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ARTICLE



## Beacons of Nordicity: Nordic Conservation Day 1970 and the reimagination of history

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### ABSTRACT

This article shows how a reimagined history of the Nordic countries informed their claims to a common destiny as they sought to give shape to the ‘ecological turn’ and to Nordic cooperation at a critical juncture. A narrative analysis of the uses of history on Nordic Nature Conservation Day in September 1970 reveals that the political needs of governments and environmental organizations required that the region ignore its violent history of intra-Nordic warfare. The applied narratives all depended on a harmonious past. Paradoxically, Conservation Day’s foremost event was the synchronized lighting of 600 beacons dotting the Nordic landscape, explicitly re-enacting the call to arms used in the wars that had shaped each country’s borders and identities. The organizers claimed they were sounding the alarm on behalf of nature itself, as if mobilizing the past to save the future. Along the way, this past had to be sanitized to fit the required narratives of regional harmony. Yet the contemporary disharmony of the Cold War could not be escaped and came to affect how the story was told, which demonstrated the frailty of Nordic cooperation under the pressure of the great powers and the ensuing limitations on regional unity.

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De gamle varder tennes

for å varsle om farer

som truer vår natur<sup>1</sup>

(The beacons of old are lit

to warn of dangers

that threaten our nature)

Through the above message, set up to resemble a poem, the organizers of the Nordic Nature Conservation Day on 6 September 1970 sought to let their audience know, line by line, that practices of the past, dangers of the future and nature itself were intertwined. The warning was sent out by the organizers in Norway, but its gist was also communicated across the three other participating Nordic countries. Government and NGO

representatives, along with the media, made explicit and implicit use of history to explain where humanity's stewardship of Earth had gone wrong, to present salvation in different hues of Nordicity and to argue for political action.

On its face, the lighting of beacons and other ceremonies of Conservation Day put on display a broad consensus that humanity had placed nature at risk. Yet, for the event's numerous stakeholders, the very storytelling involved in the event posed risks of its own. Conservation Day carried a significant potential for discord. It stepped into two highly charged political processes of the time, both emblematic of the late 1960s as a high-strung period of calls for transitions out of the postwar era, and each portending reverberations at the national, regional and global levels. One took place as politicians struggled to ride the rapidly building wave of global environmental politics.<sup>2</sup> The other was the ongoing effort to weave the Nordic countries into a political and economic partnership that would offer respite from European and global pressures. Both processes triggered concerns related to such basic political aims as economic growth and national security. Encompassing all of these developments, the Cold War permanently threatened to derail any process that was viewed as challenging the premises of economic growth and liberal market economics, Western cohesion, or the strategic balance of the Nordic region. Both domestic and international relationships were at stake. Created under such a context of pressure, the messages examined in this article were laden with paradox and ambiguity.

Conservation Day's synchronized lighting of more than 600 beacons on rocks and hilltops throughout the Nordic region bound Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark together spatially and visually, as political entities on a map, as a landmass, and as peoples acting in a supposedly unbroken link across seas and borders. As this article will demonstrate and discuss, the unity suggested by this coordinated event also represented a claim on a shared history and purpose. Paradoxically, however, the pre-modern practice of beacon-signalling embodied the disunity of war. Reinforcing the ambiguity entailed by such a situation, the explicit use of historically correct beacon lines pointed to the violent past relationships through which the Nordic countries had forged their borders and their national identities had been inspired. The use of the past to argue for the future thus required that Conservation Day wipe away centuries of internecine warfare.

This article takes as its starting point the assumption that research into the uses of history has to answer the basic questions of why, how and by whom the past is invoked.<sup>3</sup> Answering these questions requires both the identification of narratives and of those acting to shape and support them by initiating particular events, for specific reasons.<sup>4</sup> In the type of context examined here, relevant functions of a narrative might include providing legitimacy to a cause or a process or helping to join the past to a desired future by providing a certain meaning and orientation.<sup>5</sup> In turn, such functions may assist in the achievement of a political goal by gathering support or altering established power relations. By situating the narrative analysis presented here within the history of environmental politics, Nordic cooperation and regional security policy, this article aims to contribute to those fields in their own right.

In what follows, this study is first situated within the context of the ecological turn and then that of Nordic cooperation, before the narrative analysis considers Conservation Day within each context. Towards the end, the analysis turns to the fraught balance between national and regional historical narratives. Here, a moment of acute and explicit Cold War

pressure is revealed, as the Finnish planners hit the brakes, demanding that the beacon lines be readjusted to please the Soviet Union. The article concludes that the display of balance and harmony seen on Conservation Day relied on a wilful disregard not only of past Nordic conflicts but also of contemporary great-power politics.

### The ecological turn in a political perspective

The Nordic Nature Conservation Day marked the climax of the Council of Europe's European Conservation Year (ECY) in the Nordic countries.<sup>6</sup> At the time, the ECY was the world's largest international awareness-raising undertaking of its kind. Throughout 1970, the 18 Council of Europe member-states each carried out national programmes of activities that adhered to a framework they had agreed upon in a series of meetings held over several years at the Council of Europe headquarters in Strasbourg. Scientific committees drafted and redrafted reports on wetlands, urban pollution, air quality and endangered wildlife. Politicians and civil servants met regularly to negotiate unanimous declarations that sought to reconcile the reluctance of those calling for moderation and the urgency of those who worried that material progress threatened to wreak unimaginable destruction. With its membership stretching from the Mediterranean to Northern Europe and combining a diverse set of Western countries, the Council of Europe had no formal power to iron out differences or force through any binding agreement on what was then an emerging field of policy. Consequently, it produced a wide mandate to be filled with nationally desirable content by each participating state.<sup>7</sup>

The ECY coincided with the display of local environmental activism and awareness-raising on Earth Day in the United States in the spring of 1970.<sup>8</sup> This more famous cousin of the ECY is often highlighted as a particularly potent example of the environment's breakthrough as a political topic, but it was scarcely noticed in the Nordic countries and most likely not taken into consideration by the organizers of Conservation Day.<sup>9</sup> Still, Earth Day does offer both parallels and contrasts of interest for the present study. Both Earth Day and the Nordic Nature Conservation Day relied on volunteers and activists to set up local events and fill them with content, and to a certain extent both events also granted such volunteers and activists the freedom to define their messages. However, the two events differ in terms of the degree of overall control exercised by the state, which was considerably greater in the case of the ECY than in the mostly government-independent Earth Day. In terms of the degree of message control exercised by the various Nordic governments, Sweden stood out in particular. Still, it should be noted that Conservation Day was among the more liberally managed undertakings associated with the ECY in the Nordics, as local volunteers, NGOs, and civil and elected officials were allowed considerable leeway in crafting programmes for each local event.<sup>10</sup>

The ECY was initiated in the mid-1960s as the field of environmental policy began to emerge in its global form. The iconic photography of Earth taken from lunar orbit on Christmas Eve in 1968 – *Earthrise* – came to symbolize the newfound realization that the planet and everyone walking its surface were fragile passengers travelling through space. Sometimes branded 'the ecological turn' by environmental historians, the late 1960s and early 1970s were marked by a rapidly expanding public awareness that pollution, resource shortages and environmental degradation could be seen as interrelated issues constituting a 'threat to the survival of man'.<sup>11</sup> Notably for the present attempt to study the

interplay between state-sponsored activities and grassroots activism, the late 1960s saw an increase in government-level efforts to pursue environmental action in the international arena. Simone Turchetti has pointed out how this served to '[renew] collaborations and tensions already existing at a national level', also within NATO and in Cold War geopolitics.<sup>12</sup>

Writing from a Swedish perspective, David Larsson Heidenblad has highlighted the central role of scientists in '[raising] the alarm about an ongoing environmental crisis of global proportions' at this 'transformative moment' in time.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, the efforts of these scientists preceded the activities of the environmental movement that is often associated with a strengthened popular awareness of environmental issues. Studying Norway, Peder Anker has explored the emergence of ecology as a focal point for radical environmental activists and scholars that tended to blur whatever boundaries existed between them.<sup>14</sup> The campaign at the heart of this article involved these types of actors, yet they are not the main object of study here. Conservation Day was dominated by national and local authorities, along with established conservationist associations. Accordingly, the analysis presented here places the 'raising of the alarm' in a political perspective, both in terms of agency and in relation to the campaign's messages. Crucially, in this study of entanglements between environmental politics and Nordic cooperation, broader currents and political needs are brought into view, which makes it possible to link the analysis to the wider context of the 1960s.<sup>15</sup>

### ***The usefulness of Nordic cooperation***

The Nordic governments, each in its own way, sought to control the European Conservation Year by employing the same corporatist structures that had helped them shape their postwar societies.<sup>16</sup> The main conservationist NGOs had maintained close relationships with state authorities for several decades and continued to take on formal responsibilities on behalf of the public. This is not to downplay the significant leeway granted to local Conservation Day organizers, but rather to point out that national and even Nordic coordination limited the degree to which anyone could stray from the overall historical narratives that were put to use. Of additional interest here are the emerging radical environmental organizations that were beginning to break through but had not yet gained the prominence that would later provide the backdrop for a more antagonistic relationship between the state and environmental activists.<sup>17</sup>

A significant grassroots commitment was manifest in the practical organization of Conservation Day, which was down to the main conservationist associations in each country. Contributing from the top, the state authorities that controlled each nation's ECY operations actively contributed to the funding, planning and execution of events. Public attendance at the beacon sites across the Nordics, along with broad local and national media coverage, increased the reach and the significance of the event. Mutual recognition of a common heritage among the Nordic populations suggested a sense of unity. The merging of state-sanctioned and private messages reinforced the Day's claim to popular representativity and thereby its symbolic relevance.

The Nordic aspect of this summoning of popular legitimacy was on display even in the organizational structure of Conservation Day. For the national governments, the cooperation between activists and civil servants from each state was an end in itself. Seeking to

fulfil a Nordic Council recommendation, the countries had agreed that the ECY should form part of their work to strengthen regional cooperation between their fledgling environmental protection bureaucracies.<sup>18</sup> Melina Buns has identified 1967 as a turning point in this effort, with the years leading up to 1970 marking the emergence and institutionalization of Nordic environmental cooperation.<sup>19</sup> In all of the Nordic countries, new and larger government structures were being considered or established to match the expectations for stronger state involvement in environmental protection. Whether fully established, such as Sweden's Environmental Protection Agency (SNV), or still constituted by relatively modest ministerial subsections, as in the other countries, Nordic political leaders wanted to increase the links between these organizations, as they had done in several other areas of government. Greater cooperation was intended to alleviate concerns related to ongoing attempts at Nordic and European economic integration, but the maintenance of Nordic cohesion also served as a motivation of its own.<sup>20</sup>

Intended audiences for such displays of Nordic unity would be found both internally and externally. Communicating to the outside world that the Nordic countries did indeed constitute a region had taken on an importance of its own. As Nikolas Glover has observed, the 1960s 'saw an overall boost in attempts to actively promote foreign awareness of Nordic cooperation'.<sup>21</sup> As a set of otherwise vulnerable small states, the Nordic countries had long counted on others to see them as an identifiably Nordic bloc in international negotiations, at least since the interwar period.<sup>22</sup> This held true even during the Council of Europe's series of preparatory meetings for the ECY. Ahead of each meeting, the representatives of the Nordic countries had already coordinated their views in separate pre-planning sessions lasting a day or two in one of the Nordic capitals.<sup>23</sup> The countries also agreed among themselves that the Swedish delegate, who had been appointed to the ECY's executive committee, would act on behalf of all of them. Similar informal coordination already characterized Nordic participation in the United Nations, the Organization for European Economic Co-Operation (OEEC) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).<sup>24</sup>

Domestically, 'Nordic cooperation' had become a celebratory phrase to some, denoting consensus and harmony.<sup>25</sup> It was a notion to which politicians under pressure would retreat in order to escape toxic debates over European and transatlantic relationships, not least in the increasingly confrontational late 1960s. A strong 'ethos of Nordic cooperation', among both governing elites and the general public, has also been identified as an explanation for the recurrent attempts to overcome setbacks and failures in regional negotiations during the first decades after the Second World War.<sup>26</sup> Yet this persistence or application of Nordic cooperation as a safe haven should not be interpreted as a reflection of harmony in relation to the underlying material issues. The differences between the Nordic countries that were caused by great-power politics could not be shut out simply by retreating to Nordic-only negotiations. This much had become clear in 1949, when attempts to create a Scandinavian defence union failed as a result of Sweden's and Norway's diverging views on a formalized Atlantic commitment.<sup>27</sup> The continuing influence of the Cold War on Nordic affairs was evident even as the ECY was being planned.

By the end of the 1960s, Nordic cooperation found itself at a particularly fraught moment. The Nordic states were finalizing a treaty to create a Nordic economic union under the acronym NORDEK. Intergovernmental cooperation had steadily increased following the Second World War, significant setbacks in the areas of defence and the

economy notwithstanding, and the Nordic Council had strengthened its position throughout the 1960s.<sup>28</sup> As the 1970s and the ECY awaited, the proponents of regional economic integration appeared on the cusp of a significant breakthrough. The proposition of Nordic unity was being tested in a process not only of tremendous political reach but also of considerable material consequence to both businesses and populations in the region. It was this same idea of unity, and even the claim of a particular Nordic identity, that underpinned Conservation Day.

As things turned out, the high-stakes NORDEK negotiations ended up demonstrating the strength of extra-Nordic relations rather than the power of an idealized common identity among peaceful nations. Just as a deal seemed about to be secured in March of 1970, Finland pulled out and the effort collapsed. What had caught up with Nordic cooperation were the international dynamics that some had hoped it would help them evade. A change in French foreign policy seemed to reopen the door for the United Kingdom to join the European Economic Community (EEC), thereby increasing the likelihood that Denmark and Norway would also do so. NORDEK suddenly seemed to be a springboard to EEC membership rather than its alternative.<sup>29</sup> To Finland, this meant an increased risk of getting pulled towards the Atlantic by its prospective partners. Soviet emissaries to Helsinki advised the Finns to decline the treaty and to 'make sure that Finland is not drawn to the West'.<sup>30</sup> The next day, Finland withdrew, and NORDEK was dead. As Rolf Tamnes put it, 'the Nordic option withered as soon as the European Community opened its arms'.<sup>31</sup> Nordic cooperation had not defied but had rather been defined by the growth of the EEC and the geopolitics of the Cold War.<sup>32</sup>

The collapse of NORDEK in the spring of the European Conservation Year provides a forceful reminder of the constant challenge posed to Nordic cooperation by the Cold War. In fact, Cold War politics had directly affected the make-up of the Nordic group of representatives in the Council of Europe's planning for the ECY. Finland's very participation there rested on an institutional compromise set up to ease Soviet pressures. The Council of Europe had been founded by Western European states early in the Cold War, with membership for Finland almost unthinkable. In order to include their Nordic partner, the three Scandinavian countries invited Finland to participate by way of their regional ECY subgroup without having to fully commit to Strasbourg. Nordic cooperation thus provided Finland with a bridge to a Western institution that would otherwise have been out of reach. Eventually, when the beacons were lit on Conservation Day, the expression of Nordic unity appeared whole and unbroken, with no visible signs of the earlier manoeuvring that had been necessitated by the fragility of the partnership.

### ***Mobilizing the past to save the future***

Beginning in a remote location in each participating country, the chains of beacons stretched through valleys and along coasts to simultaneously reach a great bonfire on the steps of Oslo City Hall. The national broadcasters of the various countries provided coverage of the event, two of them live.<sup>33</sup> National and local newspapers carried articles with maps showing the beacon chains and informing readers about local opportunities to take part. On the day of the great event, reporters conveyed what the event's organizers had taken care to let them know about the beacons as historical symbols.

In Sweden, information was provided about how beacons represented an ancient Nordic means of mobilization in times of war and crisis. One Swedish regional daily wrote: 'It has been a long time since beacons were lit on our West Gothland hills. Those were times of war, and the beacons the telegraph of the era, relaying the message that all men should report for military service'. Following a presentation of the ECY and the dangers posed by environmental degradation, the piece ended with an admonition that Conservation Day should 'teach us to protect' that which cannot be retrieved once it is lost. 'Through all of time the beacon has been a sign urging vigilance and attention to impending danger'.<sup>34</sup> Albeit in a more florid manner, the text captured the main components of the more straightforward coverage elsewhere in the country: An ancient method of sounding the alarm had returned to implore us to change course lest it be too late.

In Denmark, too, the symbols of mobilization and centuries bygone were present, although the allusion to an emergency was given less emphasis in news reporting than in Sweden and Norway. Danish newspapers tended to portray the lighting of beacons on Conservation Day as a festive occasion, with many of them calling it a 'bonfire celebration' (*orig.* 'bålfest'). Yet the historical reference remained present and the subtheme of military alarm implicit. In Skibstrup, where the beacon relay crossed Øresund into Sweden, two men dressed as Vikings sounded their arched overhead battle horns to accompany the fire. Later, those present sang 'Høje nord, friheds hjem' – a 19th-century ode to Scandinavia, its nature and the spirit of its peoples.<sup>35</sup> At the point of origin of the Danish beacon chain, near Vedersø in Western Jutland, the same song had been used to end the proceedings, which had begun with drum rolls and trumpet fanfares from the historical dragoon regiment of the area, who attended in full dress uniform and with mounted officers.<sup>36</sup> Drawing on the same syndicated article that had been circulated a few weeks ahead of Conservation Day, some newspapers made reference to 'the old beacon signal system' but offered little context.<sup>37</sup> Reporting from the event in Næstved, one local daily repeated the prevalent explanation that beacons were 'salutes in the manner of old', but then went on to discuss their military aspect. Quoting at length from a short story about the area in the 12th century, the paper informed its readers that beacon chains reaching all the way to Southern Sweden had been employed in the past to help repel invading forces.<sup>38</sup>

References to the use of beacons in Norway largely reflected those seen in the Swedish example, but the contrast between past and present was more explicitly stated. At least 31 national, regional and local newspapers across the country, in a total of 44 articles over the span of a few days, adopted as their own the organizers' statement in a press release that the beacons 'remind us of the damage done to our surroundings by our age of technology'.<sup>39</sup> Most of these newspapers also repeated the press release's mention of the beacons as a warning of an impending threat or danger.

Peter Aronsson has identified four basic tropes that assist narratives in ordering the relationship between the past, the present and the future. These four tropes take the form of two symmetric pairs. The first pair comprises the static alternatives that there is either constant change or never any change at all (i.e. there is nothing new under the sun). The second pair, whose two tropes refer to change in opposing directions, is of particular interest to this article. One portrays decay and the loss of



a golden age, the other its positive inversion, whereby progress leads out of a sorry past. Niels Kayser-Nielsen has added to these four tropes a 'U-model', which allows a happy state to be succeeded first by decay and then, in a third phase, by restoration.<sup>40</sup> The structural parallel between such a model and the biblical fall from grace and subsequent redemption is obvious.<sup>41</sup>

The interpretations of the beacon ceremonies that were provided to Scandinavian publics could be understood as stories of decay in Aronsson's sense. However, Kayser-Nielsen's U-model would seem to be a better fit, as the purpose of the Conservation Day beacons was to enable mobilization in defence of all that is good. This is most evident in the Norwegian narrative, where the 'age of technology' has caused the fall from grace. Man has fallen out of step with nature, creating a calamitous situation that previously did not exist. To the time before is ascribed purity; the threat arose in the after. The beacons thus call for a restoration of purity in a future climbing of the second upright of Kayser-Nielsens 'U'.

In a wider sense, the awareness that humanity had enabled its own possible self-destruction had been placed front and centre with the advent of the atomic bomb. In his study of environmental debates in Sweden, Heidenblad points to the importance of the nuclear threat in lending gravity to the other threats humanity appeared to have created for itself: Population growth, resource shortages and, as the 1960s progressed, the sense of a global environmental crisis could all be seen as coming from the same technological can of worms as atomic weapons.<sup>42</sup> Although it did not feature explicitly in the official Conservation Day rhetoric, the Cold War prospect of instant annihilation remained the most vivid and immediate threat to the Nordic peoples as they demanded political action to ensure their survival.

Peder Anker finds a similar narrative of urgently needed redemption at work in the self-understanding of Norwegian scholar-activists around 1970: 'It was a grand story of an environmentally harmonious past, followed by environmental havoc, which, thanks to the environmental awakening of the scholar and his or her followers, would eventually lead to the restoration of a new harmonious future for the world'.<sup>43</sup> Among these ecologists, particularly those tending towards some manner of Marxism, many would point to the supposedly self-sufficient fishermen-peasants of Northern Norway as ideals for a future balance between man and nature through which industrialization and modernity could be held in check.<sup>44</sup> This ideological tendency achieved its breakthrough moment mere weeks ahead of Conservation Day as a protest against a hydropower development site was forcibly ended by police. The timing of the civil disobedience protest, soon known only as 'Mardøla' after the name of the affected river, gave Conservation Day an unexpected level of controversy and temperature.<sup>45</sup> The long, historically argued narrative of decay caused by a rupture in an implicitly static, pre-modern balance with nature must have come across as an even more powerful piece of commentary on current affairs than the organizers of Conservation Day could have imagined. Throughout the 1970s, these various narratives of an industrial-era original sin were all used to argue for political action in support of environmental protection.<sup>46</sup> As the topic heated up, the persistent demand of the Cold War for clarified loyalties meant that protesters and critics were increasingly forced into different camps depending on whether or not they foresaw revolutionary change as part of the 'restoration' described in Kayser-Nielsen's 'U-model'.<sup>47</sup>

### **Affirmations of Nordicity**

Taken together, the hundreds of dots marking the Conservation Day beacons on a map created an image of a region that stood out almost as a continent of its own. The live broadcast on Norwegian television displayed each beacon as a tiny bulb lighting up on a giant wall-mounted contour outline of the Nordic countries. While perhaps less breathtaking an image than that of the *Earthrise* photo, the region appeared eerily alone on the dim, shadowy surface rising up above the TV presenter in his strangely underlit, black-and-white studio. Similarly, seen from the ground at each of the beacon sites, the relay of bonfires will have constituted a spatial confirmation of a destiny shared. Largely following the region's borders, the warning emanating from the series of lights did not just define the outer limits of Nordicity: as with the menacing darkness surrounding the Nordic region on the TV map, it located the threat on the outside. The official slogan crafted to emphasize the Nordicity of the day called attention to a sense of fatefulness and community: 'Nature of Norden – Future of Norden'.<sup>48</sup> A planned lapel pin meant to display the slogan crested around the silhouette of a beacon never materialized,<sup>49</sup> but together each country's Norden Association circulated 85,000 copies of a booklet bearing the slogan as its title.<sup>50</sup> Most of the hundreds of newspaper mentions of the day included the branding of the day as a Nordic venture.

The beacon relay had first been contemplated within a national frame, as part of plans by Norwegian conservationists for a Norwegian Conservation Day in 1966. Their argument was that nature's worthiness of protection would best be argued by a celebration of the Norwegian-ness of the country's natural splendour.<sup>51</sup> Once the European Conservation Year came into view, however, and the Nordic countries had taken the decision to coordinate their ECY programming (as they did with environmental efforts more generally), the day's national labelling was swapped for a regional one. In this relabelling from Norwegian to Nordic, the forceful use made of history to enlist both the landscape and its inhabitants, remained unchanged. Indeed, there is little or nothing to indicate that the organizers pondered the geopolitical consequences of expanding the border of fire to the wider Nordic region. Yet, albeit unwittingly, the decision would thrust Conservation Day into a completely new set of challenges.

The projection of internal unity helped construct a common Nordic protagonist in the narrative around Conservation Day. In his study of political narration and national unity in the wake of the terror attacks that took place in Norway on 22 July 2011, the sociologist Tore W. Rafoss employs a relatively straightforward model in which a narrative needs a protagonist, an antagonist, a contested object over which they fight, and actions structured in time.<sup>52</sup> The presence of a crisis and the political task of identifying a way forward would suggest that such a structure is also applicable to narratives of environmental disaster. Pertinently, Hans Mouritzen has identified both 'peacefulness' and 'environmentalism' as traits typical of ideas of a particular 'Nordic progressivity', each suggesting a widespread faith in the protagonism of the Nordic region.<sup>53</sup>

Applying Rafoss's structure, it is evident that the Conservation Day narrative of Nordic unity differs in important ways from the environmental narrative of humanity's fall from grace. The biblical story of redemption has humanity fight itself as both protagonist and antagonist – the struggle is within. In the narrative of Nordic unity, it is not human beings as such but *Nordic* human beings that constitute the protagonist. The Norwegian head of

the ECY, Olav Gjærevoll, explained to a newspaper that the beacons were meant to mobilize 'the Nordic peoples'.<sup>54</sup> Rather than a top-down order to fight, however, the hundreds of decentralized, grassroots-driven beacon ceremonies suggested that it was in fact the peoples themselves that were sounding the alarm. The people of each country, acting as one, are the protagonists of the narrative of Nordic unity. Any antagonist, by implication, is un-Nordic. There is an exceptionalist undertone to the accompanying suggestion that goodness distinguishes the Nordic protagonist from threats on the outside. The narrative's contested object is not nature or Earth in general, but is very specifically defined by the Conservation Day slogan as *Nordic* nature.

The purported Nordicity both of the region's nature and of its defence helps illuminate the invocation of history in support of Conservation Day. To those motivated by concern for the environment, the symbols of Nordic popular unity served to define their cause not as politically charged but as representative of national and regional consensus. The Nordic conservationist associations that were delegated the role of organizing Conservation Day were also given the right to formally represent their countries and the Nordic region. Dissent would by definition be un-Nordic, as anyone opposing the call of the slogan would place themselves in the role of antagonist to the Nordic peoples.

The use of historical beacon chains as proof of Nordic cohesion would serve the aim of providing legitimacy to the event.<sup>55</sup> History would be used to emphasize the organic nature of Nordic cooperation as the people of each country joined hands to defend their physical surroundings. By presenting the beacons as ancient Nordic practice, Conservation Day affirmed the relevance of Nordic cooperation through what Jörn Rüsen has termed a 'traditional narrative'.<sup>56</sup> In asserting continuity between the past, the present and the future, such a narrative 'frames the present and points out the options for future action'.<sup>57</sup> Viewed in this light, Conservation Day allowed the Nordic governments to use history to reinforce impressions of a steadily solidifying Nordic bloc.

### ***A violent past erased***

The continuing Nordic unity implied in the 'traditional narrative' rested on a less than sound historical footing. In their attempt to fuse the past of the beacons with the present, the storytellers of Conservation Day conveniently left out the historical tensions between the Nordic countries. Both as symbols and as physical structures, beacons favoured national rather than regional historical references. After all, the beacons had been devised to protect against attacks from neighbours who were themselves mostly Nordic. Another of Rüsen's categories for narrative function, that of the 'genetical narrative', might better have reflected the commonly accepted history of the Nordics as a region in which war and conflict was replaced by peaceful partnership.<sup>58</sup> However, the transformational function that defines this category would preclude the traditional narrative's reference to primordial qualities such as a particular Nordic relationship with nature. The same problem would have ensued had the organizers chosen to rely on Aronsson's trope of progress, according to which the Nordics would have left their violent past behind to create a future in harmony. The organizers averted this problem by attempting to ignore past strife entirely, causing paradox and ambiguity along the way.

From the outset, Conservation Day planners ran into challenges related to their efforts to drape events in tradition by professing their accurate references to history. While mapping out the beacon chains, Finland's central organizers reported to their counterparts in the other countries that the demand for historical accuracy was causing them headaches. There was simply no precedent for the premise of Nordic cooperation in the historical locations of beacons. Along the south coast of Finland, archaeologists had helped organizers identify chains that had run from west to east, and then in the opposite direction as enemies changed, but not covering distances that met the requirements of Conservation Day. Elsewhere in the country, beacon chains had run inland up the river valleys to warn against seaborne aggressors, but not in the opposite direction, from the thousand lakes to alert the coast.<sup>59</sup> Among the most far-fetched ambitions of Conservation Day, was probably the one to have Finland's alarm system cross the Baltic Sea and mobilize the country's old rulers in Sweden.

Tensions between national and regional histories were also evident in Norway. The newspaper article that first publicized the plans for a beacon-lit Conservation Day while this was still being imagined as a national event within Norway had employed the rhetoric of national mobilization. In the past, beacons had been used to signal 'that danger was close and that everyone should get ready to fight for their country'.<sup>60</sup> Even after the Nordic label had replaced the national a couple of years later, the organizers made symbolic reference to the Gulathing Law, a regional law for Western Norway that was first written down in the 12th century. References such as this to Old Norse traditions of laws and parliamentary assemblies (*ting*) would be likely to arouse romantic sentiments of the bygone greatness of medieval kings and seafarers that have often fuelled Norwegian national identity. Still, the regionalization of the project did not stop the organizers from pointing out that the people of the present time would have to take up 'the old tradition of lighting beacons when danger threatened the country', as had been prescribed almost a thousand years earlier.<sup>61</sup> Nor did the references to actual warfare appear to have concerned those swapping 'Norwegian' for 'Nordic'. The premise remained that the beacon chains would join the Nordics as one unit. The fact that the Norwegian beacons along the Swedish border had been put in place in the 17th and 18th centuries to keep invaders from Sweden out did not affect their cross-border coupling.<sup>62</sup> One might ask, as seen from the eastern side of the border, in what absurd past would Charles XII have peasants of the Swedish interior alert the Danish–Norwegian troops at Akershus Fortress that his army would soon be arriving?

Medieval and early modern wars may have provided historical references so distant that their challenge to contemporary claims of unity made little impression. Perhaps more problematic was the live broadcast from the steps of Oslo City Hall on Conservation Day, in which the highly complicated Nordic legacy of the Second World War was invoked. Next to the central Nordic beacon, the very node where the chains from Finland, Sweden and Denmark all joined together with the Norwegian one, Norway's resistance to Nazi occupation was re-enacted through the medium of dance. A Norwegian folk dance group performed in national costumes while singing the poem 'Vardevakt' (Eng. 'beacon watch') a cappella. The NRK TV presenter explained that the poem had been adapted for folk dance during the German occupation, 'under the influence of the peril then facing the country'.<sup>63</sup> Only 25 years after liberation, the popular memory of conflicted Norwegian–Swedish relations during the war remained close to the surface. There is nothing to

indicate that the poem had been chosen to add insult to injury, but its author Per Sivle had been a well-known proponent for Norwegian independence in the volatile years leading up to the end of the union with Sweden in 1905. As an act of communication, the dance was more than an isolated element orchestrated by someone perhaps not fully aware of the event's context. In his role as the national head of the preparations for Conservation Day, the secretary general of the Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature wrote to all civil associations involved in the event to suggest that the dance be performed locally across the country.<sup>64</sup>

Contradictions like this were not new to those carrying the gospel of Nordic good will and unity. The tensions between past wars and present cooperative efforts had been considered explicitly by Nordic diplomats only a few years earlier, as they negotiated over the themes for a common pavilion at the World Exhibition in Montreal in 1967. Nikolas Glover has shown how history came to complicate the ambition to portray the region as a cooperative and harmonious group that was continually championing world peace and human rights. A civil servant tasked with drafting an overall message suggested that the story be told of a region once ravaged by internal wars that had since changed forever into one worthy of the heading 'Unity in Scandinavia'. According to Glover, the idea was that 'if the extent of today's cooperation was to be communicated, it could not be presented as an organic expression of harmonious historical progress'. Yet, after several interventions by political leaders and external consultants, that was close to what happened. The violent past disappeared, and what remained were the Nordic nations welcoming visitors to their 'joint pavilion, a result and symbol of their constructive cooperation'. The topic of war was not accepted as part of the story of a region that Finland's representatives at one point suggested be termed 'masters of peace and the equality of mankind'.<sup>65</sup>

### ***Nordic balance challenged***

The Cold War interplay between the Nordic countries and the various pressures from and obligations to nations and organizations outside the region has been interpreted as the expression of a distinct Nordic balance.<sup>66</sup> With Sweden as a neutral middle component, the region's stability was ensured by Finland's formal obligations to the Soviet Union in the East and the NATO allegiance of Norway and Denmark to the West. Alarms would go off in the Nordic capitals whenever anything threatened to upset this balance. The Nordic Council's efforts throughout the 1960s sought to integrate policies on almost any area but national security, which should serve as a reminder that roads not taken have often been deliberately evaded.<sup>67</sup> Conservation Day was no exception. Yet, and perhaps inevitably, great-power politics did catch up with the uses of historical symbols of war and mobilization.

In the autumn of 1969, with barely a year to go before the event, the Nordic planning group received a written request from the Finnish government's representative that a Swedish venue replace Oslo as the destination for the common Nordic beacon chain. At the group's previous meeting only a couple of weeks earlier, the same Finnish representative, Reino Kalliola, had previewed his misgivings over Oslo. His Norwegian counterpart had made a personal note from that event that 'Finland will answer before 1 November 1969 whether they can accept Oslo'.<sup>68</sup> Kalliola's subsequent letter, however,

lamented that he had perhaps not been 'sufficiently clear'. He asked whether it would not 'be more natural that the end point be placed in Sweden (Stockholm), which is geographically centrally located?' He then added an argument with which the other Nordics would have been all too familiar: 'Moreover, considering Finland's geopolitical situation, it would be desirable that the gathering of the Nordics happen within Sweden.'<sup>69</sup>

In a matter with such implications for questions of national security, it is highly unlikely that Kalliola acted on his own. His appointment as the deputy chairman of Finland's ECY executive committee was a natural tangent to his regular job as the country's nature conservation supervisor and to his scientific authority as a professor of botany. The objection to Oslo as the nexus of the beacon chains, however, must be presumed to have originated with someone closer to the heights of power. Among the likeliest explanations is that Kalliola received a directive from his superior on the executive committee, Kauko Sipponen. Sipponen was chief of staff to Finland's prime minister, Mauno Koivisto, and would have been intimately familiar with issues of national security. Although Sipponen's relative absence from the sources indicates that Kalliola and a meagre ECY secretariat were left to carry out the bulk of the actual work, his appointment strikes a remarkable contrast with the other Nordic countries. It is likely to have meant that all ECY communications of any consequence were immediately available to the prime minister's office. That would not have been the case in Sweden, Denmark and Norway, where the executive committees were headed by civil servants or scientists, and the political level was only intermittently involved. Sipponen's role kept Conservation Day close to the country's national leadership.

The Swedish chairman of the executive committee who received Kalliola's letter wrote back that time had run out for any change of venue, while also demonstrating his understanding of Finland's predicament. He suggested that Finland do as the other Nordic countries had done and nominally leave Conservation Day to the national conservation societies: 'This way the countries – the nations – take no part directly.'<sup>70</sup> The disagreement appears to have ended there, as the plan remained unchanged.

The Swedish proposition that the countries, as states, took no direct part is at best a creative reading of Conservation Day. Throughout Denmark, Sweden and Norway, Conservation Day was marked by the high-visibility participation of national military organizations. In all three of Finland's partner countries, it was the armed forces, mainly Home Guard units, that both lit and secured the beacons. Finland's armed forces declined to participate, pointing to budgetary restraints.<sup>71</sup> The central bonfire in Oslo was watched over by the Royal Guard, a situation that presented press photographers and TV camera crews with the remarkable silhouette of a full-dress guardsman in front of the flames.<sup>72</sup> This deployment of not just historical military structures such as the beacons but also contemporary military units must have reminded at least some of those attending of the region's historical animosities and its continued geopolitical fragility.

The deployment of national armed forces on Conservation Day could also be understood as a reminder of one particular aspect of the Nordic balance – that it rested on the relative absence of foreign military units and bases – and so the demonstration of Nordic unity was not necessarily diminished by the display of national military uniforms. As Christopher Browning has noted, the Nordics have 'presented themselves as having successfully overcome the security dilemma between themselves to establish a region of peace and prosperity'.<sup>73</sup> Their own armed forces were viewed as inherently non-

aggressive. Just south of the Baltic Sea, the opposite reality made the stakes of the Cold War mercilessly clear. There, hundreds of thousands of US soldiers joined their counterparts from the Western European countries in the decades-long face-off with Soviet and Eastern European units along the line separating East from West. When Nordic cooperation continued to be tempered by the need to maintain the Nordic balance, it was in part to avoid the exposed fate of Central Europeans. Although no less fearful about a nuclear war than their German, Lithuanian or Polish neighbours to the south, the majority of Nordic populations did not have to live under any comparable assumption that one day cannons would roar and tanks roll through their cities and villages.

The Nordic balance that helped the region appear so peaceful and harmonious was paradoxically unreliant on the traditions that were reasserted by the historical narratives of Conservation Day. In his classic discussion of the Nordic balance, Arne Olav Brundtland argues that it was the strategic interests of the superpowers outside the region that made the absence of military forces opportune for both the West and the East. It was the *lack* of unity – that is, the diverging national security orientations – that provided the balance. As long as Sweden remained neutral, both the East and the West had a buffer. As long as NATO allies did not permanently place forces in Norway, the Soviet Union did not need to make up for such a move by pressuring Finland further. And, inversely, as long as neither side shook the balance, it was assumed that it remained in their opponent's interest to also abstain from escalation.<sup>74</sup>

The exceptionality claimed by the narratives of Conservation Day alleged a primordial unity within the beacon-lit Fenno-Scandinavian frame. Yet, when the Finns chose to tread softly and requested that the beacon chains be redirected to Stockholm in the autumn of 1969, or when they walked away from NORDEK at the last minute half a year later, they did so because the proposition that the Nordic region was different relied on constant maintenance. As Johan Strang has observed, 'the idea of Nordic exceptionality' proved useful as the region tackled 'centrifugal issues', notably its diverging relations to Europe and NATO.<sup>75</sup> In this light, the Finnish tinkering with event plans or its semi-formal status as an ECY participant could be seen both as a detraction from and a confirmation of the overall message of unified Nordicity. Following Brundtland's analysis, it was the constant and mutual recognition that Nordic cooperation remained at the mercy of great-power politics that kept it alive and relevant to those attending the beacon ceremonies on 6 September 1970.

## **Conclusions**

The sensitivity to maintaining the Nordic balance of the Cold War suggests that regional harmony was less settled than might have been suggested by the synchronized beacon chains and other celebratory ECY features such as Nordic posters and postage stamps. Claims of unity may have resonated with a sense of shared identity, and even destiny, but their manifestations had to take shape according to the sometimes divisive conditions of the Cold War. The beacons' associations with mobilization and armed conflict offer, at least in hindsight, a forceful reminder of regional instability, both as proven through the centuries and as whispered potential in 1970.

When the traditional narrative of historical beacon chains was accepted despite the beacons' origins as tools of intra-Nordic wars, the explanation may be found in the contemporary fears about a possible return of hostilities. At the time, the military threat

of nuclear annihilation was perceived as an external one. Rather than being rattled by re-enactments of mobilization, the regional self-image of nature-loving, peace-inducing Nordic peoples may even have been reinforced by the conversion of military communication lines to serve the cause of environmental protection. The story would come together in the end if this transformative act were to be seen as an essential trait of Nordic peoples – that it is their nature to turn swords into ploughshares. That, however, necessitated Conservation Day's suspension of Nordic fratricide as a defining element of past life along the beacon chains.

Conservation Day served as a vehicle for two separate historical narratives that were both parlayed for contemporary political gain. The conservationists organizing the beacon event turned historical military practice into a display of Nordic unity to portray their cause as representative of inherent qualities of their peoples – of tradition. Likewise, the governments and institutions seeking to strengthen the contemporary political impact of the Nordics used history to demonstrate the region's ability to come together in a non-belligere partnership for humanity and nature. Both narratives sought to provide legitimacy through assumptions of continuity.<sup>76</sup>

Their similarities notwithstanding, the two narratives relied on contradictory narrative tropes. Applying Kayser Nielsen's 'U-model' on history, the conservationists claimed that society must turn around and rediscover the natural balance of pre-industrial life. Here, two historical breaking points are necessary, one constituting a fall from grace and the other redemption. In contrast, the official advocacy for a stronger Nordic role in the promotion of peace and humanity in international affairs depended on a historical narrative void of change. As a result, the pre-19th-century past had to be ignored. There is a suggestion of primordial Nordic qualities in the claim that, by the strength of popular virtue, the Nordic region could remain as one even when faced with the Cold War pressure to fall into line. The dramatic change presupposed by the U-model or Aronsson's tropes of decay and progress would undermine such an argument, which requires that fundamental aspects of the story be considered permanent. The effort to disregard centuries of intra-Nordic violence points to Aronsson's trope in which 'nothing is new under the sun'.<sup>77</sup> Rösen's category of traditional narratives is equally relevant, as these 'confirm already given self-understandings'.<sup>78</sup>

With such contradiction – between the dynamism of the biblical cycle and, on the other hand, a Nordic region outside time itself – how could activists and government representatives from across the Nordic region all sit on the same committees and join the same celebrations of Nordicity as the best hope for nature and the future? The answer may reside in the cover-up, so to speak. Diverging narratives or not, both uses of history relied on a construction of a Nordic past without violence and disharmony. Where the one needed a desirable past to contrast with contemporary despair, the other needed an invisible past to avoid any appearance of contrast at all. Both were helped by a willingness to forget why the landscapes of the Nordic countries were dotted with beacons in the first place. And as the bonfires flared from the promontories and summits, they tied the landscape together, drowning out for a moment even the contemporary and irrepressible external demands that, as the flames died down, East and West return to their respective camps.



## Notes

1. Synonyms for the Norwegian word 'varde' (Eng. 'beacon') include 'vete' and 'baune'. In Danish, the term is 'bavn', in Swedish 'vårdkase', and the Finnish word used by the organizers was 'vartiоровio'. 'Nordens naturverndag 6. september', Fb-2, PA-641 Norges Naturvernforbund, National Archives, Oslo, Norway [NAO].
2. Warde, Robin and Sörlin, *The Environment*; on the Nordics, see Anker, *The Power of the Periphery*; Asdal, *Politikkens natur*; Buns, "Green Internationalists"; Heidenblad, *Den gröna vändningen*; and Notaker, "Staging Discord".
3. As applied to Norwegian political history, see Ryymin, "Innledning," 10.
4. Ryymin, "Innledning," 11.
5. Aronsson, *Historiebruk*, 57–67.
6. Norway, Sweden and Denmark were full Council of Europe members. Finland was not and only joined the three others as part of an ad hoc ECY planning group initiated by the Nordic Council. Iceland did not participate in this group or in the Nordic Conservation Day, and only marginally in the ECY. Finland committed fewer personnel and funds to the ECY and the Conservation Day than the other countries, perhaps because of its non-membership in the Council of Europe. In addition, for linguistic reasons, Finnish planning documents were not shared with the partner countries to the same extent as documents produced by Denmark, Norway and Sweden. For both reasons, Finland's contribution was less integrated within the Nordic approach than that of the other countries. This also means that Scandinavian sources outweigh those of Finland in this article. Archival sources have been retrieved from the national archives of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. All contain substantial paper records of the organizing committees and national nature conservation societies, along with their mutual correspondence and publications. News coverage has been systematically retrieved through the digital media repositories available in the Scandinavian national libraries, using a broad set of search terms in each language relating to the ECY, the Nordic Nature Conservation Day and beacons, as well as more specific terms relating to persons, places or events. The scope of the search has also been defined by the author's linguistic competence, which does not include Finnish.
7. On organizational aspects of the ECY, see Notaker, "Staging Discord".
8. Rome, *The Genius of Earth Day*.
9. Heidenblad, "En nordisk blick," 116.
10. Notaker, "Staging Discord," 316–21.
11. Heidenblad, "Mapping a New History," 265.
12. Turchetti, *Greening the Alliance*, 8; see also Hamblin, "Environmentalism for the Atlantic Alliance".
13. Turchetti, *Greening the Alliance*, 8; see also Hamblin, "Environmentalism for the Atlantic Alliance".
14. Anker, *The Power of the Periphery*.
15. On connecting environmental history with wider currents, see Maher, *Apollo in the Age of Aquarius*, 69.
16. Notaker, "Staging Discord".
17. Anker, *The Power of the Periphery*, chs 4–5; Jamison, Eyerman and Kramer, *The Making of the New Environmental Consciousness*; Kaijser and Heidenblad, "Young Activists," 303; Kielland, *Natur og ungdom*.
18. Recommendation 26–1964, Nordic Council; memo, 13 December 1966, Da-79, S-1452 Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet/Distriktsplanavdelingen, NAO.
19. Buns, "Green Internationalists," 6, 31.
20. *Ibid.*, 41, 50, 71.
21. Glover, "Unity Exposed," 221.
22. Fure, *Mellomkrigstid*, 222; Buns, "Green Internationalists," 93.
23. Esping to Huse, 30 January 1968, Da-15; Hofsten to Germeten, 18 December 1967, Da-79, S-1452, NAO.
24. Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 148.

25. Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 169.
26. Olesen and Strang, "European Challenge," 32; Andersson, *The Nordic Council*, 118–20.
27. Sverdrup, *Inn i storpolitikken*, 326.
28. Sonne, *NORDEK*, 46.
29. Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 168; Sonne, *NORDEK*, 185–86.
30. Sonne, *NORDEK*, 185.
31. Tamnes, *Oljealder*, 168.
32. On the interplay between domestic and European factors in shaping Nordic economic cooperation, see Eriksen and Pharo, *Kald krig og internasjonalisering*, 287–306.
33. NRK aired the event in Oslo live on television in Norway; see NRK TV, "At vardar vaka". According to radio listings in Danish newspapers, DR broadcast live on radio from the last beacon in the Danish chain.
34. *Gt Søndagstidningen*, September 6, 1970.
35. *Frederiksborg Amt Avis*, September 7, 1970.
36. *Holstebro Dagblad*, September 7, 1970.
37. Byline given as 'VB' (i.e. Venstrepressens Bureau). See, for example, *Frederiksborg Amts Avis*, August 18, 1970; *Vendsyssel Tidende*, August 20, 1970; *Vejle Amts Folkeblad*, August 20, 1970.
38. *Næstved Tidende*, September 7, 1970.
39. Search made 26 February 2019, on [www.nb.no](http://www.nb.no); search term 'teknologiske tidsalder'. Filters: newspapers only and September 1970; press release: 'Nordens naturverndag 6. september', Fb-2, PA-641, NAO.
40. Aronsson, *Historiebruk*, 79–81; Ryymin, "Innledning," 27.
41. Seland, "Tøffe valg," 231.
42. Heidenblad, *Den gröna vändningen*, 64–65.
43. Anker, *The Power of the Periphery*, 8.
44. *Ibid.* 26–29.
45. On *Mardøla*, see Anker, *The Power of the Periphery*, 65–70.
46. Proving the durability of the narrative, Eivind Heldaas Seland has identified its presence even in Norwegian government reports on the climate from the 1990s and 2000s. There, as well, the tide turns with industrialization, which had humans 'inadvertently releasing forces beyond their comprehension and control'. Left to the present, argues Seland, was the choice between finding a way out and on into the trope of progress or non-action and descent into unimaginable decay. Seland, "Tøffe valg," 231.
47. Anker, *The Power of the Periphery*, 27, 65, 81–92, 101.
48. "Nordens natur – Nordens fremtid".
49. Midttun to Kretsforeningene, 23 January 1970; Skedsmo to Rogaland naturvern, 22 June 1970, FB-3, PA-641, NAO.
50. In each country, an NGO called the Norden Association, prefixed by a national denominator (e.g. 'Norwegian'), advocated for increased Nordic cooperation; Jansen, *Hvem gjør hva*, 223.
51. *Aftenposten*, January 18, 1967.
52. Rafoss, "Kampen om demokratiet".
53. Mouritzen, "The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument," 11.
54. *Arbeiderbladet*, January 7, 1970.
55. Aronsson, *Historiebruk*, 62.
56. Rösen, *History*, 13.
57. Ryymin, "Innledning," 26–29; for a discussion of Rösen in a Norwegian context, see also Heiret, Ryymin, and Skålevåg, "Innledning," 28.
58. This historical process and the question of Nordic peace as such is itself the focus of a rich body of research. See, for example, Archer and Joenniemi, *The Nordic Peace*; Browning and Joenniemi, "From Fratricide to Security Community".
59. Standertskjöld to Wahlberg, 5 June 1969, Fb-3, PA-641, NAO.
60. Rafoss, "Kampen om demokratiet".
61. 'Rammen omkring Nordens naturverndag,' n.d., Fb-2, PA-641, NAO.
62. Riksantikvaren, "Veter varsler".

63. NRK TV, "At vardar vaka," at 19:38.
64. Memo, "Forslag til arrangement," July 14, 1970, Fb-2, PA-641, NAO.
65. Glover, "Unity Exposed," 230.
66. Brundtland, "The Nordic Balance".
67. The Nordic efforts at keeping security issues apart from environmental politics were, in a sense, simultaneously counteracted as the United States actively sought the opposite outcome. Jacob D. Hamblin has argued that US President Richard Nixon's initiative for a NATO environmental programme should be understood as a deliberate effort to inject the field directly into the East–West dialogue; see Hamblin, "Environmentalism for the Atlantic Alliance," 71. Simone Turchetti points out that the Nixon initiatives were also intended to draw attention within NATO 'to evade key issues marring the cohesiveness of the alliance'; see Turchetti, *Greening the Alliance*, 98.
68. 'Notat fra G.borgmøte 13–15/9', undated, Fb-3, PA-641, NAO.
69. Kalliola to Esping, 2 October 1969, F1:2, 'Svenska nationalkommittén för det europeiska naturvårdsåret 1970', SE/RA/420432, Riksarkivet, Stockholm (NAS).
70. Esping to Kalliola, 10 October 1969, F1:2, SE/RA/420432, NAS.
71. Rafoss, "Kampen om demokratiet".
72. NRK TV, "At vardar vaka".
73. Browning, "Branding Nordicity," 32.
74. See note 67 above.
75. Strang, "The Nordic Model," 18.
76. Aronsson, *Historiebruk*, 62.
77. *Ibid.*, 79–80.
78. Heiret, Ryymin, and Skålevåg, "Innledning," 28.

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