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**The future is history**

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## Introduction

Whenever the West intervenes in the outside world it does so under the misapprehension that it speaks for the international community. "The Bosnian Serbs have thrown down a challenge to which the international community would be hard put to respond" observed an editorial in a major British newspaper, commenting on the remark of Malcolm Rifkind, the British Defence Secretary at the time, that the international community ie the West had "no appetite" for military intervention in the Balkans.<sup>1</sup> In the spring of 1993 nothing confirmed America's fears about the continued viability of the Western alliance more than the failure of its European allies to punish Serbia (and its clients the Bosnian Serbs).

Either the alliance should intervene, wrote the widely syndicated columnist William Safire or "shut up shop". In the eyes of another respected columnist, Anthony Lewis, the credibility of the West rested on the fate of the Bosnian Muslims.<sup>2</sup> Nothing that has happened since - not even the Dayton Accord - has reassured the Americans on this score. Instead, the dominant mood in Washington is a mixed one: there is little expressed optimism and little sense of anticipation. On the contrary, there is a sense of nostalgia on the part of those who remember the predictability of the Cold War years, and apprehension on the part of those who look towards the future and see even greater disorder. The United States itself is not well placed to meet the goal set out by the Pentagon's Defence Planning Guidance Report for 1994-99: to promote "the sustained co-operation of the democratic countries" against the tendency of the world to fragment into murderous mini-states from Bosnia to Somalia.

No western country is well placed at the end of the twentieth century to understand the alleged "irrational" forces that seem to plague a world whose main political features would be unrecognis-

able to the statesmen of even ten years ago.

Everything they know of societies such as Somalia reinforces the sense that within the world community (such as it is) there is another world with its own laws and conventions, a world only tenuously related to the one which the West has known for the past half century.

## Three versions of the future

*From the right angle, the world could be seen as one large and magnificent firework display. (Madison Stuart Bell Doctor Sleep (1991))*

Let me offer three visions of this disordered world. All three bear out the title of this essay. The future does indeed appear to be increasingly like the past; it is also so bleak that much of the world can be said to have no future - the future, to use the colloquial meaning of the term, is "history".

The first version is by the South African poet Breyten Breytenbach, writing at the end of the twentieth century in which, unexpectedly for many, the black population of his own country was finally successful in fighting a long and unremitting struggle for the right to determine its own future.

Breytenbach writes of a world in which the prophets and charlatans, and the ideologies they espoused - communism and fascism - have finally been discredited. The conspiracy of ideologies ostensibly imposed a pattern upon history at the cost of murder - "the big kill intended to confer a purpose upon small death". But Breytenbach's world is one in which little has changed for the disenfranchised and dispossessed. It is a world in which one ideology - liberal internationalism - dominates, masking the exploitation that is carried on by the hypertrophic rhetoric of liberal leaders. It is a world in which a new "ism" - globalism or the force of global integration - cloaks "private es-

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trangement" at home. It is a world in which the industrial societies of East Asia and the West confront the inhabitants of the rest of the world with a bleak future: "those exotically miserable continents constituting the ghostly subconsciousness of history". Many societies especially in Africa have "time but no history". In a word, they have been rendered history-less.<sup>3</sup>

It is a world in which the "cans" and "can'ts" have taken the place of the traditional "haves" and "have-nots." It is a world in which decisions are no longer made by the old protagonists of history - the bourgeoisie, the workers or the nation state, but by global forces. The future will belong to the industrialised world, together with those societies in which two groups meet up, often in conflict - the middle class venture capitalists of the First World and the marginalised labour force of the Third.

They include Breytenbach's own country, South Africa - the only African country on the list. Others include Brazil, Indonesia, India and, closer to home, Turkey. Cultural forces will be vital to the future of each. Some of these societies are Islamic (both for the moment secular) states: Turkey and Indonesia (the largest Islamic society in the world). Others such as India have their own brand of fundamentalism, in this case a particularly divisive nationalism which has already led to communal conflict within the country, most notably in recent years between Hindus and Sikhs. Others are aggressively secular societies such as Brazil, with its teeming masses in the shanty towns perched precariously on the periphery of the major cities, although here too a new force, that of Protestant evangelism, may be more significant in future than the Catholic liberation theology of the 1980s ever was.

These, in a word, are the *breakthrough* or *breakdown* societies, those who will either successfully cross into the First World, or fail and join the Third. They will be the key to international security in the twenty-first century: the "strategic prizes" that the West will struggle to co-opt. In Breytenbach's words they will either be reconciled to the future (modernity) or estranged from it. The problem is that when one is estranged from oneself

one is estranged from others too.

The second vision of the future is associated with the work of the American journalist Robert Kaplan, whose article on the "Coming Anarchy" which appeared in *Atlantic Monthly* in February 1994 painted a much more disturbing picture than Breytenbach of a world fast regressing into barbarism, a world which was about to be reclaimed by a history we had thought we had escaped. Kaplan has since developed his argument in a recent book, *The Ends of the Earth*.<sup>4</sup> His original article so impressed President Clinton that he talked about it for weeks afterwards, telling one listener that it made him envisage the future as a "Mel Gibson 'road warrior' movie". Under instructions from the White House, Vice President Gore ordered the CIA to draw up a study of nearly 70 countries considered to be most at risk.<sup>5</sup>

Kaplan offers a nightmare vision of a world in which the past has returned in the shape of disease, criminal anarchy, and the breakdown of the state system. It is a world in which groups we used to think were premodern - warlords in Somalia, bandits in Liberia, private mercenary armies such as Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone (the new *condottiere* of the twentieth century) have returned. Afghanistan and Somalia have witnessed the reappearance of traditional military castes; Liberia the emergence of bandits and renegades; Colombia the emergence of criminal cartels powerful enough to force the government to tear up its extradition treaty with the United States (the main market of the narcotics trade).

In Bosnia, for example, well organised criminal gangs, based in Italy and Germany, have taken advantage of the country's division, positioning themselves perfectly to take huge government contracts and buy up state owned enterprises (such as the concession to run the cellular phone industry). These gangs are the only genuinely multi-ethnic organisations now functioning in the country, with their intermingling of ethnic Serbs, Croats and Muslims. They have a strong work ethic and appeal across ethnic divisions. They are a product of globalisation or global capitalism.

What Kaplan's vision entails is an "epoch of

themeless juxtapositions in which the classificatory grid of nation states is going to be replaced by a jagged-glass pattern of city-states, shanty-states [and] nebulous and anarchic regionalisms".<sup>6</sup> The rich countries, he warns, will ignore the plight of the poor at their peril. For poverty will foster international criminality which in turn will spill over the frontiers into the First World. Indeed, the blurring of the traditional distinction between war and crime is likely to call into question the traditional distinction between war and peace.

Unlike Breytenbach, Kaplan suggests that Africa will play a major role in the future, if only as a model of what is to come. For far from being a special case, Africa "may be as relevant to the future character of world politics as the Balkans were a hundred years ago. Africa suggests what war, borders and ethnic politics will look like a few decades hence".

The third vision I associate with the recent work of Susan Strange, who paints the picture of a world which is just as violent as Kaplan's and just as unjust as Breytenbach's but one which is far less dangerous to those who matter most: ourselves. If the danger of war between advanced industrial powers such as the United States and Japan, and the next wave of countries coming on stream: such as Brazil and Chile, Korea and Taiwan, has greatly diminished, then perhaps the world market does not need universal peace or collective security against aggression. "Let us not assume", Strange writes, "that because preventing war between the great powers was the main issue of world politics in the twentieth century, that it will also be the major issue in the twenty-first".<sup>7</sup>

The favourite model for the losers in this world is that of the Underclass. It offers a particular way of looking at the world, one which has a historical precedent. For in the nineteenth century the discovery of Africa was as much a social discovery of Europe as the discovery of the "dark continent". The poor were seen in a new light: they were regarded as both primitive and savage, almost as "uncivilised" in their manners as the Africans in the bush. Social reformers saw themselves as missionaries bringing faith to a people living in darkness. Many even called themselves "social

explorers" or "travellers in the undiscovered country of the poor". Urban jungles were discovered only a stone's throw from the Free Trade Halls of the major cities. The poor, in a word, were there to be converted to a bourgeois world, where they would be introduced for the first time to the distinctions of childhood and gender.<sup>8</sup>

In the 1930s Frances Donaldson remarked that the middle classes regarded the working class as quasi-foreign. When they moved among them with a view to improving their lot, they did so as anthropologists or missionaries visiting "a tribe more primitive than themselves".<sup>9</sup> Today the same middle classes spend most of their time visiting the world as tourists. And if their itinerary usually avoids the world's trouble spots, they know enough about them from what they see on television. They are culturally predisposed to thinking about the outside world largely in negative terms. This time their vision may be all the more acute because they use models of their own society in order to understand the outside world.

When looking at the world beyond their borders they tend to think in terms of the "underclass", a word which was first coined to describe the terrain of violence and despair in America's inner cities, and those who lived in them, a group outside politics and the mainstream social structure, beyond the usual language of class, unable to protest or revolt, with no future beyond their own self-destruction.<sup>10</sup>

It is important perhaps, that the underclass in the United States is increasingly black. For Africa too is seen as the great failure of the twentieth century, a continent that, in the case of three out of ten countries, is poorer today than it was twenty five years ago. By 2050 half of the population is likely to be living below the subsistence level.

Of course, the association of urban poverty with race in the United States is relatively recent - a product of the massive migration of African-Americans into the northern cities after the Second World War. Similarly until the late 1970s Africa did not emerge in the world's consciousness as its most divided or troubled continent. That dubious honour fell to South East Asia which had been in an almost permanent state of war since 1945, or

the Middle East, which when not at war was in a permanent state of armed peace. The 1980s witnessed a change. Africa produced three out of the world's four major famines. Disease, particularly AIDS, struck four southern African states very badly. Today Africa accounts for two-thirds of the world's refugees.

A final theme of the underclass debate is "the culture of poverty", a phrase invented by Oscar Lewis who introduced it into social science in the 1960s. Like the underclass it means more than just economic deprivation. It describes an entire way of life, a feeling of helplessness and despair in America's inner cities, where in some cases infant mortality is rising and life expectancy decreasing, not the indices we normally associate with a developed economy.

In many African countries likewise, life expectancy is lower than it was in 1950. Food production has been declining by two percent a year since 1980. The population is by contrast rising substantially, which, in terms of lower protein, may well result in a genetic deficit in the next century. Those to blame for the catastrophe are held not to be the underclass itself, so much as the social workers and welfare programmes which eroded their will to work, and the aid programmes which destroyed incentives for stable family life. In Africa the villains are held to be the Western development economists of the 1960s, or the World Bank staff a decade later, who encouraged African countries to expect too much of aid.

Even if the analogy were accurate, or the metaphor useful in diagnosing a major problem in international society (and I am far from convinced that either is the case) the world's underclass, of course, cannot be contained or quarantined for long. Population flows arising from the movement of refugees will be one of the most serious challenges to the nation states of the First World.<sup>11</sup>

All three explanations of the disorder from which much of the world suffers share one thing in common: a distinctively old fashioned understanding of history. All three writers offer us a quasi-Hegelian version of the contemporary scene in which the West once again is deemed to have patented history, that of others as well as its own.

Breytenbach writes of a world in which some societies have time but not history, in which they are excluded from the historical consciousness of the rest of the world. Success or failure is likely to be defined by whether they successfully break through into the future or break down into the past. For his part Kaplan paints the picture of a world in which the big themes have been replaced by a mosaic of unclassifiable confrontations. It is a world which is themeless - "a themeless juxtaposition of events", a world which is also without a history - for what is history if it has no theme. Strange writes of whole societies which are no longer progressing into the twenty-first century, but apparently marking time. As the hero of Saul Bellow's novel *The Dean's December* (1982) remarks rather ruefully, the underclass is a "redundant" class. When referring to its plight one can't even use the term "culture of deprivation".

*There is no culture there. It is only a wilderness and damned monstrous too. We are talking about a people consigned to destruction, a doomed people.*<sup>12</sup>

Even if their accounts of the world disorder are only partly true, they each agree on one point: that there has been a major change in the structure of world history. In the Cold War years we lived in a single historical time zone - the future. Today we appear to live at least in two. History is no longer a dialectic within one zone - a battle essentially between communism and capitalism. Instead, it has become in our own imagination a dialectic between two - the future and the past.

With respect to the old time zone - the future, that of the Cold War years - I am struck in this respect by a passage from the end of Marcel Proust's novel, *The Remembrance of Things Past* where the narrator declares:

*Not only does everyone have this feeling that we occupy a place in time, but that this "place" is something that the simplest among us measure in an approximate fashion as he might measure with his eye the place we occupy in space.*

Proust offers us a particular space: the space of memory. He aligned himself in so doing with the thinking of his philosophical contemporaries. In different ways, but with significant points in common, Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger sought to understand the nature of existence or being by exploring the obscurities of time. Proust's time is psychic time. He establishes a world in which characters meet in the imagination as well as physical space, a world in which there is coherence between time and space, a world in which dreams can be realised.<sup>13</sup>

His world of time is also, of course, a search - as the title of his book suggests - a search in the imagination: that is to say a voyage in a space in which men might one day live in peace with the world and each other. Space is the future, one which holds all men equal, one which represents the brotherhood of man. For one of the key features of Proustian time is metamorphosis. It transforms us. In getting to the future we transcend ourselves, we become real or authentic human beings. The future, in that sense, offers a distinctive type of communion.

In many ways this was how the West tended to look upon the rest of the world for much of this century. It regarded it as a backwater that could only be redeemed by escaping from its origins, from its history into History in the upper case. Something of this comes out from a remark by the Marxist writer Christopher Caudwell who, like so many intellectuals of his generation, went out to fight sixty years ago in the Spanish Civil War. Writing en route to the Front he observed: "England seems centuries away".<sup>14</sup> It was a significant phrase. Spain in 1937 did indeed appear to be living in a different time zone from the United Kingdom. Those who joined to fight against fascism consciously thought of themselves as fighting to bring Spain into the modern world - one that could have no truck with fascism, or for that matter a catholicism still anchored to the Middle Ages. Both Marxists and non-Marxists alike who supported the Republican cause did so because they believed Spain could only be redeemed by rejecting its pre-modern condition. Those who fought for the fascist cause did so to prevent Spain from being

transformed into what others wanted it to be. In a graphic phrase the philosopher Ortega y Gasset wrote that what they were fighting against was their own "Japanisation".

Later, during the Cold War, western writers referred frequently to history in their work, to the roads of history, those long straight lines which stretched unequivocally before and behind the traveller. More often than not they also wrote of voyages of discovery. One of the great development economists of the era, Walter Rostow, concluded a book in 1957 with an invocation from Whitman's *Leaves of Grass*: "All people of the globe together/sail the same voyage/all bound to the same destination".

The idea of embarking on the same journey was also a theme of Marxist writing. Landing in Orly in 1958, after spending a month in Madagascar, the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty reported that he had seen the future of the Malagassy people. It might be intimidating to be force marched into the future, but there was no question of arresting, let alone reversing the trend. Nothing, he added, was to be gained by "recreating archaism". Echoing Rostow, he maintained that "we are all embarked on the same ship and it is not nothing to have set out on that voyage". History, he added, was comprehensible only in terms of transcendence. The present was the starting point for the future.<sup>15</sup>

The future offered the Third World an escape from the past, a chance to treat the present as a bridge to a new century. To cite a phrase uttered by one of Malraux's characters in his novel *The Human Condition*, "Marxism isn't a philosophy, it is a destiny". You can't argue with destiny, of course, or even refute it. You either yield to its appeal, or rebel against it. "The other side of destiny", writes Octavio Paz "goes by the name of consciousness: freedom."<sup>16</sup> The true freedom fighters were those who did rebel, who insisted on making history on their terms, not that of the "World spirit", or "the Absolute", or the *Zeitgeist*, or any of the many other names by which History traded, history that is, in the upper case.

For the most part, however, the freedom fighters of the Cold War preferred to fight in the name of the industrialised world's understanding of

the Zeitgeist. Angola's first Marxist President echoed Rostow when he insisted that all socialist countries, whether they were advanced or developing, shared a "common destiny". Even one of the more conservative American Secretaries of State, speaking a few years earlier, accepted that Marxist-Leninist movements were in the vanguard of Africa's transition to the modern world. In a telling phrase he added, they were "completing the unfinished business of its emergence into the twentieth century".<sup>17</sup>

In that sense, history in this period was defined by very Western criteria. It was the product of a culturally specific understanding of history. The present was a boundary or a division between what had been and what would be. It was a very special boundary, of course, because once a threshold has been reached there can be no turning back. The Romans knew that once the Rubicon had been crossed history could never be the same again. There was only one path that could be charted: the one that lay ahead. There was no mission abort option in history. Such thinking did not change with the Empire's conversion to Christianity. As Aquinas argued, even God cannot cause what has not been to have been since such a violation of time would be contrary to its very nature. Greek and Latin rationalism added to the concept. It is one that still dominates mathematics, logic and even computer programming.<sup>18</sup> This is what I mean by "a common historical space".

It is this certainty that we have all lost. Today the West finds itself living in an era in which much of the world seems to be reclaimed by a past which it thought we all had escaped. As the historian Eric Hobsbawm concluded in his *History of the Twentieth Century*, invoking a familiar metaphor:

*The old maps and charts which guided human beings singly and collectively through life no longer represent the landscape through which we move, the sea on which we sail [...] We do not know where our journey is taking us or even ought to take us.*<sup>19</sup>

The post-Cold War world is one in which Proust's

work is still germane, but in a different sense from what I have been arguing. For the paradox at the heart of the Proustian world - of his concept of time as a historical space - was that it referred only to social life as a spectacle. The true world, that of the psychic personality, can only be built by delving deep into ourselves to regain the time of our inner lives. Proust offers us a space of memory as a reality, the exploration of memory, an unfolding of ideas and images which we recall as we build. Today that remembrance is often exclusive, not inclusive. It is also often dangerous, containing as it does the memory of injustices or slights, real or imagined, of nationalist dreams or missions which are fast dividing the world against itself from Bosnia to Somalia. We are no longer dreaming together.

Karl Marx saw with admirable clarity that capitalism would bring about for the first time in history the unification of mankind in a worldwide economic system, but he was blind to the reverse phenomenon: the persistence of national cultures. In a word, we used to think History could transcend culture. It now appears that culture can transcend history, and in the process be revalued or devalued completely. A culture is primordial. It arises from shared emotions and traditions. It is essentially a way of looking at the world which determines our interaction with others, which gives us our identity, or a code of values on which all interaction is based.

In transcending History, cultural forces seem to be more important than ever, Islamic fundamentalism being a case in point. In other societies some of the old state structures dating from the Cold War are breaking down though we are wrong to think that the forces responsible for it are necessarily irrational or nihilistic.

### **Islam and the end of the future**

As an example of the first process, Algeria offers an excellent example of a society which is in the midst of revaluing its culture after its progressive devaluation in the past 25 years. Alexis de Tocqueville quotes the French commander who



conquered the country in the 1830s as saying that colonialism would be as alienating to the Algerian people as the introduction of socialism would be to the French. In the event they suffered two processes of alienation: one colonialism, the other socialism. And of the two the second may well have been the more alienating.

For in Algeria the war for socialism continued long after the French had left. The government in the 1960s conceived of its Five Year Plans or national development programmes as military campaigns, a continuation of war by other means, a war against Algeria's pre-modern condition. As one writer notes, the government related to Algerian society "as if it were a military headquarters commanding an army on the battlefield in a new species of war called [...] national development". The state fell into the hands of a revolutionary class of technocrats who were more at home with the social ideals of Henri de Saint-Simon than the social message of Islam. "History was made [...] in the imperative mood, in a Schopenhauerian world in which people lived as if all that mattered was the will to power."<sup>20</sup>

The phrase "the will to power" recalls Friedrich Nietzsche who devoted a large part of his life to trying to secure a future in which people would not be ashamed of themselves or their ancestors. As he wrote in one of his very first works *Untimely Meditations*, when a people is ashamed of its past:

*no-one should be surprised if [a people] perishes of petty egoism, of ossification and greed [...] and ceases to be a people; in its place systems of individual egoism, brotherhoods for the rapacious, exploitation of non-brothers [...] may appear in the arena of the future.*<sup>21</sup>

As Joseph Brodsky noted we all crave the future; that we can imagine the world other than it is is the mark of our species. History, however, is here to make "that claim, or the future itself, legitimate".<sup>22</sup>

Unfortunately the Algerian people were estranged from their past. They were encouraged to see themselves not as a people so much as "social forces" of the revolution arrayed in pecking order

according to their ideological importance as workers, peasants, or soldiers or the young, with peasants ranking below workers who were themselves divided into employees or self-employed. Others were dismissed as negative social forces - such as the bourgeoisie, or the capitalist class, or the class of imperialism and reaction, typecast according to their roles as oppressive landlord or exploitative *rentier*.

What began to happen in the 1970s was a change of consciousness, as people began to look at themselves in a different light. Its perceived haunts were the mosque and the city neighbourhood. And where socialism tended to mass identity, Islamic revivalism involved a large element of individuality invoked in the citizen's personal communion with God.

Whatever the inadequacies of religion, and there are many: sectarian strife, stupidity of dogma, intolerance towards other faiths, it is at least an institutional expression of an idea - that in the face of modern life moral values are still important. At the end of the twentieth century the presence of God seems to be as necessary for modernity as it once seemed unnecessary in the minds of sociologists such as Imile Durkheim and Georg Simmel. In the absence of God it produces what Milan Kundera calls "unbearable" - a certain lightness of being.

In Algeria the government's response to Islamic consciousness has resulted in 60,000 dead in the past three years. The people alas are also capable of being traduced by their fundamentalist leaders as much as by the founding fathers of the revolution. But all sides to the conflict do appear to have recognised why culture is so important to modernity. They have begun to recognise that modernity is not an end, only a means to an end: in this case the renewal or revaluation of the cultural life of an entire people.

## Africa and the re-discovery of the past

If we diminish Islam by failing to distinguish between revivalism and fundamentalism as a form of revaluation, we *devalue* Africa by dismissing the

forces at war with each other as irrational, nihilistic or anarchical.

The problem is that the West still finds all violence *dysfunctional* in keeping with its own cultural experience and its own conceptual stereotypes. It is not. As Michael Howard explains, "War is only a particular kind of social conflict [...]. The problem is the control of social conflict as such not simply of war".<sup>23</sup> For the most part, however, western political scientists, instead of treating war as part of social discourse, continue to see it as an aberration, a dysfunctional phenomenon which must be "managed" or "resolved". If we see it indeed as quite functional, we may understand better why societies are resilient enough to often survive it.

Angola, for example, has been at war longer than anyone else. It has been at war since 1961. Eighty percent of its citizens have never known a period of peace. But the society continues to function and the state to operate. Do the Angolans feel themselves constantly at war as the British undoubtedly thought themselves at war with Germany for 365 days every year between 1939-45? What Angola has lived with is a level of societal violence which at times is intensive and at others not. If we consider warfare as part of a larger spectrum of violence, we might look instead for episodes which represent war, and others which do not: states such as banditry that fall far short of it.

We are also, writes Graham Shipley, not only historically reductionist, but ideologically so as well. We still look for the cause of war rather than its causes. We still see war in terms of political goals such as the fight for freedom. Instead, we should see it as a social goal. Aristotle classified war as a species of "acquisitive activity". Moses Finlay characterises the Greek style of war as essentially a profit making enterprise.<sup>24</sup> That is what it is for many of those involved in war today from the Sudan to Sierra Leone.

States tend to fight to augment their power in order to enact an agenda. Non-state actors tend to fight for interests - particularly their own material well being. The warlords in Somalia, to take one example, were what the economic historian

Mancur Olson calls "stationary bandits". They ran protection rackets for their own benefit while at the same time providing a service for their followers which the state could not match. For the Somalis war was one of the chief mechanisms by which they could move around in the short term. In many societies warlike activity of all kinds, including banditry and mercenary service, is a way of avoiding economic hardship.

Where Third World societies differ most from those of the First World is that they are ones in which warrior classes still operate, and which war is honoured. But they are not militarised societies. Martin Ceadel defines militarism as "the view that war is necessary to human development and therefore a positive good".<sup>25</sup> That is not the view in Somalia. It was of course in Nazi Germany and to some extent in Soviet Russia in the 1930s. These were states whose ideology put a premium on martial values and military life. These were states that tried to militarise entire societies, exhorting their citizens to fight endless battles in the hope of winning the world's respect.

Some of these conclusions can be applied in the societies which Kaplan dismisses as especially anarchical. The violence that led to a devastating famine in southern Sudan in the 1980s (in which half a million people died) was represented at the time by the government in Khartoum as arising from "a longstanding" ethnic hostility between the Arabic speaking Baggara peoples of the north and the Dinka and Nuer in the south. Superimposed on this inaccurate portrayal was another misreading of events, for which this time the western media was largely responsible. Too many journalists tended to find religious origins of the war in a clash between the predominantly Islamic north and a predominantly Christian south.

In fact, much of the hostility was induced by a government which was strapped for cash, and deeply in debt to the international community. The Baggara militias were supplied with arms by Khartoum and granted immunity from prosecution for attacking the two peoples from whom the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) drew most of its support. The famine in turn helped depopulate an area of the country rich in oil in

which the SPLA operated, an area which the government needed to exploit in order to repay its debts and reward its own followers. As David Keen writes, the Sudanese state did not collapse. Violence compensated for the government's economic weakness. It also gave the Baggara access to grazing land, stolen cattle and cheap labour. Violence, in other words, was not irrational; it was quite functional. It kept the state in being at the cost, of course, of the cohesion of Sudanese society.<sup>26</sup>

Sierra Leone offers another example of a society in which the state has voluntarily surrendered the monopoly of violence - in this case contracting out not to a tribe but a private company. Beset by civil war the government has hired Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African registered corporation, which has tapped into a new market - a massive unmet demand for security. It has positioned itself perfectly in that market. It has discovered a market niche.<sup>27</sup> Mercenary activity is only one of EO's many activities, thirty two in all, which include the production of education programmes and mining ventures in Angola. In the latter it was paid 40 million US dollars a year for two years to train Angola's Special Battalion, fly MiGs and modify training aircraft in combat. In Sierra Leone it has been employed since 1995 driving a rebel movement from the diamond mining districts of Kono in the country's Eastern Province, a key mining area which the government needed to secure to pay its own employees and its own army.

The role of EO, both in Angola and in Sierra Leone, must be seen against the developments of the 1990s, a rolling instability in Africa that began with the decline of its strategic importance to the West, the UN's failure in Somalia, Rwanda and the Western Sahara, and the reluctance of international business to risk investors' money in insecure ventures. Africa is witnessing a growing ambiguity in the gap between the public and private sectors. The regular work of companies such as EO is likely to bring a kind of discipline - and, in turn, of course, more contracts - than impromptu mercenary activity did in the past. The opportunities for such ventures are probably limitless.

## A history-less West

What is the consequence of all this? Quite a simple one. The deconstruction of the old order seems to be inevitable. International efforts to preserve its integrity are likely to result only in greater disorder still. The world should be allowed to assume such shape as the energies and aspirations of its various peoples may eventually assign it. The energies of the West should be engaged in holding the ring, in discouraging the internationalisation of the internal conflicts taking place.

What we are witnessing is not the destruction of the world order but its deconstruction. If war does fulfill a function then seeing it in deconstructionist terms might serve a purpose. It might make the West a little less concerned with what is happening in the outside world, and a little less inclined to see itself as the sole provider of value in the international system. Nietzsche was convinced that a culture could only revalue itself on the ruins of the previous order. But the importance he attached to historical continuity suggests that despite the violence of his rhetoric deconstruction was what he had in mind - a process which would lead to reconstruction or revaluation.

The West experienced a similar transformation in the nineteenth century. In the first half of the century it was conscious, in the words of John Stuart Mill, of repudiating some of its oldest institutions and doctrines while not yet acquiring new ones. Later, Matthew Arnold saw the old system of dominant ideas and faiths melting away. By definition an age in which change is revolutionary and rapid has a dual aspect: destruction and reconstruction. Both tendencies were apparent by 1830. After describing the breakup of many of Europe's most timeworn landmarks Bulwer Lytton concluded "The age then is one of destruction [...] miserable would be our lot were it not also an age of preparation for reconstructing."<sup>28</sup>

The difference between the 1830s and today, of course, is profound. That is why the analogy with the early nineteenth century does not suggest itself to the western imagination. For although all ages are periods of transition the early Victorians

thought of their own time as an era of change *from* the past *to* the future. To Mill and the Victorians the past they had outgrown was not the Romantic period and not even the eighteenth century. It was the Middle Ages. When they referred to the "old" and "ancestral" they meant the "medieval" or "feudal". The contrast today is with a world that sees the age in quite different terms - a transition *from* the future *to* the past, a return to the Middle Ages. Neo-medievalism is now one of the most popular themes of contemporary discourse.<sup>29</sup>

We might assuage some of our anxieties about the future if we were to recognise that our perspective is questionable. It is questionable because we are not the society we once were. For we too have changed. We are now a post modern people.

Kierkegaard believed he had glimpsed the coming of a post-modern sensibility as early as the 1840s. A revolutionary age was one of action. His own, he regretted was one of advertisement and publicity. Nothing happened but there was immediate publicity everywhere.

*In the present age rebellion is of all things the most unthinkable. Such an expression of strength would seem ridiculous to the calculating intelligence of our times. On the other hand, a political virtuoso might bring off a feat almost as remarkable. He might write a manifesto suggesting a general assembly at which the people should decide upon a rebellion. At the meeting itself he would be able to create the impression that his audience had rebelled after which they would all go quietly home - having spent a very pleasant evening.<sup>30</sup>*

Kierkegaard penned these lines in 1846. The 1848 revolutions broke out two years later after which the nineteenth century was confirmed in its opinion that the modern age had arrived in earnest. It is that age which has passed, which has given way to the anxiety of the post-modern mind, our own, one which for the moment is peculiarly western. It is an age which looks back not forwards and is consumed as a result with fear of the future. It is an age in which the West will play very little part in the non-western world's reconstruction. It is an

age in which the West too is being rendered history-less.

Unfortunately, writers such as Kaplan are so preoccupied with developments outside the West that they have paid little attention, if any, to changes within the Western time zone which are rendering it next to impossible to intervene in the outer world, in that zone of instability which lies beyond its borders. The result, a deeply ironic one in the circumstances, is that the West is rendering itself history-less as others make their own history on their own terms. It is the West, not the war torn Third World, which is watching its own historical marginalisation.

Let me identify three themes which explain why it is so difficult for it to intervene with success. All three reflect changes in what used to make western societies especially distinctive: its historical consciousness. Respectively they cover the attitudes of three groups: government, the military and the public.

(1) In the past the issues at stake were historically clear. They were clear to Ann Morrow Lindberg who wrote in her seminal book, *The Wave of the Future* (1941):

*I cannot see this war [...] as simply and purely as a struggle between the forces of good and the forces of evil. If I could simplify it into a phrase at all it would seem truer to say that the forces of the past are fighting the forces of the future.<sup>31</sup>*

In 1961 president John F. Kennedy used the title of Lindberg's book to state the reason why the United States had chosen to contain communism everywhere it manifested itself from Latin America to Vietnam. Either the West would ride the wave of the future or be submerged by it, or pulled along in its undertoe. The adversaries which the British army found itself fighting during the Cold War years: from Greek Cypriots to Indonesian irregulars and army mutineers in East Africa, were, at least, easily identified as the forces of the past or future. The British army had no doubt that it was on the side of history. It might be deterred from inter-

vening by the cost of making history on its own terms, or daunted by the diminishing capabilities at its disposal, or chastened by the risks of intervening at all, but it was not - as in Bosnia - possessed of a profound despair about the *point* of intervening.

Even in the closing years of the Cold war when the Europeans took issue with American intervention in such areas of discord as Central America, they did so because they were confident of their own reading of history. After the elections in El Salvador in 1983 the French government regretted that the government would probably use its mandate to suspend any further negotiations with the Marxist guerillas, and thus fail in its obligation "to come to terms with history". The deputy chairman of the German Social Democrats was emboldened enough to tell an audience at Princeton that the West should no longer try to defend "outmoded historical structures", including the regimes to be found in much of the Latin American world.<sup>32</sup>

Today we are all historically at a loss. History, as an anonymous Pentagon official complained in 1990, "is happening in a way it is not supposed to".<sup>33</sup> We no longer believe that history has a goal or a purpose. No single configuration or historical narrative can produce a theme. In the words of the novelist John Barth "the sum of history is no more than the stuff of metaphors". A chapter precis from one of his novels amplifies the point:

*The poet wonders whether the course of human history is Progress, a Drama, a Retrospect, a Cycle, an Undulation, a Vortex, a Right or Left handed Spiral, a Mere Continuum, or what have you. Certain evidence is brought forward but of an ambiguous and inconclusive nature.*<sup>34</sup>

We no longer believe that history is determined by a class or a nation appropriating it in its own name. Even American politicians no longer talk about the American Century.

One of the reasons the Europeans have been paralysed by indecision in theatres such as Bosnia is that they cannot interpret the present with reference to the past or the future. *Everything is historical but nothing is historic.* We cannot determine what our present will mean to our

descendants. If we cannot make the present significant for them, we won't be able to make it significant for ourselves. We cannot determine what the future will find significant or not. In a word, we have no ground of action.

(2) The second problem is also a historical one. The ethos of Western armies has changed significantly. It is a change which is likely to have profound consequences for peacekeeping operations in the future.

Back in May 1917 the German novelist Ernst Junger, while serving on the Western Front with the Hanover Fusiliers encountered his first Indian soldiers. They were Rajputs from one of India's military castes or "martial races" - men from the First Haryana Lancers. As members of a military caste, Junger concluded, he and his men had been privileged to fight them.

*What does Nietzsche say of fighting men? "You must have as enemies only those whom you hate but not those whom you despise. You must be proud of your enemy and then the enemy's success is your success also".*<sup>35</sup>

One of the reasons western peacekeeping forces have met with so little success is that the local forces have despised their managerial techniques and their pre-occupation with media management rather than fighting. Military castes *can* be defeated in the field by a professional army - the Germans had the better of their encounters with Indian army soldiers in 1917. But then the army in which Junger served displayed many more of the traditional military virtues than the American army today.

The Indian Army still recruits from its military castes - from 20 percent of the population, from the Rajputs, Sikhs, Dogras, Maharattas, and the people of the North West Himalayan Frontier. The Indian Army, the third largest in the world and the most formidable non-Western, has a military caste which the British did much to encourage. Like the Muslims before them, the British bowed to Hinduism. Indeed they were so infected by the caste system that at one time their cavalry regiments made a return showing the caste of their horses.

The British merely made that system more rigid than ever.<sup>36</sup>

Elsewhere in the world Western armies have come across other warrior *classes* - peoples whom the Western empires had trouble taming in the nineteenth century. In Somalia, one particular warlord gave the British the runaround for the first twenty years of this century. They were led by a leader known in the British press as the "Mad Mullah" - a man who was neither a mullah nor mad, but a warrior and poet who was only defeated when he died of influenza in 1920.<sup>37</sup> In the 1980s the Russians came up against the same Afghans whom the British had never mastered, the Taliban and Pashtuns, the traditional rulers of Kabul and their hated rivals, the ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks.

The Russians should have thought twice about intervening given their own experience with another mountain people, the Chechens, in the mid nineteenth century, as recorded so tellingly by Mikhail Lermontov and Leo Tolstoy. Prince Chernyshev remarked as long ago as 1842 that a mountain people could not be pacified. Operations against them would only destroy the morale of the Russian Army, leaving its soldiers demoralised, disorganised and exhausted.<sup>38</sup> Chernyshev was writing of the Chechens a hundred years ago. When the Russian Army engaged them again in 1994 it found itself facing the same tactics. Warlords such as the Chechen and Somali leaders do not engage in decisive battles. A warlord's army constitutes his political capital. Spending that capital in a battle is to be avoided at all costs, a point the Americans might have recognised before embarking on the futile attempt to capture their main Somali antagonist, General Aideed.

What should these campaigns tell us? They should tell us that a professional army such as the late nineteenth century British, could engage with Afghans and Somalis (although not always successfully) as long as it had a warrior *ethos* of its own.

In India, wrote Hegel, in *The Philosophy of History*, every caste had its special duties and rights. While the Europeans said bravery was a virtue, the Hindus said Abnavery is the virtue of the cshatryas - the warrior caste".<sup>39</sup> In Britain it was

the virtue of a class, not a caste. In a letter that Winston Churchill wrote to Francis Alanbrooke on his appointment as Commander of the Imperial General Staff in November 1941, he reminded him of his friendship with his two brothers, one whom he had met in the 4<sup>th</sup> Hussars while serving in 1895 on the North West Frontier, the other while fighting in the South African war at Spionkop. Like other members of his class, Churchill also saw war as character forming, as a form of nurture. In his account of his first campaign, that of the Malakand Field Force, he extolled war's moral virtue. Its value lay in "the uncertainty and importance of the present (which) reduced the past and future to comparative insignificance".<sup>40</sup>

Today the "virtue" of war is now under challenge at home. For armies in the West are being transformed slowly but surely from professions into trades. It is part of a secular trend in all Western societies: one that involves *reevaluation* of a different kind - the introduction of commercial criteria into the old Victorian professions, one which encourages doctors and teachers, lawyers and soldiers alike to operate by commercial rules. War is now seen as a business rather than an honourable profession, one that has its own remit (cost effectiveness) and commercial criteria by which to judge success. Armies will soon be assessed by input/output charts and performance levels, even more comprehensively than the American Army was in Vietnam.

All of this is not new. It is an offshoot of Manchester liberalism. Lecturing at the Woolwich Arsenal in the 1860s, on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War, John Ruskin urged the army to adopt as its formula "no capture, no pay". War, he suggested, should be fought like any other business, otherwise the army had no business fighting it. It is a philosophy which is hardly likely to win the respect of the enemies the West may be called upon to fight in the early years of the next century,

(3) As for public opinion, the world of global communication - of instant news reporting - which has become part of the peacekeeping phenomenon in recent years, is also pregnant with significance for the future. Television images confront governments with public pressure to intervene. Images of

peacekeeping forces being killed, of course, also prompts them to disengage as quickly as possible. The attention that the Pentagon is giving to the introduction of non-lethal weapons which were first seen in Somalia in February 1995 is directly driven by contradictory pressures arising from the CNN factor. US politicians want to avoid scenes of American soldiers acting in ways which would bring pressure from an American public to decouple or disengage prematurely.

Unfortunately, peace enforcement cannot be divorced from pacification, which requires a high level or intense use of force. It took more than thirty years for the British to subdue the Beggara in southern Sudan with which the government in Khartoum has been collaborating recently. Thirty three punitive expeditions were needed to persuade them to renounce such customs as cattle rustling which the Baggara now engage in quite openly. Those expeditions were violent. Crops were burned, families driven into the bush, or left (as in the campaign in 1917) to die of thirst in the Nuba Mountains. When air power was introduced the campaigns became shorter but the damage was much greater. Incendiary bombs were used to start forest fires. Herds of cattle, together with their owners, were often machine gunned.

Air power was at its most horrific in Iraq when it was used against the Kurds and Marsh Arabs.<sup>41</sup> In 45 minutes a village could be wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured, the government was assured by the Air Staff. In the main when air power was employed, neither the aim nor the result was intended to be destruction. Warnings were mostly given, villages were evacuated to save loss of life, and destruction kept to a minimum. The aim was not so much to destroy houses, as to interrupt daily life.<sup>42</sup>

The point of these campaigns, of course, was to bring peace - not restore it, for most of these societies had been at war for centuries. The purpose, claimed Air Marshall Sir John Salmon speaking before an audience in 1925, was to help "a heterogeneous collection of wild and inarticulate tribes [to be brought] into an ordered system of representative government by the vote."<sup>43</sup> The purpose today is to restore order, to reconstitute

states which in some cases look just as archaic as the imperial structures they replaced thirty years ago.

The problem with peacekeeping is that time zones run on different times, or rather in the West time itself has significantly changed. Culture, as I said at the beginning, is a matter of perception, or how we see the world. Our culture is intensely visual. We see everything on television. We see it in a particular way.

We live in a world in which we have instant information. Information is circulated quite literally between TV stations and on the Internet, but it is not shared. We don't experience it as a community. It is not processed or presented as news, only as data.

What we see on television are not events, but images which can and do reveal the effects of war, but very rarely its causes or its purpose. Like thermal imaging at night we can see soldiers standing in front of us but not the soldiers behind. We have no historical depth or understanding.

The modern age, of course, was characterised by the news it produced. Nietzsche and Marx both accorded newspapers a central importance in their analysis of modernity. In our post-modern era we watch conflicts live. We do not mull over news of events, but the event before it has become news. Unfortunately, news remains crucial to our capacity to contextualise events and thus give them meaning.<sup>44</sup>

What is all of this, if not a short circuiting of a historical time into an eternal present? In such circumstances every death we see necessarily appears to be gratuitous, whether it is the death of eighteen US marines on one day in the streets of Mogadishu, or eighteen Somalis killed by US marines. For the Somalis the war was history. They were conscious of making it themselves. For the Americans, it lacked historical significance.

## Conclusion

Let me return to my point about time zones. In the years before 1989 we were all concerned about the temporalisation of history. In *The Storyteller*

Walter Benjamin wrote about it in terms of literature. He wrote about the future in terms of "epic memory" and called the epic a "different temporalisation of history" from the narratives of the past. More particularly he distinguished between the unitary memory of the novelist and the multiple short-lived reminiscence of the story teller. For Benjamin, writing in the 1930s, the story teller was dying out. Like most non-western cultures he had already begun "to recede into the archaic".<sup>45</sup>

The epic (as a metaphor for universalism) persisted long after the colonial powers disengaged from the Third World in the 1950s. For they did not disengage from their imagination of those who had been dispossessed of their own history. Their ideas remained in the political structures they left, locking their former colonies into the international order, categorised as free market or socialist, or often a mixture of the two.

The metaphor of poetry was employed by W.H. Auden to capture this dilemma. As Caliban asks in his commentary on *The Tempest* (the first play on the theme of the colonial experience): was it possible that the old imperialist Prospero, not content with inveigling Caliban into Ariel's kingdom lets loose Ariel in Caliban's when he withdraws and returns to Europe? "We note with alarm that when the other members of the final tableau were dismissed he was not returned to his arboreal confinement." Where is he now? "For if the intrusion of the real has disconcerted and incommoded the poetic, that is a mere bagatelle compared to the damage which the poetic would inflict if it ever succeeded in intruding upon the real." We want no Ariels here, Caliban insists, breaking down our picket fences in the name of fraternity [...] robbing us of our sacred pecuniary deposits in the name of justice."<sup>46</sup>

The stories which Benjamin thought had lost their appeal are being re-told. The epic is losing its grip on the imagination. Marx thought that the alienation of man in society could be resolved by the eradication of differences. We now recognise that civil society (and thus civilisation itself) is based on difference, that the uniformity of the international system is alienating for many who live in it.

For Benjamin, time as the "epic" was ever expanding. For Auden it was encroaching on the history of others. Today in the view of writers such as Kaplan and Breytenbach it is contracting, and with it the West's grounds of actions, its reason for intervening.

It is difficult, of course, for western societies to stand on the sidelines of history. For it still thinks in universal terms. Even now it still pays lip service to universalism as a goal in terms of order and justice. It is more difficult still for it to delimit the scope of its responsibility for the consequences of disorder, without diminishing its importance in its own eyes as well as those of others. It is still reluctant to be condemned to the margins of history. Whether it sees the historical events I have described as significant or not, it is still inclined to want to make other people's history for them, invoking, as it still does, the language of Christian redemptionism. "We are not here to free the Somalis", declared Lawrence Eagleberger when the Americans went into Somalia, "we are here to redeem them."

While the West must resist the temptation to intervene, it must also avoid engaging in a social pathology, one that highlights all the negative and dysfunctional aspects of the world situation, rather than the creative associations and self-help communities which are growing up even in the poorest areas of the world. To stigmatise an entire continent - Africa - is dangerous, for it challenges the central claim of liberalism that values and moral laws are not the birthright of one culture.

Those who made the mistake in the past of believing that they alone had values have often woken almost too late to the realisation that the real barbarians were not outside the walls, waiting to break in, but had been lying low inside for a long time waiting to break out. It is even more a danger today than it was in the 1930s for the outcome of the world disorder is the passage of migrants into the western world. In the next century the great challenge for both Europe and the United States will be this: can a multi-ethnic and multi-racial society also be transformed into a successful multicultural one? Upon the answer to that question will depend whether or not the West will continue



to adhere to its own standards of civilised behaviour.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> *The Spectator* 17 April 1993.

<sup>2</sup> *The Observer* 1 January 1993; *The Washington Post* 26 February, 1993.

<sup>3</sup> Breyten Breytenbach, "Writing the darkening mirror" in *The memory of birds in time of revolution* (London: Faber and Faber 1996), p. 6.

<sup>4</sup> Robert Kaplan, *The Ends of the Earth: a journey at the dawn of the twenty-first century* (New York: Random House 1996).

<sup>5</sup> Paul Kennedy, 'Doomsterism' *The New York Review* 19 September 1996, p. 21.

<sup>6</sup> Roger Kaplan, "The coming anarchy", *Atlantic Monthly* February 1994, p. 72. For the criminal syndicates in Bosnia see *International Herald Tribune* 8 October 1996.

<sup>7</sup> Susan Strange and John Stopford, *Rival states, rival firms competition for world market shares* (Cambridge University Press 1991), p. 7.

<sup>8</sup> John and Jean Comaroff, *Ethnography and the historical Imagination* (Boulder, Westview 1992), p. 291.

<sup>9</sup> Paul Fussell, *Abroad: English literary travelling between the wars* (Oxford University Press 1980), p. 47.

<sup>10</sup> Michael B Katz, "The urban underclass as a metaphor of social transformation", in M. Katz (ed.), *The Underclass Debate* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1993), pp. 5-8.

<sup>11</sup> Peter Osborne, *The Politics of Time: modernity and the avant garde* (London: Verso 1995), p. 18.

<sup>12</sup> Saul Bellow, *The Dean's December* (London: Penguin 1982), p. 205.

<sup>13</sup> Marcel Proust, *A la recherche du Temps perdu* (Paris: Pleida 1954), Volume 3, pp. 182-4.

<sup>14</sup> Valentine Cunningham, *The Spanish Front: Writers on the civil war* (Oxford University Press 1986), p. 281.

<sup>15</sup> See History, *Truth and Liberty: selected writings of Raymond Aron* (ed.) Francizek Draus (Chicago University Press 1985), p. 49.

<sup>16</sup> Octavio Paz, *Convergences: essays on art and literature* (London: Bloomsbury 1987), pp. 108-9.

<sup>17</sup> *The New York Times* 19 February 1970.

<sup>18</sup> Umberto Eco, *Interpretation and over interpretation* (ed.) Stefan Collini (Cambridge University Press 1992), p. 28.

<sup>19</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes* (London: Longman 1993), p. 271.

<sup>20</sup> El Kentz (ed.) *Algeria: the challenge of modernity*, (London: Cordossia Books 1991), p. 8.

<sup>21</sup> Cited Daniel Ahern, *Nietzsche as cultural physician* (Pennsylvania University Press 1995), p. 193.

<sup>22</sup> Joseph Brodsky 'Profile of Clio' in *On Grief and Reason: Essays* (London: Hamish Hamilton 1996), p. 120.

<sup>23</sup> Michael Howard, *The Causes of wars* (London 1984), pp. 11-12.

<sup>24</sup> See Graham Shipley, 'The limits of war' in Shipley (ed.) *War and Society in the Greek world* (London: Routledge 1993), p. 10.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* p. 19.

<sup>26</sup> David Keen, 'Organised Chaos: not the new world order we ordered', *The World Today* January 1996, p. 15.

<sup>27</sup> Jeremy Harding, 'The mercenary business', *London Review of Books* (August 1996), p. 7.

<sup>28</sup> Cited Walter E. Houghton *The Victorian frame of Mind 1830-70* (Yale University Press 1957), pp. 2-3.

<sup>29</sup> For one of the first uses of the analogy see Umberto Eco's 2 essays "The return of the Middle Ages" in Eco (ed.) *Travels in Hyper-reality* (London: Picador 1980), pp. 59-73.

<sup>30</sup> Soren Kierkegaard, *The Present Age* (trans. Alexander Dru) (New York 1962), p. 15.

<sup>31</sup> Cited John Lukacs, *The Last European War* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1976), p. 514.

<sup>32</sup> See my *A nation in Retreat: Britain's defence commitment* (London: Brassey's 1986), p. 114.

<sup>33</sup> Edward Mortimer, *European Security after the Cold War*, Adelphi Paper 271 (London: IISS 1992), p. 1.

<sup>34</sup> John Barth, *The sot-weed factor* (New York: Doubleday 1960).

<sup>35</sup> Ernst Junger, *The Storm of Steel* (London: Constable 1994), p. 154.

<sup>36</sup> Philip Mason, *A matter of honour: an account of the Indian Army, its officers and men* (London: Jonathan Cape 1974), p. 529.

<sup>37</sup> For a good account of the Somali military ethos see Gerald Hanley, *Warriors: life and death among the Somalis* (London: Eland 1993).

<sup>38</sup> *The Times* 8 August 1996.

<sup>39</sup> Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History* (New York: Dover 1956), p. 148.

<sup>40</sup> David Jablonsky, *Churchill and Hitler: essays on the political and military direction of total war* (London: Frank Cass 1994), p. 38.

<sup>41</sup> Lawrence James, *The rise and fall of the British*

*Empire* (London: Little Brown and Co 1994), p. 286.

<sup>42</sup> Philip Towle, *Pilots and rebels: the rise of aircraft in unconventional warfare 1918-88* (London: Brassey's 1989), p. 22.

<sup>43</sup> Lawrence James, *The rise and fall of the British Empire* (London: Little Brown and Co 1994), p. 402.

<sup>44</sup> Gilbert Adair, *The post-modernist rings twice: reflections on culture in the 1990s* (London: Fourth Estate 1992), p. 113.

<sup>45</sup> Peter Osborne, 'Small scale victories, large scale defeats' in A. Benjamin (ed.) *Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: destruction and experience*, pp. 80-1.

<sup>46</sup> W.H. Auden, *Collected Longer Poems* (London: Faber and Faber 1968), pp. 233-4.

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