Håkon Lunde Saxi

Norwegian and Danish defence policy

A comparative study of the post-Cold War era
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Norwegian and Danish defence policy

A comparative study of the post-Cold War era

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Norwegian and Danish defence policy

A comparative study of the post-Cold War era

This study argues that in the field of defence policy, Norway and Denmark pursued markedly different paths in the post-Cold War era. Investigating the period 1990–2008, the study demonstrates Norwegian reluctance to get involved in the growing number of international military operations after the Cold War, initially doing so only with low-risk support units. Denmark, however, welcomed the new international paradigm whereby the armed forces were employed actively in the service of the country’s foreign policy. Embracing expeditionary deployment at an early stage, Danish units were frequently among the few Western forces to take part in actual combat operations abroad.

The study identifies four key reasons for this difference. Firstly, Denmark’s geopolitical situation allowed it to focus on distant threats, while Norway’s remained tied to threats closer to home. Secondly, Norwegian leaders were generally satisfied with the Cold War defence policy, while the Danish leadership actively sought a break with the past. Thirdly, Danish strategic culture brought with it a reappraisal of the utility and morality of utilizing force, while Norway remained committed to the traditional Nordic view. Finally, while Danish military culture was easily adapted and receptive to the new post-Cold War expeditionary mission, the Norwegian Armed Forces remained more comfortable with their historically defined territorial defence tasks.

Key Words: Norwegian defence, Danish defence, international military operations, geopolitics, leadership, strategic culture, military culture
**List of abbreviations**

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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>DIB</td>
<td>Danish International Brigade</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>FIST</td>
<td>Norwegian Army High Readiness Forces</td>
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<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<td>LANDJUT</td>
<td>Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTB</td>
<td>Missile Torpedo Boat</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-commissioned Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORDCAPS</td>
<td>Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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Introduction

Norway and Denmark are two countries with a great many similarities. The two states share a common Scandinavian language and culture, very similar democratic political systems, a generous welfare state, and even membership in the same military alliance. For many non-Scandinavians the two states may appear almost politically and socially indistinguishable. However, even very similar countries can sometimes develop marked differences in particular sectors of society. This study will argue that defence policy is one such sector. After the Cold War Norway was reluctant to get involved in international military operations, and initially did so only with low-risk support units. Denmark, however, wholeheartedly embraced expeditionary deployment of its Armed Forces, and Danish units were frequently among the few Western forces to take part in actual combat. In the two decades that have passed since the end of the Cold War, Norwegian and Danish defence policies have therefore differed significantly.

Images can provide a powerful insight into similarities and differences. Two snapshots of Norwegian and Danish post-Cold War military operations may serve in this case to illustrate some of the differences. The first is from the Bosnia and Herzegovinan city of Tuzla, April 1994, just a few years after the collapse of the Soviet empire. Danish Leopard 1 main battle tanks are engaged in a regular battle with Bosnian Serb forces, possibly killing as many as 150 Bosnian Serbs.\(^1\) If the Danes need medical aid, Norwegians medics stand ready to assist; if they need medical evacuation Norwegian helicopters are available to fly them out; if they need logistical support the Norwegians can provide it.\(^2\) The Norwegians provided support, but unlike the Danes


they did not fight. The Danes did battle; the Norwegians were “in the rear, with the gear”.

The second is from Afghanistan, August 2006, separated in other words by only a few years from the present day. Danish soldiers in lightly armoured vehicles drive to the tiny village of Musa Qala in southern Afghanistan to relieve a platoon of British paratroopers. Over the next 36 days the Danish soldiers endured over 70 Taliban attacks, and killed at least 25 enemy combatants before they were relieved in turn by British troops. The encampment they held was nicknamed the Alamo, due to its being totally isolated and surrounded on all sides by hostile fighters. The Norwegians were also in Afghanistan, this time with combat troops. The Norwegian units in Afghanistan were trained, organised and equipped to fight, having brought heavily armed and well-armoured CV9030N infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). Seemingly, the Norwegians were now ready to fight alongside the Danes. But they did not engage in battle. The reason was simple: the regular Norwegian soldiers were not stationed at Musa Qala, but at Maymana and Mazar-e Sharif. Both are in the north, far from where the Danes were battling the Taliban insurgents.

These two simple images, snapped twelve years apart, illustrate a basic difference between Danish and Norwegian defence policy in the post-Cold War era. While the Danes have been ready and able to fight alongside (mostly) British and American troops in places far from Denmark, Norwegian troops have been more reluctant both to go and especially to fight. Why is this? Only a fairly limited number of English-language publications offer a comparative view of Norwegian and Danish defence policies in the post-Cold War era. One of the most exceptional is the work of the Danish International Relations scholar Peter Viggo Jakobsen, who published a comparative study of the Nordic states’ approach to peace operation in the post-Cold War era. While an excellent study, Jakobsen does not explore the pronounced differences he finds between the two NATO countries Norway and Denmark more widely.

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4 For a description of the Norwegian contribution to ISAF, see The Permanent Norwegian Delegation to NATO. “Operations: Afghanistan”, 29 Oct 2009 <online >.
Unlike Jakobsen, most English-language studies on Danish or Norwegian defence policy tend to compare the chosen policy with those of non-Nordic countries, as Henning-A. Frantzen and Henning Sørensen have done. The few dedicated English-language studies of Norwegian or Danish post-Cold War defence policy focus exclusively on the one or the other, see the studies by Torunn Laugen Haaland and Tormod Heier. Most publications dealing with Norwegian and Danish defence policy in the period after the Cold War are written in Norwegian and Danish, and most do not adopt a comparative perspective. There is therefore a need for an in-depth comparative study of the subject that will make this research available to an English-speaking audience. This study aims to do both.

But what sort of explanation does the available literature offer for the differences between Norway and Denmark? The Norwegian political scientist Ståle Ulriksen has a cultural explanation for the Norwegian aversion to deployment abroad. Its reluctance is due to the Norwegian defence tradition, which understood the role of the Armed Forces as the defence of the territory and nation of Norway. The Armed Forces were therefore less thought of as a foreign policy tool, and when Norwegian soldiers did go abroad, they were less willing to sacrifice life and limb for what at best were secondary objectives, at worst costly distractions from their “real” task. Not until 2001 was Norway willing to make operations outside Norwegian territory one of the main tasks of the Armed Forces, realising what Ulriksen terms a “paradigmatic shift” in Norwegian defence policy.

Commodore (Ret.) Jacob Børresen has a geopolitical rather than cultural explanation for Norway’s greater reluctance to participate in distant military undertakings. The end of the Cold War, he argues,
did little to change Norway’s main geopolitical challenge: the shared border with Russia. The main role of the Norwegian Armed Forces has therefore remained relatively constant since the disintegration of the Soviet Union: to demonstrate Norway’s willingness and capacity to defend its territory and resources by maintaining a certain military presence in the High North. Whereas Ulriksen argues that the Armed Forces were insufficiently oriented towards international operations in the 1990s, for Børresen too much attention was given early in the millennium to deploying military forces to far-flung places.\(^\text{10}\)

Both the cultural and the geopolitical explanation have their counterparts in the Danish academic debate. The Danish international relations scholar Bertel Heurlin sees geopolitics as being decisive for Denmark’s path to expeditionary defence. Because Denmark no longer faced any direct threat after the Cold War, but, on the contrary, was surrounded by friends and allies on all sides, it became necessary for Denmark to use its Armed Forces actively as a foreign policy tool. Doing so enabled Denmark to retain influence with its allies and especially with the sole remaining superpower. “Activism” became a way to avoid marginalisation in a unipolar world. In order to generate maximum political benefit from its military contributions, Denmark restructured its Armed Forces to enable a rapid response capacity, global projection, and ability to fight alongside high-tech American troops (first-in, first-out capacity).\(^\text{11}\)

The cultural explanation for Norwegian reluctance to participate in international military operations also has its counterpart in Denmark, fronted by the Danish political scientist Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen. He sees Denmark as having experienced a shift from a deterministic “what’s the use of it?” attitude towards the Armed Forces during the Cold War, to one of increasing militarisation of its foreign policy under the term “activism” in the post-Cold War era. Unlike Heurlin, Rasmussen sees nothing inherently necessary about Denmark’s decision, following the disappearance of the threat from the east, to make use of its newfound strategic opportunity to project military force

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abroad. Rather, Danish politicians, civil servants, officers and academics found a new consensus, about what could be accomplished by using the Danish military. This was the decisive factor.\textsuperscript{12} This new consensus was so radically different from the old, and so unquestioned across the political spectrum, that one can talk about the emergence of a new strategic culture in Denmark. This set Denmark apart from Norway, whose strategic culture changed considerably less in the post-Cold War era.

The questions one is left with after summarising the above views then relate to \textit{how and why Norway’s and Denmark’s defence policies differed so widely after the Cold War}. The time period covered by this study stretches from 1990 to 2008, the starting date being a compromise since the exact end of the Cold War is disputed,\textsuperscript{13} and the end date being as close to the present day as can reasonably be studied in contemporary history. Because the full implications of close-to-present-day events are harder to gauge, I will put more emphasis on the earlier part of the period.

\section*{Explaining the difference}

While the Scandinavian academic debates seem to fall into one of two categories, depending on whether participants favour a \textit{cultural} or \textit{geopolitical} explanation of the differences, there are two main problems with restricting oneself to either the one or the other. First, culture operates at many different levels in society. Organisations can exhibit a particular culture, affecting which tasks are considered important, appropriate and natural within the individual organisations, somewhat independently of the grander societal norms in which the culture is embedded.\textsuperscript{14} To account for this, I shall divide culture into a grander \textit{strategic culture} and a narrower, organisation-focused \textit{military culture}.

\textsuperscript{12} This argument is put forward in Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, “What’s the Use of It?: Danish Strategic Culture and the Utility of Armed Force”, \textit{Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association} 40, no. 1 (2005).


\textsuperscript{14} Edgar H. Schein has studied culture at the level of organisations, and argues convincingly that culture plays a great role at this level of analysis. Edgar H. Schein, \textit{Organizational Culture and Leadership}, 3rd ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004).
The second is that they are inherently structural accounts, and pay therefore insufficient mind to human agency. This represents an ontological problem, because, as Yale Ferguson and Rey Koslowski note, “[a]ll collectivities are ultimately reducible to individuals.” In order to incorporate agency, I will therefore introduce the concept of leadership. All of these four factors, geopolitics, leadership, strategic culture and military culture, will be outlined below.

It is important to note, however, that these categories must ultimately be seen as an analytical device, not as a true reflection of reality. They are all by necessity interrelated and thus not truly independent variables in the logical-positivistic sense of the word. Nevertheless, as analytical tools they provide useful counterpoints, bringing forth the bigger picture from the tyranny of details.

What exactly, then, is meant by the term geopolitics? According to one definition geopolitics is commonly thought to be “about world politics, with a particular emphasis on state competition and the geographical dimensions of power”. Three different levels of geopolitics can be identified: local, regional and global, each with its own “code” which may or may not conflict with the other levels. A central point in the literature on Denmark and Norway is that notwithstanding the enormous impact on the global and regional distribution of power by the end of the Cold War, for Norway, local power dynamics were much less affected. Due to its proximity to Russia and the potential for conflict over Norway’s rich maritime resources, Norway remained wary of engaging in post-Cold War euphoria. I will argue that this dissimilar security environment is necessary to any sound explanation of the great differences between Norway and Denmark, but in and of itself insufficient.

Next, leadership seeks to incorporate agency into the story. Theo Farrell argues that a process of radical norm transplantation can be driven by individual, elite “norm entrepreneurs” in the centre of the

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15 For a theoretical account of the agent-structure debate in IR, see Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”, *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (Summer, 1987).
17 In International Relations (IR) terminology the culture vs. strategic behaviour debate can be seen as a constructivist/post-structuralist position on the one hand, debating with a classical-realist/neo-realist on the other.
decision-making apparatus, who by their actions are able to “communicate and push through new ideas”. Similarly, at the organisational level, Edgar H. Schein argues that leaders can bring in new beliefs, values, and assumptions that they can sometimes successfully impose as shared experiences if their ideas succeed in solving the group’s problems. On this note, Peter Viggo Jakobsen has been making the case for re-instating agency, in the form of “heroic leadership”, when it comes to understanding Denmark’s post-Cold War military activism. Jakobsen draws inspiration from those who seek to “rescue men and women as individuals from the oblivion to which political scientists have consigned them”. As I will demonstrate, drawing on Farrell’s, Schein’s, and Jakobsen’s arguments, introducing individual agency as an explanatory factor can help tremendously in understanding why two so seemingly similar states as Denmark and Norway developed such profound sectoral differences after the Cold War.

While geopolitics and leadership as terms are not unambiguous, culture is, perhaps, a more contentious term. I will use Peter Wilson’s relatively short and clear definition, identifying culture as “the values, norms, and assumptions that guide human action”. When culture is employed in relation to a nation’s foreign, security, and defence policy, one often speaks of that nation’s strategic culture. Jack Snyder offers the most authoritative definition, identifying it as:

[T]he sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to […] strategy.

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21 Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 225.


Studying strategic culture allows one to say something about a society’s “perception of risk, goals, and the relative willingness to use force”. I will focus in particular on the latter point, in arguing that there has been a significant difference in the willingness of Denmark and Norway respectively to use force as part of their foreign policy, and that this is a key reason why their defence policies came to differ so substantially in the post-Cold War era.

Finally, because this study deals with a particular sector of society, it makes sense to ask whether cultural traits peculiar to the armed forces of Norway and Denmark respectively influenced the defence policies. I will call this more narrowly defined category military culture. Like culture generally, military cultures cannot be changed overnight. Change will rather involve the merging of new and old practices, and the redefinition of old in a new context. Consequently, a culture more adapted to the new challenges of the post-Cold War world, such as the requirements of expeditionary operations, will facilitate the transition to these new tasks. I will argue that Danish and Norwegian military cultures differed in their adaptability to tackle the new type of international military operation in the post-Cold War era. I shall therefore single out different military cultures as source of explanation.

I will demonstrate that each of these factors played a vital, if not equally important, part in defining the different paths Denmark and Norway chose for their defence policies over the last two decades. Furthermore, I will demonstrate that Norwegian military reform and deployment of combat forces in joint military operations abroad have later been seen as too little, too late, even by the Norwegian Government itself. Meanwhile, Danish reforms and force deployment have often been ahead of their time, coming before the new security situation in the post-Cold War era had fully materialised.

Geopolitics has prescribed the available options, defining the physical and material limits within which the states operated. Denmark’s options were much wider than Norway’s after the Cold War, due to the unparalleled freedom created by the disappearance of all conventional

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threats to Danish territory. However, while determining which options were available, geopolitics did not determine what actions were actually taken. Leadership, on the other hand, has determined the pace at which change has taken place. Denmark enjoyed considerable geopolitical freedom of action, and ambitious reformers moved to make maximum use of it. In Norway, however, leaders needed longer to adjust defence policy notwithstanding the country’s much less radically altered security environment. The advent of decisive leadership was a catalyst of cultural change in both countries, but change in Denmark happened at a much more rapid pace and was more intensive than in Norway.

The reason for Denmark’s rapid rejection of Cold War era pacifism was therefore that Denmark’s leaders engineered a change in Danish strategic culture which made the use of military power abroad seem natural and appropriate. This did not happen in Norway, where leaders preferred to present Norwegian military operations abroad as a continuation of the past, rather than as a break with it as in Denmark. The actions undertaken by the Danish leadership also rapidly transformed Danish military culture, aided by the great receptiveness for these changes in the Danish Armed Forces. However, the more traditional use of the Norwegian Armed Forces abroad during much of the 1990s meant that similar changes were more modest in the Norwegian military. The culture of the Norwegian Armed Forces was also less receptive to the post-Cold War era military tasks and mode of organisation, and therefore offered greater resistance to those leaders trying to engineer change than in Denmark.

The above does not necessarily represent any universal causality or explanation of general change in defence policy, but it is rather my reading after comparing Norwegian and Danish defence policy of the last two decades, and how they can best be understood. While there may be implications for other states and time periods, the aim of this study seeks only to explain developments in the two countries between 1990 and 2008.

Sources
In Norway, the most important policy documents pertaining to defence are the Long Term Plans for the Armed Forces, enacted every four to five years. In the period dealt with in this study, six such plans were
issued (1989–1993, 1994–1998, 1999–2002, 2002–2005, 2005–2008, 2009–2012). When larger revisions of defence policy have been envisaged, a defence commission or defence policy committee has been convened. The findings and recommendations of these committees are used by governments as the basis of future long-term plans. One such defence commission presented its findings in 1992, and two defence policy committees did so in 2000 and 2007 respectively. All were preceded by a defence study providing the military advice of the Chief of Defence.

In Denmark, the key documents in defence policy have not been parliamentary documents per se, but extra-parliamentary Defence Agreements reached between most of the Danish political parties. Five such defence agreements were signed in the relevant timeframe (1989–1991/2, 1993–1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2004, 2005–2009). As in Norway, Denmark also periodically appoints defence commissions to report in advance of far-reaching revisions of defence policy. Two such commissions delivered their findings in 1989 and 1998 respectively, and a smaller defence policy working group in 2003.

Besides government documents, newspapers, biographies, memoirs, and interviews with certain key figures are the bulk of my source material for this study. This wealth of material made it relatively easy to pin down the specifics of what happened, when, where and how. The difficult part, as always in historical accounts, was answering “why?”. Explaining the events was the core task of this study.

**International military operations**

A brief mention is necessary of the different types of military operations in which the Norwegian and Danish armed forces have been taking part since the end of the Cold War. Apart from preparing for wartime territorial defence tasks and undertaking peacetime duties such as sovereignty and surveillance missions, international military operations have been the main activity of the armed forces. These fall broadly into four categories.

Firstly, there are the so-called traditional peacekeeping operations of the type undertaken regularly during the Cold War. Here one seeks to monitor compliance with ceasefires, and in some cases physically insert the peacekeepers between the former belligerents. This is based on a “holy trinity” of consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force.
Secondly, there are the so-called managing transition operations. Unlike traditional peacekeeping, these take place after a conflict has ended, and seek to implement a peace accord freely entered into by the parties involved. Both traditional peacekeeping and managed transitions fall under Chapter VI of the UN charter. Thirdly, so-called robust peacekeeping is conducted internally in states to promote peace and stability, often under circumstances where consent is at least periodically withdrawn by the warring parties. These operations therefore require forces that more combat-capable and equipped, and willing to use force at the tactical level to protect themselves and complete their missions. Fourthly, peace enforcement or Chapter VII missions involve using force against one or more of the warring parties to impose a settlement and restore peace and security. Since this by its very nature can involve high-intensity warfare, it requires the highest level of combat capabilities from the participating forces. Note that while the military requirements of the different missions are here framed in UN Charter terms, they need not be led or even sanctioned by any global or regional organisation. So-called coalitions of the willing or even individual countries can also perform them without any legal authorisation from the UN, NATO or regional bodies.

In Scandinavia the preferred term for all of the above tasks is either peacekeeping operations or international military operations, terms that have a benign ring in Scandinavian. The term expeditionary operations, often favoured in the UK and US, has not been common until very recently. However, since most international military operations in which Denmark and Norway have participated have taken place in remote theatres, calling them expeditionary operations is not inappropriate. Finally, NATO employs a third term, Peace Support Operations (PSO), encapsulating all of the above categories. In this study I use the terms PSO, expeditionary and international military operations more or less interchangeably.

33 NATO Standardization Agency, AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French) (Brussels: NATO, 2008), 2-P-3.
The first three chapters of this study approach the topic in historical narrative form. Chapter 1 gives a brief historical introduction to Norwegian and Danish security and defence policy between the Napoleonic wars and end of the Cold War (1807–1989). The object is to provide a point of departure, to contextualise the ensuing chapters and draw the reader’s attention to important similarities and differences. Chapters 2 and 3 outline Norwegian and Danish defence reforms since the end of the Cold War, as well as military operations and engagements abroad. These chapters seek to demonstrate how Norway and Denmark’s defence policies differed after the Cold War, both in defence posture and in military engagements abroad.

In the next four chapters, the substantial difference between Norway and Denmark is explained using the four categories outlined above: geopolitics, leadership, strategic culture and military culture. Each factor is dealt with in a separate Chapter (4–7). The chapters demonstrate the importance of each factor individually, but also how they interact with one another, and collectively strive to explain why Norway and Denmark’s defence policies differed after the Cold War. Finally, the conclusion provides an overview of how it all fits together.
Chapter 1

The long lines

Norway and Denmark have both historically been neutral states, that is until the German occupation of World War II demonstrated the fallacy of this policy. They were therefore founding members of NATO in 1949, and, as front-line members of the Atlantic Alliance, their defence strategies and structures became very similar. Both developed balanced conscripted, mobilisation-based forces designed to contain a territorial invasion until allied reinforcements could arrive. They shared limited exposure to warfighting during this “long peace”, the most common deployments of their armed forces abroad being classical peacekeeping missions.

This chapter will chart the long historical lines of Danish and Norwegian defence policies, demonstrating how their historical experiences brought them together in the same alliance, and made them embrace very similar modes of military organisation. It will, however, also highlight important differences between them, differences which, during the Cold War, made Norway a more committed member of the Atlantic Alliance than Denmark, but which in the post-Cold War world would help turn Denmark into a more avant-garde NATO country than Norway.

Defence policy 1720–1949

Between the end of the Great Nordic War in 1720 and creation of NATO in 1949, Danish foreign policy was designed to avoid embroilment in conflicts between Europe’s great powers. Denmark’s involuntary involvement in the Napoleonic wars 1807–14 constituted

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the first disastrous failure of this policy.\footnote{On Denmark’s involvement in the Napoleonic Wars, see Kurt Villads Jensen, Knud J. V. Jespersen, and Gunner Lind, \textit{Danmarks krigshistorie 1: 700–1814} (Copenhagen: Gads Forlag, 2008), 370–457.} The second was the second Schleswig War (1864), in which the multi-lingual Oldenburg state was reduced to a homogenous image of modern Denmark. The third was the Second World War, in which Denmark experienced the trauma of being \textit{de facto} occupied by Germany 1940–43 and \textit{de jure} 1943–45.

Perhaps the most influential event for Danish defence policy was the debacle of 1864. The defeat left the country in deep sense of despair, similar to that of fifty years previously, when Napoleon’s defeat forced Denmark to hand over Norway to Sweden.\footnote{Carsten Holbraad, \textit{Danish Neutrality: A Study in the Foreign Policy of a Small State} (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1991), 32–41.} Symptomatic of this attitude was a statement by a Liberal member of Parliament, Viggo Hørup, in March 1883, in which he questioned the government’s defence policy with the words “what’s the use of it?”.\footnote{Quoted in Claus Bjørn and Carsten Due-Nielsen, \textit{Fra Helstat til nationalstat, 1814–1914}, vol. 3 \textit{Dansk Udenrigspolitks Historie} (Copenhagen: Gyldendal Leksikon, 2003), 404. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are the author’s.} As the Danish historian Knud J.V. Jespersen sees it, the Danish defeat in 1864 “gave birth to the peculiarly Danish image of Denmark as Lilliput, with a small and insignificant role to play, and which could do best by turning its back on the world.”\footnote{Knud J.V. Jespersen, \textit{A History of Denmark} (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 24–25.}

This small-state mentality was to prove particularly influential in defence policy. While the Danish state was initially eager to reclaim lost territories, the defeat of France in 1871 and the unification of Germany made this goal unattainable, leaving Denmark a linguistically and culturally homogeneous entity. It is in this sense the Danish historian Uffe Østergård argues that 1864 created modern Denmark.\footnote{Uffe Østergård, “1864 og det moderne Danmark”, 2 Nov 2008 <online>.} A referendum in 1920, stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles, returned northern Schleswig to Denmark and gave Denmark probably the most accurate border it could hope for with Germany in terms of the language and disposition of the population.\footnote{Bo Lidegaard, \textit{Overleveren, 1914–1945}, vol. 4 \textit{Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie} (Copenhagen: Gyldendal Leksikon, 2003), 133–141; Jespersen, \textit{A History of Denmark}, 24–25.}

Following its defeat in 1864, Denmark managed its defence policy increasingly in light of a persistent fear of antagonising its giant neighbour in the south. In the interwar period, there was a political consensus that Denmark would be unable to defend itself against a German attack, but divisions over whether Denmark should...
nevertheless attempt some kind of organised resistance. The Social Democratic Prime Minister Thorvald Stauning was clearly against, declaring in his New Year’s speech in January 1940, “our country is prepared to guard our neutrality, but warfare in any real sense is not an option”. Stauning effectively ruled out Danish resistance to a foreign invasion. When the Germans invaded Denmark on 9 April 1940 (at 04:15 hours) the Danish Government had decided by 06:00 the same day to order the cessation of resistance. The Danish government would cooperate with Germany, and continued to function as an independent government in Denmark despite the German presence until 28–29 August 1943. When the German Wehrmacht moved to neutralise the Danish Armed Forces on 29 August 1943, the death of 23 Danish soldiers marked this day as an even bloodier one for Denmark than 9 April 1940.

Unlike Denmark, Norway celebrated 1814 as a triumph for liberalism and nationalism. The subsequent dissolution of the union with Sweden in 1905 was viewed as a similar success, involving few embarrassing concessions apart from the demolition of a few fortresses along the Swedish border. While estimates of the relative strength of Norwegian Armed Forces in 1905 vary, there is a persistent myth according to which “a strong defence” proved decisive for the peaceful dissolution of the union.

When Norway left the union with Sweden in 1905, it, like Denmark, sought to avoid international entanglements. The new state wanted to focus attention on consolidating independence. Perhaps due to the absence of other threats, an eventual conflict with Sweden informed the Norwegian defence effort in the years following the dissolution of the union. While Norway remained publicly neutral between 1905 and 1940, there was tacit understanding in Norway of Great Britain’s interests in ensuring that no other power gained control over Norwegian territory. Though seldom articulated, it was assumed in Norway that Great Britain would ultimately come to Norway’s aid should a threat materialise. Until 1940 Norwegian politicians were

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42 Ibid., 531–532.
therefore in a position to “have their cake and eat it”, enjoying the protection of a great power, while indulging in a neutralist stance and a moralistic criticism of great power politics.

In contrast to Denmark, Norwegians put up two months of organised resistance to the German invasion of April 1940, though British naval power was trumped by German airpower and resistance ultimately proved futile. The Norwegian Government and Armed Forces continued the war from exile, as did the resistance movement in occupied Norway. When the Government and military returned in May 1945, it was with their honour intact.

The campaign in Norway in April–June 1940 demonstrated the defensibility of the country as long as military assistance was prepared in advance rather than improvised at the last minute. Norway hence emerged from the period 1905–45 with a positive view of what the country’s defence forces could achieve if provided with the necessary resources and allied assistance. This positive legacy of 1905 and 1940 formed the basis of the continuation of what Ståle Ulriksen defines as the “Norwegian defence tradition”. This was the belief in the validity of having large conscripted armed forces with close (often local) ties to territory and nation, but little emphasis on the military as a means of furthering the foreign policy the state.

Denmark did not share Norway’s optimistic evaluation of what could be achieved with military means. Due to its exposed geographical location, but also to Denmark’s recent history, Danish defence preparations during the Cold War were very symbolic in character. The lesson of 1864 and 1940 suggested there was little Denmark could do to resist a continental invader, and spending scarce funds on the military was therefore a waste of money better spent elsewhere. There was a sense that “Denmark’s fate would be decided by others irrespective of what she did”, which can be described as an “unspoken assumption” among Danish politicians. It was more important for Denmark that

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49 Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen.
50 Heurlin, Riget, magten og militæret, 221–228.
51 Skogrand, Alliert i krig og fred, 226.
52 Pharo, “Scandinavia”, 203.
53 Ibid.
its defence forces were considered credible by its own allies, since they would ultimately have to protect it from a foreign invader, than by the expected enemy.54 “[Danish] defence efforts tended to be symbolic”, argues the Danish historian Nikolaj Petersen, “enough to qualify for the NATO guarantee, but not to put up a meaningful deterrent.”55

Despite their different military histories, Norway and Denmark arrived at somewhat similar conclusions about their security and defence policy after the Second World War. Both countries negotiated with Sweden for a possible Scandinavian defence union, before dropping the idea. It would not provide the security guaranties and preferential arms deliveries they needed. Norway therefore pursued membership of the Atlantic Alliance, followed shortly afterwards by Denmark, and both were original signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty.56 After the failure of neutralism to avert the German attack of April 1940, both put their trust in a combination of national defence and outside assistance from the western great powers. In this their paths diverged markedly from their Nordic neighbours, Finland and Sweden.57

Joining an alliance represented a sharp break with neutrality for both Norway and Denmark. There was nevertheless a stronger sense of continuity in foreign policy in Norway after World War II than in Denmark. For Denmark, abandoning neutrality and pragmatically accommodating Germany changed the conditions of Danish security policy completely.58 More so than Norway, Danish NATO membership was therefore “half-hearted” from the start,59 and Denmark was sometimes described, perhaps somewhat unfairly, as the “weakest link” in the NATO chain.60

As for Norway, the Norwegian historian Olav Riste sees NATO membership in 1949 not so much as a vital turning point for Norway, but rather a codification of a pre-existing national security strategy

54 Heurlin, Rigtet, magten og militæret, 224.
56 Sverdrup, Inn i storpolitikken 1940–1949, 326–327.
57 Olav Riste, War and Peace in the Political Culture of Scandinavia in the 20th Century, IFS Info, no. 5 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2003), 10–11.
59 Petersen, “The Dilemmas of Alliance”, 277.
which was “to ‘nail the Anglo-Saxon powers’ to their presumed responsibility for the security of the area”. There was therefore a stronger feeling of continuity in Norwegian security and defence policy than in Denmark’s after 1945, a factor that may explain the greater enthusiasm for NATO membership in Norway.

The Cold War

Both Norway and Denmark occupied geopolitical positions of great importance in the emerging Cold War. Norway’s long Atlantic coast was of strategic importance to the Western powers, as was Denmark’s location at the entry to the Baltic Sea, and its possession of Greenland. Throughout the Cold War both countries sought a balance between two parameters: of integration and screening in the Western Alliance, e.g. by refusing allied bases and nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime. In this way Norway and Denmark were said to be playing their part in maintaining a particular “Nordic balance”, which ensured the Nordic countries remained an area of relatively low tension during much of the Cold War. By regulating the access of their Alliance partners to their territory, and especially the United States, Denmark and Norway were also able to influence their much larger allies.

During the Cold War both countries were part of NATO’s Northern European Command, which also included Schleswig-Holstein in northern Germany. An isolated Warsaw Pact attack on Norway or Denmark was considered unlikely, at least since the late 1960s, but in the event of a general conflict with NATO, there were several reasons why the Warsaw Pact might want to take control of Danish and Norwegian territory. Control of Denmark, as well as southern Norway, would give the Soviet Baltic Fleet an exit from the Baltic Sea, allowing joint operations with the Soviet Northern Fleet. It would give Soviet

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naval forces in the North Sea access to bases and repair facilities in the Baltic. Denmark would also be an important flank against NATO’s central region, and possibly provide airbases for attacks on NATO naval forces and targets in the British Isles. The Warsaw Pact possessed large contingents trained in amphibious operations in the Baltic, and the Soviet Baltic Fleet appeared designed to achieve control of the Baltic and passage to the North Sea. Some of the Warsaw Pact forces in the German Democratic Republic could also have been used against Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland.66

Northern Norway was strategically important due to its location between the US and the Soviet Union, and to the proximity of Soviet naval bases in the Kola Peninsula. There was considerable advantage for the Soviet Union in gaining control over northern Norway. It would provide better protection of its Kola bases, resupply points for its Northern Fleet operating in the Atlantic and airbases to support its fleet further west with land-based aircraft. The Soviet Union had considerable forces in the Leningrad Military District, as well as sufficient forces in the Kola Peninsula to carry out a surprise attack against parts of Norwegian territory.67 In the event of war, the Norwegian Armed Forces would mostly have operated on their home territory, whereas Danish forces, as part of the German-led multinational corps LANDJUT, would also have been employed in defence of Schleswig-Holstein.68 Even Norway’s contribution to NATO’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic would have broken away from the force and returned to national waters in case of a crisis or war at home.69

From the late 1960s both countries experienced a discrepancy between the ambitions of the politicians regarding defence structure and the budgets they subsequently approved. The defence budget was insufficient to modernise the force structure, most of it being tied to personnel expenditure. This was a legacy of the early Cold War, when much of the infrastructure and weapons acquisitions had been financed by the US and NATO. Norway only had to meet 60 per cent of its


defence spending between 1950 and 1965. Neither country was able to resolve this problem during the Cold War.

Norway and Denmark also had very similar experience of out of country military operations during the Cold War. Both countries maintained a combat brigade in Germany in the early Cold War period, first as part of the occupying forces and later as contributions to allied defence efforts. The Norwegian brigade remained in Germany from 1947 to 1953, whereas the Danish brigade was stationed in Germany from 1947 to 1958.

But although they contributed to allied defence in Germany, neither Denmark nor Norway supported efforts to take NATO out of its core area, nor give the organisation new tasks. For the duration of the Cold War, Norway and Denmark wanted to limit NATO expansion beyond its collective defence mission in the Euro-Atlantic area, and both opposed wider membership of the Atlantic Alliance. Rather than going “out of area” with NATO, Norway and Denmark, together with non-aligned Sweden and Finland, pioneered UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War, introducing what Peter Viggo Jakobsen calls “the Nordic Model of peacekeeping”. The Nordic states provided about 25 per cent of the personnel serving as peacekeepers during the Cold War, about 125,000 troops in total. These missions can almost all be classified as classic peacekeeping missions, involving only the use of force in self-defence. The one notable exception to this rule was Norwegian and Danish participation in the United Nations Operation in the Congo in 1960–64.

Both Norway and Denmark took on a number of long-running peacekeeping missions. Jointly they provided a battalion (DANOR) for the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza 1957–67. Separately Norway provided an infantry battalion (NORBATT), as well as, initially, a medical and a maintenance company plus a helicopter detachment, for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 1978–98.

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and Denmark provided an infantry battalion for the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 1964–94.

**The armed forces during the Cold War**

If we compare the state of the two countries’ armed forces at the very end of the Cold War, we find them to be very similar but with a few interesting differences. Both had peacetime structures designed as training establishments, producing soldiers who, after the end of their service, joined the reserve formations making up the bulk of the armed forces. By 1973 Denmark was supplementing the conscripted units with formations composed of contracted enlisted soldiers. In the peacetime establishment Norway and Denmark had about the same number of active troops. Conscripts made up about two-thirds of the active Norwegian forces but only one-third of the active Danish troops.

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<td>27,850</td>
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<td>From cohort</td>
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<td>Denmark conscripts</td>
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<td>From cohort</td>
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**First, as shown in Table 1, conscription was far more universal in Norway than in Denmark. Second, the size and composition of the forces differed significantly. Norway could mobilize almost three times the number of reserves that Denmark could, despite Denmark having a larger population than Norway. Conversely, the Danish Army**

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was considerably more mechanized than the Norwegian Army, having twice the number of tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Meanwhile, the Norwegian Navy was significantly larger than the Danish, having three times as many submarines and almost twice as many major surface combatants. Finally, the two countries’ air forces were quite evenly matched in terms of the number and quality of combat aircraft available.\(^{76}\)

The differences in the structure of the two countries’ armed forces can to some extent be explained by their different geography. Norway’s landmass covers 324,000 km\(^2\) while Denmark’s only covers 43,000 km\(^2\). As Norwegian governments frequently pointed out during the Cold War, with limited resources the Norwegian Armed Forces had to defend a land area equal to the combined territory of Denmark, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany.\(^{77}\) As expressed by the then Inspector-General of the Norwegian Army in 1992, the choice of a militia system was logical because the army had to “defend an area three times the size of England, with a population barely half that of London”.\(^{78}\) Under such conditions only total utilization of available manpower was deemed sufficient.

In addition to being much larger than Denmark, Norway also had very different terrain. As stated in one Cold War era textbook on military defence in the Nordic states, while Denmark had an “open landscape […] favourable for air landing and mechanized troops”,\(^{79}\) Norway possesses an excellent defensive terrain due to “a nearly tree-less alpine landscape descending into the sea”.\(^{80}\) This rugged landscape was said to be particularly suitable for light infantry.\(^{81}\) In order to exploit this favourable defensive terrain most of the high-end Norwegian forces were concentrated in the mountainous county of Troms, with only a small “trip-wire” force deployed nearer the Russian border. Norway also had a considerably longer coastline than Denmark (25,148 km to 7,314 km), and from the late 1970s was claiming partially disputed maritime economic zones of approximately two million km\(^2\), six times

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\(^{76}\) Ibid.


\(^{80}\) Ibid., 34.

the area of continental Norway. All this would seem to offer good military justification for Norway’s larger wartime forces, less mechanized army and larger navy.

There were, however, also important political reasons for the high number of conscripts. In order to construct a national and unifying military that would conscript nearly all able-bodied men, the Norwegian Armed Forces adopted a defensive military strategy designed around quantity rather than quality. Ståle Ulriksen goes as far as to claim that Norway had a military structure “constructed for nation-building – not warfare”. Critical shortage of equipment meant that only 2–3 of the army’s 13 mobilisation brigades were adequately equipped at the end of the Cold War, and training standards left much to be desired. The need to equip and train such a large reserve force meant that even the few standing forces were never equipped with modern weaponry. Some of the same deficiencies could however be found in the Danish mobilisation units.

Nevertheless, the Norwegian political establishment seemed to have more faith in the value of their military forces than the Danish political leadership in theirs. It was the mantra of the Norwegian political elite that the Armed Forces had to be prepared to defend the country until allied reinforcements could arrive. No similar doctrine existed in Denmark, where few policymakers seemed to envisage that the Danish military would be able to defend the country that long. The Danish chiefs of defence were also systematically less optimistic than their Norwegian counterparts.

It is telling that in international-relations lingo the term “Denmarkisation” came to mean countries free-riding on the efforts of oth-

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83 Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen, 228.
ers in a military alliance.\textsuperscript{90} The US had hoped Norway could serve as a model for Denmark, which was said to be lacking in Alliance solidarity.\textsuperscript{91} In fact, the Norwegian government itself sometimes criticised its southern neighbour for its perceived lack of Alliance loyalty and effort.\textsuperscript{92} Denmark was normally the lowest spender of the NATO countries in percentage of GDP. Between 1985 and 1989 defence spending in Norway was almost three per cent of GDP, whereas in Denmark it was closer to 2.2 per cent. In NATO, only Luxemburg spent less on defence. In 1990 Denmark spent USD 2.2 defence billions compared to Norway’s USD 3.4 billion, and Norway was able to invest a much larger share of its defence budget in new equipment and infrastructure than Denmark was.

Many observers of Danish defence policy view the low mobilisation of personnel and resources for the Danish Armed Force in the Cold War as an indication that Denmark’s Armed Forces were considered to be more or less symbolic, and of low priority. In contrast, the Norwegian Armed Forces were able to mobilise more personnel and received more resources. A strong and credible national defence was held to be of great importance by Norwegian policymakers.\textsuperscript{93} To put it bluntly, we could say that, in the context of the Cold War, Denmark was considered to be the “bad boy” of the NATO class, whereas Norway was one of the “good boys”.\textsuperscript{94} This would change after the Cold War, when the willingness and ability to participate in international military operations abroad became the new benchmark by which NATO member states were measured.

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\textsuperscript{91} Skogrand, \textit{Alliert i krig og fred}, 226.


\textsuperscript{94} Jens Ringsmose, \textit{Danmarks NATO-omdømme: Fra Prügelkanb til døks} (Dansk Institut for Militære Studier, November 2007); Skogrand, \textit{Alliert i krig og fred}, 226.
In the aftermath of the Cold War the Norwegian and the Danish Armed Forces underwent radical change. From being manpower intensive territorial defence forces intended to fight World War III, they became smaller, more capital-intensive and capable of expeditionary operations. In this new post-Cold War world PSOs in distant theatres became a major facet of day-to-day activity for Danish and Norwegian soldiers. This change was difficult and controversial for both countries, but they carried it out at very different speeds. While the transition to expeditionary defence began in the early 1990s in Denmark, Norway did not follow suit until a decade later.

This chapter charts the transformation of the Danish and Norwegian armed forces in the first decade after the Cold War, showing how two historically similar countries differed so sharply in the area of military policy and pace of military reform.

Armed forces reform 1990–94
The defence commissions established by Norway and Denmark at the end stage of the Cold War both delivered largely similar recommendations. The Danish commission was appointed in July 1988 with a mandate to assess what changes, if any, should be made to the organisation of the Danish defence forces in peace as well as in war.95 Submitting its findings in December 1989, the commission sketched out a best and worst case scenario, depending on the success of ongoing negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. These treaties were seen as very beneficial for the Western Alliance in general, and the defensibility of Denmark in

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95 Danish Defence Commission of 1988, Forsvaret i 90’erne (Copenhagen, 1989), 8.
particular, with the former scenario more likely to materialise than the latter. The commission did not envisage radical changes in the role assigned to the Danish military, but moved to rationalise the Danish Armed Forces.

Most noticeable in operational terms was the recommendation to scrap the F-35 Draken aircraft and concentrate upon the F-16. As agreed previously in the March 1989 Defence Agreement, the Navy was to rationalise by concentrating activities and scrapping elderly vessels. The Army was the least affected service. It was to draft more conscripts, increasing its peacetime size somewhat. Bases should be closed to cut costs, sparking vociferous protests in the areas affected. But while the 1988 Defence Commission argued for a rationalisation of the Danish defence establishment, it did not advise any radical departure in terms of basic mission and organisation. Due to uncertainties about international developments, decisions were effectively postponed.

In Norway, a Defence Commission was also assigned to chart the way forward. The commission was appointed in January 1990, and submitted its findings in March 1992. Although these findings were issued more than two years after the Danish commission’s, they were informed by the same wary conservatism. Considering the enormous changes in Europe over these two years, this was remarkable, not least considering the commission’s mandate, part of which was to evaluate the implications of recent developments in “Eastern Europe and East/West relations” for Norwegian defence. The commission chose to focus more on the defence of northern Norway, in light the improvements to the security of southern Norway caused by the changes in Eastern Europe. Instability in and conflict with Russia were seen as the main security challenges. The commission recommended cutting seven
brigades of the planned wartime Army, from 13 to 6 and 11 independent battalions, from 28 to 17, the reduced land forces being more heavily mechanized than before. For the Navy, the number of Missile Torpedo Boats (MTBs) should be cut from 36 to 22 and coastal artillery fortresses from 29 to 13. The Air Force would retain its present count of about 80 fighter aircraft.106

Altogether the Norwegian defence commission suggested, like its Danish counterpart, moving cautiously into the future. While rationalising the Armed Forces to make more room for investments in new equipment, neither of them heralded any radical changes in the organisation and mission of the Armed Forces. But as the cautious Norwegian defence commission delivered its findings, a new course was already being plotted for the Danish Armed Forces.

In November 1991 NATO’s heads of state and government adopted a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance.107 It envisaged a new conventional force structure for member states, dividing them into Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF) and Rapid Reaction Forces, which would be mobile and flexible, and more traditional in-place Main Defence Forces. While Norway and Denmark responded positively to the new NATO Strategic Concept, Denmark would go much further towards contributing to the Alliance reaction forces than Norway.

Alignment towards expeditionary defence began in Denmark with the November 1992 Defence Agreement for 1993–1994. This defence agreement differed from those of the Cold War, given the absence of a defined military threat. The risk of an invasion of Danish territory was considered close to zero.108 It prompted a shift of emphasis away from territorial defence towards international operations, most noticeably with the establishment of a Danish International Brigade (DIB) of 4,500 soldiers.109

Parallel with the creation of the DIB, Denmark also introduced the obligation for non-conscripted members of the Armed Forces to serve in military operations abroad. From January 1994, all Danish regular military personnel (and some civilians) had to state whether they wanted to limit international service to traditional missions;

106 Ibid., 194–197.
nearly all regular members of the Danish Armed Forces thus became eligible for deployment in international operations. A similar law allowing the Norwegian government to order officers to participate in international operations came into effect from January 1999. The law only applied to officers entering the Armed Forces from January 1999, and only when there was a shortfall of volunteers. This arrangement proved transitory, as in March 2004 new legislation required all regular serving members in the Norwegian Armed Forces to participate in international military operations. This was almost exactly 10 years after Denmark adopted the same principle.

The DIB should be capable of participation in “conflict-preventing, peace-keeping, peace-making, humanitarian and other similar operations on a mandate from the UN or the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)”. In this capacity, it replaced the Danish commitment of 1964 to maintain a permanent Danish military force for the use of the United Nations. Until the DIB’s establishment Danish peacekeeping organisation had been ad hoc and outside the normal Army structure, as was the case for the Norwegian Armed Forces. The DIB would also be available as a rapid-reaction brigade for NATO, and from 1995 was to contribute to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and deployed as part of the 1st (UK) Armoured Division. The brigade would be structured as a Danish armoured infantry brigade, with about 20 per cent regular personnel and 80 per cent former conscripts who had signed a three-year readiness contract with the Armed Forces. Reaction time was seven days for the headquarters elements, and 14 days for the brigade as a whole. The brigade would enable Denmark to maintain 1,500 soldiers continuously in international military operations abroad. The Danish Navy would have one corvette, one submarine and two mine-clearing vessels as NATO IRF and Rapid Reaction Forces contributions, the Air Force one F-16 squadron and a HAWK surface-to-air squadron.

In December 1993 the Danish Parliament passed a new Defence Act stating explicitly that there was now no direct military threat to Danish existence, integrity, and sovereignty. The new act committed the Armed Forces to participate in “conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace making [and] humanitarian missions” without any geographical limitations, as well as “crisis management and defence within NATO’s

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111 Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support, 165; Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen, 237.
area”. The law marked a shift towards a much wider definition of security, and towards viewing the Danish Armed Forces as a useful foreign policy tool rather than an instrument of last resort, intended solely to ensure national survival.

Despite the massive changes that had taken place in the years 1989–91, Norway did not, like Denmark, shift its focus from invasion defence towards international operations. The recommendations of the Norwegian 1990 Defence Commission were not substantially revised, as were those of the 1988 Danish Defence Commission. While the new long-term plan noted the substantial changes in regional and global politics, the objectives of Norway’s security policy, said the Government, remained unchanged. Norway was still neighbour to one of the largest military concentrations in the world, and therefore the defence of northern Norway would remain the dimensioning task of the Armed Forces. The changes made in the size and organisation of the Armed Forces where almost entirely in response to lack of resources to sustain the Cold War structure, rather than any desire to give the military new tasks.

In the early 1990s the army adopted the new manoeuvre warfare doctrine, though without this provoking any wish within the organisation to reduce the size or number of wartime brigades. The central problem of the army’s doctrine remained how to fight a numerically superior enemy invading Norwegian territory. Through the early and mid-1990s, a number of revisions emphasised the importance of participation in international operations, but the changes to the military structure were of a relatively minor and incremental nature. Norway decided to contribute to NATO’s IRF with an infantry battalion, an F-16 squadron, a frigate and two mine clearing vessels. In addition, the number of troops available for UN operations was increased from 1,300 to 2,000. Unlike the DIB, the Norwegian UN

115 Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen, 264–265.
readiness forces were only trained, organised and equipped for classical peacekeeping operations, not warfighting.118

**Gulf War I and the Balkan Wars**

The policy changes which affected the Danish and Norwegian forces after the Cold War cannot be isolated from developments in international politics in the 1990s. The broad changes taking place in the world, especially the winding down of the East–West confrontation, allowed for a wave of UN interventions around the world. These were to be very different from the traditional Chapter VI UN peacekeeping missions, in which the Scandinavian countries had participated from the start.119 The August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the unravelling of Yugoslavia from June 1991, offered Norway and Denmark an opportunity to adapt their armed forces to what was for them a novel exercise in international relations; that is, using the armed forces as an instrument of foreign policy. Denmark took to this new environment wholeheartedly, while Norway proved more hesitant.

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Denmark and Norway came under pressure to contribute to the UN coalition being amassed in the region. The most direct military contribution the two countries would consider at this time fell under Security Council resolution 665, which called upon UN member states to uphold the embargo against Iraq.120 On the day after the request was made by the Security Council the Danish government discussed the issue with members of the opposition and quickly decided to contribute a corvette to enforce the embargo. The Danes then conferred with their Norwegian counterparts, who were less enthusiastic about the prospect of participating in the Gulf embargo.121 The Norwegian government was left in the position of having to respond to the Danish initiative, and the Danes now asked Norway to provide either a navy vessel or a supply ship for the Danish corvette. Norway decided to provide a Coast Guard vessel as a supply

and support ship for the Danish corvette, and a medical company from the Norwegian UN reaction force to the Gulf coalition.\textsuperscript{122}

The Danish contribution was minor, but symbolically important. It was the first time Denmark had sent an armed unit “out-of-area” outside of a UN peacekeeping context.\textsuperscript{123} The Norwegian contribution was less groundbreaking. The Norwegian government made a conscious decision not to send combat units, just support units and humanitarian and economic assistance.\textsuperscript{124} This followed the established Norwegian custom of contributing support units to UN coalitions, such as a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (NORMASH) in the Korean War.

Nearly two years after Iraq had been evicted from Kuwait, Norway and Denmark became involved in enforcing another UN embargo, this time against the former Yugoslavia. In November 1992 NATO, together with the Western European Union, began to enforce the UN arms embargo against Yugoslavia. As part of NATO’s standing naval forces, Norway and Denmark regularly rotated warships into the Adriatic for the duration of the Bosnian War, 1992–95.

While naval deployment was handled through NATO, the ground forces in Yugoslavia were initially a more traditional UN Chapter VI peacekeeping force. In February 1992 the UN Security Council established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in order to “create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation for an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis”.\textsuperscript{125} The UN asked Denmark in March 1992 to contribute to UNPROFOR, and Copenhagen responded with a reinforced battalion with five manoeuvre companies and a support company, a total of some 940 soldiers. Norway provided a transport control unit, some civilian police and a few military observers, totalling 143 people.

Both Norway and Denmark contributed to the Nordic Battalion in Macedonia, established in March 1993, but the Norwegians made by far the largest contribution. Norway sent a manoeuvre company and joint staff company personnel, 218 troops in total. The Danish contribution was limited to the commander of UNPROFOR’s Macedonian Command, with six staff officers and a UN observer. The deployment in

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{122} Børresen et al., \textit{Alliansforsvar i endring}, 189–192.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Petersen, “Adapting to change”, 108.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Børresen et al., \textit{Alliansforsvar i endring}, 190.
\end{itemize}
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Macedonia was relatively uneventful, and the Norwegian contribution was scaled down to about 30 men from August 1994.

Things were considerably less peaceful for the Danish units in Croatia and Bosnia. In April 1993 it was decided to reinforce the Danish contingent with UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia. The Danish Parliament voted to despatch additional sanitation, armoured transport, heavy mortars and anti-tank rockets, all in order to improve the forces’ security and their ability to perform the mission. The decision meant that the Danish forces in the theatre became more robust, and yet more robustness was to come. In August 1993 the Danish Parliament voted to despatch an armoured squadron to Bosnia-Herzegovina, as part of Nordic Battalion II. Possessing 10 Leopard 1 main battle tanks, this represented the first time in history that tanks where deployed as part of a UN peacekeeping force.\(^{126}\) This force would be involved in the heaviest fighting any Nordic military unit had seen since the Second World War. In a single engagement, on 29 April 1994, Danish tanks fired 72 main-gun tank rounds in anger, reputedly killing as many as 150 members of the Bosnian Serb Army in the engagement.\(^{127}\) This operation was widely reported in the international press, changing international perceptions of the Danish Armed Forces. Whereas Denmark used to be the “peace-loving, foot-dragging footnote country”, it now gained a more martial reputation.\(^{128}\)

The Norwegian contribution on the ground in Bosnia was less robust: a medical company and a helicopter detachment (NORAIR). In June 1994 it was decided to send a Norwegian logistical battalion to Bosnia, which was in place in theatre about three months later. It was the Norwegian government’s policy to limit Norwegian participation in peacemaking operations only to support units, such as engineers, maintenance, logistics or medical units. First and foremost the Norwegians wanted to avoid peace enforcement and concentrate on traditional UN peacekeeping tasks, where Norway was thought to have certain comparative advantages.\(^{129}\)

In December 1995 the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) replaced UNPROFOR in Bosnia. IFOR numbered 60,000 troops, and was much more strongly equipped both in weaponry and rules

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128 Ibid., 17.
of engagement than UNPROFOR. Both Norway and Denmark agreed to have their UNPROFOR forces “switch hats” and become part of IFOR, as a joint Nordic-Polish Brigade together with Sweden, Finland and Poland. Denmark contributed a manoeuvre battalion with one mechanized and one armoured company, numbering approximately 800 troops in total. Norway contributed a supply battalion and a medical company, totalling 921 troops. When IFOR became Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in December 1996, Norway’s participation changed too. For the first time, combat units were deployed in a peace enforcement operation. The Norwegian government decided to contribute a mechanized infantry battalion and an independent mechanized infantry company, hoping these forces would be more visible, and hence give more political influence. Less visibly, Norwegian Special Operations Forces were deployed in the Balkans from 1996. This represented a new, robust capability, as well as one of the first deployments of standing, combat ready army units in international operations.

In March 1997 Italy offered to lead a multinational intervention force to stabilize Albania, known as Operation Alba. Denmark participated with a light reconnaissance squadron of 59 soldiers, integrated into a French infantry regiment. This was possible because the Danish unit was a standing, volunteer unit with light equipment, which made it possible to deploy it rapidly. Norway chose not to participate in the ad hoc coalition in Albania, and in any case had few standing high-readiness units suitable for such a deployment.

In February 1998 an armed insurgency broke out in Kosovo, a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Western diplomacy failed to defuse the conflict, which by early 1999 had become an outright civil war. On 24 March 1999 NATO aircraft started attacking targets in the FRY. The object of the bombing campaign was, according to most European leaders, to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe caused

131 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, 147.
132 Gjeseth, Hæren i omveltning, 163–164.
by a vicious campaign of persecution by FRY military and paramilitary forces against the Kosovar Albanian population.\textsuperscript{136} Denmark and Norway contributed combat aircraft to the air campaign; Denmark with four operational F-16s, plus two reserve aircraft, which were employed in air-to-air and air-to-ground roles.\textsuperscript{137} Norway made a similar contribution, and operated together with the Danish Air Force from the Grazzanise base in Italy. However, the Norwegian F-16s could not be used in an air-to-ground role. Norway therefore avoided the more controversial action of attacking ground targets.\textsuperscript{138} There were signs of increasing Norwegian robustness in 1999. The Norwegian Army Special Operations Forces were among the first units to enter Pristina as part of a British Special Forces unit.\textsuperscript{139}

Norway and Denmark thereafter chose to make a battalion-sized contribution to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), which moved into the province after the Yugoslavian force had agreed to withdraw. Denmark found it difficult to deploy a battalion to KFOR of approximately 875 soldiers while simultaneously having a battalion in SFOR, and the size of the Danish battalion in Kosovo had to be reduced to about 500 soldiers in February 2001.\textsuperscript{140} Norway contributed a reinforced mechanized battalion of approximately 1,200 soldiers, but experienced problems getting the unit ready despite winding down deployment in Bosnia at the same time.\textsuperscript{141} The decision to deploy was taken on 14 June 1999, but the battalion was not fully deployed in Kosovo until 12 October 1999. The Norwegian deployment hence took nearly four months. While it was not a secret that Norway had never been able to fulfil NATO’s IRF reaction-time requirement, something the government readily admitted by before the Kosovo deployment, a reaction time of four months was considered far too long.\textsuperscript{142} Denmark also struggled with the reaction-time requirement, and needed eight weeks to deploy the Danish DIB battalion in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{143} The performance of the Danish and Norwegian armed forces in the Kosovo War

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\item\textsuperscript{137} Hækkerup, \textit{På skansen}, 130–131.
\item\textsuperscript{138} Børresen et al., \textit{Allianseforsvar i endring}, 223.
\item\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., 225.
\item\textsuperscript{140} Hækkerup, \textit{På skansen}, 135–137.
\item\textsuperscript{142} Norwegian Ministry of Defence, \textit{Tilpasning av Forsvaret til deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner}, Report to the Storting, no. 38 (1998–99), 31–33; Børresen et al., \textit{Allianseforsvar i endring}, 220–227.
\item\textsuperscript{143} Jakobsen, \textit{Nordic Approaches}, 98.
\end{itemize}
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Thus strengthened the argument for more regular, standing units with contracted personnel to enable the military to respond rapidly to this kind of crisis.

**The Baltic states**

The Balkans was not the only area in which the Danes were pushing to use their military as a foreign policy tool. Towards the end of the Cold War Denmark had been an early and outspoken supporter of the Baltic movement for independence, and continued to take a leading role after independence in matters such as military cooperation with the newly independent states.144 Norway chose to keep a lower profile.145 The Danes also seemed to view themselves as the Baltic states’ best friend;146 indeed, Danish political scientist Hans Mouritzen described the Baltic states as a Danish sphere of influence in the 1990s.147 Denmark also took the lead, along with Canada and the Netherlands, in developing high-readiness forces for the UN. In January 1995 Denmark appointed a working group to develop a Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG). The brigade would consist of 4–5,000 troops, and have a reaction time of 15 to 30 days. By 1999, 11 countries had chosen to participate, and the brigade was declared available to the UN from January 2000. While Norway was a signatory country, it was the Danish Minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup who had been the most active promoter of SHIRBRIG.148 The Danes where initially told that Norway had trouble in meeting the expected reaction time.149 The Norwegian Ministry of Defence and senior Armed Forces figures believed the initiative was incompatible with Norway’s role in the Alliance and military posture.150 The Norwegian contribution to the SHIRBRIG force pool was limited to a helicopter detach-

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147 Mouritzen, “Denmark in the Post-Cold War Era”, 42–47.
148 Joachim Koops and Johannes Varwick, *Ten Years of SHIRBRIG: Lessons Learned, Development Prospects and Strategic Opportunities for Germany*, GPPi Research Paper Series, no. 11 (Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, 2008), 9–10.
149 Hækkerup, *På skansen*, 89.
150 Børresen et al., *Allianseforsvar i endring*, 216.
ment, whereas Denmark contributed part of the brigade headquarters, a reconnaissance squadron and a military police company.

**Defence reforms after the Bosnian War**

A new Danish Defence Agreement 1995–1999 was signed in December 1995.\(^{151}\) The agreement further rationalised the structure of the Navy and Air Force by cutting the number of bases, and reduced the number of Army brigades from four to three. Although the Army’s wartime strength fell to 58,000 troops, the DIB received new equipment, and by 1999 five of eight investment programmes benefited the brigade directly.\(^{152}\) The number of internationally deployable land units remained unchanged from the prior 1993–1994 Defence Agreement, but the navy and air force increased their contributions.

Most importantly, a new defence commission was to be convened in 1997 and deliver its report in 1998. The commission’s report would form the basis of the next Danish Defence Agreement after 1999. The Danish defence commission of 1997 consisted, like its predecessors, of politicians, officers and experts from the ministries and academia. In its report, submitted in November 1998,\(^{153}\) it noted the general changes that had taken place since the last defence report of 1988, and the new role for the armed forces as an active instrument of Danish security policy.

While Denmark was rapidly adapting its Armed Forces for expeditionary operations, and was clearly more willing to use them in combat than Norway, Denmark also demonstrated greater affinity with the “new NATO” than did Norway. In April 1999 NATO again revised its Strategic Concept, moved a step further towards enlargement and took the organisation “out of area”, giving it a more proactive role besides its classic collective defence mission.\(^{154}\) Unlike Norway, it had been Denmark’s wish since the early 1990s for NATO to take on missions on behalf of the UN and CSCE.\(^{155}\) Denmark therefore supported the American effort to take NATO “out of area” at the Washington

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152 Frantzen, *NATO and Peace Support*, 151.
summit in 1999, as well as to enlarge NATO’s membership. In particular, Denmark repeated its longstanding argument that the Baltic states had to receive the same treatment as the other Central and Eastern European countries. Norway remained sceptical: NATO’s Partnership for Peace, Oslo suggested, could be an alternative to enlargement. Norway toned down its scepticism towards enlargement and the new tasks, partly for tactical reasons, including the fear of being viewed as the last “Cold Warrior” within the Alliance.

The Danish Defence Agreement 2000–2004, agreed in May 1999, was based on the conclusions of the 1997 Defence Commission report. It sought to shift the emphasis in the Armed Forces even further away from a mobilisation-based territorial defence towards crisis management. The Army’s contribution to NATO’s IRF was increased from a platoon-sized light reconnaissance unit to a company-sized unit, and the DIB was given an integrated helicopter unit. The Navy’s contribution to NATO was reduced, due to the overall reduction in platforms. The Air Force added radars and a logistical unit to its existing contribution. The Danish Home Guard was assigned more territorial defence tasks, in order to allow the other branches of the Armed Forces to focus more on international operations. All in all the change in the Danish force posture was not such a radical one, because the Armed Forces had already begun orienting themselves towards international operations before the engagement in the Balkans. As such, the defence agreements from 1995 to 2004 merely continued along a path staked out by the Defence Agreement for 1993–1994.

Norway, on the other hand, would experience a largely unanticipated radical shift in its defence posture around the turn of the millennium. Despite the engagement in the Balkans, the Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces 1999–2002 did not envisage radical changes to the Armed Forces. While noting the absence of a “military threat to Norway today”, the Government still expressed its concern that

159 Tamnes, Oljealden, 138–139.
161 Ulf Scheibye, “Fremtidens hjemmeværn”, Militært Tidsskrift 129, no. 3 (June 2000): 260–266.
security developments were plagued by uncertainty. The Armed Forces should still be designed to meet an invasion of Norwegian territory.

The Norwegian Armed Forces faced critical shortages of certain types of equipment in the late 1990s, especially the Army, where many units existed only on paper. According to the Chief of Defence, the Armed Forces were not receiving the resources they needed to maintain the structure laid down in the 1999–2002 long-term plan. In November 1998 he commissioned a defence study. It would become the first high-level proposal for a radical restructuring the Norwegian Armed Forces. The current total defence structure, designed to ensure national survival, was passé. The Armed Forces should be designed for more relevant scenarios requiring better and more responsive units. The latter required rapid deployment capabilities – for operations at home and internationally.

In June 1999, immediately following the Kosovo War, the Government presented a White Paper entitled *Adapting Norway’s Armed Forces to the Requirements of International Operations*. It proposed the creation of the Norwegian Army High Readiness Forces (FIST), which would be available for international operations. Norway now abolished the separation between NATO IRF and UN standby forces, something Denmark had already done in creating the DIB in November 1992. FIST would consist of units from the Army, Navy and Air Force, totalling approximately 3,500 soldiers. The Army’s contribution to the High Readiness Forces (FIST-H) would be one mechanized battalion for rapid-reaction, and one battalion equivalent of follow-on forces. For the first time the Army planned to deploy tanks and artillery in military operations outside Norway. The Navy would contribute a frigate, a submarine, a minesweeping vessel, a command-and-control vessel, four missile patrol boats and a platoon

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166 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Tilpasning av Forsvaret til deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner*.
of combat divers. The Air Force would contribute an F-16 squadron, four transport helicopters, a NASAMS equipped air-defence unit, two C-130 transport aircraft and a P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. In addition some unspecified Special Forces, intelligence and medical personnel would be made available. Significantly, the reform brought the level and capabilities of the Norwegian land units available for international operations close to those Denmark had possessed since the decision to create the DIB in 1992. However, it was still only a modification of the existing structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces, not a wholesale reform. However, such a reform soon followed.

In February 2001, the Norwegian Government presented the 2002–2005 Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces. It was informed by the findings of the 2000 Defence Study and Defence Policy Committee report of the same year.\textsuperscript{168} The Government was aware of the critical state of the Armed Forces, which were “not up to solving the tasks of the future”.\textsuperscript{169} According to the then Minister of Defence, Bjørn Tore Godal, this was a much more provocative formulation than what one would normally find in a government document.\textsuperscript{170} The white paper listed some of the problems Norway had experienced providing relevant rapid-reaction forces to NATO operations as examples of the problem. Despite considerable resources and highly qualified personnel, the Armed Forces in its present form lacked the capabilities required by the government. The Armed Forces had to increase mobility and flexibility, shorten reaction time, and make themselves ready for use nationally and in PSOs.

Because of the lack of a parliamentary majority, the plan was passed by Parliament with modifications. The Defence Policy Committee had proposed increasing the number of brigades retained from two to three, and questioned the proposal to phase out the Navy’s existing MTBs and not acquire the new Skjold class.\textsuperscript{171} Picking up on these suggestions, the Standing Committee on Defence recommended continued mothballing of some of the coastal artillery installations in preference to discarding them completely, acquiring new MTBs and maintaining the Home Guard at its present strength.\textsuperscript{172} In the end Parliament


\textsuperscript{170} Bjørn Tore Godal, Utsikter (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2003), 55.

\textsuperscript{171} Norwegian Defence Policy Committee of 1999, NOU 2000: 20, 82–83.

decided to maintain a larger Army and Navy than originally envisaged by the Government. The Home Guard remained at 83,000 troops, and the Army was cut from six to three brigades.\footnote{173} Despite these alterations, the main suggestions of the Chief of Defence and his staff were implemented.

One example of the evolution of a static in-place organisation into a more mobile one was the replacement by the Norwegian Navy of a territorial organisation in favour of a functional and radically centralised structure.\footnote{174} Another novelty which received widespread attention, was the creation of an Army battalion employing enlisted soldiers on three-year contracts rather than conscripts.\footnote{175} This professionalised Telemark Battalion was much more robust and capable than its predecessor, and could realistically be expected to participate in operations across the full range of military operations, including high-intensity operations, with a relatively short reaction time.\footnote{176} An attempt was made amongst the parties in Parliament to adopt the Danish system of broad, long-term defence agreements. This had been the recommendation of the 2000 Defence Policy Committee.\footnote{177} However, it proved impossible to reach any such broad-based settlement.\footnote{178}

As the 20th century drew to a close, Norway was emulating Denmark in replacing its Cold War invasion defence structure with a smaller, more deployable force. Something resembling a Norwegian brigade was now available for rapid deployment abroad, with forces so robust as to be realistically expected to take part in high-intensity warfare. Can one then reasonably talk about convergence between Danish and Norwegian defence policy in 2000–01? Indeed, overseas deployment capacity of the Norwegian and the Danish Armed Forces were now remarkably similar with the establishment of the FIST, particularly in qualitative terms. The Norwegian forces were as robust and capable of high-intensity operations as the Danish. Furthermore, Norwegian air and land combat forces in the Kosovo War represented a milestone in

Norwegian willingness to conduct actual warfare. The beginning of the new millennium thus marked a point in time at which Norway came to resemble Denmark in terms of capabilities and willingness to fight. However, this convergence was to prove short lived.
Chapter 3

In the aftermath of 9/11

The first decade of the new millennium saw Norwegian and Danish soldiers being sent to warzones in some unlikely places, namely Afghanistan and Iraq. Initially, relative parity existed between the forces deployed by the two countries and their missions in the theatres of operation, indicating convergence had taken place in the early years of the 2000s. However, in 2003 Denmark took part in the Iraq war as a belligerent state, while Norway’s participation was very limited. Then in 2004 Denmark undertook a radical transformation of its Armed Forces, turning them into a mostly professional expeditionary corps. This was followed in 2006 by a Danish decision to send combat forces to the war in southern Afghanistan, where Norway again chose not to participate.

This chapter describes Norwegian and Danish defence policy in the post-9/11 years, and shows how the two states continued to differ in the new millennium with regard to adapting their armed forces to expeditionary operations and willingness to participate in warfighting alongside their allies.

Afghanistan and Iraq

Following the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, Norway and Denmark made immediate and very similar contributions to the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In January 2002, a Danish Special Forces unit was despatched to Afghanistan, remaining in theatre until June. A Norwegian Special Forces unit was also in place by January 2002, and like their Danish colleagues remained until June. Among other tasks, the Danish and Norwegian Special Forces participated in Operation Anaconda in March 2002. Both states also sent support personnel
such as mine clearers, and a joint Danish-Norwegian-Dutch C-130 transport aircraft detachment was also in Afghanistan from March to September 2002.

At Washington’s request, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands despatched six F-16 combat aircraft each to Kyrgyzstan in October 2002. Their role was to provide combat air support to coalition forces in Afghanistan. During their tour of duty, aircraft from Denmark and Norway dropped live ammunition in support of friendly forces. For Norway, 27 January 2003 therefore became an historic date. While Danish forces had seen combat before, including bombings in Kosovo, for Norway these were reportedly the first official rounds fired at an enemy since 1945.\(^{179}\)

In the Balkans the Danes had always been quicker to send robust ground forces than the Norwegians. In Afghanistan it would initially be the other way around. In December 2003 Norway sent a company from the Telemark Battalion to Kabul, as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In July 2004 Norway also assumed responsibility as lead-nation in one of ISAF’s multinational battlegroups. In 2006 the Norwegian manoeuvre company moved from Kabul to Mazar-e Sharif in northern Afghanistan, where they were to provide the Quick Reaction Force for ISAF’s Regional Command North. Norway already had a military presence outside Kabul at this time. In September 2005, the Norwegian Armed Forces assumed responsibility for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Maymana from the United Kingdom.

While the Norwegians provided robust ground forces in Afghanistan, the Danes initially made only limited contributions. The Danish forces varied between 50 and 140 soldiers in 2003 and 2004, all in various support functions. In 2005, additional smaller Danish contributions were made to various PRTs in the north. In this initial PRT phase the Danish soldiers were more involved in rebuilding than combat operations.\(^{180}\) Not until autumn 2006 did any significant Danish ground forces arrive in Afghanistan, in the form of the light reconnaissance squadron from Bornholm, an artillery-locating radar team, and a civilian-military cooperation unit. All these new forces


were deployed in the south of Afghanistan, in support of the British PRT and ISAF’s regional headquarters in Kandahar. The total number of Danish soldiers in Afghanistan in 2006 rose to approximately 390.

The reason Denmark delayed so long in sending more forces to Afghanistan was not any greater reluctance to go, but simply that the Danish Army was overstretched. Unlike Norway, Denmark had joined the American-led “coalition of the willing” in Iraq. Danish participation in the multinational invasion of Iraq was argued to be necessary in order to help remove a threat to peace and security in the region. The initial contribution had comprised of a submarine, a corvette, and a medical detachment. In May 2003, the Danish Parliament also voted to contribute to the stabilisation forces in Iraq. The force was to be part of the British-led division in southern Iraq. The initial contribution consisted of a battalion with a reconnaissance squadron, a mechanized infantry detachment, military police and a civilian–military cooperation unit, totalling approximately 380 soldiers. By October it had proved necessary to reinforce the battalion with more military police, a full mechanized infantry company, and some engineers. This increased the size of the force to more than 500 soldiers. The Danish forces were periodically engaged in heavy urban warfare with Iraqi insurgents. Parallel to the military engagement, Danish civilian authorities were involved at many levels within the Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority.

Norway did not consider itself part of the coalition forces in Iraq. The Government decided to send military forces to Iraq only after the Security Council in May 2003 asked member states to assist in stabilising the country. An engineer company numbering approximately 136 soldiers, initially from the Telemark Battalion, was sent to the theatre two months later and stationed close to Basra in southern Iraq. Under British command, the company remained in Iraq until July 2004, when it was withdrawn. Only a few Norwegian staff officers remained in Iraq, along with a few Norwegian NATO instructors for the Iraqi Army. The Norwegian battalion in Kosovo was similarly

wound down in July 2004 in order to allow the Armed Forces to focus on Afghanistan.\(^{185}\)

Due to the challenge of being engaged in three geographically separate regions (Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan), while being dimensioned for just two, the Danish Army was overstretched.\(^{186}\) This overcommitment of the Danish Armed Forces has been described as a small-state version of imperial overstretch.\(^{187}\) Not until its engagement in Iraq was wound down, ending in August 2007, were the Danish Armed Forces able to project considerable forces to Afghanistan. Once disentangled from Iraq, the Danish Armed Forces became heavily involved in Afghanistan. In May 2007 it was decided to send a Danish battalion to make up a part of the British Task Force Helmand, while reducing or winding down the participation in the PRTs in the north. The number of Danish soldiers deployed in Afghanistan was estimated to rise to approximately 640. The engagement also soon took on a qualitatively new nature. In October 2007, the Danish Government decided to send an armoured platoon to Afghanistan, making Denmark one of the few countries to deploy tanks in the theatre. In June 2008 a detachment of four Fennec reconnaissance/observation helicopters were also ordered to Helmand province.

The Danish engagement in Afghanistan came later than the Norwegian one, but it was of a very different nature. Firstly, and unlike most nations contributing troops to ISAF, Denmark placed no national caveats on its deployed troops.\(^{188}\) Secondly, immediately after ISAF took over responsibility from the American Operation Enduring Freedom in southern Afghanistan, Danish troops became involved in continuous combat in the region. The first major encounter was in August 2006, when the Danish light reconnaissance squadron endured 36 days of heavy combat defending the village of Musa Qala against the Taliban. An estimated 25 enemy combatants were killed during the siege, and several Danish soldiers were wounded.\(^{189}\) The light reconnaissance squadron continued to engage regularly with the Taliban

189 Ringsmose, “Heltene fra Musa Qala”; see also Johannesen, De danske tigre.
thereafter. The unit employed their light weapons, mortars, 84mm recoilless rifles and coalition air support during Operation Medusa and Sarwe in September 2006.\textsuperscript{190} But while the Danes participated willingly, the Norwegian government actively resisted calls by NATO allies to allow for deployment of its forces in southern Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{191}

Two years later it was more or less routine for Danish forces to engaging the Taliban in fire fights. On 5 January 2008, Danish tanks were once again engaged in combat: the first time since Bosnia in 1994. On this occasion, Danish tanks fired 20 rounds from their main guns in the battle.\textsuperscript{192} In October 2008, the Danish battalion in Helmand engaged in another major operation, in which speculative reports claimed that 30 to 50 Taliban insurgents may have been killed.\textsuperscript{193}

The most dramatic incident for the Norwegian forces in Afghanistan occurred 7 February 2006, when the Norwegian PRT in Maymana came under attack. Six Norwegian soldiers were injured, and four Afghans killed.\textsuperscript{194} Perhaps the engagement most resembling regular combat occurred in early November 2007, when Norwegian soldiers from the Quick Reaction Force engaged insurgents with small arms, heavy weapons and air support.\textsuperscript{195} This was the first time the CV9030N IFVs were used in combat, and the first time Norwegian ground forces called in coalition air support.\textsuperscript{196} Nevertheless, for Norwegian combat forces in the north the service in Afghanistan was much less hazardous than for the Danes in the south, and direct combat with the enemy was the exception rather than the norm. Danish and Norwegian casualties reflected this. By September 2009 Denmark had lost 25 soldiers in Afghanistan, most of them as a result of direct combat with the Taliban. By comparison, Norway had lost four soldiers due to enemy action.

\textsuperscript{190} Thomas Larsen, \textit{Dagbog fra Afghanistan} (Copenhagen: Borgen, 2008), 22–36.
\textsuperscript{191} Michael Evans, Richard Beeston, and Roger Boyes, “You must do a lot more to pull your weight, Nato chief chides refuseniks”, \textit{Times}, 13 September 2006; Anne Vinding, Camilla Ryste, and Ingunn Andersen, “Norge sier nei til NATO”, \textit{Verdens Gang}, 18 October 2006.
\textsuperscript{192} Christian Reinhold, “Kampvognene for alvor i ilden”, (Copenhagen: Forsvarskommando, 14 January 2008).
\textsuperscript{193} Mari Åsland, “– Danske soldater drepte opptil femti Taliban-opprørere”, \textit{Aftenposten}, 26 October 2008.
Defence reforms 2002–08

While SHIRBRIG, as we saw previously, was a Danish project in which Norway followed with some reluctance, the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) was different. It was established in 1997 in order to facilitate Nordic cooperation in PSOs, replacing the Nordic Cooperation Group for Military UN matters. In 2003 it was agreed to set up a NORDCAPS force catalogue with the purpose of providing a Nordic multinational brigade for UN, OSCE, NATO, and UN operations.197 Norway and Denmark both offered their available international deployable forces for NORDCAPS, Denmark the DIB and Norway the FIST. While the Danish Army contribution was more robust than Norway’s, including armour and self-propelled artillery, the Norwegian Air Force and Navy contributed considerably more than their Danish counterparts.198 The force catalogue was never employed, and was eventually declared obsolete in May 2006 due to functional overlap with other multilateral force pools.199 Nevertheless, it does demonstrate the change in Norwegian capability and willingness to use military forces abroad. While SHIRBRIG was initiated when Denmark had just experienced success with employing its Armed Forces actively abroad, Norway’s Armed Forces at that time remained focused on the defence of Norwegian territory. When the NORDCAPS brigade pool was created, Norway was in a position to offer a much larger force thanks to the establishment of the FIST in June 1999, and the implementation of the new Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces 2002–2005.

However, just as Norway was starting on the path towards creating an expeditionary unit similar in robustness and size of the DIB, Denmark downgraded territorial defence further and took steps to make international operations the effective raison d’être of the Danish Armed Forces. The new Danish Defence Agreement 2005–2009 took the final step away from invasion defence. Since the radical shift occurred in November 1992, with the decision to create the DIB, the Danish Armed Forces had remained in principle unchanged. While units intended for international operations in the following two defence agreements received more attention and resources, the old Cold

198 See Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, Table 8.1 NORDCAPS force pool (2004), 210.
War structure of long-term conscription and static mobilisation defence forces remained.\textsuperscript{200} The 2004 Defence Agreement did away with this legacy force structure, replacing it with a two-pillar structure: a professional expeditionary force and a total defence force.\textsuperscript{201}

The agreement was not preceded by defence commission inquiry, though a smaller working group had been appointed, chaired by the diplomat Hans Henrik Bruun. Presenting its report in August 2003, the group reiterated the findings of the 1997 Defence Commission: there was no direct territorial threat to Denmark. The group went further and concluded that the remaining territorial defence capacity in the Danish Armed Forces was no longer needed, nor was there any need to retain a base from which to regenerate such a force. A small state such as Denmark had limited ability to sustain a sizable force in PSOs abroad. In order to make more effective and visible contributions, the group therefore recommended specialising in delivering rapidly deployable initial-entry forces, capable of taking part in high-intensity warfighting operations alongside allied forces.\textsuperscript{202}

Signed in June 2004, the new Defence Agreement aimed at increasing the ability to deploy military forces internationally, and of the Armed Forces to combat terrorism and its effects.\textsuperscript{203} The agreement drew inspiration from the new US national security strategy from June 2002, as well as the creation of the US Department of Homeland Security in January 2003.\textsuperscript{204} Support functions were now only to be dimensioned by the military’s operational units, and the Army was reduced to the Danish Division with two mechanized infantry brigades. The 1\textsuperscript{st} Brigade would be a standing brigade with mostly regular serving personnel, available for NATO on high readiness. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade would consist of personnel on reaction-contracts, as well as soldiers receiving basic training. The Navy would receive three new frigates and two flexible support ships, primarily to participate in international military operations far away from Denmark.\textsuperscript{205} This was a marked improvement, because most of the existing Cold War era materiel in

\textsuperscript{200} Ringsmose and Rynning, “The Impeccable Ally?” , 59.
\textsuperscript{202} Hans Henrik Bruun, et al., De sikkerhedspolitiske vilkår for dansk forsvarsopolitik (Copenhagen: Danish MFA, August 2003).
\textsuperscript{203} Danish Ministry of Defence, Aftale om forsvarets ordning 2005–2009 (Copenhagen: Danish MoD, 10 June 2004), 1.
\textsuperscript{204} Bruun et al., De sikkerhedspolitiske vilkår, 24.
the Navy had been intended solely for operations in the Baltic and the North Sea.\textsuperscript{206} The Danish Air Force also aspired to become an expeditionary air force, phasing out elements intended primarily to defend Danish airspace in favour of deployable capabilities seen as relevant for international military operations.\textsuperscript{207}

The new defence agreement scrapped Denmark’s submarines, along with the ground-based air defence composed of DeHawk missiles. By slaughtering the “sacred cows” of the mobilisation forces and two whole weapon categories, it was possible for the Danish Armed Forces to develop credible deployable capabilities with the limited resources available.\textsuperscript{208} Conscription was reduced to four months, and trained personnel who did not enlist in the regular forces would spend three years as mobilisation personnel in a new total-defence force of 12,000 lightly-armed troops. This new total-defence force would be employed, along with the police and the Home Guard, according to a total-defence concept.\textsuperscript{209} A key task would be to defend society against the threat of international terrorism. After the implementation of the agreement, the Danish Armed Forces would have standing forces capable of rapidly responding to international crises, as well as to constantly maintain approximately 2,000 troops in international military operations.\textsuperscript{210} This doubling in the number of deployable troops would come at no extra cost to the Danish taxpayer, since the defence budget remained effectively fixed.\textsuperscript{211}

In March 2004 the Norwegian Government presented its Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces 2005–2008.\textsuperscript{212} Coming only three months prior to the new Danish defence agreement, it showed how much Norwegian defence planning had changed since the Kosovo War. The Norwegian defence force envisaged by new long-term plan looked remarkably similar to the Danish Armed Forces. But while the goals and tasks of the defence forces in both countries were now almost

\textsuperscript{209} Danish Minister of Defence, Et robust og sikkert samfund: Regeringens politik for beredskabet i Danmark (Copenhagen: Danish MoD, June 2005).
\textsuperscript{210} Danish Ministry of Defence, Aftale om ... 2005–2009, 5.
identical, the Norwegian Armed Forces retained a greater focus on purely national tasks.\footnote{Norwegian Ministry of Defence, \textit{Komparativ analyse av det danske og norske forsvaret} (Oslo: Norwegian MoD, 31 January 2005), 4.}

The Norwegian long-term plan at least theoretically did away with the distinction between units envisaged for national defence and units intended for international operations. All units in the Armed Forces were now in principle available for operations outside national territory.\footnote{The Border Guard battalion in Kirkenes and the Royal Guard battalion in Oslo were the exceptions.} In practice, this would be less the case for Norway than Denmark, however, given the former’s decision to retain long-term conscription. In Denmark, only the units performing the basic four month training of the conscripts would be unavailable for international deployments. The 1\textsuperscript{st} Brigade would be available to respond rapidly to international crises, while the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade would maintain the Danish Army’s long-term commitments abroad.

In Norway, only the Telemark Battalion within the Brigade North would be a standing unit composed of volunteers. The other deployable units within the brigade would consist of personnel on readiness contracts. The entire brigade would be available for deployment internationally; this was the first time Norway adopted a policy allowing a brigade-sized expeditionary force.\footnote{Norwegian Ministry of Defence, \textit{Den videre moderniseringen … 2005–2008}, 61–63.} However, the Norwegian brigade would have a considerably longer reaction time than the Danish.\footnote{Norwegian Ministry of Defence, \textit{Komparativ analyse}, 61.} Also, the intended tasks were different. The Danish 1\textsuperscript{st} Brigade was envisaged in a “first in – first out” capacity, capable of high-intensity coalition warfare,\footnote{Poul Kiærskou, “Forberedelse til indsatse i den internationale mission”, \textit{Militært Tidsskrift} 132, no. 4 (December 2003): 565–566.} while the Norwegian brigade was more likely to be deployed as a rotating brigade in an ongoing operation.

The primary tasks of the Norwegian Navy would be national, but it should also have sufficient capacity to contribute to international military operations. Taking part in and possibly leading NATO’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic were particularly mentioned.\footnote{Norwegian Ministry of Defence, \textit{Den videre moderniseringen … 2005–2008}, 63–65.} The Navy would get new, high quality equipment, including five new frigates and six new MTBs. Thus, while the Danes were investing in capabilities designed primarily for expeditionary operations, particularly units of the
Army, the Norwegians were allocating resources to the Navy, the focus of which remained basically national.219

Both in Norway and Denmark the respective 2004 defence plans transformed the Home Guard into a force designed for assisting the police and civilian authorities, e.g. with combating terrorism. Both created a prioritised reaction force within their guard, of 5,000 and 3,000 soldiers respectively. This force would be able to react rapidly, and be better trained and equipped than their regular Home Guard units. In Norway, an additional 20,000 strong reinforcement force would make up a mobile component of the guard, another 25,000 would be available for securing vital infrastructure, and an untrained pool of 33,000 soldiers would make up a reserve force. In Denmark the 50,000 strong guard was divided into an active and a passive component, with about 23,000 members active as of December 2007. The Danish Home Guard remained more specialised than the Norwegian one, having, for example, a dedicated Police Home Guard tasked with providing assistance to the civilian police.

In February 2004, as part of the process to establish a European Rapid Reaction Force, the United Kingdom, France and Germany agreed to establish battalion-sized EU battlegroups available for rapid deployment. In November 2004, Norway, declared together with Sweden and Finland that it would contribute to building a Nordic multinational EU battlegroup, the Nordic Battlegroup. The Norwegian contribution would consist of about 200 soldiers, serving in support functions such as medical service, logistics and strategic lift.220 Due to the Danish reservations against the European security and defence policy (ESDP), Denmark did not participate in the battlegroup.221 However, according to the 2004 Defence Agreement, the structure of the Danish Armed Forces would be such that an immediate entry into the ESDP would be possible following a lifting of the Danish reservation.222 This nevertheless represented a departure from earlier practice in relation to Nordic multinational forces, where Denmark had normally taken the lead. The self-imposed Danish restrictions thus allowed Norway to become a more active player in an important new

219 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Komparativ analyse, 63.
joint multinational military venture than Denmark, a change from the earlier trend of the mid-1990s characterised by Danish activism and Norwegian reluctance.\footnote{See e.g. Pernille Rieker, “Norway and the ESDP: Explaining Norwegian Participation in the EU’s Security Policy”, \textit{European Security} 15, no. 3 (September 2006): 288–291.}

In January 2005, a new law on military personnel in the Norwegian Armed Forces came into effect, creating a new class of professional, non-commissioned officers (NCOs).\footnote{Norwegian Ministry of Defence, “LOV 2004-07-02 nr 59: Lov om personell i Forsvaret”, (2004).} Introducing the new law, the Norwegian Government noted how the Armed Forces had suffered from a surplus of older and a lack of qualified younger officers and NCOs to command lower-level units. A reform of the personnel structure of the military was therefore necessary.\footnote{Norwegian Ministry of Defence, \textit{Om lov om personell i Forsvaret}, Proposition to the Storting, no. 60 (2003–2004), 11–17.} In essence, Norway embraced the Danish model of professional NCOs, explicitly modelling its new NCO corps on the Danish system.\footnote{Pål Remy Østbye, \textit{Støtte til militærfaglig utredning 2003 (MFU 03) – utredning om befalsordning, FFI/RAPPORT-2003/01485, (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2003).}

In January 2008, a new Defence Study was presented by the Norwegian Chief of Defence, calling for further professionalisation of the Norwegian Armed Forces.\footnote{Norwegian Chief of Defence, \textit{Forsvarets Forsvarsstudie 2007: Sluttrapport} (Oslo: Norwegian MoD, 2007).} It recommended slashing the MTBs, reducing the Home Guard to 30,000 troops and converting two conscript battalions to a volunteer battalion. The Defence Policy Committee agreed with most of the military recommendations, though it wanted to retain one conscripted manoeuvre battalion while adding the one professional battalion. It also wanted a 40,000 strong Home Guard.\footnote{Norwegian Defence Policy Committee of 2006, NOU 2007:15 \textit{Et styrket forsvar} (Oslo: Departementenes servicetcenter, Informasjonsforvaltning, 31 October 2007), 58–60.}

In March 2008, the Norwegian Government presented its new Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces 2009–2012, based on the Defence Policy Committee’s recommendations.\footnote{Norwegian Ministry of Defence, \textit{Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier}, Proposition to the Storting, 48 (2007–2008).} The overall structure of the Armed Forces would remain basically the same, but lowering the number of bases and units would help streamline the organisation. There was an increased focus on responsiveness, to be accomplished by increasing the number of regular contracted soldiers and soldiers on reaction-contracts. However, the most controversial proposal put
forward by the Chief of Defence, to replace the two conscript-based manoeuvre battalions in Brigade North with an all-volunteer battalion, was rejected. The MTBs were also retained, and the Home Guard was given an authorised strength of 45,000. Norway therefore did not choose to move as radically towards an all-volunteer force as Denmark did. While rejecting further professionalisation of the Army, contrary to Denmark’s decision four years previously, the Norwegian authorities did follow Denmark in moving towards a new total-defence concept, aimed amongst other things at combating terrorism.  

Understanding the 1990–2008 difference

The preceding three chapters have outlined the development of Danish and Norwegian defence policy from approximately 1990 to 2008. While the two nations’ armed forces shared similar missions and force postures around 1990, a decade later these missions and postures had become very different indeed. While differences had narrowed somewhat after the Norwegian defence reforms in 1999 and 2001, they nevertheless grew again once Denmark abolished territorial defence and long-term conscription altogether in 2004.

Anthony Forester, in his 2006 study of armed forces and society in Europe, argues that in the 21st century, the armed forces of Denmark and Norway parted ways, and now belonged in his view to different categories. While Norway retained a territorial defence model, the type of armed forces both countries had possessed during the Cold War, Denmark had transformed its military into a late modern force.  

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231 Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe, 53–65.
Table 2: Different typologies of armed forces

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<tr>
<th>Territorial Defence Model</th>
<th>Late Modern Model</th>
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<td>Have generally been willing to engage in peacekeeping tasks only to a very limited degree, with still less enthusiasm for high intensity peacemaking and war-fighting operations, and relatively few resources have therefore been allocated to the development of a rapidly deployable forces.</td>
<td>[Has a] dual mission providing what might be termed a “residual Territorial Defence function”, but in parallel a commitment to provide a significant contribution as a proportion of overall sizes to international peacekeeping.</td>
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Denmark had also moved towards a war-fighting focused conceptualisation of peacekeeping, Forester suggests, which included high-intensity warfare, and was more willing to make use of force without a Security Council mandate, when circumstances required action (the so-called post-Westphalia position).232 This change in Danish policy had contributed to inverting the Cold War era transatlantic relationships of Norway and Denmark. During the Cold War Atlanticism had been stronger in Norway than in Denmark, and it was the former country that had led the latter into NATO.233 In the 21st century the tables had turned. Denmark and the United States were now criticising Norway for its supposedly inadequate effort in Afghanistan.234 Danish efforts in expeditionary warfighting had boosted its reputation in NATO as a country that contributed to the Alliance in both treasure and blood, and were awarded with several high-profile summits between Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen and President Bush.235

It is important to reiterate once more that we are talking about a difference of degree. While the Danish Armed Forces have experienced a stronger reorientation towards international operations than the Norwegian, the latter are nevertheless said to have undergone one of the greatest public-sector reforms in modern Norwegian history.236 Also,

232 Ibid., 217, 205.
while it is true that Danes were more willing to take part in high-intensity combat than the Norwegians, comparison with the US or UK paints a different picture.\(^{237}\) Finally, while the Danish military has been more positive towards an all-volunteer force than the Norwegian Armed Forces, Norway and Denmark nevertheless are two of the last NATO countries with any conscription at all.\(^{238}\) Thus one should not overemphasise the differences between Norway and Denmark compared to other countries.\(^{239}\)

Nevertheless, there are substantial differences, and they need to be accounted for. Why did Denmark pay more attention and allocate more resources to international military operations than Norway, and why were the Danes much more willing to engage in combat operations in risky areas of the world? The following four chapters will examine one by one the four main factors identified as driving this early and persistent reform of the Danish Armed Forces for deployment in expeditionary missions, and will also explain the more measured pace of the Norwegian military transformation. When viewed together, these factors provide the answer to the second research question, why Norway and Denmark’s defence policies differed after the Cold War.

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238 Of the 19 "old" members of NATO, only Germany, Greece, Turkey, Norway and Denmark retained conscription in 2008, and of the 10 "new" members only Estonia. Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe, 163–164.

The impact of geopolitics

Norway has access to rich natural resources in vast ocean areas, and borders on to a great power in the north. These two factors largely define Norway’s regional dimension.

The 2004 Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces

With its newly gained and unique level of security in relation to traditional conventional threats, Denmark in the 1990s developed an interest in preserving the global and especially regional framework for this security.

The 2003 Bruun report on Danish defence policy

A key factor causing the difference in Norwegian and Danish defence policy after the Cold War was their different geopolitical situations. Even with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Norway was left with two geopolitical problems which precluded a radical and immediate reorientation towards expeditionary operations: the shared border with Russia and the huge and partially disputed maritime economic zones. Denmark, on the other hand, faced neither a lingering territorial threat nor the same need to exercise authority and sovereignty in its maritime economic zones. These geopolitical differences facilitated the rapid transformation of the Danish Armed Forces and its employment abroad, while forcing Norway to remain focused upon national issues even in the post-Cold War era.

This chapter accounts for the different geopolitical calculations made by Norwegian and Danish policymakers after the Cold War, in

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241 Bruun et al., *De sikkerhedspolitiske vilkår*, 19.
particular in the areas of defence reform and weapons procurement. It argues that their different geopolitical situations allowed for the rapid Danish reorientation towards international deployment, but barred Norway from pursuing a similarly rapid and radical change of priorities.

The security environment of the 1990s

That the disappearance of a territorial threat opens up a space for reorienting the armed forces is hardly unique to Denmark. Karl W. Haltiner, in his study of the decline of mass armies in Europe, finds that countries closely integrated into multilateral security institutions, and facing no territorial threat, have reoriented their armed forces more towards standing, volunteer forces intended for expeditionary operations.242 In this, Denmark and Norway seem to be no exceptions. The Danish academic Bertel Heurlin finds that, for all the Nordic states, geographical proximity to Russia provides a major source of explanation for the degree of change away from territorial defence after the Cold War. Norway, Sweden and Finland all shared proximity to, and therefore continued to feel uneasy about, their giant neighbour in the east. Denmark, however, was suddenly surrounded by friendly states on its east flank, acting as a buffer against Russia.243

By the early 1990s local Danish and German air and sea forces were able to counter all likely threats in Denmark’s vicinity. The Danish Army had consequently only a very limited operational role on Danish territory.244 A number of official acts and inquiries coming directly on the eve of the Cold War recognised Denmark’s new security situation, and were instrumental in moving official Danish policy towards a more comprehensive view of security.245 Denmark’s relocation from the frontlines to the backwater of the Alliance thus made it possible to reorient the Armed Forces, and especially the Army, towards crisis management away from Denmark proper.246 Thus, from an early point in the post-Cold War era the disappearance of a concrete threat to Danish territory

246 Lyng et al., Ved forenede krafter, 268.
enabled Denmark to direct its defence policy towards combating chaos on the fringes of the international system. Heurlin argues that since Denmark was “faced with an international environment without any possible conventional military threats, the only usable choice for the Danish military was in international operations.” The Armed Forces were also transformed into a foreign policy instrument in order to retain influence in the new NATO, and especially with the sole superpower. As the Danish journalist Jørgen Dragsdahl expresses it: “[the Armed Forces] are to be visible and harvest good-will in Washington”. Heurlin thus sees the shift towards expeditionary operations as a result of Denmark’s altered geopolitical position.

Indeed the Danish relationship with the American superpower has been central in post-Cold War Danish security policy. Hans Hækkerup, Minister of Defence 1993–2000, stated that Denmark aimed to be America’s best friend. Per Stig Møller, the foreign minister of Denmark since 2001, emphasised the tremendous benefits to Denmark of the close bilateral ties it enjoyed with the US. This close relationship was seen as giving Denmark a say in the major international issues of the day. Announcing Denmark’s intention of joining the American coalition in the Gulf in 2003, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen argued that supporting the United States would always be in Denmark’s interests.

The Danish political scientist Hans Mouritzen further argues that with German unification Denmark faced the unpleasant scenario of being placed in Germany’s shadow once more. The EU served as a way of preventing this, by tying Germany into a European political structure from which it could be controlled. However, without full integration in the EU, due to the opt-out on defence, a strong and well-functioning NATO would have to serve as the Danish instrument for tying Germany down effectively. Denmark’s “opt-out” from the European security and defence policy in 1992–93 served to make the

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249 Ibid., 118.


251 Hækkerup, På skansen, 40.

252 Interview with Per Stig Møller in Kvist and Skipper, Udenrigsminister, 420–426.

253 Bjerre, Larsen, and Stougaard, Blindt ind i Basra, 78.

country all the more dependent upon NATO and its relationship with the United States.\textsuperscript{255}

Henning Sørensen, unlike Heurlin and Mouritzen, sees the transformation as less of a necessity and rather more of a luxury. The increased sense of security after the Cold War allowed Denmark, Sørensen argues, to move towards selective security, allowing the state to employ its Armed Forces to deal with problems that did not directly constitute an existential threat to Denmark. The structure of the armed forces came to reflect this selective security environment, offering soldiers a number of different options depending upon what kind of service they wanted to render state and society, rather than universal conscription designed to defend the survival of the nation.\textsuperscript{256} However, whether they see the new Danish Armed Forces as a necessity or matter of choice, both Heurlin and Sørensen agree that Denmark’s changed geopolitical circumstances was the main engine driving the change in mission and organisation of the Armed Forces.

But while Danish officers and politicians in the early 1990s were wondering in public “where is the front?”,\textsuperscript{257} and looked for new tasks for the armed forces, there was little such existential soul-searching among the Norwegian officer corps and political leadership. According to Norwegian historian Olav Riste, Norway’s next-door neighbour gave the country “good reasons for seeing that the end of the Cold War was not ‘the end of History’”.\textsuperscript{258} The massive military presence in the Leningrad Military District did not disappear overnight, nor did the Northern Fleet in the Kola Peninsula, with its strategic nuclear missile submarines. Russian democracy was seen as unstable, and Russia still had an unsolved territorial dispute with Norway. Russia remained a source of long-standing uncertainty, to which Riste attributes the relative stability of Norwegian defence spending after the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{259} Even if Russia slashed its military spending to a normal European level, there would still exist a huge local military disparity

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{256} Sørensen, “Denmark: From Obligation to Option”. See also Henning Sørensen, “Den selektive soldat”, \textit{CS Bladet} 38, no. 2 (March 2008): 9–10.
\bibitem{258} Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations, 277.
\bibitem{259} Ibid., 277–278.
\end{thebibliography}
between Norway and Russia. The Norwegian historian Rolf Tamnes similarly shows an awareness in the Norwegian government of certain persisting geostrategic factors after the Cold War. Norway was still located “within the Russian great power sphere of influence”, and the great natural resources located in the partially disputed northern areas were seen as a potential source of conflict with Moscow. Norwegian security and defence policy therefore exhibited greater continuity in the post-Cold War era than in most other NATO countries, at least prior to the eastern enlargement.

The guiding principle of Norwegian defence planning throughout the 1990s was the continued possibility of a military invasion of northern Norway. To Norwegian intelligence, the strategic importance to Russia of the High North had grown, and Russian forces in the region were deemed to be sufficient to launch an isolated attack on northern Norway. There remained uncertainty in Norway about Russia’s actual stability in the 1990s, due to the economic woes and political instability plaguing the country. The Armed Forces also needed to maintain sufficient air and sea power to conduct surveillance and exercise authority and sovereignty in the Norwegian maritime economic zones, a mission with increased importance as Norway began to develop oil and gas resources further north.

The Norwegian view of the importance of geopolitical continuity was shared by prominent politicians in Denmark. That geopolitics played an important role in creating different defence policies is certainly the impression of the former Danish Minister of Defence, Hans Hækkerup. “[H]aving Russia as a neighbour rather than the Soviet Union does not make much of a difference”, he says by way of explaining the continuation of Norway’s territorial defence posture. Denmark had a much stronger sense of a sudden change in the geopolitical situation, which facilitated the move from invasion defence towards an expeditionary defence posture. In particular, Poland’s transforma-
tion from foe to friend drove this change in threat perception. Poland’s accession to NATO, says Hækkerup, was supported so enthusiastically by Denmark because it “would change Denmark’s geographical placement decisively”. 268

Like Hækkerup, former Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs Uffe Ellemann-Jensen also sees Danish assertiveness as partly driven by its new geopolitical circumstances. Danish policy on the Baltic states towards the end of the Cold War and after was about, says Ellemann-Jensen, exploiting the window for action which had suddenly opened, further facilitated by Denmark’s dual membership of both NATO and the EU. 269 Danish outspokenness on the Baltic issue can hence be explained at least in part by its strategic distance from Moscow. 270 By way of contrast, Norway did not share Denmark’s vital interests in the Baltic region, being more concerned about the Barents Sea. Further, Norway’s shared border with Russia made it wary of opposing Russian interests. 271 Clive Archer describes Norway’s policy as having been “Russia first”, which was also the case for Sweden and Finland. Only Denmark gave priority to the relationship with the Baltic states. 272 Thus, while Denmark during the Cold War could hardly be defended, the post-Cold War world left Denmark safely at a distance from “the realities of great power politics”. 273

Norway’s huge maritime economic zones also tied down a great deal of Norway’s military resources. Between 1977 and 1980 the enlargement of the maritime economic zones to 200 nautical miles had given Norway approximately two million km² of oceanic territory. This huge area had to be managed, under conditions where the legal rights of Norwegian authorities to do so were constantly challenged. 274 The discovery of large quantities of petroleum in the North Sea in

268 Ibid., 15.
269 Interview with Uffe Ellemann-Jensen in Kvist and Skipper, Udenrigsminister, 227–228.
273 Tamnes, “Norsk forsvarsaktivitett i dag og i morgen”, 64.
274 Tamnes, Oljealder, 279–283, 305–316; Børresen et al., Alliansesforsvar i endring, 272–273.
1969 had also given Norway new responsibilities, and by the 1990s Norway had become the world’s second largest producer of oil, and Europe’s second largest source of natural gas. While the direct defence implications were modest, being mainly the responsibility of the Special Forces, the growing importance of Norway’s energy resources was frequently invoked as a reason why the country needed to maintain air and sea forces capable of maintaining situation awareness and exercising authority and sovereignty in its maritime economic zones.

**Reforms in the 21st century**

The difference in their respective geopolitical situations seems to offer several convincing reasons for Norwegian continuity and Danish change in defence policy after the Cold War. The question then becomes, if proximity to Russia and oceanic jurisdiction favoured continuity in the territorial defence posture of the Norwegian Armed Forces, why then did Norway choose to reform its military in the early 21st century? Did geopolitics diminish in importance around the turn of the millennium? I argue that geopolitics still played a prominent role, but that circumstances had changed since the early 1990s.

Firstly, Norway experienced a similar problem to Denmark: diminishing allied interest in its territory. As one Norwegian foreign minister expressed the attitude in Washington, “the problem with Norway is that there is no problem with Norway”. Like Denmark, Norway could no longer maintain a relationship with the United States based simply on American interests in Norway’s strategic location. Providing Norwegian forces for US-led multilateral military operations, mostly within NATO, consequently became a new way of maintaining friendly relations with the sole remaining superpower. In doing so, Norway hoped to sustain NATO and by association the American security guaranty that made up the cornerstone of the Alliance. It became a

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275 Rolf Tamnes, ”Norske petroleumsressurser i et utenrikspolitislt perspektiv”, in NATO 50 år: Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk med NATO gjennom 50 år, ed. Chris Prebensen and Nils Skarland (Oslo: Den norske Atlanterhavskomite, 1999).
276 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Styrke og relevans, 43–44.
277 Tamnes, Oljepalder, 139–145.
278 Jonas Gahr Støre, Å gjøre en forskjell: Refleksjoner fra en norsk utenriksminister (Oslo: Capellen Damms, 2008), 141.
common understanding among the political leadership that if Norway expected to receive allied assistance when needed, the country had to contribute to the alliance in turn.\textsuperscript{281} It is indicative that when the new long-term plan, initially unveiled in 2001, began to be implemented, it was warmly welcomed by top NATO officials.\textsuperscript{282}

However, even as Norway reformed its Armed Forces in response to NATO’s call for a more modern and expeditionary-capable force, it was always done with a view to keeping NATO’s classic collective defence role relevant.\textsuperscript{283} In a bid to justify sending Norwegian troops to Afghanistan, Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre emphasised Norway’s need of the Alliance given its particular location, geography and resources.\textsuperscript{284}

Secondly, the nature of the threat from the east changed after the Cold War. Specifically, the deterioration of the Russian military, and advancements made in military technology, had affected Norway’s strategic environment. Norway’s shift away from conscripted reserve units and towards more regular contracted units in 2001 was therefore in some respects driven by the realisation that Russia continued to be a potential threat, but that scenarios involving Russia had changed from the threat of a massive Russian military invasion to more limited scenarios.

That the Russian conventional forces had decreased tremendously in size and capabilities in the decade after the Cold War, even in the Kola Peninsula, was something of which the Norwegian authorities were keenly aware.\textsuperscript{285} Qualitative reforms in the Russian Armed Forces meant that Russia was also expected to develop more limited means of accomplishing their military objectives, such as stand-off guided munitions, rather than having to carry out a full-scale conventional ground invasion.\textsuperscript{286} In the Norwegian defence establishment, the large, mobilisation-based, relatively static invasion defence army therefore came to be seen as increasingly unsuitable to the most likely scenarios involving Russian forces. A massive invasion designed to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{284} Maria Reinertsen, “I krig for freden”, Morgenbladet, 16 February 2007.
\item \textsuperscript{285} Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005, 28–29.
\item \textsuperscript{286} Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, 122.
\end{itemize}
take control of most of Norway now seemed very implausible. Rather, limited Russian military operations against Norway were more likely, designed to achieve limited aims. Under these circumstances better and more mobile units, with shorter reaction times, would be required to win in this type of limited warfare scenario.  

287 Crisis management replaced invasion defence as the main task of the Norwegian military units in northern Norway. 288 The seriousness of these new tasks was underlined by the heightened probability that an actor could use limited force in or near Norway, since such a limited conflict would not automatically escalate. 289 Under these circumstances, quality and response time became more important for the Norwegian Armed Forces than quantity and endurance.

Thirdly, and finally, the importance of the Norwegian maritime economic zones increased in the new century. This was due to its abundant food resources, the promise of significant oil and gas deposits in the region and its role as a maritime transport hub to and from Asia via the Northeast Passage. 290 By 2008, the Norwegian Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen considered strategic competition over access to these resources as the most likely source of conflict in the region. It would most likely take the form of a tactical confrontation involving mainly air and sea forces, and possibly short-term air or sea-launched raids with limited land forces against valuable military and economic targets. 291

These new tasks required mobile and flexible forces, available all year, with short reaction times and the ability to work alongside units from allied countries. In short, virtually the same kind of units needed for participation in international operations abroad. 292 The Coastal Artillery provided a good example. Because technology had made fixed coastal artillery vulnerable, the Coastal Artillery was converted in 1998 into smaller, more agile, high-technological, mobile forces. Its successor, the Coastal Ranger Command, established in 2001 to train

conscripts, gradually became a standing, volunteer force. In the fall of 2005, the unit was active with four Combat Boat 90s on an exercise with British and Dutch marines off the coast of Senegal, and had a reconnaissance squad in Afghanistan, while maintaining readiness for contingencies in Norway. Thus the new organisation proved equally employable on Norwegian territory as on the global arena.

Similar to the Coastal Artillery, the Norwegian Army had remained bound throughout the 1990s to a static defence concept, and was only really capable of tactical mobility in the mountainous Troms county. Such limited tactical mobility was now no longer sufficient; the Army needed to be rapidly strategically deployable and capable of winning in limited scenarios. The threat of vertical envelopment created by an increasingly air-mobile Russian military further made the old, relatively static defensive concept unsuitable for modern conditions. The new, smaller Army had increased availability, responsiveness, mobility, firepower and protection, and at least parts of it would in principle be equally capable of deploying to win a limited tactical engagement in northern Afghanistan as in northern Norway.

Even as the Norwegian Armed Forces grew remarkably similar to the Danish military after 2001, the motives for the Norwegian reforms were nevertheless different. The justification for restructuring towards a smaller number of volunteer units was not solely or even primarily the requirements of PSOs in distant theatres, but rather the need for military forces to be available for national contingencies requiring a capacity for rapid reaction.

The importance of the High North was, however, not a constant: it fluctuated during the 1990s and 2000s. By the turn of the millennium, political interest in the area reached an all-time low. By 2005, however, the new centre-left coalition Government was becoming increasingly committed, at least rhetorically, to an active High North policy. Increasing the presence of the Armed Forces was part of this policy, and the High North can therefore be said to have experienced a renaissance in Norwegian security and defence policy towards the end

of the period examined here.\textsuperscript{297} As expressed by the State Secretary in the Ministry of Defence: “Many of the geopolitical factors we used to think of as obsolete are once again relevant.”\textsuperscript{298} Although no new Cold War had replaced the old, Norwegian policymakers remained aware of Russia’s military resurgence and the growing geopolitical and energy importance of the High North.\textsuperscript{299}

**Weapon procurement**

Norway’s continued territorial focus and Denmark’s expeditionary focus are clearly apparent in weapon procurement decisions taken in the early 21\textsuperscript{st} century. When the Norwegian Government decided in the autumn of 2008 to replace the F-16 with the F-35, the reason the new aircraft were important was the role they could play in national crisis management, surveillance and in Norway’s ability to enforce national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{300} Indeed the main competitor of the F-35, the JAS Gripen, was considered adequate for NATO missions abroad, but was ultimately rejected because it failed the requirements of national tasks.\textsuperscript{301} In contrast, in a study conducted by the Danish Institute for Military Studies, the choice of future Danish aircraft rested essentially on their ability to take part in international military missions abroad; a capacity for homeland defence (air policing) was listed only as a second criterion.\textsuperscript{302}

The five new *Fridtjof Nansen* class frigates which began to be phased into Norwegian service in 2006 offer another case in point. Not having been requested by NATO, the need to acquire the frigates was primarily legitimised by reference to national priorities in national waters.\textsuperscript{303} Strengthening the capacity for crisis management


\textsuperscript{301} The Office of the Norwegian Prime Minister, “Pressemelding nr.: 180/2009: Går inn for Joint Strike Fighter”, (Oslo, 20 November 2008).

\textsuperscript{302} Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen and Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch, *Danmarks behov for kampfly: En strategisk analyse af det fremtidige behov for danske kampfly* (Copenhagen: Dansk Institut for Militære Studier, October 2007).

in Norwegian waters was considered their most important operational task by the Government.\textsuperscript{304} Similarly, the procurement of \textit{Skjold} class MTBs was not justified by their capacity for force-projection abroad. On the contrary, they were optimised for anti-invasion operations in coastal areas.\textsuperscript{305} Norway also continued to maintain a strong Coast Guard, numbering 15 vessels in 2008, whose main task was exercising Norwegian sovereignty and authority in its northern waters. New vessels were delivered to the Coast Guard, which acquired five small \textit{Nornen} class patrol ships in 2006–07; three \textit{Barentshav} class vessels, each displacing 4,000 tons, were being constructed in 2008. Northern and maritime dimensions hence took on a relatively greater importance in post-Cold War Norwegian defence policy, raising the priority of the Navy at the expense of the traditionally dominant Army.\textsuperscript{306} The service mainly concerned with operations abroad therefore diminished compared with one focusing mainly on national tasks.

The Danish, for their part, downsized their Navy more rapidly than the Norwegians after the Cold War, and concentrated new acquisitions around larger platforms suitable for operations outside the Navy’s traditional Baltic theatre of operation, indicating the increased priority assigned by Denmark to PSOs and NATO standing naval forces away from national waters.\textsuperscript{307} While patrolling the Danish economic zones around Greenland and the Faeroe Islands continued to be important, it now became the sole responsibility of the \textit{Thetis}, \textit{Agdleq}, and \textit{Knud Rasmussen} class arctic patrol ships. Force projection and sea-to-land operations were the priority of the new Danish Navy. The new 6,300 ton \textit{Absalon} class could carry 200 extra soldiers in addition to the 100 regular crewmembers, had a roll-on-roll-off platform which could even accommodate the heavy 62 ton Leopard II main battle tank, and was equipped with a 127mm cannon that could provide naval fire support up to 100 km inland. The Danish Navy’s ambition was to “create a fleet that can do on water what Danish soldiers are doing on land”, that is, take part in distant international military operations far

\textsuperscript{304} Norwegian Ministry of Defence, \textit{Et forsvar til vern}, 78.
away from Denmark proper.\textsuperscript{308} The Danish Navy can in some respects be said to have returned to the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries, when Danish ships-of-the-line displayed the Danish flag and protected Danish ships in distant waters.\textsuperscript{309} For example, the DKM Absalon in August 2008 assumed command of the Combined Task Force 150, the international naval force conducting anti-terrorism operations, as well as protecting shipping from terrorist and pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa.

### The impact of geopolitics

While Denmark in the wake of the Cold War transformed its Armed Forces into a professional expeditionary corps, safe in the knowledge that no conventional military threat to Danish territory exists, Norway has not enjoyed the same feeling of safety and security. Due to its uncertainty \textit{vis-à-vis} its great power neighbour in the northeast, and its need to exercise authority and sovereignty over huge maritime economic areas, Norway has retained a stronger territorial focus in its Armed Forces. This is one important reason why Norway has had fewer capabilities available for deployment abroad, despite spending much more on its Armed Forces than Denmark.

But while geopolitical differences provide an important and indeed \textit{necessary} condition for the difference between Norwegian and Danish post-Cold War defence policies, they fail to provide a \textit{sufficient} explanation for the differences. The enhanced security environment only gave Denmark the opportunity to orient its Armed Forces towards expeditionary operations, but it does not explain why this opportunity was seized so early and so decisively. Also, Norway’s move away from invasion defence came rather late. In the crisis year of 2001, the Norwegian Government itself declared that failure to reform the armed forces had left them unprepared to deliver the kind of military power required by the new security environment.\textsuperscript{310} That Denmark subsequently became the stated model of several studies and reforms in Norway is indicative of the opinion among Norwegian authorities, at least in some respects,
that the Danish Armed Forces were more aptly organised for the new tasks of the post-Cold War era.\textsuperscript{311}

Because geopolitics alone only partly explains why Norway and Denmark differed so markedly in defence policies, I shall therefore use the following three chapters to examine in turn the role of the individual leaders and the cultural factors that decided the shape of Danish and Norwegian defence policies after the Cold War.

\textsuperscript{311} See e.g. Norwegian Ministry of Defence, \textit{Komparativ analyse}; Arne Røksund, “Befalsordningen”, \textit{Norsk Militært Tidsskrift} 172, no. 2 (2003).
Chapter 5

The impact of leadership

If the Alliance were to falter, we (the Norwegians) would be among the last ones to leave the sinking ship.

Johan Jørgen Holst, Norwegian Minister of Defence

When the Cold War was over, the work began to restore Denmark’s ruined credibility as an ally and partner in international cooperation.

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs

One of the key reasons Norway and Denmark pursued different post-Cold War foreign policy strategies is that senior policymakers had different assessments of the need for change and the changes required. Decision-makers in Norway were generally satisfied with existing policies, and did not feel the need for making substantial changes to defence policy before the turn of the century. Denmark’s decision-makers, on the other hand, actively sought to create a new political consensus around new policies. These leaders wanted to remake Danish defence policy and enable the Armed Forces to promote Danish interests and values abroad, and especially to ensure that Denmark was seen as being in the vanguard of the Atlantic community. In this endeavour they succeeded very well indeed.

This chapter will highlight the importance of individuals with fresh ideas and new projects. This is a factor that has all too frequently

been dismissed in the literature on post-Cold War Nordic defence policy, often in favour of more “objective” material factors, such as geopolitics.

**Decision-making structures**

Norway and Denmark have broadly similar decision-making structures in the defence sector. The prime minister and minister of foreign affairs wield considerable influence over defence policy; both employ expert advisors and staffs who work with defence and security issues. The minister of defence has the widest institutional powers over the defence sector, and can therefore bring to bear tremendous influence on defence policy issues. Both Norway and Denmark also have relatively independent chiefs of defence, both of whom act as chief advisor to their respective minister of defence, but who also exercise direct control over the armed forces in peacetime.

Parliament has broad powers of oversight and control in both countries, especially in terms of budgetary powers. However, a constitutional difference between Norway and Denmark is that while the deployment of troops abroad requires parliamentary approval in Denmark, this is not the case in Norway. The Norwegian Government nevertheless consult the parliamentary Expanded Foreign Affairs Committee before taking major security and defence decisions, and parliament thus nevertheless exercises a great deal of influence *de facto* on the government’s decision-making process.

**Denmark: the “dynamic duo”**

The Danish academic Peter Viggo Jakobsen argues that while a “zero-threat environment” which “moved Denmark from the frontline to the backwater” was indeed a requirement for the rapid Danish transition to expeditionary defence, it also required dynamic leadership to build political consensus and public support.³¹⁴ To send Danish combat troops abroad was in no way a natural choice, and it broke decisively with past practice in Denmark.³¹⁵ Jakobsen especially identifies two

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³¹⁵ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Stealing the Show”, 41–42.
successful defence policy entrepreneurs, the Liberal Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and the Social Democratic Minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup, whom he describes as the “dynamic duo” of Danish defence policy in the early post-Cold War years.\textsuperscript{316}

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen served as Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1982 to 1993. He was deeply dissatisfied with what he perceived as Denmark’s wholly inadequate support to its allies during the Cold War, which he described as virtual appeasement of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{317} Ellemann-Jensen felt ashamed by the role Denmark had played in NATO as a “footnote-country”.\textsuperscript{318} The new policy introduced by him in 1989 was termed “active internationalism”, and was meant to remedy Denmark’s damaged reputation as a “wimp state” (\textit{pusling-land}).\textsuperscript{319} Denmark should be a reliable and predictable ally and stand by its friends. This was particularly important in relations with the United States.\textsuperscript{320} This change of policy was enabled by the restoration of consensus in Danish politics, following the elections of 1988, and the close cooperation of Ellemann-Jensen and Hans Hækkerup.

Ellemann-Jensen saw the 1990–91 Gulf War as an opportunity to rebuild Denmark’s reputation as a reliable ally, and to move the frontier of what was considered possible with respect to the employment of the Danish military. Ellemann-Jensen set out to change Denmark’s foreign policy by sending the corvette KDM \textit{Olfert Fischer} to the Gulf in 1990. In this he was supported by future Minister of Defence Hækkerup, who sat on the Standing Committee on Defence in the Danish Parliament and was defence policy spokesman of the Social Democrats.\textsuperscript{321} Despatching the KDM \textit{Olfert Fischer} to the Gulf was the closest to actual participation in the US coalition Danish domestic politics would allow, and was only possible because Ellemann-Jensen, Vice-Admiral Hans Garde, then Chief of Defence Staff, and Hans Hækkerup worked closely together.\textsuperscript{322}

To Ellemann-Jensen the Gulf War marked a watershed. Unlike in the past, Denmark did not let its allies down.\textsuperscript{323}

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\textsuperscript{316} Peter Viggo Jakobsen, \textit{Nordic Approaches}, 93–94.
\textsuperscript{317} See his book on this topic, Ellemann-Jensen, \textit{Fodfejl}.
\textsuperscript{320} Interview with Ellemann-Jensen in Kvist and Skipper, \textit{Udenrigsminister}, 183.
\textsuperscript{321} Hækkerup, \textit{På skansen}, 94–98.
\textsuperscript{323} Ellemann-Jensen, \textit{Din egen dag er kort}, 239.
\end{flushleft}
to the Gulf in 1990 was considered important by Hans Hækkerup as well, as it changed Danish attitudes towards the use of military force. Like Ellemann-Jensen, Hækkerup had been very uncomfortable with Denmark’s status as a ‘footnote state’, but like the Liberal Foreign Minister he justified staying on despite the policy because his resignation would not have changed it. Upon becoming Minister of Defence in January 1993, Social Democrat Hækkerup continued the Liberal Party’s Ellemann-Jensen’s policy of employing the Armed Forces proactively abroad, most noticeably in the Balkans. Hækkerup stood his ground and pushed for the deployment of the Danish tank squadron to Bosnia, despite the scepticism of the UN. Unlike the Dutch, who deployed to the safe area of Srebrenica without heavy-weapons, the Danes came heavily armed to their zone in Tuzla. The result was disaster and humiliation for the Dutch battalion in Srebrenica, and comparative success for the joint Swedish–Danish–Norwegian battalion at Tuzla.

Hækkerup also took a strong interest in the organisation of the DIB, which he regarded as “the jewel in the crown” of the November 1992 Defence Agreement. Hækkerup himself described the DIB as his “pet project”. His enthusiasm for the brigade was such that its first commander, Brigadier General Finn Særmark-Thomsen, was initially concerned about undue ministerial interference. The strong political patronage was an important reason why the DIB received a clear procurement priority with the Danish Armed Forces. SHIRBRIG also enjoyed Hækkerup’s personal patronage. He feared that his pet project would fail if it was not used, which was the main reason why SHIRBRIG was deployed to Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000. If the UN called and SHIRBRIG did not respond, Hækkerup feared it would fall apart. As he put it, “a soufflé rises only once”. The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea therefore marked a brief return to traditional, non-robust UN peacekeeping for Denmark.

324 Hækkerup, På skansen, 97–98.
325 Ibid., 140–142.
326 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, 93–94.
327 Hækkerup, På skansen, 178.
328 Ibid., 203.
329 Finn Særmark-Thomsen, Troldmandens lærling: Et soldaterliv (Copenhagen: Eget Forlag, 2008), 136.
330 Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support, 151.
331 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, 95–96.
332 Hækkerup, På skansen, 90.
333 See e.g. Ole Luk Sørensen, Kasper Søegaard, and Kjeld G.H. Hillingsø, Udsendinge for fred: Danske soldater i internationale konflikter (Copenhagen: Documentas, 2006), 144–173.
The Liberal politician Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who served as Prime Minister from 2001 to 2009, took the “dynamic duo” project a step further. It demonstrates the level of success of the dynamic leadership, but also shows that the new leader was brave enough to challenge domestic constraints and past practice. The need to make a break with the embarrassing past and reinvent Denmark as a reliable, assertive ally, which “punched above its weight”, was important to Rasmussen. A new chapter in the process of breaking with the past came with his decision about Danish participation in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The sense of Denmark having a “debt of honour” to its allies was thus still felt when Denmark joined the US/UK coalition. Rasmussen viewed past Danish foreign policy as “hiding behind others and following a policy of passive adaptation”.

Rasmussen adopted Ellemann-Jensen’s rhetoric of the early 1990s and, to a lesser extent, Hækkerup’s of the late 1990s. The three managed to build a remarkably broad cross-party political support for the new policy, which endured for two decades almost without cracks. Only with regard to participation in the Iraq War did the consensus actually break down. While it was quickly restored when the Social Democrats supported the presence of Danish troops to stabilize the country, consensus again broke down in March 2006. This accelerated the Rasmussen Government’s decision to withdraw from Iraq in 2007. Unlike previous experiences in the Gulf and the Balkans, participation in the Iraq War has subsequently been seen as less successful.

While an early desire for change in Denmark was decisive in revamping Danish defence policy at an early date, its continued success rested on an ability to make difficult choices about priorities. The senior leadership of the Danish Armed Forces played a crucial role in this respect, and particularly so with the milestone 2004 Defence Agreement. While the August 2003 Bruun Report was given little

336 Kaae and Nissen, Vejen til Iraq, 218.
media attention, the so-called K-note (*Capacity Memorandum*) from the Danish Defence Command received a lot. Presented publicly in September 2003 by Chief of Defence General Jesper Helsø, it was the first time the Armed Forces themselves had taken a leading role in the political debate about defence reform. The K-note effectively sidelined those who wanted to retain the remnants of territorial defence, and accelerated the new defence agreement. With the K-note the Armed Forces themselves led the way towards expeditionary defence. They made sure that the tools in the military toolbox “would be of an expeditionary nature”.

This prioritising of expeditionary capabilities was aided by a political leadership which dared to cut entire military capabilities. Minister of Defence Søren Gade presided over the 2004 Defence Agreement which disbanded the Navy’s submarines, the Air Force’s ground-to-air missiles and the Army’s Multiple Launch Rocket System. Denmark’s low defence spending left a choice between starving the military or transformation, and the civilian and military leadership boldly chose the latter.

Norway in the 1990s: continuity

In Norway, no political entrepreneurship was forthcoming after the Cold War to match the Danes. Political leaders tended to support the status quo as far as the Armed Forces were concerned, and if anything, they were not particularly interested in military affairs. “Tampering” with the Armed Forces, cautioned Per Ditlev-Simonsen, Conservative Minister of Defence from October 1989 to November 1990, was undesirable at this point in time. In this he was supported by his Chief of Defence, Admiral Torolf Rein, who called for prudence and

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339 Bruun et al., *De sikkerheds-politiske vilkår*.
no dramatic changes to the mission or shape of the Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{346} The 1990 Defence Commission, chaired by the former Conservative Prime Minister Kåre Willoch, did argue that the Armed Forces should be prepared to participate in peace enforcement operations under the auspices of the UN or the CSCE.\textsuperscript{347} Overall, however, the recommendations given by the commission in 1992 were very conservative considering Denmark’s contemporaneous establishment of the DIB. Generally, Norwegian Governments seemed more comfortable with traditional peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{348}

In his vision of Norway’s security policy in the 1990s, the well-known academic and Labour politician Johan Jørgen Holst, who served as Minister of Defence 1986–89 and 1990–93, made no mention of Norwegian participation in international military operations,\textsuperscript{349} despite his enthusiastic and energetic participation in the process of reshaping NATO for the post-Cold War era.\textsuperscript{350} Holst supported the idea of NATO-run enforcement missions in the interest of regional order, provided the mandate came from the UN and CSCE.\textsuperscript{351} This implied that the Norwegian IRF force could also be used for such missions. However, when Parliament discussed in June 1993 the Government’s proposal to create the IRF battalion, few politicians seemed to think the unit would be utilized for warfighting abroad.\textsuperscript{352} The only politicians interested in debating the proposal belonged to the Socialist Left Party, which traditionally opposed anything involving NATO.\textsuperscript{353} The IRF battalion represented the only real innovation in the structure of the Armed Forces likely to improve overseas deployment capability, as the Navy and Air Force already possessed units capable of embarking

\textsuperscript{347} Norwegian Defence Commission of 1990, NOU 1992:12, 149.
\textsuperscript{348} Alf Granviken, Rammebetingelser for internasjonale operasjoner – militært perspektiv, FFI/Rapport -96/06059 (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 1997), 9.
on IRF missions. Nevertheless, as Ståle Ulriksen argues, even this relatively limited force was more symbolic than real.

There was a feeling that the events of 1989–91 had not altered things as radically from the Norwegian point of view as from the Danish. Preserving NATO’s historic role remained therefore essential. Thus the Government spent much time and energy salvaging what could be salvaged of equipment prepositioning programmes, NATO headquarters and dedicated allied reinforcements. Less was spent on reforming the Armed Forces, whose main task remained invasion defence. Leif Mevik, who served as Norway’s NATO ambassador 1992–98, describes how Norway was increasingly seen as out of touch with what other NATO countries viewed as the defence and security challenges of the day. This criticism was sometimes voiced publicly by NATO officials. As the 1990s wore on, Norway became more and more a special case in an Alliance increasingly oriented towards other tasks than collective defence. Norwegian foreign ministers and ministers of defence continued to focus upon the relevance of Article 5, the High North and Russia. While always careful to emphasise the new comprehensive security challenges, this commitment was much stronger in word than in deed.

The Labour politician Jørgen Kosmo served as Minister of Defence from 1993 to 1997. He was thus the main player in implementing the Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces 1994–1998, and in drafting the plan for the next period 1999–2002. Together with his Chief of Defence, General Arne Solli, Kosmo adopted a cautious approach towards implementing the plan. Under Kosmo and Solli plans to continue downsizing the Armed Forces were shelved; personnel expenditure again took up a growing proportion of the budget, at the expense of equipment acquisitions. When the 1999–2002 plan began to be drafted, Kosmo wanted to examine the economic feasibility of maintaining the invasion defence structure. Any major changes to the

354 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, 196–197.
355 Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarsstradisjonen, 238.
356 Tamnes, Ølfaelder, 137–144.
361 Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, 137–138.
organisation of the Armed Forces or the present system of conscription were ruled out. Under Kosmo and his successor, the Christian Democrat Dag Jostein Fjærvoll (1997–99), “uncertainty” became a watchword legitimising continuity in defence policy. Fjærvoll could see “no responsible alternative” to a conscripted, mobilisation-based total defence force.

Prominent politicians did not call for a radical reorientation of Norwegian defence policy in the 1990s, partly because few votes were to be gained, and many lost by doing so. By one calculation, almost nine per cent of the working population of northern Norway were directly employed by the Armed Forces in 1992, and a total of 15 per cent were affected. In some northern municipalities military employment exceeded 40 per cent. The Norwegian Armed Forces were therefore an important employer in these relatively rural areas, a factor complicating any attempts at rationalising and reforming them. The “municipality-military complex” which had emerged during the Cold War, consisting of local base commanders, municipal and county politicians, and local businessmen, proved effective at squashing attempts to rationalise the number of bases. The draw-out political decision-making process required to enact change left ample opportunity for local communities to mobilize effectively against reforms considered undesirable, such as those involving base closures. Furthermore, maintaining rural communities in northern Norway had itself become “securitised” during the Cold War, justifying the many bases as a security gain in themselves. Many defence policy decisions were in fact taken with rural habitation policy in mind from the outset.

364 Ibid., 13.
369 Securitization is said to take place when an issue “is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedures”. Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde, and Ole Wæver, Security: a new framework for analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 23–24.
Norway after 2000: change

By the turn of the new millennium, Norway had reached a turning point in its defence policy. Several key political and military leaders were now convinced that the Norwegian Armed Forces were in a crisis, and that radical reforms were needed. There were two reasons for the new mindset: resource imbalance and task imbalance. Firstly, due to shrinking budgets, failure to cut costs and inaccurate planning costs, the Armed Forces could not invest sufficiently in force modernisation and training. Secondly, even if adequate funding were available, the structure of the Armed Forces was such as to render them incapable of delivering the kind of relevant military power demanded by the political leadership. In Norwegian defence policy documents these factors were collectively referred to as the *dual imbalance*.372

The first imbalance was said to be turning the Armed Forces into a “technical museum” because of lack of funding for new equipment.373 Equipment acquisitions were being postponed regularly. The latter imbalance had been clearly demonstrated by the Kosovo War. When the Norwegian units arrived in Kosovo three months after the Kosovo Force had already deployed there, the British commander Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson was supposed to have asked sarcastically, “what took you so long? Have you been walking?”374 Clearly the slow responsiveness of the Army was an embarrassment to the Norwegian political leadership. While the Danish leadership experienced the same unpleasant surprise, the Danish Armed Forces nevertheless performed better than their Norwegian counterparts.375 The political consensus in Norway after the Kosovo War was that Norway needed more high-quality capabilities with shorter response time.376

Much of the intellectual and ideological impetus for the reforms came from within the Armed Forces themselves,377 the key figure being the future Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen. Since early in his career

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he had been an advocate for a standing military with a high number of service members on contracts. After the Cold War he continued to argue the need for more standing forces of higher quality with shorter reaction time. The role of the military had changed fundamentally in the new age, and Norwegian Armed Forces had to keep up with the times, he insisted. The old invasion defence force was neither fit for purpose nor affordable anymore. The Armed Forces should become a volunteer-oriented, capital-intensive, power-political instrument for the state, adapted for limited rather than total war.

His leading role in drawing up Defence Study 2000 made Diesen the chief ideological architect of the transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces. While the study was commissioned for financial reasons, it soon became a vehicle for updating the Armed Forces to a new international and technological environment. The work proceeded in close association with the work of the Defence Policy Committee, whose support provided extra weight.

The reforms were carried out under the leadership of two reform-minded ministers of defence. First, plans for a new defence were drawn up during the tenure of the Labour politician Bjørn Tore Godal, Minister of Defence in the vital period 2000–01, when the radical Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces 2002–2005 was prepared. After a new Government took office in October 2001, the Conservative Kristin Krohn Devold served as Minister of Defence for the entirety of plan’s implementation period.

Godal saw the threat of a full-scale invasion as a thing of the past; it would take at least 10–15 years for a new threat to emerge.
New multi-dimensional challenges were replacing yesterday’s threats. However, as he saw it, the Armed Forces were still adapted to yesterday’s scenarios. Norway needed military instruments that could rapidly be utilized along with other instruments, both in the High North, and if necessary out of area, alongside its allies. The present invasion defence structure was neither economically sustainable, nor, more importantly, needed or fit to face the new challenges of the post-Cold War era. Territorial defence tasks could largely be transferred to the Home Guard. Public and expert reactions were unexpectedly passionate. Godal compares the response of many groups in Norway to that of “sleeping beauty” upon being wakened not by a prince, but a monster. In this case, the monster was showing the public a picture of reality they did not want to see. Notwithstanding vocal opposition in many quarters, by providing political leadership and acting as a public spokesman for the reforms, Godal played a decisive role in ensuring that most of the ideas for a “new defence” were in the end adopted. Putting the reforms into practice, however, would be the responsibility of Godal’s successor, Kristin Krohn Devold. She was his equal in her determination to enable the Armed Forces to perform their new tasks.

It was during Devold’s ministerial that Norwegian Armed Forces took active part in combat operations abroad for the first time. Within a month of assuming office, she had offered a significant contingent of Norwegian forces to the US-led War of Terror. Within two months, Norwegian Special Forces took part in combat operations in Afghanistan, something that was noticed and appreciated by the US. Devold wanted to shorten response times and improve ability to conduct more complex missions. She especially wanted bet-

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391 Ibid.: 12.
393 Godal, Utsikter, 54–56.
ter deployability, declaring to the American press, “we want to be relevant”. Devold became an active exponent of the idea of developing niche capacities for overseas use alongside larger allies, her stated strategy being to “identify what you are good at, and concentrate on it”, because “that way you can play with the big boys even if you are small”. Her enthusiasm to transform the military and enable the use of Norway’s Armed Forces abroad made her quite popular with Norway’s NATO allies, enough to make her a serious candidate for the post of General Secretary of NATO.

However, Godal and Devold were less successful at building the type of broad, cross-party political support needed to make clear defence policy priorities. Unlike Denmark, Parliament did not sanction an expeditionary concept which emphasised a “first in, first out” capacity at the expense of sustainability. Nor did Parliament accept that Norwegian forces were rendered technically obsolete. The formula to come out of the discussions was that the Norwegian Armed Forces “had to be both modern and large, and should underscore NATO as well as UN-related operations”. Parliament also refused to cut military units, insisting for instance on acquiring and retaining the Skjold class MTBs counter to the advice of repeated military studies. Finally, Parliament was reluctant to trimming base and support structures to the extent recommended by the Armed Forces. Political vacillation in Norway clearly slowed the process of modernisation. The Danish situation was different, and modernisation could proceed at a faster pace. This was a key reason why Denmark was able to get seemingly the same range of deployable capabilities from their armed forces, despite a much lower defence budget.

Godal and Devold also failed to make a convincing case for participation in warfighting abroad, unlike Denmark. In 2005 the decision to deploy fighter aircraft to Afghanistan again was still so controversial that MPs from one of the Government parties publicly protested the

396 Kristin Krohn Devold, “What Europe wants from NATO?”, speech at the NATO/GMFUS Conference, Brussels (3 October 2002).
398 Ibid.
399 Stephen Castle, “Robertson to step down as Nato’s Secretary General”, Independent, 23 January 2003.
400 Heier, “Influence and Marginalisation”, 231.
decision.\textsuperscript{404} The 2006 debate on whether to despatch ground forces to southern Afghanistan similarly revealed a lack of consensus on the issue.\textsuperscript{405}

The importance of leadership
In a way, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen played the part of forerunner in Danish defence policy; he advocated a new policy even before the security environment justifying it had fully materialised. His ambitious “active internationalism” in the Gulf and towards the Baltic states was, thus, slightly ahead of events. Hans Hækkerup worked to consolidate the embryonic approach begun by Ellemann-Jensen and himself by despatching the Danish Armed Forces to Croatia and Bosnia in the early to mid 1990s. By then, the post-Cold War security environment from which Denmark benefited had been realised, but Hækkerup’s determination to see the Armed Forces play a decisive part in risky operations in the Balkans drove a change that was in no way predetermined by the country’s new strategic situation. The policy of breaking with the past continued in the new century, with Anders Fogh Rasmussen adopting the same rhetoric as Ellemann-Jensen and Hækkerup when Denmark went to war in Iraq. Early, decisive and successful leadership must thus be said to have been a vital factor in driving Denmark’s rapid transformation from “weakest link” into one of NATO’s most willing members when it came to warfighting. The Armed Forces senior leadership finalised the transformation into an expeditionary force with the K-note issued in late 2003.

In Norway, no ambitious leader with a program for radical change took the helm after the Cold War, and the structure suggested by the 1992 Defence Commission was neither economically sustainable nor militarily appropriate to Norway’s security environment of the late 1990s. The failure of political leadership to enact timely reforms therefore made of the 1990s a “lost decade” in Norwegian defence policy.\textsuperscript{406} That little was done to downsize and restructure the Armed Forces resulted in a feeling of crisis in 2000, when the Armed Forces proved inappropriately organised and much too expensive.

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\textsuperscript{404} Sveinung Bendiksen, “SV-protest mot egen regjering”, Stavanger Aftenblad, 9 November 2005.
\textsuperscript{405} Vinding, Ryste, and Andersen, “Norge sier nei til NATO”.
At this point two political leaders did come forward in Norway, and they were willing to propose and to carry through a massive reorganisation. Godal’s programme of reform was, however, drawn up by ambitious reformers in the Armed Forces themselves, chief of these being Brigadier Sverre Diesen. They were subsequently enacted by the energetic Devold, who worked tirelessly to change Norway’s reputation of being out of sync with its allies.

In summary, when we regard the impact of leadership in the two countries, what conclusions can be drawn? Decisive political leadership in Denmark, driven by a strong cross-party desire for change, was a key reason for early and thorough reform and active use of the Danish Armed Forces. In Norway, leadership remained comfortable throughout the 1990s with the existing tasks and structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces, and therefore the status quo was mostly maintained. Thus different leaderships proved very important in causing the great difference in Norwegian and Danish defence policy after the Cold War.
The impact of strategic culture

The successful Danish military participation in the Gulf and in the Balkans served finally to rid the country of the defeatist “what’s the use of it” attitude which had persisted since 1864.

-Hans Hækkerup, Danish Minister of Defence\textsuperscript{407}

Peace and justice provide the safest shield for lands and peoples, and the people that make peace their purpose will thereby have gained an honourable place in the history of the world.

-Halvdan Koht, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs\textsuperscript{408}

Another important reason for the different post-Cold War defence policies pursued by Norway and Denmark was the countries’ different strategic cultures. The Danish and Norwegian strategic communities came to exhibit very different “ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour” in the post-Cold War period.\textsuperscript{409} Firstly, this was due to Denmark’s successful deployment of forces overseas, which drove the reconfiguration of its relations with its Armed Forces, and made it reappraise the utility and morality of utilising force. Norway, on the other hand, did not undergo those changes and therefore retained a more traditional Nordic position on sovereignty and the use of force. Secondly, however, Denmark also developed a different threat perception, where new and distant threats were perceived as national security challenges. In Norway, however, humanitarian reasons rather than national security tended to justify

\textsuperscript{407} Hækkerup, \textit{På skansen}, 9.
\textsuperscript{408} Halvdan Koht was a renowned Norwegian historian who served as Foreign Minister 1935–1941. Quoted in Riste, \textit{Norway’s Foreign Relations}, 254.
overseas deployment of the Armed Forces. Essentially then, the different views on the desirability and possibility of utilising force lay behind Denmark’s much more frequent use of it than Norway did in the post-Cold War era. Finally, unlike the Danish, the Norwegian Armed Forces continued to have important strategic tasks at home, defending the country and building the nation.

This chapter will demonstrate the significance of two countries’ different strategic cultures after the Cold War, with a special emphasis on how culture affected force employment, threat perception and view of international law. Their dissimilar strategic cultures, I shall argue, was a key reason why Norwegian and Danish defence policies continued to be very different in the 21st century.

**Denmark: reinventing itself**

The successful entrepreneurship of members of the Danish political class, made possible by a benign security environment, and aided by a military both able and willing to do warfighting abroad, all served to produce a change in Danish strategic culture. It changed fundamentally the conception of what was normal and routine in Danish defence policy. Having Danish soldiers participate in high-risk combat operations far from home would certainly not have been normal just a few years previously. It became nevertheless “an axiom that hardly anyone questioned”. Once policymakers, officers and the public grew accustomed to the successful use of the Armed Forces as instruments of Danish foreign policy, and the military came to view such activity as its main *raison d’être*, it became self-reinforcing. Hans-Henrik Holm finds the changing Danish conception of the use of armed force to have emerged from a gradually change in practice:

> The Minister of Defense at the time, Mr. Hans Hækkerup, fundamentally changed the traditional Danish approach to the role of the armed forces in Danish foreign policy. They were seen as a prospective tool that could be used to support a policy of active internationalism.\(^{411}\)

\(^{410}\) Jakobsen, *Nordic Approaches*, 94.

Peter Viggo Jakobsen agrees with Holm:

The deployment of Olfert Fischer to the Gulf got the snowball rolling and the subsequent (from a Danish perspective) successful deployments in Croatia and Bosnia created an avalanche that changed the Danes’ understanding of their appropriate role in the world.\footnote{Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, 94.}

Far from being seen as useless and purely symbolic anymore, in the 1990s the Danes came to regard their Armed Forces as a useful tool for achieving security.\footnote{Henrik Larsen, “Denmark and the ESDP out-out: A new way of doing nothing?”, in New Security Issues in Northern Europe: The Nordic and Baltic States and the ESDP, ed. Clive Archer (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 80.} The military-diplomatic policy towards the Baltic countries provides another example of change in Danish strategic culture since the end of the Cold War. Christian Hoppe, a section head at the Danish Foreign Ministry, argues that post-Cold War Danish policy towards the Baltic states demonstrates that Denmark had put the legacy of defeatism from 1864 behind it. Under the old Danish attitude, a small state like Denmark had no international influence. Now the view in Denmark was that Danish activism towards the Baltic states, both bilaterally and multilaterally, had an impact.\footnote{Christian Hoppe, “Danmarks østpolitik”, in Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1993, ed. Nikolaj Petersen and Christian Thune (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1994), 68–69.}

What made this change in Danish defence policy possible, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen suggests, was the new consensus that was built on an amalgam of Danish “Scandinavian cosmopolitanism” and “defencism”. Adherents of the former ideology had traditionally been active supporters of the UN and sceptical of NATO and the Armed Forces. Supporters of the latter had been enthusiastic about NATO membership and a strong defence, but less interested in what they viewed as an altruistic foreign policy by the cosmopolitanists.\footnote{Rasmussen, “What’s the Use of It?”: 72–76. For an early 1990s analysis of Nordic/Scandinavian identities, see Ole Wæver, “Norden Rearticulated”, in Nordic Security in the 1990s: Options in the Changing Europe, ed. Jan Øberg (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992).} These two traditions came increasingly closer on the need for Danish Armed Forces to combat indirect threats to peace and stability in Europe and beyond.\footnote{Rasmussen, “What’s the Use of It?”: 77.} This political consensus was instrumental in the creation of the DIB, and thereafter in giving first priority to capabilities that

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
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\item Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, 94.
\item Rasmussen, “What’s the Use of It?”: 77.
\end{thebibliography}
were internationally deployable, such as the DIB in the Army, tactical transport helicopters for the Air Force and flexible support ships for the Navy.\textsuperscript{417} This clear set of priorities on internationally deployable capabilities of the Danish political and military leaderships was combined with a willingness to make use of the new expeditionary force to engage in high-risk combat operations. As expressed by Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, “activism means that Denmark had begun to think of armed interventions as a natural part of its foreign policy and organize its defence accordingly.”\textsuperscript{418} Whether military force was useful or not was now no longer a matter of debate. The Armed Forces had become an unquestionable tool in the foreign policy toolkit.\textsuperscript{419}

To Sten Rynning, the Danish relationship with its Armed Forces is reminiscent of the mid 19\textsuperscript{th} century, when Denmark was willing to employ force to achieve its aims in its relations with its German neighbour states. Denmark once again sought to become a strategic actor. The development of an expeditionary intervention force was intended to secure Danish influence in NATO and with the US, and to further a law-governed liberal world order from which Denmark would benefit.\textsuperscript{420} What emerged was something akin to a great power mentality in Denmark, claims Poul Villaume, driven forth by military activism and close alignment to the United States.\textsuperscript{421} Anders Wivel in turn argues that the Danish worldview in the post-Cold War period moved at least somewhat towards that of the US, in seeing security and a liberal world order as requiring the possession and use of military force.\textsuperscript{422}

**Norway: a humanitarian superpower**

In Norway, not many norm-entrepreneurs came forward to deliberatively change what was considered natural or appropriate, as Ellemann-Jensen and Hækkerup did in Denmark.\textsuperscript{423} Less assertive use of Norwegian military forces after the Cold War slowed recognition of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{418} Rasmussen, “What’s the Use of It?”; 82.
\textsuperscript{419} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{423} Jakobsen, “Stealing the Show”, 42.
\end{flushleft}
the new paradigm of using the Armed Forces as a foreign policy tool, and when it did occur, it did not penetrate the collective Norwegian mindset as deeply. Norway consequently found it much harder to adapt to the new international PSO environment, where use of force beyond self-defence was becoming increasingly common. This new paradigm was seen to run counter to the traditional Norwegian emphasis on peaceful conflict resolution and mediation. 424

According to Norwegian political scientist Halvard Leira, Norwegian foreign policy culture had been characterised since the late 19th century by a strong emphasis on conceptions of the peaceful nature of Norway and its people. This powerful peace discourse in the foreign policy realm meant that defence issues were seen as something apart from foreign policy, as the defence discourse lacked an international dimension. It necessitated the portrayal of Norwegian military engagements abroad as inherently humanitarian, in extension of this peace tradition. 425 For a Norwegian politician to challenge the established tradition by advocating a more proactive use of Norwegian military forces would involve taking considerable political risk. 426 There was therefore a gap between the new paradigm, where military force was associated with a wider foreign policy conception, and domestic Norwegian practice. In 1990 it was considered unnatural to contribute combat forces to the Gulf War; 427 there was “nothing in our historical tradition” which suggested Norway should participate. 428 As we have seen, this refusal to send combat troops to peacemaking operations did not disappear until 1997 and the creation of SFOR. Denmark, while also exhibiting much of the same discourse, had a stronger tradition for thinking strategically about military force in terms of foreign policy, and its peace tradition was less missionary than the Norwegian. 429

Torunn Laugen Haaland suggests that in the early 1990s, while wanting to demonstrate Norway’s solidarity with its allies, the

426 Leira, “’Hele vort Folk’”, 180.
Norwegian political leadership did not want to be associated too closely with military matters. By way of compromise, they emphasised the non-military aspects of Armed Forces’ operations abroad, portraying Norwegian soldiers as military humanitarians. It continued during Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan operations, even as the Norwegian military contributed increasingly robust combat forces. Norwegian politicians still continued to accent the non-military and humanitarian aspects of the military activities abroad, downplaying and even using clever rhetorical ploys to mask the military aspect of overseas operations. Kjell Magne Bondevik, the Norwegian Prime Minister during the 1999 Kosovo War, was accused of trivialising Norway’s military involvement by describing it as “limited military operations”. It is also revealing to read the account of the Norwegian Foreign Minister 2000–01, Thorbjørn Jagland. While recognising that NATO’s Article 5 had been invoked, he still praised the toppling of the Taliban as a humanitarian intervention, and made no mention of Norwegian military participation. This fits Marc Houben’s finding: Norwegian participation in international military operations was mostly justified by international obligations and humanitarian concerns, and far less by material national interests. Noting this, Karsten Friis argues,

[T]hat Norwegians have to kill and die on another continent to secure national strategic security appears to have been difficult to state publicly for the government. The humanitarian version is safer and less controversial.

The resulting gap between rhetoric and reality was very wide, leading to something akin to cognitive dissonance.

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432 He later regretted his choice of words; Kjell Magne Bondevik, Et liv i spenning (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co, 2006), 431–434.
434 Ibid., 8–21.
War, risk perception and sovereignty

Neither the Danish Government nor prominent members of the Danish public had the same inhibitions as their Norwegian counterparts when it came to talking publicly about using the military. Prominent Danish politicians repeatedly stated publicly that the country was at war and that Denmark was being defended in Iraq and Afghanistan. These public statements became so common that, according to Jakobsen, “nobody [in Denmark] raises an eyebrow” when a politician describes Danish operations in the Iraqi desert or mountains of Afghanistan as part of the defence of Denmark.

Danish risk perception, unlike Norwegian, related to more distant and non-classical threats, such as terrorism. A newspaper article written by the Norwegian Minister of Defence legitimising military engagements abroad listed humanitarian and developmental aid as the primary purpose. Her Danish counterpart drew attention rather to Denmark’s security. The centre-right Government that took office in November 2001 aligned itself closely with the US and the War on Terror, arguing that Denmark was a belligerent in a global war on terrorism that had both an offensive and a defensive side. The US concept of Homeland Security was warmly embraced in Denmark, and became the main task of Danish forces on Danish soil. Meanwhile the Government claimed to be pursuing an offensive foreign policy, citing involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq as examples.

The Danish Government also seemed to be more receptive than the Norwegian to the idea of engaging in war without a UN Security Council mandate if the situation arose. The 2003 Iraq War was a case in point, marking a break with Danish foreign policy of the

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439 Jakobsen, ”Stealing the Show”, 37.
443 Per Stig Møller, ”Kronik: Den offensive udenrigspolitik vil fortsætte”, Berlingske Tidende, 16 November 2006.
444 Hanne Fall Nielsen, Camilla Ahlmann-Jensen, and Michael Seidelin, ”Danmark vil hurtigere i krig end FN”, Politiken, 19 May 2005.
past. While the initial Danish decision to join the US-led coalition of the willing can to some extent be attributed to the election of Fogh Rasmussen’s Government in 2001, opposition in Danish society was limited, and after the invasion the Social Democratic opposition initially supported Danish presence in Iraq. Norway, however, remained insistent on the primacy of international law. This clearly placed Denmark squarely in the “post-Westphalia” group of countries, as Anthony Forester argues, while Norway remained tied to Westphalian norms as far as the use of military force was concerned. Overall Norway remained committed to a more traditional Nordic position regarding sovereignty and use of force, whereas Denmark had reappraised the utility and morality of utilising force.

The effectiveness of the Danish contribution in the 1990s was reinforced because Denmark tended to concentrate its deployments in fewer locations, whereas Norway tended to participate in a larger number of missions. Denmark also favoured NATO PSO missions earlier, whereas Norway continued to spread its priorities between the UN and NATO until the late 1990s. The net result was that, despite still being among the lowest spenders in NATO on defence, Denmark boosted its reputation among its allies after the Cold War. In comparison, Norway lost at least some of the favourable status it had enjoyed in the Alliance compared to Denmark.

**Lingering strategic tasks**

Differences in perceptions of the desirability of using force and adhering to Westphalian norms of sovereignty were important strategic differences between Norway and Denmark. However, there were also other reasons. The two countries espoused different strategic rationales for

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445 Knudsen, “Denmark and the War against Iraq”.
452 Ringsmose, *Danmarks NATO-sandemøne*, 28–33.
maintaining armed forces at all. It may seem paradoxical that Danish scepticism about the usefulness of military force during the Cold War could give way such a strong military activism in the post-Cold War era. In fact, however, it is precisely the absence of such missions during the Cold War that allowed the rapid transition towards Danish expeditionary defence after 1990. Given the obsolescence of the primary function of providing a symbolic defence, and influence in the Atlantic Alliance now increasingly married to what a country did to support international operations, conditions were ripe for rapid change in Denmark.\textsuperscript{454} When the need for a symbolic resistance to an invasion orchestrated by the Warsaw Pact disappeared, there were simply too few functions left for the Armed Forces to fulfil.

Norway’s Armed Forces were more diverse in purpose than Denmark’s, and calls for change were therefore fewer and less successful. While the end of the Cold War shocked most Western states into reorganising their armed forces, neither Norwegian politicians nor the Norwegian Armed Forces were sufficiently shocked by the end of the Cold War to seek radical change.\textsuperscript{455}

Firstly, unlike Denmark’s, the Norwegian Armed Forces were not seen as merely providing a symbolic defence of the nation; they were viewed as actually capable of defending the country.\textsuperscript{456} Secondly, the Norwegian military continued to be seen as an homogenising institution for the young men of the nation.\textsuperscript{457} In the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, ties between the Norwegian Armed Forces and civic society were already close due to the work of voluntary organisations and broad parliamentary oversight.\textsuperscript{458} Conscription in Norway was said to serve a socialising and educational purpose, gluing the nation together.\textsuperscript{459} For the duration of the Cold War there was little conflict between society’s desire for universal male conscription, and the functional requirements of the Armed Forces. In order to secure the territory of the state, virtually the entire nation would need to be mobilized in some capacity.\textsuperscript{460}

\textsuperscript{454} Ringsmose, \textit{Danmarks NATO-omdømme}, 7.  
\textsuperscript{455} Græger and Leira, “Norwegian Strategic Culture after World War II”; 54.  
\textsuperscript{456} Brundtland, “Norwegian Strategic Culture after World War II”; 54.  
\textsuperscript{457} Henning Sørensen, “Conscription in Scandinavia During the Last Quarter Century: Developments and Arguments”, \textit{Armed Forces & Society} 26, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 316; Ulriksen, \textit{Den norske forsvarstradisjonen}, 253–266.  
With the end of the Cold War, however, what society wanted and what the military was supposed to do increasingly parted ways. Despite this there was little debate on national service. Conscription was institutionalised and so strongly tied to national mythology, it was difficult to challenge on functional grounds.\textsuperscript{461} Any attempt to reform the system faced strong emotional reactions.\textsuperscript{462} This was how Norway differed from Denmark, where the institution of conscription was weaker, and the system of long-term conscription easier therefore to reform.\textsuperscript{463}

**The significance of strategic culture**

The formative 1990s established a new Danish culture in matters pertaining to the use of military force, including situations for which there was little justification in international law. The country came to see the use of force as an acceptable and effective method to advance general foreign policy. Denmark and Norway also differed in their evaluation of the necessity of employing force, because remote threats such as terrorism, rogue states and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were held to seriously threaten Danish national security, but received less attention in Norway. Further, the disappearance of the one primary strategic purpose of the Danish Armed Forces after the Cold War made reorientation that much easier.

On the other hand, Norwegian strategic culture remained more tied to pre-1989 norms of consent and only defensive use of force. Norway also retained a stronger attachment to Westphalian norms and international legal principles, and did not have the Danish sense of being endangered by remote threats. Rather, Norway’s military engagement abroad often sought justification in humanitarian and idealistic motives, and efforts were made to make operations appear as pacific as possible. The Armed Forces were also still expected to defend the country and build the nation, strategic tasks beyond expeditionary defence.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{462} Heier, “Forsvarets utvikling etter den kalde krigen”, 22.
\end{thebibliography}
It thus seems clear that some of the differences between Norwegian and Danish defence policy can be traced back to differences in strategic culture during the two decades following the end of the Cold War. This explains why the differences persisted into the 21st century, after Ellemann-Jensen and Hækkerup had left politics and the Norwegian Armed Forces had become more willing and capable of projecting military force beyond national territory.
The impact of military culture

During the Cold War we used to joke that everything would be O.K., because it was all just a joke (...) When we started receiving the first fallen Danish soldiers from international operations (...) the joke was over.

Col. Lars R. Møller

Many of my colleagues say they joined the military to defend Norway, and not to embark on foreign adventures.

Gen. Sverre Diesen

The final factor behind the great difference between Norwegian and Danish defence policy after the Cold War was the countries’ dissimilar military cultures. While the Danish Armed Forces quickly became a willing and capable foreign policy tool, the capacity of the Norwegian military to perform the new expeditionary missions was lower, and it lacked the inclination moreover to do so. The reasons were threefold. Firstly, the Danish military was involved in overseas combat operations much sooner after the Cold War, promoting and accelerating the adoption of expeditionary warfighting more quickly than in the Norwegian case. Secondly, because the Danish Armed Forces had traditionally depended less on conscription and standing volunteer units were more easily employable for warfighting abroad, the personnel structure was more suitable for expeditionary missions. Thirdly, the Danish Armed Forces had a longer history of out of country operations. The historical mission of the Norwegian Armed Forces was more strongly associated

465 Brzezinski, “Who’s Afraid of Norway?”
with the territory of Norway. The Norwegian Armed Forces therefore resisted the state’s attempt to task them with a growing number of new and demanding missions abroad, while the Danish Armed Forces quickly accepted and supported the new expeditionary missions.

This chapter will highlight the significance of different organisational cultures within the Danish and Norwegian Armed Forces, and argue that while the former acted as a catalyst, the latter was an inhibitor in determining the speed at which the two organisations became willing and capable of performing the new post-Cold War missions.

**Different experiences in the 1990s**

In proportion to its population, Denmark contributed more troops than any other nation to the UN mission in the former Yugoslavia, and such forces as were deployed were involved in the most intense combat engagements Danish forces had experienced since the Second World War.\(^{466}\) Between 1992 and 1997 over one third of all Danish Army officers and nearly half of all NCOs had done service in Bosnia.\(^{467}\) This war-like experience, which the Danish soldiers gained in the Balkans 1992–95, helped change the self-perception of the Danish Armed Forces. When Danish officers came face-to-face with the harsh reality of PSOs in the post-Cold War era, so different from the “beach party” days in Cyprus, even older officers came to a different worldview.\(^{468}\)

As Henning-A. Frantzen argues, participation in the Balkans led the Danish Armed Forces to adopt a robust approach to PSOs, a “warfighting first” doctrine.\(^{469}\) The Armed Forces came to accept their new role as an instrument in foreign relations within this warfighting-focused framework, whereas previously, peacekeeping duty had been a side show and a bad career move for officers.\(^{470}\)

While these deployments sustained the Danish commitment to UN peacekeeping operations, the risk involved and the very robust nature of the Danish contribution were something new.\(^{471}\) The consequences of making a mistake abroad were no longer comparable with a

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\(^{466}\) Sørensen, “Denmark: From Obligation to Option”, 125.
\(^{468}\) Møller, *Det danske Pearl Harbor*, 56.
\(^{469}\) Frantzen, *NATO and Peace Support*, 172.
\(^{470}\) Ibid., 167, 176.
bungled exercise in West-Germany, but could literally result in Danish soldiers returning in coffins.\textsuperscript{472} Consequently, the requirements of international military operations increasingly determined force structure and procurement priorities of the Armed Forces, eventually supplanting all other considerations.\textsuperscript{473} The “hot” combat-exposed parts of the organisation began to take precedence, at the expense of the “cold” peacetime establishment.\textsuperscript{474}

The effect of operations in the Balkans on the Danish approach to PSOs can be illustrated by the way they organised their camps and military units in Croatia and Bosnia respectively. In Croatia the camps were located on the demarcation line, and designed more for convenience than defensibility. In contrast, the camps built in Bosnia were established well away from the buffer zone and built-up areas, with clear fields of fire around the base. The organisation of the battalion sent to Bosnia was also more robust and organised into regular manoeuvre companies rather than observation teams. This was a result of lessons learned from the vulnerability of small observation posts and teams in the Croatian deployment to intimidation and being taken hostage by the warring parties.\textsuperscript{475}

While they were assigned to PSO missions, Danish officers did not feel the need for special PSO training or doctrine, because their ability to conduct PSO missions was based on their ability to fight. The commander of the Danish battalion in the Nordic-Polish Brigade found the Danish battalion better prepared for the mission because it was organised like a regular Danish mechanised infantry battalion. The other battalions in the brigade, including the Norwegian battalion, were specially equipped, trained and organised for PSOs. Because the Danish battalion was more robust and prepared for warfighting, it would be better able to execute the full range of tasks to which it could be assigned in Bosnia, according to its commander.\textsuperscript{476} Similarly, the Danish commander of the Multinational Corps Northeast (MCN-NE) emphasised the corps’ warfighting ability as the foundation on which

\textsuperscript{472} Møller, *Det danske Pearl Harbor*, 57.
\textsuperscript{474} See Soeters, Winslow, and Wibull, “Military Culture”, 247.
all other tasks relied, even though its most probable mission would be low-intensity PSOs. 477

The Norwegian contingents in the Balkans 1992–95 were primarily involved in support functions, and did not, therefore, gain first-hand experience of regular platoon and company-size combat engagement as did the Danes. While serving in support functions in Bosnia by no means meant serving in the rear, the Norwegian units in theatre did not have combat as their assigned role. 478 Although the Norwegian forces experienced almost the same quantitative shift as the Danish forces in being deployed abroad, they did not experience the qualitative shift as strongly in terms of the types of mission they were asked to perform. 479 Differences in the size and role of the Norwegian forces serving in international operations, slowed the embedding of new practices in the Norwegian Armed Forces. The Norwegian Armed Forces continued to espouse a view of international operations as “an unwelcome diversion of personnel and resources, rather than an opportunity to gain valuable experiences”. 480

During the transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR in Bosnia, attitudes in the Norwegian military began to change. Norwegian officers serving in SFOR in Bosnia 1996–97 began to sense a more positive attitude in the Armed Forces towards participating in international operations. 481 High-ranking officers wanted the government to provide more than the support units being despatched to international operations. The commander of the Norwegian contingent in the Nordic-Polish Brigade, Colonel Kjell Grandhagen, saw no comparative advantage to Norway when it came to logistics and medical services. Problems recruiting specialised personnel to those units created in fact a comparative disadvantage. 482 Secondly, Grandhagen felt that the type of contribution Norway was making gave the country little credit in the Atlantic Alliance. Norway should send manoeuvre units

478 Gjeseth, Hæren i omveltning, 144.
480 Haaland, “Small Forces with a Global Outreach”, 166.
to Bosnia, urged Grandhagen. He also wanted units to be more robust, capable of forcing their will upon uncooperative parties in the area of operations. Other officers urged greater use of Norwegian Special Forces in robust PSOs abroad, as initial entry forces and for direct action missions.

This initial trickle of support for a new overseas deployment policy grew into a flood after the Kosovo War, with officers such as Lieutenant Colonel Robert Mood calling for change on his return from abroad. The officers with experience of both actual and virtual combat operations abroad returned with new ideas about how the Norwegian Armed Forces should be structured, organised, trained and equipped. They challenged the old worldview and its fixation on the peace-time training establishment the Norwegian Armed Forces had been during the Cold War. In Lebanon and Bosnia in the 1990s Norwegian Army units had only been trained and organised for peacekeeping. After Kosovo there was a new emphasis on high-intensity warfighting capability as the benchmark for all other activities. What had transpired in Denmark in the early 1990s, started to take place in Norway as well.

The early Danish emphasis on robust peacekeeping was well ahead of UN thinking at the time, but echoed the recommendations of the Brahimi Report submitted to the UN General Assembly in August 2000, which emphasised the need for bigger, better equipped forces capable of offering a credible deterrent. While UN members increasingly despatched well-equipped forces with robust rules of engagement for peacekeeping operations in the wake of the Brahimi Report, it was policy in Denmark as early as the mid 1990s.

SHIRBRIG, the Danish UN prestige project, was initially an exception to the Danish robustness rule. It was more of a traditional, infantry-based peacekeeping brigade. However, in June 2004, the

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483 Ibid.
484 Ibid.: 19.
486 Mood implored his political superiors and fellow officers “let us not do this again”. Mood, “Efaringer fra KFOR I”.
487 Interview with Major General Robert Mood January 2009 and Major General Per Arne Five February 2009.
Danish Government and most of the opposition parties agreed as part of the Danish Defence Agreement, 2005–2009, that Denmark would work towards developing SHIRBRIG so as to deploy with more robust units in the future, capable of executing Chapter VII missions of the UN Charter.\(^{491}\) The failure of this revitalisation project led to the decision to abolish SHIRBRIG in late 2008.\(^{492}\)

In contrast to the Danish emphasis on robust, warfighting-capable units, the Norwegian UN readiness force remained structured around lightly equipped infantry until it was merged with the Norwegian NATO IRF units in 1999. The Norwegian unit was only capable of classic, consent-based peacekeeping missions, as opposed to the muscular type of peacekeeping which became common in the 1990s. The supposedly warfighting-capable IRF battalion was also found lacking when it was required to deploy in Kosovo in 1999. When the battalion was initially established, it consisted of an infantry company equipped with wheeled lightly armoured vehicles and two infantry companies mounted in unarmoured tracked all-terrain vehicles. Considering the forces were in principle intended for high-intensity warfare, the battalion seemed inadequately equipped in terms of protection and firepower.\(^{493}\)

**Personnel policies**

While the Norwegian military lacked the experience of the Danish Armed Forces of robust peacekeeping in the Balkans, there were other, more deep-seated reasons why the Norwegian military was a less manageable foreign policy instrument than the Danish Armed Forces. The Norwegian approach to post-Cold War international military operations represents what Peter Viggo Jakobsen has called “an interesting combination of civilian activism and military foot-dragging”.\(^{494}\) In other words, the Norwegian military was a less-than-willing instrument, even for those Norwegian politicians who wanted to employ the Armed Forces abroad.

Bjørn Tore Godal describes the confrontation over the 2002–2005 Long Term Defence Plan as a “collision between two different views

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\(^{492}\) Ritzau [Danish news agency], “Nordiske lande vil ud af FN-styrke”, *Berlingske Tidende*, 7 August 2008.


on what the tasks of the Armed Forces were”. A large group of redundant officers of colonel and lieutenant colonel rank, in alliance with retired senior officers and civilians who saw themselves as friends of the Armed Forces made up the traditionalists and the reactionaries opposing the reforms. This group was, according to Godal, still thinking in terms of yesterday’s security challenges. One of the reasons Godal gives to explain the strength of the opposition to reform is the organisation’s top-heavy structure. Despite being much smaller than the Swedish military, the Norwegian Armed Forces had twice as many admirals and generals. In 2002, Norway had three times as many officers at lieutenant colonel/commander level as Denmark, nine per cent of all military personnel in Norway compared to three per cent in Denmark. Three-quarters of the Danish Armed Forces were either enlisted soldiers or sergeants. In Norway it was about a quarter.

If the Norwegian military wanted to carry out sustained military operations abroad, it had to be streamlined. The number of young, low-level "trigger-pullers" would have to grow, and the number of old, high-ranking desk officers fall. Re-introducing a professional NCO corps, as the leader of a working group proposed after the reform in 2001, was meant to address this problem. Naturally, officers facing redundancy would be inclined to resist this process. Indeed, two of the three military unions were against the bill. A more profound question was, however, at stake in the reform. The reformists wanted to reduce the number of redundant traditionalist officers. While a voluntary separation package offered by the Norwegian government had slimmed the ranks of the Armed Forces, it was feared that if nothing was done to change the officer training system, a new group of redundant older senior officers would soon emerge. These officers would re-entrench themselves and again make reforming the Armed Forces difficult.

Another aspect of the NCO reform was the question of egalitarianism in the Armed Forces. The military unions argued against the (re) introduction of a professional NCO corps because it would allegedly

495 Godal, Utsikter, 65–78.
496 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Komparativ analyse, 54.
499 Norwegian Union of Military Officers (NOF) and Military Officers’ Association (BFO), Om ny befalsordning i forsvaret (Oslo: NOF and BFO, 2003).
introduce an elitist class system into the Armed Forces. The new system, they claimed, would violate Norwegian values. An important reason for merging the officer and the NCO corps had been to secure equal access to education and do away with outdated social divides. As a consequence of this reform not only did Norway have a more top-heavy military hierarchy than Denmark, but leaders at lower levels were also consistently less experienced.

Norway had stood out in the Atlantic Alliance during the Cold War for lacking specialised leaders at the squad and section level, and this absence was frequently commented on by Norway’s allies. In most Alliance countries, e.g. Denmark, this was where the technical expertise in low-level tactics and weapons would lie. With increasing military involvement abroad in the 1990s, resulting in increased risk for members of the Armed Forces, senior Norwegian officers and intellectuals pressed for an urgent revision of the system and the introduction professional NCOs. Eventually the new system was introduced in January 2005, giving Norway a military personnel system somewhat similar to the Danish on which it was modelled.

There was, however, another key difference in the area of personnel that made the Danish Armed Forces much more capable of expeditionary operations: namely their enlistment contract system. In 2002, 46 per cent of all Danish active regular soldiers had enlisted voluntarily, compared to nine per cent in Norway. At the same time, 25 per cent of all active soldiers in Denmark were conscripts, whereas the corresponding number in Norway was 57 per cent. This high percentage was an obstacle to projecting military force abroad. For the early UN missions to Suez and Congo, Norway had despatched conscripts. By the time of the Lebanon peacekeeping mission in 1978, Norway had revised its policy in this area, and conscripts were no longer de-

501 Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen, 247–249.
503 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Proposition to the Storting, no. 33 (1926), 68–69.
506 Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen, 247–249.
507 Røksund, "Befalsordningen", 12–14.
ployed. Consequently, a higher percentage of volunteer enlisted soldiers gave Denmark an advantage when it came to making contributions to NATO and UN PSOs.

It is interesting to note that the Danish Home Guard had always been a voluntary organisation. While initially conceived as a voluntary force in Norway as well, concerns about recruitment and calls for a proper “people’s defence” resulted in the introduction of conscription for the Home Guard. More important than the principle of relying on volunteers or conscripting soldiers was, however, the issue of whether to employ regular, standing forces on contract (professional soldiers). The 1973 Danish Defence Agreement had introduced a mixture of units manned by contracted soldiers alongside conscripted units, and the Social Democratic Party had been in favour of an all-volunteer, standing military from the early 1970s to the late 1980s. The military unions also supported wider professionalisation, and proposed in September 1990 reducing the Army to two brigades manned by regular contracted soldiers, reserving conscripts for seven local defence battalions and the Royal Guard battalion. Mobilisation-based units were to be cut to a minimum.

In Norway, proposals to recruit a large number of volunteer enlisted soldiers during the Cold War were always controversial. Consequently, the group was restricted to a few specialists with certain technical skills for the duration of the East–West confrontation. The Norwegian Army never had more than about 250 contracted soldiers during this period. This did not change markedly with the establishment of the IRF battalion in 1993; the military and civilian leadership continued to be deeply concerned about “elite” units. The traditionally favoured Border Guard and Royal Guard battalions were given priority over the new battalion when conscripts were scarce, demonstrating the higher priority units with strictly national tasks were still held to

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512 Union of Privates and Corporals in the Danish Army (HKKF) and Central Association of Permanent Defence Personnel (CS), *Et forsvar, der er brug for* (Copenhagen and Frederiksberg: HKKF and CS, September 1990), 88–104.

Concerns over elite units can arguably be traced back to the strong Norwegian emphasis on egalitarianism. Historical accounts from the Second World War tended to idealise the Norwegian citizen-soldier, who took up arms despite lack of proper military equipment or training.

Resistance against all-volunteer units in Norway persisted beyond the reorientation of the Armed Forces after 2001. When the Chief of Defence proposed replacing two conscripted battalions with a volunteer battalion in 2008, the military unions lobbied for a larger Army, with four conscripted and only one all-volunteer battalion (which was already in existence). The traditional resistance to a small, professionalised military thus persisted into the new millennium, continuing to deflect the Norwegian Armed Forces from employing more contracted units.

**Different responses to internationalisation**

While the debates about personnel structure were important because it affected the Armed Forces’ ability to participate in international military operations, another debate dealt with the issue of whether such participation should be an *obligation* or a matter of *choice*. It is interesting to note that while the Danish military unions argued for greater international orientation of the Danish Armed Forces, the Norwegian military unions did exactly the opposite. This is all the more interesting because, during the Cold War, the Armed Forces in both countries had shared a negative attitude towards their one major source of military deployment abroad: peacekeeping.

This attitude changed relatively rapidly in Denmark after the Cold War, partly driven by the success of robust peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, as outlined above. However, there were also some deeper reasons. First of all, the conceptual leap required to deploy the Armed Forces beyond national territory was smaller in Denmark than in Norway. Unlike the Norwegian Armed Forces, the Danish military

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515 Ulriksen, *Den norske forsvarstradisjonen*, 200–204.
had been charged during the Cold War with defending not only their own territory, but, in a forward-defence role, parts of Germany as well. To do this they had been tightly integrated with German land, air and sea forces through LANDJUT and Allied Forces Baltic Approaches.\textsuperscript{518} Because the Danish PSO doctrine came to emphasise robustness and capacity for warfighting over and above classic peacekeeping and the missions were initially in the Balkans, the new international tasks could be seen as a continuation of the old NATO tasks of defending the near abroad as an extension of defending Denmark.\textsuperscript{519} By 1993–94, high-ranking members of the Danish officer corps were no longer being trained in the defence of Danish territory, but in conflict resolution, crisis management and the conduct of joint operations without reference to any particular geographical area. Examples were taken from all over the world.\textsuperscript{520}

The shift towards projecting forces outside national territory was hence less of a revolution in Denmark than in Norway, where the Armed Forces had solely been tasked with defending Norwegian territory in case of a general war.\textsuperscript{521} However, the mental shift required in the Norwegian case was probably even greater than this would suggest. Norwegian national romanticism has historically been particularly tied to Norwegian landscapes and geography, and historical accounts tend to reflect this by focusing on events that took place within the realm.\textsuperscript{522} Norwegian military history has therefore traditionally ignored historical accounts of military operations outside Norwegian territory. The objective has been to present the Armed Forces primarily as an institution tied to the territory and nation of Norway, a nation-building institution in other words.\textsuperscript{523} Norwegian officers have therefore not considered, even in historical terms, warfighting abroad as a natural part of their sphere of duty as much as their Danish counterparts.

The difference in mentalities can be seen in the different responses to increasing internationalisation of the armed forces of the two

\begin{enumerate}
\item Volden, \textit{Danske hærordninger}, 65–68.
\item Frantzen, \textit{NATO and Peace Support}, 169–173.
\item Anne Eriksen, “Norge – en naturlig historie”, \textit{Historisk Tidsskrift} 76, no. 1 (1997): 76–86.
\end{enumerate}
countries. There seemed to have been little grass-roots resistance to further internationalisation within the Danish Armed Forces. Indeed, the military unions themselves created the momentum to set up the DIB by proposing in September 1990 to create a reserve brigade manned by volunteer soldiers for operations outside Denmark.\textsuperscript{524} When service in international operations became mandatory, only five per cent of the serving members of the Armed Forces chose to reserve themselves against this.\textsuperscript{525} Vice-Admiral Hans Garde, the Chief of Defence Staff, took this low number of reservations to indicate widespread support for the new international tasks that Danish Armed Forces were becoming involved in.\textsuperscript{526}

In contrast, when the Norwegian Government latterly proposed making participation in international military missions obligatory, it caused widespread debate and controversy. It was particularly controversial within the ranks of the Armed Forces, evoking strong opposition from the largest military unions.\textsuperscript{527} Major General (ret.) Werner Christie led the charge against the Government. A soldier’s duty was to protect home and fatherland against those who would threaten their liberty; peace enforcement missions in distant conflict zones had nothing in common with this objective.\textsuperscript{528} Christie also opposed moves to make service abroad more rewarding for officers’ careers.\textsuperscript{529} Being ordered to fight in distant conflicts would reduce Norwegian soldiers to the level of mercenaries, he said.\textsuperscript{530} The result of such military concerns was the interim 1999 law, under which it would have taken decades before the entire officer corps could be ordered to serve overseas. Only in 2004 was a genuine universal obligation for regular members of the Armed Forces to serve abroad introduced. By then military obstructionism had delayed legislation for a full decade after its adoption in Denmark.

The Norwegian academic and politician Espen Barth Eide sees the cause of this resistance to ordering soldiers overseas in a narrow view of

\textsuperscript{524} Union of Privates and Corporals in the Danish Army (HKKF) and Central Association of Permanent Defence Personnel (CS), Et forsvar, der er brug for, 92.
\textsuperscript{525} Jakobsen, “The Danish Approach”, 121.
\textsuperscript{527} Børresen et al., Allianseforsvar i endring, 201.
the role of the Norwegian Armed Forces, not least within the institution itself.\textsuperscript{531} Changing established views and ways of doing things was a painful process for most of the Norwegian officer corps.\textsuperscript{532}

The obligation to serve abroad is an example of military foot dragging; the awarding of medals for doing so is another. As a result of the engagement in the Balkans, the Danish Armed Forces quickly felt the need to reward those distinguishing themselves in the line of duty. Consequently, in 1996 the Armed Forces introduced a medal for bravery in combat, and one for those wounded in the line of duty. Norway finally introduced a universal medal for participation in international operations in 2000. But it took until 2005 before a medal was created honouring soldiers who had died or been wounded in combat. By 2008 the question of whether or not to award a medal for bravery in combat still remained a hotly contested topic in Norway, over a decade after the first such post-World War II medal was awarded in Denmark.\textsuperscript{533}

When Norwegian defence policy did take the proverbial leap to embrace expeditionary defence, with the new long-term plans introduced in 2001 and 2004, the reforms still provoked the same fierce criticism from the older members of the officer corps. Commodore (Ret.) Jacob Børresen was the most articulate and persistent critic. He expressed his discontent with the reforms’ lessening emphasis on conscription as it severed the ties between nation and military, and weakened Norway’s ability to control and defend its own territory independently of its allies. Quality should not replace quantity to the degree now occurring, and interoperability with allies and the ability to deploy outside Norway should not be the be-all and end-all for all parts of the Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{534} Børresen quickly became the standard-bearer for critics of the reforms.\textsuperscript{535} The ideological architect of the reforms, future Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen, had to answer allegations


\textsuperscript{533} The Norwegian medal for bravery, \textit{Krigskorset}, has so far only been awarded to veterans of the Second World War. Janne Haaland Matlary, “Norske soldater i krig”, \textit{Aftenposten}, 14 November 2007, morning edition.


\textsuperscript{535} See e.g. Torkel Hovland, “Forsvaret på villspor”, \textit{Norsk Militært Tidsskrift} 174, no. 67 (2004): 12–15.
that the Armed Forces had lost all legitimacy now that its *raison d’être* was no longer defence of the nation’s territory.\(^{536}\)

However, these rearguard actions against the reforms were inevitably doomed due to the average age of the protesters. As the polemical journalist Aslak Nore puts it, this was a generational cleavage. The debate was resolved as the older Cold War generation naturally declined, and new officers realized the necessity of success in international military operations to advance their careers.\(^{537}\) These younger officers felt being obliged to serve abroad constituted a natural part of their chosen profession.\(^{538}\) The remaining proponents of territorial rather than an Alliance-integrated defence were successfully branded as dinosaurs by the reformists, by which time they lost much of their influence.\(^{539}\) A series of interviews with members of the Norwegian Armed Forces in 2006 show majority support for the new long-term plan. The new mobile, Alliance-integrated force structure was more suitable, felt the respondents, to this day and age than the old mobilisation-based territorial defence force.\(^{540}\)

Consequently, it seems that attitudes towards international military operations were in fact changing around the end of the 1990s. Members of the Armed Forces were less likely to sense an inherent conflict between defending Norwegian territory and participating in military operations abroad. This was particularly the case in the Army, traditionally the most sceptical service of the Armed Forces. Participation NATO-led rather than UN operations also helped, because the Armed Forces were generally much more positive to NATO missions.\(^{541}\)

In her study of role perceptions in the Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold War, Torunn Laugen Haaland found that Norwegian soldiers had primarily considered themselves “homeland defenders” and “state employees” at the end of the Cold War. A decade later, involvement in challenging military operations overseas had revitalised a certain “warrior role” in the institution, making the Armed Forces

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539 Ulriksen, “Brydningstid”, 147.
both more able and willing to participate in dangerous military operations abroad.\textsuperscript{542} By the time the second Norwegian battalion was rotated into Kosovo, warfighting skills and robustness had become the focus of the units deployed in theatre. Less emphasis was now put on special peacekeeping training, equipment and organisation.\textsuperscript{543}

The “new model army” deployed to Afghanistan in the new century was even more different from the army of the early 1990s. This “new army” considered the Cold War era conscript army as its antithesis.\textsuperscript{544} Cold War era officers had an understanding of duty and honour tied to fighting and possibly dying in direct defence of the nation.\textsuperscript{545} The post-Cold War generation had developed pride in their professionalism and a kind of warrior ethos unknown in the old army.\textsuperscript{546} Its members viewed the Cold War force as a “rigid, passive, slow organisation with desk officers without combat experience”.\textsuperscript{547}

The Armed Forces sought to strengthen this new expeditionary ethos. In 2004 the Army published a new historical work emphasising the long history of engagement in missions overseas, with the explicit aim to foster an expeditionary culture.\textsuperscript{548} Operations abroad strengthened rather than weakened the defence of Norway, and officers who did well abroad were now being hand-picked for the top jobs at home.\textsuperscript{549}

The effect of military culture

Like many other Western military forces, both the Danish and the Norwegian armed forces had been mostly homebound “unblooded” armies after the Second World War.\textsuperscript{550} This changed with the end of the Cold War, as both countries became involved in a new type of PSOs around the world. Both the Norwegian and the Danish military gradually came to rediscover some of their warrior roots after the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{542} Haaland, “Small Forces with a Global Outreach”, 244–257.
\bibitem{544} Friis, “The Power of the Draft”, 112.
\bibitem{545} Karl Hellemvik, “Refleksjoner rundt militær kultur”, in Kryssild: \textit{Militært lederskap i en ny tid}, ed. Karl Hellemvik and Johan Haarberg Kristian Firing (Trondheim: Tapir Akademisk Forlag, 2007), 143–150.
\bibitem{547} Ibid., 112.
\bibitem{550} Lars Nyholm, “On the social organisation of western armed forces after the Cold War: a return to warrior ethics?”, \textit{Militært Tidsskrift} 126, no. 4 (October 1997): 396.
\end{thebibliography}
Cold War, embracing more of what Christopher Coker has called the warrior ethos.\textsuperscript{551} The Danish experience in the Gulf and especially in the Balkans however gave this transition in the Danish Armed Forces greater pace and breadth, leading to radical changes at tactical and operational level in the employment of Danish forces abroad. Norwegian reluctance to commit combat forces to the two theatres slowed the progression of the new post-Cold War mentality in the military ranks in Norway.

An important reason for this is that the Danish military culture was more positive towards professionalisation and internationalisation in the first place. Hence, the Danish military culture facilitated a rapid transition to expeditionary operations, whereas the culture of the Norwegian Armed Forces served to slow the process and keep the organisation focused on its old Cold War tasks of territorial defence and traditional, non-robust UN peacekeeping.

\textsuperscript{551} Christopher Coker, \textit{The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror} (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).
Conclusion

Denmark was quicker to embrace operations going beyond traditional peacekeeping, it was quicker to give priority to peace operations in its defence planning, and it was the only one to give its military forces pride of place in its foreign policy.

Peter Viggo Jakobsen

When studying the post-Cold War security and defence policies of Norway and Denmark, one is struck by the degree to which the patterns established during more than four decades of Cold War were inverted. Following the Second World War, Denmark became a reluctant ally within the Western camp, and throughout the Cold War it retained an image as that of the weakest link in the Alliance. Norway, on the other hand, was not held to be a so reluctant an ally; indeed, the Americans considered Norway to be one of the most cooperative countries within the Alliance.

A little over a decade after the end of the Cold War, opinions had reversed. Given its almost pacifist Cold War policy, Denmark had made significant adjustments, and was now described as the impeccable ally. Meanwhile, by the end of the 1990s Norway had become a special case in NATO, and was in danger of becoming “the last cold

552 Jakobsen, Nordic Approaches, 93.
554 Agger and Michelsen, “How strong was the ‘weakest link’?”.
557 Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support, 185.
558 Ringsmose and Rynning, “The Impeccable Ally?”
warrior” in the Alliance. The reason for this inversion of perceptions was the new philosophy within the Alliance: to foster the capacity and willingness to participate in expeditionary military operations, preferably with combat troops in high-risk areas.

With the 2001 reform Norway did temporarily come to resemble Denmark in terms of expeditionary capabilities, and Norway and Denmark made nearly identical contributions to the 2001–02 invasion of Afghanistan. However, this alignment was short-lived. The 2004 Danish Defence Agreement again gave expeditionary capacity in the Danish Armed Forces precedence, and the 2003 Danish participation in the Iraq War, followed by the 2006 decision to send regular ground forces into southern Afghanistan, again served to accentuate the differences between Norwegian and Danish defence policy.

This chapter draws the discussion of the preceding seven chapters together, and especially seeks to relate the different factors handled in chapter 4–7 to one another. It then attempts to present a few hypotheses about the future, drawing on recent developments in Danish and Norwegian defence policy. Finally, it offers a few reflections on viable future research topics, and how this study fits into a new form of history-writing relatively unknown in Scandinavia, which builds bridges between, on the one hand, a technical military literature, and on the other, a more accessible foreign policy history.

**Geopolitics, leadership, strategic and military culture**

As we have seen, the reasons Norway and Denmark parted ways in the extent of their willingness and ability to pursue a policy of expeditionary warfighting in the post-Cold War era can be divided into four main categories:

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Table 3: Overview of factors determining change or continuity in Norwegian and Danish defence policy after the Cold War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Norway</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geopolitics</strong></td>
<td>• Lingering threat from Russia and need to exercise sovereignty/authority in maritime areas. Therefore territorially focused</td>
<td>• No military threat to Danish territory after the Cold War. Could therefore refocus the Armed Forces on combating distant/diffuse risks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership</strong></td>
<td>• Political and bureaucratic desire for continuity</td>
<td>• Political and bureaucratic desire for change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Successful example of political and bureaucratic inertia</td>
<td>• Successful case of political and bureaucratic entrepreneurship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ambivalent leaders unwilling to identify clear priorities</td>
<td>• Willingness to make tough choices and prioritise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Culture</strong></td>
<td>• Political consensus persisted which emphasised traditional role of the Norwegian armed forces</td>
<td>• New political consensus emerged which viewed the Armed Forces as useful and employable foreign policy tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Use of the Armed Forces abroad seen as much as humanitarian as national security issue</td>
<td>• Use of armed force against distant new threats seen as necessary and vital for national security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Old Cold War functions to defend the state and build the nations still relevant</td>
<td>• Cold War symbolic defence functions of the military obsolete in the new era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Culture</strong></td>
<td>• Strong national service traditions. Top heavy force</td>
<td>• Weaker national service tradition. Balanced force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lacked professional soldiers and NCOs</td>
<td>• Tradition for employing professional soldiers/NCOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Opposition to operations outside of Norwegian territory</td>
<td>• Stronger support for expeditionary operations</td>
</tr>
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</table>

These factors played out differently at different periods. Marked differences in geopolitical environment remained the prominent factor throughout the period covered. Denmark’s geopolitical concerns decreased more in these years than Norway’s. Denmark’s sense of security was strengthened by Poland’s NATO membership in 1999. Thus Danish freedom to combat distant and diffuse threats grew over the years. For Norway, perceptions of the geopolitical environment changed to a lesser extent. The decline of the Russian military, new
advances in military technology, and the drastically reduced probability of a Russian desire to occupy Norwegian territory, combined to make the invasion defence forces obsolete by the turn of the century. However, the Norwegian government remained concerned about the possible application of limited force in the High North. In addition, the economic importance of the High North was growing, increasing the need to maintain a presence in the region, to exercise sovereignty and authority, and to have the necessary capacity for managing a limited crisis.

The appearance of decisive leadership was a striking phenomenon in Denmark in the 1990s. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Hans Hækkerup, working closely with military counterparts such as Hans Garde, managed to overcome entrenched domestic constraints on overseas deployment of military force. Their success, part skill and part luck, created a new domestic consensus: it was now viewed as normal and even desirable for Danish soldiers to be located on the frontlines in distant wars. Bjørn Tore Godal and Kristin Krohn Devold, acting as the political agents of military reformers such as Sverre Diesen, played a somewhat less prominent role in Norway in the beginning of the new millennium. They managed to overcome domestic opposition to scrapping the Cold War era invasion defence force and to introducing a more modern and employable structure. They did not, however, manage to do more than soften domestic constraints on engaging in combat operations abroad, which still remained controversial. Nor did they manage to set political priorities for the Armed Forces by closing redundant bases and cutting excess capacity.

The advent of successful political leadership in Denmark on the cusp of the post-Cold War period resulted in the emergence of different strategic cultures in Norway and Denmark. During the Cold War Denmark and Norway had shared a common Nordic outlook towards the use of force, on sovereignty and international institutions. In the post-Cold War world, Norway retained much more of these classical Nordic positions than Denmark. The latter now reinvented itself as a strategic actor feeling it occasionally necessary to employ military means against the dangers of this world, whether condoned by international institutions or not. Denmark thus reinvented a new strategic role for its Armed Forces, as expeditionary warriors first and homeland security providers second. In Norway, however, the Armed Forces’ strategic tasks remained tied to the more classic role of defending state
and territory, while conscription as a nation-building instrument continued to inform the popular image of the military.

Differences in military culture became apparent in the 1990s, as conservative older officers in Norway fought against Armed Forces cuts, the re-introduction of an NCO corps and the obligation of Norwegian officers to serve overseas in international military operations. In Denmark these issues were not only uncontroversial, they were actively advocated by the Armed Forces. With the post-2001 military reforms, the deployment in combat operations in Yugoslavia in 1999 and Afghanistan since 2002, the Norwegian Armed Forces began slowly to break with the past’s absolute attachment to a large conscripted force and territorial defence. Thus the sharp differences in military culture were a transitory phenomenon, although the Danish Armed Forces still had a higher contingent of professional soldiers and remained more focused on high-intensity, expeditionary warfighting.

The present and the future
Both Norway and Denmark are committed to current levels of international deployment, though the latter is showing the strain. Denmark maintains its focus on deploying combat forces under the NATO or US/UK umbrella; Norway will continue its balancing of national and Alliance-integrated tasks.

The 2008 Danish Defence Commission, chaired by Hans Hækkerup, presented its findings in March 2009. Current Danish defence policy should continue in broad measure.560 The June 2009 Danish Defence Agreement 2010–2014 largely adopted the Commission’s recommendations.561 While there is dissent, criticism has mostly been limited to questioning whether the report was innovative enough.562 Danish defence policy is therefore unlikely to change in the short term. The recent appointment of the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO’s General Secretary also seems to confirm

Denmark’s excellent standing in NATO circles, giving Denmark some cause to congratulate itself.\textsuperscript{563}

Denmark has remained relatively unconstrained by its Arctic possession Greenland, or indeed by the Faeroe Islands. The 2009 Defence Agreement gives more attention to these areas. A joint Arctic Command will be created, along with a force catalogue, known as the Arctic Response Force, composed of units capable of operating in the Arctic. Aware of the opportunity created by the melting of the polar ice cap to exploit the natural resources and establish new sea routes in the Arctic, Denmark is considering following Norway’s lead and allocating more resources to increasing its military footprint in the area.\textsuperscript{564}

At the moment, however, were Denmark to reduce its international military commitment the reason would be either the great strain on personnel and equipment, and/or a popular backlash in light of the mounting casualties. Retention of personnel is perhaps the most serious problem, seeing as how the Danish Armed Forces are now short of 2,300 soldiers at the start of 2009.\textsuperscript{565} The strain on equipment has also been substantial, as the increasing Danish deployment tempo has not resulted in any comparable increase in defence spending. Though differences have narrowed somewhat, Norway spent more than Denmark on defence in the entire 1990–2007 period, and also invested a much higher percentage of its defence budgets in new equipment. While Denmark is increasing its defence expenditure somewhat, it is nevertheless forced to cut capacities even more in order to focus on the remaining. The 2009 Defence Agreement scrapped the M109 self-propelled artillery system, as well as the Army’s ground-based, short-range air-defence systems.\textsuperscript{566}

The recent Norwegian Long Term Plan for the Armed Forces 2009–2012, presented in March 2008, contained no shocks. The current force structure of the Norwegian military will continue, albeit with some rationalisation. Overall the Norwegian Armed Forces remain occupied with their dual mission, a national, territorial one and an alliance integrated one abroad.\textsuperscript{567} The High North receives wider attention, and the budget for 2009 allocated more funds to increase

\textsuperscript{563} The Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre was, however, also mentioned as a possible candidate if Rasmussen was rejected. Steven Erlanger, “U.S. Backs Dane for NATO Post Amid Turkey’s Objections”, New York Times, 23 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{564} Danish Ministry of Defence, Aftale om … 2010–2014, 10–11.

\textsuperscript{565} Danish Defence Commission of 2008, Dansk forsvar – Globalt engagement, 1.


\textsuperscript{567} Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Et forsvar til vern.
slightly the Navy’s and Air Force’s presence in the region, and increase the Army’s readiness. 568 Linked to Norway’s growing concerns about a resurgent Russia and the growing importance of the High North is the Government’s attempt to bring NATO “back into area”. This is necessary, the Government argues, to strengthen the organisation’s legitimacy, which in turn will strengthen support for out-of-area missions. 569

There seems to be little prospect of the present centre-left Government changing the established policy of providing combat troops only to relatively safe locations. In Afghanistan the Government wants less emphasis on the military. 570 Norway seems therefore for the moment to continue rotating troops for stability operations, rather than participating in high-intensity combat as initial entry forces.

Final remarks

This study has attempted a detailed comparative analysis of Norwegian and Danish defence policy after the Cold War, a field in which the differences between these very similar countries have been so remarkable as to inspire frequent comments in the media, popular culture, as well as academic and military studies. It is, however, by no means a comprehensive study, dealing as it does with nearly 20 years of history and several different aspects of security and defence policy. Firstly, perhaps one of the most unexpected findings I made, about which nothing has appeared in the scholarly literature to my knowledge, is the substantial differences between the personnel structure and traditions of the armed forces of Norway and Denmark. There is certainly a comparative article waiting to be written on this subject alone, if only military researchers could turn their attention away from their own particular country of study. Secondly, little has been done comparatively on Scandinavia by contributors to the strategic culture literature. Given the many similarities between Norway and Denmark, their defence sector differences would surely make an excellent subject for a historical study. It would explore precisely the “same-but-different” foreign policy cultures and draw on recent developments in the field of

570 Ibid., 92.
strategic culture to bring it up to date. Finally, and most importantly, relatively little has been written in the cross-sectional field of military and foreign policy history in Scandinavia. Military history tends to be narrow and specialised, and general political and foreign policy history tends to ignore military issues. While this may have a natural explanation in the long peace of the Cold War, the “militarisation” of Scandinavian foreign policy over the last two decades has surely created room for this type of history. \textsuperscript{571} Hopefully, this study is but one of many new contributions to this genre.

\textsuperscript{571} Note that the word militarisation is used here in a neutral, analytical, not a derogatory sense.
Parliamentary documents and governmental publications

Norway


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