

8 år i Afghanistan, Quo Vadis?

Et seminar om militær maktanvendelse

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8 år i Afghanistan, Quo Vadis?

Et seminar om militær maktanvendelse

GILs LUFTMAKTSEMINAR 2010

Torgeir E. Sæveraas (red.)

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Forord

Når dette skrives, går den pågående konflikten i Afghanistan inn i sitt niende år. Den 7. oktober 2001 lanserte USA *Operation Enduring Freedom* som et svar på terrorangrepene mot New York og Washington 11. september samme år. I denne første fasen lyktes det USA, i allianse med den afghanske Nordalliansen, å fjerne Taliban fra makten i Afghanistan og ødelegge Al-Qaidas treningsleire i landet. Selv om mange av Al-Qaidas krigere ble drept under felttoget i 2001, klarte mange, inkludert Osama bin Laden, å slippe unna til Pakistan. Fra sine baser i Pakistan har Taliban og Al-Qaida klart å gjenreise en del av sin styrke, og utgjør nå en reell trussel mot dagens afghanske styre.

Konflikten i Afghanistan har gjennom de ni årene den har vart, endret karakter fra konvensjonell krigføring via stabilisering til *counterinsurgency* (opprørsbekjempelse). Norge har gjennom International Security Assistance Force (ISAF, opprettet ved FN-vedtak 6. desember 2001) deltatt med ulike styrkebidrag, og har høstet mange erfaringer fra landet og konflikten. Det var sann sett kanskje bare på tide at Generalinspektøren for Luftforsvarets Luftmaktseminar 2010 tok for seg Afghanistan.

Luftmaktseminaret 2010 bar tittelen *8 år i Afghanistan, Quo Vadis? Et seminar om militær maktanvendelse*, og samlet en rekke sentrale norske og internasjonale foredragsholdere. Denne utgaven av *Luftkrigsskolens skriftserie* inneholder de fleste av foredragene avholdt under seminaret. Første del, *Afghanistan: konfliktens kompleksitet*, tar for seg hvilke forhold som gjør Afghanistan-konflikten særlig utfordrende. Annen del, *Maktanvendelsens rolle i Afghanistan*, handler særlig om luftmaktens rolle i konflikten, mens tredje del, *Det norske perspektivet*, tar for seg konflikten fra et norsk ståsted. I fjerde og siste del, *Afghanistan, quo vadis?*, er det veien videre i Afghanistan som står i fokus.

Samlet sett gir denne utgaven av *Luftkrigsskolens skriftserie* et godt bilde av dagens situasjon i Afghanistan, og hvilke utfordringer og muligheter norske og internasjonale militære styrker står overfor i denne konflikten.

Trondheim, oktober 2010
Torgeir E. Sæveraas (red.)

DEL 1

Aghanistan: Konfliktens kompleksitet

Seminaråpning på vegne av Generalinspektøren for Luftforsvaret

Brigader Øyvind Strandman

For Luftforsvaret er det avgjørende at vi evner å utvikle oss. I en hektisk hverdag er det ofte ikke tid til å tenke på de mer teoretiske og prinsipielle spørsmålene. Nettopp derfor er det så viktig at vi har et miljø her ved Luftkrigsskolen hvor vi kan arbeide med sentrale spørsmål innen luftmakt med et akademisk perspektiv. Denne tilnærmingen – sammen med de operative erfaringer – er med på å gjøre oss bedre rustet til å møte de kravene og utfordringene vi står overfor.

Jeg er svært glad for at vi har offiserer og sivile her ved skolen som har valgt å satse tungt på en akademisk karriere, og som har tilegnet seg – eller er i ferd med å tilegne seg – kompetanse helt opp til doktorgradsnivå. Selv om vi er et lite luftforsvar, er vi helt avhengige av å ha et faglig sterkt miljø for utvikling av luftmakt og lederskap. Det må vi bevare og videreutvikle. Som befal og offiserer skal vi og må vi ha den kunnskapen som er nødvendig for å sette anvendelsen av luftmakt på dagsorden. Det krever at vi er villige til å ta opp og diskutere dagsaktuelle problemstillinger. Det er også viktig at ikke isolerer diskusjonen til en intern debatt i Luftforsvaret, men inviterer andre til å delta.

For å få til en kontinuerlig utvikling er åpenhet og stor takhøyde essensielt. Luftkrigsskolen er en av våre viktigste kulturbærere, og jeg forventer et mangfold av ytringer i løpet av dette seminaret. Årets tema er altså militær maktanvendelse i Afghanistan, med hovedvekt på bruken av luftmakt. Afghanistan er et tema som opptar oss alle, og diskusjonen om hvordan vi skal oppnå suksess, foregår i alle media. Vi har vært innom temaet ved tidligere luftmaktseminarer, men aldri så omfattende som denne gangen.

Luftmaktens anvendelse i Afghanistan har blitt lite diskutert her hjemme. Dette skyldes nok at Norges bidrag hva gjelder luftmakt, har vært relativt beskjedent sammenlignet med en del andre nasjoner. Det vi har gjort og gjør,

er likevel svært viktig. Det er derfor nødvendig at vi evner å diskutere og forstå bruken av luftmakt i denne type konflikter – ikke bare i teorien, men også i praksis når vi blir kalt på av våre politikere.

I løpet av seminaret er det mange bidragsyttere som har studert temaet inngående. La meg likevel få komme med noen innledende betraktninger av mer generell karakter. Når man skal tilnærme seg en konflikt og diskutere forskjellige handlemåter, kan det være lurt å begynne på det mer prinsipielle plan. Når man leser historien om suksess og fiasko i konflikt og krig, er det særlig to spørsmål som er viktige: Har de politiske målsettingene vært klare, og hvordan har samsvaret mellom de politiske målsettingene og bruken av militære maktmidler vært?

Vi vet at lavintensitetskonflikter har sin spesielle karakter; de er uoversiktlige, og motstanderens handlemåter er vanskelige å forutsi. Målsettingene vil være forskjellige fra en konvensjonell krig, og erfaringsmessig er det bortimot umulig å nå målsettingene med militære midler alene. Motstanderen vil ha sine egne målsettinger og egen vilje, og han vil opptre på en måte som utnytter våre svakheter.

Der man har hatt suksess i lavintensitetskonflikter, har det vært en klar politisk retning og et meget godt samspill mellom alle midler man har til rådighet – politiske, økonomiske, diplomatiske og militære. Det har gjerne handlet om å vinne folkets vilje over på sin side – en problemstilling som også er kjent fra Afghanistan. Mitt inntrykk er at det her har vært dynamikk og hyppige tilpasninger til situasjonen – og i begrepet helhetlig tilnærming har man helt tydelig fattet dette grunnleggende prinsippet. Men så gjenstår selvfølgelig spørsmålet om man faktisk får det til, noe som kan være en helt annen sak.

Et ofte stilt spørsmål er om vi doktrinært og kapabilitetsmessig er forberedt på denne typen konflikter. De fleste land har en arv basert på konvensjonell krigføring, og både tenkningen og utstyret er anskaffet med henblikk på det. Dagens sikkerhetspolitiske bilde er mer komplisert. Etter at muren falt, har vi hatt stor oppmerksomhet på restutfordringene fra den kalde krigen, samt en serie av lavintensitetskonflikter. Tendensen har vært at lavintensitetskonflikter har tatt stadig mer plass. Vi ser også at USAs dominerende rolle på verdensarenaen er i ferd med å bli utfordret. Kina og India har vokst betydelig militært og de klassiske geopolitiske utfordringene med maktkamp mellom flere stormakter har igjen blitt tydelige.

På den ene siden er det lett å ta til orde for at transformasjonen burde gå i retning av evnen til å håndtere lavintensitet, men samtidig kan vi ikke glemme de klassiske interstatlige konfliktene. USAs forsvarsminister har tatt til orde

for en balansert tilnærming. Han vil i større grad utforme forsvaret med hensyn på lavintensitetskonflikter, for bedre å kunne løse de utfordringene vi har nå. Samtidig sier han at det fortsatt vil være viktig å også ha evne til konvensjonell krigføring.

Den samme problemstillingen er også aktuell her hjemme. Vi sier at det som dimensjonerer vårt forsvar er utfordringer i våre nærområder, men faktum er at vi tilpasser *både* utstyr og operasjonskonsept etter forholdene i Afghanistan. Når vi skal diskutere luftmakt i Afghanistan og konsekvensene av den, er det derfor viktig at vi har de overordnede spørsmålene klart for oss. Vi er *ikke* til for oss selv, og luftmakt må *alltid* brukes i et samspill med andre aktører. Derfor er det viktig at vi også har en formening om hvordan man skal tilnærme seg lavintensitetskonflikter.

Det hevdes at operasjonen i Afghanistan i liten grad utnytter luftmaktens muligheter. Luftmaktens grunnleggende egenskaper, H2R – Høyde, Hastighet og Rekkevidde – blir til en viss grad neglisjert. Operasjonene er landtunge, og i kampanjeplanleggingen blir ikke luftmakten integrert på en tilfredsstillende måte. Hadde luftmakten blitt forstått og integrert fra første stund, kunne resultatene vært annerledes. Vi må med andre ord ha gode kunnskaper om hva luftmakten kan bidra med, og hvordan, slik at vi i et *helhetlig perspektiv* kan gi anbefalinger deretter, for eksempel i Afghanistan.

Afghanistan: NATO og Norges største internasjonale operasjon noensinne

Forsvarsminister Grete Faremo

Norge har deltatt med militære bidrag i Afghanistan siden januar 2002. I august 2003 overtok NATO ledelsen av ISAF-operasjonen, og høsten 2005 besluttet Stoltenberg II-regjeringen at all norsk militær innsats i Afghanistan skulle knyttes opp til ISAF.

Luftforsvaret har hele tiden gitt substansielle bidrag til vår innsats i Afghanistan, blant annet med F-16 jagerfly, C-130 transportfly og nå med Bell 412 helikoptre. Hundrevis av personell har vært deployert for å operere og understøtte disse flysystemene. Norge ledet også driften av flyplassen i Kabul en periode og var ansvarlig for brannberedskapen der.

Rett før jul besøkte jeg Afghanistan for første gang. I løpet av noen hektiske dager møtte jeg alle de norske avdelingene og snakket med afghanske myndigheter, på både lokalt og sentralt nivå. Her så jeg med egne øyne at norsk befal og soldater gjør en formidabel innsats under krevende forhold. Jeg fikk blant annet sett hvor viktig helikopterbidraget er for å sikre rask medisinsk hjelp til sårede. Jeg møtte personell som leverer, holder høy faglig standard og utfører sine oppgaver med entusiasme og engasjement. Slikt gjør en forsvarsminister stolt.

Det var tungt å motta budskapet om at vi mistet en av våre soldater i tjeneste i Afghanistan i slutten av januar 2010. Jeg satt på et fly til USA hele den dagen og tenkte mye på hans pårørende og hans kamerater. Det kjentes vanskelig å følge programmet som oppsatt, men jeg ble oppmuntret til å fortsette.

Jeg var på vei til flere møter for å diskutere situasjonen i Afghanistan – om nye planer om forsterkede styrkebidrag til RC Nord fra både afghanerne og amerikanerne. Og da USAs forsvarsminister Robert Gates kondolerte oss alle, følte det rett å snakke sammen om samarbeid og en effektiv oppgaveløsning i nye sammenhenger. Jeg besøkte også ACT, og fikk blant annet en redegjørelse for arbeidet som gjøres for å styrke innsatsen for å bekjempe impro-

viserte sprenglegemer, IED. 70 prosent av alle tapene ISAF tar, er knyttet til IED, så alle tiltak for å redusere risikoen for dette er av svært stor betydning.

Afghanistan i dag

Når det gjelder situasjonen i Afghanistan, åtte år etter Talibans fall, må vi ikke glemme hvor viktig vårt oppdrag i Afghanistan er:

- Vi er invitert dit av verdenssamfunnet gjennom FN og den folkevalgte afghanske regjeringen for å bidra til å skape fred og stabilitet for det afghanske folk.
- Vi stiller oss solidarisk med våre allierte i NATO og tar ansvar som medlem av FN.
- Alternativet er at afghanerne kastes ut i en ny langvarig runde med blodig borgerkrig som kan destabilisere store deler av regionen.
- Gjennom å skape stabilitet ute bidrar vi til å skape trygghet her hjemme.

Derfor er vi i Afghanistan.

Det er ikke til å legge skjul på at åtte år etter at det internasjonale samfunnet engasjerte seg militært i Afghanistan, står vi fortsatt overfor en svært krevende sikkerhetssituasjon. Mest alvorlig er det i sør og øst, men også i nord merker våre styrker et økt trusselnivå. Sivillbefolkningen rammes av angrep fra opprørere, som søker tilhold i landsbyer og begår overgrep mot innbyggerne.

Det er kort sagt fremdeles en vei å gå før Afghanistan når det utviklingsnivået og får den sikkerheten for befolkningen som mange hadde målsetting om ved operasjonens begynnelse. Dessverre går det også fortsatt uskyldige sivile liv tapt som følge av de militære operasjonene. Det kan svekke oppslutningen om den internasjonale innsatsen og styrke Taliban, som har fått økt fotfeste i flere regioner. Det har også vist seg å være en vanskelig balansegang for det internasjonale samfunn å kombinere kamp mot opprørere med bistand og utvikling.

Talibans koordinerte angrep mot det politiske sentrum i Kabul i januar er et bekymringsfullt uttrykk for den krevende sikkerhetssituasjonen jeg nettopp skisserte. Det er imidlertid én viktig og sannsynligvis positiv erfaring i kjølvannet av dette angrepet; afghanske sikkerhetsstyrker ordnet selv opp og demonstrerte sin autoritet over Kabul under og etter kampene. Kabul er så langt den eneste provinsen som er overlatt til afghanske sikkerhetsstyrker, og

det er nødvendig at befolkningen ser at disse viser autoritet. Særlig viktig er dette når landets regjering og folkevalgte organer utfordres.

Imidlertid har en svak regjering så langt ikke greid å etablere tilstrekkelig autoritet utenfor hovedstaden. Presidentvalget i fjor var omstridt og bidro ikke til den sårt tiltrengte styrkingen av sentralmakten. Kravene til den gjenvalgte presidenten Karzai om å levere resultater er derfor betydelig skjerpet. Vi forventer nå at en ny regjering slår ned på korrupsjon, tar tak i narkotikakriminaliteten og ivaretar befolkningens humanitære rettigheter. Heller ikke internasjonal bistand vil være effektiv uten en sentralmakt som tar tak i de utfordringene som hemmer politisk og sosial utvikling.

Positive utviklingstrekk

På tross av alle disse utfordringene, må vi ikke miste av syne den fremgangen som har funnet sted i disse åtte årene. Det er etablert et demokratisk politisk system basert på en ny grunnlov. Det ble gjennomført valg til nasjonalforsamlingen i 2005, og det ble avholdt et presidentvalg i fjor.

Gjennomføringen av presidentvalget vitner på den ene siden om en valgprosess som ikke holdt demokratisk standard. På den annen side har Afghanistan fått et valgsystem som det er knyttet forventninger og engasjement til. Til tross for juks og sikkerhetshendelser, mener jeg at valget vil få positive konsekvenser for demokratiseringsprosessen.

En viktig og positiv utvikling som særlig kunne observeres under presidentvalgkampen, var oppblomstringen av nasjonale og private medier. Valgkampen fikk stor oppmerksomhet gjennom en bred dekning av politiske møter og debatter.

Andre positive nyheter finner vi i helse- og utdanningssektoren. Spesielt jentene har fått et vesentlig bedre skoletilbud, og de fleste afghanere har nå tilgang til rent vann og grunnleggende helsetjenester. Barne- og mødredødeligheten er også på kraftig vei nedover. På samferdselssektoren skjer det dessuten positive ting. For første gang i historien er man i gang med å bygge et jernbanenett i Afghanistan. I første omgang fra byen Herat i vest over grensen til Iran. Det planlegges også en linje fra Mazar-e-Sharif i nord over grensen til Usbekistan.

Den utfordrende sikkerhetssituasjonen gjør oppbyggingen av den afghanske hæren og politistyrkene svært viktig. Dette er nå ISAFs høyest prioriterte oppgave, og et av de viktigste håndslagene Norge kan bidra med til den afghanske regjeringen. Hæren er på få år bygd opp fra ingenting til en betydelig styrke på 134 000 soldater innen oktober i år, og vi forventer en

videre oppbygging. Disse soldatene bidrar i økende grad til sikkerhet utover i landet, enten sammen med internasjonale styrker eller alene. Oppbyggingen av politiet har dessverre ikke hatt like god fremdrift, men 18 000 politimenn ble i fjor trent og utplassert i Kabul og provinsene rundt.

Det internasjonale samfunnet har brukt store ressurser i Afghanistan. Noen hevder at for stor del har gått til den militære innsatsen. Jeg vil si at for lite har blitt brukt på sivil samfunnsutvikling. FN har for eksempel manglet ressurser. Det aller største problemet har imidlertid vært manglende koordinering og helhetlig innsats. FNs koordinerende rolle må derfor styrkes.

Det finnes opprørsgrupper og medlemmer av Taliban som ikke er drevet av uforsonlig religiøs overbevisning. Stadig flere har derfor pekt på nødvendigheten av en nasjonal forsoningsprosess der de moderate delene av opprørsbevegelsen inngår. På den måten kan kanskje de ekstreme kreftene isoleres. Det diskuteres nå et internasjonalt fond som kan bidra til reintegrering og forsoning og hvordan dette i så fall må utformes for å oppnå hensikten.

Nøkkelen til økt sikkerhet og effektiv statsbygging er et nært partnerskap mellom afghanske myndigheter og det internasjonale samfunn. Derfor må den internasjonale innsatsen bidra til å øke myndighetenes legitimitet og tillit i befolkningen. Det er utfordrende, ikke minst fordi Afghanistan i utgangspunktet er et desentralisert stamme- og klansamfunn, der sentralmyndighetenes makt ute i provinsene er liten. De gamle krigsherrene har også stor innflytelse på politikk og samfunn.

Sammenblendingen av politisk makt, korrupsjon og kriminalitet er en dårlig oppskrift på hvordan man skal etablere et troverdig styresett med nødvendig tillit. Å endre dette systemet er imidlertid en utfordring i et land hvor skiftende alliansetilknytning har vært den fremste overlevelsestaktikken i århundrer. En styrking av de lokale myndighetene og deres samarbeid med sentralregjeringen er en viktig grunnstein i byggingen av demokrati i landet. Norge gjør en innsats gjennom å støtte nasjonale programmer for oppbygging av institusjoner på lokalt nivå.

På tross av det inntrykket som gjerne formidles i media, vil jeg hevde at utviklingen i Afghanistan går sakte, men sikkert fremover. Det tar lang tid å etablere demokratiske tradisjoner, og vi må se utviklingen i lys av afghansk historie og tradisjon, ikke vestlig utålmodighet. En spørreundersøkelse foretatt i desember i fjor tyder også på at store deler av befolkningen opplever fremgang for seg selv og landet sitt. 70 prosent av den afghanske befolkningen mener nå at utviklingen går i riktig retning, mot 40 prosent for ett år tilbake.

Helhetlig tilnærming

Som tidligere bistandsminister, justisminister og nå forsvarsminister er jeg svært opptatt av sammenhengen mellom sikkerhet og utvikling. Uten sikkerhet, ingen utvikling, og uten utvikling, ingen sikkerhet. Konseptene for helhetlig tilnærming og integrerte operasjoner må nå omsettes i praksis. Det krever en bevisst og aktiv innsats fra alle de internasjonale aktørene.

FNs misjon til Afghanistan (UNAMA) var frem til i fjor en politisk misjon med et begrenset mandat. Hovedfokuset var støtte til institusjonsbygging. Først i mars 2008 ble mandatet utvidet av FNs sikkerhetsråd, og misjonen ble gitt en koordinerende rolle for den internasjonale innsatsen.

Beklageligvis er det fortsatt slik at mye av den sivile bistanden følger giverlandenes egne prioriteringer og er helt frakoplet den afghanske utviklingsstrategien. Svært mange givere velger å bruke nesten alle sine bistandsmidler i den provinsen de har sine militære styrker. Ofte er prosjektene kortsiktige og på siden av de planene afghanske myndigheter og FN har blitt enige om. Norge er blant de landene som i størst grad følger den overordnede strategien.

Sikkerhetssituasjonen gjør det mange steder vanskelig for hjelpeorganisasjonene å operere. I slike områder må derfor sivile oppgaver ofte gjennomføres av militære aktører. Det er en pragmatisk tilnærming som kan være riktig i enkelte situasjoner, men som kan komme i konflikt med prinsippet om et klart skille mellom humanitære og militære oppgaver. Vi ønsker en bedre samordning, men vi ønsker ikke samrøre. Norge bestreber seg derfor på å praktisere et klart skille mellom humanitære og militære virkemidler i felt.

Ny NATO-strategi

I fjor høst la COMISAF frem sin strategiske vurdering av utviklingen i Afghanistan. Rapporten legger opp til fundamentale endringer i måten ISAF opererer på. Den nye strategien legger for det første opp til en tilpasning av operasjonsmønsteret, med økt fokus på beskyttelse av sivilbefolkningen og mindre vekt på nedkjemping av opprørere. Den innebærer også en geografisk prioritering av innsatsen i sør og øst, der de fleste amerikanske forsterkningsstyrkene settes inn.

Den beste styrkebeskyttelsen er å alliere seg med befolkningen. Det gjør vi gjennom en aktiv relasjonsbygging med forståelse og respekt for afghanernes omgivelser og kultur. De må føle at de internasjonale styrkene er der for å beskytte, ikke angripe dem. Ved å akseptere økt risiko på kort sikt, kan man på denne måten redusere risikoen på lang sikt. Dette krever imidlertid flere

internasjonale styrker på bakken og er grunnlaget for den økningen på 40 000 soldater som nå er i gang.

For det andre legger strategien opp til en betydelig styrking av de afghanske sikkerhetsstyrkene, gjennom en kraftig økning av hæren og politiet. Parallelt med denne økningen skal utdanning og trening intensiveres.

De fleste av ISAFs operasjoner gjennomføres i dag med deltakelse av den afghanske hæren. En økende del av operasjoner blir også ledet av den, som regel under rettleiding av mentorer fra ISAF. Arbeidet med å bygge- og lære opp sikkerhetsstyrkene skal koordineres gjennom en felles NATO treningsmisjon. Mye av ISAFs innsats vil dreies over mot dette oppdraget i tiden som kommer. For å finansiere arbeidet er det etablert et støttefond der Norge bidrar med 20 millioner dollar i 2010. I tillegg bidrar vi med ytterligere 10 millioner dollar til oppbyggingen av politiet.

ISAF-operasjonen er pr. 2010 i fase tre, det vil si stabiliseringsfasen. Vi forventer å innlede fase fire, overføringsfasen, fra midten av dette året. Denne fasen innebærer en trinnvis overføring av lederansvaret for sikkerheten til afghanske myndigheter utover i distriktene. Som jeg snart skal komme nærmere inn på, ønsker vi fra norsk side å være pådrivere for overføring av ansvaret for sikkerheten i provinsen Faryab. Denne ambisjonen vil bli gjennomført så snart situasjonen tillater det.

Strategiens tredje hovedpunkt er at det skal legges større vekt på godt styresett, mer enhetlig ledelse og helhetlig innsats. Omleggingen av ISAFs kommandostruktur er nettopp et uttrykk for ønsket om en mer enhetlig ledelse av den militære innsatsen. Når det gjelder utvikling av godt styresett og helhetlig innsats, ligger hovedansvaret hos den afghanske regjeringen og de sivile internasjonale aktørene. ISAF skal imidlertid bidra til og støtte opp under dette arbeidet.

For det fjerde adresserer strategien behovet for en regional tilnærming til utfordringene i Afghanistan. Det er her naturlig å nevne den amerikanske Afghanistan–Pakistan-strategien, som gir føringer for USAs støtte til pakistanske myndigheter og deres innsats mot opprørstyrker i grenseområdene mot Afghanistan. Den pakistanske regjeringen kan ikke leve med at deler av territoriet er et fristed for opprørere og terrorister, og å etablere myndighetskontroll i disse grenseområdene er derfor av felles interesse for de to landene.

Økt fokus på beskyttelse av sivilbefolkningen, økt afghansk ansvar for sikkerheten, helhetlig innsats og regional tilnærming – det er essensen i NATOs nye strategi og samtidig nødvendige forutsetninger for å lykkes.

Den 28. januar deltok representanter fra 60 land på Afghanistan-konferan-

sen i London. Fra Norge deltok blant annet min egen statssekretær. Målet med konferansen var nettopp å bidra til at afghanske myndigheter gradvis skal bli i stand til å overta ansvaret for både sikkerhet og utvikling i eget land. Alle deltakerne sluttet opp under betydningen av en klar og målrettet plan for å overføre sikkerhetsansvaret til afghanske myndigheter, provins for provins, noe som innebærer at de internasjonale styrkene vil gå over i en tydeligere støtterolle.

Den norske Faryab-strategien

Resultatene fra London-konferansen er i tråd med synspunkter vi lenge har fremmet fra norsk side, blant annet gjennom den norske Faryab-strategien fra juni 2009 – bygging av afghansk kapasitet og eierskap.

I likhet med ISAF-strategien legger vi fra norsk side opp til en trinnvis dreining av militærinnsatsen over mot støtte til afghanske sikkerhetsinstitusjoner, herunder hæren og politiet. Det gjør vi gjennom trenings- og mentoringslagene våre, forkortet OMLT. Vi vil prioritere dette enda sterkere i tiden som kommer. OMLT vil etter hvert også få en større rolle med hensyn til trening av politiet.

Vår økende støtte til afghanske sikkerhetsstyrker kommer til uttrykk på flere måter. Vi har for eksempel nettopp ferdigstilt utvidelsen av en leir til den afghanske hæren i Meymaneh. Leiren vil gi plass til 650 soldater. Forsvarsbygg har vært byggherre for prosjektet, som har en kostnadsramme på om lag 28 millioner kroner. Det er et betydelig bidrag til oppbyggingen av hæren i Nord-Afghanistan.

Den norske strategien legger til grunn FNs integrerte tilnærming for gjennomføring av den afghanske utviklingsplanen og provinsutviklingsplanene for Faryab. Den legger også til grunn en videreutvikling av PRT-konseptet, der det tas hensyn til lokale behov for sikkerhet, utvikling, kapasitetsbygging og styresett. En målsetting for oss er å effektivt samordne og koordinere innsatsen mellom alle aktørene. Sivil innsats i området skal fokusere på godt styresett, utdanning, landsbyutvikling og humanitær bistand. Vi vil dreie sivile tiltak enda sterkere inn mot UNAMA og provinsmyndighetene i Faryab.

I dag går ca. 20 prosent av norsk bistand til Faryab-provinsen og Ghowrmach. Størstedelen av bistanden kanaliseres gjennom multilaterale og afghanske kanaler. Dette er noe FN og afghanske myndigheter gjentatte ganger har berømmet oss for. Det er også en målsetting å styrke det allerede betydelige nordiske samarbeidet i Nord-Afghanistan. Vi vurderer grunnlaget for et samarbeid om trening og mentorering av en ny afghansk brigade, som er

planlagt lokalisert til Nordvest-Afghanistan. Norge har dessuten tatt initiativ til et tettere samarbeid mellom alle ISAF-landene som har ansvar i de nordlige provinsene. Det blir ikke minst viktig fordi amerikanerne og den afghanske hæren nå har varslet økte styrkebidrag til Faryab.

Innretningen av våre styrkebidrag fremover

Vi trodde først at afghanske styrker ville være i stand til å ta et større ansvar for sikkerheten i Faryab allerede fra sommeren 2010, men en stadig mer krevende sikkerhetssituasjon har dessverre gjort dette urealistisk. Regjeringen anser det derfor nødvendig å videreføre det norske styrkebidraget i hele 2010, med noen tilpasninger.

Sannsynligvis vil også behovet for støtte til politiet øke. Det foreligger planer om at USA skal utplassere amerikanske trenings- og ingeniørstyrker i nord for å støtte denne styrkeoppbyggingen. Det passer godt inn i våre planer om å videreføre og styrke OMLT- bidraget, og samtidig omforme dagens infanteristyrke til en partnerenhet med hovedoppgave å støtte afghanske avdelinger i felt.

Regjeringen har også besluttet å bidra praktisk til opptreningen av afghanske politistyrker gjennom å etablere et politimentorlag. Det skal bestå av tre befal, seks korporaler og en tolk, og det blir støttet av norske politirådgivere i tilknytning til PRT Meymaneh. Oppdraget er å trene opp og være mentorer for afghansk politi i Faryab allerede fra 2010, og laget er deployerbart i juni dette året.

Slik situasjonen er i dag, ser vi oss nødt til å forlenge Luftforsvarets helikopterbidrag utover oktober 2011, for vi vurderer denne kapasiteten til å være avgjørende for sikkerheten til norske og andre styrker i området. Uten denne kapasiteten vil styrkenes aksjonsradius kun omfatte Meymaneh by og omkringliggende områder. Dette vil i stor grad begrense vår evne til å støtte de afghanske sikkerhetsstyrkene.

Forsvarssjefen anser det uforsvarlig å operere norske styrker i Nord-Afghanistan uten nødvendig helikopterkapasitet for medisinsk evakuering, og det har dessverre ikke lyktes å få andre land til å påta seg et slikt ansvar på kort sikt. Regjeringen er klar over at dette ikke er uproblematisk med hensyn til utfordringene her hjemme, både personellmessig og når det gjelder andre viktige oppgaver som helikoptermiljøet ivaretar. For å redusere de negative konsekvensene av forlengelsen vil forsvarssjefen fremme forslag til avbøtende tiltak.

Vi har så langt ikke avklart mulighetene for andre norske styrkebidrag etter

2010. Jeg våknet til overskrifter i avisene i januar 2010 om at det skulle være besluttet å sette inn spesialstyrkene våre på nytt, få måneder etter at de ble trukket hjem. Jeg kan imidlertid forsikre om at det ikke foreligger noen slik beslutning. Vi har heller ikke fått noen henvendelse fra NATO om dette. Men at spesialstyrkene kan bli satt inn på et senere tidspunkt, er jeg ikke fremmed for. Deres innsats har blitt høyt verdsatt både av ISAF og afghanerne selv.

På sikt vil en overføring av sikkerhetsansvaret til afghanske myndigheter i Faryab kunne frigjøre ressurser. Det betyr ikke at vi fra norsk side ensidig kan planlegge for å trekke oss ut. Vi gikk inn sammen med våre allierte, og vi går ut sammen med dem. Vi tilpasser derimot bidraget vårt gradvis mot en tydeligere støtterolle for afghanske styrker og myndigheter.

Personellet

Det er viktig for meg å uttrykke at det personellet vi sender ut i internasjonale operasjoner, har vår fulle støtte. Derfor har jeg også tatt mål av meg til å besøke hver kontingent vi sender ut. Det er et enstemmig storting som står bak vårt engasjement i Afghanistan, og jeg ønsker å skape oppmerksomhet rundt – og forståelse og aksept for – den viktige innsatsen norske soldater gjør for sikkerhet og stabilitet i landet. Her har vi som politiske myndigheter et ansvar, sammen med den militære ledelsen og soldatene selv.

Vi skal også ta vare på soldatene våre – før, under og etter tjeneste. Derfor har vi lagt opp til en rekke tiltak for å forbedre oppfølgingen av personellet som har deltatt i utenlandsoperasjoner. Siden en stor del av Forsvarets personell nå utgjøres av veteraner, betyr dette ikke minst god personellforvaltning i det daglige. De som trenger det, skal også få ekstra oppfølging når de kommer hjem.

Avslutning

Dette seminaret skal diskutere bruk av militærmakt og målsettingene for den internasjonale innsatsen i Afghanistan. Som politisk ansvarlig for vår militære innsats har jeg valgt å konsentrere meg om de utfordringene vi møter i Afghanistan, målsetningen for engasjementet og den strategien som danner grunnlag for våre bidrag og vårt operasjonsmønster. La meg avslutte med noen betraktninger rundt bruk av makt.

Jeg vil minne om president Obamas presisering i sin nobeltale: Krigens instrumenter har en rolle å spille i å bevare fred. Dette er helt i tråd med tenkningen som har stått sentralt i norsk politisk bevissthet lenge: Makten må

forankres i retten, men noen ganger må makten brukes i rettens tjeneste. Men makten må samtidig brukes på riktig vis og innenfor faste rammer. Derfor er regjeringen opptatt av å ha en klar politikk for tydelige skillelinjer mellom sivile, humanitære og militære oppgaver. Vi får ros for denne holdningen fra sivile aktører. Men vi har en vei å gå før dette blir den rådende oppfatningen blant alle våre allierte bidragsytere i Afghanistan. Her vil vi gjøre en innsats for å påvirke. Ikke minst er vi opptatt av krigens folkerett og en klar holdning til Genèvekonvensjonene.

ISAFs rolle er basert på et entydig FN-mandat, slik vår deltakelse i alle internasjonale operasjoner skal ha. Regjeringen vil i fremtiden legge økt vekt på de sivile aspektene ved vårt engasjement, kombinert med afghansk eierskap. Samtidig kan vi ikke fjerne oss fra realitetene. Utfordringene i Afghanistan vil fortsatt ha en betydelig militær dimensjon. Det blir imidlertid viktigere enn noen gang å unngå utilsiktede følgeskader som resultat av militære operasjoner. Det er også en av hovedårsakene til hvorfor det var nødvendig å legge om strategien og øke styrketallet.

Maktanvendelsen må forankres i retten, og militære virkemidler må brukes til å underbygge målsettingene for operasjonen. Vi må være ydmyke for oppdragets kompleksitet og de kravene som stilles til demokratiske staters bruk av makt i internasjonale operasjoner. Det krever meget god vurderingsevne og høy kompetanse hos personellet på alle nivå. Jeg er trygg på at norske mannskaper og befal er godt rustet til å løse de oppgavene de er satt til i Afghanistan.

Understanding Afghanistan: A Brief Framework

Dr. Sultana Parvanta

Introduction

I was born and raised in Kabul but left Afghanistan during the wars and traveled and studied in the West. I have since returned, and I now reside and work mainly in Kabul. During the past seven years, I have worked in various positions within the Afghan government. At the same time, I have been volunteering and serving as the chancellor of the first private medical university in Afghanistan and have been involved in charitable work and activities with various groups in the country.

This rich exposure gives me access to a broad cross section of the Afghan public and private life, which keeps me informed of what the young Afghans as well as other professionals from Kabul and the provinces think and what is important to them. I am in constant conversation with many people from varied backgrounds and segments of the Afghan society. In this seminar I would like to convey to you some of the thoughts, feelings, and perceptions that I hear from my Afghan friends, colleagues, and others from the country.

A Brief Sociopolitical History of Afghanistan

Today's Afghanistan has its roots anchored deeply in its ancient history. The history and the rugged landlocked geography define the people and their traditions. From early times, this territory has been exposed to invaders. The land has been traversed by many different people and their cultures, and it has been subjected to various military dispatches and incursions from other cultures and traditions. Many attacks and invasions were resisted. Still, the long periods of military conflicts and the various cultural influences have had a profound influence on the people of Afghanistan.

The various interactions and exposures through trade, military, art, and religion have all led to an enriching mix of well-nuanced culture and traditions. These contacts and interactions with others contributed to the formation of

a country made up of a mix of people from varied and distinct backgrounds who settled in the land long ago.

From the earliest times, there have been a number of major and minor clashes, wars, and genocides. The Buddhists were wiped out while the Zoroastrians came and left. The armies of Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and Timor-e Lang, as well as the armies of several other empires came, left behind legacies, and departed.

In 1202, Genghis Khan's army destroyed whatever they saw on their way. Nothing was safe, neither people nor property. Then, Timor's army, which numbered a quarter of a million men, marched in and killed more than 150,000 people. They destroyed what little was left. Timor-e Lang's army was known for their cruelty as they built pyramids from human heads wherever they went. Timor and his army came back a couple of years later to rebuild the city of Kabul and other places as retribution.

Afghanistan has also been a battleground in the not-too-distant past. The Anglo-Afghan wars and skirmishes are still remembered by older Afghans. For example, between the 1840s and the 1940s, there were at least 59 punitive incursions into the country by the United Kingdom alone. They were then called B and B, which meant Butcher and Bolt. Since the mid-1800s up until now (2010), Afghanistan has been experiencing a variety of political systems of different governments and regimes, all leaving vestiges of their values and institutional cultures, and adding and enriching the heritage and traditions of this land.

The years between the 1950s and the mid-1970s are considered the golden age of Afghanistan. The country held a neutral political position. There was peace, and the beginning of modernization and economic development as Afghan leaders became open and receptive to forge diplomatic relations with Western countries and to receive international influence and aid. It was in the mid-1970s that the Afghan nation began a new history of violence, instability, and destruction that lasted more than three decades, followed by another decade of insurgency wars. It started with a coup d'état by the then Prime Minister, Mohammad Daoud. During his presidency in April 1978, the Communist Revolution of 8th of *Sawr* took place by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which was followed a year later by the invasion by the former Soviet Union in December of 1979.

In a short span of time, people in Afghanistan have witnessed and experienced eight distinct, opposing, and extreme political regimes – from totalitarian monarchies, followed by a reformist monarchy during King Amaan Ullah's reign, then a constitutional monarchy by King Zahir Shah, a republic system

by General Mohammad Daoud, followed by the communist revolution and invasion by the former Soviet Union, then the long and brutal civil war also called the *Jihad*, and to Taliban's totalitarian and extremist regime called the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan.

In 2001, the Taliban regime was attacked by the West (the Operation *Enduring Freedom* as response to the 9/11 attacks on the US). The totalitarian and fundamentalist Taliban regime was ousted and humanitarian and relief assistance from the West followed. Soon, the Bonn conference was convened and the new Transitional Government of Afghanistan was formed. In 2004, following the first presidential elections, the current Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, a constitutional democracy as a fledgling representative regime, came into being. This government, with assistance from NATO member countries, has been fighting an insurgency war during the past nine years.

During the various drastic and radical shifts in political regimes and arrangements (particularly during the 1990s, which is considered the worst part of the wars (the *Jihad*)), the violence caused a great deal of internal strife, suffering, and displacement of the Afghan people. These ongoing and brutal wars caused the displacement of over five million Afghans who left their country for safety and immigrated to other countries. This was one of the largest groups of displaced people ever to become refugees in recent history.

The Cultural Milieu

Historically, a majority of the Afghan people lived in rural villages and communities and led an agrarian existence. Life was simple and based on agriculture and trade, both locally and regionally. Their social, economic, legal, and other matters, including conflicts, were settled by a body of elders who gathered together to collectively discuss and attend to important tribal and local matters.

At the local, usually at the village level, people paid a great deal of attention to the selection of members in the local council, and made sure that the elders who were selected for membership in a council (*Shora*) were good men of honor, who were decent individuals and were known for good, moral, and ethical standings. They were known to strive for the betterment and for the good of their people, act and decide justly on behalf of their people, and for maintaining peace. These men who held and attended the councils were famous for being just, fearless, honorable, and good diplomats.

In these local and informal councils and *shoras* or *jirgas*, (bigger events convened for major national issues) decisions were made on the basis of negotia-

tions and deal making to reach desirable consensus. Reaching consensus is a time-consuming process; however, it was important in this tradition that all parties involved in a dispute were acknowledged, their opinions heard, and the resolutions and decisions made by the council proved satisfactory to all. Time was given for this process, and the focus was on the process and the results – not how long it took to reach the desired consensus.

This system was inherently based on a democratic process, and worked well for small villages and within a tribal framework. This traditional system of decision making and solving problems has been used for both public and private affairs with the participation of all parties involved in a dispute or any other matter involving decision making. This old mechanism of holding councils, its associated systems of hierarchy, and selection of elders for leadership have been deliberately targeted, attacked, and disrupted – manipulated by many efforts to destabilize and weaken these local and tribal systems.

The first assault on this structure took place during the communist regime, then by the Taliban, along with the influences of ISI from neighboring Pakistan. The very last remnants of this traditional system have been disrupted during the last nine years in manipulating struggles for power and control, particularly among the various Pashtoon tribes in the south.

The Afghan People

In almost all aspects of Afghan life, variation is the norm. There are many differences among the Afghans from ethnic diversity to customs and traditions. In general, the Afghan people are made up of a mix of ethnicities mostly formed by kinship tribes, clans, and the notion of *Qaum*. Generally the ethnic groups are also associated with geographical locations, like the Uzbeks and Tajiks in the north, the Pashtoons in the south and east, and the Hazaras residing in the central highlands. However, there are exceptions. Some good examples of these are pockets of Pashtoons in the north and Hazaras in Khandahar. Mixes of various ethnic groups live in the capital and in the other big cities and areas around the capital. During the recent wars many Afghans left the rural areas and immigrated to urban centers seeking a better life since agriculture and the rural economies were devastated by mines and other calamities brought on by the wars. In these urban centers, Afghans are living peacefully with each other across ethnic lines.

Traditionally, affiliation and association with one's tribe or *Qaum* was a protective mechanism. Historically, Afghans have turned back to their own people and source of origin for strength and support. This has been an effective way

to withstand the onslaught of intrusions and change. The people have always turned back to their roots and source of origin for protection and for regeneration to fight back. Therefore, maintaining and nurturing the association and affiliations with one's people or tribe has helped Afghans to survive and to overcome difficult times.

Related to this primacy of keeping and guarding strong ethnic affiliations, Afghans place a great value on family. An Afghan is very close to his family and values her or his religious beliefs. Family and Islam are of primary importance in an Afghan's life. This is followed by the love for the land and the country. An Afghan is very passionate about protecting his family, his faith, and his land. After family, religion, and land comes friendship; Afghans value their social ties, and have extended social networks in the society – both at the village level and in the urban settings.

The centrality of Islam in personal life, as well as in political affairs, is undeniable. Religion has been used by power elites and in national politics as a powerful tool for shifting opinions, forging alliances and for mobilizing the people. We saw a good example of this during the years of *Jihad* as Afghans organized and fought against the Soviet troops. We see the use of religion in the insurgency and in the third element of the Afghan Constitution where «all the laws in this constitution have to be in accord with the Sharia Law.» Recently, we have seen the use of religion and influence of religious beliefs in the passing of the Family Law by Mr. Karzai.

In today's Afghanistan, a majority of the people who live in the rural areas have little access to formally organized services, formal institutions, and agencies that provide access to basic health services, education, safe roads, clean water, communication, and other essential services such as electricity. Those who live in the crowded urban centers are a mixture of some former urbanites that did not leave the cities during the wars. Large numbers of people from rural areas came from the countryside overcrowding the urban centers. They escaped from their villages and migrated to urban centers due to various reasons such as too many mines in their fields, fear of retributions, lack of food due to drought, and search for better earnings and a better life. These formerly rural city dwellers have still not fully adopted the urban ways, and are for the most part illiterate and poor, and live under difficult conditions in the big cities, particularly in Kabul.

Poverty in Afghanistan is palpable in all areas of Afghan life. It is contextual and does exist at different levels. The deficiency is not only in the standards of living and in the physical quality of people's lives, but it also manifests itself in a myriad of other ways such as poverty of skills, lack of educated labor, poor (or

absence of) infrastructure, lack of services and resources, absence of rights for women and children, lack of care for the environment, no room for new ideas and expressions to emerge and flourish, lack of tolerance for divergent views, and lack of openness for free debate, though presently the media enjoys the privilege of free press and has become a good venue for the public to convene open discussion.

The wars and the disruptions of peoples' lives and livelihood during the decades of violence have had a negative influence and also severely impacted the psyche of the Afghan people. They have been emotionally scared and mentally handicapped by the intense experiences of these decades of war. In Afghanistan, the people as a whole suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) syndromes. The PTSD is manifest in daily life and easily witnessed as one interacts with people on a daily basis.

From the beginning of establishing the new Afghan government, the government leaders and the international organizations basically ignored and misjudged the levels of trauma among the people. Nobody took into account or accommodated the fact that the Afghan public is seriously traumatized by years of violence, suffering, and survival – living years on end in fear and under intimidation. The Afghan government has not until now formally acknowledged the fact that the loss of life and the levels of brutality by many players have hurt the people and that no family has escaped this loss. There are many Afghans who have lost family members, men have disappeared in large groups, young and old have perished, and the psychological wounds, anger, and collective trauma are still something that is very alive.

This trauma has brought a kind of survival mentality and harshness to the people, and manifests itself in people's behavior and in various manners including stress that hampers their intelligence. In this context, for most, survival is all that matters. The notions of rational planning and setting long-term goals are difficult to grasp for most people. Many people that we are dealing with in the country are in some form affected and do experience various forms of stress and usually strive toward a survival mentality at all costs.

Their sense of trust is impacted and mostly impaired. It is now hard to gain trust among the people. The sense that momentary survival is all that matters overshadows other long term planning. The trauma also influences issues related to ethics and telling the truth. Trust and honesty have been casualties of wars to a great extent. People also do not trust the leaders of their government since many of the key figures in government leadership are men who have caused violence and committed brutal and criminal acts on the populace.

In response to such conditions, many people strive to survive, hedge their

best bet, and would tell you what they think you want to hear. At times they respond to questions in subtle ways to insure that whatever the outcome, it is to their benefit. This makes communication at all levels difficult and demanding. Communications tend to become a game of manipulation where content and process are evaluated and gauged as to decipher both tone of language and behavior as extra meaning is introduced in a conversation, and this usually leads to a very nuanced, challenging, and contradictory sense of communication with Afghans. This is the norm both at the level of the public at large, and during discussions among high-level officials.

The PTSD and its leftover residue is a mental health issue that makes it difficult to properly communicate and understand Afghan people. For the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), it is important to remember this while working in this country. For an average Afghan, the daily life is made hard by poverty, lack of services, and a great deal of mental stress. Economically, it is extremely hard for the average large families to cope with the dual economy that is created around the salary of international staff and expatriates.

The appalling level of poverty is fanned by overall inflation, high unemployment, and absence of noticeable improvement in living conditions (except for a very few who benefit from contractual arrangements and those who are becoming rich from the narcotic trade). For most Afghans, the high cost of housing, food, fuel, and medicine make living conditions difficult to cope with, particularly during harsh winters. The burden of dealing with daily pragmatic issues of life is made more difficult by fear of political uncertainty, suicide attacks, high inflation, wide-spread corruption, and injustice that all lead to further deadening of the mind and reflexes of Afghans, causing a great deal of alienation and confusion. Again, for most people, self-preservation and survival on a daily basis is all that seems to matter. Most Afghans also feel powerless and at the same time they find the social and political conditions in the country unsatisfactory. People are tired and angry at the abuse of power among political leaders. They have grievances against the government and the newly rich elite supported by the government.

Governance and Afghan Politics

Afghan politics, though new in its formation, has its roots in a mix of the rich history of the region. Due to multiple reasons, cultural, geopolitical, tribal, and other significant affiliations and historical conditions, Afghan government and politics are very difficult to understand, to decipher, and at times

even to navigate. It is very difficult to take both the government and the politics at its face value. One does not always get what one sees and told. When we are talking about the Afghan government as a system of polity, we are not talking about a state system (as you know and have experienced in your own country). Afghanistan is at an early stage of state building. The efforts to build a nation and a new and democratic system require strong and well-run institutions.

Our current government institutions and establishments are weak and are run ineffectively, inefficiently, and mostly unprofessionally. We are not at a state formation stage, but rather we are dealing still with a primitive mechanism that operates on the basis of manipulating power, relying on trusted affiliations, and on loyal patronage and dispensing protection. The *Grand Bargaining* style of governance, where affiliation is all that matters, and personal networks and loyalties win over all other considerations and where personal relations, tribal and clan connections, and money ties lead to deal making that cause things to happen or not to happen, is all too familiar and common in Afghanistan. This system of affiliation and cronyism is something that we have had for a long time.

The Afghan governance today continues, as in the past, to circle around a cult of personality. The top leaders divert oppositions and forge opinions and allegiance by giving those who are favored easy access to positions, resources and possibilities as well as legal protection. From the top comes unequivocal safeguarding to those who are loyal and trusted. This style of governance is conducive to the creation of an environment where nepotism, cronyism, corruption, low capacity, and incompetency flourish and lead to malfunction and to an endless cycle of failure at large public institutions.

The government's lack of capacity and low achievement in key areas are the main reasons for the public's discontent as they expect the government to take care of all that has been missing. The people want their government to protect them, make their lives safe, provide them with security, defend their rights from the raw power of well-known warlords and their top brute commanders, to bring employment, safety in law, and protection of their homes and lands that were taken from them illegally and by force. The dismay by the Afghan people caused by uncertainty, anxiety, trepidation, disappointment, and discouragement is obvious.

Since last year's election, a growing mistrust and discontent have grown between people and the government, and between different ethnic groups. This high tension is considered unhealthy for the country. People want leadership to promote national unity, a better life, and a return of the old values of

goodness and honesty. People feel that they did not receive the peace or the prosperity that was extended by the international community and promised by the Afghan leaders. People are faced with an intolerable level of corruption and deceit with no recourse to any source. Some individuals (unfortunately the numbers are increasing) feel that the legal and judicial chaos is helping the rich become richer and immune to the implementation of the rule of law; as a protest and in anger toward the central government, they join either the insurgency or turn to criminality.

Problems arise when people feel that the government does not attend to their grievances, and that the rule of law is not protecting the average man. The death of innocent civilians and children has also caused anger and dismay among the populations who blame the government for not protecting them, and feel that the NATO forces do not seem to respect and protect Afghan life. The civilian casualties have added to the discontent and the people's disappointment at the government and the international forces has further widened the gap and the trust between the people and the state.

It is clear that defining a civilian casualty as real casualties of innocent people is hard to determine in an insurgency war where the friend and the foe look alike and live in the same compound. Usually innocent civilians in their family compound are most vulnerable because insurgents force and threaten them by inciting fear and intimidation to achieve acceptance and patronage in their homes. It is hard for these people to say no and refuse shelter to the insurgents. So, in a way, the innocent civilian who would otherwise choose not to cooperate with the insurgents is bound to become a casualty between the two opposing and fighting forces.

However, when the life of an innocent child or a woman is lost, the public blames the West and the government who is supported by the West. The insurgency uses this discontent as an effective information campaign to bring the people to their side, and this further erodes the legitimacy of the state. This happens when the insurgents invoke faith-based propaganda and call a civilian casualty incident an attack on religion, and the objective of the infidel who wants to wipe out Moslems. Since it is difficult to avoid civilian casualties, it is best to avoid decisions and conditions that can lead to loss of innocent lives, and when it does happen, it is critical to explain, apologize and ask for forgiveness. Then it is less likely that the families of the victims would join the insurgency for revenge.

It is therefore important to remember that the Afghan people in general bear a great deal on their hearts and on their shoulders. Understanding and allowing for these issues makes it easier to work and understand the Afghan

context. What is good to know in all this is the fact that the majority of the Afghan people are tired and fed up of war and violence. They are impatient for it to end. The majority supports the NATO–ISAF mission; they understand the significance and the many contributions, and long for the possibility and manifestation of peace in their homeland. This peace and stability continues to be at a distance due to many unconstructive reasons and elements both within and outside Afghanistan.

Reconstruction and Development

The development and reconstruction efforts during the last decade could be considered a radical endeavor given the social and cultural condition of the country after decades of war. From the start, the plans to rebuild Afghanistan were both ambitious and contradictory. There was a sense of hurry and many plans were drafted to build many things all at once. Some agencies were to be dismantled for being too old and too rigid and anchored in the conflicting past (government subsidies, cooperatives, and the old army and military institutions were dismantled).

Plans for institutional change were aimed at government administrative reforms, judicial, educational, and many other reforms with the help of international donors and large international organizations like the WB, IMF, ADB, USAID, the UN family, and many more. The challenges were at many levels between the old and the new. Low capacity among Afghans, language barriers on both sides, mismatch of expertise to the on-the-ground conditions, procedural issues (writing proposals for receiving funds), high cost of insuring the safety of internationals, absence of effective coordination, lack of security prohibiting Afghans and internationals to check and monitor projects, etc., all have slowed down the development process.

Many international professionals and consultants have had no real interest in or knowledge of the country and some showed irresponsible conduct. They produced too little in terms of tangible outcomes, and their efforts usually fell short of implementation – though they held conferences, also produce volumes of written reports, policies, procedures, strategies, and manuals that are hardly read or attended to by many in the government. Both Afghans and internationals seek large and lucrative contracts in various sectors – particularly those related to building infrastructure and those associated with the military. Many large international as well as national contracts go through a less-than-transparent process and are passed through multiple layers of sub-contracting. By the time the project becomes ready to provide tangible out-

comes and services to the people, the results are usually at minimal levels. Most of the programs funded by the large donor agencies have had little or inadequate follow-up or evaluation, and lacked monitoring mechanisms.

«Phantom Aid» is how some locals refer to the economic development and the sources of money that come to the country and then leaves it through various routes – the ratio of aid money that goes out and stays in the country is 8:2. Efforts for reconstruction and modernization have been faced with many challenges, contradictions, and conflicting issues. Despite institutional efforts and reforms to remove some of these problems, there are still many barriers and obstacles on the path of success. Many areas still need serious reform – such as implementation of serious mechanisms for dealing with proper contracting procedures, corruption, monitoring and evaluation of projects, clear implementation of law, protection of property rights, etc.

One of the most important needed reforms is to further build a professional police force that can implement the rule of law and curb corruption. In Afghanistan, like in many other places, major issues are interlinked and related to various other issues that keep in place certain conditions through symbiotic relationships. For example, there is a direct relationship between success in development and the quality of governance and the maintenance of security, positions, support given to power brokers, and resource allocation at any sub-national level in the country. Understanding and working effectively with these relationships and their dynamics are crucial to the success of any development project.

The Larger Contextual Issues

Historically the major influences from outside on Afghanistan have taken place one at a time. These major influences, be it the army of Genghis Khan, Timor Lang, or the former Soviet Union, each brought sweeping changes, and there were always long periods of integration when the people and the land incorporated these changes. However, in modern Afghanistan, there are several major influences that are simultaneously impacting the country. These powerful forces are taking place in this country at the tail end of a long period of wars and while an insurgency war is still crippling parts of the country. These large influences, in their own terms, are leaving their marks on the land and its people.

These pressures are powerful and in a major way each capable of a great deal of influence and forceful impact, and they are mostly from outside. They are as follows: (1) the rise of fundamentalism and terrorism, (2) international

focus both in military (NATO) and in humanitarian aid/development, (3) the emergence of the private security industrial complex, (4) regional politics and globalization of trade, and (5) the rise of poppy cultivation, the drug trade and corruption.

Fundamentalism and Terrorism: This is an extremist, fanatical ideology coupled with unspeakable violence and terror. This radical movement politicizes Islam and forces people to commit to a particular set of beliefs and practices that include a hatred and outright rejection of the West both in political and social terms. Its interests lie in taking over the government and to establish the Emirates of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

International Focus and NATO: Today, Afghanistan is a place where 60 plus countries (about 1/3 of the world's countries) have come together and want to cooperate to help. There are even new countries that are joining: Monte Negro, South Korea, Colombia, and Mongolia. This large international presence made up of more than 60 countries wants to contribute financially and some also militarily to Afghanistan. This international focus and attention is one of the largest efforts ever to rebuild a post-conflict country. The efforts both economic and military have faced myriads of challenges in communication and implementation.

In general there have been a series of disconnects and a lack of coherent strategy and coordination from the beginning. There is a need to clearly define and redefine the goal for the various missions by the donor countries and for the international forces. Afghanistan today is different than when plans were made at the Bonn Conference in 2001. The new strategy by NATO and ISAF to focus on people, and use more of COIN doctrine and principles is a good and welcome change.

Private Security Industrial Complex: The buildup of private security forces emerged after 9/11. This development is easily seen as one looks around in Kabul, or any other city, government buildings, airports, sea ports, etc., in Afghanistan. Life has changed – large private security contractors and private armies have emerged. The concrete business for building security barriers in Afghanistan is by itself a multimillion dollar business. These large concrete barriers – produced by the thousands – are all made with cement from Pakistan.

Every reconstruction contract in Afghanistan has to calculate in its budget at least 20% to 22% of the net budget for private security measures. This is a huge business. Afghans and internationals alike have benefited in a huge way from this Private Security Industrial Complex and its lucrative contracts. The Afghan cities and countryside is witnessing a surge of private security guards

with machine guns. There are over a hundred thousand armed private security forces operating around Afghanistan. This is not including the private militias that are owned by some warlords. ISAF should take into consideration that there are well armed men in both rural and urban Afghanistan and that operate in their neighborhoods.

The armed private guards help fuel the privatization of the war, and this combined with warlords and the drug trade leads to the emergence of a ruthless group of armed men and criminal elements that are involved in a wide range of illegal activities and are further threatening public safety and the rule of law.

Neighbors – Regional Politics: Afghanistan has two sets of neighbors, those on the borders of the country and those beyond the borders¹. All of these neighbors are influential in the affairs of the country and to a large extent can play a significant role in stabilizing Afghanistan both politically and economically.

Non-border neighbor countries: India (one of the first countries that formally recognized the Afghan communist regime), Turkey, and Saudi Arabia (which formally recognized the Taliban regime).

A great deal of discussion is underway as to what role Afghanistan can play in the region, in particular in terms of a trade route connecting Central Asia to South Asia. Trade and exchanges of regional resources, movement of a skilled labor force, exporting power (electricity, water, and minerals), raw materials, professional expertise, and resources are keys to further build and improve regional economic development. This potential for trade – both legally and illegally – also causes powerful impacts and influences both within Afghanistan and in the region.

Drugs and Narcotics Trade: The sale of drugs from Afghan narcotics is estimated at 90+ billion dollars annually in the international markets (in contrast the international donations and contributions the past few years to Afghanistan has been around 20 billion dollars). The sale of narcotics produces a large sum of money creating rich and powerful individuals who are cruel and corrupt, and above the law. This situation further leads to the creation of a false and illicit economy, increasing corruption, creating a structure of very well-to-do power brokers, as well as to the creation of a strong criminal sector headed by regional warlords. Some of this income from the drug trade also supports the insurgency.

The influences stated so far are mostly emerging from outside of Afghani-

1 Countries on the borders of Afghanistan: Iran, Pakistan, China, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

stan (except the drugs that are cultivated and grown here). The rest are influences that are mostly introduced from outside and are causing major impacts not only in Afghanistan, but also in the region and throughout the world. Some of these forces are not paying attention to the overall goal of bettering the conditions in Afghanistan, and to bring democracy or stability to her people. It is important to understand the weight and the impact of these powerful influences in the country, particularly since most of these forces are impacting the international operations and are capable of affecting NATO's operations. That is why it is important to look at the larger dimension and view and understand the current conflict from both micro and macro perspectives.

Conclusion

Despite the many difficulties, challenges, and complications in Afghanistan, it is important to mention that a great deal has been accomplished during the past decade. There have been successes and achievements in various sectors in comparison to what was the case ten years ago. Accomplishments have been made in fields like building roads, education, health, communications, military, etc. However, the main concern is the fact that given the unprecedented attention given by the world, interest, and allocation of resources that have gone into creating a stable and prosperous Afghanistan, the results fall far short of the intended goals.

To remedy the situation here requires corrective actions based on the good military principle of *Lessons Learned, Identified and Applied*. There are many suggestions as to what are the major and significant lessons learned and how to apply them. For the military, a couple of lessons learned could be to include Afghans at all levels of planning, both in the kinetic and non-kinetic activities and programs, and to use power and authority (that comes with the uniform and rank) to influence and persuade for good governance and influence political leadership in the home country to lean on the Afghan government and demand accountability from its leaders at the national and at the District levels. We must remember that the Afghan people, like all of us, aspire to have peace and experience happiness and prosperity.

Afghanistan and her people need to have the time to heal, and to have the required stability and the protective space that allows these basic values to grow and govern their lives so that they can rebuild their broken lives. The Afghan people can and should do better. With better leadership, more informed and coherent guidance from the international military, and the generous donor community, the Afghan experiment can and will succeed.

Afghanistan: Political and Cultural Complexity

Dr. Arne Strand

Why is it that we have not seen more positive results in Afghanistan since 2001? What are the major challenges now, for the Afghans, and implicit: us? To answer these questions, I will try to discuss the ethnic and religious diversity of Afghanistan, and try to draw some major historical lines. I will talk about the regional conflicts, and how the conflicts in the region influence Afghanistan. I will try to show the political complexity that has brought the country where it is today, from the youth revolt in 1973 to the parliamentary elections in 2010, with some of the key actors involved in both of them. I will also mention important factors like Kabul versus the provinces, the ongoing power games and other major challenges that we see today.

Afghanistan is a very fascinating country to travel in, because of the complexity of it. It is, however, the ethnicity and the religious complexity that somehow forms Afghanistan that also is today's challenge. The Pashtuns may be called the largest minority group in the country, because they are not more than fifty percent of the population. They mainly live in the south, but there are also pockets of Pashtuns up north. Some of them were deported there by the then Afghan King Abdur Rakhman because of their opposition towards his central authority.

Then you have, in the central Afghanistan, the Hazaras, the religious minority that has the closest affiliations with Iran. It was legal to keep them as slaves until the 1930s. A lot of them feel that they have a lot to regain with regards to influence in Afghanistan. Up to the north-east are the majority of the Tails living, and all the way up north you see the very clear links between the Afghan ethnic groups and the neighboring countries, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Many of these groups fled the Russians a long time ago to establish their place of living in Afghanistan.

Traditionally, Afghans have more or less lived in a kind of peaceful cohabitation in Afghanistan, but the country has been under one rule – it has been ruled by the Pashtuns. That is an element we also need to keep in mind today. The reason is that Pashtuns do not only reside in Afghanistan: As

mentioned, they are the largest ethnical group, but there are actually more Pashtuns living in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. They do not, as does not Afghanistan officially, accept the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Durani-line that was drawn up by the British more than a hundred years ago. That is still a contested border, and so is also the border up north that is set by the river Amu Dari. The use and division of water from that river is still an unresolved issue between these former Soviet republics and Afghanistan.

But going back to the Pashtuns, they have a long history. They are divided into different tribes, which again are divided into sub-tribes. Still the tribes form a kind of unity – which in Afghanistan also has coincided with the power of the state.

In Pakistan, they have been a minority, though being granted autonomy in the tribal areas from the time of British rule, officially named the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). I will not go into all the tribal honor codes of the Pashtuns. I will just say that they do have a system of governance, and a system of mobilizing among themselves. And they do have, deeply inherited, a duty to protect their family, their tribe, their honor, but also their nation.

They work more or less by consensus. They work in meetings of men, where they sit together for a long period of time to try to reach a conclusion on what could be acceptable to all of that tribe. And yes, the tribes have been under a lot of pressure these last years from commanders, from different kinds of powerful groups, and from the Taliban, but I think we still have to admit that the Pashtun tribe is a unity that we can't disregard as a political force in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, we are faced with a country where possibly as much as 25 percent of the population has returned from neighboring countries since 2001. This has been a major endeavor, where people actually shift their homes and belongings from where they have been refugees due to the war. They take everything of their belongings and go back to a country many have never been to before. Migration has traditionally been a way for Afghans to leave Afghanistan to seek protection at times of war and conflict. Migration is now a major possibility for many Afghan men to go and seek jobs outside of Afghanistan, because there are too few jobs for them back in Afghanistan. This is a challenge that we need to take very seriously, as the lack of jobs and possibility to ensure sufficient income for a family puts the men at risk when they leave for working in other countries. It is also a very destabilizing factor, not least for the families where the men have to be away for a large part of the year and

we have seen in the north that many of those working in Iran have returned as drug addicts due to the hard working conditions.

It is the poorest that now remain abroad, the two to three million Afghans that still are refugees in Pakistan and Iran. If they are forced back because Iran or Pakistan fears that they might be a security risk, Afghanistan will be faced with a situation even worse than today. These Afghans are the ones without land to return to, they have hardly any education at all, and they come back with big families.

Turning to the regional complexity of things, it is important to note that Afghanistan is landlocked, and it has a very nice «handle» up north-east, called the Wakan corridor, that was actually established to ensure that the British and the Russian empires had no common border. Already at that time, Afghanistan held geopolitical importance in the region. Aside from that, we need to take a closer look at the relationship between India and Pakistan. One of the reasons why it's so difficult to find peace in Afghanistan, and one of the reasons why Pakistan has such an interest in Afghanistan, and why they have so little interest in actually addressing any of the concerns about Taliban and other groups residing in Pakistan, is India. They don't see it in their interest to alienate those Afghan groups that they might be able to rally for their protection against India in the future. A solution to the Kashmir issue needs to come into place before one really can have a possibility to stabilize the wider region, and Afghanistan. India is probably feeling much less threatened by this than Pakistan, but it's still important to work with India to be able to change the situation in Afghanistan.

Iran has been a major positive force, I would say, over the last year, in support of the government in Kabul and in denying access to Taliban and other groups. So up to now they have actually been an important neighbor. But they also fear their neighbors, both in Iraq and in the US troop buildup in Afghanistan. So I think we will see an Iran that is more cautious, and would like to have more of an influence in Afghanistan. We see it in some of the demonstrations at the universities now, where groups with Iranian affiliations seem to take very quickly to the streets and protest against the government and international forces. I leave it there, but it's important to recognize that some of these actors hold a major influence on what is possible to do in Afghanistan.

If we look at the political situation, my main point is that some of the same men that were instrumental in the early revolts at the universities back in the 1970s, then in demand for more democracy, still remain very influential. We can mention people like Professor Rabbani, Professor Sayaff, the late Com-

mander Massoud, and the Fahims. All these names are quite familiar today, but they started their careers with a struggle at the university. As said, they were supporting democracy, and the Afghan King and later the President was not very happy about this. He therefore forced them out of Afghanistan, and they took up refuge in Pakistan, which was very happy to host them, train them and provide them with military support because of the conflict over the Durani line that was ongoing at that time. But what we witnessed at that time was the formal establishment of militant organizations that was ready, when the Soviet invaded in 1979, to take up the battle both against what was perceived as a communist threat against an Islamic country, and also against an atheist regime gaining military influence in Afghanistan.

This then led to formation of Islam based resistance groups at that time, the mujahedeen, some led by the above mentioned persons involved in the revolts at the University. In the 1990s, after the Soviet withdrawal, I would define the situation in Afghanistan as one of ethnic and religious civil war. I witnessed this myself in Kabul. I saw how Kabul went from hardly being affected by the conflict to being more or less completely destroyed within a year's time, resulting in a very large number of refugees. But the conflict had also a very strong regional influence, with the different groups involved in the fighting either supported by Pakistan, Iran or India. To me, that is a kind of reminder of the situation we might be getting closer to today, because at that time, the international community had withdrawn from Afghanistan. There were no major powers to provide them with weapons, but there was no one either, somehow, to keep their ears and say «Behave! Do not end up with bloodshed like this!» To some extent, we might be moving towards a very similar to the situation now. Afghans fear, or are hoping for, an international exit, at least of military forces from Afghanistan. Afghans in power are hedging their bets; they are awaiting and positioning themselves as they did in this period. At that time, it led to bloodshed. Taliban came in as a kind of savior, and again it was the Pashtuns, in this case primarily the Pashtun Taliban, who captured Afghanistan from the ethnic minorities, in the end controlling almost 90 percent of the country.

But then of course, Operation *Enduring Freedom* changed all that. It was the commanders that Taliban had disarmed and sent out of Afghanistan that came back with a lot of dollars and a lot of guns, joined up with the minorities to recapture Kabul, and then recaptured Afghanistan.

This led to the current political puzzle, where some of the former important figures in the resistance were also the ones that, because of violation of the rules of election to the parliament, were elected into office. But, this was

also the result of a very deliberate strategy of trying to co-opt these people. The aim was to bring them into the government, the army and the police, allowing them to be part of it rather than in opposition. The trouble with that such a strategy is that you may bring the wrong people in. I believe we see the consequences now in 2009–2010, where some of the latest events show that ethnic tension is again on the rise and that people's disrespect for the Afghan government is increasing.

A lot of people are very disillusioned in the government because it is not what they had hoped for. The current situation is not what they feel they had been promised, by their government and by the international community. The daily conflicts in Afghanistan are mostly related to land, water, and family issues. As a lot of Afghans have pointed out to me, people want someone to protect them against this. However, the police are often part of these conflicts. Increasingly, Afghans trust their army, but they do not see the international forces active in this kind of protection. Instead, they are questioning them: «Why are you here? To protect us or to protect yourself?» It's a question I've faced in large parts of Afghanistan. If we can't do something about the daily security of Afghans, then why stay?

Karzai was recently reelected as president of Afghanistan, and in a sense I think it was good that all the fuss about the election came up. The reason is that all that surfaced was not only about the election, it was also somehow about the state of affairs of the Afghan government. This might allow us a more realistic discussion on what actually the Afghan government is functioning – or not. It must, however, be said that there are a lot of ministries that have started to function well, but there are also ministries that don't take on the responsibility they should, and there has developed a culture on corruption within the Afghan government, and a high degree of nepotism, that is about to destroy even for those who do a good job.

Moreover, there are a number of power games going on within this government. Karzai felt before the election that he had very limited Afghan and international support and he has therefore increasingly turned into what I would define as Afghan politics. That's where he sees that he needs and can secure his backing. That is the reason why he brought on board people with human right records like the former Defense Minister Fahim, simply to protect his own position. He knew that he needed them to actually get enough votes in the election. But he also knew that those who might be after him personally would be much more reluctant to «take him out», to use that term, if he were to be replaced by a Deputy President as Fahim. Karzai is a strategist. He knows to protect himself in a very difficult position. Part of the problem

is that that also includes his family and those who see the presidential power as a way to seek their own benefit rather than that of Afghanistan.

The parliament has had very limited influence, partly because of the composition of it, but also because by definition it is given a very limited role in the Afghan democracy. And this is a major challenge that needs to be discussed. Afghanistan has a president who, if he receives 51 percent of the votes, is more or less in control of everything. This is different from the tribal system, and this is different from the traditional system in Afghanistan, which is focused on the balancing of negotiations. It's something that has been brought on to ensure that we, the West, had a president and a government that somehow had their ears to the international support and the international interests.

We also see that the key ministries are held by Pashtuns. Moreover, we see that a lot of the power has been centralized in Kabul, against international resistance. The south of Afghanistan now sees Kabul as more or less dominated by the minorities through their puppet president, trying to impose their will on them, for example by using international soldiers. Meanwhile, the north sees the current government as a Pashtun government, who are trying to take away some of the legal rights that the minorities should have in Afghanistan, given the undue long Pashtun dominance. And it is also, I think, alarming that the possibilities to do development projects in what is more stable areas – the central and most parts of the north – somehow has been downplayed for trying to use more of the development aid into the conflict areas. The province in Afghanistan with the larger number of 4x4 cars is actually Helmand, whereas it's much more needed in Badakstan if you want to go off the roads, as is development projects. So this kind of undue presence of assistance going to the conflicts could cause conflicts in other places, because people would see that they could benefit, actually, from a bit of fighting in a neighborhood. The war has become a business for very many Afghans, and the longer it continues, the more money they can make.

On the issue of building a strong state, I think we need to do some major rethinking to ensure that we have an Afghan state where more focus is directed to the districts and the provinces. But for them to be able handle an increased responsibility you also need to build their capacity to be able to handle it. While at the same time you need to have a centralized, but ethnically diverse and balanced, police and army.

And then there is another challenge: how fast should you actually go on with such developments? How are you to do it in a way that, somehow, is acceptable to the Afghans?

There's a quote by Afghan king Abdur Rahman Khan says:

My sons and successors should not try to introduce reforms of any kind in such a hurry as to set the people against their ruler. They must be reminded that in establishing a constitution and a government, introducing more lenient laws and modeling education upon the system of a Western university, they must adapt all these gradually, as the people become accustomed to the idea of modern innovation.

And this is part of the challenge today. I wonder if we have gone a bit too fast, in our urge for something that resembles our democracy, or that we somehow have bypassed too much of the traditional mechanism, or we haven't seen them as a kind of potential to work with. I think we might still be going too fast on some of the issues that actually the Afghans should be the one to front, including some of the issues relating to human rights and women. I am not saying that we should not prioritize it, but it's a question of who articulates it and who are seen as enforcing it.

The Afghans have correctly pointed out that neighboring countries are major causes of insecurity. But then again, they are also pointing to unemployment, ethnic conflict, disempowerment of Pashtuns in the south, tribal disputes, the Taliban, as well as a host of other issues. These issues are central to understand what makes mobilization against the Afghan government possible, why there is resentment in Afghanistan against their government, and why there is resentment against the international community. As general McChrystal stated in his initial assessment in 2009: «Progress is hindered by the dual threat, by the resilient insurgency and by a crisis of confidence in the government and the international community. To win their support we must protect the people from both of these threats.»

That's an important reminder on the realities and who we then define as our enemies and who we define as our friends. Those areas in between being an enemy or a friend are sometimes very gray. The challenge facing us is complex, and we have to acknowledge that Afghanistan needs to be allowed to build a kind of state in a slower tempo than what we had anticipated and hoped for. But, if we enforce our model of a state upon them, then we will just be met by more resistance.

Afghanistan – A Commander’s perspective

Lt. Col. Ivar Knotten

While serving as Commander of Provincial Reconstruction Team Meymaneh (PRT MEY) last year, I had one of the most challenging tasks I ever have had, but also the most rewarding. In my opinion, achieving success in Afghanistan is about respect, cultural understanding, and leadership. As PRT Commander, you find yourself where political views, diplomatic efforts, and military strategies meet tactical realities on the ground. In such an environment, it is good to have friends you can trust.

The working title of my speech was «Afghanistan and the conflict, a military perspective». I have realized that I am in no position to give you a solid and comprehensive view of the overall situation in Afghanistan. The one thing I know for sure is that the situation in Afghanistan is complex; it is different in Kabul compared to the countryside, but it is also very different from province to province. Each province has its own history, its own geography and infrastructure, its own warlords and powerbrokers, its own reshaped local governance and security providers, its own elements from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), like PRTs, and various civilian support from the international community.

Another fact important to remember is that the situation in Afghanistan is very dynamic. People change, new organizations and commanders are coming in, ANSF is expanding, and the direction and guidance from higher echelons may change. What I can give you therefore is a commander’s perspective of the situation as I experienced it in 2009.

My focus in the following will be to provide some insight from how I experienced military interaction with the government and society in Faryab province. I have to provide you with a little background about the PRT concept and mission, and I will talk briefly about the structure of the PRT. I will focus on discussing «Integrated approach» as well as the concept of mentoring and partnering, before summing up with some lessons learned.

The PRT Concept

«A PRT is a joint, integrated civil-military institution that seeks to establish an environment that is stable enough for international agencies, the local authorities and civil society to engage in reconstruction, political transition and social and economic development.»

The concept of PRTs was developed by NATO in order to assist the central Afghan government in extending the governance from Kabul to the provinces. Clearly, the situation has developed and changed since ISAF entered Afghanistan. It is worth mentioning that you cannot find two similar PRTs in Afghanistan even though ISAF has tried to implement a PRT standard. I am not very worried about that, since the situation on the ground is different from province to province. The important part is that here is Unity of Effort between the different actors working in an area.

The concept gives an overarching setting while the mission is focusing our efforts:

«As directed by Regional Command North and co-ordinated with national authorities, PRT Meymaneh will assist Government of Afghanistan in Faryab province in building *security*, *governance* and promote *development* in order to establish a safe and well governed Afghanistan.»

The mission statement forms the basis from where the PRTs can develop their own Framework operations or campaign plan. In addition, the PRT receives various orders from Regional Command North (RC N) and ISAF. These orders may direct short-term or long-term operations or provide general direction and guidance. Last year, we saw a gradual shift in how ISAF reads the situation on the ground. This was reflected in the second revised OPLAN from ISAF. In my opinion, among the more interesting points from this revision was the focus on counter insurgency operations, the introduction of the «shape-clear-hold-build» concept, and the focus on putting the Afghans in the lead. Just by stating that, we are conducting a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation that will help focus the military mind. We do have doctrines that describe what the shortfalls may be and what best practices that exist. As an example, 99 percent of the time, the population is the centre of gravity in any COIN. Building national security forces is also an important part of COIN. COIN is different than a UN-led peace support operation as we have seen in the past. We have taken side, and we are not neutral.

I see a challenge when politicians and experts are reading and talking high-level strategy for Afghanistan, and claim that a specific PRT could or should implement the same strategy. To name one example, COM ISAF is stating that we need to be more population centric and that we should live among the

Afghans and not stay in the camps. He has a good point, but the execution will be applied differently when you have 5–10 000 people available or when you have about 400. In my opinion, it is simple: we need to share the same goals, but we should be allowed to use different methods.

Another point I would like to mention is the lack of national guidance you receive. As military Commander of PRT MEY, I was part of the ISAF and NATO structure. Norway has transferred the authority to control operations from national hands through NATO to RC N, an ISAF command. We military are used to this, and there are no issues with this arrangement. But at the same time, I was also in command of a Norwegian-led PRT where the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Embassy in Kabul had a leading role. It is at the PRT level that these two separate «commands» meet. Since there is no official Norwegian campaign plan, it has become the responsibility of the PRT commanders to develop one. Granted, this freedom to develop plans from «bottom up» allows the PRT to be innovative, but quite often our plans are more ambitious and demand more resources than what the authorities would allow.

Organization

As for the order of battle for my PRT, I will first give a few comments about the civilian component of the PRT. In PRT MEY, I had development advisors, a political advisor (POLAD), and prison advisors as well as police liaison officers. Today, the PRT also have a civilian coordinator.

There is as you might be aware of some differences in opinion regarding how the military and civilian cooperation should be organized on the ground. Norway has a strong tradition of having a clear separation between military and civilian activities. This tradition is mostly based upon the fact that emergency aid or humanitarian assistance should be impartial and need-based. I support this view, but I will like to point out that most of the time we are not working with humanitarian assistance or emergency aid, we have taken side in the conflict and we are working together with the Afghan government helping in reconstructing and developing their country. It seems that a lot of people are mixing the term «humanitarian assistance» with development activities. There are strong feelings regarding this subject, and, remarkably enough, the farther you get from Faryab or Afghanistan, the stronger the feelings seem to get. People are a little more pragmatic and focused on helping out when you get a little closer to the challenges.

The model we used in PRT MEY was that the military was primar-

ily responsible for the security sector, the development, and POLADs with support from the embassy was in charge of development and together we worked on the governance sector. We had regular meetings internally in the PRT focusing on the way forward and raising both awareness and issues to each other. The civilian component brings continuity, expertise, and access to the political level in our home countries, but also in Kabul through their embassies. I was fortunate to experience their motivation, their willingness to cooperate as well as their expertise on various issues.

The prison advisors did a great job improving living conditions for the inmates in the prisons as well as educating the prison guards. The Police Liaison officers did an outstanding job under my command. They assisted both the regular police (ANP) as well as the border police (ABP). Some of the remote ABP and ANP outposts had faced several attacks by insurgents and several times they had left their equipment and fled the posts. Upon request from ANSF, the outposts were fortified with HESCO barriers provided by the PRT, funded by NCC, and constructed by a local contractor together with villagers we hired. We were able to provide some basic equipment through partners in Mazar-e-Sharif, some mentoring on how to survive a fire fight was given, and the morale among the soldiers was improving. Next time this outpost was attacked, they managed to hold their post. It was a good example of how things could be done.

The POLAD kept in touch with the political parties, the provincial council, and of course the governor and his staff. The development advisors kept close cooperation with UNAMA and NGOs as well as the various departments of the provincial and district government. My only regret is that the civilian component is too small. The civilians also require leave from time to time and, during those periods, we are desperately short on manpower to work various issues. The workload is too high for two- or three-men teams, which means that you become dependent on other organizations work, especially, NGOs. Even though our relationship was great, it has not always been the case. I believe a joint strategy developed by the various departments back home in Norway, operationalized into a joint campaign plan through the National Joint Headquarters and the Norwegian Embassy in Kabul, and implemented by the integrated PRT in MEY, could have been an interesting idea.

The PRT has a military staff organized as a battalion or brigade staff, is manned with fairly young officers, but are dealing with responsibilities and tasks similar to those on even higher levels. The staff is the glue working to get all the various pieces joined up and hauling in the right direction. As for the remaining order of battle, the PRT included the following units:

– The ISTAR Task Group collects information, analyzes it, and presents it to the commanders and the rest of the staff. Some of the teams are also conducting liaison with official and unofficial power structures. Finally, the teams are capable of conducting small-scale partner operations.

– The Task Unit (TU) was my primary combat unit, the Hammer. The TU is a small infantry company in numbers, but they have a variety of different tools, they are well trained, and they are a very robust and good partner for the Afghan infantry units. The TU was partnering primarily with ANA, but in many cases it was an all-out ANSF operation. I used the TU with ANSF in areas we wanted to influence and prioritize.

– The Latvian Force Protection Company, which was doing a remarkable and important job. In addition to airport and camp security, they provide escorts near and far, they had units on 10 minutes notice to move, and they were partnering with ANSF in Meymaneh.

– CSS Coy is the key to get daily operations ongoing. They do all kinds of support, both in camp, but also on operations far from camp.

– The Medical Company and the Norwegian Aeromedical Detachment (NAD) is our life line. The combination of NAD and Med Coy allows the PRT to operate throughout the area of operations. I am very grateful for the dedication and eagerness the NAD personnel showed throughout my time in the operation. I know you are proud of this contribution in the Air Force, and you have all the rights to be proud. I cannot see the PRT continuing doing operations in Faryab without the NAD. If you go home, we all have to go.

To sum it up, the PRT is a well-balanced and well-trained unit. I could clearly like to see more PRT troops considering the number of tasks we had and the vast area of operations. But, we should not forget that the overall number of soldiers in Faryab province is gradually getting higher, as more ANA units are being fielded. The Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) that operates in Faryab training the ANA Infantry kandak (battalion) is Norwegian. It is a great advantage operating together with soldiers who has the same background, training, language, and equipment as yourself. As battle space manager, the PRT has tactical control on all OMLTs coming into Faryab.

Commander PRT Meymaneh

As Commander of the PRT, I had the overall responsibility for all PRT activities. Even though the civilians have ties to other organizations and units, I think they accepted the arrangement of having a military commander in charge. How good the cooperation is between the civilians and the military is of course partly a result of the chemistry between them. But it is also reflecting the kind of guidance the two parts are getting from our superiors in Norway.

As Commander, I commanded not only the Norwegians, but also our Latvian, Macedonian, and Icelandic colleagues. Their well being, their equipment status, their training level, and their way of employment is the responsibility of the PRT Commander. As lead nation, we should never forget this. I think a good commander has to love his soldiers. At the same time, he is the one who is responsible for solving the mission, in many cases, tasking the soldiers to go to areas where chances are pretty high that they will get into contacts with the enemy. During these contacts, we are aware that we may have to pay the ultimate price. We know this and we are willing to do it. But we want to come prepared to the fight; we need to trust our abilities and each other. Sufficient training with the right equipment is part of this preparation. In the end, the Commander is responsible to bring the soldiers home, and he should be prepared to face the parents, regardless of the status on own troops.

This responsibility is tough to carry at some times, regardless what nation your soldiers come from. We are all aware of the dangers doing the missions, but we still believe they are worth doing. In late January, we lost one soldier in an IED attack. It is just a matter of time before we loose more soldiers. I made a point that all our soldiers should understand why we conducted operations; understand the commander's intent, before they left camp. At least by doing that, I ensured that the soldiers themselves understood why they were doing the mission. Commanding all our soldiers was still inspiring. The motivation and dedication they are showing even on rough days helped me finding strength as well. It is good to see how they are helping each other on good and bad days.

I have briefly mentioned that the organization of PRTs may differ from province to province. In some provinces, there are both a PRT and a Task Force. The structure varies. In Faryab, I was de facto both PRT Commander and Commander of a Task Force. Sometimes, the Task Force just consisted of smaller units from the PRT and ANSF; other times, I became ISAF Ground Force Commander with a lot of units and actors involved. During operation TUFAN in May and June 2009, I had full command of own forces, attached German and US units, tactical control on Kandak OMLT 1, 2, 4, and 5 as

well as 1st BDE OMLT. US ARSIC NORTH had a forward command element, and the same was the case for RC N. During this operation, it was two commanders on the ground, COM 1st BDE/209th Corps and COM PRT MEY. ANA had several kandaks involved; in addition, ANP provided roughly 120 regular police or gendarmerie, NDS had about 20, and the ABP provided about 30 men in support of the operation. During the offensive part of the operation, focus is naturally oriented along the handling of units. But at the same time, the Commander must be able to step back, keep the big picture, and look ahead at other things that need to be handled. This is especially important when you are working with people who have a totally different culture and who are not too familiar with running large military operations for weeks.

My most important role as PRT Commander was perhaps as a supporter and mentor to the provincial governor and the security forces in Faryab. ANSF has improved a lot in the last years, but there is still rivalry between them. Several times, I had to act as a diplomat when ANSF was discrediting and blaming each other. Bottom line, they are still dependent on mentoring and support from the international forces and civilian organizations.

In the districts, the PRT Commander is considered a very important and powerful actor. Being the one with the most guns and toys, and among these definitely the helicopters, the district leaders and elders consider the PRT Commander an important warlord. Most of the time I did not deal with district leaders or elders; they were dealt with by my MOT liaison officers. But, sometimes, I had to show presence, reinforce the messages that was previously given, or simply be there supporting the District leader.

The PRT has to be careful in getting too deeply involved in internal business. I remember being asked by Qari Dawlat, The District Administrator of Ghowrmach, to come to an emergency meeting at the District City hall. At the meeting, all the ANSF commanders and their mentors were present, in addition to the DA, my TU commander, and I. The first issue being brought up was that earlier that morning the DA had allegedly been attacked in his quarters by the previous DA, Abdullah Jan. He claimed it was disrespectful to be considered as an attack on the President and that Abdullah Jan should be arrested. After a long debate, and plenty of motivation, all that was needed was the approval of the PRT Commander to arrest the man. I argued that we will never see peace in this part of Afghanistan if the two men could not put away their differences and come to an understanding. I argued that the DA would get a lot of credit and support from both the governor and I if he could provide stability in the district. He clearly did not like the message. The second

issue of the day was that he begged me not to use airpower during a funeral that was going to take place later that day. He said it was an important elder that had passed away and that a lot of Taliban, regular people as well as police officers and other officials would take place in the funeral. I had no intentions of using airpower or to bomb a funeral and had no problem promising him that I would not do such a thing.

After the meeting, as I was about to mount the vehicles to go back to the FOB, I was approached by one of the participants of the meeting. I knew he was a supporter of Abdullah Jan. He asked me if I would be kind enough to meet with Abdullah Jan, the previous DA who was accused of attacking the current DA. I asked where I could find him and was surprised when I was told he was in the ground floor of the building where we just had the meeting. I figured it would be best if I met him without any other officials so I took one interpreter (IP) and followed the guy into the building. I went inside a small door and came into a room with about 15–20 elders. Luckily enough, I had met Abdullah Jan before, so I recognized him pretty quick. He was pleased that I wanted to talk to him. I realized I had to be very frank and open about what had been discussed upstairs, since he probably already knew what had been discussed. I told him that I had been informed about the events that morning by Qari Dawlat, and that I wanted his side of the story now. I also told him that I had refused to arrest him. He told me his side of the story; he claimed that Qari Dawlat was taking assets for own personal use, that Qari Dawlat did not respect the elders and the tribal shura, and that he was a Taliban. I asked the audience; is he a Taliban, and they chanted Talib, Talib, Talib.

The reason why I am telling this story is twofold. First, as foreign military, you may have to deal with rivalry between tribes and you may be used in an internal power struggle. Secondly, I tell this story to inform you that the Afghans have other ways of solving issues than what you are used too. They may have local cease fires between officials and insurgents; they are talking to each others as old friends before lunch and fighting each other after lunch. I believe it is vital to have a solid situational awareness as a commander. You get most of your information from Afghan sources, but I believe it is vital to keep some collection assets on national or ISAF hands. I was lucky to have a lot of smart guys available helping me to understand the situation.

Integrated Approach

During the fall of 2008, «Integrated approach» was becoming the buzzword in Afghanistan. You have also probably heard the same concept referred to as «Comprehensive approach.» The basic idea is that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, UNAMA, and ISAF have divided the responsibilities between them and that they are committed to work toward common goals. This cooperation is found centrally in Kabul, in the regions as well as in the provinces. Early 2009, it was decided that Ghowrmach district should be a Pilot Action District, where the mentioned institutions should show the world and sceptics that integrated approach is the way to move forward.

The number of actors involved in the Pilot Action District programme was tremendous. This had a huge impact on us in the PRT – with all the actors involved, someone had to take charge. In many cases, it was the PRT who had the resources, the network, and the well-trained staff necessary in order to lead. Although there is a UNAMA office in Meyaneh, the staff is very limited. Just like on the civilian side of the PRT, UNAMA need additional manpower if they are to be successful in Afghanistan. The ones they have is a great asset, and we worked together toward the same objectives.

The Provincial governor was a little reluctant to the concept of Pilot Action District. As he stated: «What about the other districts?» He was responsible primarily for Faryab and was not sure if he liked the focus on Ghowrmach, a district that used to belong to Badghis province. But I would like to give credit to the Provincial governor as well. His analysis of the situation was very accurate, and some of his scepticism proved to be well justified. The Governor is under a lot of pressure from his own people, political parties, former warlords, the central government, international agencies, and organizations. I am impressed by the governor of Faryab, Mr Abdul Haq Shafaq. He managed to keep a good overview of most cases. I met him mostly on the Security Council meetings, but also on various meetings he had with different ISAF representatives and Norwegian officials.

The Security Council is a body consisting of representatives of all security providers in Faryab, ANSF, mentors, UNAMA, the leader of the provincial council, the Governor, and the PRT. I normally brought the POLAD and the senior police liaison as well as our own IP and a note taker. ANSF and the PRT gave a weekly summary of activities, we discussed the security development in the provinces, and the governor gave his guidance. Initially, the focus on missions was to show resolve and unity; later, we had higher ambitions. Today, we see improvement in how these operations are planned and coordinated.

The integrated approach is alive as a concept, but I am not sure if the pilot

action district concept is still alive. Everyone who was part of the programme wanted immediate results. They should be the first to know that it takes a lot of time to shift government budgets, recruit, equip, and train new troops as well as getting all organizations to work on the same topic with the same priority.

Mentoring and Partnering

As promised, I will offer a few comments to the concept of partnering and mentoring. The PRT, or the ISAF Ground Force Commander, and the Afghan Commander are equal partners sharing a common goal or mission. Sometimes, the ISAF Commander is in the lead; other times, the Afghan is taking the lead. The mentors in an OMLT cannot replace the partner, but they are crucial in planning and conducting operations. In operations, they served as my liaisons to the Afghan units when we operated dispersed.

In order to raise the standard and to support the development of the Afghan Army, it is important to stay in front and to show the way in order to establish common respect. We have to be good examples. An equal partner has to take an active part in the planning and conduct of the operations. We have to share the same dangers as our Afghan colleagues. When you do this, you gain respect, and the respect is crucial. If there is no mutual understanding and respect, they do not listen to what you have to say, you just become «a talker.»

The following story about expectations is illustrative. When our first OMLT started mentoring the 1st Kandak, the company mentor was greeted by Capt Hannan, who is the commander of 2nd coy/1st Kandak. «You know, I was chief of staff in a kandak some years ago. At that time we had Russian mentors. We had different opinion and one day we lined up the mentors and shot them. Then I took the kandak and we joined the Mujaheddin.» You do get motivated to find common ground and develop mutual understanding after such an introduction.

Even though we now see more ANA troops coming in to the area, there is a requirement to keep a strong PRT in Faryab. Young soldiers coming into ANA have just received basic training and are forming companies straight after their initial training. These units require more training and mentoring before they go after the insurgents. But, due to the shortfall of troops, they are not given that luxury. The OMLTs and the PRT play a key role in the continuous training of the kandak and during joint operations. Even though the PRT and the OMLT Kandak speak the same language, our friends in ANA do not.

It is important to keep it simple. Most of the officers know how to read and write, but I think it is fair to say that they have less formal military education than us. But, they are rich on real-life military experience. It is hard to grasp some of the clever concepts like shape–clear–hold–build when you have lived most of your life fighting guerrilla-type warfare in squad-sized units, or just recently have been given a company or battalion.

I remember the kandak commander being a little anxious and reluctant during the preparations on one of the early operations; asking if we had medical support, helicopter support, close air support, and so on. He also expressed doubts going into an area, saying that the insurgents would be long gone before we arrived. He was simply not ready to go in. I asked what the battalion commander wanted to do. His response: «I do whatever you tell me to do!» We carried out the plan as we then agreed and managed to achieve our objectives and then returned to base. Afterward, I was informed that the kandak commander had given his mentor a hard time. He was clearly of the opinion that we should have pressed further south into enemy territory and picked a fight. The mentor asked why he did not suggest this to the PRT Commander. «I can not say that to him. He is the PRT Commander.» The authority and standing is remarkable. But, this also reflected that we did not know each other good enough. I talked this through with him later and explained why I did not want to go south. I also told him that we would get new chances to inflict damages on the enemy.

Another time, I realized that he did not get the basic idea and intention of the plan. I knew he was not stupid; the problem was of course that our interpreter did not know enough military jargon or English to give a clear presentation of the plan. Based on these experiences, we started to use a lot more models, we integrated better during planning processes, and we did practical rehearsals in order to get everyone on board. Our common understanding was improving and so was the effectiveness of our operations.

During the initial operations, we worked intertwined with one ANA coy and our TU. The ANA coy was basically looking at our infantry, saw how they operated, were impressed when they charged up a hill to secure it, and pleased to see that we were riding in front. Later, we operated with the two companies next to each other and toward the end, we were able to run it as joint battalion ops. This would not have been possible without the mentors. The role of the mentors was twofold; they assisted in planning and preparations as part of the ANA team, and they were the link on our radio nets and an active part of the combat operations.

The first time we met the 1st Kandak and the company, which was located

in FOB Ghorwmach, they hardly dared to go to the bazaar to buy bread. During Op Tufan, the same company with mentors independently pressed south and secured the brigade flank on our move toward the Badghis border.

As our relationship developed, so did the courage. We also gradually got more and better support from higher headquarters. Our requests for pre-planned air support were being granted, we got other assets to support the operations and our skills improved. After a successful mission, the kandak commander stated the following. «Air support is great, but we should also kill enemy with direct fire. That is good for the soldiers' morale.» He was a hard man to please. He got more opportunities to use direct fire than he wanted some days later. At that time, the PRT assets were withdrawn from the operations doing hand over/take over in Meymaneh, and the 1st Kandak was at this time the backbone of 1st Brigade supported by their NOR OMLT. During this fight, the 1st Kandak and their mentors proved that they had reached the desired level of expertise and they had to use all their assets in order to withstand the attack and survive.

We are now gradually using the same model with mentors on police development, but I also believe we should use the same model on the rest of the civilian sector. I realize it is a question about resources. Mentoring several sectors is manpower intensive, and Norwegian labour is expensive. Still, you can do a lot more with just a few more people.

Lessons Learned

There are those who ask «is this really working?» The security situation is deteriorating according to statistics, and in this case the statistics are correct. «The tea drinking days are over,» as one of my soldiers once said. A few years ago, we could drive land cruisers in the countryside, drink tea, hear about the problems, and go back to base report what we had seen. This is no longer the case. First of all, the situation is not improving if you are just assessing and analyzing. People in Faryab want to see improvement and change.

Secondly, as the governor, the ANSF, and ISAF are getting stronger, the insurgents are loosing their power and freedom of action, and they do not like it. They are very happy being without a strong government, because this means they can continue to run their operations freely. Not all of them are Taliban, but the Taliban and others who fight the government have one thing in common. They are better off without a strong government.

A lot of people claim that the military cannot win the struggle in Afghanistan alone. I think they are correct. The people and government of Afghani-

stan need to see a lot of civilian development and construction in the years to come. The country had almost no infrastructure when the operations started in 2001. But, there will not be any victory without the military. If we pull out of Afghanistan before the ANSF is ready to take over, we will experience our worst nightmare. They will fold like a house of cards. I believe the way we worked together with 1st Kandak is proving that there is possible to leave security to the Afghans themselves. But, they need the time to get the chance to be good at it.

I also believe Norway as lead nation in the PRT MEY should try to develop a comprehensive and unified strategy with all actors who have a share in it. I am aware of the strategy that was developed last year. Frankly, I was not impressed by that work; to me, it was just a wish list stating the obvious. I believe we need to set the ambitions of our involvement and develop a plan for how we will reach those goals. It is considerably more difficult developing and constructing a province than to fight a war. We should also be aware of all the other actors who have a share in this project.

In my view, there is no need to talk about what the military cannot do. I would rather like to hear a plan describing what the civilians will do together with the military. It is as I have said before, a matter of resources. You need a substantial increase in manpower to draft a comprehensive joint plan with the Afghans, to implement it, and to mentor the civilian provincial government of Afghanistan.

The handicraft of the military is as important as ever. Technology can help you in many ways, but you have to master traditional soldiering skills. The soldiers must be given the resources to be best at their handicraft. This means enough ammunition to be good at the basic skills, enough training on the right equipment, and enough exercises in order to be a well-functioning system of war fighters. Our soldiers need to win the initial contact. We cannot afford to loose.

All soldiers need to master the basics; in addition, the officers should prepare mentally as good as possible for war. For most of us, war is so different from our regular lives that most of us have not experienced it before we go to a place like Afghanistan. Why not learn from others who have been involved in a war? If you can hear other soldiers' stories, great! But if you cannot, read about it in relevant books. I read a lot of books about Afghanistan, culture, traditions, and about units and commanders who had been in war before I started the pre-deployment training. Some of the experiences I read about in books, I found myself doing some months later for the first time in my life. It was good to have some references.

I think my greatest lesson learned in Afghanistan is that it is all about people. You have to analyze your environment, your enemies and your allies, your mission, and your tasks, you have to develop plans and you have to get organized. But, in the end, it is about execution and most of all it is about people. You need your people to help you do the analysis, you need your people to do the staff work, and you need your people to execute your plans. It is your own soldiers battling it out with all others who want to influence the environment. In order to get your people to do all these things, you have to be there and lead them.

There are no shortcuts; you simply have to be there and you have to know your people. I believe talking to the soldiers and hearing their stories are more important than drafting cunning plans and sending them electronically to be executed. I also believe that this notion of having a master commander far away with situational awareness based on electronics is a fraud. We have to empower the commanders on the ground, who has got the best awareness, and we have to share the dangers with the troops to fully understand what it is all about. I am grateful for the trust and support my soldiers gave me and I am grateful for getting them home – that was not always given.

DEL 2

Maktanvendelsens rolle i Afghanistan

The International Community and the Role of the Military in Afghanistan

Dr. Christine Fair

Recently, President Obama has rolled out a new strategy for Afghanistan. It's a substantial revision over the strategy that he presented in March, and in some sense it's a scaling back strategy. The whole approach is centered on something that we conceivably can do, whereas the March strategy that he laid out was much more ambitious and perhaps wasn't terribly doable. But one of the threads that remain somewhat consistent across the first strategy and the newest strategy is that we're trying to reverse what had previously been eight years of considerable focus upon the central government. This was obviously centered around Karzai, and obviously there's a long history here. We did get the president that we expected to get out of the Bonn process, we got the constitutional problems that we should have expected, having put forward the constitution that was forged at Bonn. Over the years, our means of engagement resulted in the government challenges that we're really beginning to deal with now.

I was disconcerted by the response to General McChrystal's interim commander's assessment. Everyone immediately focused on one element of that strategy, namely the additional troops. But in fact, if you read his document, you would see that there were consistently two elements in every section of the report that he focused upon considerably. The first was corruption in the Afghan government and the need to have an effective Afghan partner. The second involved troops—how many there are and what their missions are. My interpretation was therefore that there was only one lever in that entire strategy that we could operationalize and optimize, and that was the number of troops and what they did in theatre. We can scale them up, we can scale them down, and we can change their mission. But, we can't make the Afghan government any more effective.

We are therefore moving away from focusing exclusively on the central

government down to not only the provinces and the districts, but in fact the sub-district level of government. Now, in principle this sounds like a really good idea, but if you look at the way the Afghan government is arranged, you find that it is deeply vertically integrated. Therefore, if you are thinking about delivering services at the sub-district level, all of those decisions are actually made in Kabul, at the line ministries. The concept that we are now operationalizing is the district support teams. They are supposed to go out to the district and bring some level of coherence and competence in public service provision to the district and even sub-district levels. In principle that sounds like a great idea, because that is where the Taliban are most effective. The Taliban don't really care about cities per se. Their central area of legitimacy is the district and sub-district levels. So the district support teams sound like a good idea at least in principle. However, when you actually think about how we, the U.S. government and our partners, go about doing this, I think you really come quickly to the sobering limits of American power. After all, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams have struggled for personnel and the Iraq civilian surge demonstrated that even if you can have quantity of civilians, you may not quality.

The other issue that I think is important is the part of the strategy about securitization or handing the security of Afghanistan over to Afghans. We have seen the July 2011 timeline come up, but I think it's been mischaracterized in the press. It's less of a deadline for retreat and more about creating conditions in order to transfer authority to the Afghans. This process basically has two components. One is building the Afghan National Police (ANP), and the other is building the Afghan National Army—collectively referred to as the Afghan National Security Forces or ANSF. However, there are problems connected to this build-up both in terms of recruitment and retention. Many people think that we are not going to get an Afghan National Army (ANA) bigger than 100,000. This really is a hollow force, both in terms of quantity and of quality. Corruption often gets associated with training of the ANP, but it's also a problem in the ANA.

In order to try to hand the security off to the Afghans as fast as possible, a program called the Community Defense Initiative (CDI) has recently been launched. The point with CDI is to train and equip those militias that say they want to fight the Taliban. This involves something I would call moral hazard. The problem with the CDI, apart from the fact that Afghanistan does not need more militias, is that we already have a very low density in terms of trainers. And the International Security Assistance Force wants to pull some of these trainers off from building the police to building the CDI. By the way, Afghans

don't call these «community defense initiatives,» they call them «militias.» While we don't have enough trainers to make legitimate police, we are now going to use these scarce resources to these militias instead.

If you look at Afghanistan's history, it's always been a rentier state, something that has made the country vulnerable to its predatory neighbors. And of course, the neighbors remain as predatory as possible. This brings me to the very interesting, and quite frankly frustrating paradox in the entire strategy – that the US went ahead and rolled out the surge in troops, without a Pakistan strategy. This is deeply disturbing, because there actually is not a Pakistan strategy. Remember that the US has actually paid Pakistan 15 billion dollars to participate in this global war on terrorism, and in fact they have done nothing to retard the activities of the Afghan Taliban on their territory. On the contrary, we have got evidence that shows that Pakistan continues to actively support the Afghan Taliban. Therefore, because we can't make our so-called ally in the war on terror behave like an actual ally, we have to build this massive unsustainable security architecture in Afghanistan that simply makes no sense over the long haul. Lacking a strategy for Pakistan, I'm concerned that we've essentially handed the Pakistanis an ever bigger stick with which they can do whatever they want.

Pakistan represents two significant problems. Obviously there is nuclear proliferation, and then there is support for terrorism. The American policy community tends to see these things somewhat distinctly generally with the exception of the scenario whereby terrorists get their hands on nuclear weapons. It is possible to say that in Pakistan, they use terrorism under the security of their nuclear umbrella. If they didn't have this nuclear umbrella, India would have sorted them out some time ago. However, under their nuclear umbrella, Pakistan is free to use asymmetric warfare to prosecute Pakistani interests in India, and also to some extent in Afghanistan.

Returning to Pakistan, we need to be very clear about a couple of things. We've now had the emergence of the Pakistan Taliban, and many Pakistanis have been killed fighting the Pakistani Taliban. But there's a distinction across these various groups of so-called «Taliban.» The Pakistani Taliban are not the same as the Afghan Taliban, they're not the same network, not the same individuals, and they don't have the same organizational objectives. The Pakistan Taliban wants to destroy the Pakistan government; the Afghan Taliban would like to do something with the Afghan government. They have intersecting but not overlapping networks, they share a backbone of ideology, they have some contacts with Al-Qaida, depending on the cell, and certain individuals represent a pin that spans across both networks. But, when the Pakistanis say

that «we've taken a beating killing the Taliban», they've taken a beating killing *their* Taliban, not *our* Taliban.

What I do find somewhat dismaying is that we've had a transitive property of security for the last several years. That is to say, that if we fail in Afghanistan, then Pakistan will fall. We actually need to think about a different strategy in Afghanistan that gives us the ability to create space for compellence to deal with the real problems, which are actually present in Pakistan. Our force projection in Afghanistan therefore makes us dependent upon a state which is far more dangerous, in my view, than Afghanistan could ever possibly be. We therefore have to think about a scenario where the Taliban do come back. And so we have to raise some level of awareness that there's going to be some degree of Taliban presence back in the governance of Afghanistan, and ask ourselves what this does mean for our collective supreme national security interests vis-à-vis Al-Qaida? In my view, we need a Plan B that really focuses much more intensively upon Pakistan and what we do about that country and its role on international security in and beyond the region.

Pakistan represents the nexus of the things that are absolutely the most horrifying. Europeans know, and Americans are coming to learn, that many of the conspiracies that have been disrupted here have their footprints in Pakistan. Therefore, we should think about the strategy in Afghanistan the other way around: We need to think about Pakistan's ability to, in some sense, overdetermine the fate of Afghanistan. After all it is Pakistan that in many ways, but not exclusively, has a lot of influence over the dynamics of militant groups in Afghanistan and in the region.

When it comes to reconciliation, Pakistan becomes really important. Pakistanis would really like to see some sort of Taliban presence back in Afghanistan, for reasons that are pretty obvious. However, I have a couple of questions about the Kabul-led political process of reconciliation and the U.S.-supported process of «reintegration». By reintegration, the United States doesn't mean reconciliation. Rather the United States intends to «train» and «pay» Taliban to defect and return to Afghan society as non-combatants. But there's not a political process of reconciliation associated with this concept of re-integration. And to me, this is a little bit disconcerting. My concern is that without a formal process of reconciliation, reintegration, I think, is not going to be the magical bullet that we see it as to be able to extract ourselves from the situation.

I know that reconciliation/reintegration is key to the American strategy of «Afghanizing» the situation in Afghanistan so that we can begin a process of ceasing combat operations. But for Afghans, this is actually a much more

difficult situation. They were pretty frustrated when the Americans brought back the delegitimized warlords as a part of our security strategy. So, when you're thinking about reconciliation, you need someone with whom you can reconcile with, and the question remains if Karzai is someone with whom the Taliban can reconcile? They largely hate him. Furthermore, is this something that Afghans want? Therefore, I think this is a reasonable time to ask: what are the objectives of reintegration? And, not only is reintegration effective, but what will it take to actually reconcile the Taliban? And is the Taliban reconcilable at all? I don't have any answers to these questions, but I am really concerned that this is seen as a meaningful part of our way out.

Air Power in Counterinsurgency

Col. Gary Crowder, USAF

What I would like to do, despite the title of this article, is to take a complete step back and give a strategic overview of the challenges facing NATO and the US over the next century. Although we are not allowed to use the term «The Long War» anymore, I believe the challenges facing us and the conditions that exist will be here for a very long time.

My first point is that strategy matters, and that resources drive strategy. When one considers the resources needed to execute a counterinsurgency campaign, the strategic question we need to ask is therefore «Why counterinsurgency, and why now?» Our biggest problem is to define the problem that we face. Although Iraq and Afghanistan are immediate challenges, these challenges are not in themselves the problem that we face. This is a much broader problem that has to do with the evolving state structure within the broader global community.

I think it is worthwhile to look at this problem within the context of NATO's history. For the first 40 years of its existence, the alliance was focused on deterring a near-peer competitor, namely the Soviet Union. In that respect, NATO was a spectacular success. Not only did NATO deter the Soviet Union, but the alliance also maintained the political and military cohesion necessary to defeat it. After 1991, NATO struggled for a few years. It did not have the logistical and communication capabilities necessary for conducting the kind of operations needed in the Balkans in the 1990s. However, from an airman's perspective, the operations in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999, showed that the 50 years of training that went before the operations had been very meaningful – US and NATO air power really worked when employed.

Then came Afghanistan, which clearly is an out-of-area operation. The broader question we have to ask is if Afghanistan is an anomaly, or if we will have to do more of these kinds of operations in the future? And if so, how will nations and military forces need to be organized in order to support this? If the nation states cannot defend themselves against global terrorism, they will change. This is not a Huntingtonian clash of civilizations, however, but rather a clash of economic success. In the world today, we have simultaneously preagrarian, agrarian, early industrial, and information age societies. In the pre-

agrarian, agrarian, and early industrial societies, the population is increasingly impoverished, out of work, and migrating to the cities. And, from there, they will try to go to the information age societies.

Many, however, will not have jobs or other means of economic opportunities, and some therefore will begin to support Al-Qaida, the Taliban or other related groups. In my mind, these are just the first in a series of such groups that we will see emerge in the future. The main difference between the anarchist movements of the late 19th and early 20th century and the groups we face today, is that the groups today have access to weapons of mass destruction and may organize themselves globally over the Internet.

Ultimately, the core challenges we face today is not that of «global governance», but that of «local governance on a global scale». In the world today we have regions of anarchy, with ungoverned or ungovernable states and regions. To secure ourselves at home we must engage globally, with cross-governmental and non-governmental solutions to enhance local governance and security on a global scale. This is not a battle; it is not a war, but rather a series of engagements, operations, and involvements that will involve all elements of our governmental structures, both civilian and military. To my mind, we will also have to involve ourselves in the regions where there is little or no governance to improve security if we are to improve our own security in the years ahead.

If we are to do that, we will have to analyze the environment we are going to operate in. To my mind, there are only three viable reasons for ever sending troops overseas. The first is peacekeeping, a situation where you are not taking sides in a conflict, but rather trying to make a period of peace last longer. The second, and more prevalent, is to assist a partner nation in governance, training, and security. And, finally, go in to remove the government of a rouge regime.

The reason why it is important to divide between these three types of campaigns is because it tells us something of the nature of the operations we can or should conduct during a certain situation. In the first environment, it is vital not to take sides. In the second you have a challenge in that you must take sides, but you can't do so visibly or forcefully. Rather, you must help the partner nation develop its own capabilities and structures. The final one is probably the most complex, in that if you actually overthrow the regime, you don't have time to develop local governance capacity – you have to impose it. The dilemma occurs if you are in the third environment, but are unable to impose governance capacity – then you are in the worst of all worlds: The force structure and capabilities you have to impose security is directly contraproductive

in the process of enabling local capacity within the partner nation. Therefore, I would caution against counterinsurgency by analogy. More often than not, there are flaws in the analogy that will lead you to the wrong solution to the problems of today.

If we understand the different roles our external forces (both political and military) can play in providing governance and security in these types of operations, what then is the particular role of the military? First of all, the military must provide layered security within the partner nation, in the form of a national army, a regional/constabulary force, and a local police force. Historically, this is a necessity to conduct a successful counterinsurgency operation. There is a tremendous benefit in doing that, because power is then federalized – it is broken into smaller parts rather than in one big army. Also, you need to establish a small and professional air force to assist the ground troops, for two reasons. Firstly, this reduces the size of the conventional forces needed to provide security, and secondly, it increases the effectiveness of all the military forces.

There is also a duality in the process of assisting partner nations in developing air forces. As mentioned, it significantly enhances and empowers smaller ground forces, but also provides immediate and sustained economic development opportunities and capabilities. Every dollar invested in developing an air force is a source of economic development, because you then need to train pilots and the engineers necessary to provide for the air force, both in terms of airplanes and installations. Air forces therefore are an essential element of any counterinsurgency strategy, and we as airmen need to be more articulate in this respect. I believe that if we do this right, air power can play a unique and highly effective role in governance and security operations. However, we need new tools, new concepts, new organizations, and new strategies. The primary responsibility of airmen in a counterinsurgency campaign should be to train our replacements and go home.

I will now move to what I think is a major trait with current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, namely the fusion of operations and intelligence. These are no longer sequential activities. Air crafts no longer take off without targets, and you may have to watch targets days on end. The fusion between operations and intelligence therefore is what makes our current operations work, and is the salient characteristic of the conflicts we will see, particularly in low-intensity conflicts, for the foreseeable future. We will have to learn to deal with this.

In that respect, it is important to note that the army and the air force have two fundamentally different views on operations. The US Air Force

believes in centralized control and decentralized execution, while the US Army believes in decentralized planning and execution. These two philosophies were designed for major combat operations. In major combat operations, we have to move air power rapidly to meet emergency contingencies. The ground forces, however, need to have the right capabilities, and then «let go» to do the job necessary with as little meddling from the top as possible. Therefore, these two philosophies have to adapt for counterinsurgency.

From the airman's perspective, centralized control and decentralized execution does not help us if the subordinate elements of our theater air control system are not robust enough to do an effective and tactical execution of the mission to support the ground forces that are distributed on the battle space. For the army, the decentralized planning and execution problem is twofold. Firstly, it is extremely resource intensive, and secondly, it is not going to lead to the execution of a coherent strategic vision. Therefore, these two philosophies have to come to the middle when it comes to counterinsurgency. Moreover, we have to distribute command and control to allow tactical planners to talk to tactical ground entities and work in direct support of a tasked subordinate entity rather than being tasked from the theater air operations center.

However, in a global environment, command and control has changed considerably. The US is now flying Predators in Afghanistan that are controlled by people based in the United States, where the intelligence networks also are based. We therefore have to manage the Predator-flying crews and the intelligence exploitation crews on a global basis all the time. That enables us to funnel intelligence at a moment's notice to the tactical commander on the ground, but it is also a very complex process that is not easily repeated at the tactical level as we support partner nations in insurgency operations.

At the moment, it is also possible to say that we have the wrong air force to do counterinsurgency. Currently, it costs us 30000 dollars an hour to get a B-1 in the skies over Afghanistan. A light TAC air plane could do the same job at 1000 dollars an hour. We are therefore moving towards an air force which will also be consisting of more lightly armed air planes, especially with regards to establishing partner nation air forces.

We will also have to maximize Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS; smaller platforms) and Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA; for example Predators and Reapers) operations. These aircraft are essential to a cost-effective and militarily effective counterinsurgency campaign. We will therefore have to find a way to fly them and use them globally to the utmost efficiency.

Finally, we have to acknowledge that airspace control is probably more complex in a counterinsurgency operation than in a major combat operation.

In the last case, you can accept a certain level of attrition, something that is impossible in the first. This requires new technology and new systems. While we have developed significant new capabilities to enhance air power's contribution to counterinsurgency campaigns, full exploitations of these capabilities will require closer doctrinal development with ground force elements.

To conclude, I will say that the future holds certain involvement in uncertain areas. The military therefore needs to develop options for the political leadership, while governments must gain a broader strategic perspective. Counterinsurgency is more effective and efficient if partnering and developmental/security assistance can be provided earlier rather than later. Air power is an indispensable element of any developmental or security assistance team, but we must adapt from what we know to what will actually work.

DEL 3

Det norske perspektivet

Erfaringsbasert læring i det norske forsvaret i Afghanistan

Dr. Torunn Laugen Haaland

– Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the US intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy. ...the vast intelligence community is unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which the US and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade. (Major General Michael T. Flynn, 2010)

Jeg vil innlede med følgende sitat, som har vakt oppsikt på Lutvann utenfor Oslo, men som kanskje også bør leses av større deler av Forsvaret. Generalmajor Michael T. Flynn har vært Deputy Chief of Staff i etterretning i ISAF i et drøyt halvår, og før det var han Director of Intelligence i Pentagon. Grunnen til at sitatet ovenfor er interessant i vår sammenheng, er at det representerer to grunnleggende sannheter om erfaringslæring. Den første er at slike selvkritiske og fundamentale revurderinger av strategien som Flynn her tar til orde for er veldig sjelden. De er veldig krevende å gjennomføre, og man skal lete lenge i norske erfaringsrapporter for å finne slike fundamentale vurderinger, som går på om man gjør det riktige i Afghanistan, og i hvilken grad de norske bidragene bidrar til å fremme de overordnede målsettingene for operasjonen.

Den andre sannheten er at Flynn har jobbet i amerikansk etterretning i over 30 år, og har hatt gode mulighet til å påvirke den amerikanske etterretningsstrategien i Afghanistan de siste åtte årene. Likevel er det først nå at artikkelen kommer. Jeg kjenner ikke forhistorien bak denne artikkelen. Det kan godt hende at Flynn har forsøkt å fremme sine synspunkter internt uten å bli hørt og at offentliggjøringen var en siste utvei for å få fram et viktig budskap. Poenget mitt er at amerikansk etterretning selvfølgelig har lært av sine erfaringer de siste åtte årene, men likevel er det dessverre slik at vi gjerne lærer innenfor den forståelsesrammen vi har fra før; vi lærer på en måte det vi allerede kan fra før. Erfaringslæring påvirkes derfor sterkt av den rådende kulturen i organisasjonen og det man kan kalle de rådende forestillinger.

Lærdommene vi trekker fra det vi gjør i Afghanistan, er ikke objektive sannheter som venter på å bli avdekket. De er i siste instans politiske ettersom det vi anser som lærdommer fra Afghanistan, vil være med på å forme de valgene

vi tar med hensyn til hvordan Forsvaret skal se ut de neste 20 årene. Hvilke lærdommer som skal trekkes fra erfaringene i Afghanistan, vil man derfor være uenige om innen forsvarsgrenene, mellom de ulike forsvarsgrenene, og mellom Forsvaret og det politiske nivået.

Når vi snakker om lærdommene fra Afghanistan, snakker vi ofte om at erfaringene og lærdommene ligger der, det er bare å finne dem. Mitt syn er imidlertid at lærdommene alltid vil være omstridt. I sin artikkel hevder Flynn at det største problemet for å få til en god erfaringslæring er kultur, holdninger og menneskene som gjør jobben. Han hevder at amerikansk etterretning bare er interessert i informasjon om fienden, og at man der ser bort ifra den enorme informasjonen som finnes om den øvrige afghanske befolkningen. Ifølge Flynn er etterretningen heller ikke opptatt av om den informasjonen som fremskaffes, faktisk er nyttig for de som skal ta beslutningene. De er derimot opptatt av hemmelighold, og er heller ikke særlig opptatt av effekten av det de faktisk gjør. Noen slike kulturelle skylapper finnes også i det norske forsvaret, og det preger måten vi lærer av våre erfaringer på.

Når det gjelder den nære historien for erfaringslæring i Forsvaret, vil jeg si at det fram til midten av 1990-tallet ikke fantes noen interesse i Forsvaret for å lære av de erfaringene folk gjorde i operasjoner utenlands. Det ble ansett for å være irrelevant, siden disse erfaringene ikke kunne brukes i en krigssituasjon hjemme i Norge, noe som da ble ansett for å være Forsvarets hovedoppgave. Selv om mange av dem som kom hjem fra for eksempel Libanon, hevdet de hadde lært mer der enn de hadde gjort gjennom mange år på en norsk base, skjedde det lite eller ingen erfaringslæring. Norge deltok i viktige verdensbegivenheter i Somalia og på Balkan, men vi finner nesten ingen spor av disse operasjonene i Forsvaret i dag.

Dette endret seg da Nato engasjerte seg på Balkan i siste halvdel av 1990-tallet. I Norge oppdaget man da at styrker som i utgangspunktet skulle ha kort reaksjonstid, ikke hadde det, eller at styrker som ble sendt til operasjonsområdet, måtte trenes fordi de ikke kunne erklæres for operative idet de ankom. Læringskurvene gjennom en slags «learning by doing» var på dette tidspunktet ganske bratte, men interessen for erfaringslæring i Forsvaret generelt var fortsatt ganske begrenset.

Etter 11. september og etter at Norge begynte å delta i Afghanistan, har dette endret seg betydelig, og det er nå stor interesse for hva som foregår i Afghanistan i hele Forsvaret. Likevel har vi en vei å gå før vi har fått institusjonalisert en erfaringslæring som gjennomsyrrer hele organisasjonen. Det er fortsatt mange i Forsvaret som ser på det vi utfører ute som noe vi gjør i påvente av det vi egentlig skal gjøre, og dermed vurderer den kompetansen

man får ute opp mot det man anser som Forsvarets egentlige oppgaver. Andre igjen ser motsatt på det, og mener at det vi gjør i Afghanistan i dag, er det Forsvaret primært skal drive med og derfor det vi primært trenger kompetanse på.

Det er to grunnleggende syn på hvordan erfaringslæring skjer. Det ene går på at læringen skjer gjennom formaliserte prosedyrer, hvor man trekker læring ut fra erfaringsrapporter, og deretter kanaliserer lærdommen til andre deler av Forsvaret og på den måten genererer en slags loop fra ute til hjemme, og deretter til ute igjen. Det andre grunnleggende motsatte synet er at læring skjer gjennom praksisfellesskap. I henhold til dette synet bearbeider man og snakker om opplevelser ute, og tar med seg erfaringene hjem hvor man fortsetter å snakke om sine erfaringer med nye kolleger, og på den måten skjer erfaringslæringen både hos den enkelte som har erfart noe og i hans eller hennes omgivelser. Etter dette synet har man aldri én enkeltstående erfaring som ligger fast, men erfaringene bearbeides derimot hele tiden. Hvis man ti år etter at man var i Afghanistan får spørsmål om hva som var det viktigste man lærte, så vil svaret kanskje være noe helt annet enn det man svarte rett etter at man kom hjem.

Generelt tror jeg at veldig mye av erfaringslæringen i Forsvaret skjer gjennom praksisfellesskap, og at det ikke skjer så mye gjennom formaliserte prosedyrer. Jeg tror også Forsvaret er ganske gode på læring gjennom praksisfellesskap. Problemet er imidlertid at man da ikke kan løfte fram lærdommene og la de gjennomgå de fundamentale drøftingene lik den vi har sett Flynn foreta i USA. Vi lærer ganske snevert og kortsiktig fra én kontingent til en annen, selv om vi gjør dette ganske bra. Mentorering, besøksreiser og overlapp er derfor mye viktigere for læring enn skriftlige rapporter.

Når det gjelder den vide og langsiktige læringen til resten av Forsvaret, tror jeg det skjer mye hos selve styrkeprodusentene, mens det er skjer mindre innenfor utdanning, doktrine og konseptutvikling. Prosessen bak skrivingen av 2007-utgaven av Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine var for eksempel i liten grad erfaringsbasert. Når det gjelder langtidsplanleggerne i Forsvarsdepartementet, tror jeg faktisk de er litt bekymret for at vi skal bli for opphengt i de kortsiktige lærdommene rettet mot det vi skal produsere til neste kontingent, og på den måten mister av syne et mer helhetlig og overordnet perspektiv på Forsvaret. Uansett tror jeg det er korrekt å si at Forsvaret mangler en institusjonell hukommelse som det vil være interessant å ta fram igjen og lese om 10 til 20 år.

Hva lærer så egentlig Forsvaret av Afghanistan-erfaringene? På bakgrunn i erfaringsrapportene fra Afghanistan vil jeg si at de skriftlige lærdommene

hovedsakelig dreier seg om hvorvidt den misjonsspesifikke treningen var god eller dårlig, om materiellet fungerte som det skulle, og om samhandlingen med Forsvaret hjemme fungerte som den skulle. Det som derimot ofte mangler i erfaringsrapportene, er spørsmål som «Hva oppnår vi med det vi gjør?», «Opererer vi på riktig måte?», og så videre. Selvkritikk er svært, svært sjelden, og vi får stort sett inntrykk av at operasjonene har vært en suksess. Det er dessuten få afghanere og ingen kvinner som omtales i rapportene, og enkelte ganger står det i klartekst at: «Mellommenneskelige relasjoner vil ikke bli omtalt.» På dette området tror jeg det er en veldig stor diskrepans mellom den skriftlige og den muntlige erfaringslæringen.

Jeg tror det er mange ulike årsaker til dette. En viktig grunn er at vi har en sterk muntlig kultur og nokså svak skriftlig kultur i Forsvaret. Erfaringslæringen skjer gjennom praksisfellesskap og er i all hovedsak muntlig. Dette er vel og bra, men det er dermed vanskelig å vite hva den konkret består av, og derfor vanskelig å forholde seg kritisk til den. Kanskje kunne intervjuer med hjemkomne soldater og offiserer fra Afghanistan gitt oss en mye rikere erfaringsbase. Basen måtte riktignok vært gradert, men den kunne likevel gitt oss veldig interessante rådata.

Som sagt lærer man det man kan fra før, og i hele Forsvaret er høyintensitetsoperasjoner det man først og fremst skal kunne. Alt man lærer blir vurdert i forhold til det, og man fokuserer dermed på ting som at man er god til, som å finne og drepe Taliban, mens man blir lite opptatt av hvordan man kan finne ut av hva befolkningen i Afghanistan egentlig synes om den innsatsen man gjør, rett og slett fordi kulturen man har med seg, har et helt annet fokus. Jeg har lest mange erfaringsrapporter som sier at vi må bli bedre på å skyte, men har ennå til gode å lese en erfaringsrapport som sier at vi må bli bedre på å forstå afghansk kultur.

De norske rapportene er preget av en positiv tone hvor det vektlegges at man har gjort en god innsats. Eventuelle ting som har gått galt tillegges gjerne sivile aktører eller allierte styrker. Det kan godt hende at det generelle bildet er korrekt, men jeg savner likevel et selvkritisk fokus, selv om jeg har forståelse for at kulturen i Forsvaret ikke legger opp til dette i den formaliserte rapporteringen.

Det er mye lettere å måle det man gjør enn *effekten* av det man gjør i denne typen operasjoner. På grunn av at det er svært vanskelig å måle effekt blir det lett til at man snakker om det man gjør i stedet for å stille spørsmål ved om man gjør det riktige. Utydelige politiske målsettinger gjør i tillegg at hver aktør kan forfølge sine egne målsettinger – enten det er å utvikle militære ferdigheter eller å bygge skoler for kvinner. Det er derfor ikke noe sterkt press, verken

på politisk eller militært nivå, for å få til en overordnet læring av erfaringene til norske styrker i Afghanistan. Man kan lære innenfor den problemstillingen man er opptatt av, men det kan være noe helt ganske enn det som er operasjonens overordnede målsetninger.

Det er dessuten begrenset politisk interesse for erfaringslæring fra Afghanistan, rett og slett fordi det norske politiske miljøet i mange tilfeller utviser en slående mangel på interesse for selv operasjonene. Alt i alt er kan det virke som at Afghanistan ikke er viktig nok for Norge, og at vi derfor strengt tatt ikke trenger å lære av det vi gjør for å sikre at vi lykkes i den operasjonen vi er involvert i. Norsk sikkerhet avhenger ikke av hva som skjer i Afghanistan, og vi kan derfor tillate oss å la være å stille spørsmål ved hvorvidt et valgt operasjonskonsept bidrar til å nå de overordnede målene i operasjonen.

Avslutningsvis vil jeg gjenta at lærdommene fra Afghanistan ikke er objektive sannheter som kan avdekkes, men at lærdommer er omstridte og i siste instans politiske. Hva slags lærdommer vi sitter igjen med, vil ha innflytelse på hvilket forsvar vi skal ha de neste 20 årene. Dette perspektivet mangler ofte i Forsvarets håndtering av erfaringslæring.

Hva har Luftforsvaret lært etter åtte år i Afghanistan?

Major Dag Henriksen

Vi har så langt i seminaret hørt en rekke gode foredrag om den kompleksiteten som preger Afghanistan, og de utfordringene ISAF har stått overfor de senere årene. Vi har hørt ulike perspektiver, vurderinger og lærdommer knyttet til måten NATO opererer på, og hvordan amerikanerne ser for seg luftmaktens muligheter og begrensninger i tiden fremover. I mitt foredrag vil jeg forsøke å knytte dette til et norsk luftmaktsperspektiv. Mitt utgangspunkt er å innlede til en diskusjon her i salen, i et forsøk på å synliggjøre styrker og svakheter ved Luftforsvarets evne til å tilegne seg, behandle og distribuere erfaringslærdom/kunnskap, slik at vi mest mulig effektivt evner å bygge relevant kompetanse til fremtidige operasjoner. For hva har egentlig Luftforsvaret lært etter åtte år i Afghanistan?

La meg først begynne med noen av de erfaringene USA har gjort de siste fem årene. Som den mest toneangivende premissleverandøren innen militærmakt og luftmakt, for Norge og NATO, kan det være nyttig å gi et riss av de utfordringene vår mest ressurssterke alliansepartner har erkjent, for å se om disse har gyldighet også i Norge.

Den kanskje mest kraftfulle erfaringen har USA fått i Irak. David Kilcullen har påpekt essensen av hva mange observatører mente om USAs invasjon av Irak: «[...] the [Iraqi] war, in grand-strategic terms, was a deeply misguided and counterproductive undertaking, an extremely severe strategic error, and a model of exactly how not to do business.»¹ Det ble da også klart for amerikanerne at situasjonen ble «ugrei» både politisk og militært i årene som fulgte. Militært blant annet fordi – som Andrew J. Bacevich, professor i historie ved Boston University, argumenterte i 2006 – motstanderen hadde funnet en rekke teknikker for å underminere USAs/Vestens åpenbare militære høyteknologiske fordeler. Bacevich konkluderte: «The sun has set on the age

1 D. Kilcullen (2009) *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, Oxford University Press, s. 117.

of unquestioned Western military dominance. Bluntly, the East has solved the riddle of the Western way of war.»²

Ingen har, så vidt jeg vet, vært klarere på de militære utfordringene dette medførte for USA enn US Army & US Marine Corps (USMC). I *Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24)*, U.S. Army og U.S. Marine Corps doktrine for *counterinsurgency* (COIN), påpekes det i innledningen: «The sad fact is that when an insurgency began in Iraq in late summer of 2003, the Army was unprepared to fight it. The American Army of 2003 was organized, designed, trained, and equipped to defeat another conventional army.»³ FM 3-24 var USAs første doktrine innen *counterinsurgency* på over 20 år da den kom ut, og interessant for Luftforsvaret i denne sammenheng er doktrinens forord som argumenterer for at

*the most important contribution of the manual is likely to be its role as a catalyst in the process of making the Army and Marine Corps more effectively learning organizations that are better able to adapt to the rapidly changing nature of modern counterinsurgency campaigns.*⁴

En erkjenner altså at (1) denne type krig (COIN) var en ikke forberedt på, (2) krigens karakter i denne type operasjoner endrer seg raskt, noe som gjør at organisasjonen må være tilpasningsdyktig, og (3) en nøkkel til å få til denne organisasjonsendringen og tilpasningsdyktigheten ligger i å bli en *bedre lærende organisasjon*.

US Air Force synes å ha vært litt langsommere i sin tilpasning til denne type operasjoner, men erkjennelsen av behovet for en fundamental endring av organisasjonen synes nokså likt US Army/USMC. Da jeg jobbet i ISAFs hovedkvarter i Kabul høsten 2007, kom jeg i kontakt med oberstløytnant William E. «Bill» Pinter, som den gang var sjef for strategidivisjonen (Director, Strategy Division) i United States Central Command Air Forces (AFCENT), Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC) i Qatar – luftoperasjonssenteret som styrer store deler av luftoperasjonene i Afghanistan og Irak. Pinter sendte meg utkastet til en rapport som hans avdeling hadde utarbeidet ved årsskiftet 2007/2008, og som argumenterte følgende:

2 A.J. Bacevich (2006) «The Islamic Way of War», i: *The American Conservative*, 11. september 2006. Lastet ned 15. januar 2010 fra <http://www.amconmag.com/article/2006/sep/11/00007/>

3 The U.S. Army/Marine Corps (2007) *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, University of Chicago Press, s. xiii.

4 Ibid, s. xvii.

The US Air Force needs to reassess its capabilities across the spectrum of conflict and recognize the limitations resident within its current force construct towards irregular warfare (IW) [...]. US Air Force doctrine and theatre command and control were designed to defeat conventional forces and field armies in major combat operations (MCO) [...]. Simply put, the US Air Force has not developed a comprehensive strategy [that] directly addresses how the US Air Force should organize, train and equip, and employ forces in irregular warfare and counter-insurgency environments.⁵

Mye av tenkningen i denne rapporten ble videreført av Pinter i en forskningsrapport han sendte inn til US Air War College ved US Air University. (For denne forskningsrapporten mottok Pinter US Air University Foundation's (AUF) pris for beste bidrag i 2009, «for [an] outstanding paper on the joint employment of airpower in support of national military strategy».)⁶ I denne rapporten argumenterer Pinter:

US Air Force doctrine and theatre command and control were designed to defeat conventional forces and field armies in MCO. To date, this has resulted in a series of numerous, often ad hoc innovations as Airmen make every effort to adapt (...) this, for the most part, has been an adaptation out of tactical necessity rather than by operational or strategic design. The current outcome is a system that continually seeks improvement in tactical effectiveness at the margins while ignoring the potential for substantial improvements in tactical and operational effectiveness and even more dramatic improvements in efficiencies that a more comprehensive review could enable.⁷

Jeg opplever at Pinter peker på et system eller en bedriftskultur i USAF som er identisk med det Kongelige Norske Luftforsvar. Fokuset ligger i hovedsak på taktisk nivå. Vi er meget gode praktiske utøvere av luftmakt, vi er ofte fleksible og «strikker det til» mens vi går, og vi evner på en god måte å identifisere og videreformidle læring innad i de taktiske enhetene (NAD, jagerflymiljøet, osv). Jeg tror for øvrig dette er hovedutfordringen til *luftmaktsmiljøet*, snarere enn et spesifikt norsk eller amerikansk fenomen. Operasjonelt og strategisk

5 United States Central Command Air Forces (2007) "Balancing the Force: Improving Air Force Combat Capabilities and Theater Command and Control for Major Combat Operations and Irregular Warfare», i: *White Paper*, 5. desember 2007, Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar: Combined Air Operations Center, Strategy Division, United States Central Command Air Forces, s. 1–3.

6 Hjemmesiden til US Air War College. Lastet ned 20. januar 2010 fra <http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:NUn8XfdCHS0J:www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awards.htm+%22William+E.+pinter%22+%22USAF%22+%22Award%22&cd=1&hl=no&ct=clnk&gl=no>

7 W.E. Pinter (2009) *Air-Ground Integration in the 21st Century: Improving Air Force Combat Capabilities and Theatre Command and Control for Major Combat Operations and Irregular Warfare*, 12. februar, en forskningsrapport innlevert til Air War College, Air University.

nivå er på en måte «noe annet», noe litt «abstrakt» og «teoretisk» på en måte, som i mindre grad angår oss. Som Pinter indikerer, har en langt på vei ignorert eller ikke tatt tilstrekkelig på alvor de strategiske utfordringene en står overfor, hvor en bedre strategisk tilnærming til konflikten har potensial til å øke effekten på taktisk og operasjonelt nivå i betydelig grad.

Dette preger da også vårt (Luftforsvarets) fokus. På forkurset til Stabsskolen i juni 2009 hadde vi flere orienteringer fra ulike fagkontor på Rygge Flystasjon – blant annet en orientering fra jagerflykontoret. Etter to timer var alle klar over at utfordringen verken var hvordan Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) som plattform hadde en sensorpakke som til sammen kunne gi helt åpenbare gevinster på alle nivå (taktisk, operasjonelt, strategisk) av krigen, eller hvordan JSF kunne bidra med informasjon som gjorde at luftforsvaret som system kunne forløse større deler av sitt samlede potensial – den store utfordringen fremover fremstod å være *hjelmsikte* og hvordan vi skulle få tilgang på den sist utviklede teknologien på området. Det var for øvrig ikke et perspektiv jagerflykontoret var alene om. I den grad det var en rød tråd i de respektive fagkontorenes fremlegg i juni 2009, så var det at (a) vi har et taktisk fokus, og (b) den helhetlige tilnærmingen for vår organisasjons samlede leveranse av luftmakt er meget begrenset. Dette er med andre ord ikke en bransjemessig utfordring, slik jeg ser det. Det er et uttrykk for én sentral dimensjon ved vår bedriftskultur.

Selv om dette er noe vi skal diskutere grundigere på lederskapsseminaret ved Luftkrigsskolen høsten 2010, så handler dette i betydelig grad *også* om organisasjonens lederutvelgelse og fokus, som i for stor grad har ligget på det taktiske og militærmaktens fysiske utøvende nivå. Dette er ikke begrenset til jagerflymiljøet – en har de samme strukturene innen helikopter, Orion, kontroll og varsling, luftvern mfl. Det har bidratt til at vi ofte har meget kompetente avdelinger/strukturelementer på taktisk nivå, noe som er en stor styrke ved vår organisasjon. Overordnet tenkning om luftmakt på operasjonelt og strategisk nivå har imidlertid ikke mottatt samme interesse. Dette er en *lederutfordring*. Det blir kompetansemessig ubalanse av slikt, for nivåene er uløselig sammenbundet. Det spiller ingen rolle om en er taktisk verdensmester i å plassere bomber presist, hvis ikke organisasjonen har kompetanse til å ha en klok helhetlig intensjon med, og effekt av, oppdraget.

Pinter skriver altså at læring, endring og tilpasning i US Air Force skjer hovedsakelig som en taktisk nødvendighet snarere enn som et produkt av en helhetlig tilnærming. US Air Force er langt svakere, påpeker Pinter, på å identifisere, forstå og implementere lærdom på det *operasjonelle* og *strategiske* nivået. Det er kanskje spesielt uheldig, fordi det ofte er nettopp der det er viktigst å trekke lærdommer for å lykkes militært.

Å identifisere, forstå og implementere lærdom på det *operasjonelle* og *strategiske* nivået er heller ingen paradegren i det Kongelige Norske Luftforsvar. Kanskje kan dette blant annet forklares med vår litt særegne bedriftskultur og lederutvelgelse. Vi velger lederne våre hovedsakelig fra flygermiljøet. I større grad enn andre fagfelt i Forsvaret, er det å fly et ønske og en ambisjon i seg selv. Så vi flyr gjerne til vi er 40, ofte uten at fokuset i tilstrekkelig grad har vært balansert opp mot overordnede doktriner, fellesoperativ planlegging eller strategisk tenkning. Kanskje kan dette blant annet forklares med at vår militære organisasjon i nokså lang tid har vært formet av *den kalde krigen*, hvor en definert motstander skulle møtes i et relativt konkret scenario. Hvordan «de samme flyene» skulle skape effekt på Balkan eller i Afghanistan, har gitt en del ekstra dimensjoner som vi har hatt problemer med å håndtere. Desto større grunn er det til å velge ledere og skape en organisasjon med sterkere fokus på å håndtere den operasjonelle og strategiske kompleksiteten som det medfører.

Jeg mener det er en sentral utfordring for vår organisasjon å inkludere nettopp dette nivået i vår tenkning rundt hvordan vi skal forløse luftmaktens potensial: Hvordan kan vi få en mer balansert og helhetlig tilnærming til vår primærleveranse – luftmakt? Vi *er* og *skal* være dyktige på taktisk nivå, men det handler om å utvikle en kompetanse som setter oss bedre i stand til å gjøre de riktige tingene – ikke bare å gjøre tingene riktig. Det er her US Air Force virker å innse at de er for svake, og det er her Luftforsvaret, etter mitt skjønn, også må sette inn ressurser. Vi har ikke i tilstrekkelig grad de strukturene som trengs for å identifisere, bearbeide og implementere lærdom i *bele* organisasjonen, og innen *alle* operative nivå.

Det er verdt å merke seg den utfordringen dette synes å representere for *bele* luftmaktsmiljøet. USA er enerådende med hensyn til å ha tilgang på hele spekteret av virkemidler luftmakten kan tilby, og fremstår som den eneste med kompetanse til å utnytte hele spekteret. En helt sentral luftmilitær kilde i ISAFs hovedkvarter i Kabul høsten 2007 (jeg kan ikke bruke navnet fordi vedkommende ikke har autorisert sitatet), påpekte at vi i de respektive luftforsvar ikke har tilstrekkelig innsikt til selv å kombinere og utnytte de samlede luftmaktressursene i krigen mot opprørerne i Afghanistan. Teknologien ligger foran vår evne til å utnytte den. Vi er ofte gode fagfolk innen våre respektive fagområder, men evner ikke å formidle potensialet til de andre våpengrenene – sannsynligvis fordi vi har fokusert for lite på å forstå denne helheten selv og følgelig ikke forstår det fulle potensialet til vår egen våpengren – «which is quite a depressing thought», som vedkommende offiser konkluderte.

Luftkommandøren i ISAF i 2007, generalmajor Freek Meulman, påpekte

i 2007 at det i all hovedsak var nærstøtte til bakkestyrker (CAS) som var den etterspurte effekten i Afghanistan, og at «we have to fight every day for a place around the table in order to broaden the perspectives on how airpower can best be utilized».⁸ Sentrale aktører indikerer med andre ord at det er en utfordring å erverve tilstrekkelig forståelse for egen våpengrens potensial, og evnen/muligheten til å formidle dette potensialet til de øvrige våpengrenene i en fellesoperativ ramme. Liknende signaler kommer fra generalsnivået i NATO i dag, som ifølge oberst Jan Ove Rygg (CAOC 1, Danmark) er bekymret for luftkomponentens rolle og innflytelse internt i NATO – en rolle og innflytelse som kan bli ytterligere redusert i fremtiden dersom relevant luftmaktkompetanse ikke er tilgjengelig.⁹ Større helhetsforståelse for luftmaktens muligheter og begrensninger – vårt eget kompetanseområde – synes å bli viktig i årene som kommer.

Et sentralt spørsmål for oss blir sannsynligvis hvilken ambisjon Norge som en småstat skal ha, og hvilke konsekvenser det får for hva Luftforsvaret skal fokusere på. La oss ta et konkret eksempel av stor betydning for luftmaktsmiljøet. *Luftmaktvisjon 2025* skal etter eget utsagn være Luftforsvarets grunnlag for utvikling av luftmakt i fremtiden. Den er nokså konkret i sin målsetting: «Luftmakt på rett sted, til rett tid, med rett effekt.» Å levere rett effekt har vært den sentrale ambisjonen for luftmaktsmiljøet i drøyt 100 år, men hvordan vi kan lykkes med dette har vært diskutert og problematisert minst like lenge – uten at det ennå er noen enighet om konklusjonen. General James N. Mattis, sjefen for U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), gikk eksempelvis langt i å likvidere det begrepet som i luftmaktsmiljøet har vært sentralt i snart 20 år, da han i 2008 uttalte: «It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and over-extended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.»¹⁰

Det man imidlertid synes enige om det siste århundret, er at *targeting* er helt sentralt. Luftmakt kan, som kjent, i liten grad holde terreng, og vil i visse scenarioer være avhengig av å levere våpen mot mål på bakken for å oppnå ønsket effekt (selv om begrepet *targeting* inneholder en rekke komponenter som kan gi effekt – ikke bare fysisk ødeleggelse). Sammenhengen mellom kampfly og effekt vil i en rekke scenarioer være nettopp *targeting* – i en slik grad at eksempelvis en ikke ukjent luftmaktshistoriker, Philip S. Meilinger, hevder at

8 Intervju med general Freck Meulman, ISAFs hovedkvarter i Kabul, Afghanistan, 24. november 2007.

9 Telefonintervju med oberst Jan Ove Rygg, 11. januar 2010.

10 J.N. Mattis (2008) «Memorandum for U.S. Joint Force Command», Washington D.C.: Department of Defence, 14. august 2008, s. 1.

luftmakt *er* targetting: «In essence, airpower is targetting, targetting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations.»¹¹

Nå ser det ut som om Luftforsvaret vil få et strålende nytt kampfly: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Det har imidlertid over tid vært betydelig mindre interesse for å utvikle kompetanse på det å skape effekt, den andre delen av likningen, nemlig targetting. Ifølge targetting-miljøet, har noen toneangivende offiserer de siste årene uttrykt alt fra at *dette skal vi ikke drive med*, til mer retoriske spørsmål som *bør vi egentlig drive med targetting?*

Targetting-miljøet selv føler seg svært stemoderlig behandlet, noe som i klare ordelag ble uttrykt da tidligere nevnte forkurs (LUFO) til Stabsskolen besøkte Forsvarets Operative Hovedkvarter (FOHK) i juni 2009. Ifølge en av de som jobber med targetting, er kompetansemiljøet i Norge over tid redusert til en svært liten gruppe, og to nærmer seg pensjonsalder. Hvor mange som til slutt vil bli med til Bodø (FOH), er usikkert. Argumentene mot å bygge opp kompetanse innen targetting synes å være at vi på nasjonalt nivå bare skal ha en kapasitet som ivaretar scenarioer på et meget begrenset krisehåndteringsnivå, hvor targetting i liten grad er relevant. Skulle krigen komme, er det andre og større NATO-hovedkvarter innen rammen av en artikkel 5-operasjon som vil ivareta behovet for targetting.

Det er ikke min hensikt å gå inn i en diskusjon rundt stillingshjemler på FOH. Mitt poeng er å slå fast at targetting er *helt* sentralt innen fagområdet luftmakt, og at det vil bli en voldsom ubalanse i vår forståelse av primærleveransen vår – luftmakt – dersom vi ikke kontinuerlig bygger og ivaretar kunnskap om (a) hva vi ønsker å oppnå, (b) hvorfor, og (c) i hvilken grad effekten i ettertid er i samsvar med intensjonene. Det burde være tilnærmet *utenkelig* for en kompetanseinstitusjon som Luftforsvaret å akseptere det. Sender vi seks F-16 til Afghanistan, basert på det som våre nære alliansepartnere har droppet av våpen der nede tidligere, vil vi kunne ta utgangspunkt i at vi grovt sett omtrentlig dropper én bombe om dagen i snitt. Det er direkte umoralsk, naturligvis, dersom vi ikke har som ambisjon å forstå intensjonen (hvorfor) og konsekvensen (effekt) av de bombene vi slipper, og de livene vi tar. Når en fra samfunnets side er betrodd å forvalte et av de kraftigste militære maktmidlene som er tilgjengelig, så er en naturligvis moralsk forpliktet til å forstå hvordan maktmidlet best kan benyttes – ut over å taktisk transportere sprengstoffet fra A til B.

Som tidligere nevnt vil noen kanskje argumentere for at en i et nasjonalt

11 P.S. Meilinger (1995) *Ten Propositions regarding Airpower*, Washington D.C.: Air Force History and Museum Program.

perspektiv skal bruke kampfly i *luft-til-luft*-rollen. I de tilfeller hvor de skal brukes i *luft-til-bakke*-rollen, er dette hovedsakelig i en internasjonal kontekst, og da vil amerikanere og andre NATO-allierte ivareta det operasjonelle og strategiske nivået – også targetting. Vi er en småstat og vil uansett ikke ha nevneverdig innflytelse.

La meg derfor forsøke å trekke opp et perspektiv rundt dette. Nederland, som en liten europeisk nasjon, har hatt seks F-16 i Afghanistan i flere år nå. I tillegg har de sendt bakkestyrker til Uruzgan i Regional Command South (RC-S). Innflytelsen i ISAF vil avhenge i betydelig grad av det styrkebidraget vi sender. Nederland hadde, til tross for å være en liten europeisk stat, stillingen som luftkommandør i ISAF i 2007 og 2008, ved henholdsvis general Meulman og general Eikelboom.

Hadde Norge bidratt med F-16 i Afghanistan, og latt spesialstyrkene operere i Sør – kanskje også med bidrag fra Telemarksbataljonen – ville vi sannsynligvis nokså raskt kunne fått tilbud om eller forhandlet frem svært sentrale stillinger i ISAF. Spørsmålet blir: Har vi et ambisjonsnivå og etablerte strukturer som sørger for at vi tilføres kompetanse i hele spekteret (taktisk, operasjonelt, strategisk), som gjør at vi har personell som er tilstrekkelig kompetent til å ivareta en slik posisjon? Vi kan vel, som et minimum, kanskje bli bedre?

Høsten 2009 fikk Tyskland et ublidt møte med konsekvensen av feilbombing. Det som fremstår som dårlig militært og politisk håndverk, har medført at Oberst Kleins beslutning om å ta ut en tankbil nær Kunduz i Nord-Afghanistan ikke bare forarget Commander ISAF, general McChrystal, på grunn av antall sivile som ble drept i angrepet, men har siden ført til at sjefen for den tyske hæren og den tyske forsvarsministeren har måttet gå av.¹² Mitt poeng er at vi kan få stillinger som setter oss i en posisjon til å ta slike beslutninger, og det innebærer en betydelig kompetanse og forståelse av Afghanistan, COIN-operasjoner, krigens natur og kompleksitet, samt den politiske konteksten man opererer innenfor – hovedtemaer for dette seminaret. Dette er en type kompetanse vi i liten grad erverver på taktisk nivå i Luftforsvaret.

Det er ikke mer enn drøyt ti år siden vi hadde en oberst i samme posisjon som oberst Klein, og som daglig foretok valg om hvem skulle leve og dø i

12 N. Blome, J. Meyer og J. Reichelt (2009) «How Afghan bombing scandal was covered up in Germany», Bild.com, 4. desember 2009. Lastet ned 15. januar 2010 fra <http://www.bild.de/BILD/news/bild-english/world-news/2009/11/27/kunduz-air-strike/how-deadly-afghan-bombing-scandal-covered-up-in-germany.html>; N. Kulish (2009) «German Minister Resigns Over Afghan Airstrike», The New York Times, 27. november 2009. Lastet ned 15. januar 2010 fra http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/28/world/europe/28germany.html?_r=1

Serbia – basert på hvilken effekt vi ønsket å oppnå. Vedkommende opplevde situasjoner hvor blant annet NATO, basert på hans beslutning, endte opp med å feilbombe et sivilt tog med påfølgende tap av sivile liv. Mitt poeng er naturligvis ikke å henge ut vedkommende, som de fleste observatører hevder gjorde en imponerende jobb i CAOC Vicenza (Italia), men å vise at vi for relativt kort tid siden hadde en slik posisjon, og kan få den igjen. Det er med andre ord ikke et abstrakt fantasiscenario på noen måte – det kan skje raskt.

Spørsmålet er om vi har strukturer som ivaretar en kompetansebygging som setter oss i stand til å løse slike oppgaver på en fullgod måte under de rådende forutsetningene i Afghanistan. Har vi strukturer som forløser potensialet for læring på en tilstrekkelig god måte? Det er i et slikt perspektiv vi må vurdere hvorvidt vi har lyktes i å identifisere, bearbeide og distribuere erfaringene fra Afghanistan til de delene av Luftforsvarets organisasjon som trenger det. Jeg tror vi har en jobb å gjøre, spesielt innen tenkning/forståelse på operasjonelt og strategisk nivå, altså det som skal skape en helhetlig og balansert projeksjon av luftmakt.

Jeg kan ikke avslutte dette innlegget før jeg har kommentert Forsvarets utdanningssystem. I høst diskuterte vi internt på luftmaktsavdelingen hvem som egentlig tenker og formidler luftmaktsrelaterte erfaringer fra Afghanistan. Vi var usikre. Noen dager senere kom det en e-post fra oberst Jan Ove Rygg ved CAOC 1 i Danmark, som lurte på om det ikke var på tide at Luftforsvaret tok opp følgende spørsmål:

Hvilken luftmakt produserer Luftforsvaret, hvor produseres det, og på hvilket nivå? Hvordan organiserer Luftforsvaret seg – og hvordan disponerer de sitt personell for å bygge luftmaktskompetanse på alle nivå – fra taktisk til strategisk nivå?¹³

Svaret er vel noe i nærheten av at «dette har vi *egentlig* ikke noen gode helhetlige strukturer for å ivareta». Luftkrigsskolen har gått over til å levere en 3-årig bachelorutdanning. Luftkrigsskolens 2. avdeling (LKSK II) eksisterer ikke lenger. Der en tidligere fikk dykke ned og problematisere luftmakt blant personell med operativ erfaring, er hovedtyngden av dagens kadetter 22–24 år. Riktignok har vi tilvekst av personell med operativ erfaring på bachelorstudiets andre år, men det er likevel ugreit å problematisere for mye når majoriteten ofte ikke har nevneverdig operativ erfaring. Vi har på en måte slått KS II og KS I sammen til en 3-årig utdanning, og slått de erfarne sammen med

13 E-post fra oberst Jan Ove Rygg, oktober 2009.

de uerfarne. Hvorfor vi har gjort *det*, og ikke beholdt KS II, er uforståelig ut fra et kunnskapsperspektiv.

Dette temaet kunne blitt et eget foredrag, men poenget mitt her er at majoriteten av de som uteksamineres fra Luftkrigsskolen, nå er ca. 25 år. Etter det er det *lite luftmakt* og *marginalt med lederskap* resten av karrieren innen det formelle utdanningsløpet. Jeg går selv stabsskolen nå, og det er uforståelig at den siste formelle utdanningsinstitusjonen før du blir topplerer i Forsvaret, *ikke* inneholder lederskap.

Luftmakt inngår naturligvis i planleggingen av fellesoperasjoner, men fokuset ligger på planleggingsverktøy, planleggingsprosesser, begrepsavklaring og forståelse av det fellesoperative nivåets fokus og oppgaver. Luftkomponenten er følgelig bare 1 av 15 stillinger som skulle fylles i planleggingsgruppene (Joint Operational Planning Group), på linje med sivil-militært samarbeid (CIMIC), informasjonsoperasjoner, spesialoperasjoner, psykologiske operasjoner, kjønnsperspektiv (Gender) osv. Det er ingen kritikk av Stabsskolen som sådan, men et uttrykk for at utdanningssystemet vårt synes å ha blitt «flikket på» så lenge, at helheten har blitt mistet litt av syne. Det ligger ingen god helhetlig struktur der for å ivareta det oberst Rygg etterspør: Det bygges i liten grad luftmaktskompetanse i hele spekteret, på alle nivå.

Vi har naturligvis enkeltstående kurs på ulike steder. Targeting-kurs i Oberammergau, to-ukers luftkampanjekurs i USA osv. Viktige kurs, som komplementær kompetansebygging, men ikke viktige for selve forståelsen for luftmaktens mulighetsrom, for eksempel for hvordan luftmakt i COIN-operasjoner som i Irak eller Afghanistan skiller seg kvalitativt ut fra andre konflikter – hvordan luftmakt kan sys sammen med andre militære og sivile bidrag som til sammen medfører en helhetlig tilnærming til konflikten. Det blir mye «utsjekksregimer», og kursing på operatørnivå. Det er vårt taktiske fokus i praksis, og et viktig fokus, men det bør ikke være det eneste.

Menneskene er samfunnets, Forsvarets og Luftforsvarets i særklasse viktigste ressurs. Det er flott med JSF, vi trenger det, men hvor er hovedsatsingen på *effekt*? Det hadde vært noe, innimellom radarprosjekt, kampfly, transportfly og nye helikopter: «Prosjekt 78910 – hvordan skape effekt med luftmilitære virkemidler», med en budsjettamme på 30 millioner. I fravær av LKSK II og Stabsskole I hadde det kanskje vært en god idé å etablere personelletts «Mid-Life Update (MLU)» innen luftmaktsteori og effekt?

Kanskje ville det være et godt sted å starte å skape en arena som binder våre små fagmiljø sammen til en mer kraftfull læringsarena. Vi er et lite forsvar, og et enda mindre luftforsvar, og da har vi ikke råd til å operere så autonomt som fagmiljøene gjør nå. Luftforsvaret og Luftkrigsskolen har brukt 20 år på

å bygge opp Luftmaktsavdelingen til en avdeling som i dag *eksporterer* fag til NTNU, og ikke motsatt – som har vært situasjonen i mange år. Men Luftkrigsskolen har nesten ikke noe samarbeid med FOHK/FOH ut over at vi reiser på en studietur i ny og ne. Vi har svært lite faglig samarbeid med Stabsskolen, veldig lite med Forsvarsdepartementet, høyst sporadisk med Norwegian Battlelab and Experimentation (NOBLE) – og til tross for at relasjonene til Luftforsvarsstaben (LST) og spesielt Luftforsvarets Utdanningsinspektorat (LUI) har vært svært gode i mange år, så er det lite faglig samarbeid også med Luftoperativt Inspektorat (LOI) og LUI. Dette gjør at vi utnytter ressursene for dårlig. Vi gjør ikke hverandre så gode som vi kan. Luftkrigsskolen bør her være en av de første institusjonene som feier for egen dør, og innrømme at vi har vært for dårlige til nettopp dette. Kanskje har min kollega, Ole Jørgen Maaø, rett når han antyder at vi har blitt litt vel vant til å plaske rundt i vår «akademiske andedam»? Vi ville blitt styrket av et tettere samarbeid med de nevnte institusjoner, og kanskje kunne vi bidratt enda mer til Luftforsvaret?

Dette foredraget har som tittel «Hva har vi lært etter åtte år i Afghanistan?». Det viktigste svaret er kanskje at vi ikke har utnyttet potensialet vårt med hensyn til å identifisere, bearbeide og distribuere/implementere kunnskap og lærdom fra Afghanistan. Vi må bli bedre på å etablere strukturer som bedre ivaretar behovet for læring og kompetansebygging på alle nivå – ikke bare det taktiske. Dette er i så måte uavhengig av Afghanistan og dagens voldsomme fokus på COIN-operasjoner. Det handler om å skape strukturer for læring som gjør at vi relativt raskt kan tilpasse oss nye utfordringer. Som oberst Gary Crowder (USAF) påpekte for en tid siden: «[...] there really has not been a substantial [...] intellectual investment into what I think I would call air-ground integration looks like in the 21st Century», og han advarte samtidig mot at vi fokuserer for mye på irregulær krigføring fordi fremtiden er vanskelig å predikere.¹⁴

For dette er kanskje selve poenget – å sørge for å etablere de strukturer som gjør at vi blir en mer lærende, tilpasningsdyktig og fleksibel kunnskapsorganisasjon. Det vil si strukturer som bedre ivaretar behovet for kompetansesmessig balanse mellom det *taktiske*-, *operasjonelle*- og *strategiske* nivået for bedre å sikre en helhetlig tilnærming til primærleveransen *luftmakt*.

14 M. Weisgerber (2008) «Light-attack plane could save USAF billions in O&M, preserves fighters», *Inside the Air Force*, 4. april 2008. Lastet ned 15. januar 2010 fra <<http://integrator.hanscom.af.mil/2008/April/04102008/04102008-15.htm>>

DEL 4

Afghanistan, Quo Vadis?

Afghanistan and the Way Forward: An Afghan Perspective

Mrs. Manizha Bakhtari

Just nine years ago, Afghanistan was held hostage by extremists and was a staging ground for international terror. It was isolated from the international family of nations. Our people were denied fundamental human rights. In short, the chances of leading a normal life were unthinkable. Yet, with the collapse of the Taliban and its Al-Qaida associates, the people of Afghanistan were liberated from a brutal tyranny that was oppressing them. Thanks to our partners in the international community, we are today witnessing a new Afghanistan, one in which the ideals of democracy, freedom, liberty, and justice have prevailed despite all obstacles.

Looking back at the journey we began nine years ago, our achievements are obvious. Afghanistan is again among the responsible members of the international community. We continue to make steady progress in the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law as the foundation for our stability and prosperity. Significant progress has been made in sectors like independent media, health, education, and private investments. Today, 7 million Afghan boys and girls go to school, while 75,000 students study at 22 universities. We have now about 700 media outlets and about 20 TV broadcasters in Afghanistan. Freedom of speech is another achievement, and Afghan media today is free to express their views and opinions. We also have a vibrant civil society, where thousands of women work.

Despite this formidable transformation, big challenges remain. Terrorism and insecurity is still the most significant challenge in Afghanistan. The debate on why the international community has to be present in Afghanistan is welcome, and we think it is well worth having this debate. We understand that Western governments have trouble convincing their populace that the effort in Afghanistan is worth the cost. However, terrorism is not a challenge only in Afghanistan; it is a regional and even an international challenge. The struggle

in Afghanistan is therefore not only confined to that country, but to the entire world.

Afghanistan has been calling up on priorities that have to be taken into consideration. We seek international support based on our priorities, in partnership with our international allies. I prefer to refer to President Karzai, who in his inaugural speech established priorities regarding security and stabilization. He said that «defending our country and providing security for our nation is a duty for all Afghans.» Based on the state monopoly of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan over the defence and security forces of our country and other imperatives of national sovereignty, we want to organize and improve our national army and other security forces, both in quantitative and qualitative terms in consonance with the defensive needs of Afghanistan.

While there are substantial challenges to Afghanistan and her military partners to achieve these ambitions, I would like to point out and discuss some main subjects now. There is no doubt that peacebuilding in Afghanistan is impossible without any political solution. President Karzai has therefore established a peace- and reintegration program to promote peace through a political approach. In this program, all Afghan Taliban who are willing to lay down their arms and accept the constitution could join. A political solution is priority number one in Afghanistan, because we know from our experience that the conflict cannot be won by military means alone.

What does a political solution mean? First, it means that we should have a reconciliation and negotiation process with the Taliban. Who, then, are the Taliban? There are several definitions available. However, if we are to win this war, we must know our enemies. In my view, one of our problems is that we do not have a comprehensive definition about the Taliban. Some of us seem to think that the enemy is the Taliban, while others would say Al-Qaida. We therefore need an integrated definition of who exactly the Taliban are.

The Taliban includes local insurgent elements that are not happy with the Afghan government. However, there are also a lot of foreigners that support the Taliban, both financially and militarily. We should therefore separate between the different types of Taliban. Al-Qaida is definitely our enemy and must be fought. If we can have a reconciliation process with the local Taliban, however, then we can end this war. That is the reason why president Karzai has put forward the peace- and reconciliation program, which demands only two things of the Taliban: that they lay down their arms and accept the constitution. The Afghan constitution is very modern, and if all members of the Taliban accept it, the current conflict will be solved. That would isolate the foreign Al-Qaida, which then of course would have to be fought.

The second point is to build, train, and strengthen the Afghan security forces, so that they can gradually take on more responsibilities. Establishing a time-table for handing over responsibilities to local forces is a step forward to Afghan ownership and leadership of security operations. Through the international effort of the last nine years, more than 60% of operations in Afghanistan today is led by Afghans and supported by the international forces. We hope to establish professional national forces that all Afghans can take pride in and that can assume full responsibility for Afghan security at the earliest possible date. This will require at least 171,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers and 134,000 Afghan National Police (ANP) by October 2011. Enabling Afghans to secure their own country and building Afghanistan's security institutions, through training professional forces able to deal with terrorism, drugs, weak governmental institutions, and so forth, is a long-term task.

We hope to build a capable force of 400,000 men, but the long time needed to train all these men and develop the necessary infrastructure and leadership capabilities must be taken into consideration. However, it is important that a decision to build this force is made at an earliest possible date. We would like NATO to contribute in this process, by training, mentoring, and partnering Afghan national security forces. In all provinces, there will be more ANA and ANP forces, available due to the continuing growth of Afghan national security forces. This requires that more NATO troops are committed to training, mentoring, and partnering the new Afghan national security forces. With the help of the international community, we must also train and equip the ANP so that it can fulfil its police mission. We should construct the necessary facilities and provide the weapons and equipment needed to enable the ANP in all its activities.

Regarding this subject, I want to express that the Afghan government fully support the new strategy presented by president Obama, which involves sending more troops to Afghanistan. We need to intensify the war against the terrorist elements based in Afghanistan, and these troops will help us do that. However, in the long run, we need capable, well-trained Afghan national security forces that can take on the roles that the international troops are filling now. There are thousands of young Afghan men eager to join the national security forces, but the problem is that we have not been able to train all of them. We therefore need to continue the training and mentoring program. Also, we need a transitional period to transfer all the responsibilities to Afghan authorities.

The people of Afghanistan want to be able to build their own country. We certainly appreciate and need the support of the international community at

the moment, but that does not mean that Afghanistan should rely on this help indefinitely. Therefore, Afghanistan needs to build its own security forces and also rebuild its infrastructure, which was destroyed during the wars. What is most needed is not programs yielding quick results, but long-sighted, sustainable programs.

My third point is that we need to increase the coordination, both in terms of improving the effectiveness of financial aid from the international community, and in seeing to that the international forces act in accordance to interrelated needs the Afghan people have. All international development must be coordinated more closely. A comprehensive approach and an integrated strategy are required to achieve this.

As a fourth point, we need to enhance the mutual understanding and mutual responsibilities of the international community and the Afghan government. We need to do more to counter the enemy propaganda- and misinformation campaign and its ability to influence local and international media. We must work to increase public awareness of the government's and the international community's progress and achievements in Afghanistan. The international and Afghan national security forces are very important in this respect.

All programs and projects must contribute to increasing this awareness. The support and legitimacy of the government among the Afghan people will only increase if the people see that the government is capable of fulfilling their basic needs of food, shelter, clean water, health care, and provide them means of living. Afghans want to be governed in accordance with their customs and norms. Respect of different beliefs is therefore very important in order to win people's hearts and minds.

The fifth point is that protection of the population should be the utmost priority of any operation. Every effort must be made to further minimize civilian casualties. This has become the most contentious issue for the Afghan public as well as the Afghan government and the international forces. In the course of the past nine years, the international forces have caused numerous civilian casualties. According to a United Nations report, there were 2118 civilian Afghan casualties in 2008 alone; of these, 55% were killed by insurgents, while 39% were killed by American-led forces. The casualty figures for 2009 have probably increased, although they are not yet available.

The government of Afghanistan has continuously advised that the civilian casualties must be reduced, because the war will not be won on the battlefield alone, but also in the hearts and minds of the people. Reducing the number of civilian casualties must therefore be a top priority in all operations, because these casualties only serve to strengthen the enemy.

Point six is that Afghanistan, like all countries under the rule of law, must monopolize the use of force within its territory. The arrest, search, and detention of Afghans must be done by Afghans in order to be considered legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan public. All detention operations should be carried out by the Afghan national security forces, with the full knowledge and understanding of the concerned Afghan authorities. Moreover, the transfer of detention facilities to Afghan authorities is required to demonstrate the sovereignty of the Afghan government. We will require further assistance, training, and resources to achieve this.

My last point is strategic patience, something I consider to be very important. It is very easy to destroy everything we have achieved up until now, but it will be extremely hard to rebuild it again. The tasks we are facing in Afghanistan are not something that we can solve in one, or even ten years, but something we have to be strategically patient about.

Afghanistan – The Way Ahead

Mr. Abdul Aziz Babakarkhail

The topic «Afghanistan – the way ahead» is a difficult and complex one. It has various thematic dimensions, which are critically interdependent. Leaving one and treating the rest will not give a full picture. I hope I can do the topic justice, though it is not always an easy task. I will therefore talk about the past, present, and future of the current rebuilding project in Afghanistan. I refer to the current national and international involvement simply as the rebuilding of Afghanistan, since the people of Afghanistan believe that their country will stand on its own feet at the end of this endeavor.

This project has three important stakeholders – the people of Afghanistan, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), and the international community. Nobody can afford to ignore the relative importance of each individual stakeholder in making this current endeavor successful in Afghanistan. This is a joint enterprise.

Historical and past events always provide a framework for future events to take shape. The lessons learned in the past can help us guide our decisions toward realizing a desirable state in the future. Thus, having reviewed the past and present states of the current process in Afghanistan, we get to know that we have had joint achievements, missed opportunities, and overlooked risk factors that have exacerbated our challenges.

I will also speak about the different aspects of the current project, which identify the involvement and responsibilities of both the international community and the GIROA. For instance, governance, development, and security, all come under the functions of the GIROA, supported by its international partners. Furthermore, I will elaborate upon the issues of aid delivery and the war on terrorism. At the end, I will outline some practical recommendations for the way ahead.

Historical Background

After September 11, the international community turned its attention to Afghanistan; the UN security resolution was passed and, consequently, the deployment of the US and coalition forces took place. The Bonn agreement

provided a framework for creating a provisional government, the Loya Jirga or Grand Council, as well as drafting the new constitution and embarking on peacekeeping activities in Afghanistan.

This endeavor resulted in a set of achievements with regard to laying down foundations for the building blocks of the elected government. Presidential and parliamentary elections were held; the elections held in a setting such as Afghanistan after a long period of the rule of guns did not only function as a means to build a legitimate state, but also served as a means to an end. That people were able to participate in the elections, and thereby exercise their legitimate right to choose the leaders and system to govern them, was a tremendous step forward. People showed their enormous support to the rebuilding project.

At present, all governmental institutions can take on more responsibility to achieve the major goal of this project, particularly the security forces, if further assisted properly. We also have the Afghanistan National Development Strategy – the ANDS document that can bring unity of efforts among all stakeholders involved. We have jointly made major commitments through many conferences such as the Tokyo, Berlin, Bucharest, Paris, and London compacts as well as the recent London conference. The international commitment to Afghanistan is a great asset, and two major stakeholders, the GIRoA and the people of Afghanistan, are well aware of its importance.

The rebuilding project has created hope and expectations among millions of citizens in the country. The hope of the Afghan people could have been a great asset for the rebuilding project, and one that both the GIRoA and international community should have capitalized on. But, it did not happen to a satisfactory extent. The expectations – that we all should have delivered on – have been a challenge that all stakeholders involved in the project have yet to meet.

This has led to, on one hand, that the gap between the people and the GIRoA alongside with the international community is further widening. On the other hand, the security situation has deteriorated in Afghanistan. The number of destabilized districts has increased. The GIRoA has not been able to extend its writ and influence into many provinces and districts in order to provide basic services, security, and governance, as well as justice and development. What went wrong? What were the underlying assumptions that made the current situation turn out the way it has? To my knowledge, there are several reasons:

1. The risk factors – both external and internal – in managing the huge rebuilding project have not been appropriately identified and then mitigated. The internal risk factors deal with the internal environment of the project, involving the state-building and peacekeeping activities. The external risk factors take their origin in the deliberate cross border terrorist and insurgent war waged on the Afghan soil. Both the GIRoA and the international community have been taken by surprise and have come to realize that they are only dealing with tactical crisis management in the country rather than achieving strategic goals.
2. The international community has paid less attention to the political and military dynamics in Afghanistan that were prevalent prior to 9/11, labeling terror and extremism as purely an Afghan problem and ignoring its authentic origin. This has always been a regional problem, and the terrorists and extremists' sanctuaries and training camps are across the borders.
3. These establishments in the neighboring countries send a constant supply of violence and terror to Afghanistan. Taking this situation into account, bombing the Afghan villages and arbitrary house searches will amount to fighting the symptoms rather than dealing with the root cause, which has increased the risk factor of alienating the people from the current reconstruction process. This is a wrong medicine in the wrong time and place.
4. The weak capacity of the government and limited resources at her disposal have made it impossible to reach out to the people in the districts and villages, creating the dichotomy of de jure and de facto authorities.
5. The Afghan government has inherited a century-old governmental structure that hinders the resource-flow down to the provinces and districts. Therefore, the lack of basic services delivery, governance, and development has its root cause not only in the resources' constraints, but they can also be attributed to the inherent centralized structure of the government.
6. Parallel bureaucratic structures created by the donors undermine the capacity of local governance institutions, blurring the legitimacy of the GIRoA in the eyes of her people.
7. Lack of maneuver space for the GIRoA to act has put her in the vicious circle of lack of capacity, leaving the GIRoA as an incompetent stakeholder to do her part in this rebuilding project. Meanwhile, this has increased the chance of corruption, bad governance, and influence of the criminal elements.
8. A lack of coherent, consistent, and unified approach by the whole international community on one side and the GIRoA on the other side have led

to haphazard, fragmented, and «quick fix» approaches without a common vision.

That said, we should not plunge into despair and pessimism. The points above are just a general overview of what we have done and where we are standing. We all still have great chances for success in the country, although the road that lies ahead of us is difficult and bumpy. There is the road toward peace, stability, and security as well as effective state building, good governance, and development. We all can reach our goals with firm resolve and determination, but then we must all agree that failure is not an option in Afghanistan.

President Obama made the right policy option when he announced his strategy for Afghanistan. This policy gives a direction with clear strategic goals and objectives to the US and coalition forces, dismantling the terrorist sanctuaries so that Afghanistan will not become a free heaven for the terrorists once again. The policy also takes into account the regional aspect of the insurgency and extremist activities on a regional basis.

The GIRoA is not operating in a vacuum either. It has developed the ANDS, which has been approved by the international community. The policy for improving subnational governance has been drafted with inclusion of relevant stakeholders. The subnational governance policy will be endorsed by the cabinet in the spring of 2010. The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) has had the leading role in shaping this policy and will have a leading role in coordinating the implementation of this policy across the whole country.

This policy, implemented effectively, has the potential to achieve concurrent progress in social, economic, and security sectors, just as President Karzai claimed while issuing his decree for the new policy on May 8, 2008. The policy implements constitutional provisions on subnational governance. If implemented, the policy will establish good governance at local level, which functions as an enabler of development. The subnational governance policy improves coordination among subnational entities and improves delivery of services. It also brings the decision-making process closer to the people and makes decision-makers accountable to them.

The district delivery program is another major program that paves way for consolidation of the district administration in critical districts in the wake of military operations. This is a cross-ministerial program that is led by the IDLG. The main goal of the program is to enable the GIRoA to establish its legitimate presence that responds to the critical need of the populace with regard to providing:

- Basic services
- Access to justice
- Hope

This program also lays down a sound foundation for economic stability and sustainable development of infrastructure.

While we all work together to successfully complete the huge enterprise of rebuilding Afghanistan, we must take the following factors into account:

- We must work together in a coherent and consistent framework to avoid overlapping and duplication. There is need for harmonization and coordination among the donors. The international aid will only be delivered effectively if channeled through the GIRoA's budget and implementation channels. The overhead and security costs will be reduced enormously. For this goal to be realized, all programs should be aligned behind the ANDS and local priorities. This will ensure that the GIRoA takes lead and ownership of the development projects and programs.
- The international community must work with the GIRoA to reduce the level of corruption in government offices. It must also encourage political will to fight this fatal disease and build the necessary capacity for good governance.
- The international community must increase the resource flow to train and mentor more Afghan national security forces. While the increase in numbers is important, improvement in recruitment and the management process is even more critical to achieve the desired quality.
- We must identify the risk factors in managing the current rebuilding project, and we all have to mitigate the risks in real time.
- We must embark on effective state-building activities.
- We must enable mechanisms that facilitate the people's participation in the decision-making process and turn the people into a real and trustworthy stakeholder in the rebuilding project. Arbitrary repair of wear and tear here and there cannot win the hearts and minds of the people.
- We must create mutual accountability mechanisms, so that tax payer's money will only be used for the development purpose and not be siphoned off.
- We must avoid parallel bureaucratic structures that undermine the capacity and functionality of local governance institutions. However, we must supply the governance institution under consideration with embedded resources to carry out the tasks of projects and programs that must

urgently be implemented. The reason is that resources employed on a regular basis are only sufficient to execute the tasks related to the normal functions of an agency or an office. This may delay the planning and implementation of upcoming projects and programs. The embedded resources will therefore make the transition toward normal function of the governance institutions easier as the projects come to completion.

Rebuilding Afghanistan is a huge and complex task. But it is viable if we all work in a coordinated way with a coherent approach and unified vision for the future. Therefore, let us all put our minds and hands together for a long-term commitment to Afghanistan.

Perspektiver på den norske innsatsen i Afghanistan sett fra Stortinget

Storingsrepresentant Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide

Temaet for årets Luftmaktseminar, veien videre i Afghanistan og den militære maktanvendelsens rolle i den konflikten, går rett til kjernen av den forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitiske dagsorden og den offentlige debatten. Tittelen på mitt bidrag åpner i utgangspunktet for en ganske vid tolkning, og jeg tenkte derfor å si noe om hvordan jeg oppfatter Stortingets rolle i situasjoner med krig, konflikt og militær maktanvendelse, for så å konsentrere meg fullt ut om operasjonen i Afghanistan.

Stortingets rolle

Hvilken rolle spiller Stortinget, som folkets valgte representanter, egentlig når det kommer til spørsmål om konflikt og bruk av militærmakt? Gjennomføringen av sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikken er i stor grad Regjeringens prerogativ. En eventuell militær operasjon utføres av Forsvaret. Mediene formidler og kommenterer, mer eller mindre korrekt, og i et åpent og fritt samfunn som det norske bør det også legges opp til en informert og levende debatt i offentligheten og blant innbyggerne. Så hvilken rolle blir igjen for Stortinget?

Stortinget formelle roller er å gi lover, bevilge ressurser og kontrollere regjeringen og offentlige myndigheter arbeid – i kortversjon: Stortinget beslutter, og er valgt av folket til å representere dem og fatte beslutninger på deres vegne.

Disse poengene fremstår kanskje som banale, men er likevel viktige fordi det med beslutningsmyndighet også følger *ansvar*. Stortingets rolle som beslutningstager gir oss til syvende og sist en større rolle og et betydelig større ansvar enn det som først er åpenbart. Først og fremst er vi ansvarlige overfor velgerne – for å fatte riktige beslutninger på informert grunnlag – og vi er ansvarlige overfor Forsvaret som skal utføre et oppdrag på våre vegne. Det må

Stortinget, gjennom politiske vedtak, oppfølging og bevilgninger, sette Forsvaret i stand til å gjøre. Men vårt ansvar favner bredere enn det.

Det å delta i en internasjonal operasjon, konflikt eller i krigshandlinger, det å vedta og så sende ut norske soldater – som vi gjør i Afghanistan – er ikke bare en sak for Forsvaret alene. Det er en sak for hele det norske samfunnet. På den praktiske siden innebærer det at staten sørger for å ivareta våre soldater før, under og etter operasjoner i utlandet. Det gjelder både ressurser og materiell, tilstrekkelig trening og øvelser, oppfølging og rettigheter, økonomiske rettigheter og ordninger.

Men i tillegg til det praktiske må vi se dette i et større perspektiv: For det første har politiske beslutningstagere et klart ansvar for å skaffe seg kunnskap og innsyn, og å holde seg oppdatert – man må fatte beslutninger på et riktig grunnlag, og foreta nødvendige strategiske vurderinger. Så må man se på risiko og konsekvenser. Det ligger i den militære maktanvendelsens natur at det å ta den i bruk, har meget alvorlige og til dels påregnelige konsekvenser. Den har også klare begrensninger. Det må man være bevisst når beslutningen om å ta den i bruk, blir tatt. Vi har også et særlig ansvar for å opplyse befolkningen om hvorfor norske myndigheter har tatt de valgene de har gjort. Hvorfor vi er i Afghanistan, og hvorfor det er verdt at norske kvinner og menn i uniform risikerer eller faktisk mister livet?

For det andre må det norske samfunnet anerkjenne og ta inn over seg at det finnes kvinner og menn som er villige til å ofre livet for et oppdrag som *vi som samfunn* har gitt dem. Det krever vår respekt og støtte. Når man beslutter å benytte militærmakt, åpner man samtidig for alvorlige konsekvenser. En beslutning om å sende norske styrker til et konfliktområde handler i realiteten om at vi som politikere sender unge mennesker ut på våre vegne – for i verste fall å måtte drepe eller dø som en konsekvens av våre politiske valg. I Afghanistan har fem norske soldater og offiserer måttet bøte med livet. Slike hendelser, hvor tragiske de enn er, vil skje i det som reelt sett er en krigssituasjon. Konsekvensene må være gjennomtenkt og akseptert av det politiske lederskapet når beslutningen om norsk deltagelse fattes. Og ikke minst må de være klart kommunisert til norsk offentlighet og presse. Det kan ikke bare skje i etterpåklokskapens lys.

Nettopp derfor synes det stadig klarere for meg at vi, som ansvarlige politikere, ikke har vært flinke nok til å forklare og debattere hvorfor militær maktbruk og norsk militær deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner er nødvendig, eller hvilke konsekvenser som må påregnes. Etter nesten åtte års norsk innsats i Afghanistan ser vi fortsatt at virkelighetsbeskrivelsen og begrepsbruken rundt engasjementet varierer dramatisk. Både militære og pårørende

etterspør større åpenhet om de faktiske forholdene og en mer realistisk tilnærming fra det politiske Norge. Meningsmålinger viser at det norske folk er delt omtrent på midten – mellom de som helhjertet støtter opp om det norske engasjementet, og de som er usikre eller ønsker å trekke norske soldater ut. Vi har med andre ord fortsatt et forklaringsproblem.

Vi har kunnet lese at foreldrene til norske soldater er utslitt av å måtte forsvare hva deres sønner og døtre faktisk gjør i Afghanistan. Reaksjoner på deres yrke og innsats har vært negative, kunnskapsløse og tankeløse. Et sterkt og klart uttrykt forsvar av norsk Afghanistan-politikk og norske soldater er ikke en oppgave som burde vært delegert til pårørende: Det er en soleklar oppgave for landets politiske lederskap i Stortinget og regjeringen. Det er et politisk ansvar å stå bak de beslutningene man fatter, og de soldatene vi sender ut på Norges vegne.

Jeg mener ikke at vi skal kvele debatter om norsk sikkerhets- og forsvarpolitikk, eller ukritisk støtte ethvert utenlandsengasjement eller enkelthandling. Men politiske beslutninger forplikter. Når samfunnet, Stortinget, og vi som politikere sender unge mennesker ut på våre vegne – for i verste fall å drepe eller å dø som en konsekvens av våre politiske valg – har vi også en forpliktelse til å sørge for dem, både materielt og moralsk.

Engasjementet i Afghanistan

Ikke noe sted er dette ansvaret tyngre enn i Afghanistan. I dag er det slik at mange av trådene i norsk utenriks- og forsvarspolitikken samles nettopp der. Vi deltar i den internasjonale innsatsen i landet med både sivile og militære virkemidler, i hele spekteret fra humanitær bistand via langsiktig utviklingshjelp og statsbygging til spesialstyrker. Afghanistan-engasjementet viser virkelig behovet for å se politikken og strategien i sammenheng.

Mitt klare utgangspunkt er at Norge deltar i Afghanistan fordi det er i vår interesse. Vår deltagelse er først og fremst et spørsmål om vår egen og våre alliertes sikkerhet. Det internasjonale samfunnet gikk inn i Afghanistan høsten 2001, ikke for å starte et massivt utviklingsprosjekt, men for å forhindre at landet igjen kunne brukes som en base for å planlegge og utføre angrep mot oss eller våre allierte. Under Taliban-regimet frem til 2001 var Afghanistan et fristed for terrorister som truet internasjonal fred og sikkerhet.

Det var altså ikke kvinnefrigjøring, demokratibyggning eller skolegang for barn som brakte oss til Afghanistan. Dette er positive konsekvenser av vår tilstedeværelse, og nødvendige forutsetninger for at afghanerne igjen skal bli

i stand til å ivareta egen sikkerhet, men disse formålene kan altså utledes av hovedformålet, ikke motsatt.

For å oppnå sikkerhet på en måte som er bærekraftig over tid, må det skapes en tilstrekkelig grad av stabilitet og utvikling. Det kan vi bare gjøre gjennom å bistå afghanerne i bygge opp en noenlunde fungerende stat med en akseptabel grad av territoriell kontroll og en viss legitimitet over hele landet. Nettopp derfor er begrepene sikkerhet, stabilitet og utvikling uløselig knyttet sammen i denne konflikten. Det er en klar vekselvirkning mellom dem. Det er viktig å huske at godt styresett og en rettsstat er nøkkelen til suksess, og sikkerhet er i denne sammenhengen en støttefunksjon. Mange har pekt på at problemet i Afghanistan ikke så mye er Talibans styrke som det er statens svakhet. Det er altså en uløselig kobling mellom sikkerhet og styresett.

I den grad en noenlunde legitim, stabil afghansk regjering med et fungerende statsapparat, politi- og militærvesen også er demokratisk, er dette et pluss, men vi kan ikke forvente et styre av demokratisk, vestlig modell i et førindustrielt samfunn i Sentral-Asia. Målet, på alle plan, må være å sette afghanerne i stand til å kunne bestemme over egen fremtid, og så arbeide for å påvirke denne samfunnsutviklingen i en positiv retning. Vesten må nok utvise noe mer ydmykhet overfor et samfunn så forskjellig fra vårt eget. Status i dag er at situasjonen er vanskelig, og den oppleves som mer krevende enn noen gang. Samtidig er det lyspunkter. Som mange på bakken i Afghanistan påpeker: Virkeligheten ser veldig annerledes ut i NATO-hovedstedene enn i Afghanistan – alt er ikke svart.

Likevel er det mange årsaker til at situasjonen er vanskelig. Karzai-regimet er svakt, gjennomkorrupt og upopulært etter valget, og parlamentet spiller en lite selvstendig rolle. Grensen mellom Afghanistan og Pakistan er nærmest ikke-eksisterende, og det er svært mye terrorvirksomhet på pakistansk side. Taliban er på fremmarsj i mange områder i Afghanistan, og antallet sivile som drepes av opprørere, har økt. Der de sivile tapene som følge av ISAFs operasjoner har gått ned – blant annet som følge av nye regler for bruk av flystøtte – har nå opprørere hovedansvaret for tap. Av om lag 2200 sivile som har mistet livet det siste året, kan drøyt 1400 av disse tilskrives opprørsaktivitet. Det har blant annet sammenheng med at opprørerne de siste par årene har endret strategi – fra å angripe ISAF til å true og angripe afghanere, særlig ved bruk av eksplosiver. Ca. 70 prosent av ofrene for IED er afghanere.

NATOs nye strategi

Jeg mener at NATOs nye implementering av strategi, basert på general McChrystals rapport fra august 2009, viser veien fremover. Den veien er imidlertid ikke enkel, og den er ikke ufarlig. Å gå aktivt inn i flere befolknings-sentra, fokusere på beskyttelse av den afghanske sivilbefolkningen, redusere egen styrkebeskyttelse, panser og flystøtte og operere lett i og for sivilbefolkningen, øker på kort sikt risikoen for allierte soldater. Det er et tøft valg, men vi er nødt til å gjøre det for å lykkes. Når antallet treff med opprørselementer, eller såkalte hendelser, øker til dels dramatisk i Nord-Afghanistan, er ikke det bare fordi opprørerne er styrket. Det er kanskje i større grad fordi afghanske, norske og allierte styrker nå opererer og etablerer fast tilstedeværelse i områder som før ble overlatt fullt og helt til opprørere og kriminelle. Det betyr altså ikke nødvendigvis at det er mange nye elementer som gjør situasjonen dramatisk mye verre, men at vi engasjerer oss mer med dem. Selve kjernen i den «counterinsurgency»-strategi som McChrystal har skissert er å være til stede, eller som sjefen for Luftkrigsskolen, oberst Fauske, sa sist jeg hørte ham snakke om Afghanistan: «tilstedeværelse, tilstedeværelse, tilstedeværelse. Det holder ikke lenger å dra inn i landsbyen kl. 17 og ut igjen kl. 20 – vi må garantere afghanernes sikkerhet 24/7».

Å nøle for lenge er farlig. McChrystal hevdet høsten 2009 at man hadde tolv måneder på å lykkes. Hvis Vesten fortsetter å vise tegn til å vike unna i møte med Taliban, vil afghanerne sette seg på gjerdet i frykt for et fremtidig Taliban-regime. Vi må vise at Taliban og ekstremismen tilhører fortiden, og at vi stiller opp til jobben er gjort. Ingen må være i tvil om at dette er i vår klare interesse.

Samspeillet mellom sikkerhet og utvikling er som sagt helt sentralt i Afghanistan. Det er denne krevende kombinasjonen NATO må bidra til å realisere. Den store feilkoblingen i deler av opinionen og i enkelte partier i Norge er forestillingen om at det militære engasjementet i Afghanistan er en offensiv strategi, mens humanitær og sivil bistand er en defensiv strategi. Det kan vi for eksempel høre ved bruken av begrepet «angrepskrig», som enkelte partier bruker for å beskrive det vi og våre allierte holder på med.

Sverre Diesen har brukt et godt bilde på hva som er realiteten: I kampen for et nytt afghansk samfunn er det tvert imot utviklingshjelpen som er sverdet, og soldatene som er skjoldet. Du vinner ikke krigen uten at skjoldet gir sverdet spillerom. Derfor er rene militære bidrag ikke tilstrekkelig. Norge og våre allierte har forpliktelser i Afghanistan som løper ut over det som tradisjonelt er Forsvarets oppgaver. Og ingen har noensinne hevdet at denne kampen kan vinnes utelukkende militært. Koordinasjon og

samarbeid er avgjørende – det er også et sentralt poeng i McChrystals strategi.

Et stadig mer sannsynlig scenario er at ISAF får flere sivile oppgaver og en tydeligere sivil rolle. Det er mange oppgaver som skal og må løses, og noen må gjøre det. Som det sies fra NATO-hold: Spørsmålet fremover er ikke så mye hvem som gjør hva, men hva som blir gjort. Skal vi lykkes, må fokus dreies fra utfører til oppgave.

Sivilt-militært samarbeid

Sivile organisasjoner ønsker forståelig nok ikke å gå inn i områder der sikkerhetssituasjonen for personellet er for dårlig. Samtidig er det stor motstand mot at Forsvaret skal bedrive virksomhet som gjør at det blir vanskelig for lokale å skille mellom de sivile organisasjonenes arbeid og Forsvarets virksomhet. Det kan også hevdes at utviklingsarbeid heller ikke akkurat er Forsvarets og NATOs kjerneoppgaver. Men det er behov for en konstruktiv tilnærming til hva Forsvaret kan bidra med. Sivile organisasjoner og Forsvarets styrker bør kunne samarbeide tett. For å bruke nederlendernes virksomhetsidé for sin innstas i Afghanistan: så sivilt som mulig, så militært som nødvendig.

De humanitære organisasjonene og utviklingsorganisasjonene ville ikke vært i stand til å fungere uten den sikkerheten ISAF-styrkene leverer. Ekstreme opprørere i Taliban skiller ikke mellom sivil og militær tilstedeværelse fra det internasjonale samfunnet. Alle anses som mål.

Norge opererer i dag med en modell hvor det er vanntette skott mellom sivil og militær innsats. Det skaper en situasjon hvor den ene hånden ikke vet hva den andre gjør, og den samlede innsatsen svekkes. Den norske modellen bør derfor revurderes og evalueres. Sivilt og militært engasjement må koordineres bedre. Det som fungerer på papiret hjemme i Norge, fungerer ikke nødvendigvis på bakken i Afghanistan. Det er et kvalitativt skille innenfor den sivile innsatsen – mellom rent humanitært arbeid, som skal være nødlindrende og 100 prosent nøytralt, og langsiktig utviklingsarbeid, som i sin natur er politisk. Dette skillet må også klargjøres og synliggjøres.

Det er en utfordring at FN/UNAMA er svekket. Etter angrepet på gjestehuset 28. oktober 2009 ble 600 FN-medarbeidere evakuert. Mange av disse sitter nå i Dubai, og det er ikke vanskelig å forstå at det gjør koordineringsarbeidet ytterligere komplisert. I tillegg er det i utgangspunktet vanskelig å koordinere innsatsen fra mange land, når verken hjelpeorganisasjonene i de ulike landene eller landene seg imellom har noe stort ønske om å la seg koordinere.

Å legge til rette for et konstruktivt samarbeid i Afghanistan er et ledelses-

ansvar – det er et regjeringsansvar. Overfor afghanerne har vi et ansvar for å sørge for at den sivile innsatsen vår kommer frem og bli mest mulig effektiv. Da er samarbeid og koordinering avgjørende. Her bør det tas initiativ som også kan vise vei for resten av alliansen. Det handler om å vinne freden og legge til rette for en positiv utvikling for hardt prøvede sivile medmennesker i Afghanistan. I Washington og New York, der jeg både høsten 2009 og i januar 2010 fikk anledning til å diskutere dette med mange svært kompetente mennesker, var det ett mantra som gikk igjen: Suksess i Afghanistan måles i afghanernes opplevelse av trygghet.

Det er utfordringer med engasjementet i Afghanistan sett fra et politisk perspektiv. Usikkerheten fremover er blant annet:

1. Vil vi klare å opprettholde dagens militære nærvær? To av de største allierte, Canada og Nederland, har politiske vedtak om å trekke seg ut.
2. Det foregår en intensivert og omfattende debatt om Afghanistan, til og med i USA og Tyskland.
3. Skal sivil gjenoppbygning/utvikling og oppbygning av sikkerhetsinstusjoner lykkes, kreves langsiktig økonomisk engasjement (ambisjonen om å øke afghanske styrker til 400 000 personer, vil koste 12 milliarder USD hvert år i flere år fremover).

Norsk deltagelse i utenlandsoperasjoner

Operasjonen i Afghanistan er kanskje det fremste eksemplet på at det å delta i internasjonale militære operasjoner er en integrert og sentral del av norsk utenriks- og forsvarspolitik. Og utenlandsoperasjoner – fredsoppbyggende så vel som fredsbevarende – er en viktig oppgave for dagens norske forsvar.

Jeg mener at det viktigste ikke er hvilken farge våre soldater har på hjelmen, eller at Norge skal bidra i flest mulig operasjoner. Vi bør heller sikre at norske bidrag er robuste der vi velger å delta. Norge bør gi substansielle bidrag der hvor vi har forutsetninger til både å virke og til å lykkes. Vi bør bidra til internasjonale operasjoner sammen med våre allierte, så langt vi kan, av tre grunner:

1. Stadig flere trusler angår også oss, selv om de ikke retter seg direkte mot norsk territorium. For eksempel kan terrorisme ramme nordmenn og norske interesser ute og kan også fort komme til norsk jord.
2. Hvis stabilitet, sikkerhet og utvikling kan skapes med norske bidrag, har vi en moralsk plikt til å bidra.

3. Hvis nære allierte utsettes for en trussel, er det i vår interesse å bidra. Vi har i alle år vært avhengige av andres solidaritet. Hvis vi fortsatt skal basere oss på det, må også vi bidra. Solidaritet dreier seg om å ta og gi – ikke bare ta. Sikkerheten i det transatlantiske området er udelelig.

Samtidig må vi innse at våre betydelige bidrag til internasjonale militære operasjoner har en kostnad, både økonomisk og menneskelig. I 2010 vil Norge bruke godt over 1 milliard kroner på ISAF-operasjonen, mens feltsykehuset og ingeniørsoldatene i Tsjad er beregnet å koste 500–600 millioner totalt. Det er betydelige midler.

Enda mer utfordrende vil jeg si at vårt store internasjonale engasjement er for Forsvaret og Forsvarets personell. I forhold til folketall er innsatsen stor, og vi ser at presset på soldater og befal med innen en del særskilte kompetansemiljøer over tid er uholdbart. Slitasjen er for stor, og vi trenger en større styrkebrønn for å gi den enkelte soldat og offiser tid til ny opptrening og kompetanseutvikling – og aller viktigst: hvile og muligheten til å ha et normalt liv med familie. Fortsatt rovdrift vil undergrave og forvitte Forsvaret.

I tillegg til slitasjen på den enkelte ser vi også at måten vi opererer på, kanskje særlig i Afghanistan, skaper nye utfordringer for Forsvarets avdelinger og for det «systemet av systemer» som utgjør et moderne forsvar. Innretningen mot mentorering, trening og opplæring (OMLT) medfører for eksempel at Hærens avdelinger avgir sine mest erfarne tropps- og kompanisjefer, i tillegg stabsoffiserer. Det skaper en særdeles vanskelig situasjon for Hæren. Denne trenden forsterker de utfordringene et sterkt presset driftsbudsjett allerede skaper.

Luftforsvaret kjenner også denne utfordringen på kroppen. Videreføringen av helikopterbidraget setter et lite kompetansemiljø, som allerede leverer store bidrag, under ytterligere press. Dette er krevende, men med grunnlag i den proposisjonen om videreføring og ekstrafinansiering av bidraget som nettopp ble oversendt Stortinget, en proposisjon som kommer til å få Stortingets enstemmige støtte, er oppdraget klart.

Dette oppdraget er også viktig; det øker aksjonsradius, muliggjør involvering med lokalbefolkningen, og gir soldatene trygghet for at de kan få hjelp. For igjen å sitere oberst Fauske så er helikopterbidraget «helt vitalt». Kravet om at ingen ISAF-operasjoner skal planlegges der militært personell ikke kan få kirurgisk hjelp innen 90 minutter, gjør at helikopterbidraget er en helt nødvendig forutsetning for den nye tilstedeværelsesstrategien. Helikoptrene er derfor en avgjørende innsatsfaktor for å lykkes i Afghanistan, og jeg er overbevist om at Luftforsvaret vil fortsette å levere.

Avslutning

Akkurat disse spørsmålene kunne gitt meg en inngang til å gå dypere inn i de mer grunnleggende utfordringene for det norske Forsvaret i dag. Det er det dessverre ikke rom for innenfor rammene av denne artikkelen. Likevel vil jeg få påpeke at det er påfallende hvor stor avstand det er mellom Forsvarsdepartementets vurderinger av status og de økonomiske forutsetningene for Forsvaret, og den pressede virkeligheten som Forsvarets avdelinger og mannskaper møter i sitt daglige virke. Nesten daglig ser også vi som politikere eksempler på dette.

Jeg mener at Forsvaret fortsatt står overfor betydelige utfordringer med hensyn til målet om balanse mellom struktur, ressurser og oppgaver i 2012, slik regjeringen forutsetter. De økonomiske forutsetningene for langtidsplanen holder dessverre ikke. Det handler blant annet om fortsatt underbudsjettering, etterslep fra tidligere perioder, undervurdering av omstillingskostnader og usikker pris- og lønnskompensasjon. Riksrevisjonen har ved en rekke anledninger også påpekt disse og andre forhold, noe jeg håper jeg kan komme tilbake til ved en senere anledning.

Betraktninger omkring det som motiverer en ung offiser for internasjonale operasjoner

Kadett Carl Waldemar Wilhelmsen

Hvorfor er norske styrker i Afghanistan? Fordi Forsvarets arbeidsgiver, norske styresmakter, har bestemt at Forsvaret skal være der. Til tross for at norske styresmakter har valgt å sende hundrevis av soldater, noe som ofte gjøres der det er et behov for stabilitet og sikkerhet, virker det som om lite eller ingenting er på spill i Afghanistan. Det er fordi bidraget er fullt av unnlatelser. Her sikter jeg ikke til at Norge ikke bidrar med nok innsats, men snarere at det kan virke som om den norske politiske debatten ikke i stor nok grad er opptatt av situasjonen. Med andre ord virker det som om lite eller ingenting er på spill. Et bevis er valgkampen høsten 2009, der spørsmålet ikke en gang ble nevnt. Dette preger oss yngre offiserer og vår motivasjon for å delta. Jeg skal i dette innlegget komme med betraktninger omkring noe av det som motiverer en ung offiser for internasjonale operasjoner.

Norge som nasjon har begrensede ressurser i sikkerhetspolitisk sammenheng sammenlignet med andre land. Imidlertid kan det virke som om Norge er komfortabel med en lav profilering med tanke på å vise seg frem i konflikter og internasjonale operasjoner. Et eksempel er da NATOs militære hovedkvarter tok kontakt med Norge under Kosovo-kampanjen fordi de ønsket brigader Gunnar Lundberg som ny militær pressetalsmann. Da motsatte den norske regjering dette, riktig nok uoffisielt, med begrunnelsen at det «ville medføre en for høy medieprofilering». Det er nærliggende å tro at det man altså her tok høyde for en norsk opinion. Dette mener jeg også har en overføringsverdi til Afghanistan i dag. Jeg synes det er betimelig at norske styresmakter velger en slik mellomlinje når de i utgangspunktet har valgt å delta med styrker.

Militærmaktens anvendelse er nettopp på politikkens premisser. Politikk er en komplisert dynamikk med dilemma og kompromiss. Krigen er et instrument for politikken. Enhver bruk av militærmakt et rent politisk ansvar mer enn noe annet. Det er tross alt politikk i praksis i sin skarpeste form. Med

bakgrunn i dette mener jeg at det helt klart er behov for en klar politisk debatt rundt utenlandsbidraget Norge har i Afghanistan. Både regjering og storting må ta inn over seg at Forsvaret ikke driver kvinnefrigjøring eller humanitær hjelp i Afghanistan, men forsøker å skape sikkerhet gjennom bruk av militær voldsmakt. Etter min mening er dette inntrykket i dag lite reflektert i medias dekning, men viktigst av alt også temmelig fraværende i den politiske debatten.

Den debatten vi ser om Afghanistan i media, er ofte ikke så todelt som den bør være. Bidrag der norske styrker deltar, bør debatteres med to innfalls-vinkler: (1) støtten til oppdraget og (2) støtten til egne norske styrker. Etter min mening blir dette altfor ofte sett under ett, noe jeg mener er uheldig, for politikerens verktøy – Forsvaret – og dets omdømme tar regningen, både i den offentlige debatten i media og i regjeringskvartalet.

Det grunnleggende paradokset i forholdet mellom den norske befolkning og Forsvaret er at da den kalde krigen var over, og krigsfare sank betydelig for det norske folk, så økte samtidig sannsynligheten for at Forsvaret skulle komme i kamp. Det er altså mulig å si at krigen kom nærmere Forsvaret, parallelt med at avstanden til resten av befolkningen økte. Derfor mener jeg at nettopp en offentlig debatt om hva Forsvaret gjør og hvorfor Forsvaret er engasjert i internasjonale operasjoner, i langt større grad må vektlegges av norske styresmakter. Premissene for utenlandsbidragene er annerledes nå enn for noen år siden, og Forsvarets kobling til samfunnet må være tydelig og klart. Befolkningen må forstå hvorfor staten holder seg med og anvender sin voldsmakt, som de facto er det ytterste maktmiddelet staten rår over.

Med en økning i tap av norske soldater i Afghanistan har også jeg personlig innsett at dette faktisk er en alvorlig situasjon med fare for liv og helse. Jeg vil selv reise ned, men har i det siste blitt klar over at det å dra ut medfører en reell risiko. Jeg har selvfølgelig tatt inn over meg den risikoen mitt arbeid kan medføre, og har ikke blitt umotivert av det – jeg vil ut, og jeg vil ha erfaringen.

Men jeg er ikke villig til å dø i Afghanistan, og det tror jeg heller ingen andre norske offiserer er villige til. Derimot er jeg villig til å ta risikoen for at det kan skje. For å være risikovillig må man føle at man har ryggdekning her hjemme. Hvis jeg skal tjene Norge under fjerne himmelstrøk med risiko for tap av eget eller kameraters liv, vil jeg at de hjemme skal føle at det er verdt det, for da vil det være det også for meg. Derfor trenger vi en seriøs, bred og god debatt, som i dag dessverre er fraværende. Motivasjonen for å delta i utenlandsoperasjoner er med andre ord uløselig knyttet sammen med den politiske og samfunnsmessige aksepten, og det er regjering og storting som i siste instans bærer ansvaret – det er tross alt de som velger å bruke oss som verktøy.

The Revised US Strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan

Dr. David Kilcullen

The theme of this speech is the current situation in Afghanistan seen from a practitioner's standpoint. I want to discuss where things stand now at the strategic level and where they perhaps may go from here. I therefore want to look mainly at three things: First, the nature of the campaign in Afghanistan today; second, the key characteristics that we see currently employed on the ground; and third, a prediction of what is most likely to happen in Afghanistan in the next 18 months to 3 years.

Let us first take a closer look at the nature of the campaign. I was part of the writing team for the US Army and US Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. However, the situation in Afghanistan is not a typical FM 3-24-type insurgency. The classical, FM 3-24 model of an insurgency is one where a government is threatened by an internal, armed challenger. It may be a government that is ineffective or weak, and disconnected from its population but is basically legitimate.

This government is then attacked by an internal, armed force, and therefore needs to become stronger, more capable, and more connected to its population. The role of the international community in classic counterinsurgency theory is to help the threatened government by strengthening it and helping it connect better with its population, so that it can govern in an effective way. Initially, the international community will act as a windbreak, sheltering the nascent institutions of the government so they can grow stronger, until they are able to bear the brunt of the insurgency, and then the international community can begin to transition to local government control.

We often shorthand that process with what is now the slogan of «clear, hold, build.» That means that we seek to clear the enemy away, hold the secured area in conjunction with the threatened government, build new governmental institutions, and then gradually transition to the new government being in charge.

As mentioned, this is not the situation we are dealing with in Afghanistan. The campaign in Afghanistan is better thought of as a stability operation than

as a classical counterinsurgency. What we are dealing with in Afghanistan is a cycle of instability that is driven by a number of factors, one of which is the Afghan government. I have worked very closely with Afghan government officials over many years, and although many of them are very capable and dedicated, as a whole, the Afghan government is part of the problem as well as part of the solution in Afghanistan.

Why is that? Well, let me start with the issue of corruption. Transparency International ranks Afghanistan as the second most corrupt country in the world, just behind Somalia. There is a high degree of corruption and criminal behaviour at every level and in different institutions throughout Afghan society. One of the impacts of the corruption and criminality of, for example, lower-level officials and power-brokers in local communities, is that it creates incentives that encourage and reward abusive and exploitative behaviour by some officials of the Afghan government.

What we are looking at is therefore a particularly difficult environment for anybody who would want to be a responsible member of the local government in Afghanistan. Corruption creates abusive government behaviour, which in turn creates popular rage and disillusionment with the Afghan and international stabilization effort, which then again empowers the Taliban. The reason for this is that the Taliban's political strategy is not particularly religious or «fundamentalist» – in this respect the Taliban is not dramatically different from some other groups in Afghan society, but is mainly based on the Taliban's reputation for just and clean (albeit extremely harsh) behaviour – something that is only reinforced by the issue of corruption and abuse by local government officials.

The Taliban operates local court systems and local taxation systems; they have a «hotline» to call in case of kidnapping, so that the Taliban will take care of it for you; they have an ombudsman-committee where you can file a complaint in case of abuse by the Taliban, something which is unheard of on the government side. All of this is a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the Afghan government and the international community, based on the assumption that you might not like the Taliban, but they are clean – they are not corrupt – and predictable.

To some extent this is a propaganda pose on the part of the Taliban, but that is nevertheless the message that they are putting forward, and it resonates with populations suffering under abuse and oppression. The popular rage and discontent therefore empowers the Taliban, and the fact that there is an insurgency going on in large parts of the country, and the fact that the Taliban themselves are engaged in a lot of corruption and a lot of criminal activity,

including the narcotics trade but not solely limited to this (gem smuggling, timber smuggling industry, and a variety of urban criminal activities), the Taliban further generates corruption and criminality, which drives the cycle further along.

This cycle has been running since 2001, even though the fighting in Afghanistan did not become really severe until the summer of 2005. From 2002 to the middle of 2005, we were basically looking at a peacekeeping and reconstruction operation in Afghanistan, albeit many important aspects of reconciliation and peacebuilding were neglected. Importantly, stabilization and reconstruction was the mission that NATO, including the Norwegian government, committed to originally in 2001-2002. That is not the environment we have now. Still, the current environment is not characterized by a classical insurgency either, but rather by the aforementioned cycle of instability, so that it makes more sense to conceive of the war as a stabilization operation than as a classical counterinsurgency.

The problem is therefore not the classic counterinsurgency problem of strengthening the government and connecting it to its people better, the problem is one of reforming the government and making people believe that the government is legitimate while addressing the underlying problems that are driving the cycle of instability.

The Taliban strategy can be summarized as a three-faceted approach. As mentioned, it is not a classical «people's war» strategy, not like, for example, the Maoists in China or the Vietcong in Vietnam, who tried to displace the government by creating «liberated» areas and linking them together, pushing the government out. Rather, one could summarize the Taliban strategy as «discredit, exhaust, inherit.» They try to discredit the international effort, and the Afghan government in the eyes of its people – discredit aid that comes from the international community – make people feel like the effort is futile. Second, they try to exhaust the international community by the sheer amount of time, money, and casualties that is required so that eventually they will leave. And at that point, the Taliban will seek to inherit what remains.

This could be described as an «exhaustion» strategy rather than the classic Maoist «displacement» strategy. Rather than trying to fight us and push us out of Afghanistan, they try to tire us out, so that we leave on our own accord. We will then leave behind a weakened Afghan government that the Taliban will hope to control or take over. This is a strategy which has worked for them in the past, and a lot of Afghans remember the period of the civil war, when the Mujahedeen that had fought the Soviets took over the country and almost immediately began squabbling among themselves, leading to a period in the

middle of the 1990s, when one member of the cabinet was actually shelling the capital where other members of the cabinet were working.

The destruction that was suffered in Kabul, in particular, did not to a large extent happen in the period of Soviet occupation, but rather in the civil war period. The same is true in a lot of city centres throughout Afghanistan. The Afghan people remember that, and also remember the damage done to Afghan society by corruption, by the warlords, and by the regional commanders of the civil war.

The Taliban originated in madrassa students, west of Kandahar, who fought the Soviets under the leadership of their mullahs and were not part of the mainstream mujahedeen movement based in Pakistan. After re-emerging in refugee camps in Pakistan and in disillusioned former fighters in the early 1990s, the neo-Taliban gained backing from the Pakistani government and entered the scene in 1994-1996 with a reputation for cleanness, for being against corruption, and for not being part of the group of people who had destroyed the country. Once they were in office the Afghan people very rapidly became disillusioned by the Taliban, but that was nevertheless how the Taliban initially got their start. Today, they are putting forward a very similar political pitch.

In addition to all the things that make Afghanistan different from a classical insurgency, you do also see an external sponsor for the Taliban. In the eastern part of the country, that external sponsor is Pakistan. I do not necessarily want to suggest that the Pakistani government as a whole is supporting or backing the Taliban. Still, the evidence suggests that there are some elements in the Pakistani national security establishment who tend to see the Afghan Taliban as an insurance policy. If and when the international community gets tired and pulls out of Afghanistan, the Taliban is Pakistan's insurance policy to prevent India or somebody else who do not share Pakistan's interests to fill that security vacuum. Therefore, some people in Pakistan are ready to tolerate and support the Afghan Taliban.

Most of the insurgency that is happening in the Kandahar province in the south right now, and most of the insurgency in what is called regional command east, in the eastern part of the country, really traces back to Pakistan. By that I do not necessarily mean the Pakistani government, but rather to safe havens in Pakistan. Some of what happens in the Helmand province translates to support from Pakistan, but in fact there is also a substantial Iranian support of Taliban activities in the Helmand province.

The Western parts of the country are also very tied to Iran economically, for example, in terms of where the people get their electrical power from,

what currency they use, and who their external trading partners are. However, there are now also close ties between elements of the Iranian national security establishment and some elements of the Taliban. There are therefore a number of external sponsors to the insurgency.

I tend to think of the Taliban as a loose confederation of a number of different elements. Pashtun nationalists, religious radicals, members of the old Taliban regime associated with the Quetta shura, ethnic and tribal fighters who are fighting for local interests, and then some opportunistic elements who may just be criminal or may be pursuing a tribal or personal agenda. A lot of the fighting in Northern Helmand, for example, is actually more tribal or criminal than Taliban-related. You therefore have a loose confederation of people, and not all of the fighting in Afghanistan is with the Taliban – moreover, not all the Taliban are fighting us. In December 2009, at the request of a senior U.S. commander, I had dinner with a couple of community leaders aligned with the Taliban. We met in Kabul, for a four-hour conversation about the war over a bottle of Jonnie Walker Blue label. There are a lot of people who are closely aligned with the Taliban who are not that interested in fighting.

All this means that a classic FM 3-24 strategy is not necessarily going to work without modification in Afghanistan. If the government is a key part of the problem, and your strategy is to strengthen that government and better connect it to its population, the better you do at that strategy the worse things are going to get. So rather than try to do that, what a lot of people in Afghanistan are trying to do, is to work with members of the Afghan government on critical reform programs to try and change what is happening on the local level and thereby change the dynamic. At the same time, they try to treat the symptoms of instability as the problem. The Taliban is not seen as the problem, neither is the Afghan government, but rather the instability itself – the dynamic that is driving the violence. A lot of people are therefore starting to focus on that.

We also need to recognize that the coalition's own behaviour has been a key part of the problems we are dealing with now. One of the biggest issues that is always raised by Afghans in the 6-monthly surveys that are done in the country is the failure of the international community to deliver on promises of development and reconstruction. It is very easy to sit in a Western capital and criticize the Afghan government for not delivering on its promises, but when you look at the portion of donor-committed funds that has actually been spent on what was promised, when you look at what people have actually delivered as part of the reconstruction and development effort, it is hard to deny that

we have been almost as big a part of the problem as anybody else, and Afghans know that.

This seems to suggest that we need to develop a strategy that identifies the sources of instability, makes someone responsible for addressing each source of instability, and works to build peace from the bottom up, reform the government from the top down, and eventually connect that reformed government to a more stable community over a period of time. If that is the strategy we need, it is worth to ask the question if that is the strategy we have. The current strategy, as outlined by President Obama on December 2, 2009, in some ways is an appropriate strategy for this kind of environment, but in other ways it is not. I would characterize that strategy as a «limited counterinsurgency» strategy. President Obama has not actually committed to a full-scale counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. What he has committed to is a counterinsurgency campaign that is limited in certain ways.

First, there are limits placed on resources. I do not want to get into the discussion of how many troops General McChrystal actually asked for; but let me just say that 30,000 was well toward the lower end of what anybody that knows anything about counterinsurgency would consider to be necessary in Afghanistan. We are currently looking at 100,000 US troops, about 60,000 Afghan troops when you subtract the ones that are not in a combat role, as well as about 44,000 NATO troops. All in all, that is just 200,000 soldiers in a country with a total population of 32 million people. In Vietnam, the US had 600,000 troops and the allies another 500,000 troops for a population of 16 million South Vietnamese, so roughly 20 times the force levels per head of population that we see in Iraq, and they still lost. So, if you are looking at force ratio, the numbers we are able to put on the ground is just nowhere close to a classical counterinsurgency force ratio. That does not mean that it will not work, it simply means that it is very limited in terms of resources.

One of the critical resources in carrying out this type of campaign is air power. With that I do not mean just ISR, transportation, and the ability to swiftly move people around by helicopter, I mean kinetic, air-to-ground close air support and battlefield interdiction. This becomes critically important when you do not have enough ground troops to saturate areas with ground troops. But, air-ground coordination also becomes critically important, otherwise you can get yourself into situations like those we have seen in the past in Afghanistan, where ground troops have bitten off more than they can chew and have been forced to rely on the air force to bail them out, inflicting non-combatant civilian casualties as a result.

The second key limitation is the limitation on time. President Obama basi-

cally gave the military an 18-month window and said that he was going to start the pull-out of Afghanistan in the middle of 2011. Now, in the broad sweep of history, there have been about 385 counterinsurgency campaigns since 1815, and none of them has taken less than 9 years. Most successful counterinsurgencies take about 15 years. If you think about 2001 as the start of the Afghan war, we are in the 9th year now. However, the insurgency didn't really start until the middle of 2005. So really, we are only about 4 years into the conflict and yet we are talking about pulling out in the middle of 2011. That is a very limited timeframe to deliver the sorts of effects that need to be delivered if we are to establish capable institutions that will be able to take over the fight when we start to pull out.

There has been some discussion as to the 2011 deadline: is this the start of the transition, the end of the transition, or where this end will come. For many Afghans with whom I have spoken, or who have been interviewed by researchers, however, the impression is that the coalition will leave in 18 months, something that reminds them of the time when Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in 1986 and gave the commanding general in Afghanistan 18 months to win the war – a period that turned into the bloodiest phase of the Soviet-Afghan war. Many Afghans therefore feel that they have seen this before – the coalition will leave, there will be mass bloodshed, and the Afghans will have to sort out the problems themselves.

The Taliban also has the impression that the coalition will leave in 18 months and have adopted a political strategy of intimidation. They say «look, you might work with the coalition today, but they will be gone in 18 months, and whose side will you be on then? We will still be here. The coalition will be gone. Think carefully before you decide to help the international community.» That is the main problem with the 18-month limit.

The third key limitation is space. We have not undertaken any serious effort to deal with the safe-havens in Pakistan. Again, I would not necessarily blame the Pakistani government for what happens in Pakistan, but it remains a fact that the Pakistani army and the Pakistani government have never ever taken any kind of serious action against the training camps, the recruitment system, or the financial systems that support the Afghan Taliban from inside Pakistan. A lot of the work that the Pakistani government is doing now is targeting the Pakistani Taliban and other terrorist organizations associated with radical groups inside Pakistan. There has yet to materialize a serious effort to target the Afghan Taliban, and, as mentioned, there are still people in Pakistan that continue to see the Afghan Taliban as an insurance policy.

The last limitation is that President Obama specifically de-emphasized

nation building, stating in his speech that «the nation that I'm most interested in building is our own.» His strategy is closely aligned to defeating and dismantling Al-Qaida. I have worked in Afghanistan since 2001 and have yet to meet anybody that has actually seen an Al-Qaida operative in Afghanistan. The intelligence people have publicly given an estimate that there are at most 100 Al-Qaida operatives in Afghanistan, there is the occasional terrorist attack that gets traced back to Al-Qaida, but the problem of instability in Afghanistan is not about Al-Qaida. Rather, it is about the Taliban, about government weakness and corruption, and about the cycle of instability. If you are not going to deal with that, your way of addressing the problem is going to be quite limited.

It is an open question whether that limited strategy is likely to be viable in Afghanistan. I am not going to say it is not going to work, because wars are unpredictable. It therefore might work, but we nevertheless have to ask ourselves if the limited strategy has a better chance of working than the current strategy, which obviously has not been very successful.

Notwithstanding all that, at the operational and tactical level I actually see a lot of reasons to be cautiously optimistic about what is happening in Afghanistan. There is a new, excellent leadership team. With General McChrystal, General Rodriguez, and General Caldwell, we finally have a leadership team with a thorough understanding of the problem and about what they need to do.

The creation of the ISAF Joint Headquarters makes a big difference as well. Until the middle of 2009, ISAF headquarters was trying to be both a strategic, operational, and tactical headquarters, all at the same time. Although it employed 1200 people, it was not able to deliver on the broad set of tasks it needed to address. Bringing in a headquarters underneath it, to act as an operational manoeuvre headquarters, has freed up ISAF headquarters, so that it is able to focus on some of the issues that it really needed to be focusing on all along.

In my view, the Community Defence Initiative (CDI), now known as Local Defence Initiative (LDI), is another very positive development. Also, reconciliation and reintegration programs that have been running for a long time have really started to pick up some speed now and may possibly influence the conflict. Moreover, we are starting to see some positive improvements in air power targeting and in counterinsurgency tactics, leading to a drop in civilian casualties. The combat action is increasing, but the damage to civil society is starting to level off, a sign that the air forces are starting to operate in a more effective fashion.

However, there are a lot of risks in the environment. The enemy could simply wait us out, thinking that we will be leaving in 18 months. They could decide to go to Pakistan, rest and refit, and simply come back when we leave. That is sort of what they did to the Soviets, in fact. Pakistan remains highly unstable and could spin out of control in a fairly short timeframe. Also, the idea of transfer of lead security responsibility, or TLSR, a key element of the 18-month strategy, is still somewhat undefined. That represents risk, for example, if you try to transition the whole country at the same time or without a clear understanding of stability indicators to decide when and where to transition.

Moreover, the political will in Western capitals has been pretty shaky. In fact, some of the hearts and minds we need to win are in Norway, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and so on. That is completely reasonable, considering that we have been in the country for 9 years. However this is one risk connected to the 18-month strategy – if we do not show measurable progress in a reasonable timeframe, it is possible that people will start to lose hope.

The new Karzai cabinet is actually pretty good, in my view. Still, to many Afghans, it falls short in comparison to the revolutionary promises put forward in front of the election. Also, we have to admit that the growth targets for the Afghan national army and police are unrealistic. It is going to be extremely difficult to generate the number of Afghan soldiers or the quality of Afghan police that we need in the timeframe and resources we have available. Two bad policemen are not better than one good policeman, it is worse. One of the problems we have in expanding the police in the past is that the quality has gone down. General Caldwell has a plan to turn this around – so if anyone can do it, he can, but it is a tough job.

In a survey done in January 2010, Afghans were asked which different elements of the Afghan government they paid bribes to during the last year. The Afghan army was seen as the cleanest element in the Afghan government; the most corrupt element was seen as the Afghan police. Importantly, the Afghan police represent the government to a lot of Afghans. If you live in a village in rural Afghanistan, you really don't see anyone from the central government or the provincial government; the only government representatives you see are the local policeman. If he is corrupt and ripping you off, your perception of that policeman tends to shape your perception of the entire government.

As for predictions of what is likely to happen in Afghanistan the next days and months, I think it is likely that the Taliban will switch from an insurgency strategy to a terrorist strategy. They might start focusing on bombs in the

city centers, on putting Taliban cells into the cities, on running an intimidation campaign against key parts of the government and the civil society, and thereby keep everybody fearful and uncertain. They may use a terrorist campaign in the cities to pull back their main fighting units, so that they can rest, refit, and recoup so that they are ready to fight again at the end of the 18-month period. Also, Pakistan is unlikely to threaten any Taliban safe havens inside Pakistan, especially if the Afghan Taliban does not attack any Pakistani targets.

The Taliban propaganda approach will be to say that «we are here, we are from here, we are never leaving, whereas the international community is pulling out in 18 months. And when they leave, we will take over. Therefore, you'd better not support the international community.»

The increase in the number of ISAF troops will definitely improve the security situation the next 18 months. There will certainly be a more secure environment in some parts of the country as the new troops pour in. The problem will not be one of security, but rather how to translate that improved security into something permanent. The improvements will be real, but will be linked to the surge of foreign troops. And as we start to pull back, it is likely that the gains will be lost.

The Afghan security forces will grow, but will struggle to reach the levels we have set as targets. Moreover, the quality of both the army and the police will deteriorate a little bit from where they are now. The Afghan government will improve significantly in terms of corruption, governance, and a variety of other issues, but it remains an open question whether or not they will improve enough to be able to govern effectively as ISAF starts to pull back.

These are pretty easy predictions to make, but there are at least three «wild cards,» or unpredictable factors, as well. The first one is LDI. This is a new movement that started about 6 months ago, where local communities have started to defend themselves against the Taliban. There had been a number of different attempts to make this work in Afghanistan earlier, but this is different. Under LDI, local members are going into areas where three conditions occur. First, there is a very strong Taliban shadow government. Second, the local population is already fighting the Taliban, or third, they have made a direct request for military aid.

Unlike earlier efforts, where we armed new local militias and ran the risk of creating new warlords, we are now registering groups already fighting the Taliban and helping them to organize better, if they show some allegiance to the central government and the broader international community. That has the potential to be a transformative event in the war in Afghanistan. It is

entirely possible that this movement will spread in the next 18 months to the point where people become self-defending, and then might be able to link those self-defending communities to a viable construct, thereby creating a partnership with the local Afghan government. However, the effort might also go bad and instead create a thousand new, local militia commanders. Right now the effort seems to be on the right track, but it is still a bit too early to tell.

The second wild-card issue is reconciliation and reintegration: There has been a lot of talk concerning negotiating with the Taliban. In my view, whether or not one should go through with that depends on what you mean by negotiations and what you mean by Taliban. If you are talking about negotiating with members of the Quetta Shura in terms of presenting some kind of «surrender»-deal, I think it is highly unlikely that you will get any sort of negotiations happening right now. That is because the Quetta Shura sees itself in a strong position and believes that as long as it keeps fighting, it will achieve its objectives. And while ever the enemy thinks it has more to gain by fighting than by talking, they are unlikely to get into serious negotiations. To my mind, that is probably why the Mecca process failed in 2008, because the Afghan government and the Taliban were negotiating at cross purposes. They were not really in the same negotiation.

But if on the other hand you are talking about bringing in a bunch of local leaders who are currently aligned with the Taliban because they are Pashtun nationalists, because they don't trust the Karzai government, because they have some kind of local tribal or economic interests, or some other less important reason, then I think we would have a significant chance of turning around the process. The Taliban-aligned community elders I met with in December 2009 are close to the Quetta Shura, but they hate Al-Qaida, and they hate the Pakistani government. In fact, one of the things they hate about the war is that they have to live in Pakistan. They say «we just want to come back, but we don't trust this government. We want a deal that allows us to come back and have a place in Afghan society.» There are a lot of people like that out there.

The final wild card, or new development that I think is very important, is the increasing role of the Afghan parliament. In 2001, we ended up with a presidential system, where the parliament did not have a lot of power, and one of the sources of tension in Kabul, between the different ministries, inside the cabinet and in terms of administering the country ever since then, has been the tension between a presidential style of administration and a system where the parliament has more say. In the aftermath of the very corrupt elections of August 2009, we saw the parliament becoming much more active and

demanding of the president and starting to exercise its role as a forum where leaders of Afghan society can come together and resolve issues, as well as a check on the power of the executive. This has continued to develop as we have gone through the process of cabinet formation recently performed by the Karzai government, and this is a new development in Afghan politics that could potentially be very positive.

To conclude, if you would ask me where I was in terms of a «glass half-full/glass half-empty» type of scale right now, I am very much glass half full. There are many problems with the strategy, there are a lot of problems connected to what we have been trying to do in the past, and it is easy to see how the whole thing could go bad. But, I also see some pretty positive new developments, and depending on how this develops in the next 18 months, we may see some significant improvements. It is really an open question at this moment, and it is too early to tell what the final result will be in Afghanistan.

Epilogue: The Many-Leveled Conflict of Afghanistan

Professor Torbjørn L. Knutsen

In his opening remarks to this conference, the commander of the Academy wished that these proceedings would heighten our knowledge of Afghanistan. In my closing comments I would like to assure him that his wish has been granted. I, for once, am leaving this seminar with a far better knowledge of Afghanistan, its conflict and the Western engagement there than when I came three days ago.

This new knowledge has altered my assessment of the possibilities for allied success in Afghanistan, but only by a little bit. If I had been asked to make a *prologue* for this seminar, I would have sketched a bleak picture of the situation – I would probably have summarized my view of Afghanistan by the old quip, «It is always darkest just before it goes totally black.» Now that I am asked to make the epilogue, and I have the advantage of more than a dozen informative lectures on the subject, I am more optimistic. I no longer entertain an outlook of uniform blackness. Three days of presentations have made me conceive of our engagements in Afghanistan in more optimistic shades of charcoal.

I will try, in this epilogue, to arrange my new knowledge on three levels of analysis – three different mental shelves, as it were. I will begin with what I have learnt about the people who are affected by the conflict, because I think I have learnt most about them. I will then make some comments about what I have learnt about the country itself. Finally, I will make some observations about the international system within which this country, and its conflict, is encased.

Since every genuine increase of knowledge also involves a heightened awareness of one's ignorance, I will add to each level of analysis some questions that entered my mind during these proceedings – questions that I did not have when I arrived three days ago, but which troubles my mind now that I am about to depart.

The Individual Level

Several of the lecturers have imparted much valuable knowledge about the individuals who are engaged in or affected by the Afghan war, from Sultana Parvanta's and Lt. Col. Knotten's opening lectures on ordinary men and women who deal with the situation daily to David Kilcullen's closing lecture on the nature of the insurgency. Ms. Parvanta sketched a thought-provoking image of people who have suffered 30 years of war and who are, as a result, deeply marked by a collective post-traumatic stress disorder. Lt. Col. Knotten gave a fine portrayal of the tasks of the Western soldiers. He communicated well their dedication and proficiency, their routine relations with local leaders and the important role they played in maintaining civil order and safety in a situation of conflict and war.

Dr. David Kilcullen portrayed the insurgents. He portrayed them as individuals, and, in doing so, he outlined the contours both of an elusive «enemy» and of «an Afghan way of war.» He identified Afghan attitudes and values that are meaningful in their native context but which may be hard to grasp outside that context. The Afghan approach to war does not always dovetail with the more rational, cost-benefit calculations of Western military analysis.

I would like to gain more anthropological insight into these «insurgents» and their non-Western way of war. What kind of complex phenomenon is it that we find behind the glib and easy label «the Taliban»? How does the organization work? Who are the leaders? How unified are they? What do they want?

In addition, I would like to know more about the individuals on the Western side of the conflict. Especially about the Western leaders who initially framed the mission – the politicians who formulated the goals as well as the military planners who assessed the requirements needed. What were they thinking? And how did their thoughts and actions evolve over time?

They knew that al-Qaeda had organized terror operations in the past, both against the West and against the West's Middle Eastern allies – long before the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. They knew that al-Qaeda was an enemy of the West. Thus, their first goal was phrased in individual terms, viz., to capture al-Qaeda's leader, Osama bin Laden. Their second goal was phrased in social term: to destroy al-Qaeda as an organization.

The first goal was never met. Osama bin Laden escaped during the confused battle of Tora Bora and was never caught. Why? Where did he go? Who sponsors him? And how badly did Western leaders prioritise his capture over the years?

The second goal was quickly reached. However, al-Qaeda was scarcely destroyed before NATO shifted its attention and began to fight the Taliban. I have often wondered about this development. First, because the Taliban was never a terror organization with foreign cells and international reach. True, Afghanistan's Taliban government had hosted Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda jihadists; it had intolerant views and repressive practices and represented an obnoxious kind of social organization. Yet, it was not an international network of terror, but a domestic movement.

Second, the Taliban has established itself as a major player in the region, and to exclude it from all efforts to establish order and peace would yield a victors' peace – and such a peace tends to be unstable and transitory (and may be illustrated e.g. by the 1919 negotiated peace at Versailles, from which Germany was excluded). Third, the Taliban government of the late 1990s may have been the closest Afghanistan had come in many decades to a country-wide force of order. Yet, the West not only excluded Taliban representatives from the negotiations of order and peace, it defined the Taliban as enemies, fought them and tried to destroy their organization. Why? Was this behaviour the result of a dispassionate analysis of the correlation of forces in the region? Did the West carefully analyse the nature of the Taliban and consider its role in Afghan society before consciously deciding to fight it? Was the fighting a result of a failure to think? Or was it the result of a failure to think dispassionately? Or was it an unwitting result of a creeping evolution of an unfortunate combination of events?

The answer, perhaps, lies in the third Western goal: i.e. to make sure that Afghanistan could not be used as a staging area for international terrorism in the future. Or rather, the answer may lie in the way the third goal was implemented: For at one point, the West announced that Afghanistan was a failed state and that it should be rebuilt as a democracy. This announcement raises big questions. First, because Afghanistan has never been a proper state; so there was nothing there to rebuild. Second, because building a democracy in Afghanistan was wildly unrealistic. The Western announcement must have been fuelled by a moral or an ideological agenda. And the fact that its basic ideas circulated so widely suggests that the United States and its NATO allies were badly informed both about democracy and about the country they invaded in the late fall of 2001. Did Western leaders really believe that democracy was possible? Did they not see that even the establishment of a unified state structure would be an Augean task? Did political leaders consult the many military historians who have gleaned three Anglo-Afghan wars to understand why Great Britain retreated without victory in any of them? Did

any military planners study the Soviet-Afghan war to discover why 120,000 ruthless Soviet soldiers failed to impose their will on the Afghan people? Did anyone approach Russian veterans for clues to the Soviet debacle in the late 1980s?

The Americans seemed to invade with nothing but military plans in their kit; the Bush-administration made it perfectly clear that it would not engage in nation building. The Europeans seemed to have had skimpy knowledge of the country and wildly unrealistic ambitions about the kind of nation that could be built. And, frankly, NATO did not seem to have its attention riveted exclusively on Afghanistan: the US government would soon switch its priorities and resources to Iraq, whereas the Europeans seemed more preoccupied with the future of NATO rather than with that of Afghanistan.

It is one thing to invade a country while badly prepared. It is another to learn as the operation evolves. How fast did Western soldiers learn? And how they relay their lessons to their own leaders? And how fast did the leaders learn? What do they think about the Taliban now, after eight years of war? What do Western planners think about the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban today? Al-Qaeda is broken and scattered. The Taliban is strong – and it seems to be expanding its presence. How do the Western leaders intend to implement their third goal in this new situation? Did they ever consider negotiation with Taliban representatives? Are they willing to consider the possibility now?

Questions such as these were addressed at great length during the second day of this seminar. I will not spend my time reviewing the debate, but I will just note that the take-home messages for leaders, who are charged with the unenviable tasks of defining goals of war and with planning operations, seem to be these: How do you learn to understand the nature of your enemy? How do you formulate realistic goals? How do you formulate realistic goals that go beyond those that are strictly military and that convert battlefield victory to political order? How, in short, do you convert battlefield victory into political order? And, if you start on the wrong foot, how quickly can you learn from your mistakes and adjust your course? The answers to these questions do not lie exclusively in the minds of Western and Afghan leaders. They also lie in the particular social and geographical context of the war. They lie in Afghanistan itself.

The National Level

Most of the lectures of this conference have shown a deep, first-hand knowledge of Afghanistan, and they have generously shared their knowledge and impressions. A couple of these impressions stand out in my mind. The first is that Afghanistan is a wild and vast and varied territory. It is too heterogeneous to be meaningfully presented as a nation. It is too fractured to be termed a nation-state.

Strand, Parvanta, and other lecturers maintained that Afghanistan has always been divided, each segment having its own system of order. These systems of order unravelled during 30 or 40 years of violent struggle: During the 1970s, communist coups sought to reform them. During the 1980s, Soviet occupants sought to replace them. During the 1990s, a new variety of war lords shook them deeply – and paved the way for the Taliban. So, not only is Afghanistan *not* a state; its traditional mechanisms of order have unravelled. New systems of order have to be imposed. But by whom? And how? And where?

I was not surprised to learn that the order imposed by the Karzai government in Kabul is trusted by few and resented by many. But I was surprised to hear that village councils are still very much alive in many places. And I'd like to know more about such surviving institutions or order. Also, I would like to know more about Western efforts to establish new civil institutions. I'd like to know more about the Community Defence Initiatives and the Reconciliation Programs. And I'd like to know more about the intersection between Afghanistan's traditional systems of justice, rule, and order and these new programs initiated by the West. For if there is a constructive confluence between the two, this intersection represents, in my mind at least, large glimmers of light.

Are these Western reforms stepping stones for democracy in Afghanistan? I doubt it very much – and I have over the last three days heard no lecturer claim that they are. Also, Western politicians have removed notions of an Afghan democracy from their speeches. For, frankly, time is long overdue to acknowledge that Afghanistan will not become a democracy any time soon. The preconditions for a Western-type of democratic rule do simply not exist.

Social scientists have long ago identified some of the basic preconditions for democratic rule. One factor stands out as more important than any other: a unified, working state. Afghanistan does not have that. Once such a state is in place, there are several other elements that need to be present for democracy to strike root. One of them is a certain level of wealth – some scholars make the point that no democracy has ever been established in a country with less than \$3700 GDP per capita. Another precondition is a minimum of working

civil associations. A third is a certain level of popular literacy. A fourth is an impartial civil service anchored in law and systems of political accountability. A fifth precondition is an industrial base that can maintain a certain level of productivity and financial services to sustain a thriving middle class – which will serve as a fiscal base on which a monopoly of taxation can draw in order to fund both a monopoly of force and an apparatus of trusted civil servants. Afghanistan does not merely lack one or two or three of these preconditions; it lacks all of them.

Neither Great Britain in the 19th century nor the Soviet Union in the 20th century succeeded in establishing a central government in Afghanistan. Can NATO? A democracy is out of the question. But can the USA and NATO, aided by the international community, pave the way for another kind of orderly governance on this poor, long-suffering population?

The lecturers at this seminar have provided three rays of hope. First, there has been full agreement that the Afghan people must be at the centre of gravity in NATO's efforts. This is a ray of hope, for it involves an entirely new approach to the Afghan conflict, as David Kilcullen explained.

Second, there has been full agreement over the last three days that military might is necessary to *keep* order, but that it alone cannot *build* an order. That large-scale involvement of civil agents is absolutely necessary if a stable, self-sustaining social order is to be established in the country. This is a ray of hope, because it makes a clean break with the curious claim of the first Bush administration: that the United States was not in Afghanistan to do nation-building but to bring justice.

From this emerges a third ray of hope: That although the establishment of an effective central government in Kabul is unlikely, it may nevertheless be possible to establish systems of governance on local or regional levels. This possibility was suggested by Kilcullen. It informed the US approach in the final days of the Bush administration. It seems to inform the approach of President Obama.

I would, however, like to know more about the mechanisms involved in this regional possibility. How do Western forces, in its daily practice, work to keep common people safe? And how do they actually work with civil actors to translate this force-based order into legitimate systems of self-sustaining, local governance?

For is it possible, I wonder, for Western forces to help establish local order in *some* of Afghanistan's 365 districts? Is possible to carefully expand such order and carefully nurse into life local systems of law and institutions of accountability? Is it possible to connect some of these systems into larger,

provincial segments or order? And can this produce pockets of regional integration, order and peace over time?

The West seems to have worked with a unified state model in mind. However, Afghanistan is a fragmented country and it may be wise to put aside all ambitions of establishing a unified state anytime soon. The country has never had a monopoly of force. It lacks a legitimate fiscal service. And in the highly unlikely possibility that the country were to establish such a service, it is so poor and its domestic tax base so small, that it alone cannot sustain a monopoly of force that is adequate to meet domestic or regional challenges. An Afghan order will have to rely on large international donations for the unforeseeable future.

If we suspend the idea of a unified Afghanistan, we are pushed to think in terms of other, more traditional and composite social formations. We may think in terms of a divided land. Or we may think in terms of (con)federal arrangements, built from below by local pockets of order having spread over time and fanned out over steadily larger areas.

But however we think about Afghanistan, we will have to face the difficult core question of what to do with the Taliban. Should its supporters be invited to take part in this order-building project? Should Taliban leaders be integrated into emerging systems of order? Or should they be kept out?

Over eight years, Taliban leaders have been kept out of Western plans for a (re)constructed Afghanistan. However, if a consensus has finally emerged that no military solution exists, then I am tempted to add that no political solution exists either, unless Taliban leaders are fully integrated into in a process of reconciliation and power sharing. The implications of this are vast and disturbing. For it means putting Western ideology and moral agendas aside. The implications may, however, not be as deeply disturbing at it appears on first sight. For if we have jettisoned the idea of Afghanistan as a unified state, we also open up for other, more flexible – and more palatable – solutions. Among them is an idea of a divided or diverse Afghanistan – akin to the diverse Germany established after the Napoleonic Wars or the divided Germany established after World War II. A largely Pashtu Afghanistan may, perhaps, be established in the south, and a more diverse Afghan confederation in the north? Such scenarios, however, cannot be implemented by the West and by the Afghans alone. It is a vast operation that must be carried out on a regional and international level.

The International Level

On one level, it is a mistake to fight the Taliban. It is the wrong enemy. Repugnant though the Taliban might be, it did not have an international terror network in 2001 and 2002; it did not represent a threat to the West. It was a threat to the extent that it associated with and protected al-Qaeda. But al-Qaeda has been greatly weakened since 2001 – the West has captured or killed many of its leaders; the Islamic world has increasingly turned its back to the organization, because it has killed thousands of ordinary Muslims over the last few years. However, although al-Qaeda has long been on the ropes, the influence of jihadist Islamism has grown in the larger region. Also, the influence of the Taliban has grown; Western opposition has not decimated organization; it rather seems to have scattered it.

On a more general level, it is easy to understand why the Taliban is a threat. If we move from the national level and the question of order on to the international level of analysis, as some of the lecturers have done these past three days, we can see how the Taliban represents a larger threat. We can also see that the Afghan war has been fought in a badly defined regional context: It was long fought with no apparent attention to a regional diplomacy.

For the last 30 years or so, the Afghanistan wars were never isolated to Afghanistan alone. They were spun into a complex web of regional politics. Afghanistan is surrounded by powers that would not trust each other across the street. They joust and they bargain and they all have a dog in the Afghan fight. This is most decisively the case with Pakistan – with which Afghanistan shares a porous border and a vast Pashtu population. The remnants of al-Qaeda are, in all likelihood, hiding on the Pakistani side of that border – in the northern tribal areas or in North Waziristan.

The second most influential player in the region is Iran, whose government has sometimes opposed the Taliban and sometimes negotiated with its leaders. India is also an influential actor, weary of Pakistan's designs to support and influence Afghanistan's Pashtu population, including the madrassas and its Talibs. Russia, too, is a substantial force in the region. The leaders in the Kremlin have carefully watched the Western operations – partly with anxiety and partly with malicious glee. There are other actors too, none of them eager to see the Afghan conflict end on terms that they deem as disadvantageous to themselves.

NATO's leaders have failed to construct a regional diplomatic effort to complement their military operations. For the longest time, it did not seem to have a firm Pakistan policy. Does it have one now? As long as Bush was in office, he did not even consider talking to Iran. He never tried, to my

knowledge, to establish any kind of regional council where the West could gather Afghanistan's neighbours, inform them, monitor their reactions, and, perhaps, most importantly, allow them to exchange views and abuse. The new Obama administration has sent signals that suggest the establishment of such a regional council. How far has this process come?

But there is a higher level of analysis still – a systemic level of the large scale and the long term. Col. Crowder mentioned this level, and I think it touches a core concern of the West. In fact, I think we cannot understand the many misjudgements made in the early phases of the Afghan war without bringing in this systemic level of analysis. For it touches the substantial, common interest of the United States and all its Western allies in defending a modern, economically integrated, orderly, and democratic world.

Consider the big, world historic canvas for a moment. After World War II, Western Europe managed, with the initial assistance of the United States, to overcome a long history of rivalry, instability, violence, and war. During the second half of the 20th century, Asia and Latin-America followed; they too grew more peaceful and wealthy. This development was driven by processes of economic integration, constitutional politics, technological modernization, wealth creation, and middle-class formation. It has, by all indicators, been a remarkable transformation – perhaps the most remarkable transformation in recent human history. This development has, over the last 40 or 50 years, lifted millions of people out of chronic conflict, poverty, and degradation.

Look around the world today. There is order, peace, and growth on an unprecedented scale on the international scene. In Europe, East Asia, and Latin America, there is less violence and war than ever. Only one major region is an exception to this general pattern of progress: A vast belt that stretches from the Eastern Mediterranean, across the Middle East and the Fertile Crescent to the Hindu Kush and beyond. This vast belt is the major region of conflict in the contemporary world. The belt includes Iran and Iraq, the Caucasus, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and parts of India. This region represents the most fertile ground for extreme and backward-looking ideologies and religions that inform the most insistent anti-modern forces and anti-Western movements in today's world.

In this large perspective, the struggle against the Taliban makes sense. It does, in fact, make doubly sense. First, it makes emotional sense, because the Taliban has, in the imagination of the West, become a convenient symbol for all the forces that resist the progress of prosperity and peace in the region. If the military forces of the West were to throw in the towel and vacate Afghanistan, warlords and Taliban-like systems of rule may well take command over

significant parts of the country and encourage like-minded actors throughout this unruly region. Such systems are repressive and arbitrary. They inhibit long-distance trade and condemn their inhabitants to poverty and deprivation. They especially condemn millions of girls and women to lives of degradation and abuse.

Second, the struggle against the Taliban makes material sense. This region is unruly; it was destabilized by the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the wake of which many Soviet republics seized the opportunity to proclaim themselves independent and enter into fights over unclear borders and engage in regional games of influence. This would not affect the West in any major way were it not for one unfortunate thing: This unruly region has been endowed with most of the world's known reservoirs of oil and gas – which is needed to sustain the wealth creation, the progress, and the peace that have transformed the 20th century, and to fuel those processes into the 21st.

Concluding Comments

Viewed from the high-level, systemic perspective, the Afghanistan engagement is a worthy engagement. From the point of view of the nation-level, the Afghanistan engagement appears dicey at best; the engagement is laden with difficulties – the enemy is unclear, and the Western goals have been over-ambitious; they have hinged on dubious assumption about Afghanistan being a (failed) state and that this state can be governed according to Western principles of popular sovereignty.

At an individual level, the war is, like all wars, fraught with tragedy. But it is also marked by decency and heroic accomplishments – not the least when it comes to basic, human relations. It is also marked by professional dedication of a very high standard.

On the level of the large-scale and the long-term, the Afghan war has become part of an effort to defend established Western values. During the 1980s, Afghan wars played a role in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Twenty years later, they challenge the safety, the stability and the standards of justice of the Western world.

I hope that the approach I have presented here – that the Afghan war is a conflict of many layers – may help capture and systematise some of the war's complexities. But I hope most of all that it may help bring out some of the war's dilemmas. The most serious of these dilemmas is embodied in the third goal of the Western intervention – i.e. the effort to establish an order that will prevent Afghanistan from being used as a future staging area for anti-Western

activities. It is still possible, I believe, to meet this goal and establish a national order in Afghanistan, but only if Pashtu leaders with Taliban associations are brought into the process of reconciliation and power sharing. This, however, is a deeply troublesome solution. On one level, the West will help establish an order that will counter the most basic Enlightenment ideals of freedom and sovereignty that lies at the heart of the West's own societies. On another level, the continued progress of the West, and of an increasing number of non-Western regions as well, will be imperilled if actors like the Taliban expand their influence over this vast and unruly region, over its peoples and over its substantial resources. It is a contradictory and a perilous outcome. But it may be the only one that is practically obtainable at the moment – and only if we are lucky, send skilful diplomats and sponsor the resulting institutions with generous funds for a long time to come.

Om forfatterne

Brigader Øyvind Strandman

Brigader Øyvind Strandman har meget bred erfaring fra både operativ- og stabstjeneste i Luftforsvaret og Forsvaret. Han har gjennomført Forsvarsakademiet i København og Air War College i USA. Her tok han også en Mastergrad i strategiske studier. Han ledet ISL-prosessen og var senere sjef for ARGUS som hadde ansvaret for den største omstillingen i Forsvaret noen gang. Han sitter nå i stillingen som Luftforsvarets Utdanningsinspektør med et helhetlig ansvar for utdanning og kompetanse i Luftforsvaret.

Forsvarsminister Grete Faremo

Forsvarsminister Grete Faremo (Ap) er utdannet jurist fra Universitetet i Oslo med spesialfag i folkerett. Hun har lang og bred politisk erfaring, bl.a. som bistandsminister i 1990–1992, justisminister i 1992–1996 og olje- og energiminister i 1996. Hun har også bred erfaring fra næringslivet hvor hun bl.a. har vært konserndirektør i Storebrand og direktør for jus og samfunnskontakt i Microsoft. Faremo overtok som forsvarsminister 21. oktober 2009.

Dr. Sultana Parvanta

Sultana Parvanta er født og oppvokst i Afghanistan. Hun tok sin PhD ved Indiana University i USA i 1986 innenfor temaet »Social Change; Organizational Development». Hun har bred akademisk erfaring fra USA, og har i de siste årene hovedsakelig arbeidet i Kabul med utviklingsoppgaver for den afghanske regjeringen. Parvanta blir ofte benyttet som foredragsholder av NATO, og hun er rådgiver ved trening av stabsoffiserer til ISAF.

Forsker Arne Strand

Arne Strand er forskningsleder ved Christian Michelsens institutt i Bergen og er en av Norges fremste Afghanistan-spesialister. Han har spesialisering i etterkrigs-gjenoppbygging og koordinering av humanitær støtte i komplekse scenarier. Strand har publisert en rekke artikler og bokkapitler om situasjonen i Afghanistan.

Oberstløytnant Ivar Knotten

Oberstløytnant Ivar Knotten har bakgrunn fra Hærens samband og har tjenestegjort i en rekke stillinger fra troppsnivå til bataljonssjef for sambandsbataljonen 2006–2008. Han har sin utdannelse fra Krigsskolen, Forsvarets stabsskole og US Army Command and General Staff College. Knotten var sjef for det norskledede Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) i Meymaneh fra desember 2008–juni 2009.

Dr. Christine Fair

Christine Fair er statsviter og Assistant Professor ved Center for Peace and Security Studies (CPASS) ved Georgetown University. Hun har jobbet for bl.a. RAND Corporation og the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) i Kabul, og er Senior Fellow ved the Counter Terrorism Center ved West Point. Hennes forskning har særlig rettet seg mot politiske og militære forhold i Sør-Asia. Hun har utgitt en rekke artikler og bøker innen sitt fagfelt og har lang praktisk erfaring fra feltarbeid i Afghanistan og Pakistan.

Oberst Gary Crowder

Gary Crowder er oberst i US Air Force (USAF), og tjenestegjør som Deputy Director for Command and Control ved Directorate of Air Operations i hovedkvarteret til USAF. Han har tidligere fungert som sjef for Strategy, Concepts, and Doctrine Division ved USAF Air Combat Command, samt som kommandør for 609th Air and Space Operations Center ved Headquarters USAF Central. Oberst Crowder innehar to mastergrader, fra henholdsvis National War College og Johns Hopkins University.

Dr. Torunn Laugen Haaland

Torunn Laugen Haaland er dr.polit. i statsvitenskap fra Universitetet i Oslo og ansatt ved Institutt for forsvarsstudier/Forsvarets Høgskole, hvor hun bl.a. forsker på erfaringshåndtering i norske militære operasjoner i Afghanistan.

Major Dag Henriksen

Major Dag Henriksen har operativ bakgrunn fra K&V-bransjen, og har bl.a. tjenestegjort ved ISAF HQ, Kabul, Afghanistan, høsten 2007. Henriksen har studert historie og statsvitenskap ved NTNU, Trondheim, gått fire år som kadett ved Luftkrigsskolen (KS I og KS II), og har en PhD fra University of Glasgow. Han gikk Forsvarets Stabsskole 2009-2010 (Fellesoperasjonsmodul),

og tjenestegjør i dag som hovedlærer ved Avd. for luftmakt og teknologi (ALMT) ved Luftkrigsskolen.

Manizha Bakhtari

Manizha Bakhtari ble utnevnt til afghansk ambassadør til de nordiske landene i september 2009. Før utnevnelsen var hun stabssjef for den afghanske utenriksministeren, i tillegg til at hun underviste ved Kabul universitet. Hun har en bachelorgrad i journalistikk og en mastergrad i persiske språk og litteratur fra Kabul universitet. Hun har skrevet om utfordringer afghanske kvinner møter i sitt dagligliv.

Abdul Aziz Babakarkhail

Abdul Aziz Babakarkhail jobber for den afghanske regjeringens Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), hvor han har stillingen som Senior Economic Advisor & head of the PRTs Unit. Han har tidligere jobbet for den afghanske sentralbanken. Babakarkhail er norsk statsborger, og er utdannet Cand. Oecon. fra Universitetet i Oslo.

Ine-Marie Eriksen Søreide

Ine-Marie Eriksen Søreide er utdannet jurist og er stortingsrepresentant for Høyre, som leder for utenriks- og forsvarskomiteen. Hun har møtt på Stortinget siden 2001 og er nå inne i sin andre periode som fast representant. Søreide er en av Høyres mest profilerte representanter og har innehatt en rekke politiske verv. Hun har tidligere vært leder av kirke-, utdannings- og forskningskomiteen.

Carl Waldemar Wilhelmsen

Carl Waldemar Wilhelmsen er kadett ved Luftkrigsskolen og har erfaring fra Kontroll og Varsling (K&V) med tjeneste fra både Luftving 131 Sørreisa og Luftving 130 Mågerø. Kadett Wilhelmsen har utsjekk fra begge faggrupper innenfor K&V, og er ved siden av arbeidet engasjert i ulike forsvarsorganisasjoner og fagforeningsarbeid. Etter endt utdanning har Wilhelmsen fått stilling ved Luftving 131 Sørreisa, men skal etter kort tid på oppsetning til Afghanistan.

Dr. David Kilcullen

David Kilcullen har sin PhD fra University of New South Wales, hvor han drøftet effektene av geriljakrig på ikke-statlige politiske systemer i tradisjonelle samfunn. Kilcullen har tidligere tjenestegjort som offiser i den australske

hæren og var en av de sentrale arkitektene bak endringen av den amerikanske strategien i Irak og i utviklingen av den amerikanske hærens manual FM 3-24 om antiopprørskrig (COIN). Han har senere arbeidet med Afghanistan. Han utga boken *The Accidental Guerilla* i 2009 og har publisert en rekke artikler innenfor sitt fagfelt.

Professor Torbjørn Knutsen

Torbjørn Knutsen er professor i statsvitenskap ved NTNU samt professor II ved Luftkrigsskolen. Knutsen har sin PhD i International Relations fra University of Denver. Han har skrevet flere bøker om internasjonal politikk, er mye brukt som foredragsholder, og har vært gjesteforsker ved en rekke anerkjente institusjoner i inn- og utland. Hans akademiske interesseområder inkluderer internasjonal politikk, norsk og amerikansk utenrikspolitikk, og terrorisme. Knutsen er medlem av regjeringens sikkerhetspolitiske utvalg.

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Nytt kampfly – hvilket og til hva? (2007)

Norsk luftmakt – tilbake til fremtiden? (2008)

Luftmakt og teknologi – realisme eller overmot? Hvilken effekt har moderne teknologi i krig? (2009)