of the cold war, the United States stopped treating West Germany as a foe and began to look at the country as an ally. At least from 1947, Washington aimed to revitalise the German economy. Two years later, in 1949, the three Western zones of occupation were granted statehood and became the Federal Republic of Germany. Still, West Germany was no ordinary country. Bonn had no army, and the occupation powers enjoyed vaguely defined, but essentially limitless, privileges. In legal terms, the Federal Republic was occupied territory.

Then, in the aftermath of the North Korean attack on South Korea, the Western powers agreed to let the Federal Republic rearm and prepared to make the country a regular member of the Atlantic Alliance. In return for Bonn's co-operation, the Western powers agreed to lift the remaining restrictions on West German heavy industry and grant the Federal Republic full sovereignty - within the framework of European integration. These developments would inevitably undo the Potsdam agreement and with it the Soviet Union's hope for war reparations. Worse, German soldiers would again confront the Red Army.

The urgency that Soviet observers felt about Germany is explained, not by facts alone, but by the distorted lens through which Moscow observed the developments in the Federal Republic. Moscow saw the German economic miracle as part of an arms build-up, and Soviet diplomats were convinced that the monopolistic Ruhr industries carried the seeds of revanchism, fascism and imperialism. Besides, the European integration process allegedly gave the United States direct control over many aspects of West German society.

In responding to the danger of German soldiers, the Soviet Union pursued two different strategies. One was advocated by Soviet diplomacy and involved

some kind of understanding with the Western powers; the other was spearheaded by East German Communists, embraced the Sovietisation of the Eastern zone and the struggle against Bonn and the Western powers. Stalin wavered between the two strategies; he failed to co-ordinate different policy initiatives and left confusion and disarray.

Detour Palais Rose

When first confronted with the danger of German soldiers, Moscow's response was to demand that the great powers maintain *status quo* in Germany and refrain from arming the country. Moscow wasted the winter of 1950 and the spring of 1951 with one long, head-on attack against a future German army. At the Palais Rose Conference (March-June 1951), Moscow challenged the Western powers to respect the Potsdam agreement; meanwhile, East Berlin arranged meetings and collected signatures against remilitarisation.

The Soviet strategy backfired. Although there was indeed discontent with rearmament both in the Federal Republic and among America's European allies, Moscow failed to exploit the opportunities. Rather, the direct and aggressive Soviet approach served to convince the Western powers about the need to rearm Germany.

Moscow considers unification and a treaty on Germany

The failure of the Palais Rose Conference brought about a shift in Soviet strategy. In the summer of 1951, as the Western powers moved undeterred to establish a European army and grant the Federal Republic sovereignty, the German desk proposed that the Soviet Union, irrespective of what the other great powers aimed to do, should elaborate the text of a peace treaty with Germany, excite the West German public and enter negotiations with the Western powers on how to solve the German problem.

Within the Soviet foreign ministry, Gribanov and the German desk were responsible for administering Soviet relations with the Western powers over Germany. Although Gribanov worked in a minefield of conflicting interests, his work showed a surprising consequence; he repeatedly tried to convince his superiors that a peace treaty with Germany could solve the Soviet Union's problems. The German desk continued to employ the logic of the Potsdam agreement and sought co-operation among the great powers to keep Germany down.

In advocating a peace treaty, Gribanov sought security, not revolution. His department, the German desk, produced a couple of unfinished peace treaty drafts that reveal how Soviet diplomats aimed to secure iron-clad guarantees against a Nazi revival and German militarism. The plans did not, however, include any strategy to place Communists in political positions or secure state ownership of German industries. Gribanov used Italy rather than the GDR as model for a united Germany, and he hoped to impose on Germany the same kind of punitive clauses that the wartime Allies had placed on Italy in 1947. Furthermore, Gribanov hoped to secure high war reparations, German non-alignment and far-reaching privileges for the four great powers. The foreseen regime to keep Germany demilitarised under supervision by a control commission would strictly limit German sovereignty.

To avoid unnecessary opposition in the West against negotiations, the foreign ministry decided to launch, not the full text of a peace treaty, but a document called "the foundations for a peace treaty with Germany". This document has since become known as the Stalin note of 10 March 1952. The note reflected the Soviet idea of a peace treaty, but presumably unpopular suggestions about war reparations and four-power privileges in a united Germany were removed.

In the fall of 1951, the Politburo approved of Gribanov's peace treaty strategy, but not without second thoughts. The Kremlin was haunted by the hard and unyielding Soviet strategy at the Palais Rose. For fear that the Western powers would interpret a new Soviet peace treaty proposal as a retreat and, consequently, a sign of weakness, the Politburo ordered a broad public campaign in Germany. The purpose of this campaign was to create a

demand in the West German population for negotiations with Moscow. When this demand was sufficiently strong, the Soviet Union could offer to discuss a peace treaty, and the move would appear, not as a retreat in the face of a determined Western policy, but as a generous Soviet concession to the German people.

Walter Ulbricht's mutiny

On Moscow's orders, the East German Communists spent the autumn of 1951 trying to tempt Adenauer to join in the plea for a peace treaty. East Berlin had standing orders to behave in a conciliatory way, avoid confrontation and stage the broadest possible German appeal for a peace treaty. Time and again, the SED leadership courted Bonn - only to be rejected by Adenauer. By January 1952, Ulbricht ran out of patience and proposed a change in tactics: he wanted to attack the Adenauer regime and the General Agreement. Ulbricht preferred to use the peace treaty as a battle cry. His hopes were to unite the national idea with the idea of socialism, and help spread the East German model of society to all of Germany.

Walter Ulbricht was a man of tremendous zeal. Having escaped Hitler's persecution, he fled to Moscow, and - as one of not to many exiled Communists, he escaped Stalin's purges as well. His life was a long stubborn fight for revolution, the Soviet Union and Communism.³⁵⁴ Ulbricht might have hoped for unification, and many SED officials indeed believed in unification well into the 1960s,³⁵⁵ but he never mixed his priorities: national unity was only Ulbricht's second priority, socialism his first. Like Colonel Tiulpanov before him, who ran the political life in the Soviet Zone of Occupation until 1949, Ulbricht anticipated the division of Germany and acted upon it.³⁵⁶ Later in life, he spearheaded the construction of the Berlin wall and built "socialism in half a country".³⁵⁷

Two lines of policy collide

Occasionally, Ulbricht's policies conflicted with the intentions of his Soviet masters. The memoirs of Vladimir Semenov, for example, confirm that the SED general secretary pushed for socialism and that the Soviet foreign ministry tried to restrain him.³⁵⁸ This study, as well, has touched several internal disputes that occurred as Walter Ulbricht stepped onto the turf of Mikhail Gribanov and the Soviet foreign ministry.

A first controversy was caused by the East German attempts to widen their field of competence. In their eagerness to help Moscow, the SED leaders - consciously or not - preferred actions that added to the sovereignty and prestige of East Berlin. In the autumn of 1950, for example, Dertinger proposed calling a conference of Soviet-bloc foreign ministers (the Prague Conference) not least because his government needed recognition and a place to show the flag.

The Soviet foreign ministry, on the other hand, carefully guarded the Potsdam agreement. The German desk opposed the East German attempts to enter parts of the field where only great powers should tread. When East Berlin proposed to undo this or the other part of the Potsdam agreement, the German desk reacted strongly - sometimes leaving the impression that Soviet diplomats identified themselves with the Allies of the Second World War rather than with their Communist brethren in East Berlin. Indeed, a Russian historian, Aleksei Filitov, sees the Stalin note as a Soviet effort to frighten the GDR establishment and make sure they stayed loyal to Moscow.³⁵⁹ Control in the Eastern zone was certainly a Soviet objective, but not the only one.

A second disagreement between the German desk and East Berlin concerned which tactics to apply against German militarisation. The Soviet foreign ministry hoped to solve Moscow's troubles by way of diplomacy; the SED hoped to confront the West with manifestations and campaigns. Ulbricht and Gribanov were different personalities. Individual conviction may have played a role in their choice of tactics, but we may as well point at institutional factors. Bureaucracies everywhere, in East Berlin, Washington

or in the Soviet foreign ministry, strive to be useful; they fight to justify their existence and invent roles for themselves in the process.³⁶⁰ Diplomats become believers in diplomacy, propagandists in propaganda.

Frequently, however, the task of a bureaucracy will also affect its outlook: where you stand depends on where you sit. Thus, Ulbricht and Gribanov differed, not only in their choice of means, but also in their preferred ends. Considering the conditions for German unification, the German desk would let the Germans choose whichever government they wanted as long as they were unable to take up arms against Moscow or support the war machine of the Atlantic Alliance. This strategy allowed for German unification, capitalist bourgeois democracy and competitive capitalism.

Ulbricht's approach was rather more ambitious on behalf of the Soviet Union. He pushed to extend the East German model of society on to the Federal Republic. For Ulbricht, the Stalin note was merely a battle cry in a popular fight for unification under socialism. In his proposed keynote speech for the Second SED Party Conference, Ulbricht, in no uncertain words, described the GDR as a model for all of Germany. Gribanov reacted angrily, claiming that the SED general secretary behaved as if "the existing division of Germany will continue for ever".³⁶¹ Apparently, the German desk suspected East Berlin of sabotaging the Soviet unification attempt.

Stalin did not side with Gribanov or with Ulbricht. The Soviet strategy allowed both negotiations with the West and a propaganda campaign. In April 1952, however, when the Western powers rejected the Stalin note, and negotiations ceased to be an option, Moscow adopted Ulbricht's strategy. The East German Communists should no longer seek solutions that resembled the order in other parts of Germany, but demolish the old order and build socialism. The Soviet foreign ministry abandoned the idea of a peace treaty, and during the last year of Stalin's reign, there was no Soviet initiative for a peace treaty.³⁶²

Totalitarian rationality reconsidered

Until recently the dominant picture of Soviet decision-making showed Stalin on top of a huge pyramid, issuing orders and recommendations to all his subjects so that each part of the Soviet empire would work in coherence with the rest.³⁶³ Most of these previous studies applied a high degree of rationality to the Soviet decision-making system.³⁶⁴ The implicit assumption in those works was that Stalin knew what he wanted and how best to achieve his goals.

The opening of Russian archives dealt a blow to the image of rationality in Stalin's foreign policy. It appeared the dictator was not a good genius, nor an evil genius, but rather a mortal man with flawed assessments and spectacular faults of judgement. Still Stalin was the undisputed ruler and historians keep pointing at Stalin's personality, for example his notorious feeling of insecurity, in order to explain Soviet conduct.³⁶⁵ Hence, the new image of Soviet foreign policy still depicts Moscow as a unitary actor, albeit one that frequently, and sometimes irrationally, changed directions to keep up with Stalin's whims.

There is no reason to question Stalin's powers. Such was Stalin's standing that German Communists turned to him for counsel even on trivial questions. Vladimir Semenov recalled in his memoirs how GDR President Pieck asked for Stalin's advice on whether it was permissible for Otto Grotewohl to divorce his estranged wife and marry his secretary. Pieck insisted on Stalin's opinion - and he got it. Grotewohl was divorced with Stalin's blessing.³⁶⁶ Gribanov, like the East German Communists, had no higher aim than to please Stalin.

Here is the riddle: Both Gribanov and Ulbricht advocated clearcut and sometimes diametrically opposite opinions about what to do in Germany. If either had suspected that Stalin sided with the other, neither would have dared to stick his neck out. But they did. The fact that both Gribanov and Ulbricht must have believed they acted in accordance with Stalin's wishes, is better evidence of Stalin's ambiguity than the few documents that point to debates and disagreements in the Politburo about the German question.

Unlike differences of opinion in a finely tuned Western bureaucracy, the totalitarian indecisiveness at the top of the Soviet pyramid of power could seriously upset the work of the Soviet foreign ministry. The Soviet model demanded that a great number of decisions be made at the very highest level. Sometimes the Politburo considered issues that most foreign ministries in the West would let their travel agent resolve, for example the entertainment of a visiting trade union delegation. Thus, since the people further down in the pyramid of power had limited room for manoeuvring, indecisiveness on the top had a number of unforeseen consequences.

One consequence was simply *lack of co-ordination*. When Stalin lacked time, or failed to make up his mind on an issue, Soviet policy lost coherence. With regard to Germany, Stalin failed to issue overall guidelines and to co-ordinate the policies of different actors. Gribanov and Ulbricht were left to fight each other.

Sometimes, lack of directions from above led to a *paralysis* of the foreign policy apparatus. The foreign policy apparatus, led by the timid foreign minister, Andrei Vyshinskii, could produce lists of advice without a clearcut strategy; Vyshinskii shunned responsibility and preferred to offer a variety of opinions for the Politburo to choose from. Even opinionated Soviet diplomats, as a rule of thumb, tried only to *administer* Soviet foreign policy. And when the decision-making was left in disarray, so were they.

A third consequence of Stalin's indecisiveness was the *disproportionate power of precedence* in the shaping of Soviet foreign policy. When Stalin failed to give directions, Soviet diplomats and East German Communists checked what they had done the last time around and continued along that path. Gribanov, for example, revised a peace treaty proposal that Molotov had made in 1947. For lack of new directions, Soviet diplomats continued to employ the logic of the Potsdam agreement and other policies shaped before the cold war broke out and the two German states were established.

Finally, Stalin's indecisiveness might offer *startling influence for those lesser figures* who dared make up their mind. Even the German Communists yielded influence with their humble advice. So did the German desk. Of dire necessity rather than desire for influence, the German desk elabo-

rated an overall Soviet policy to fill the vacuum at the top. However inferior Ulbricht and Gribanov might have been, they were at least able to come up with opinions. And, regardless of power and standing, those who know what they want, invariably enjoy an advantage compared to those who do not.

Appendix on sources

Printed sources

Diplomatičeskii slovar v trekh tomakh [Diplomatic dictionary in three volumes], A.A. Gromyko, A.G. Kovalev, P.P. Sevostianov and S.L. Tikhvinskii (eds.), Moscow: Nauka, 1984.

Documents on German Unity, volumes I and II, Frankfurt: Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, 1951-1952.

For a democratic peace with Germany: speeches and statements by V.M. Molotov, minister for foreign affairs of the USSR, made at the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, November 25 - December 15, 1947, London: Soviet News, 1948.

Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], Washington D.C., Government Printing Office.

The Soviet Union and the question of the unity of Germany and the German peace treaty, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952.

Treaties and international agreements registered or filed and recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations, New York, 1945-

Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953, R. Badstübner and W. Loth (eds.), Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1994.

Archival sources

AVPRF - Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation)

RTsKhIDNI - Rossiiskii Tsentri Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History)

TsKhSD - Tsentri Khraneniia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (Storage Centre for Contemporary Documentation)

GARF - Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State Archives of the Russian Federation)

On the AVPRF

This study relies heavily on materials from the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (AVPRF). Unlike diplomatic archives elsewhere, the AVPRF was never intended to support researchers, but rather serve the needs of ministry officials. In-house archivists (*fondakhraniteli*) used to do all the work in the archives. Only recently, through the work of the International Archives Advisory Group and the International Archives Support Fund, has the AVPRF acquired a reading room, Xerox machines and a structure that allows independent research. Gradually, the AVPRF has been transformed into an accessible archive. Those who are willing to spend some time in Moscow, and show some serious interest in the archive and its staff, will eventually overcome the difficulties.

To identify relevant collections (*fondy*) of files in the AVPRF, a researcher will need to know which branch of the foreign ministry carried

responsibility for a particular policy. Most basic work took place in geographic offices, 1st European, 2nd European, etc. Each geographic office dealt with a region, but documents were stored according to country. In our period (1950-1952) the archives treated Germany as one single entity and kept files about the GDR and the Federal Republic in the same country series (*Referentura po Germanii*). The country series are obvious places to start a search since they usually contain the most extensive holdings on any given issue. AVPRF collections of this kind were divided in two sub-collections, one more secret, the other less secret. To tell the collections apart, the number of the more secret collection was preceded by a zero; thus, *fond* 082 contains secret material about Germany and *fond* 82 contains less secret materials.

If a question gained in importance, a deputy foreign minister, or the foreign minister himself, would eventually guide and censor the drafting of initiatives. Thus, materials on the Stalin note are also present in the collections of three central deputy foreign ministers and the foreign minister himself: *Sekretariat A.Ia. Bogomolova* (*fond* 019), *Sekretariat V.A. Zorina* (*fond* 021), *Sekretariat A.A. Gromyko* (*fond* 022) and *Sekretariat A.Ia. Vyshinskogo* (*fond* 07).

The Soviet foreign ministry was a strict hierarchy. The co-ordinating functions rested with the minister and his deputies. The General secretariat (*fond* 029) handled some central functions such as archives and personnel administration. Besides, work in the Department of Treaties and International Law (*Mezhdunarodno-pravovoe upravlenie* - *fond* 054) and in the Department of Economics (*fond* 046) would necessarily affect policy in several countries. The collections of these central offices have not been subject to systematic declassification, and the researcher will have to inquire about materials for specific cases. According to AVPRF archivists, the files of the Department of Treaties and International Law contain additional materials about the German peace treaty. I have only been given access to the non-secret collection of this directorate (*fond* 54).

The most pressing problem with work in the AVPRF is how to select materials from a given collection. The in-house archivists relied on a

systematic but inflexible regime. For any given year, they would create an inventory list (*opisi*) that listed every file (*delo*) in a given collection (*fond*). These inventories (*opisi*) list classified and declassified information alike, and are generally not shown to researchers. To make proper use of the inventories, a researcher should also be familiar with the hierarchy of index numbers that helps identify the subject of a particular file. When given due notice, the AVPRF may produce inventory lists without references to classified materials. I have only been able to use *opisi* from Gromyko's and Zorin's collections.

The absence of concise finding aids in the AVPRF leaves a certain disarray about what materials that remains classified. The problem is aggravated because documents are stored in bound and sealed volumes; since a single document with classified information cannot be removed from the file, the presence of one single piece of classified information may force the archive to withhold the whole file. Similarly, most intelligence reports remain classified since there is no way of deleting a single paragraph of sensitive material. Thus, most of the concise political reports produced annually by Soviet embassies (*godovye otchety*) remain classified.

Another broad category of classified materials is the huge collection of telegrams that were sent in a ciphered code (*fond 059*). The foreign ministry decoded the ciphered messages and produced a single copy of the text. The fragile condition of the paper, and the fact that access to such telegrams might, in theory at least, help break the original code, continue to impede declassification. Large portions of documents about Germany remain inaccessible because materials from military institutions like the Soviet Control Commission in Germany (*fond 0457*) are exempt from ordinary declassification.³⁶⁷

A researcher in the AVPRF would be wise to develop strategies to compensate for missing finding aids and classified materials. One alternative is to broaden the request for materials. For 1951 and 1952, I have requested every sequence of files in the *Referentura po Germanii* where political materials - widely defined - might be stored. I have made numer-

ous specific, rather than few and sweeping, requests. Furthermore, I have compared the contents of the more accessible deputy foreign ministers' files with the picture that emerges from the larger, but less accessible, *Referentura po Germanii*. (Allegedly, some 95 per cent of the files in Molotov's and Vyshinskii's collections are now open to research). After three consecutive visits to the AVPRF, each stay lasting four to six weeks, I have become less mystified. That, in the end, is the only way I can prove I have seen a sufficiently broad selection of materials.

To compensate the shortcomings of the AVPRF, one may also make use of materials from the *Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History* (RTsKhIDNI). The RTsKhIDNI holds the files of the Communist Party's Central Committee from the years prior to 1953, including the files of the Central Committee's International Commission (*Vneshnepoliticheskaiia Komissiiia - fond 17, opisi 127 and 138*). This body received full reports on the political sentiments in Germany, on campaign activities and Communist party activities. The Politburo protocol is available on microfiche in the RTsKhIDNI. Although this protocol may reveal when a particular matter was discussed, most foreign policy resolutions are stored in special files (*osobyie papki*) that frequently remain classified as of October 1996. Besides, the Politburo did not take minutes during Stalin's last years.³⁶⁸ Lots of questions are thus likely to remain unanswered.

Notes

¹ All citations from *Documents on German Unity*, vol. II, pp. 60-61, Soviet government's note to US government, proposing discussions on a German peace treaty, 10 March 1952. Identical notes were handed to the French and British governments.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ T.A. Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1991, pp. 80, 154.

⁵ R. Steininger, *The German question: the Stalin note of 1952 and the problem of reunification*, M. Cioc (ed.), New York: 1990, p. 2.

⁶ For short bibliographical sketches, see for example G. Wettig, "Die sowjetische Deutschland-Note vom 10. März 1952 als geschichtswissenschaftliches Problem. Ein gewandeltes Problemverständnis", *Deutschland Archiv*, vol. II (1992), pp. 157-167; R. Steininger, *The German question...*, pp. 3-13.

⁷ R. Steininger, *The German question...*

⁸ H. Graml, "Nationalstaat oder westlicher Teilstaat", *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 25 (1977), pp. 821-864; H. Graml, "Die Legende von der verpaten Gelegenheit", *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 29 (1981), pp. 307-341.

⁹ P. Sethe, *Zwischen Bonn und Moskau*, Frankfurt/Main: 1956.

¹⁰ For example, A.G. Meyer, "Die sowjetische Deutschland-Politik im Jahre 1952", in *Forschungsberichte und Untersuchungen zur Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 24 (Thübingen: Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Osteuropaforschung, 1970).

¹¹ See for example H. Graml, "Nationalstaat oder westlicher Teilstaat" in *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 25 (1977), pp. 821-864; H. Graml, "Die Legende von der verpaten Gelegenheit" in *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 29 (1981), pp. 310ff; G. Wettig, "Die sowjetische Deutschland-Note vom 10. März 1952: Wiedervereinigungsangebot oder Propagandaaktion?" *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 2, 1982, pp. 130-148.

¹² For example, J. Weber, "Das sowjetische Wiedervereinigungsangebot vom 10. März 1952", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 50 (1969); G. Wettig, "Der publizistische Appell als Kampfmittel" in *Politik im Rampenlicht: Aktionsweisen moderner Außenpolitik*, Frankfurt/Main: 1967, pp. 136-184.

¹³ Wettig has published his thesis in several articles. It first appeared in G. Wettig, "Die Deutschland-Note vom 10. März 1952 auf der Basis diplomatischer Akten des russischen Außenministeriums. Die Hypothese des Wiedervereinigungsangebot", *Deutschland Archiv*, vol. 7, (1993), pp. 786-805. A slightly revised version is found in G. Wettig, "Die Deutschland-Note vom 10. März 1952 nach sowjetischen Akten" in *Die Deutschlandfrage von der staatlichen Teilung Deutschlands bis zum Tode Stalins*, in the series *Studien zur Deutschlandfrage*, vol. 13 (1994), pp. 83-111. For a short English-language version, see G. Wettig, "Stalin and German reunification: Archival evidence on Soviet foreign policy in spring 1952", *The Historical Journal*, vol. 37 (1994), pp. 411-419.

¹⁴ G. Wettig, "Stalin and German reunification: Archival evidence on Soviet foreign policy in spring 1952", *The Historical Journal*, vol. 37 (1994), p. 418.

¹⁵ So according to E. Scherstjanoi, "Zur aktuellen Debatte um die Stalin-Note 1952", *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 4 (1994), p. 181.

¹⁶ E. Scherstjanoi, "Zur aktuellen Debatte um die Stalin-Note 1952" ..., pp. 181-185; J. Laufer, "Die UdSSR, die SED und die deutsche Frage", *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 10 (1993), pp. 1201-1204. Wettig's answer to his critics, see "Übereinstimmung und Auseinandersetzung über die sowjetische Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr 1952", *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 10 (1993), pp. 1205-1210.

¹⁷ J. Laufer, "Die UdSSR, die SED und die deutsche Frage" ..., pp. 1201-1204. The full quote runs "Ist die einseitige Schuldzuweisung an die Adresse der UdSSR, die Nicht-Berücksichtigung ihrer Erfahrungen und Interessen, eine Fortsetzung des Kalten Krieges mit anderen Mitteln?"

¹⁸ "Excerpts from the decisions of the Potsdam conference" in *The Soviet Union and the question of the unity of Germany and of the German peace treaty*, Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 1952, p. 10.

¹⁹ B. Meissner, "Die Frage des Friedensvertrages mit Deutschland vom Potsdamer Abkommen bis zu den Ostverträgen" in *Die Sowjetunion und Deutschland von Jalta bis zur Wiedervereinigung*, Cologne: 1995, pp. 44 ff.

²⁰ On Soviet goals in Germany, see N.M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: a history of the Soviet zone of occupation, 1945-1949*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1995, pp. 9-10.

²¹ N.M. Naimark, "The Soviets and the Christian Democrats: the challenge of a 'Bourgeois' party in Eastern Germany, 1945-1949" in F. Gori and S. Pons (eds.), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-1953*, London: 1996, pp. 37-56.

²² B. Meissner, "Die Frage des Friedensvertrages ...", pp. 44-45, 50-51.

²³ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 1091, ll. 43-54, minutes of conversation with East German delegation, 31 January 1947. Citation from, p. 46 "... если партнеры не согласятся на создание Центрального правительства, или Центральной администрации Германии". The SED visit is also covered in B. Bonwetsch and G. Bordjugov, "Stalin und die SBZ: Ein Besuch der SED-Führung in Moskau vom 30. Januar - 7. Februar 1947", *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, no. 2 (1994), pp. 279-303.

²⁴ B. Meissner, "Die Frage des Friedensvertrages ...", p. 57. See also *For a democratic peace with Germany: speeches and statements by V.M. Molotov, minister for foreign affairs of the USSR, made at the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, November 25 - December 15, 1947*, London: Soviet News, 1948.

²⁵ M. Narinskii, "The USSR and the Berlin Crisis, 1948-1949" in F. Gori and S. Pons (eds.), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-1953*, London: 1996, pp. 57-75. Much the same judgement is found in M. Narinskii, "USSR i plan Marshalla po materialam Arkhiva prezidenta" [The USSR and the Marshall plan from documentation in the Presidential archives], *Novaia i noveishchaia istoriia*, vol. II (1993), pp. 11-17.

²⁶ N.M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany ...*, p. 345.

²⁷ D. Staritz, "Die SED, Stalin und die Gründung der DDR", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, vol. V (1991), p. 7 (note 20). The same information is recapitulated in N.M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany ...*, p. 312.

²⁸ M. Narinskii, "The USSR and the Berlin Crisis, 1948-1949" in F. Gori and S. Pons (eds.), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-1953*, London: 1996, pp. 57-75.

²⁹ Quote from N.M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany ...*, p. 352; W. Loth, *Stalins ungeliebtes Kind: Warum Moskau die DDR nicht wollte*, Berlin: 1994.

³⁰ Tiulpanov's department was first called the *Propaganda and Censorship Department*, then the *Propaganda Administration* and eventually, from the autumn of 1947, the *Information Administration*. For details, see N.M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany ...*, pp. 20, 323, 327-341.

³¹ N.M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany ...*, pp. 24-25, 351-352; W. Loth, *Stalins ungeliebtes Kind...*, pp. 226-227.

³² N.M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany ...*, pp. 310-311.

³³ N.M. Naimark, "'To know everything and to report everything worth

knowing': building the East German police state, 1945-1949", *Cold War International History Project - working paper*, no. 10 (1994); W. Loth, *Stalins ungeliebtes Kind ...*, pp. 162 ff, particularly pp. 166-167.

³⁴ On American concerns about German economy and security, see M.P. Leffler, *A preponderance of power: national security, the Truman administration, and the cold war*, Stanford: 1992, pp. 151-157. On the widening split among the Soviet Union and its wartime allies, see *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956*, part 1, *Von der Kapitulation bis zum Plevan-Plan*, G.F. Von Roland, C. Greiner, G. Meyer, H. Rautenberg and N. Wiggerhaus (eds.), Munich: 1990, pp. 45 ff.

³⁵ N.M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany ...*, pp. 53-54.

³⁶ For a fascinating, but controversial, argument to this end, see W. Loth, *Stalins ungeliebtes Kind...*

³⁷ D. Staritz, who questioned the Soviet desire for a Socialist East German state, paraphrased Stalin's slogan "socialism in one country" in the title of his book *Sozialismus in einem halben Lande: Zur Programmatik und Politik der KPD/SED in der Phase der antifaschistisch-demokratischen Umwälzung in der DDR*, Berlin: 1976.

³⁸ W. Loth, *Stalins ungeliebtes Kind ...*, pp. 158-160.

³⁹ W. Otto, "Deutscher Handlungsspielraum und sowjetischer Einfluss: Zur Rolle der Sowjetischen Kontrollkommission" in E. Scherstjanoi (ed.), *'Provisorium für längsten ein Jahr.' Die Gründung der DDR*, Berlin: 1993, pp. 138-144.

⁴⁰ For a Soviet account of the discrepancy between official statements and actual praxis, see *Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii* [Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation], in the following AVPRF, *fond* (f.) 082, *opis* (op.) 38, *papka* (p.) 230 *delo* (d.) 46, *list* (l.) 14, request for permission to revise working plan of GDR foreign ministry, Kudriavtsev to Zorin, 4 April 1951.

⁴¹ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 14, d. 156, ll. 1-7, draft of letter to Stalin on Bierut's possible visit to the GDR, Vyshinskii to Stalin, 29 January 1951. The full quote reads "... чтобы правильное оценить целесообразность посещения Берутом ГДР в настоящее время с международной точки зрения."

⁴² N.M. Naimark, "'To know everything and to report everything worth knowing': building the East German police state, 1945-1949", *Cold War International History Project - working paper*, no. 10 (1994).

⁴³ W. Loth, *Stalins ungeliebtes Kind...*, pp. 166-167; N.M. Naimark, "The Soviets and the Christian Democrats: the challenge of a 'Bourgeois' party in the East,

1945-1949" in F. Gori and S. Pons (eds.), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-1953*, London: 1996, pp. 37-56.

⁴⁴ On the election fraud, see J. Laufer, "Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit und die Wahlfälschungen bei den ersten Wahlen in der DDR", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, vol. V (1991), pp. 17-30.

⁴⁵ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 23a, p. 11, d. 143, ll. 1-8, draft of Politburo resolution on reactions to the September meeting of the Western powers, Gromyko to Stalin and Politburo, 28 September 1950.

⁴⁶ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 23a, p. 11, d. 143, ll. 14-28, draft of Politburo resolution to call the Prague conference, Gromyko to Stalin and Politburo, 6 October 1950.

⁴⁷ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 235, d. 84, ll. 119-123, draft of Politburo resolution on Ulbricht's proposal about German trade, Gribanov to Gromyko, 19 December 1951. This draft was written "in accordance with the [Politburo's] directions".

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* The Allied obligation to control German trade rested on paragraph 15c in the Potsdam agreement, see *Documents on German Unity*, part 1, p. 6, excerpts of the Potsdam agreement, 2 August 1945.

⁴⁹ For Lenin's *Imperialism* in digest, see W.C. Wohlforth, *The elusive balance: power and perceptions during the cold war*, Itacha, New Jersey: 1993, pp. 33-34. The Communist *Weltanschauung* is also evident in memoir literature, see F. Chuev, *Molotov remembers: conversations with Felix Chuev*, Chicago: 1993; V.S. Semenov, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatsjow*, Berlin: 1995; N.S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev remembers*, E. Crankshaw and S. Talbott (eds.), New York: 1970.

⁵⁰ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 672, ll. 171-206, SCC memo on the SPD, Fadeikin to Grigorian and Gribanov, 26 September 1951.

⁵¹ M.P. Leffler, *A preponderance of power: national security, the Truman administration, and the cold war*, Stanford: 1993, pp. 383 ff.

⁵² FRUS, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1286-1299, decision of the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France with regard to Germany, 19 September 1950; Russian translation in AVPRF, f. 07, op. 23a, p. 11, d. 143, ll. 5-8, communiqué on Germany, TASS, 19 September 1950.

⁵³ On Adenauers improved bargaining position, see T.A. Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany*, Cambridge, MA: 1991, p. 117. On attempts to control the economy in the Western zones of occupation prior to 1949, see *ibid.* ..., pp. 28, 39 ff., 68 ff.

⁵⁴ *The Soviet Union and the question of the unity of Germany and of the*

German peace treaty, Moscow: 1952, pp. 63-72. Another translation is available in *Documents on German Unity*, vol. 1, pp. 158-162.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* The two translations differ in telling detail: the Soviet translation declines to spell Hitlerite with a capital "H", prefers vivid "sanguinary struggle" to prosaic "bloody battle", "revive" to "renew" and uses the strictly geographical term "Western Germany" rather than "West Germany".

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ On the decision to launch the Schuman Plan, see F. Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: the first statesman of interdependence*, London: 1994, pp. 181 ff.

⁵⁸ T.A. Schwartz, *America's Germany...*, pp. 103, 189 ff.

⁵⁹ "Communique from the Prague meeting of October 1950" in *The Soviet Union and the question of the unity of Germany and of the German peace treaty*, Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 1952, pp. 63-72.

⁶⁰ Two thick files at the AVPRF contain surveys, memos and inquiries on the ECSC: AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 234, d. 77 and AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 33, d. 388.

⁶¹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 234, d. 77, ll. 8-24, SCC memos about the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan, Bushmanov and Kovalev to Gribanov, 5 April 1951.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 33, d. 388, l. 13, short memo on the Schuman Plan, Zorin, Arutiunian and the MID department of economics to Stalin and the Politburo, 5 April 1951.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, ll. 49-50, 3EO survey on the remilitarisation of Germany and her inclusion in the North-Atlantic pact, 23 May 1951.

⁶⁶ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 33, d. 388, l. 13, short memo on the Schuman Plan ...

⁶⁷ AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 16, d. 116, ll. 50, quaterly report on West Germany, Diplomatic Mission in East Berlin to Politburo, Bogomolov, Vyshinskii, Zorin, Gusev and Podtserob, 2 October 1951.

⁶⁸ See AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, ll. 24-62, MID survey on the remilitarisation of Germany and her inclusion in the North Atlantic pact, German desk, 23 May 1951.

⁶⁹ AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 16, d. 116, ll. 6-7, quaterly report on West Germany...

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, l. 50, 3EO survey on the remilitarisation of Germany and her inclusion in the North-Atlantic pact, 23 May 1951. See also K. Törnudd, *Soviet attitudes to regional non-military cooperation*, Helsinki: 1963, p. 140.

⁷² E. Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: a history*, London: 1980, pp. 86-90.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92.

⁷⁴ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 107, ll. 20-22, memo on the Pleven Plan, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 4 February 1951.

⁷⁵ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 110, ll. 3-8, memo on the creation of a European Army, 6 September 1951. The document originated in the "small" Committee of Information, see V. Zubok, "Soviet intelligence and the cold war: the 'small' Committee of Information, 1952-53", *Diplomatic History*, vol. 19, no. 3 (1995), pp. 453-472.

⁷⁶ Remark at a meeting of Atlantic Council defence ministers in October 1950, quoted in T.A. Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany*, Cambridge, MA: 1991, p. 142.

⁷⁷ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 234, d. 77, l. 24, SCC memos about the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan, Bushmanov and Kovalev to Gribanov, 5 April 1951. The full quote reads: "Практическое осуществление плана Плевена с его громоздкой организацией и структурой представляется мало реальным."

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 16, d. 116, l. 50, quarterly report on West Germany, Diplomatic Mission in East Berlin to Politburo, Bogomolov, Vyshinskii, Zorin, Gusev and Podtserob, 2 October 1951.

⁸¹ T.A. Schwartz, *America's Germany* ..., p. 94.

⁸² T.A. Schwartz, *America's Germany*..., pp. 44, 235 ff.

⁸³ The quotation is taken from AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, l. 127, 3EO memo on possible measures with regard to the situation in Western Germany, Gribanov to Gromyko, Vyshinskii, Zorin, Gusev and Bogomolov, 9 July 1951.

⁸⁴ *The Soviet Union and the question of the unity of Germany and of the German peace treaty*, Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 1952, pp. 63-72.

⁸⁵ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, l. 49, 3EO survey on the remilitarisation of

Germany and her inclusion in the North-Atlantic pact, 23 May 1951.

⁸⁶ *The Soviet Union and the question of the unity of Germany*..., pp. 63-72.

⁸⁷ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 10, MID memo on the termination of the state of war, Kudriavtsev to Zorin, 14 June 1951. Bonn was spelt with a small "b" as a sign of disregard.

⁸⁸ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, ll. 49, 3EO survey on the remilitarisation of Germany and her inclusion in the North-Atlantic pact, 23 May 1951. The citation reads "[...] не означает предоставления Западной Германии какого-либо, хотя бы ограниченного суверенитета [...]"

⁸⁹ W. Laqueur, *Russia and Germany*, London: 1965, pp. 235, 241.

⁹⁰ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 44, ll. 105-110, 3EO draft of memo about the foreign policy apparatus of Western Germany, Gribanov, 4 December 1951. See also AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 16, d. 188, ll. 1-19, MID position paper for a possible CFM session, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 9 January 1951.

⁹¹ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 672, ll. 171-206, SCC memo on the SPD, Fadeikin to Grigorian and Gribanov, 26 September 1951.

⁹² RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 672, l. 9, SCC memo on the West German CDU, Fadeikin to Semichastnov and the CC VKP(b) [Central Committee of the All-union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)], 27 February 1951; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 44, ll. 23-37, SCC memo on laws and measures by the Bundestag and the Bonn government to lower the living standard of the working masses and eliminate the last remains of democratic freedoms, Bakulin to Ilichev and Gribanov, 20 July 1951.

⁹³ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 911, ll. 171-177, GlavPURKA [Main Political Administration of the Worker-Peasant Red Army] political portrait of German Minister of the Interior Lehr, Savosin and Goncharov to Grigorian, 13 September 1952.

⁹⁴ See AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 233, d. 69, ll. 1-8, memo on the neo-fascist organisations Bruderschaft, First Legion and Fatherland Union, Andreev to Gribanov and Semenov, 24 February 1951; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 233, d. 69, ll. 9-19, SCC memo on nationalist and fascist organisations in Western Germany, Kiiatkin, 24 April 1951; RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 672, ll. 72-85, SCC memo on the 'Socialist imperial party', Bakulin to Pushkin and Grigorian, 29 June 1951; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 233, d. 69, ll. 34-40, 3EO memo on the organisation Bruderschaft, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, Gromyko, Gusev and Zorin, 1 October 1951; RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 672, ll. 207-217, SCC memo on the

Bavarian Party, Fadeikin to Grigorian and Gribanov, 17 November 1951; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 110, ll. 109-123, 3EO memo on militarist organisations in Western Germany, Gribanov and Sychev to Vyshinskii, 3 December 1951.

⁹⁵ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 233, d. 69, ll. 25-33, 3EO memo on nationalist and neo-fascist organisations in Western Germany, German desk to Zorin, 31 March 1951.

⁹⁶ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 672, ll. 144-153, SCC memo on the German Party, Bakulin to Grigorian, 31 July 1951.

⁹⁷ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 670, ll. 47-51, SCC memo on conditions for resettled people in Western Germany, Fadeikin to the CC VKP(b), 13 February 1951. For social and economic data on the refugees, see AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 233, d. 69, ll. 20-24, SCC memo on the situation for resettled people in Western Germany, Ilichev to Gribanov, 28 February 1951.

⁹⁸ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 670, ll. 47-51, SCC memo on resettled people ..., 13 February 1951.

⁹⁹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 44, l. 32, SCC short memo on laws and other measures from the Bundestag and the Bonn government in order to lower the standard of living and destroy the last traces of democratic freedom, Bakulin to Ilichev and Gribanov, 20 July 1951.

¹⁰⁰ For a short review, see C. Kleßmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung: Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1955*, Bonn: 1991, pp. 255-256.

¹⁰¹ T.A. Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany*, Cambridge, MA: 1991, p. 86.

¹⁰² T.A. Schwartz, *America's Germany ...*, pp. 145-146.

¹⁰³ AVPRF, f. 022, op. 4a, p. 43, d. 28, ll. 1-13, survey of the Western press about the Brussels meeting in the North Atlantic Council, Pushkin to Gromyko, Vyshinskii and Gribanov, 29 December 1950; RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 672, ll. 10-11, SCC memo on the SPD, Fadeikin to Semichastnov and the CC VKP(b), 13 February 1951.

¹⁰⁴ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 672, ll. 184, SCC memo on the SPD, Fadeikin to Grigorian and Gribanov, 26 September 1951.

¹⁰⁵ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 672, ll. 10-11, SCC memo on the situation in the SPD, Fadeikin to Semichastnov and the CC VKP(b), 13 February 1951.

¹⁰⁶ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 672, ll. 23-38, SCC memo on the conference of oppositional Social Democrats in Frankfurt am Main, Bakulin to Grigorian, 21 May 1951.

¹⁰⁷ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 672, l. 178, SCC memo on the SPD, Fadeikin to Grigorian and Gribanov, 26 September 1951.

¹⁰⁸ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 672, ll. 205-206, SCC memo on the SPD ...

¹⁰⁹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 221, d. 6, ll. 36-46, report on 11 October conversation with Peace Movement general secretary about activities in Western Germany, Pushkin to Vyshinskii, Gromyko and Gribanov, 19 October 1951. A handwritten annotation attached to this document drew attention to the fact that Vyshinskii had underlined a passage on page 39.

¹¹⁰ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 221, d. 6, l. 39, report on 11 October conversation ...

¹¹¹ AVPRF, f. 022, op. 4a, p. 43, d. 28, ll. 1-13, survey of the Western press about the Brussels meeting in the North Atlantic Council, Pushkin to Gromyko, Vyshinskii and Gribanov, 29 December 1950

¹¹² AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 16, d. 116, l. 53, quaterly report on Western Germany, Soviet Diplomatic Mission in East Berlin to Politburo, Bogomolov, Vyshinskii, Zorin, Gusev and Podtserob, 2 October 1951. Same judgement in AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 110, l. 26, 3EO memo on the activities of the East German state, the parties and the civil organisations against Western German remilitarisation, 20 September 1951.

¹¹³ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 221, d. 6, l. 39, report on 11 October conversation ... For an article about sectarianism, see *Kratkii politicheskii slovar* [Short political dictionary], Moscow: 1989.

¹¹⁴ AVPRF, f. 022, op. 4a, p. 43, d. 28, ll. 1-13, survey of the Western press about the Brussels meeting in the North Atlantic Council, Pushkin to Gromyko, Vyshinskii and Gribanov, 29 December 1950;

¹¹⁵ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 14, d. 156: 60-66, MID memo on the movement for German neutrality, Gromyko to Molotov, 18 February 1951.

¹¹⁶ The poll was ordered by US High Commissioner McCloy and appeared in the *Washington Post* on 9 September 1950 and in *New York Times* on 10 September 1950. Referred in AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 14, d. 156, ll. 60-66, MID memo on the movement for German neutrality, Gromyko to Molotov, 18 February 1951. See also T.A. Schwartz, *America's Germany...* p. 135 (note 40).

¹¹⁷ Data from C. Klessmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung: Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1955*, Bonn: 1991, p. 475. Klessmann refers to W. Abelhauser, *Probleme des Wiederaufbaus der westdeutschen Wirtschaft 1945 bis 1953*, in H.A. Winkler (ed.), *Politische Weichenstellungen im Nachkriegsdeutschland*,

Göttingen: 1979, p. 241.

¹¹⁸ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38a, p. 248, d. 4, l. 85, economic survey on the situation in Western Germany in 1950 and early 1951, Pushkin and Senin to Kudriavtsev, 18 May 1951.

¹¹⁹ B.H. Klein, *Germany's economic preparations for war*, Cambridge, MA: 1959, particularly pp. 11, 18.

¹²⁰ L. Erhard, *Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik: Der Weg der sozialen Marktwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf: 1962, pp. 131, 164 ff.

¹²¹ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 670, ll. 2-46, SCC memo on the economic situation in Western Germany, Fadeikin to the CC VKP(b), 13 February 1951; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38a, p. 248, d. 4, ll. 1-85, economic survey on the situation in Western Germany in 1950 and early 1951, Pushkin and Senin to Kudriavtsev, 18 May 1951. Additional surveys on the West German economy are found in AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38a, p. 248, d. 4, (139 pages).

¹²² AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38a, p. 248, d. 4, ll. 80-85, economic survey ...

¹²³ On the Soviet preoccupation with inflation, see AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 234, d. 76, ll. 4-14, SCC memo on the food-stuff situation and the prices on industrial products in Western Germany, Bushmanov to Kudriavtsev, 11 June 1951; RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 670, ll. 81-111, SCC memo on the situation for the working class in Western Germany, Fadeikin to the CC VKP(b), 7 February 1951; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 234, d. 76, ll. 15-23, SCC memo on the supply situation and the rise in the prices on products in mass demand, Bushmanov to Kudriavtsev, 18 June 1951.

¹²⁴ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38a, p. 248, d. 4, ll. 80-85, economic survey ... As a sign of disregard, the author declined to spell Hitler with a capital "h".

¹²⁵ In Soviet economic thinking, a reallocation of resources from light industry to heavy industry would cause a price hike on consumer products. Such price fluctuations due to distortions in production were called "scissors crises", a term first used in the early 1920s to describe a price hike on manufactured goods in the Soviet Union caused by a comparatively fast recovery in Soviet agriculture. see G. Hosking, *A history of the Soviet Union, 1917-1991: final edition*, Glasgow: 1992, pp. 119-120.

¹²⁶ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38a, p. 248, d. 4, ll. 80-85, economic survey ...

¹²⁷ Statistical date referred in C. Klessmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung: Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1955*, Bonn: 1991, p. 476. Klessmann refers to *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands*, 1952 ff. and

Wirtschaft und Statistik, Jg. 1 (1949-50).

¹²⁸ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38a, p. 248, d. 4, ll. 80-85, economic survey ...

¹²⁹ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 670, l. 59, SCC memo on the situation for the intelligentsia and the degeneration of West German culture, Fadeikin to the CC, 5 February 1951.

¹³⁰ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 670, l. 58, SCC memo on intelligentsia and culture ...

¹³¹ T.A. Schwartz, *America's Germany...*, p. 305. For a criticism of Schwartz's America centred approach, see A. Deighton, "'Arming the key battleground': German rearmament, 1950-55", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, vol. III, no. 2 (1992), pp. 343-353. For a study that emphasises European countries and market forces rather than the United States and political decisions, see A. Milward, *The reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51*, London: 1984, pp. 462-464, 466.

¹³² See for example AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 16, d. 116, ll. 2-5, quarterly report on Western Germany, Soviet Diplomatic Mission in East Berlin to Politburo, Bogomolov, Vyshinskii, Zorin, Gusev and Podtserob, 2 October 1951. The text outlines a "sgovor", a term that imply a hidden agreement or an agreement behind the back of somebody.

¹³³ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, ll. 24-62, 3EO survey on the remilitarisation of Germany and her inclusion in the North-Atlantic pact, 23 May 1951.

¹³⁴ AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 16, d. 116, ll. 1-55, quarterly report on Western Germany ...

¹³⁵ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 238, d. 104, l. 12, annual report of the Soviet embassy in Washington, section on US policy towards Germany, Podtserob to Kudriavtsev, 11 June 1951.

¹³⁶ AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 16, d. 116, l. 49, quarterly report on Western Germany... Notice how Soviet authors refused to spell Bonn with a capital "B".

¹³⁷ FRUS, 1950, vol. IV, pp. 902-903, Soviet note calling for a CFM to discuss the demilitarisation of Germany, 3 November 1950.

¹³⁸ FRUS, 1950, vol. IV, pp. 904-906, the secretary of state to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 6 November 1950; FRUS, 1950, vol. IV, pp. 908-910, the secretary of state to the Embassy in France, 23 November 1950.

¹³⁹ On the British position, see FRUS, 1951, vol. III, part 1, pp. 1055-1057, the ambassador in the United Kingdom (Grifford) to the secretary of state, 2 January 1951.

¹⁴⁰ FRUS, 1950, vol. IV, pp. 922-924, memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) - approved by the secretary of state, 23 December 1950.

¹⁴¹ FRUS, 1952, vol. IV, pp. 920-921, Western note in response to the Soviet note of 11 November calling for a CFM session, 22 December 1950. (The three Western powers sent separate, but identical, notes.)

¹⁴² AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 16, d. 186, ll. 26-32, draft of Soviet note in reply to the Western note of 22 December about a CFM session, Molotov, 27 December 1950.

¹⁴³ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 16, d. 188, ll. 1-19, preliminary draft of Soviet position paper for a CFM session, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 9 January 1951. See also FRUS, 1949, vol. III, pp. 1131-1146, unagreed articles of the draft treaty for the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria.

¹⁴⁴ FRUS, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1051-1054, Soviet note in reply to the Western note of 22 December about a CFM session, 30 December 1950.

¹⁴⁵ FRUS, 1951, vol. III, part 1, pp. 1065-1067, Western note in reply to the Soviet note of 30 December 1950 about a CFM session, 20 January 1951; FRUS, 1951, vol. III, part 1, pp. 1070-1073, Soviet note in reply to the Western note of 20 January about a CFM session, 5 February 1951; *Documents on German Unity*, vol. I, p. 138, Western reply to the Soviet note of 5 February 1951; also in FRUS, 1951, vol. III, part 1, p. 1085 (footnote 3).

¹⁴⁶ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 16, d. 188, ll. 39-54, draft of Politburo proposal on the Soviet position at the meeting of deputies to prepare a CFM session, Gromyko, 27 February 1951.

¹⁴⁷ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 233, d. 74, l. 8, draft of directives for the meeting of deputy foreign ministers, Gromyko to Vyshinskii, 12 February 1951; AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 16, d. 188, l. 21, revised draft of directives for the meeting of deputy foreign ministers, Gromyko to Vyshinskii, 20 February 1951.

¹⁴⁸ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 16, d. 188, ll. 39-54, draft of Politburo proposal ...

¹⁴⁹ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 16, d. 188, ll. 28-38, draft of directives to the Soviet delegation on the meeting of deputies, Gromyko to Molotov, 26 February 1951; AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 16, d. 188, ll. 39-54, draft of Politburo proposal ...

¹⁵⁰ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 16, d. 188, ll. 37-38, Politburo proposal on the Soviet position on the meeting of deputies to prepare a CFM session, Gromyko to Molotov, 1 March 1951.

¹⁵¹ Identical texts in AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 231, d. 57, ll. 1-8, memo on German neutrality, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 14 February 1951, and; AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p.

14, d. 156, ll. 51-59, memo on the movement for a neutral Germany, Vyshinskii to Molotov, 17 February 1951.

¹⁵² AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 221, d. 6, ll. 5-8, memo on conversation with head of the Polish Military Mission in Berlin (Meller), Sitnikov to Vyshinskii, Gromyko and Gribanov, 14 February 1951. The report referred to a remark Acheson had made at conference of ambassadors in Frankfurt on 7 February 1951, see FRUS, 1951, vol. IV, pp. 148-170.

¹⁵³ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 16, d. 188, l. 5, preliminary draft of Soviet position paper for a CFM session, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 9 January 1951. The passage reads: "Такое наше предложение было бы трудно отклонить Министрам трех держав. Если они все же отклонили бы его под каким-либо предлогом, например, под предлогом отложить опубликование такого Заявления до окончания рассмотрения всей проблемы о демилитаризации Германии или всех германских вопросов, то наша делегация все же осталась бы в политически выигрышном положении перед мировой общественностью."

¹⁵⁴ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 16, d. 188, ll. 1-19, preliminary draft of Soviet position paper...

¹⁵⁵ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 16, d. 188, l. 6, preliminary draft of Soviet position paper...

¹⁵⁶ Soviet proposal, see FRUS, 1951, vol. III, part 1, pp. 1187-1189, the United States Representative at the four-power exploratory talks (Jessup) to the secretary of state, 5 March 1951. Western position, see *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956*, part 1, *Von der Kapitulation bis zum Plevan-Plan*, G.F. Von Roland, C. Greiner, G. Meyer, H. Rautenberg and N. Wiggerhaus (eds.), Munich: 1990, p. 34.

¹⁵⁷ FRUS 1951, vol III, part 1, p. 1111 (note 1). The Soviet proposal for item 1 on the agenda read:

"Examination of the causes of present international tensions in Europe and of means necessary to secure a real and lasting improvement in relations between Soviet Union, the US, Great Britain and France, including the following questions: on demilitarization of Germany; on reduction of armed forces of USA, USSR, Great Britain and France and in connection with this discussion of existing level of armaments and question of establishment of international control over implementation of reduction of armed forces; on other measures for elimination of threat of war and fear of aggression; on fulfillment of present treaty

obligations and agreements of four powers.”

¹⁵⁸ FRUS, 1951, vol. III, part 1, pp. 1124-1126, instructions from Acheson to Jessup, 13 April 1951.

¹⁵⁹ FRUS 1951, vol 3, part 1, page 1118 (note 2).

¹⁶⁰ *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956*, part 1..., pp. 36-37.

¹⁶¹ B. Meissner, “Die Frage des Friedensvertrages mit Deutschland vom Potsdamer Abkommen bis zu den Ostverträgen” in *Die Sowjetunion und Deutschland von Jalta bis zur Wiedervereinigung*, Cologne: 1995, p. 55.

¹⁶² FRUS, 1951, vol. III, part 1, pp. 1102-1103, the director of the Office of German Political Affairs (Laukhuff) to the director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade), 21 March 1951.

¹⁶³ B. Meissner, “Die Frage des Friedensvertrages mit Deutschland vom Potsdamer Abkommen bis zu den Ostverträgen” in *Die Sowjetunion und Deutschland von Jalta bis zur Wiedervereinigung*, Cologne: 1995, p. 57.

¹⁶⁴ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 1, proposal to establish commission to review peace treaty draft, Gribanov to Gromyko, 24 February 1951.

¹⁶⁵ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 16, d. 188, ll. 9-10, preliminary draft of Soviet position paper for a CFM session, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 9 January 1951.

¹⁶⁶ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 233, d. 74, ll. 4-5, 3EO memo on documents prepared for the meeting of deputies to prepare a CFM session, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 7 February 1951.

¹⁶⁷ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 233, d. 74, ll. 4-5, memo on preparations for the meeting of deputies, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 7 February 1951; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 1, proposal for commission to review peace treaty draft, Gribanov to Gromyko, 24 February 1951. For a review of commission members' careers, see A.A. Gromyko, A.G. Kovalev, P.P. Sevostianov and S.L. Tikhvinskii (eds.), *Diplomatischesskii slovar v trekh tomakh*, [Diplomatic dictionary in three volumes], Moscow: 1984.

¹⁶⁸ R. Steininger, “1955: The Austrian state treaty and the German question”, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, vol. II, no. 2 (1992), pp. 494-522; M. Gehler, “Kurzvertrag für Österreich? Zur Staatsvertrags-Diplomatie 1952”, *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 42, no. 2 (1994), pp. 243-278.

¹⁶⁹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 233, d. 74, ll. 31-36, memo on the Austrianisation of Germany, Kudriavtsev to Zorin, 21 March 1951.

¹⁷⁰ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 233, d. 74, l. 34, memo on the Austrianisation of Germany, Kudriavtsev to Zorin, 21 March 1951. Key passages read:

Учитывая опыт нашей оккупации Австрии, необходимо указать, что перенесение австрийского опыта в его настоящей форме на Германию не может быть приемлемо для Советского Союза.

Если бы советская сторона согласилась с этим, представители Правительства ГДР оказались бы в явном меньшинстве и не смогли бы в какой-либо степени влиять на решения общегерманского правительства.

¹⁷¹ “Agreement on the machinery of control in Austria. Signed at Vienna, on 28 June 1946” in *United Nations - Treaty Series*, 1952, vol. 138, pp. 85-110. Article 6 obliged the Austrian government to submit any decision to the Allied Control Commission - but if the Allies failed to act upon the proposal within 31 days, Vienna might assume the issue was approved. This decision did not apply to “Constitutional laws” which required explicit and unanimous approval.

¹⁷² AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 233, d. 74, l. 34, memo on the Austrianisation of Germany, Kudriavtsev to Zorin, 21 March 1951.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 233, d. 70, l. 28, proposal to publish materials from the meeting of deputy foreign ministers in Paris, Gribanov to Gromyko, 28 June 1951; V. Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen*, Munich: 1993, pp. 300 ff.

¹⁷⁶ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 44, l. 32, SCC memo on laws and other measures from the Bundestag and the Bonn government in order to lower the standard of living and destroy the last traces of democratic freedom, Bakulin to Ilichev and Gribanov, 20 July 1951.

¹⁷⁷ AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 17, d. 120, ll. 11-12, 3EO memo on the development of a German movement in favour of peace and against remilitarisation, 31 July 1951.

¹⁷⁸ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, ll. 2, 15-16, SCC memo on preparation for the referendum in Western Germany, Bushmanov, 11 May 1951.

¹⁷⁹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 44, l. 20, SCC memo on German elections, Buscmanov and Bakulin to Kudriavtsev, 11 May 1951.

¹⁸⁰ Quote from W. Loth, *Stalins ungeliebtes Kind: Warum Moskau die DDR nicht wollte*, Berlin: 1994, pp. 170-171. For information regarding the referendum

campaign, see AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, ll. 1-16, SCC memo on preparation for referendum, Bushmanov, 11 May 1951; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 233, d. 68, ll. 19-43, MID memo on the National Front, Kudriavtsev to Kabin, 2 April 1951; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 229, d. 39, ll. 29-33, SED plan on conduction of referendum in Berlin, SED to German desk, 14 May 1951.

¹⁸¹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, ll. 128-133, 3EO memo on possible measures with regard to the situation in Western Germany, Gribanov to Gromyko, Vyshinskii, Zorin, Gusev and Bogomolov, 9 July 1951.

¹⁸² *Documents on German Unity*, vol. I, p. 148, declaration of the German federal government on all-German elections, 22 March 1950.

¹⁸³ *Documents on German Unity*, vol. I, pp. 158-162, Prague Declaration of Soviet bloc foreign ministers, 22 October 1950.

¹⁸⁴ See W. Loth, *Stalins ungeliebtes Kind ...*, pp. 168 ff.

¹⁸⁵ FRUS, 1951, vol. III, part 2, p. 1766, the chancellor of the Federal Republic (Adenauer) to the chairman of the Allied High Commission for Germany (Francois Poncet), 9 March 1951.

¹⁸⁶ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 44, ll. 1-3, 3EO memo on Adenauer's declaration in the Bonn parliament, Kudriavtsev to Zorin, 12 March 1951.

¹⁸⁷ All citations from AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, l. 129, 3EO memo on possible measures regarding the situation in Western Germany, Gribanov to Gromyko, Vyshinskii, Zorin, Gusev, Bogomolov and Lavrentiev, 9 July 1951.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, ll. 126-134, 3EO memo on possible measures regarding the situation in Western Germany, Gribanov to Gromyko, Vyshinskii, Zorin, Gusev, Bogomolov and Lavrent'ev, 9 July 1951.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² "Besprechung am 30. 7. 1951, abends 8 Uhr, in Karlshorst, 30 July 1951" in R. Badstübner and W. Loth (eds.), *Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953*, Berlin: 1994, pp. 371-373.

¹⁹³ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, l. 160, draft of memo to Stalin, draft of note to the three powers on German remilitarisation, and draft of note to France on the Schuman Plan and the Plevan Plan, Gribanov to Gromyko, 9 August 1951.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.* For a report on the KPD conference, see RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 669, ll. 44-52, SCC memo on conference for KPD workers, Bakulin to Grigorian, 7

September 1951.

¹⁹⁵ "Besprechung am 30. 7. 1951..." in *William Pieck: Aufzeichnungen...* The cited paragraph reads: "Grotewohl / - Initiativ früher bei uns - bis zur / Abstimmung / jetzt beim Gegner / neuer Programmpunkt Friedensvertrag 1951 Inhalt / Remilit. mit Krieg - / Kriegszustand beenden / Gleichberechtigung in Remilitarisierung" (p.373).

¹⁹⁶ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 14, on the wish of Pieck, Grothwohl and Ulbricht that the USSR government make a concrete suggestion to conclude a peace treaty with Germany, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 15 August 1951.

¹⁹⁷ "Besprechung am 30. 7. 1951..." in *William Pieck: Aufzeichnungen...* The full text reads: "Ulbricht: /Was tun dagegen? - bisher mehr Entlarfung/mehr Molotov - /Londoner Konferenz Volkskammer / Japan Friedensvertrag gegen Wehrvereine / Wie Massen verständlich - / daß Soviet Union Frieden, USA Krieg will - / Westen sagt - für Frieden, gegen Agression / Soviet Union" (p. 372).

¹⁹⁸ Molotov's memoirs confirm that the foreign ministry was allowed only limited room of discretion, see *Sto sorok besed s Molotovym: iz dnevnika F. Chueva*, F. Chuev (ed.), Moscow 1990, p. 95.

¹⁹⁹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, ll. 12-13, proposal to establish a commission to elaborate the foundations of a peace treaty with Germany, Gribanov to Gromyko, 3 August 1951.

²⁰⁰ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, ll. 157-172, draft of a memo to Stalin, draft of a note to the three powers on German remilitarisation, and draft of a note to France on the Schuman Plan and the Plevan Plan, Gribanov to Gromyko, 9 August 1951.

²⁰¹ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1089, Politburo resolution no. 439 on Vyshinskii's medical leave, 11 July 1951; AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 33, d. 388, ll. 67-86, draft of action plan concerning Germany, Semenov and Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 20 August 1951. The plan was "revised in accordance with your [Vyshinskii's] remarks" (p. 67).

²⁰² On the parallel between Vyshinskii's actions as procurator and his style as foreign minister, see V. Israelian, "Oblichitel'" [Denouncer] in *Inkvisitor: stalinskii prokuror Vyshinskii*, [The inquisitor: Stalin's prosecutor Vyshinskii], Moscow: 1992, pp. 288-296. Gromyko's contribution in this unflattering biography is also readable, see A.A. Gromyko, "'Zagadka' Vyshinskii" [The Vyshinskii 'enigma'] in *ibid.*, pp. 296-305.

²⁰³ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 33, d. 388, ll. 67-86, draft of action plan concerning

Germany, Semenov and Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 20 August 1951.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁵ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1090, Politburo resolution no. 259 to rework the 30 July proposal of Pieck, Ulbricht and Grotewohl, 27 August 1951. The quote reads: "Вопрос о Германии. Поручить т. Вышинскому в 3-дневный срок на основе обмена мнений переработать представленный проект, имея в виду выработать предложения по вопросам, поставленным тт. Пикам, Ульбрихтом и Гротеволом в беседе с Чуйковым и Ильичевым..."

²⁰⁶ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 20, renewed proposal to let a commission prepare draft of peace treaty with Germany, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 27 August 1951. Bogomolov's copy of the document is stored in AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 17, d. 123, l. 1. The reference in G. Wettig, "Die Deutschland-Note auf Basis diplomatischer Akten...", p. 793 (footnote 22), is, however, incorrect.

²⁰⁷ S.A. Golunskii was head of the foreign ministry's Department of Treaties and International Law; S.B. Krylov was a Soviet judge on the International Court and expert on the United Nations; V.M. Khvostov headed both the international relations department at the Academy of Science and the foreign ministry archives, see A.A. Gromyko, A.G. Kovalev, P.P. Sevostianov and S.L. Tikhvinskii (eds.), *Diplomaticeskii slovar v trekh tomakh*, [Diplomatic dictionary in three volumes], Moscow: 1984.

²⁰⁸ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 20, renewed proposal to let a commission prepare draft ...

²⁰⁹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 222, d. 13, ll. 1-9, draft of report to the Instances on proposal to conclude a peace treaty with Germany and draft of orders to the SCC, Semenov, Gribanov and Pushkin to Vyshinskii, 28 August 1951. The proposals in this document were based on Politburo directions, and there is not likely to have been any major discrepancies between what the troika suggested and what the Politburo approved, most likely on a meeting 8 September 1951. On this date, "the German question" was discussed as issue no. 452 on the Politburo's agenda, see RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1090..

²¹⁰ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 222, d. 13, l. 2, draft of report to the Instances ... The full quote reads: "Указанное предложение немецких друзей, по мнению МИД СССР, является в принципе правильным. Опубликование советского проекта основ мирного договора с Германией дало бы конкретную платформу борьбы за единую Германию и против закабаления Западной Германии англо-американским империалистам. Однако, возникает вопрос о времени и форме такого выступления

Советского Правительства."

²¹¹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 222, d. 13, l. 2, draft of report to the Instances ... The full quote reads: "МИД СССР считает, что выступление Советского Правительства в настоящий момент по вопросу о мирном договоре с Германией могло бы создать впечатление, что Советское Правительство в отличие от позиции Советской делегации на предварительном совещании в Париже март-июнь 1951г. предлагает теперь созвать сессию СМИДа для обсуждения только одного вопроса о заключении мирного договора с Германией. Поэтому выступление Советского Правительства по вопросу о мирном договоре с Германией целесообразнее сделать несколько позднее, предварительно подготовив мировое общественное мнение к такому шагу со стороны Советского Союза."

²¹² AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 222, d. 13, l. 2, draft of report to the Instances ...

²¹³ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 128, d. 1091, ll. 2-6, political portrait of Pieck, Grotewohl, Ulbricht and Fechner, Suslov to Stalin, Molotov and Zhdanov, 25 January 1947.

²¹⁴ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 222, d. 13, ll. 1-9, draft of report to the Instances ...

²¹⁵ All citations from AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 108, ll. 126-134, 3EO memo on possible measures regarding the situation in Western Germany, Gribanov to Gromyko, Vyshinskii, Zorin, Gusev, Bogomolov and Lavrent'ev, 9 July 1951.

²¹⁶ *Documents on German Unity*, vol. I, pp. 196-201, statement by Grotewohl to the People's Chamber, 15 September 1951.

²¹⁷ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1090, Politburo resolution no. 566 approving interview with Chuikov about the 15 September proposal of the GDR People's Chamber, 19 September 1951.

²¹⁸ *Documents on German Unity*, part 1, pp. 208, interview with General Vassilii I. Chuikov, chairman of the Soviet Control Commission, concerning all-German elections, 20 September 1951.

²¹⁹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 46, ll. 28-36, 3EO memo on proposal of the GDR People's Chamber to call an all-German Constituent Council, Gribanov, 29 September 1951.

²²⁰ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 137, d. 642, l. 97, SCC memo on the political situation in East-CDU, Kiiatkin to Grigorian and Semenov, 8 December 1951.

²²¹ Soviet sources confirm that SED was in control, see AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p.

258, d. 35, ll. 44-46, 3EO memo on activities by the bloc of anti-fascist and democrat parties and organisations in the GDR, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, Pushkin and Podtserob, 19 October 1952.

²²² Lemmer informed a US liaison officer about the conversation, see FRUS, 1951, vol. III, part 2, pp. 1803-1804, the director of the Berlin element of HICOG [high commissioner for Germany] (Lyon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany at Frankfurt, 29 October 1951; also referred in H. Graml, "Die Legende von der verpaten Gelegenheit", *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 29 (1981), pp. 311-312.

²²³ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 221, d. 6, ll. 47-57, report on conversation with Dertinger, Pushkin to Vyshinskii, Gromyko and Gribanov, 19 October 1951; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 221, d. 6, l. 60, annotation on Dertinger's conversation with Lemmer, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 27 October 1951.

²²⁴ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 221, d. 6, l. 64, report on 29 October conversation with GDR Foreign Minister Dertinger, Pushkin to Vyshinskii, Gribanov and Gromyko, 21 November 1951.

²²⁵ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 221, d. 6, l. 60, annotation on Dertinger's conversation ...

²²⁶ H. Graml, "Die Legende von der verpaten Gelegenheit", *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 29 (1981), pp. 318-319.

²²⁷ *Documents on German Unity*, part 1, pp. 209-210, statement of government policy by Federal Chancellor Dr. Konrad Adenauer in Bundestag, 27 September 1951.

²²⁸ *Documents on German Unity*, part 1, p. 211, letter from Federal Chancellor Dr. Konrad Adenauer to Allied High Commission concerning all-German elections, 4 October 1951.

²²⁹ *Documents on German Unity*, part 1, pp. 214-216, address by Federal Chancellor Dr. Konrad Adenauer in Berlin, 6 October 1951.

²³⁰ *Documents on German Unity*, part 1, p. 218, statement of government policy by Soviet zone minister Otto Grotewohl to People's Chamber, 10 October 1951.

²³¹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 105, ll. 11-12, 3EO memo on the West German request for elections throughout Germany under international control, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 8 October 1951.

²³² AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 239, d. 105, ll. 13-15, 3EO memo on the possibility of the German question being raised in the UN General Assembly, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 18 October 1951.

²³³ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1091, Politburo resolution no. 203 on the GDR government's position with regard to all-German elections, 31 October 1951. The resolution itself is stored in a special file that remains classified, but the orders are paraphrased in *Wilhelm Pieck: Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1953*, pp. 376-378, Besprechung mit Semjonow am 1. 11. 51 im Hause abends 10 Uhr bei mir, 1 November 1951. After having received instructions, Pieck sent a letter to his West German counterpart, see *Documents on German Unity*, part 1, pp. 246, letter from Soviet Zone President Wilhelm Pieck to Federal Republic President Dr. Theodor Heuss on all-German elections, 2 November 1951.

²³⁴ *Documents on German Unity*, part 2, p. 5, statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei I. Vyshinskii before the United Nations General Assembly, opposing discussions on tripartite proposal to investigate the conditions for free elections throughout Germany.

²³⁵ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 15, d. 169, ll. 4-8, draft of Politburo resolution regarding East German response to UN commission on all-German elections, Gromyko to Stalin and Politburo, 5 December 1951.

²³⁶ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 15, d. 169, l. 9, revised draft of Politburo resolution regarding East German response to UN commission on all-German elections, Gromyko to Molotov, 6 December 1951.

²³⁷ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 15, d. 169, l. 13, copy of Politburo resolution [no 84/668] on East German response to UN commission on all-German elections, Gromyko to Stalin and Politburo, 7 December 1951. This revised resolution text was written after the Politburo meeting and reads: "3. В ответе правительства ГДР, по тактическим соображениям, не следовало бы ссылаться на то, что ООН некомпетентна обсуждать германский вопрос".

²³⁸ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 24, proposal to publish a list with names of German and Austrian prisoners of war that remain in the USSR, Gribanov, 16 January 1952.

²³⁹ E. Scherstjanoi and C. Stappenbeck, "'Dibelius war in Karlshorst... wollte Mittelsmann sein zwischen SKK und Adenauer...': Ein geheimes Gespräch zwischen Bischof Dibelius, Armeegeneral Tschujkow und Politberater Semjonow im November 1951", *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 10 (1995), pp. 1031-1047, specially, p. 1040.

²⁴⁰ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, ll. 35-40, draft of basic principles for a peace treaty with Germany, Gribanov to Bogomolov, 15 September 1951.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*

²⁴² AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 15, d. 168, ll. 1-7, annotated draft of basic principles of a peace treaty with Germany [the Stalin note], Vyshinskii's secretariat to Molotov, 30 September 1951. The next known copy, where Molotov's comments were heeded, is AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, ll. 59-64, draft of basic principles for a peace treaty with Germany [the Stalin note], Gribanov to Gromyko, 19 October 1951. Identical copy in AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 15, d. 168, ll. 8-14.

²⁴³ *Ibid.* In Russian: "Далеко не...".

²⁴⁴ When Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin received a copy on 3 December - for his eyes only - it was identical with the text from October, AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, ll. 50-55, draft of basic principles for a peace treaty with Germany [the Stalin note], Gribanov to Zorin, 3 December 1951.

²⁴⁵ AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 17, d. 123, ll. 2-9, draft of letter to Stalin on the preparing of basic principles for a peace treaty with Germany [the Stalin note], Gribanov to Bogomolov, 10 December 1951.

²⁴⁶ AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 17, d. 123, l. 7, draft of letter to Stalin ...

²⁴⁷ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 22-23, 3EO working paper on measures related to the preparing of the foundation for a peace treaty with Germany, 16 January 1952.

²⁴⁸ *Documents on German Unity*, part 2, p. vii, Ulbricht's address to the All-German Municipal Working Conference in Dresden, 10 November 1951.

²⁴⁹ *Documents on German Unity*, vol. II, p. 40, resolution on German unity, adopted by the People's Chamber on 9 January 1952. People's Chamber President Johannes Dieckmann sent the resolution to Bundestag President Hermann Ehlers on 10 January 1952.

²⁵⁰ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 10-15, reworked draft of basic principles for a peace treaty with Germany [the Stalin note], Pushkin, Koptelov and Gribanov to Gromyko, 14 January 1952. (Probably Gromyko's annotated copy from a meeting with Molotov.)

²⁵¹ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 71-82, copy of Draft of Politburo resolution and copy of letter to Stalin regarding a German peace treaty, Gromyko to Stalin, 25 January 1952.

²⁵² Molotov's instructions were copied onto AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 94-104, annotated copy of Politburo papers concerning the basic principles for a peace treaty with Germany, 25 January 1952. Molotov himself had probably read a somewhat less refined version, AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d.

11, ll. 7-13, revised draft of basic principles for a peace treaty with Germany and revised reply to GDR on campaign against the General Agreement, Gribanov, 25 January 1952.

²⁵³ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, ll. 1-6, draft of basic principles for a peace treaty with Germany [the Stalin note], Pushkin, Gribanov and Koptelov, 10 January 1952.

²⁵⁴ T.A. Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany*, Cambridge, MA: 1991, pp. 44, 235 ff.

²⁵⁵ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 25-37, 3EO draft of letter to Stalin on East German initiative regarding a peace treaty with Germany and draft of foundations for a peace treaty with Germany [the Stalin note], Gromyko to Molotov, 21 January 1952. In the Soviet text, the "General Agreement" was deprived of capital letters as a sign of disregard.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.* Gerhard Wettig makes wide use of this document, but his reference is incorrect, see "Die Deutschland-Note vom 10. März 1952 auf der Basis diplomatischer Akten...", p. 796 (footnote 28). Wettig, furthermore, claims that the document is a letter from Gromyko to Stalin. It is not. The place of origin was the German desk, which sent the letter to Gromyko who passed it on to Molotov. Stalin's name was written on the front page because the final version (not this draft) was intended for the Politburo.

²⁵⁷ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, l. 27, 3EO draft of letter to Stalin on East German initiative ...

²⁵⁸ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, l. 27, 3EO draft of letter to Stalin on East German initiative... Note how the foreign ministry used capital letters to pay reverence: "Peace Treaty" vs "general agreement" and "bonn government".

²⁵⁹ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 27-28, 3EO draft of letter to Stalin on East German initiative...

²⁶⁰ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, l. 28, 3EO draft of letter to Stalin on East German initiative ... The quote reads: "Кроме того, выступление Советского Союза с полным текстом Мирного договора на базе предложенного Народной Палатой проекта основ этого договора связало бы нам руки в возможных переговорах с западными державами по отдельным статьям Мирного Договора и дало бы повод противникам мирного урегулирования с Германией использовать невыгодные для немцев некоторые статьи договора с целью ослабить значение нашего выступления по этому вопросу."

²⁶¹ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, l. 27, ZEO draft of letter to Stalin on East German initiative ... The full quote reads: "Следует также иметь в виду, что полученный руководством ГДР агентурным путем текст Бгенерального договора вызывает серьезные сомнения в его подлинности. Не исключено, что этот документ был специально изготовлен в целях дезинформации."

²⁶² AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, l. 29, ZEO draft of letter to Stalin on East German initiative ...

²⁶³ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, l. 29, ZEO draft of letter to Stalin on East German initiative ... The full quote reads: "Указанная нота Советского Правительства означала бы, что косвенно мы предлагаем созвать Совет Министров Иностраных Дел четырех держав, однако без формального предложения на этот счет. По мнению МИД СССР, в ноте можно этим ограничиться, имея в виду, что вопрос о формальном предложении относительно созыва Совета Министров можно решить позднее, в зависимости от реакции трех держав на нашу ноту."

²⁶⁴ It has not at all times been possible to determine who dictated what change and when. The foreign ministry, supervised by Molotov, produced a host of drafts - not all of which, carbon copies in particular, were properly signed, registered and dated. The copies are stored in file AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13 d.144, titled "On the foundations for a peace treaty with Germany".

²⁶⁵ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, l. 96, annotated copy of Politburo papers concerning the basic principles for a peace treaty with Germany, 25 January 1952.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁷ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 71-82, draft of Politburo resolution (copy) and copy of letter to Stalin regarding a German peace treaty, Gromyko to Stalin, 25 January 1952.

²⁶⁸ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 71-82, draft of Politburo resolution (copy) ... The full quote reads: "Таким образом, в центре внимания германского народа был бы поставлен вопрос о мирном договоре, что усилил бы и движение за восстановление единства Германии. Выдвинув на первое место вопрос о мирном договоре, важно также принять меры к разоблачению предложений трех держав о Бгенеральном договоре с Западной Германией, который является не чем иным, как попыткой, направленной на срыв мирного урегулирования для Германии и на срыв решения вопроса о восстановлении единства Германии."

²⁶⁹ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 71-82, draft of Politburo resolution (copy) ... The full quote reads: "Вокруг обращения Правительства ГДР к четырем державам можно было бы развернуть соответствующую кампанию в печати и среди населения. Просьба Правительства ГДР об ускорении заключения мирного договора явилась бы вместе с тем новым этапом в борьбе германского народа за ликвидацию существующего раскола Германии и за воссоздание единой Германии."

²⁷⁰ The Politburo protocol (RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1092) informs that the peace treaty initiative was discussed on three meetings (30 January, 6 February and 8 February 1952). The declassified part of the protocol does not, however, contain any decision apart from one (resolution no. 352) which simply orders the foreign ministry to rework its drafts ("Поручить МИДу переработать представленные проекты предложений по данному вопросу - срок - 3 дня.")

²⁷¹ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, l. 124, revised draft of Politburo resolution on a response to the GDR, Vyshinskii to Molotov, 6 February 1952.

²⁷² *Ibid.*

²⁷³ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 124-128, revised draft of Politburo resolution on a response to the GDR, Vyshinskii to Molotov, 6 February 1952; RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1092, Politburo resolution no. 425 on measures to accelerate the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and create a united, democratic, peace-loving German state, 8 February 1952.

²⁷⁴ Ju. Kvitsinskii, "Nachwort" in V.S. Semenov, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow*, Berlin: 1995, p. 392. "Stalin gab dem Experiment schließlich seinen Segen, warnte aber, bei einem Mißerfolg werde er die Schuldigen zur Verantwortung ziehen."

²⁷⁵ G. Wettig, "Demontage eines Mythos: Semjonow und Stalins Deutschland-Note", *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 2 (1996), pp. 262-263.

²⁷⁶ In Oslo, 22 December 1997, this author discussed the Stalin note with ambassador Kvitsinskii. Kvitsinskii underlined the risk involved in offering Stalin a false judgement. The ambassador was unable to say for sure why the Politburo had considered the note risky.

²⁷⁷ RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1093, Politburo resolution no. 47 on the sending of a note to the United States, England and France with the draft of the foundations for a peace treaty with Germany, 8 March 1952.

²⁷⁸ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, l. 126, revised draft of Politburo resolution on a response to the GDR, Vyshinskii to Molotov, 6 February 1952.

²⁷⁹ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, l. 131, draft of Politburo resolution ordering a modification in the forthcoming East German plea for a peace treaty, Gromyko to Molotov, 12 February 1952; RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1092 Politburo resolution no. 453 on instructions to comrades Chuikov and Semenov regarding the GDR government's draft of an appeal to the four powers for a peace treaty, 12 February 1952.

²⁸⁰ *Documents on German Unity*, vol. II, p. 50, GDR note to the four powers requesting speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, 13 February 1952; *Documents on German Unity*, part 2, p. 52, Soviet government's reply to 13 February 1952 note of Soviet zone government, 20 February 1952. See also AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 165-168, final revision of Politburo resolution approving Soviet response to the East German plea for a peace treaty, Gromyko to Stalin and Politburo, 18 February 1952. According to a handwritten remark on the paper, the draft was approved by the Politburo on 20 February.

²⁸¹ J. Weber, "Das sowjetische Wiedervereinigungsangebot vom 10. März 1952", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 50 (1969), note 40.

²⁸² G. Wettig, "Die KPD als Instrument der sowjetischen Deutschland-Politik: Festlegungen 1949 und Implementierungen 1952", *Deutschland Archiv* (1994), p. 823 (note 21).

²⁸³ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 159-161, draft of Politburo resolution on a response to the East German plea for a peace treaty, Gromyko to Stalin and Politburo, 15 February 1952.

²⁸⁴ This conclusion is based on a thorough search in the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (AVPRF). See Appendix on sources.

²⁸⁵ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, ll. 14-24, draft of the foundations for a peace treaty with Germany and draft of letter to Poland and Czechoslovakia regarding the Soviet peace treaty initiative, Gribanov, 23 February 1952; RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1093, Politburo resolution no. 47 to send the United States, England and France a note with the draft of the foundations for a peace treaty with Germany, 8 March 1952.

²⁸⁶ V.S. Semenov, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow*, Berlin: 1995, p. 279. For Soviet press surveys on the response of the Stalin note, see AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 10, ll. 9-27, 28-44.

²⁸⁷ For a thorough account on the 2nd SED Congress, see D. Staritz, *Die Gründung der DDR: Von der sowjetischen Besatzungsherrschaft zum sozialistischen Staat*, Munich: 1984, pp. 9-37.

²⁸⁸ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 27, p. 43, d. 172, l. 34, SED's preliminary proposal about the 2nd party conference (July 1952), Semenov to Vyshinskii, 22 March 1952.

Ulbricht's proposal reads: "В то время как в Западной Германии в результате господства крупных промышленных монополий, банков крупного землевладения и связанных с ними государственных чиновников не может быть и речи о демократическом строе, в ГДР путем ликвидации монополистов, крупных землевладельцев и чистки госаппарата созданы все основы для демократического развития."

²⁸⁹ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 27, p. 43, d. 172, l. 42, SED's preliminary proposal ... The full quote reads: "Руководство борьбой за мирный договор и выполнение большой национальной задачи - создание для всей Германии в лице Германской демократической республики образца развития демократии и мирного строительства, предъявляют к Социалистической Единой партии Германии - авангарду народа - повышенные требования."

²⁹⁰ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 27, p. 43, d. 172, ll. 56-60, SED's preliminary proposal ...

²⁹¹ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 27, p. 43, d. 172, l. 67, annotation on the proposals of the SED politburo for the 2nd party conference, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 27 March 1952. The quote reads: "Тезисы ЦК СЕПГ построены так, словно руководство СЕПГ исходит из того, что существующий раскол Германии будет вечно продолжаться."

²⁹² *Documents on German Unity*, part 2, p. 71, US Government's reply to 10 March Soviet note, 25 March 1952.

²⁹³ So according to Gerald Rummel, who had worked as assistant to GDR foreign minister Dertinger, but fled to the West on 18 April 1952. Rummel's tale is recapitulated in a report from the US high commissioner to the secretary of state, dated 26 April 1952. The text is published in H. Rupieper, "Dokumentation: Zu den Sowjetischen Deutschlandnoten 1952: Das Gespräch Stalin-Nenni", *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, vol. 33, no. 3 (1985), pp. 556-557.

²⁹⁴ APRF [Archives of the President of the Russian Federation], f. 45, op. 1, d. 303, l. 179, minutes of comrade Stalin's conversation with SED leaders W. Pieck, W. Ulbricht and O. Grotewohl, 7 April 1952. The document is reproduced in "Stalin and the SED leadership", *Cold War International History Project-bulletin*, issue 4 (1994), p. 48.

²⁹⁵ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, ll. 21-34, schematic draft of the basic foundations for a peace treaty with Germany [hereafter 'schematic draft'], Gribanov to Bogomolov, 8 September 1951. For the opinion that this document was intended as propaganda, see G. Wettig, "Die Deutschland-Note vom 10. März 1952 auf der Basis diplomatischer Akten des russischen Außenministeriums. Die Hypothese des Wiedervereinigungsangebot", *Deutschland Archiv*, vol. 7 (1993). Wettig claims that: "Die sich über 15 ziemlich

waren von vornherein zu weitschweifig, als daß sie in dieser Form geeignet gewesen wären, den mit der vorgesehenden sofortigen Publizierung angestrebten geballten Eindruck auf eine breite Öffentlichkeit zu erzielen." (p. 795).

²⁹⁶ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 29, schematic draft ...

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, l. 21.

²⁹⁸ *Der Spiegel*, no. 49, 3 December 1990. For an extended version of the interview, see D.E. Melnikov, "Illusionen oder eine verpatete Chance? Zur sowjetischen Deutschlandpolitik 1945-52", *Osteuropa*, vol. 40, no. 6 (1990), pp. 593-599.

²⁹⁹ On Maiskii's career, see A.A. Gromyko, A.G. Kovalev, P.P. Sevostianov and S.L. Tikhvinskii (eds.), *Diplomatscheskii slovar v trekh tomakh*, [Diplomatic dictionary in three volumes], Moscow: 1984.

³⁰⁰ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, ll. 31-46, raw draft of peace treaty text prepared by Selianinov's team [hereafter 'treaty text']. Although the foreign ministry archivist placed this document in a file (*delo*) containing documents from January and February 1952, the dating of this document remains uncertain. The document was not included in the typewritten table of contents of this *delo*, but was added onto the table of contents afterwards. This hand-written *ad hoc* reference indicate that the document may well have been written in 1951 - or later in 1952.

³⁰¹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 23, schematic draft...

³⁰² AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, l. 33, treaty text ...

³⁰³ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁴ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, l. 34, treaty text... The quote reads: "Обязательства Германии в деле обеспечения развития всей государственной, политической и общественной жизни страны на демократической и мирной основе."

³⁰⁵ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, ll. 23-24, schematic draft ...

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, l. 23.

³⁰⁷ Gromyko himself drew attention to the Italian precedence, AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 1-9, draft of document named 'On the foundations for a peace treaty with Germany' and questionnaire about the elaboration of the document, Gromyko to Molotov, 11 January 1952.

³⁰⁸ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, ll. 23-44, schematic draft ...

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, l. 24.

³¹⁰ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, l. 35, treaty text ...

³¹¹ *Treaty of peace with Italy*, signed 10 February 1947; AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 1-9, ... questionnaire about the elaboration of the Stalin note,

Gromyko to Molotov, 11 January 1952.

³¹² AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 24, schematic draft ...

³¹³ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, l. 35, treaty text ...

³¹⁴ *For a democratic peace with Germany: speeches and statements by V.M. Molotov, minister for foreign affairs of the USSR, made at the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, November 25 - December 15, 1947*, London: Soviet News, 1948, pp. 4-5.

³¹⁵ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 24, schematic draft ...

³¹⁶ G. Ginsburg, "The Soviet Union, neutrality and collective security 1945-1959", *Osteuropa - Recht*, vol. V, no. 2 (1959), pp. 77-98.

³¹⁷ *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956*, part 1, *Von der Kapitulation bis zum Plevan-Plan*, G.F. Von Roland, C. Greiner, G. Meyer, H. Rautenberg and N. Wiggerhaus (eds.), Munich: 1990, pp. 447-448; *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956*, part 2, *Die EVG-Phase*, L. Köller, K.A. Maier, W. Meier-Dörnberg and H.E. Volkman (eds.), Munich: 1990, pp. 507-512.

³¹⁸ U. Noack, *Die Sicherung des Friedens durch Neutralisierung Deutschlands und seine ausgleichende weltwirtschaftliche Aufgabe*, Cologne: 1948; AVPRF, f. 07, op. 24, p. 14, d. 156, ll. 18-50, MID translation of Noack's thesis on German neutrality, 1 March 1951.

³¹⁹ Emphasised in AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 231, d. 57, ll. 1-8, 3EO memo on German neutrality, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 14 February 1951. Lenin claimed, "Кто имеет Германию, тот владеет Европой."

³²⁰ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 231, d. 57, ll. 1-8, 3EO memo on German neutrality ...

³²¹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 231, d. 57, ll. 1-8, 3EO memo on German neutrality ... The anti-neutrality line was allegedly adopted by the 3rd SED Congress, 20-24 July 1950.

³²² Quotations from AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 231, d. 57, ll. 1-8, 3EO memo on German neutrality ...

³²³ AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 16, d. 116, l. 54, quaterly report on Western Germany, Soviet Diplomatic Mission in East Berlin to Bogomolov, Vyshinskii, Zorin, Gusev, Podtserob and the Politburo, 2 October 1951.

³²⁴ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, l. 39, treaty text ...; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 29, schematic draft ...

³²⁵ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, ll. 26-28, schematic draft ...

³²⁶ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 29, schematic draft ...

³²⁷ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, ll. 39-40, treaty text ...

³²⁸ *Documents on German Unity*, vol. II, pp. 60-61, Soviet government's note to

US Government, proposing discussions on a German peace treaty, 10 March 1952.

³²⁹ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 25, p. 13, d. 144, ll. 1-9, draft of document named 'On the foundations for a peace treaty with Germany' and questionnaire about the elaboration of the document, Gromyko to Molotov, 11 January 1952.

³³⁰ *Treaty of peace with Italy*, signed 10 February 1947. On the renunciation of the treaty, see I. Poggiolini, "Italy" in D. Reynolds (ed.), *The origins of the cold war in Europe*, New Haven: 1994, p. 136.

³³¹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 29, schematic draft ...

³³² For this opinion, see G. Wettig, "Die Deutschland-Note vom 10. März 1952 auf der Basis diplomatischer Akten...". Commenting the passage about democratic transformation, Wettig remarked: "Dabei ging es ausdrücklich vor allem um die Weitergeltung der in Ostdeutschland einseitig durchgeführten Maßnahmen wie der Enteignungen, des Aufbaus Volkseigener Betriebe, der Zerschlagung der alten Konzerne, der Veränderungen im Agrarbereich sowie des Verbots militärischer Produktionen." (p. 794.)

³³³ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 29, schematic draft ...

³³⁴ T.A. Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany*, Cambridge, MA: 1991, pp. 59 ff.

³³⁵ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 29, schematic draft ...

³³⁶ *Ibid.*

³³⁷ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, l. 41, treaty text ...

³³⁸ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 30, schematic draft ...

³³⁹ *Documents on German Unity*, vol. II, pp. 60-61, Soviet government's note to US Government, proposing discussions on a German peace treaty, 10 March 1952

³⁴⁰ AVPRF, f. 019, op. 2, p. 17, d. 123, l. 8, draft of letter to Stalin on preparations to launch the foundation for a peace treaty with Germany, Gribanov to Vogomolov, 10 December 1951. The full quote reads: "На Германию не налагается никаких ограничений в развитии ее мирной промышленности, сельского хозяйства, транспорта, а также в развитии торговли с другими странами и в ее доступе на мировые рынки и к источникам сырья. Ю...щ Одновременно должно быть обеспечено беспрепятственное развитие частной инициативы и предпринимательства."

³⁴¹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, ll. 30, 33, schematic draft ...; and AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, l. 41, treaty text ...

³⁴² AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, ll. 42-43, schematic draft ...

³⁴³ "Wholesale price indexes" in *Historical statistics of the United States: colonial times to 1970*, US Bureau of the Census: Washington D.C., 1975, part 1, p. 199, table E-23.

³⁴⁴ West German GDP in dollars, see P. Kennedy, *The rise and fall of the great powers*, New York: 1989, p. 369. Total Marshall aid, G. Lundestad, *Øst, vest, nord, sør: hovedlinjer i internasjonal politikk 1945-1995*, 3rd edition, Oslo: 1996, p. 42.

³⁴⁵ *Treaty of peace with Italy*, signed 10 February 1947, part VI, articles 74-77; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, ll. 32-33, schematic draft ... AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, ll. 43-44, treaty text ...

³⁴⁶ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, l. 43, treaty text ...

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, ll. 45-46.

³⁴⁸ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, l. 34, schematic draft ...; AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, l. 45, treaty text ...

³⁴⁹ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 40, p. 255, d. 11, l. 45, treaty text ...

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, ll. 37-38.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, ll. 40-45.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, l. 46.

³⁵³ AVPRF, f. 082, op. 38, p. 230, d. 47, ll. 24-26, 33, schematic draft ...

³⁵⁴ Ulbricht's role in building the GDR is highlighted in W. Loth, *Stalins ungeliebtes Kind: Warum Moskau die DDR nicht wollte*, Berlin: 1994.

³⁵⁵ On the strong national sentiment of the SED leadership, see J.A. McAdams, "The GDR oral history project", *Cold War International History Project-bulletin*, no. 4 (1994), p. 44.

³⁵⁶ On Tiulpanov's instincts, see N.M. Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: a history of the Soviet zone of occupation, 1945-1949*, Cambridge, MA: 1995, p. 352.

³⁵⁷ D. Staritz paraphrased Stalin's slogan "socialism in one country" in the title of his book: *Sozialismus in einem halben Lande: Zur Programmatik und Politik der KPD/SED in der Phase der antifaschistisch-demokratischen Umwälzung in der DDR*, Berlin: 1976. On Ulbricht's role in erecting the wall, see H. Harrison, *The bargaining powers of weaker allies in bipolarity and crisis: the dynamics of Soviet-East German relations, 1953-1961*, Ph.D., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1994, pp. 139 ff.

³⁵⁸ V.S. Semenov, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatsjow*, Berlin: 1995. For a comment upon this information, see W. Loth, "Nicht Sozialismus war das Ziel", *Die Zeit*, 30 July 1995.

³⁵⁹ A. Filitov, *Sovetskii Soiuz i germanskii vopros v period pozdnego stalinizma (k voprosu o genezise "stalinskoi noty" 10 marta 1952 goda)* [The Soviet Union and the German question in the period of late Stalinism (On the question about the genesis of the "Stalin note" of 10 March 1952)], unpublished conference paper, Moscow 1997. Filitov makes extensive use of an early draft of this study, S. Bjørnstad, *Soviet German policy and the Stalin note of 10 March 1952*, Hovedoppgave, University of Oslo, Department of History, fall 1996.

³⁶⁰ P. Selznick, *Leadership in administration*, New York: 1957.

³⁶¹ AVPRF, f. 07, op. 27, p. 43, d. 172, ll. 66-67, comment on the proposals of the SED Politburo for the 2nd party conference, Gribanov to Vyshinskii, 27 March 1952.

³⁶² After Stalin's death, the Kremlin briefly considered German unity. On the insistence of Secret Police Chief Lavrentii Beria, the Central Committee sent conciliatory signals to the Western powers and ordered East Berlin to dismantle all slogans about socialism. The consequence with which Beria pursued his goal has convinced many researchers that the security chief was willing to abandon East Berlin, see A. Knight, *Beria: Stalin's first lieutenant*, Princeton: 1993, pp. 176 ff.; J. Richter, "Reexamining soviet policy towards Germany during the Beria interregnum", *Cold War International History Project Working Paper*, no. 3 (1992). The best available account of Soviet German policy after Stalin is probably H. Harrison, *The bargaining powers of weaker allies in bipolarity and crisis: the dynamics of Soviet-East German relations, 1953-1961*, Ph.D., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1994.

³⁶³ The most influential of these studies is probably A.B. Ulam, *Expansion and coexistence: Soviet foreign policy, 1917-73*, New York: 1971.

³⁶⁴ For a discussion of the rationalist approach in Soviet studies, see B.R. Posen, "Competing images of the Soviet Union", *World Politics*, vol. 39 (1987), pp. 579-597. The ultimate rationalist study is H.J. Morgenthau, *In defense of the national interest: a critical examination of American foreign policy*, New York: 1952. Morgenthau covered Soviet policy very briefly, see pp. 5-7, 69-70, 241-242.

³⁶⁵ Stalin's insecurity is a basic paradigm in V. Mastny, *The cold war and Soviet insecurity: the Stalin years*, New York: 1996.

³⁶⁶ V.S. Semenov, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatsjow*, Berlin: 1995, 271-272.

³⁶⁷ Two German researchers have made use of a non-secret part of the SCC collection (*fond 457a*) which allegedly contain information on popular German sentiments about a peace treaty in 1952, see E. Scherstjanoi, "Die DDR im Frühjahr 1952: Sozialismuslösung und Kollektivierungsbeschluss in sowjetischer Perspektive", *Deutschland Archiv*, no. 4 (1994), pp. 354-363; G. Wette, "Die KPD als Instrument der sowjetischen Deutschland-Politik: Festlegungen 1949 und Implementierungen 1952", *Deutschland Archiv* (1994), pp. 816-829.

³⁶⁸ See for example V.S. Semenov, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatsjow*, Berlin: 1995, p. 285.