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Master thesis

“The United States Rebalancing Toward Asia”:
Implications for Europe

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Foreword

To have had the privilege to study a subject of my own choice, listen to other scholars, debate with friends and relatives while enjoying life in a foreign country – for that I am grateful.

Several of you have contributed in making it possible, and to all of you I send my deepest gratitude. Some of you are worth an extra acknowledgment. First of all, my deepest appreciation to Camilla, my wife, for letting me away both physically and mentally while writing this thesis. Meanwhile, you were taking care of our daughters – thank you.

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Finally, I would like to thank the Swedish Armed Forces for letting me spend one year in Oslo, Norway, allowing me to learn more about the Norwegian culture, history, our nations' commonalities and, maybe most importantly, that our national differences are far greater than we believe. In addition, new friendships have been built, which will forever remind me of Norway.

Anders Wendel

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There are over two thousand years of experience to tell us that the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out.

Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Thoughts on War*, 1943¹

¹ Liddell Hart 1943:115

Summary

The aim of this thesis is to examine and discuss the historical and current pretexts of *to what degree the United States is rebalancing toward Asia, and to discuss what implications it has for Europe*. The aim is reached by analyzing a selected portion of political and military declaratory policies and implemented actions 1945 to 2014 by the President of The United States. Based on the findings, the thesis ends with the discussion of the implications it has for Europe

The theoretical idea used is based on previous studies that analyzed declaratory policies and planned actions/operational policies. As previous scholars have focused on *exploring* differences between the declaratory policies and planned actions or on *explaining* the outcome of different levels actions within the administrations, a new model was developed analyzing the *attention* given by the same level within the administration. By using a mixed method of statistical and qualitative data, the *attention* could be measured and the degree of rebalancing concluded.

During the time period studied, The United States has always paid attention to the Pacific Command. Within the declaratory policies studied, no degree of rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identified but within the implemented actions studied the degree of rebalancing was high from 1985 to 2005, and today just maintained. The conclusions are marred with the demarcations made of only analyzing one actor within the political and military field. This method is possibly the wrong way of addressing the debate of rebalancing and what it really means—whether it is from the political and/or military fields to other power systems such as the economic or technical. Or is it a type of war fatigue that occurs approximately every 20 years? If addressed, the implications for Europe could be argued to be positive.

The outcome of the study can be used within the general debate of the United States' attention regarding the political and military power systems. However, it cannot be generalized to other power systems or other nations, except to possibly explain the behaviors of other nations, both friendly and potential adversaries. Regarding the method developed for this study, the results indicate that it can be of general use in further studies within this academic field, both in regard to the theoretical approach and in the usage of a mixed method with emphasis on statistical data.

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to examine and discuss the historical and current pretexts of *to what degree the United States is rebalancing toward Asia and to discuss which implications it has for Europe*. The aim is reached by analyzing a selected portion of political and military declaratory policies and implemented actions from 1945 to 2014 by the President of The United States.

The analysis is based on a self-developed theoretical idea and uses a mixed method that uses mainly statistical data with added qualitative data, comments and remarks. It is divided into four main parts, first with an introduction where the methodological approach is developed, followed by the analysis of the declaratory policy and the implemented actions, and ending with conclusion of the findings and a discussion of which implications it has for Europe.

The results vary from no degree of rebalancing within the declaratory policies to a high degree of rebalancing between 1985 and 2005 and then to only a very low degree of rebalancing, if any, since 2011. The European Command has received consistently less attention over time. The implications for Europe can in fact be in favor of European security if addressed properly.

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1 Introduction

1.1 General introduction and research questions

The aim of this thesis is to examine and discuss the historical and current pretexts of *to what degree the United States is rebalancing toward Asia, and to discuss which implications it has for Europe*. It is reached by analyzing a selected portion of the United States' statements, visions and implemented actions 1945 to 2014 in order to establish when, to what degree and whether a rebalancing occurred. The thesis ends with a discussion of what implications the findings do have for Europe.

The debate or perception regarding the United States focusing less on Europe is not new,² but it gained momentum and restarted in October 2011. Former United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton published the article "America's Pacific Century" in *Foreign Policy* and shortly thereafter held a speech in Honolulu, Hawaii where she used the wording *pivot point*.³ Just a few weeks later, the debate gained more momentum as President Barack Obama addressed the Australian parliament and stressed the future American focus on Asia.⁴ The official American statements were politically debated (including in Norway), debated within academic societies (for example by Kjell Engelbrekt, Zhu Feng, Gideon Rachman, James Steinberg, Stephen Szabo, Øystein Tunsjø), written about in mass media, and widely discussed that the American rebalancing will be at the expense of American presence in Europe.⁵ A possible effect of the initial debate in 2011 and 2012, including the Chinese-stated sense of intimidation,⁶ was in the following release of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance⁷ and as the U.S. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon in 2013⁸ used the wording *rebalancing* toward Asia instead of *pivot point*. The recent

² Fabius 2014; Hallams & Schreer 2012

³ Clinton 2011a; Clinton 2011b

⁴ Obama 2011

⁵ Eriksen Søreide 2014 b; Engelbrekt 2013; Feng 2012; Rachman 2013; Steinberg et. al. 2012; Szabo 2012; Tunsjø 2013 and media i.e. Horn 2012

⁶ Nathan & Scobell 2012; Zhong 2012. Regarding Zhong, see Bibliography for extended comment.

⁷ Department of Defense 2012c: 2

⁸ Donilon 2013

pivot or rebalancing has been described in more specific detail in political objectives by the United States State Department as well as in military terms by the United States Secretary of Defense. The political objectives have been described as modernizing and strengthening U.S. alliances by interacting with new and existing partners, supporting regional institutions, increasing trade and investments, ensuring military presence, promoting democratic development, good governance and human rights and lastly, developing the relations between the regions' people.⁹ The military description includes redeployment of troops from Okinawa, Japan to Guam (an island in the Pacific, defined as United State territory), the rotation of up to 2.500 marines to Australia, maintenance of a substantial presence in South Korea and an increased presence in the area by the U.S. Navy. This Navy presence will increase the focus in the region by basing 60 percent of the ships compared to today's 50/50 split between the Atlantic and the Pacific.¹⁰ More recently, the Secretary of Defense addressed the rebalancing in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.¹¹

But is it really so that the United States is rebalancing to Asia and reducing its presence in Europe in favor of Asia? If it is, is it a negative thing? If present, is the rebalancing a trend over a long period or has it just begun? If there is no rebalancing to be found, is the debate restarted in 2011 a result of the United States sending mixed messages by declaring one thing but doing something else in practice? Such a phenomenon, that declaratory policy is or is not in agreement with operational policies, was already addressed by Paul Nitze in 1956¹² and more recently by Mats Berdal,¹³ whose theoretical framework has inspired the methodological approach in this thesis. But what if the declaratory and operational policies are in agreement? Has the ongoing crisis in Ukraine taken the spotlight away from not only the debate but also the possible effort of a rebalancing, this is if it were present?

⁹ Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs 2013

¹⁰ Panetta 2012; The Guardian 2013

¹¹ Department of Defense 2014: V

¹² Nitze 1956

¹³ Berdal 1997

These questions triggered this study. *The aim of this thesis is to investigate to what degree the United States is rebalancing toward Asia, and to discuss which implications it has for Europe.* The aim addresses two items: first, it asks if a United States rebalancing toward Asia can be identified and if so, to what degree; second, which implications do the findings of the first part of the question have for Europe.

In order to make it fulfill the aim, three research questions have been formulated and will be analyzed:

- 1) Which patterns or trends can be identified within the United States declaratory policies to support a rebalancing toward Asia?
- 2) Which patterns or trends can be identified within the United States implemented actions to support a rebalancing toward Asia?
- 3) In what way can European security be affected by a potential United States rebalancing toward Asia?

Before presenting the research design, a short discussion will follow addressing previous research within this academic field, the theoretical framework and method used in this thesis. It will then end by addressing the way in which this thesis contributes to both the general debate and the debate within academic societies.

1.2 Research survey, method and originality

It is widely known that geopolitics is an important driver for the United States security policy. The relevance and continued importance of the historical debate regarding *geopolitics* (including *Eurasia*) since the Cold War until the present for the United States has been described in former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*. In this book, Brzezinski describes the national security objective of the United States as being to dominate or hinder other nations from dominating the Eurasian landmass and by that explaining the need for the continued attention of the United States to

be within the whole of Eurasia.¹⁴ Geopolitics was well debated before the Second World War, starting in 1899 by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen, and regained momentum in the 1970s as the National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger introduced the synonym *balance-of-power politics* to describe the contest of controlling global resource between the two superpowers: the Soviet Union and the United States.¹⁵ Eurasia, a word introduced by Halford J. Mackinder in 1904 for the landmass containing Europe and Asia, describes the world's political *pivot area*, presented in Figure A.¹⁶ The importance of the Eurasia area has been discussed by several historical geopolitical writers in addition to Mackinder, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Karl Haushofer, if further reading is desired.¹⁷




Figure A: The natural seas of power, Mackinder 1904¹⁸

¹⁴ Brzezinski 1997

¹⁵ Tuathail 2006: 1-5

¹⁶ Mackinder 2006: 34-39

¹⁷ Roosevelt 2006: 39; Haushofer 2006: 40-42

¹⁸ Mackinder 2006: 38

The debate of geopolitics and the Eurasia-continent is of importance to have in mind when discussing the United States attention given to different geographical areas as well as thematic topics out of two main reasons. First; as described, the United States looks at the Eurasia-continent as one entity and not as two or three different, for instance Europe, Asia and the Middle East, when formulating the politics trying to achieve the national objective. That could mean that different tools are used in different areas for achieving the overall objective. In the end such conclusion also means having a discussion putting Europe against Asia from a United States perspective could be difficult as it is not a question of either or, rather the opposite, both at the same time. This will be touched upon within this thesis. Second, as the United States view Eurasia as one entity, actions done by the United States in one part or the area, for instance the United States action in Syria or Ukraine, can be argued to most likely be followed by all actors as it possibly indicates how other similar events will be addressed by the United States throughout Eurasia. This will also be touched upon.

Refocusing on the theoretical framework of this thesis and the basis for the used analytic method, a discussion will follow resulting in the research design presented in chapter 1.3.

As mentioned in the general introduction, the study of declaratory and operational policies was introduced by Paul Nitze in 1956 and then later used by others, more recently Mats Berdal. The idea behind Nitze's theoretical framework was to identify the difference between what politicians said (declared) and planned (actions) and this phenomenon was possible to study more in depth as more and more classified data regarding what the politicians actually planned was declassified. Paul Nitze defined declaratory policies as "policy statements which have as their aim political and psychological effects"¹⁹ and action as "the general guidelines which we believe should and will in fact govern our actions in various contingencies."²⁰ Nitze's theoretical ideas have been used in several studies which have found that declaratory policies are not in line with the planned actions. For example, David A. Rosenberg's discussion debated whether or not the nuclear policy of the United States was "massive pre-emption" instead of the commonly used

¹⁹ Nitze 1956:187

²⁰ Ibid.

term “massive retaliation”, Martin Navias’ study on British strategic planning addressed the same topic and, within the same spirit but more recently, Mikael Holmström explored the Swedish secret co-operation with NATO during the cold war.²¹

The Norwegian scholar Mats Berdal in his book *The United States, Norway and the Cold War, 1954-60*, developed the theoretical idea further. Berdal paid more attention to the different levels within the American administrations and discussed the declaratory policies as the strategic or overall policies. As Norway seldom was the main topic at the highest political level but still relevant and important on lower levels, Berdal introduced the phrase “operational policies” to replace Nitze’s used word actions. In Berdal’s case, the operational level was referring to military actors as agencies, armed forces and operational policy was defined as “planning, exercises and service programs carried out in peacetime in order to maximize military effectiveness and support specific missions in the event of war.”²² In conclusion, Berdal argues that analyzing both declaratory and operational policies is essential for a complete understanding of, in his case, Norway’s place in American strategy, meaning both levels of policies need to be studied in order to understand the politics of the United States.²³

In conclusion and simplified, Nitze was focusing on *exploring* the difference between declaratory policies and what actions were planned, while Berdal was *explaining* a phenomena by combining the declaratory policies and the planned and conducted activities on different levels within the administrations. In short, this thesis develops the theoretical framework in two ways. First, it focuses on *attention* given in different policies or actions rather than *exploring* differences or *explaining* the outcome. Second, it analyzes the *attention* given in different policies or actions generated from or conducted by the same hierarchical level in the United States administration. In this thesis, declaratory policy is seen as statements, visions or intentions, while the opposite of declaratory policy is neither Nitze’s planned actions nor Berdal’s policies at different levels but defined as implemented actions as they describe decisions implemented or actions conducted. By

²¹ Rosenberg 1983; Navias 1991; Holmström, 2011

²² Berdal 1997: xvi

²³ Ibid.: xii-xvii

comparing the attention given within the declaratory policy and implemented action over a long time frame, trends or patterns of the United States' focus can be concluded in order to see in what degree a United States rebalancing toward Asia as it describes a more comprehensive picture of the total United States politics.

The chosen theoretical idea has weaknesses. For instance, it does not study or take into account other countries' perceptions of the United States declaratory policies or implemented actions. Such a debate is vital when discussing how trustworthy the United States foreign policy is if it is found that declaratory statements and implemented actions deviates too much. Another perception not taken into account in the theory is the difference between domestic and foreign policy because it is possible that some statements are made or actions are taken as effects of domestic policy rather than foreign policy.²⁴ Both these weaknesses will be addressed within this thesis in order to mitigate their effects.

The analysis of chosen indicators for declaratory policies and implemented actions is done by combining quantitative (statistics) and qualitative (text analyses) data, a so-called mixed method,²⁵ starting by presenting quantitative data, adding qualitative comments and remarks and present conclusions. This method is used in order to reduce the negative sides of each single method and stress the positive ones. In most of the previous studies cited, a qualitative analysis is used, which focuses on trying to explain or understand. By doing so, however, the analysis often only focuses on a few data points as it is very extensive to analyze data in this way. Quantitative data or statistics are often used to describe a relationship or describe phenomena but do not explain it in context. On the other hand, such results are more undisputable as they are mathematically proofed. But this thesis does not present detailed mathematical proof, mathematical significant changes, as the purpose is to show general trends and patterns not mathematical correlations. Quantitative analysis is more common in natural sciences, whereas qualitative is more common in social science. By combining these two, as this thesis describes both declaratory policies as well as implemented actions, the best overall picture will be presented. Another way could have been

²⁴ Andrén 2002: 29-40

²⁵ Creswell 2014: 215-233

to study the declaratory policy using only text analyses and the implemented actions by using only statistics, but then the comparison between the two would have been more difficult as one indicator would be based on more subjective analyses while the other would be based on more objective analyses. Each chapter analyzing an indicator will be introduced by a short summary of the indicators' relevance and method used when compiling data, as most of the data presented had to be collected and formed into a comparable form. Additionally, specific examples have been included in order to add qualitative data (when suitable) in order to mitigate possible misinterpretations and risking drawing wrong conclusions based only on statistics. Also, to increase the reliability of the thesis, annex A has been developed and used as a matrix for sorting different organizations, alliances or other geographically connected words. All data are with the author and available upon request and can be reached via the Norwegian Defense University library homepage.

As such, this thesis differs from the more recent academic works mentioned in the general introduction as well as in this subchapter in four main ways. First, this thesis has used a developed version of the theoretical framework of how to study declaratory and operational policies. Second, it presents conclusions based on a mixed method,²⁶ primarily on quantitative data with added qualitative data and remarks. Most if not all previously mentioned works have used a qualitative method. Third, it combines historical data with current data, including the developments in Ukraine, which makes today's developments possible to put in a historical perspective. The fourth difference is that this thesis attempts to discuss military activities in perspective. One such hypothetical example of how to put military activities in perspective is to address the following question: what is the best way to defend Europe from a cyber-threat? Does the answer lie in deploying tanks or armored brigades in Europe or by having civilian IT experts working in the United States remotely operate advanced technology stationed in Europe? Such a debate is missing in previously mentioned works.

²⁶ Creswell 2014: 215-233

This thesis contributes to the general policy debate. Starting with the debate in general, the NATO Summit 2014 is approaching with the purpose of, among others, setting the new NATO agenda for the *post-Afghanistan era* including defense planning within nations. One possible item on the agenda will be the viewpoints of NATO members regarding the American pivot/rebalancing and how to contribute to burden sharing among the member nations. Such a debate is already ongoing at the political level²⁷ and in the academic world,²⁸ and the consequences are already possible to see at the operational/tactical level. For example, the United States is asking for support from NATO nations,²⁹ and the Norwegian Armed Forces not only participated in a staff exercise in South Korea³⁰ but also deployed a frigate to the Pacific in 2014 as part of the RIMPAC-exercise.³¹ This thesis can contribute to that discussion. But most likely, the situation in Ukraine and the Russian actions there will be addressed at the NATO Summit, potentially taking the edge off the rebalancing to Asia discussion.

Secondly, this thesis contributes to the development of academic studies within Nitze's and later Berdal's theoretical frameworks by introducing a third model. Adding to both the chosen theoretical framework as the general debate regarding whether the qualitative, quantitative or a combination of the two (the so-called mixed method) is best used for analyzing this type of phenomenon, this thesis contributes to the debate by using the mixed method.

1.3 Building the research design, sources and demarcations

This subchapter will describe the research design, including sources used, indicators chosen and demarcations made, including the analyzed time frame and a discussion of measuring the "degree". After the research design has been summarized in Figure C, the method of comparing the chosen indicators will be presented and discussed.

²⁷ Eriksen Söreide, 2014b

²⁸ Shea 2013; Ross 2013

²⁹ Panetta 2013

³⁰ Holthe 2013

³¹ Eriksen Söreide 2014a

To be ignorant of what occurred before you were born is to remain always a child. For what is the worth of human life, unless it be woven into the life of our ancestors by the records of history?³²

The citation is given in order to discuss the first of three overall demarcations forming the research design: the time period, which is from mid-1945 to the present, May 1, 2014. Two main arguments have led to this extensive period of time being studied. First, as the chosen method for analyzing the attention given by the United States is based mostly on quantitative data, the amount of data available makes the trends more reliable and mitigates the potential of drawing incorrect conclusions. That included reducing the risk of drawing conclusions based on “the topic of the day” and as some changes takes time before the results can be seen and described as a trend or pattern. Second, the United States’ era of being a superpower started when the Second World War ended in 1945 and continues today. It has been stated in the geopolitical discussion that any change of focus within the Eurasian continent can and would then be possible to observe more easily than just choosing a short time period, such as by only analyzing the period of the latest debate starting in 2011. Unfortunately, all data has not been able to be retrieved for the whole period, which will be addressed when necessary.

The second demarcation is done in relation to the previous discussion of geopolitics and the Eurasian continent. Studies within that field or within the field of national security often divided national power or national security into different systems. One such is done by Zbigniew Brzezinski, who divided it into six systems: political, military, economic, technology, culture (including popular/mass culture) and education.³³ Another is done by the sociologist Michael Mann, who categorized it into four bases (systems): political, ideological (including norms, values, rituals and the mass media), economic and military.³⁴ And a third is done by the political scientist Barry Buzan, who divided it into five areas: military, political, economic, societal and

³² Cicero 1939: 395

³³ Brzezinski 1997: 23-25

³⁴ Tuathail 2006: 9-10

environmental.³⁵ In this thesis only political and military indicators are used as this is a master thesis in war studies. If other systems mentioned would have been in focus when choosing the indicators, the outcome of the analysis could be different; this will be touched upon in Chapter 4.

The third demarcation is the choice of actor studied: the President of the United States. The choice has been made because the President has all necessary constitutional powers at the same time: chief of state, chief executive, chief diplomat, commander in chief and chief legislator.³⁶ By the power given in the authority, the President counterbalance all lower levels and mitigates the actions taken or statements made by these lower levels if they are not in line with the overall policy. Therefore, the President can both generate declaratory policies and conduct implemented actions. Only analyzing one actor, the President, could of course be questioned as politicians, scholars, mass media and the general public are all different actors working within a framework of a “dependent ship” that affect each other in different ways as described by the Swedish political scientist Lennart Lundqvist.³⁷ A possible result of this “dependent ship” was described in the introduction as the wording *pivot point* changed to *rebalancing* and also touches upon the weakness mentioned of the used theory within the thesis. If other actors were studied, for instance how other nations interpret the United States policies or actors working at different levels within the administrations, a different result would possibly have emerged but would not have suited the purpose of this thesis. As several demarcations are done, the generalization of the finding will be discussed more thoroughly in the end of the thesis.

So, after choosing to focus on declaratory policies and implemented actions performed by a single actor, the President of the United States within the field of political and military affairs, the chosen indicators will need to be explained before presenting the overall research design. Each indicator will be more thoroughly discussed as they are analyzed throughout the thesis.

³⁵ Buzan 1991: 19

³⁶ Shogan 2014: 1

³⁷ Lundquist 2001: 19-23

The indicators chosen for analyzing the first research question, “which patterns or trends can be identified within the United States declaratory policies to support a rebalancing toward Asia?”, are two speeches and two policy documents, all used to present visions or intentions as generating policies. The two speeches are the inaugural speeches and the State of the Union addresses, while the two policy documents analyzed are the National Security Strategies and National Security Decisions.

The indicators chosen for analyzing the second specific research question, “which patterns or trends can be identified within the United States implemented actions to support a rebalancing toward Asia?” are four very different indicators, all representing implemented actions by the President of the United States. The four indicators are: travels and visits, deployment of military personnel, military infrastructure and distribution of nuclear weapons.

No indicators are chosen for the third research question, “in what way can European security be affected by a potential United States rebalancing toward Asia?”, as it will be discussed based on the conclusion drawn from within the first two specific research questions.

As the aim of thesis is to examine and discuss to what degree a rebalancing is present the level of degree and concluded will be addressed. The purpose is not to have a statistically definition or a certain numerical level, instead the legend describing the degree is general and more open for subjective interpretations. The following levels of will be used: No degree, low degree and high degree.

The definitions of each of the levels will be as follows: No degree: No signs of a rebalancing can be seen within the indicators. Low degree: Vague or insignificant signs of a rebalancing can be seen within the indicators: High degree: Clear signs of a rebalancing can be seen within the indicators. The overall conclusion, combining all indicators to an overall conclusion, the level of degree will be discussed if not a clear pattern with in all indicators makes a discussion unnecessary.

The overall research design can be summarized as in figure B.




Figure B: Overall research design

Each of the chosen indicators can be discussed whether the reliability is good enough or not, but as addressed previously, the total number of indicators and the long time frame analyzed mitigate this question.

Two potential indicators, exercises and the deployment of naval assets, were deliberately not included in this study. The disposition of naval assets will be discussed in chapter 3.2 (Deployment of military personnel) and in chapter 3.4 (Distribution of nuclear weapons). The indicator

exercises are not studied due to several challenges and key questions. How are exercises compared in a proper and valid way? Is it by length of the exercise in days, the number of deployed troops, ships or aircraft, or the purpose of the exercise or the simulated scenario? As an example, is it possible to objectively compare a full-scale nuclear response exercise combining a ship in the Pacific, a radar station in Greenland, a staff in the United States, the United States President exercising his decision-making process from Air Force One flying over South America, versus a company of marines conducting beach landings in Korea, or a B-52 global strike training mission from the United States to Europe or the Pacific and back again or by having two B-52 flying along the Chinese border (if it can in fact be classified as an exercise instead of intelligence collecting, war preparations or something else). Another tricky way of discussing exercises is the amount soldiers' working time. If the number of exercises per soldier is increased, that also means that after the exercises are complete, the soldiers will need to be compensated with free time at other occasions, which actually reduces the readiness or planning capacity on an annual basis. The overall effect of the exercise could also be discussed.

So, in order to be able to compare the indicators the United States Combatant Command structure has been chosen as the presentation matrix.³⁸ The United States has divided the world into six geographical areas of military responsibility, *Africa Command* (AFRICOM), *Central Command* (CENTCOM), *European Command* (EUCOM), *Northern Command* (NORTHCOM), *Southern Command* (SOUTHCOM) and the *Pacific Command* (PACOM), geographically presented in Figure C.³⁹ The areas have changed borders and increased in numbers during the timeframe studied, but the current structure from 2011 has been utilized throughout the thesis. None of the data analyzed has been reported in this structure, which means that manual calculation faults or misplacing minor data posts could have occurred. The misplacing could easily have happened between the border between the Northern, the Pacific and the Southern Commands, but if it occurred, it is of marginal effect to the overall patterns and tendencies of the analysis, and it does not change the overall conclusions.

³⁸ Title 10, United States Code: Armed Forces, §164 page 161

³⁹ Department of Defense 2011b




Figure C: The World with combatant commanders' areas of responsibility.⁴⁰

Criticism of the chosen layout of the comparison matrix lies understandably with the parts of European Command situated within Asia and also in Central Command. Another risk of misinterpretation is that the United States State Department uses another way of dividing the world,⁴¹ but this has been mitigated by transforming collected data it into the combatant command structure.

This study uses a mixture of primary and secondary sources. All data used within the four declaratory indicators is based upon primary sources while the data within the implemented actions

⁴⁰ Department of Defense 2011b

⁴¹ Department of State (n.d.)

indicators is primarily secondary. The majority of all documents are official U.S. non- and de-classified documents, speeches and statistics which give an official view. For one indicator, the disposition of nuclear weapons (chapter 4.4.), data from other scholars has been used in addition to the official U.S. sources. It should be noted that further classified information does exist and most likely changes some of the details, but it will most likely not change the outcome of the analysis except within one indicator which is addressed.

A comment regarding the official statistics is in place. Several of the documents used, especially regarding the implemented actions indicators (chapter 3), are compiled in several steps within the U.S. administration and could include miscalculations, as shown in some examples in the material. The miscalculations seem to be more common in older documents where no computer assistance was present and only manual typewriters were used. Second, the definitions of the official statistics are not coherent throughout the analyzed time period. Comments are included for both of these parameters throughout the document when necessary.

As several demarcations are made regarding the theoretical approach, method used, time period studied, indicators chose etc, a discussion of how general the results in this thesis are will be addressed in the end of chapter four.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

Before addressing the first research question, a short summary of how the thesis is structured with additional remarks. This thesis is divided into four main parts. The introduction in chapter one set the overall framework by formulating the overall aim, the three research questions, and it presents the research design and the theoretical framework, including the demarcations made. The following two chapters analyze and answer the first two research questions – declaratory policies in chapter two and the implemented actions in chapter three. The fourth and last part of the thesis addresses three things, first it summarize the findings in chapter two and three and by that answers the first part of the aim of the thesis, then it continues with discussing the summa-

rized findings implications for Europe and, by that answers the third research question as well as the second part of the aim of the thesis and finally discusses how general the conclusion are.

As most of the data presented is based upon self-made databases, the reasons for choosing each indicator and the way the data has been collected and categorized need explanations. That has led to the fact that both chapter two and three have the same number of chapters and indicators, but the number of pages (words) in chapter three is more than in chapter two for explained reasons.

2 Declaratory policies

The purpose of this chapter is to answer the first specific research question – Which patterns or trends can be identified within the United States declaratory policies to support a rebalancing toward Asia? The chapter is divided into six parts, starting with an introduction, followed by an analysis of four indicators (chapter 2.1 – 2.4), then followed by a summary of the findings (chapter 2.5). Each chapter discussing an indicator will follow the same format, starting with an introduction of the indicator's relevance, followed by which data has been used and how it has been compiled, and then it will present statistics with added qualitative remarks before finally presenting the conclusions.

2.1 Inaugural Addresses

Every elected and sworn in president of the United States has delivered a speech on his inauguration day, starting April 30, 1789 with George Washington. One of the purposes of the speech is for the Presidents to “present their vision of America and to set forth their goals for the nation.”⁴² Because it receives international attention and is always thoroughly analyzed afterward, the President has a unique possibility to mention or exclude areas and subjects of focus.

Since January 20, 1945, 18 inaugural addresses have been held.⁴³ By counting⁴⁴ how many times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned in each speech and categorizing the results within each combatant command, it would be possible to identify if a possible shift of attention is present. Before analyzing or commenting on the results, some remarks about the process need clarification. Several addresses mention communism and dictatorship, but those sentences have not been taken into account. Communism or dictatorship in most speeches usually refers to the Soviet Union, but could also address China, Cuba or other states and could therefore not explicitly be categorized within a certain combatant command. As most of the speeches address domestic issues such as labor, unemployment, the Northern Command (Bermuda, Canada,

⁴² Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural ceremonies 2013b

⁴³ Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural ceremonies 2013a

⁴⁴ See annex A for the matrix used for commonality

Mexico, Puerto Rico and United States) has been excluded. A consequence of this exclusion is that Hawaii, belonging to the Pacific Command, is not counted as being within it because Hawaii has not been explicitly mentioned when talking about the United States as a whole. Still, the general trends can be argued to be valid. The data leading to the figures presented are available upon request to the author and can also be reached via the Norwegian Defense University Library, Oslo.

Presented below are two figures, D and E. Figure D shows the total number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned in each speech and are categorized by combatant command (excluding the Northern Command) from 1945 – 2013. Figure E shows the comparison in percent of the result presented in figure D.




Figure D: Inaugural addresses. Total number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned categorized into each combatant command 1945 – 2013, excluding NORTHCOM




Figure E: Inaugural addresses: In per cent the number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned categorized into each combatant command 1945 – 2013, excluding NORTHCOM

Because this indicator is an analysis of several delivered speeches, it should be mentioned that there is no maximum number of words or a maximum length for each speech. Each speech is individual, but the average length of speeches analyzed is 1900 words.⁴⁵ Neither figure D nor E shows nor reflects the context in which the words categorized within each combatant commands are mentioned, i.e. the historical, future, economic, political or military contexts. Neither does it show if it is mentioned in a positive (friendly, alliance), neutral (just mentioned) or negative (threat, enemy) context. Despite this fact, the indicator still reflects the chosen wordings of the President of the United States and the attention paid to areas outside the Northern Command.

Some general conclusions: even though it is not fully compatible because the Pacific Command includes more than just continental Asia (Australia, for example), it can be stated that the focus

⁴⁵ Peters 2013

outside the Northern Command has been mostly on the Eurasian continent. The main attention has been on the European Command, followed by the Pacific and then closely by the Central. The African and Southern Commands have just marginally been mentioned, except for the Cuban missile crisis in the 1960s. It should be noted that variations over time are significant and that the number of times areas outside the Northern Command are mentioned is rather low, which supports the argument that the wording used is being carefully chosen and thereby reflects the attention of the United States.

As historical events have unfolded, inaugural addresses have unquestionably been affected by them. Examples are the Korean War (1950-53), the Cuba missile crisis (1962), the Vietnam War (1969-1977), the collapse of the Soviet Union with the establishment of a new Europe (1989-1997) and more recently, the developments in Afghanistan and Iraq (2005-2013). The historic attention paid to the Pacific Command is closely tied to those historical events, and it has only been mentioned more times than the European Command on two occasions, in 1977 and 2013.

It can be argued vaguely and possibly prematurely that more recently there has been a regained attention on the Pacific Command during the second term of the Presidency of Obama, starting in 2013. If it is present, it is numerically very modest and could be argued as being at the expense of the Central Command. Percentagewise, the increased focus could be argued as being at the expense of both the Central and European Commands. If this argument is used, it should also be noted that the focus on the African Command has also increased, and even more importantly, the attention on the Southern Command is just as big as the attention on the Pacific. The inaugural address in 2017 will determine if there is such a trend. Also worth noting is that the speech in 2013 was the first since 1957 that all five combatant commands outside the Northern Command were mentioned. Unfortunately, this is not possible to see in the figures as the Central Command line is covering the African line, but it is possible to view in the data material. This broadened focus will be further explored in chapter 2.5.

In short, the conclusion for this indicator is that there is no degree of a general rebalancing toward Asia. A low degree of rebalancing might be present starting in 2013, but it may be premature to reach this conclusion before having additional data such as the next inaugural speech.

2.2 State of the Union addresses

The State of the Union address is delivered annually by the President of the United States and originates from the United States Constitution. In this speech, the President declares and outlines the policy and agenda of the administration and includes rhetorical arguments, ceremonial traditions, history and optimism for the future. The State of the Union address is the only annual planned and recurring event where the President can showcase all constitutional powers at the same time: chief of state, chief executive, chief diplomat, commander in chief and chief legislator.⁴⁶

Since mid-1945, several State of the Union addresses have been held or forwarded. In this thesis, only the oral addresses in front of a joint Congress and formally called States of the Union addresses are analyzed. Therefore, the written statement in 1946 and the speeches in 1981, 1989, 1993, 2001 and 2009 are excluded. Also excluded are the State of the Union addresses released immediately before leaving office, as in 1953, 1961, 1981, 1969 and 1977, because the President is more reflecting upon his legacy than setting the agenda and creating policies in such an address.⁴⁷ Also worth mentioning is that in some years, the speech has been given as a summary of or as an addition to written statements, as was the case in 1956, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1979 and 1980. However, this has not been taken into account in the statistics presented. In summary 61, State of the Union addresses are analyzed beginning in 1947 and ending in 2014.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Shogan 2014: 1

⁴⁷ Peters 2014

⁴⁸ 1947-1968 (22), 1970-1976 (7), 1978-1980 (3), 1982-1988 (7), 1990-1992 (3), 1994-2000 (7), 2002-2008 (7) and 2010-2014 (5) = 61

By counting the number of times a nation, area, city, agreement or alliance has been mentioned in each speech and arranging the findings into each combatant command, general trends can be concluded.⁴⁹ As most of the speeches relate to domestic issues such as labor or unemployment, the Northern Command, including Bermuda, Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico and United States, has been excluded. A consequence of this exclusion is that Hawaii, belonging to the Pacific Command, is not included within that command because it explicitly has not been mentioned when discussing the United States as a whole. However, the general trends can still be argued to be valid.

Presented below are two figures, F and G. Figure F shows the total number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned each year 1947 – 2014 and are categorized into each combatant command, excluding the Northern Command. Figure G shows the comparison in percent, of the result presented in figure F.




Figure F: State of the Union addresses: Total number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned each year 1947-2014, categorized into each combatant command 1947 – 2014, excluding NORTHCOM.

⁴⁹ See annex A for the matrix used for commonality




Figure G: State of the Union Addresses. In percent the number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned each year 1947-2014, categorized into each Combat Command, excluding NORTHCOM.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the figures do not show in which context the word within each combatant command is mentioned.

It can be argued as a general conclusion that the main attention given in the State of the Union address, outside the Northern Command, is the Eurasian continent.⁵⁰ Historically, the main focus has been on the European Command, followed by the Pacific and the Central Commands, but variations are present. An interesting conclusion is that since the beginning of the 1980s, the Central Command has been mentioned more times than the Pacific in total number per decade and more often than the European Command since the beginning of the 2000s. The focus on the

⁵⁰ With the remark that geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific Command as elaborated in chapter 2.1

African and Southern Commands is marginal, but variations can be identified, such as the Cuban missile crisis (1962) or the Reagan administration's focus in South America in the 1980s.

In a historical perspective, the trend is quite clear that the number of times European Command is mentioned is decreasing (albeit with some exceptions), while the total for the other combatant commands is increasing, both in actual numbers and in percentages. Some historical events can be identified, such as the Korean War in the 1950s, the breakup of the Soviet Union in the beginning of the 1990s and the focus on the Central Command during most of the 2000s. The Vietnam War and the focus on the Pacific Command during this time frame is more obvious in the statistics in the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s than later in the 1970s, when compared to the statistics during the Korean War or the more recent focus on the Central Command. Starting at the end of the 1990s/beginning of the 2000s, a more balanced approach between the European and Pacific Commands can be identified.

Regarding the debate of rebalancing, the statistics show that the number of times the European Command and to a lesser extent the Southern Command have been mentioned has decreased, while the number of times where the Central and to a much lesser extent the African Command have been mentioned has generally increased. The Pacific Command has been mentioned fewer and fewer times, but on average to a much lesser extent than European. It cannot be argued that the Pacific has been prioritized in favor of the European, but it can be argued that the Pacific has been reduced less than the European, both in favor of other combatant commands.

An even more interesting conclusion is that since the latest discussion of the pivot or rebalancing to Asia started in 2011, the trend of mentioning the European and especially the Central Command is positive while the other commands are negative (the Southern Command in 2014 is excluded). Another conclusion drawn from the figures shows a slight trend since the mid-1990s for the speeches to cover more of all the combatant commands when compared to previous years.

In conclusion, no degree of a current rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identified with this indicator, either. With the exception of major events described, it can be argued from a historical perspective that a high degree of rebalancing occurred from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s and with a short peak in 2011, but since 2013 it has been normalized to more historical levels.

2.3 National Security Strategy

One of the purposes, at least in theory, for having a national security strategy is to communicate the government's intent to both foreign and domestic key audiences. The United States produces several strategy documents, for instance the Quadrennial Defense, but the pinnacle of the national security strategy architecture is the National Security Strategy signed by the President of the United States.⁵¹ Even though some say it is a wish list mentioning everything without any economic limitations,⁵² it can still be argued and will be shown that it is possible to conclude where the main areas of the President's attention are.

The United States has released numerous National Security Strategies over the years, but the most likely known strategies are the ones that have been publicly since the implementation of the Goldwater-Nicholas Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. According to the Goldwater-Nicholas Act, the President shall forward the National Security Strategy annually to Congress on the date he submits his annual budget request. In reality, National Security Strategies were submitted annually from 1987 to 1999, except for 1989 and 1992, and more recently only publicly released in 2002, 2006 and 2010.⁵³ While working on chapter 2.4, a number of documents headings revealed that even before the Goldwater-Nicholas Act, National Security Strategies were produced.⁵⁴ These documents were approved by the President in 1948, 1950,

⁵¹ Dale 2013: 1-3

⁵² Betts 2004: 8

⁵³ Dale 2013: 1-3

⁵⁴ All displayed were not named National Security Strategies but superseded or was superseded by later documents meaning they had the same status/purpose and thereby can be argued being National Security Strategies.

1952, 1953 (three documents), 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1977, 1981, 1982 and 1986.⁵⁵ No documents with the similar (or very narrow) heading could be identified during the 1960s and beginning of 1970s, which makes the conclusions drawn vague for this period of time.

By using the same method as in chapter 2.1 and 2.2, counting each time a nation, city, agreement or alliance has been mentioned within all 30 documents and categorizing into each combatant command, conclusions can be drawn on general patterns relevant for this thesis.⁵⁶ Presented below are two figures, Figure H and I. Figure H shows the total number of times wordings have been categorized into each combatant command, excluding the Northern Command. Figure I show the same as Figure H, but in percentage form.




Figure H: National Security Strategies. Number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned each year, 1948-2010, categorized into each combatant command

⁵⁵ National Security Council 1948; 1950; 1952; 1953a; 1953b; 1953c; 1954; 1955; 1956; 1957; 1958; 1959; 1977; The White House 1981; 1982; 1986.

⁵⁶ See annex A for the matrix used for commonality




Figure I: National Security Strategies. The number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned each year, 1948-2010, in percentage form and categorized into each combatant command

Arguably, the data could be divided into two segments, 1948 to 1959 and 1977 to 2010. The analysis will comment on this matter as well.

With the same reservations as in the previous two chapters, the general conclusion is that the focus of the National Security Strategies outside the Northern Command has been on the Eurasian continent. Historically the European Command has been mentioned the most, followed by the Pacific and Central Commands.

In the first segment of the data, 1948 to 1959, the conclusion can be made that the number of times that the European Command was mentioned drastically decreased, the mentioning of the Pacific Command remained at the same level and the other commands remained almost unmentioned. Starting already in the 1977 strategy, the conclusion can be made that, in numerical for-

mat, the focus has first been on the European Command, then followed by Pacific. But even more interesting is that the number of times the other combatant commands have been mentioned greatly increased between 1977 and 1999 scattering the attention to more areas than ever before. A drastic difference can be seen in the 2002, 2006 and 2010 figures which indicate a less mentioning of geographic locations in comparison to previous years, including much less attention given the European Command and generally less to all others, especially in 2010. As the National Security Strategy 2010 has not been superseded, conclusions since the last debate started in 2010 are not possible to conclude, which a new version when released possibly will.

In percent, the overall trend shows that the focus on the European Command has decreased consistently in favor of all other combatant commands, especially the Pacific, with some minor exceptions. An interesting side note is that the trend actually changed in 2006 in favor of the European in comparison to the Pacific Command.

Likewise, the conclusion from this indicator is that no degree of a current rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identified. Except for the major events described, it can be argued that historically a high degree of rebalancing occurred from the mid-1990s to 1999, but it has been normalized again since 2002.

2.4 Presidential Directives regarding National Security

Since the establishment of the National Security Council in 1947, the President has approved policies by signing national security documents. All Presidents since 1947 have done this differently, named the documents differently and had different methods of producing the documents, but the effect and purpose of the documents have been the same – to set policies.⁵⁷

The documents have most often been highly classified and the approved documents do not need to be registered in the Federal Register, which means that the documents reveal the correct focus

⁵⁷ Relyea 2008: CRS-8—CRS-9

of the National Security Council and its work.⁵⁸ Therefore it could be argued that by sorting each document heading into the combatant command(s) it belongs to, a pattern of focus might be possible to identify. Of course, it can be stated that the most important work is not written down, illustrated by Henry Kissinger's remark that "the most important decisions were made without informing the bureaucracy, and without the use of NSSMs or NSDMs."⁵⁹ The abbreviations Kissinger refers to are the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) and the National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM), which were the Nixon administration's versions of National Security Decisions or approved policies and studies that normally lead up to policies.⁶⁰ Despite this statement, it can be argued that the work provided reflects what the United States was working on and by that measure, fulfilling the purpose of being a declaratory policy indicator. In 1999, the White House released the headings of most National Security Council Presidentially-approved documents.⁶¹ The historical list included Presidential policies from 1961 to 1993 (President Kennedy to President George H.W. Bush).⁶² In the background analysis of this thesis, the released list was compared to the documents that are available through each former President's library. Because the list released in 1999 did not incorporate documents from President Truman, Eisenhower or the Presidents after George H.W. Bush, a compilation of all headings or documents available on the internet was made in order to be able to analyze the period 1947-2014. The result of the collection is available at the Norwegian Defense University Library or upon request to the author.

Of all 1,723 officially stated existing documents, the compilation resulted in the finding of 1,663 of them. As shown in figure J below, the number and percentage of unavailable headings increases for the Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama administrations. Still, it can be argued that if the Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama administrations would have liked to state or highlight an increased focus on Asia, for example, the headings or the documents could have been leaked

⁵⁸ Relyea, 2008: CRS-9

⁵⁹ Seymour 1983: 35

⁶⁰ Relyea, 2008: CRS-10

⁶¹ The White House Office of the Press Secretary 1999

⁶² National Security Council 1999

to the press or an official press statement released. Therefore, even though the percentage of found documents is lower, the results could still be argued to be valid.

President	Officially total number of decisions	Number of found headings or full documents	In percent, found headings or documents
Truman	141	134	95,0
Eisenhower	225	212	94,2
Kennedy	272	272	100
Johnston	100	100	100
Nixon	264	264	100
Ford	84	84	100
Carter	63	62	98,4
Reagan	326	325	99,7
Bush, G.H.W.	79	76	96,2
Clinton	75	57	76,0
Bush, G.W.	66	56	84,8
Obama	28	21	75,0

Figure J: Number of Security Council decisions known and found 1946-2014⁶³

Presented below are two figures, K and L. Figure K presents the total number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned in the headings of an document, categorized into each combatant command 1945 – 2013. Figure L shows the comparison in percent of the results presented in figure K.

⁶³ Sources of the declared number per administrations: Truman: The White House Office (n.d); Eisenhower: Correlation between The White House (n.d) and Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; Kennedy through Bush G.H.W.: The White House [1999]; Clinton: W J Clinton Presidential Library (n.d.); Bush G.W: Bush (2009). The latest found was number 66; Obama: Administration of Barack Obama (2014). The latest found was number 28, January 17, 2014




Figure K: Presidential Directives: Total number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned categorized into each combatant command 1947 – 2014




Figure L: Presidential Directives: In percent, the number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned categorized into each combatant command 1947 – 2014.

Because figure K and L have several (eight) parameters and as the European and Pacific Command have more focus within this thesis, two more figures, M and N, are presented. Both Figure M and N shows the exact same information as K and L but only displaying the European and Pacific Commands and the classified numbers, done in order to make it more easier for the reader to see details.




Figure M: Presidential Directives: Total number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned, categorized into EUCOM, PACOM or classified categories, 1947 – 2014




Figure N: Presidential Directives: In percent, the number of times nations, cities, agreements or alliances have been mentioned, categorized into EUCOM, PACOM or classified, 1947 – 2014

Before concluding, two remarks must be addressed. The first remark concerns the category NORTHCOM (presented in figures K and L), which includes documents with more general headings such as nuclear planning and protection against nuclear attacks. It could be argued that if used differently, the headings now sorted within the Northern Command instead could have increased the European Command numbers since the Soviet Union was the main focus of nuclear planning. However, that would have excluded the nuclear planning against China that will be addressed in chapter 3.4. The second remark concerns the category “classified.” If it is later discovered that most of the headings within that category could be categorized within the Pacific Command, a significant focus on this command would be identified from the mid- or late- 1990s.

In a historical view, the focus of the Presidential directive regarding national security outside the Northern Command has been on the Eurasian continent,⁶⁴ with the main focus on the European and Pacific Commands. This historical trend can be argued to have ended in the beginning or middle of the 1990s, as almost no directives can be categorized into geographic locations. Instead, it can be argued that more of the directives are more general and focus on subjects such as terrorism, anti-drug and nuclear proliferation, rather than geographic locations. Another argument opposing the last conclusion can be that the National Security Council has become more aware of the importance of having more general titles and headings as more documents are now publicly available, officially or unofficially.

In line with the earlier conclusions, no degree of a rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be concluded by this indicator. However, it is important to again highlight the remark that currently classified documents could change the conclusions when they are eventually released.

2.5 Summary of the declaratory indicators

In this chapter four declaratory policy indicators have been analyzed in order to be able to answer the first research question – Which patterns or trends can be identified within the United

⁶⁴ With the remark that geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific Command as elaborated in chapter 2.1

States declaratory policies to support a rebalancing toward Asia? The chapter will start by summarizing the findings of the indicators studied, answer the first research question and conclude with a general discussion before turning to the second indicator, Implemented Actions in chapter three.

Four general findings will be discussed as a summary of the findings and conclusions within the studied indicators, which will lead to the answer of the first research question.

First, outside the Northern Command, the declaratory policies of the President of the United States have historically focused on the Eurasian continent,⁶⁵ which supports the theoretical framework of this thesis regarding the importance of geopolitics and the Eurasian continent. However, a vague but present tendency in later years within three of the indicators shows that the attention given is more spread out among all five combatant commands outside the Northern Command. This trend is possibly an indication of less attention being paid to geopolitics in a geographical sense and could be elaborated upon, but here it is only a suggestion for further research since it is not within the purpose of this thesis.

Second, historically, the focus of all indicators studied has been on the European Command, but historical events such as the Korean War, the Cuban missile crisis, the Vietnam War and lately the wars in Afghanistan/Iraq have received attention in the indicators studied.

Third, a rebalancing conclusion will need to be divided into long, short and very short term horizons. There is only one clear conclusion to be drawn within the long term rebalancing horizon: the attention paid to Europe is generally decreasing and the focus on all other combatant commands is generally increasing. There is no general conclusion to be drawn showing a rebalancing to the Pacific Command. In a short-term perspective, in this case starting in the 1980s until the present, a low to high degree of rebalancing first two then from the Pacific Command can be

⁶⁵ With the remark that geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific Command as elaborated in chapter 2.1

argued within two of the indicators. Another weak but present trend is a rebalancing from the Pacific and later the European Command to the Central Command. The short-term horizon conclusion will be presented separately as it deserves additional attention.

Fourth and final, since the discussion restarted in 2011 and continues to the present (with one major remark discussed later), in the very short term the indicators describe the degree of a rebalancing to the Pacific Command as none existing, in one case very low, if present or in this case a negative degree meaning rebalancing away from the Pacific Command. One inaugural speech has been held since 2011, and that speech only vaguely supported a rebalancing (the Pacific and Southern Commands mentioned two times each, all other combatant commands, excluding Northern, mentioned one time each). Three State of the Union addresses have been held since then, and an increase in the number of times the Pacific Command is mentioned can be seen in 2011. However, since then a general trend away from the Pacific and the African Commands can be noticed in favor of the other three combatant commands, excluding the Northern. There has been no National Security Strategy published since 2010 so no conclusion can be made from that indicator, but the latest trend from 2002 until 2010 was in accordance with the trend regarding State of the Union address – a decrease in focus on the Pacific Command. No rebalancing toward the Pacific could be identified within the fourth indicator, Presidential Directive, either, except for – and this is the major remark – if later studies show that several if not all of the presently classified Presidential Directives headings could be categorized as within the Pacific Command.

So, the answer to the first research question “Which patterns or trends can be identified within the United States declaratory policies to support a rebalancing toward Asia?” - based on stated preconditions is: No degree of a rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identified. Despite this conclusion, the focus on the European Command, in comparison to other combatant commands has decreased.

Does this mean that the United States is not focusing on the Pacific Command within declaratory policies? No, the United States has had a leading role in the Pacific since the end of the Cold

War, which has been publicly stated in several National Security Strategies including this example from 1954:

The U.S. should exert its leadership in the Pacific toward the creation of a position of strength calculated to block Communist expansion in the Far East and Southern Asia. In its Pacific role, the United States should be less influenced by the European allies than in respect to Atlantic affairs⁶⁶

The United States has emphasized being a Pacific Nation in declaratory statements, i.e. the National Security Strategies presented in 1987, 1993, 1995, 1996 and 2006.⁶⁷ The importance of such declarations, since President Obama also declared the United States an Arctic nation⁶⁸ and announced a refocus in Africa,⁶⁹ could of course be discussed. Also worth mentioning because it can be argued to have not received the same attention as the article in 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's travel to the African continent in 2012 was according to the U.S. State Department in order to "...emphasize US policy commitments outlined in the Presidential Directive..."⁷⁰ The Presidential Directive referred to was most likely Presidential Directive number 16, U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa,⁷¹ decided earlier the same year.

The declaratory statements of President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011 described in the introduction are much in line with the Pacific vision presented by President Clinton in the National Security Strategy in 1997 stating:

⁶⁶ National Security Council 1954: 6

⁶⁷ The White House 1987: 15; 1993: 7; 1995: 28; 1996: 40; 2006: 40

⁶⁸ The White House 2010: 50

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Allison 2012

⁷¹ Obama 2012

Second, America must look across the Pacific as well as across the Atlantic. Over the last four years, we have made significant progress in creating a stable, prosperous Asia Pacific community. In this endeavor, we must reinforce our ties to Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia and our ASEAN friends and allies⁷²

Already in the first sentence of this quote, an important aspect of United States' view of the European and Pacific Command as one entity not separately. This way of looking at the Eurasian continent as one entity is found in the declaratory indicators if studied more in detail. Additionally it can be mentioned that the word Eurasia is mentioned in the National Security Strategies of 1948, 1950, 1953, 1955, 1986, 1987 1988, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2006.⁷³

A final conclusion will be drawn using the indicators and discussion above that there is a possibility the United States is focusing more broadly on other areas outside the Eurasian continent and therefore risks overstretching its capacity as previous empires have historically done. Of course, it can be argued that it is not possible to overstretch in a declaratory way but only after implementing actions. On the contrary, and as discussed regarding the negative side of this methodological approach, it is possible to overstretch based upon a declaratory focus that is too broad. In such a case, trustworthiness can be challenged or tested, creating vulnerabilities for a competitor nations or alliances to challenge. One such example can be argued to be the case in Syria when President Obama declared a "red line" that Syria could not cross, but despite this warning, they crossed the "red line" later.⁷⁴ This risk of overstretching is also discussed in a Princeton paper from 2004,⁷⁵ but the risk is discussed to be as a consequence of a missing balancing of power since the end of the Cold War. The risk of overstretching is not unknown within

⁷² National Security Council 1997: 2

⁷³ National Security Council 1948: 5; 1950: 6; 1953c: 8; 1955: 5; 1997: Part III. Integrated regional approaches; The White House 1986: 2; 1987: 27; 1988: 19; 1990: 1; 1993: 7; 1994: 21; 1995: 25; 1996: 35; 1998: 10; 1999: 9 & 2006: 2

⁷⁴ Farley 2013

⁷⁵ Betts 2004: 32

the United States administrations. As an example, in 1954 the President of the United States addressed this issue at the National Security Council by stating "...absolutely the worst thing that could happen to us would be to find ourselves with U.S. forces scattered all over the world in the event of a general war"⁷⁶ which brings us to the study the Implemented actions.

⁷⁶ Eisenhower 1954: Paragraph 12

3 Implemented actions

The purpose of this chapter is to answer the second specific research question – Which patterns or trends can be identified within the United States implemented actions to support a rebalancing toward Asia? The chapter is divided into six parts, starting with an introduction, followed by the analyses of the four chosen implemented actions indicators and ending with a summary of the findings. Each chapter discussing an indicator will follow the same format, starting with an introduction of the indicator's relevance, followed by which data has been used and how it has been compiled, and then it will present statistics with added qualitative remarks before finally presenting the conclusions.

3.1 Travels and visits

Today it has become easier to travel around the globe in comparison with in the 1940s. The developments of jet aircraft, leading to the ability to easily cross the oceans and travel quickly, fundamentally changed international politics. On the other hand, the development of more modern communication equipment reduced the need for traveling and offered the possibility of calling or having face-to-face meetings via video conference. The conclusion of these two arguments is important because it means that in the beginning of the period studied, travels should have been of more importance as a method of communication rather than simply symbolic. At the same time, it still has always been a historically symbolic gesture. Today, when it is easier to communicate via using modern technology, it can be argued that the symbolic value of a visit is higher than the actual need. Other scholars⁷⁷ also frequently refer to official travels and visits by addressing their frequency to certain locations, which further stress the importance of this indicator.

So, if the President of the United States would like to stress the importance of meeting or symbolically being seen in other nations, or conversely, receive visits from foreign leaders,⁷⁸ it can

⁷⁷ Engelbrekt 2013: 139 & 147

⁷⁸ Foreign leaders are in this thesis including Head of State or Head of Government but also the highest representative of Palestinian territories and the spiritual leader Dali Lama)

be measured by counting the number of times such visits have happened in order to see if new patterns can be established. In this indicator, the travels of the President of the United States' primary representative for foreign relations, the Secretary of State, have also been analyzed because "the Secretary of State travels to all corners of the world to do his job. His duties as Secretary include acting as the President's representative at all international forums, negotiating treaties and other international agreements, and conducting every day, face-to-face diplomacy"⁷⁹ As three different types of travels or visits are presented, the chapter is divided into three parts: first an introduction with general remarks, followed by data presented in three subchapters (United States Presidents' travels abroad, chapter 2.1.1, visits by foreign leaders to the United States President, chapter 2.1.2, travels by the United States Secretary of State abroad, 2.1.3) and ending in chapter 2.1.4 with the conclusions of the findings, as they are general for all three subchapters.

Counting each travel/visit and categorizing it within each combatant command can identify trends. First, some remarks about the data collected. The administration's officially compiled and published data for the United States Presidents' travels⁸⁰ and for the foreign leaders' visits⁸¹ includes data until May 1, 2014 while the Secretary of States' travels includes information until May 5, 2014.⁸² The data is combined from different official homepages. The domestic travels are not included, which means that the Northern Command statistics only include travels to or visits from Bermuda, Canada, Mexico and Puerto Rico. Also, Hawaii is not recognized as travel abroad and thereby not included in the data for the Pacific Command. A visit to the Vatican is counted as one visit, but stops for refueling, if not combined with any meetings or other official business, are not counted. All data are available upon request of the author and can also be found at the Norwegian Defense University Library homepage.

⁷⁹ Department of State 2014b

⁸⁰ Department of State Office of the Historian 2012a; The White House 2014, schedule Jan. 1, 2013- May 1, 2014

⁸¹ Department of State Office of the Historian 2012c; The White House 2014, schedule Jan. 1, 2013- May 1, 2014

⁸² Department of State Office of the Historian 2012b; Department of State 2013; Department of State 2014a

3.1.1 The United States Presidents' travels abroad

Presented below are two figures, Figure O and P. Figure O presents the number of times a U.S. President has made a visit within each combatant command from mid-1945 to May 1, 2014. Figure P presents the same statistics as Figure O but in percentages. Of note, the data sets contain no information of any travels abroad during September 8, 1947 to October 19, 1953.




Figure O: Travels – The number of times a U.S. President has made a visit within each combatant command from 1945 – May 1, 2014.




Figure P: Travels – In percentages, the number of times a U.S. President has made a visit within each combatant command from 1945 – May 1, 2014.

3.1.2 Visits by foreign leaders

Presented below are two figures, Figure Q and R. Figure Q presents the number of times a foreign leader has visited the United States categorized by originating combatant command from 1945 to May 1, 2014. Figure R presents the same statistics as Figure Q but in percentages.




Figure Q: Visits – The number of times foreign leaders has visited the United States, categorized by originating combatant command from 1945 to May 1, 2014




Figure R: Visits – In percentages, the number of times foreign leaders have visited the United States, categorized by originating combatant command from 1945 to May 1, 2014

3.1.3 U.S Secretary of States' visits abroad

Presented below are two figures, Figure S and T. Figure S presents the number of times a United States Secretary of State has visited a nation abroad, presented by combatant command from 1945 to May 5, 2014. Figure T presents the same statistics as Figure S but in percentages.




Figure S: Travels – The number of times a U.S. Secretary of State has visited and area within each combatant command from 1945 to May 5, 2014.




Figure T: Travels – In percentages, the number of times a U.S. Secretary of State has visited an area within each combatant command from 1945 to May 5, 2014.

3.1.4 Summary of the findings regarding travels and visits

The data presented in previous three subchapters does not take into account in which setting, length of visit or the subject that the data represents, rather it only includes who travelled where and/or who visited. This can be a subject for criticism, illustrated by the complaints of several Asian nations during the George W. Bush administration.⁸³ The Asian nations felt neglected and overlooked as the administration primarily focused on terrorism rather than economic issues, which the Asian nations wanted. Regarding the speeches previously analyzed, it should be noticed that there is no maximum amount of travels or visits possible per year.

Still, the historical trend is quite clear in all data presented that travels to or visits from the Eurasian continent are generally most favored outside the Northern Command.⁸⁴ In a historical perspective, the amount of travel to and number of official visits from the European Command is still generally highest, both in number and percent with only a few exceptions.

Regarding the debate of rebalancing, three conclusions can be presented. First of all, both the amount of travel and number of official visits per year have increased from the beginning of the period studied to the present, especially since the beginning of the 1990s. This observation gives validity to the debate about the attention of the United States being scattered in more and more areas.

Second, a slight but detectable general trend of focusing away from the European Command and toward all other commands started in the mid- to end of the 1990s. However, this trend can be argued to have reversed more recently (i.e. toward a more European Command-oriented focus) at the expense of all other combatant commands.

⁸³ Bader 2012: 2

⁸⁴ With the remark that the geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific Commands as elaborated in chapter 2.1

Third, regarding the time period since the latest debate started in 2011, the number of Presidential travels has been reduced heavily during the first Obama administration began in 2009. The percent of Presidential travels to the Pacific Command increased during 2010 and 2011, but it has thereafter decreased. The same pattern can be found in the Secretary of State travels as in foreign leader visits. There is no trend supporting that the attention paid to the Pacific Command has been increased in favor of European Command, but rather nearly the opposite is likely the case as concluded above.

An argument criticizing the conclusion based on general patterns can be that they are not that important; rather, the decision where the President chose to travel when newly elected and with which country the first official visit occurred could be considered to be of greater significance. In order to identify whether any such patterns can be identified, the same data that was analyzed in chapter 3.1.1-3.1.3 was analyzed and is presented in Figure U. The date chosen as the starting point for identifying the first travel or incoming visit for each President is the date of inauguration, which is the day the President was sworn in.⁸⁵

President	First travel abroad as newly elected	First incoming visit as newly elected	First travel abroad as re-elected	First incoming visit as re-elected
Truman	No travels registered	NORTHCOM (February 11-13, 1949)	N/A	N/A
Eisenhower	NORTHCOM (October 19, 1953)	EUCOM (March 25-28, 1953)	NORTHCOM (March 20-24, 1957)	CENTCOM (January 30 – February 8, 1957)
Kennedy	NORTHCOM (May 16-18, 1961)	EUCOM (February 14-15, 1961)	N/A	N/A

⁸⁵ Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural ceremonies 2013a

President	First travel abroad as newly elected	First incoming visit as newly elected	First travel abroad as re-elected	First incoming visit as re-elected
Johnson	NORTHCOM (April 14-15, 1966)	AFRICOM (March 29-31, 1965)	N/A	N/A
Nixon	EUCOM, (February 23-24, 1969)	AFRICOM (March 5, 1969)	EUCOM (May 31- June 1, 1973)	EUCOM (February 1-2, 1973)
Ford	NORTHCOM (October 21, 1974)	CENTCOM (March 12, 1974)	N/A	N/A
Carter	EUCOM (May 5-10, 1977)	NORTHCOM (February 14-16, 1977)	N/A	N/A
Reagan	NORTHCOM (March 10-11, 1981)	SOUTHCOM (January 27-29, 1981)	NORTHCOM (March 17-18, 1985)	SOUTHCOM (January 31-february 3, 1985)
G.H.W. Bush	NORTHCOM (February 10, 1989)	PACOM (February 1-3, 1989)	N/A	N/A
Clinton	NORTHCOM (April 3-4, 1993)	NORTHCOM (February 4-5, 1993)	EUCOM (March 20-21, 1997)	SOUTHCOM (February 3, 1997)
G.W. Bush	NORTHCOM (February 16, 2001)	NORTHCOM (February 4-5, 2001)	EUCOM (February 20-23, 2005)	EUCOM (February 8-9, 2005)
Obama	NORTHCOM (February 19, 2009)	PACOM (February 24, 2009)	EUCOM (March 20-22, 2013)	EUCOM (February 2, 2013)

Figure U: Statistics of travels and incoming visits for elected and re-elected Presidents 1945-2012⁸⁶

No major conclusion can be drawn from the Figure U except that travels to or visitors from the countries within the Northern Command are most common. No increase in focus on or change of paid attention toward the Pacific Command or any other combatant command can be identified.

⁸⁶ Note that President Carter was incorporated in the matrix even though he was sworn in, not elected.

In conclusion, no degree of a rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identified using this indicator. A high degree of attention can be seen in 2011 throughout the indicators, but it has returned to normal levels since 2012-2013.

3.2 Deployment of military personnel

As the commander in chief and in cooperation with Congress, the President of the United States decides where U.S. military personnel will be deployed. The United States has had military personnel stationed worldwide since World War II and, as described in the general introduction, the issue of its presence has been generally debated. By analyzing where the military personnel are and have been deployed, trends and patterns of the United States' focus can be concluded.

The Department of Defense's Human Resource Information publishes a quarterly overview of where U.S military personnel and dependents are deployed or stationed. In this thesis, the data for September 30 on every fifth year beginning with 1950 have been retrieved and structured into each combat command.⁸⁷ The official data presents not only those military personnel deployed to each country on a permanent basis, but also how many are deployed in a category called Overseas Contingency Operations Commitments, meaning today's American deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq. In order to present both these categories, as it will be of importance for later conclusions, four figures are presented, Figures V, W, X and Y. All data are available upon request of the author and can also be found at the Norwegian Defense University Library.

The four figures are presented below. The first two, (Figure V and W) present the permanent deployed military personnel in actual number per combatant per year; but in Figure W the data is compensated for Overseas Contingency Operations. The second two figures (Figure X and Y) present the permanent deployed military personnel in percent per combatant command per year, but in Figure Y the data is compensated for Overseas Contingency Operations.

⁸⁷ Department of Defense's Human Resource Information Source 2014




Figure V: Number of deployed military personnel 1950 – 2013, without compensation for overseas commitments




Figure W: Number of deployed military personnel 1950 – 2013, with compensations for overseas commitments




Figure X: In percent, number of deployed military personnel 1950 – 2013, without compensations for overseas commitments after 2012.




Figure Y: In percent, number of deployed military personnel 1950 – 2013, with compensations for overseas commitments

Before discussing any conclusions from the findings, some remarks regarding the statistics need to be addressed. First, the statistics only reflect the permanent stationing of troops and not the temporary stationing of troops, which if included could affect the conclusions. Secondly, the category *Afloat* includes mostly the United States Navy and Marine Corps, but the data cannot be categorized into each combatant command as the official data retrieved does not make it possible. Most of the data in the *Afloat* category should most likely be categorized within the Northern or Pacific Command, less in the Southern and only marginally within the other three combatant commands. That means that the actual numbers and percentages presented in the Northern and Pacific Commands should have been higher. Third, beginning in 2009 the category *Undistributed* includes military personnel deployed in South Korea (20,000 – 40,000 soldiers based on historical data). That means that the Pacific Command should have an additional 20,000 to 40,000 soldiers added since 2009, which on average equals to 1.4 to 2.9%. Beginning in 2012, the category *Undistributed* includes also part of the number of military personnel participating within the operations Enduring Freedom, New Dawn and Iraqi Freedom. The category *Undistributed* also includes military personnel on classified deployments. In the data retrieved the total number of military personnel within the Overseas Contingency Operation Deployments is specified and shows how many are deployed from the European and the Pacific Commands to the Central Command. All Overseas Contingency Operation Deployments are located within the Central Command, meaning that in figures Y and Z, the European, Northern and Pacific Commands are reduced in total by the same amount as the Central Command is increased. Reducing the column Northern Command could possibly be incorrect as some of the reductions should possibly have been done within the columns *Afloat* or *Undistributed*. The consequences for this thesis are comparatively irrelevant because this thesis focuses mostly on the European and the Pacific Commands.

The data presented in the figures does not state what kind of military personnel are deployed within each combatant command, whether they are operational, intelligence, logistic or other types of personnel or equipment.

The observant reader may notice that the figures include 1953 as well as 2011 to 2013 and not just every fifth year. Inclusion of the additional years was made for two reasons: the 1950 data is possibly not presented in the same way as data starting in 1953, and the years 2011 to 2013 were included because the latest debate surrounding the rebalancing restarted in 2011.

The conclusion based on Figure V to Y will now finally be addressed.

The trend of where the United States deploys military personnel outside the Northern Command is clear – Eurasia.⁸⁸

Historically, the trend of attention is quite clear to present. During the Cold War the main attention was directed to the European Command with two exceptions, the commitments in Korea (1950s), and Vietnam (1960-1970s). It could then easily be concluded that two previous eras of rebalancing to the European Command can be identified, first after the Korean War and then after the Vietnam War. But if studied more closely, there is no major evidence of troops being either increased or decreased in other areas as a consequence of the two wars, except for the Northern Command. The meaning of this finding is that it cannot be explained as rebalancing in the sense of increasing somewhere equals decreasing somewhere else.

The next major change began in 1985 as general reductions started in both the European and the Pacific Commands, but the reduction within the European Command was much higher. The number of military deployed personnel within the European Command reached the same level as deployed in the Pacific in 1995, and until 2010 the numbers were essentially the same although both were decreasing. Since 2010, an increased number of deployed personnel can be seen in the Pacific Command, but this increase cannot be concluded as being at the expense of Europe. It could, however, be possibly but very weakly correlated to personnel reductions associated with the Central Command. The focus on the Central Command during the Kuwait-crisis in 1991, in Afghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (2003-) are reflected in the findings. Particularly since 2001, the

⁸⁸ With the remark that the geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific Commands as elaborated in chapter 2.1

attention paid to this command cannot be described as being at the expense on any other combatant command, but instead the total number of troops increased during this timeframe.

On a more overall aggregated level, it is possibly to argue that a rebalancing has occurred at four occasions, after the Korean, and Vietnam Wars, in the end and aftermath of the Cold War, and as the engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq were heavily reduced. But then, rebalancing does not mean at the expense on other combatant commands; instead it means reducing the total number of troops to pre-war or even lower levels. Could it be described as a type of war fatigue that recurs approximately every 20 years? Can the rebalancing therefore be described as shifting focus between different power/strategic systems as discussed in the general introduction? As this is not part of the study to analyze, it can be recommended for further studies.

Before presenting the conclusion, let's return to the debate of a rebalancing to the Pacific that restarted in 2011. In the introduction, several future deployment goals of military personal were mentioned such as the redeployment of troops from Okinawa (Japan) to Guam (an island in the Pacific, defined as United States territory), the rotation of up to 2,500 marines to Australia, the maintenance of a substantial presence in South Korea and an increase by the United States Navy to increase its focus in the region by basing 60% of its ships there compared to the current 50/50 split between the Atlantic and the Pacific. All of these changes are to occur within five to ten years.⁸⁹

If not thoroughly studied, these goals all could seem quite interesting and strengthen a debate of a potential rebalancing toward Asia, but when studied in detail and put in a military context, the conclusions become different. The first goal, the redeployment of troops from Japan to Guam, is in reality just a rebalancing within the Pacific Command, since both locations are located within the same combatant command. The rotation of up to 2,500 marines to Australia can at first glance mean an increase of 1.8-2% of the U.S personnel stationed within the Pacific Command. But, so far the only change made has been to use personnel from Hawaii for temporary deploy-

⁸⁹ Panetta 2012

ments to Australia, which is also a rebalancing within the Pacific Command.⁹⁰ The substantial presence within South Korea has not been quantified and could mean anything from increasing the number of military personnel in Korea to a reduction of military personnel overall but keeping the proportion of military personal in Korea on a substantially higher level in comparison to other areas inside the Pacific Command. The final statement of increasing the number of ships in the Pacific from the current 50/50 split to a 60/40 split in favor of the Pacific Command could arguably either already been done or have been completed before it was even stated. Today, 57% (eight) of the strategic submarines are permanently based on the West Coast within Northern Command (Pacific Ocean), and the other 43% (six) are permanently based on the East Coast (Atlantic).⁹¹ Presented in Figure Z below is the summary of U.S. naval ships' homeports, according to the official U.S. Navy homepage, and categorized per combatant command.⁹²

Combatant Command	Number of ships/ submarines	In percent, total number of ships/submarines
AFRICOM	0	0.00
CENTCOM	9	2.29
EUCOM	1	0.25
NORTHCOM (east coast/ Atlantic)	115	29.26
NORTHCOM (west coast/ Pacific)	82	20.87
PACOM	54	13.74
SOUTHCOM	0	0.00
No homeport declared	119	30.28
Under construction	13	3.31
Total	393	100

Figure Z: U.S. Navy ships/submarines homeport's per Combat Command

⁹⁰ The Guardian 2013

⁹¹ Kristensen & Norris 2013

⁹² Department of the Navy (n.d.)

When compared, 29.52% of the ships are permanently based in the Atlantic, a number that includes the ships in the Northern Command that are based on both the East Coast and in the European Command. If the West Coast fleet and the Pacific Command are added together, 34.61% of the ships' homeports are located in the Pacific. If all other commands are excluded and only the ratio between Atlantic and Pacific is counted, the split is 53.97% for the Pacific versus 46.03% in the Atlantic. In addition, it should be noted that the ships constantly move around, which is illustrated by the following point. On October 25, 2013, four of ten U.S. carriers were at sea, where two were within the Central Command, one was in the Pacific Command and one in the Atlantic (Northern/European Command).⁹³ On November 8, 2013, the disposition of carriers at sea included two within the Central Command, two within the Pacific Command (one was at a Naval visit in Hong Kong) and one was in the Atlantic (Northern/European Command).⁹⁴ In addition it should be noted that the Panama Canal will be widened and made deeper to allow bigger ships to pass through, which includes larger warships than those of today.⁹⁵ This observation strengthens the argument that counting ships or aircraft as rebalancing or as a measurement of focus are of questionable value, both statistically as well as operationally.⁹⁶

Before making an overall conclusion, it can be noticed that there were no major noticeable change of permanent deployment of military personnel as a consequence of the Cuban missile crisis in the 1960s, and the percentage of deployed military personnel within the Northern Command has generally increased since 1990 and even more so since 2010.

To summarize an overall conclusion within this indicator: there have been several shifts of attention toward the Pacific Command, with the most recent major shift starting in 1985 and ending in 1995. This shift has been the result of not reducing forces proportionally when compared to the

⁹³ Department of the Navy 2013a

⁹⁴ Department of the Navy 2013b

⁹⁵ Svenska Dagbladet 2014

⁹⁶ The operational value will not be further discussed but as an example, the cruise missiles onboard ships have range's beyond combatant commands borders, and ships with the AEGIS (Missile-defense-system) are for instance deployed in the European Command (Rota, Spain) for mitigating a threat from North Korea or Iran toward the U.S.

European Command, although there has been a minor increase starting in 2010. Therefore, a high degree of rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be concluded during the time period from 1985 to 1995 while being maintained since then. The declared military deployment goals supporting the rebalancing are at best questionable, as shown in the data.

3.3 Infrastructure

In the introduction of chapter 3.2, deployments of military personnel were stated as being rather flexible if the means for transporting and infrastructure for housing is available. The means for transport will not be discussed further, but infrastructure will be due to four reasons. First, infrastructure cannot be described as a flexible, mobile indicator, rather, it is a costly long-term investment. Second, if the political focus is on a certain area, the infrastructure will be at least maintained in order to be of possible future use versus the opposite for areas of lesser interest. Third, the presence of military installations or sites are totally different entities and can easily be misused in debate if not specified in detail what is actually being debated or compared in order not to mislead the observer. An installation or site, which will be addressed later, can be anything from a single mast to a full missile test range. Also, the amount of land needs to be considered in order to get the full picture. Fourth, the President as the commander in chief has the right to build as well as close military installations⁹⁷ but it should be mentioned that the political debate within the United States regarding the closure of military installations has been a highly contentious issue for decades. The Department of Defense proposed several series of base closures in the past, but it was unable to carry out the changes without Congressional approval due to domestic politic considerations.⁹⁸ In fiscal year 2015, the Department of Defense has requested for Congress to authorize a new round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) for FY2017 in order to reflect the proposed new force structure.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Else 2014

⁹⁸ Twight 1989

⁹⁹ Korb, Hofmann & Blakeley 2014: 15

In order to address all this, three different analyses of infrastructure will be presented. To make it more readable, the chapter is divided into four parts: first an introduction with general remarks, followed by data presented in three subchapters, number of installations or sites, chapter 3.3.1, owned or rented acres, chapter 3.3.2, and ending with military construction funding, chapter 3.3.3. Each subchapter contains conclusions of the findings.

Infrastructure can either be owned or leased by the United States, or it can be made available through agreements with other nations through so-called host nation support. In this thesis, only sites, installations and acreage owned and/or leased by the United States Department of Defense has been studied, which excludes those properties loaned or made available to the United States by other agreements.

All data are compiled from official United States documents and categorized into each combatant command. The ambition was to study each five-year timeframe during the whole time period from 1945 to 2014, with higher emphasis placed upon each year from 2010-2014. For multiple reasons, the ambition was not met as all data was not available,¹⁰⁰ and as will be presented, the available data was not possible to analyze. The data used for analyzing the number of sites and installations and owned acres are retrieved from the United States Defense Department's formal reports to Congress for Fiscal Year's 1980, 1983, 1989, 1991, 1993, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2013.¹⁰¹ Unfortunately, data prior to FY 1980 has only been collected and presented in a more general method. It should be mentioned that comparison between different years in the figures below is difficult since the data have different criteria, an area that will be further discussed.

The data counted for analyzing Military Construction Funding have been retrieved from the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2011, 2012,

¹⁰⁰ Due to budget and time constrains for the production of the thesis as several weeks of studies would have been needed in Washington.

¹⁰¹ Department of Defense 1979; 1982; 1989; 1990; 1992; 1999, 2001a; 2001b; 2006; 2011a; 2012a

2013, 2014 and 2015.¹⁰² The data for all years includes US National Security Authorization Act Division B – Military Construction Authorization. Meanwhile Family Housing, Chemical Demilitarization Construction Defense, U.S. Department of Energy National Security Programs and funding for constructions within overseas contingency operations have not been included. All data are available upon request of the author and can also be found at the Norwegian Defense University Library.

3.3.1 Number of installations or sites

In this chapter, the number of United States Department of Defense sites and installations will be analyzed, starting with some explanations and definitions. Using the statistics without understanding the differences of how the data are presented can easily lead to misunderstandings or misinterpretations. In the data studied, there are major differences in the way it is presented by the United States Department of Defense. The major difference is a shifting focus between presenting installations or sites. In the FY 2013 Base Structure Report, the following definitions are used to explain the differences between:

- **Site:** Physical (geographic) location that is or was owned by, leased to, or otherwise possessed by a DoD Component. Each site is assigned to a single installation. A site may exist in one of three forms: *land only* – where no facilities are present; *facility or facilities only* - where there the underlying land is neither owned nor controlled by the government, and *land with facilities* – where both are present.
- **Installation:** A military base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including leased space, that is controlled by, or primarily supports DoD’s activities. An installation may consist of one or more sites, or may be an administrative designation.¹⁰³

As will be seen in the figures to come, some reports focus on installations, but there are still different ways of presenting installations. For instance, in the reports for FY1980 and FY1983, the

¹⁰² National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year xx - 1989; 1994, 1999, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

¹⁰³ Department of Defense 2012a: DoD 3-4

focus was on presenting principal installations and associated properties of importance.¹⁰⁴ The summary of the years 1957 to 1974 only presents major military installations,¹⁰⁵ while the report for FY1989 presents installations based on the following criteria: “All bases with more than 300 full-time civilians are included because that is the threshold for congressional notification of base closure in section 2687 of the Title 10, United States Code. For the most part, training and bombing ranges, communication sites, Reserve Centers, outlying landing fields, and other, often unmanned, properties are not included in this Report.”¹⁰⁶

Even if different in form, the data will be presented since the conclusion addresses an issue of relevance for this thesis which will be discussed in the conclusion of this chapter. Even if the focus of presenting sites or installations has changed over the years, the Department of Defense has stated the total number of installations or sites officially possessed in its official reports. These data for the period FY1980 – FY 2013 are presented in Figure AA.

Report	Number of sites	Number of Installations
FY 1980	5672	
FY 1983	5523	
FY 1989	5539	618
FY 1991	5502	631
FY 1993	5427	569
FY 1999	Not stated	
FY 2001	6067 (calculated)	
FY 2002	6425	
FY 2007	5311	
FY 2012	5212	
FY 2013	5059	523

Figure AA: Number of officially-claimed United States military sites from FY 1980 – FY 2013.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Department of Defense 1979: 4; 1982: 4

¹⁰⁵ General Accounting Office 1980

¹⁰⁶ Department of Defense 1989: 2

¹⁰⁷ References to column sites: Department of Defense 1979: 13; 1982: 13; 1989: 6; 1990: 5; 1992: 8; 2001b: 2; 2006: DoD-6; 2011a: DoD-7; 2012a: DoD-17. References to column installations: Department of Defense 1989:7; 1990: 29, 51, 78 & 107 (by adding the numbers); 1992: 6; 2012a: DoD-4

In conclusion, the number of sites reduced/closed from FY 1980 until the present is 613, which equals a reduction of 10.8%. Since FY 1989, this total reduction of installations stands at 95, equaling 15.4%. Needless to say, the statistics do not show whether even more sites/installations were closed but replaced by new ones, and they do not reveal any operational effects that could be classified as either positive or negative. It could also be true, for example, that two sites/installations containing older technology were replaced with one newer, more capable site/installation. A theoretical example could be a switchboard, which previously needed personnel for manual handling of telephone calls. These people would have required infrastructure support to provide housing, dining and recreation facilities, etc., whereas those same personnel today have been replaced by a completely automatic switchboard.

Continuing with the analysis of comparing different numbers of sites and installations, a graphical display comparing the data would be misleading as the definitions have changed. Therefore, matrixes with raw numbers presenting the data per year per combatant command will be presented and discussed, followed by the same data in percentage form. All data have been retrieved from the reports previously mentioned and categorized into each combatant command, if not stated otherwise.

Presented are two figures, Figure BB and CC, showing a historical development of the number of major military installations possessed from 1957 to 1978. Figure BB shows the number of major military installations in the continental United States, while Figure CC shows the total major military installations in United States' territories and in foreign countries.




Figure BB: Total major military installations in the continental United States, 1957 – 1978¹⁰⁸




Figure CC: Total major military installations in United States' territories and in foreign countries, 1957 - 1974¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ General Accounting Office 1980: enclosure II, page 2

¹⁰⁹ General Accounting Office 1980: enclosure III, page 3

Presented below are two figures, DD and EE. Figure DD presents the number of installations/sites per combatant command FY1980-FY2013, while Figure EE presents the distribution in percentages per combatant command. The column total in Figure DD should be compared with Figure AA before drawing any conclusions.

Number of installations/sites per combatant command							
	AFRI-	CENT-	EU-	NORTH-	PA-	SOUTH-	Total
FY 1980	0	0	226	814	117	17	1174
FY 1983	0	0	237	884	151	8	1280
FY 1989	0	0	88	458	68	4	618
FY 1993	0	0	58	462	44	5	569
FY 1999	1	5	539	2799	281	28	3653
FY 2001	1	7	528	5214	297	20	6067
FY 2002	1	5	534	5224	295	21	6080
FY 2007	3	18	533	4361	371	25	5311
FY 2012	2	20	406	4376	386	22	5212
FY 2013	2	20	343	4284	386	24	5059

Figure DD: The number of installations/sites per combatant command

Installations/sites in comparison in percent per combatant command							
	AFRI-	CENT-	EU-	NORTH-	PA-	SOUTH-	Total
FY 1980	0.00	0.00	19.25	69.34	9.97	1.45	100
FY 1983	0.00	0.00	18.52	69.06	11.80	0.63	100
FY 1989	0.00	0.00	14.24	74.11	11.00	0.65	100
FY 1993	0.00	0.00	10.19	81.20	7.73	0.88	100
FY 1999	0.03	0.14	14.75	76.62	7.69	0.77	100
FY 2001	0.02	0.12	8.70	85.94	4.90	0.33	100
FY 2002	0.02	0.08	8.78	85.92	4.85	0.35	100
FY 2007	0.06	0.34	10.04	82.11	6.99	0.47	100
FY 2012	0.04	0.38	7.79	83.96	7.41	0.42	100
FY 2013	0.04	0.40	6.78	84.68	7.63	0.47	100

Figure EE: In percent, a comparison per combatant command of installations/sites

It is difficult to reach any conclusions based on the historical data from FY 1980 to FY 1999 because they are based on different data definitions. On one hand, it could show a major reduction in the European Command in comparison to the other combatant commands, but on the oth-

er hand, the comparison cannot be considered valid because of the fundamental differences of the data.

However, four valid conclusions for the period FY 2001 to FY 2013 are possible as this data is based on the same definitions.

First, the overall attention given outside the Northern Command is toward Eurasia.¹¹⁰

Second, the European and Northern Commands have been reduced since FY2002, the African and Southern Commands more or less remained the same, while the Central and even more so the Pacific Commands have increased in actual numbers. The same patterns are found if the percentage is studied but with one exception--the Northern Command is increasing.

Third, the United States has sites/installations in more combatant commands than ever before.

Fourth, the pivot or rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be argued to have started in FY 2001 (if not earlier) and has simply been maintained since the statements by President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton in 2010.

So, in conclusion a high degree of rebalancing can be identified starting in FY 2001 and maintained since.

3.3.2 Owned or rented land

As a complement to the number of installations or sites analyzed in the previous chapter, the total amount of owned or rented land has also been analyzed within the indicator of infrastructure.

¹¹⁰ With the remark that the geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific Commands as elaborated in chapter 2.1

Figure FF shows a compilation of the total amount of owned or rented land in acres as stated by the Department of Defense in official reports to the United States Congress.

Fiscal Year	Total number of acres
FY 1980	26 704 000
FY 1983	26 663 000
FY 1989	26 986 000
FY 1991	26 580 000
FY 1993	27 453 000
FY 1999	27 794 232 (calculated)
FY 2001	30 501 271 (calculated)
FY 2002	32 108 341 (calculated)
FY 2007	32 408 262
FY 2012	28 532 422
FY 2013	27 716 803

Figure FF: The total amount of owned or rented acres FY 1980-FY2013¹¹¹

By studying Figure FF, it can be concluded that the total number of owned or rented acres has increased by 1,012,803 acres (equaling 4.8%) since FY 1980. Since FY2007, the total number has been steadily decreasing.

Figures GG and HH show the number of acres owned or leased by the United States Department of Defense per combatant command and a comparison in percentage form per combatant command. The column “Missing” shows in percentages how many acres are missing, or as in one case, actually shows more than the officially reported number compared to the officially stated number of acres shown in Figure FF.

¹¹¹ Department of Defense 1979: 14; 1982: 14; 1989: 6; 1990: 5 the last three digits could be wrong, bad copy; 1992:8; 2006: DoD-17; 2011a: DoD-19; 2012a: DoD-14. Department of Defense 1999; 2001a; 2001b, all own calculations

Total number of acres rented or owned								
	AFRI-	CENT-	EU-	NORTH-	PA-	SOUTH-	Total	Missing in %
FY 1980	0	0	160 799	24 400 942	705 796	94 417	25 361 954	-5
FY 1983	0	0	970 633	26 392 213	551 794	95 528	28 010 168	+5
FY 1989	0	0	876 082	20 331 812	442 899	70 247	21 721 040	-19
FY 1993	0	0	581 683	14 552 752	321 270	109 606	15 565 311	-43
FY 1999	3857	9039	467 758	26 873 860	333 405	106 270	27 794 232	0
FY 2001	3856	9039	424 993	29 507 120	526 522	29 741	30 501 271	0
FY 2002	3856	9039	533 208	31 011 663	521 383	29 192	32 108 341	0
FY 2007	3856	34 012	431 844	31 406 241	502 591	29 722	32 408 266	0
FY 2012	3463	9131	410 045	27 612 153	468 464	29 163	28 532 419	0
FY 2013	3463	9134	405 267	26 793 520	475 698	29 720	27 716 802	0

Figure GG: Total amount of owned or leased acres per combatant command¹¹²

Percent of acres owned or rented							
	AFRI-	CENT-	EU-	NORTH-	PA-	SOUTH-	Total
FY 1980	0,00	0,00	0,63	96,21	2,78	0,37	100
FY 1983	0,00	0,00	3,47	94,22	1,97	0,34	100
FY 1989	0,00	0,00	4,03	93,60	2,04	0,32	100
FY 1993	0,00	0,00	3,74	93,49	2,06	0,70	100
FY 1999	0,01	0,03	1,68	96,69	0,38	1,20	100
FY 2001	0,01	0,03	1,39	96,74	1,73	0,10	100
FY 2002	0,01	0,03	1,66	96,58	1,62	0,09	100
FY 2007	0,01	0,10	1,33	96,91	1,55	0,09	100
FY 2012	0,01	0,03	1,44	96,77	1,64	0,10	100
FY 2013	0,01	0,03	1,46	96,67	1,72	0,11	100

Figure HH: In percentage form, amount of owned or leased acres per combat command¹¹³

Once again, the data is not totally comparable. The historical data from FY 1980 – FY 1999 does not reflect the total quantity of acres presented in Figure GG. For example, the FY 1980 data for the European Command does not include acres owned or leased in Germany.¹¹⁴ Another important fact regarding the European Command is that the largest land possession is Thule Air

¹¹² The CENTCOM FY 2007 figure cannot be explained. Does not affect the conclusions.

¹¹³ The CENTCOM FY 2007 figure cannot be explained. Does not affect the conclusions.

¹¹⁴ Department of Defense 1979

Base, Greenland, which covers 233 034 acres – 58% of the total acreage owned or rented in all of the European Command FY 2013.¹¹⁵

Still, two valid conclusions can be made for the period FY2001 to FY2013. First, the overall focus of the United States outside the Northern Command has been Eurasia.¹¹⁶

Second, the total number of acres decreased in all combatant commands except the Central Command. If the proportions in percentage are compared, a very slight increase is seen within the European, no significant change is seen in the African and Central, and a decrease in the Northern and Pacific Commands is observed.

Since the debate restarted in 2011, more attention is paid to the Pacific, especially in the total amount but also visible in the percentage comparisons. It should be noticed that the total numbers for the European Command have decreased, but its proportion of all acres owned has actually increased, however slight the increase may be.

So, in conclusion a low degree of rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be argued starting in 2011.

3.3.3 Military Construction Funding

In chapter 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, the number of installations or sites and the number of owned or rented acres has been discussed. This parameter will discuss whether new investments are made in installations/sites or acres and how economical investments regarding military construction are prioritized between the combatant commands. If a pattern can be identified, it can be argued that there is a pivot or rebalancing which has not yet been more than vaguely identified within the

¹¹⁵ Department of Defense 2012a: DoD-84

¹¹⁶ With the remark that the geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific Commands as elaborated in chapter 2.1

previous two chapters. However, if no pattern can be identified, it would even more strongly support the argument that there has been no change since the debate restarted in 2010.¹¹⁷

Two figures, Figure II and JJ, are presented showing the amount of funding for military construction authorized by Congress and signed into law by the President and listed by combatant command. Figure FF shows the total amount in United States dollars authorized per combatant command, while Figure GG shows a comparison in percentages. As the dollars are shown in values unadjusted for inflation each year, a graphical display will not be appropriate.

FY/COM	AFRI-	CENT-	EU-	NORTH-	PA-	SOUTH-	UNSPEC-	Total US\$
FY1990	3 500	25 800	209 690	2 934 651	103 190	0	21 540	3298371
FY1995	0	0	202 383	1 872 173	66 600	0	14 050	2155206
FY2000	2 150	83 090	81 000	2 925 878	323 160	0	0	3415278
FY2005	0	0	345 703	3 257 377	493 185	0	107 573	4203838
FY2010	41 845	292 626	394 092	8 113 040	1 038 040	66 000	200 000	10145643
FY2011	51 631	466 874	967 778	10 096 890	1 369 428	45 400	1 159 693	14157694
FY2012	89 499	135 013	908 959	8 585 823	600 859	0	954 687	11274840
FY2013	0	51 348	921 165	5 388 561	965 917	75 900	886 979	8289870
FY2014	0	74 400	902 400	5 256 284	1 264 697	0	752 466	8250247
FY2015	9 923	27 826	391 700	2 396 771	558 087	61 575	38 985	3484867

Figure II: Amounts in thousands of United States Dollars authorized for military construction per combatant command

¹¹⁷ Due to mainly economical but also time constrains for producing the thesis, the research had to be limited to FY1990-FY2014




Figure JJ: In percentages, the authorized budget in US dollars for military construction per combatant command

A few notes regarding the data presented. The data in the figures only shows the authorized budget in US dollars for military construction and does not show if or how the money is used. The data for FY2015 is only preliminary as the budget is still under negotiation within the Congress, Senate and the Obama administration.

Despite these remarks, some conclusions can be made from the available data before analyzing the last implemented action indicator. First, the overall U.S. attention outside the Northern Command has been the Eurasia continent.¹¹⁸

Second, the armed forces of the United States are investing proportionally less in the Northern Command by prioritizing primarily the European and even more so the Pacific Commands. The

¹¹⁸ With the remark that the geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific Commands as elaborated in chapter 2.1

shift toward the Pacific Command can be identified starting in FY1995. The classified/unspecified investments can possibly support but not discard this trend if and when they become declassified.

In conclusion a low degree of rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identified, starting in FY1995.

3.4 Distribution of nuclear weapons

Since their advent in 1945, nuclear weapons, to include both strategic and tactical types, have been the most important deterrence and defense capability possessed by the United States.¹¹⁹ As such, a study of the distribution of nuclear weapons storage facilities and strategic submarine fleet patrols would complement previous indicators by adding the President's prioritization of the ultimate political weapon. Furthermore, the political sensitivity of the distribution of nuclear weapons considerably strengthens the importance of this indicator as the President needs to balance political sensitivity with strategic or operational requests.

Of all indicators analyzed in this thesis, this indicator has been the most difficult to collect in terms of official data in a format useful for the purpose this thesis. Due to this fact, official documents have been complemented with data from other scholarly sources. As a consequence, the layout of presenting the data differs from other chapters and focus mostly on the European and Pacific Commands.

Nuclear weapons can be launched from the ground, the sea or the air within the so-called nuclear triad. In this thesis, focus is on the storage area of the weapons and on the strategic submarine fleet patrolling patterns. This focus excludes the strategic bomber force disposition of single airframes. Of the strategic bombers, the most commonly known is be the B-52 Stratofortress, which can reach virtually any location in the world within hours by using air-to-air refueling. Analyzing the basing would therefore be of very little to no use. As an example, during the Baltic Approach

¹¹⁹ Pifer et al. 2010

Exercise in 2012 (BALTOPS 2012), a B-52 took off from the United States, made a low fly-by for very important guests (VIPs) over the coast of Lithuania and then returned to the United States the same day.¹²⁰ The point of this example is to stress the importance of studying the storage locations for nuclear weapon rather than individual aircraft because they can easily be moved to different locations for arming.

The chapter is divided into three parts, starting with an introduction, continuing with presenting data of the nuclear weapon distribution in the European and Pacific Commands (including the deterrent strategic submarine patrols) and ending with conclusions.

To present the data on the nuclear weapons distribution, the first figure, KK, shows the total number of nuclear warheads in the United States nuclear weapon stockpile from 1945 to 2014.




Figure KK: United States Nuclear Stockpile 1945-2014. Data for 2010, 2011 and 2014 missing

¹²⁰ Lithuanian Armed Forces 2012

Before drawing any conclusions, two initial remarks are necessary. First, from a quick glance at Figure KK, it appears that the number of nuclear weapon has decreased drastically, but the figure does not show the weapons effects or state whether they are strategic (intercontinental missiles) or tactical (battlefield used) nuclear weapons. Considering the weapons effects, the figure does not show the accuracy of the missiles delivering the nuclear weapons. Today, the probability of hitting the intended target is much higher than earlier, meaning that the number of weapons could be reduced because the weapons effect of each bomb per intended target is higher. Despite this remark, the nuclear weapons during each historical time period have been viewed as state of the art and have been planned to be used in accordance with this belief. Second, the data used for compiling Figure KK are official documents released by the United States Departments of Energy and Defense and more recent data from other scholars.¹²¹ It should be noted that in an American document previously classified as top secret, the data for the years 1948 to 1959 differs.¹²² For the conclusions in this thesis, the differences in the data do not have a major impact.

The chapter will continue with first a discussion of land-based nuclear disposition within the European Command (Figure LL and MM), followed by the Pacific Command (Figure NN and OO) and then nuclear weapons afloat (Figure PP). Before summarizing the findings, the pattern of strategic submarine patrols will be presented (Figure QQ).

Starting with Figure LL, the number of United States nuclear weapons in the European Command 1954 to the present is shown.

¹²¹ For the period 1945 to 1962: Department of Energy (n.d.); For the period 1962 to 2009: Department of Defense 2010; Data for 2010, 2011 and 2014 missing; Data for 2012 and 2013: Kristensen & Norris 2013

¹²² Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 1980: 55




Figure LL: The number of United States nuclear weapons in EUCOM, 1954 to 2011¹²³




Figure MM: Atlantic Deployment On Shore 1961 – 1977¹²⁴

¹²³ Kristensen & Norris 2010: 65

¹²⁴ Norris, Arkin & Burr 1999: 32. Originally: Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 1980: 181

The two figures, LL and MM, show that a reduction in number of weapons has been made within the European Command, and only a very limited number of nuclear weapons remains today. According to official data, the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons remaining in the European Command today¹²⁵ includes 150-200 B-61 tactical nuclear weapons, which are the so-called NATO nuclear weapons.¹²⁶ It is unclear whether the data within Figure MM is already accounted for in Figure LL. Irrespective of whether it is included or not, the conclusion will still be valid as the weapons presented in Figure MM belonging to the European Command are withdrawn.

Before discussing nuclear weapons ashore within the European Command, the following two figures, Figure NN and Figure OO, will present the number of nuclear weapons within the Pacific Command.




Figure NN: Number of nuclear weapons within the Pacific Command ashore¹²⁷

¹²⁵ NATO 2012

¹²⁶ Kristiansen 2010

¹²⁷ Norris, Arkin & Burr 1999: 30. Originally: Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 1980: 180

The figure shows that in 1977, nuclear weapons remained in storage in Guam and Korea. In Figure LL, the reduction in South Korea is visible.




Figure OO: United States Nuclear Weapons in South Korea 1950 – 2000¹²⁸

Before commenting on Figure OO or making further conclusions about Figure LL and MM, Figure PP will be presented showing the nuclear weapons deployed at sea from 1961 to 1977.

¹²⁸ Kristiansen 2005




Figure PP: United States Nuclear deployments as sea 1961 to 1977¹²⁹

Before drawing conclusions from the figures presented, some additional remarks regarding the data will need to be addressed. The numbers presented in Figure PP will be added to the total amount in previous figures for the European and Pacific Commands. In the figure presenting the US Nuclear Weapons in South Korea (Figure OO), the note in the bottom right-hand corner refers to this Presidential decision in 1991 to:

eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched short-range, that is, theater nuclear weapons. We will bring home and destroy all of our nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic missile warheads. We will, of course, ensure that we preserve an effective air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Norris, Arkin & Burr 1999: 30. Originally: Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 1980: 182

¹³⁰ Bush 1991

The Pacific Command Commander's history dated 1991 states that the transfer of all tactical nuclear weapons was to be started before the end of 1991. The document further reveals that the total number of weapons concerned was over 2,000 and that ships with homeports outside the continental United States were to remove the weapons as time and location permitted.¹³¹

As the tactical nuclear weapons were to be removed, the commander of the Pacific Command wrote that the strategic nuclear weapons will continue to have a decisive role as deterrent weapons. One of the strategic weapons, strategic submarines, and their patrols will be the last figure presented in this chapter. In Figure QQ the number of strategic submarine deterrent patrols 1960 to 2012 are presented.




Figure QQ the number of strategic submarine deterrent patrols 1960 to 2012¹³²

The conclusion drawn from Figure QQ is that the European Command was prioritized during the Cold War, but a substantial reduction in the number of patrols occurred starting 1991. At the same time, the number of patrols in the Pacific remained the same. During the 1991 to 1999 timeframe, the number of patrols was essentially the same with some small variations in the Eu-

¹³¹ Commander in Chief United States Pacific Command 1991: 90-92

¹³² Kristiansen 2013

ropean Command. Since 2006, the Pacific Command has seen more patrols than the European Command, and the pattern until 2012 showed a decreased focus on the European Command in favor of the Pacific Command.

After presenting figures LL to QQ with additional remarks and conclusions, the overall conclusions for the chapter concerning the disposition of nuclear weapons of the United States within the European and the Pacific Command will be addressed.

First, from the data available and presented, it appears that the main focus of the United States nuclear presence outside the Northern Command has been within the Eurasian continent.¹³³

Second, the nuclear weapons were prioritized within the European Command during the Cold War, but since the 1990s have been prioritized within the Pacific Command on an operational level. On a more political level, it can be argued that the priority remains within the European Command, as it is the only combatant command that still has (or at least officially has) tactical nuclear weapons remaining outside the United States.¹³⁴ Such an argument is not new and has been stated before by other scholars.¹³⁵

Third, in regard to the current debate that restarted in 2010, no data can be found supporting a new or resumed rebalancing toward the Pacific Command in favor of the European Command, as the major rebalancing concluded occurred in the 1990s and regained momentum in 2005.

¹³³ With the remark that the geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific Commands as elaborated in chapter 2.1

¹³⁴ Questions can be raised about for instance Canada (Figure MM) or Guam (Figure NN). As Guam is United State territory the conclusion can still be valid for the European and Pacific Commands.

¹³⁵ i.e. Coletta 2013

In addition, it should be noticed that in 1994 the United States officially announced that no strategic nuclear weapons were aimed at the former Soviet Union,¹³⁶ but it waited until 1997 before making the same announcement regarding China.¹³⁷

In conclusion, a high degree operational rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identified starting in the mid-1990s.

3.5 Summary of the findings of the implemented action indicators

In this chapter four implemented actions indicators have been analyzed in order to be able to answer the second research question – Which patterns or trends can be identified within the United States implemented actions to support a rebalancing toward Asia? The chapter will start by summarizing the findings of the indicators studied, answer the second research question and conclude with a general discussion before turning to the overall conclusions and consequences for Europe in chapter four.

Five general findings will be discussed as a summary of the findings and conclusions within the studied indicators, which will lead to the answer of the first research question.

First, the main focus of all four analyzed indicators outside the Northern Command has been on the Eurasian continent.¹³⁸

Second, three¹³⁹ of the indicators show a pattern where the United States' attention is more scattered amongst all combatant commands than previously.

¹³⁶ Clinton 1994

¹³⁷ The White House 1998: 44

¹³⁸ With the remark that the geographical area of Eurasia is not fully compatible with the European and Pacific Commands as elaborated in chapter 2.1

¹³⁹ All indicators except Distribution of nuclear weapons, which is not possible to include as the data does not cover this aspect.

Third, the results from the four indicators analyzed do not align themselves into a single and distinct pattern regarding a rebalancing toward the Pacific. Three of the indicators – the deployment of military personnel, military infrastructure and the dispersal of nuclear weapons – indicate a recent high degree of a rebalancing toward the Pacific Command starting in 1985 and ending in 1995, with minor increases in 2001 and 2005 and still maintained today. Meanwhile, one indicator – travels and visits – shows at least a maintained focus on the European Command if not in fact an increased focus.

Fourth, one indicator, the deployment of military personnel, shows a generally increased focus on the Northern Command in recent years at the expense of the other combatant commands, while the indicator of infrastructure shows the opposite, especially concerning authorized funding. This last indicator can be argued to support a more flexible U.S. approach for having troops “back at home” and being able to send them to locations when needed or at least deploy them from the European and Pacific Commands.

Fifth, the announced changes by the Department of Defense concerning deployment of U.S. personnel to support the rebalancing toward Asia seems to be more of a rebalancing *within* the Pacific Command than a rebalancing *to* the Pacific Command. This conclusion will be put in context with the recent development within the European Command as a response to the crises in Syria as well as in Ukraine. As a response to a Turkish request to NATO, the United States deployed Patriot missile batteries in Turkey¹⁴⁰ that were normally based in the Northern Command. Perhaps coincidentally, the U.S. deployed battle tanks to the European Command as a response to the ongoing crises in Ukraine almost at the same time.¹⁴¹ Other military responses to the Ukraine crisis have been, at least initially, rebalances within the European Command by deploying U.S. F-15s from England to the Baltic States,¹⁴² U.S. F-16s from Italy to Poland,¹⁴³ and

¹⁴⁰ United States European Command (n.d.); NATO 2013

¹⁴¹ Darnell 2014

¹⁴² Svan & Vandiver 2014

¹⁴³ Ibid.

deploying 600 U.S. soldiers from Italy to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.¹⁴⁴ An important factor regarding the current Ukraine-crisis is also that the Europeans are not the only ones watching the United States' reactions-- most Asian countries are doing the same. This interest is due to the fact that sovereignty is a sensitive issue in most Pacific countries, and therefore the American response is interesting to follow for both potential adversaries along with friends and allies.¹⁴⁵

So, the answer to the second research question - Which patterns or trends can be identified within the United States implemented actions to support a rebalancing toward Asia? – based on stated preconditions is: A high degree of a military rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identified, starting in 1985 ending in 1995 and at the present it is simply being maintained. There is no general empirical evidence to support a rebalancing at the expense of the European Command.

The conclusion of a high degree of a rebalancing of military personnel did not happen secretly, but possibly it just went unnoticed.

“Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has significantly reduced the level of U.S. military forces stationed in Europe. We have determined that a force of roughly 100,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to U.S. European command will preserve U.S. influence and leadership in NATO [...] In thinking about Asia, we must remember that security comes first. The United States intends to remain active in that region. We are a Pacific nation...Currently our forces number nearly 100,000 personnel in this critical region.”¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ LaVey 2014

¹⁴⁵ Beazley 2014

¹⁴⁶ The White House 1994: 22-23

4 Conclusions and consequences for Europe

As this thesis was written, the crisis in Ukraine emerged and revitalized the discussion of the United States' attention toward Europe and consequently even further deepened the latest debate from 2011 of a rebalancing or pivot toward Asia. The purpose of this thesis has been to contribute to this debate by as objectively as possible describing the United States' political and military attention given to areas outside the continental United States by the President of the United States over a long time period. By using this approach, the aim of the thesis can be fulfilled— *to what degree the United States is rebalancing toward Asia and to discuss what implications it has for Europe.*

This chapter is divided into four parts. It starts with an introduction and continues in chapter 4.1 with combining and discussing the conclusion on research questions one and two, presented in chapters two and three and thus addressing the first part of the overall aim of the thesis – *To what degree United States is rebalancing toward Asia?* It continues in chapter 4.2 with discussing the overall findings implications for Europe and thereafter answers both the third research question – *in what way can European security be affected by a potential United States' rebalancing toward Asia?* – and the second part of the aim of the thesis - *to discuss what implications it has for Europe.* The chapter ends with an overall summary that addresses the general conclusions of the thesis, both in regard to actual findings as well as the theory and method used in chapter 4.3.

4.1 Conclusion - To what degree the United States is rebalancing toward Asia

Starting with the question – *To what degree the United States is rebalancing toward Asia?*

The answer to this question will be possible to conclude when combining the answers within the Declaratory Policies and Implemented Actions indicators studied and by adding remarks and comments. When combined, a more comprehensive understanding of the United States' politics can be described in the conclusion.

The following four combined conclusions can be presented as a summary of the answers to research questions one and two, presented in chapter two and three.

First, the main attention paid by the United States outside the Northern Command during the entire time period studied has been toward the Eurasian continent. The main focus of attention has been the European Command, followed by the Pacific and Central Commands and then marginally the Africa and Southern Commands, with a few minor exceptions. This conclusion emphasizes the theoretical discussion of the United States' continued will of balancing the Eurasian powers, even though the chosen form of comparing data (the combatant commands) are not fully compatible with the definition of Eurasia.

Second, the attention given toward other areas than the European and Pacific Commands has increased since the end of the Cold War, meaning that the United States' attention is more scattered over the world than ever before. This point leads up to a discussion of a potential overstretching of the United States' resources.

Third, throughout the time period studied, several shorter but major increases in attention can be identified, especially in the Pacific and Central Commands. These increases have always been in conjunction with major historical events such as the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the first Iraq War in 1991, and the more recent conflicts in Afghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (2003-). But within the studied indicators, there are no clear patterns or trends indicating that the increased attention given has been at the expense of other combatant commands. This could be the result of the chosen approach of using a mixed method for analyzing the indicators since the statistical data may not lead to conclusive evidence, but the added qualitative remarks have indicated that the increased focus could have been perceived as decreasing the focus on other combatant commands. As one example, many Asian countries felt overlooked or neglected during the 2000s.¹⁴⁷ But on the other hand, it can be argued that this perception by Asian countries does not mean less attention is given by the United States to the Pacific Command per se, only that the type of attention

¹⁴⁷ Bader 2012: 2

from the U.S. was not the type wanted by the Asian countries. Such a case could be described as a conflict of interest rather than of a level of attention.

Fourth and lastly, the discussion of a rebalancing needs to be divided into long-, short- and very short-term perspectives as shown in the summary chapter, 2.5 and 3.5. The declaratory policy and the implemented actions do not give one single pattern in either perspective, but some commonalities can be addressed.

Starting with the long-term perspective beginning in 1945, the declaratory indicators reveal a decrease in the attention paid to the European Command. In this time period, the proportion of attention was increased in other combatant commands, whereas it has not been possible to reach a long-term conclusion within the implemented actions due to the form of the data available. This will be addressed in the later discussion regarding consequences for Europe.

In the short-term perspective, the declaratory policies reveal an increased attention from the Pacific starting in the 1980s and the European in the 1990s in favor of the Central Command, whereas the implemented actions reveal a major increase proportionally in attention given to the Pacific Command starting in 1985 and ending in 1995, with minor increases starting in 2001 and 2005. Of course the attention toward the Central Command during the 2000s can be identified, but only within a few indicators and it does not interfere with the presented conclusions.

In the very short-term perspective since the debate restarted in 2011, no general rebalancing or increased attention given to the Pacific Command can be concluded, but rather almost the opposite. There was increased attention given within the declaratory policies in 2010 and 2011, but in 2012 and 2013 there was increased attention paid to the European Command. Within the implemented actions, the trend of maintaining the attention established during the time frame since 1985 can be found, but the flexible indicators support a focus of more attention toward the Northern Command while the non-flexible indicators support a focus more within the European and Pacific Commands.

Before presenting the overall conclusion and then discuss the implications for Europe, some additional comments will be presented.

The increase of attention within the declaratory policy toward the Central Command identified starting in the 1980s deserves a comment to be put in the proper context. The National Security Strategy described the effects of the increased focus within the Central Command as benefitting the European and Pacific Commands and subsequently benefitting the United States in the long term. In this manner of thinking, it can also be argued that this strategy led to increased attention to the European and Pacific Commands overall by focusing on the Central Command:

The Security of Southwest Asia is inextricably linked to the security of Europe and Japan and thus is vital to the defense of the United States. A key peacetime military objective in Southwest Asia is to enhance deterrence by sufficiently improving our global capability to deploy and sustain military forces so as to ensure that, if the Soviet Union attacks....¹⁴⁸

Another declaratory policy document stated that in 1981, the United States shifted its focus of general-purpose peacetime forces from the European and the Pacific Commands to the Central Command. In addition, it increased its presence in the Southern Command at the expense of the Northern Command.¹⁴⁹ The debate that restarted in 2011 regarding a rebalancing could therefore be discussed as being a rebalancing from the Central Command back to the European and/or the Pacific Commands. But if the current reductions of forces in Afghanistan and Iraq are studied more closely, such an argument is unfounded for several reasons. First, as shown in the deployment indicator, the troops are returning to the Northern Command and possibly returning to pre-2001/2003 numbers in the region. Secondly, the economic support for the overseas contingency commitments has been added by Congress, meaning that the Pacific Command has received and continues to receive the same proportional level of funding as before, even though it may be monetarily less due to further reductions in the United States' defense budget. Finally, several

¹⁴⁸ The White House 1982: 4. Please note the US State Department definition of the Middle East, Southwest Asia is used.

¹⁴⁹ The White House 1981

scholars continue to argue for a remained U.S. interest in the Middle East due to several factors such as the Israel-Palestine conflict, the developments in Iran and Syria and oil production, just to name a few.¹⁵⁰

Although there was no general conclusion to be drawn within the declaratory indicators stating that a rebalancing towards the Pacific Command was found, this finding was the opposite of the conclusions drawn regarding implemented actions. Does that imply a diversion between the declaratory policies and the implemented actions? If so, it would support further research in line with Nitze's work of exploring the difference between what is stated and what is planned or done in reality. For the following reason, this thesis argues that there is not a diversion.

The conclusions presented in the implemented actions chapter have actually been mentioned in the declaratory policies documents. For instance, the rebalancing of deployed military personnel was addressed already in the State of the Union address in 1990 saying "And so, tonight I am announcing a major new step for further reduction in U.S. and Soviet manpower in Central and Eastern Europe to 195,000 on each side."¹⁵¹ It was continued in 1995 by stating "We have determined that a force of roughly 100,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to the U.S. European command will preserve U.S. influence and leadership in NATO and provide a deterrent posture that is visible to all Europeans"¹⁵² and furthermore addressed the numbers in the Pacific by stating that "currently, our forces number nearly 100,000 personnel in East Asia."¹⁵³ It would be interesting to elaborate on Berdal's approach of analyzing different levels within the administration (discussed regarding the Department of Defense statements in chapter 3.2), but it will not further discussed as it is not within the purpose of this thesis. However, it could be recommended for further studies.

¹⁵⁰ Ciszuk 2014

¹⁵¹ Bush 1990

¹⁵² The White House 1995: 26

¹⁵³ Ibid.: 28

So, as an overall conclusion of the first part of the overall research question - *To what degree is the United States rebalancing toward Asia* – the answer would be: During the time period studied, the United States has always paid attention to the Pacific Command. Within the declaratory policies studied, no degree of rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identified, but rather the opposite can be noticed within the implemented actions studied. The degree of military rebalancing was high from 1985 to 2005, and today it is just maintained with no concrete evidence supporting a restarted rebalancing since 2011.

Since the debate restarted in 2011, the degree of a continued rebalancing toward the Pacific Command is marginally present but is difficult to describe as a rebalancing within the political and military power systems studied. But is the debate of rebalancing within these two power systems possibly the wrong way of addressing the discussion? Could the rebalancing actually be from the political and the military systems to other power systems, such as the economic or technical? Can it possibly be concluded that the rebalancing is occurring within or between these other systems or between other actors or indicators? As an example for such a hypothetical question, could the political rebalancing have happened in 1972 with the Shanghai Communique,¹⁵⁴ could the economic rebalancing have started as the trade was normalized in 1980,¹⁵⁵ or could the military rebalancing have occurred as earlier stated in 1985-2005? This could be the case that is described by former National Security Council member Jeffrey Bader, who previously worked on President Obama's Asia policies:

The Asia-Pacific region deserved higher priority in American foreign policy. With wealth, and power, and influence gradually shifting from Europe toward Asia in the past several decades, the region has emerged as the world's center of gravity for economic, political, and security decisions in the twenty-first century.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ Betts 2004: 17

¹⁵⁵ The White House 1998: 46

¹⁵⁶ Bader 2012:7

The hypothetical question raised above can be used as inspiration for further research study and is possibly what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton meant when she wrote:

One of the most important tasks of the American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁵⁷

Such a discussion would also be more in line with the political objectives stated by the United States State Department presented in the general introduction chapter, as the recently declared military goals analyzed in chapter three do not support or refute a rebalancing discussion within the military power system.

4.2 Conclusion - Implications for Europe

After establishing the overall conclusion regarding a rebalancing, this chapter will answer the third research question, “*In what way is European security affected by a potential United States rebalancing toward Asia?*” and by doing so fulfill the second part of this aim of the thesis - *to discuss what implications it has for Europe.*

As the conclusion regarding a rebalancing did not show any degree of changes resulting from declaratory policies and as the rebalancing of implemented actions occurred mainly 1985 to 2005 and is merely being maintained today, it would be easy to immediately draw the conclusion that there are no current implications for Europe. But is that really the case?

The word used in this thesis is *implications* not *consequences* (or any other word for that matter). The choice of using the word *implications* is deliberate because it has a more positive, or at least neutral, connotation in comparison to *consequences*. However, do the implications need to be negative as hypothetically questioned when formulating the aim of this thesis?

¹⁵⁷ Clinton 2011a

One example of an argued positive effect would be to look at the objectives the United States had with the financial aid associated with the Marshall Plan, described by two citations below. The first describes the starting point and the second the objectives reached by the United States:

Apart from the above problem of military capabilities, the Western European powers continue to be confronted with serious political, economic and social problems despite substantial advances, with U.S. assistance, towards greater stability and cohesion. These problems' have derived from economic conditions, political instability, neutralist tendencies, social tensions, and, in France and Italy, the continued existence of large and powerful Communist parties. Although genuine progress has been made, further efforts by the Western European countries and U.S. assistance to them will be required to overcome these adverse elements and to continue the progress toward political, economic and social stability, and collective defense in Western Europe.¹⁵⁸

Reappraisal of United States objectives and strategy for National security

European stability is vital to our own security. Our objective is to complete the construction of a truly integrated, democratic and secure Europe, with a democratic Russia as a full participant. This would complete the mission the United States launched 50 years ago with the Marshall Plan and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO remains the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security. As a guarantor of European democracy and a force for European stability, NATO must play the leading role in promoting a more integrated, secure Europe prepared to respond to new challenges.

A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1997¹⁵⁹

From the perspective of the United States, the implication of the two citations can be argued to be positive because Europe had become more stable and secure, at least until Syria and even

¹⁵⁸ National Security Council 1952: 17

¹⁵⁹ National Security Council 1997: Chapter III, Integrated regional Approaches

more recently the Ukraine crisis emerged. On the other hand, the implication of reaching the objectives can be argued as negative, which can be combined with the conclusion within the analyses that there is a less frequent mentioning of Europe and reduced presence of permanently deployed military personnel. The reduced attention paid toward Europe can be argued to be a way of reducing the importance or value of the European part of the Eurasia continent, as the historical ties are weakening and the younger generations of the United States' population will forget their ancestral ties. If the European objective is to remain the most important ally to the United States, such a development is negative. But as the crisis in Ukraine has developed, the need of the United States to possibly refocus attention on more actions implemented by the military will change this trend. But still, the military response to the Ukraine crisis needs to be put in perspective, starting with a threat analysis and leading us to reflect upon the previous discussion within the geopolitical context of using different tools for different areas/items.

The Director of National Intelligence report to the U.S. Senate from 2013 specifically mentions several different threats. The cyber threat mainly referred to Russia and China, the threat from terrorism referred mainly to Al-Qaida, Iran and Hezbollah, and other general threats not linked to specific actors were transnational organized crime, nuclear proliferation, espionage, continued development in space, natural resources (including food, water, minerals, energy and climate change), health and pandemic. Regarding the regional threat assessments mentioned, a conventional war between India and China or China's response to the United States rebalancing toward Asia (which includes Chinese military options) are mentioned.¹⁶⁰ To counter this threat assessment, it is possibly more convenient or suitable to use high-tech equipment stationed within the European Command rather than tanks and battle groups. It can also be questioned whether more civilians are required than military soldiers, which the indicators analyzed do not reflect. If a more high-tech approach is needed, the need for physical, geographic training areas are reduced as a cyber exercises most likely require much less exercise space than a brigade exercise with full fire support. In reality, the U.S. military presence within the European Command could have increased in sectors other than those studied. Such a discussion can be supported in a statement by the Department of Defense that the rebalancing is in order to meet a broader spectrum of con-

¹⁶⁰ Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2013: 2-34

flicts, no longer focusing on stability operations but on capabilities needed for the future.¹⁶¹ In addition to this argument, it could also be the case that the indicators studied do not reflect upon how the United States views its need for military presence within each combatant command. Possibly, the European Command will be seen as more of a logistical hub connecting the Northern Command with the African and Central Commands. Such a discussion or perception could be supported by the statement by the Commander of the European Command describing the importance of the location of his command because it is situated along the borders of other combatant commands.¹⁶² In order to use them when and where required, the mobilization of United States forces has been discussed in several of the declaratory documents, which address the need for global support, global mobility capability and prepositioning equipment ashore and at sea.¹⁶³ Global mobility and prepositioning is of importance in order for the U.S. to respond to any threat on the Eurasian continent because it needs to pass either the Pacific or the Atlantic Oceans in order to reach the Eurasian continent, as seen in Figure A.

As long as the United States is focusing on balancing the power of Eurasia, it can be argued that the European Command will not be forgotten and remain a focus of attention since Europe will remain a valid and important area for the United States.

Another aspect that is not studied or mentioned is the political and military doctrine. The recently discussed U.S. military doctrine, the AirSea Battle Concept,¹⁶⁴ is generally defined as the United States' response to the increased Chinese attention around Taiwan and a major part of the United States military pivot or rebalancing toward the Pacific.¹⁶⁵ An argument that could be raised and discussed in later research is whether the mentioned concept or versions adopted later¹⁶⁶ can be used toward Russia, the Arctic, the Baltic States or other areas, which consequently

¹⁶¹ Department of Defense 2014: VII

¹⁶² Stavridis 2013: 5

¹⁶³ The White House 1987: 28-29; 1988: 20; 1990: 25-26; 1993: 14; 1995: 9; 1996:15

¹⁶⁴ Department of Defense Air-Sea Battle Office 2013

¹⁶⁵ Etzoni 2013

¹⁶⁶ i.e. the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), Department of Defense 2012b

strongly influence the development of new NATO concepts and doctrines. In the end, such a debate can affect the national defense planning in regards to procurement of new equipment etc.

Another positive implication for Europe and which can be argued to be vital to maintain is actually the same finding within Implemented Action indicator – travels and visits. The conclusion showed that European leaders still have a high degree of attention and by that can influence the President of the United States. The negative aspect is that Europe most certainly will need to deliver something to maintain this position by satisfying the United States.

So, the effects upon European security can be concluded to already have already happened since the focus of implemented actions toward the Pacific occurred long before the most recent debate started. During the Cold War, European security relied heavily upon the presence of the United States in all dimensions. After the American military withdrawal from Europe during 1980s and 1990s, Europe tried to fill the gaps through different initiatives such as the European Union, but European security is still heavily dependent on the United States as has been shown in Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999-2012, Georgia in 2008, Libya in 2011, Syria from 2012- and in the Ukraine from 2014-. Therefore, the need of support from the United States, at least within the military domain, is present and seems to remain. At the same time, the focus of the United States is more geographically scattered than ever before, and as discussed earlier, it needs active European support with common burden sharing.

Because Libya 2011 was mentioned, a final comment will be made before concluding this part of the chapter. Before, during and after the war a new a United States policy of “*Leading from behind*” has been discussed and its implications for Europe.¹⁶⁷ As this thesis does not evaluate the military operations in Libya in 2011, there will be no discussion of whether “leading from behind” was the correct description versus just “leading.” Instead, it can be recommended as a future research topic using the theoretical framework of studying declaratory policies versus implemented actions. One comment relevant for this thesis is that the Libya conflict can be used as

¹⁶⁷ Cohen & Scheinmann 2014

a positive example for Europe since numerous countries participated in a coalition and showed willingness to actively participate in taking responsibility for security in Europe and its surrounding areas. In doing so, Europe demonstrated their capacity and willingness to the United States and others.¹⁶⁸ At the same time, the Libya operation can be argued as being a poor example showing the need for the United States continued participation in major military operations as Europe lacked most of the capacities. The risk of participating blindly in such operations can be discussed; if not the overall geopolitical consequences can be foreseen, risking being a tool used by the United States in reaching their national objectives.¹⁶⁹

So, to answer the third research questions – *in what way is European security affected by a potential United States rebalancing toward Asia?* – as well as addressing the second part of the aim of the thesis – *to discuss what implications it has for Europe*, the following can be concluded: the outcome for European security can be described as a paradox. As the United States is having a wider focus and risks overstressing its resources, the need for Europe to take care of itself has increased. At the same time, the need for European support to and from the United States increases as part of burden sharing. This realization means that Europe, if providing support to the United States, increases its bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States; therefore it can rely even more upon it. But at the same time, the United States does not want an overly strong or powerful Europe since it still would like to counterbalance all powers on the Eurasian continent. So if addressed properly, the historically increased American focus on Asia is potentially a winning situation for European security.

Before concluding with how general the finding and methods used are, a few comments will be made on how Europe can address this issue both with declaratory statements and with implemented actions. An example of a declaratory policy can be the Norwegian way of addressing and supporting United States engagement in Asia,¹⁷⁰ while examples of implemented actions can be

¹⁶⁸ Wagnsson, Mohlin & Engelbrekt 2014

¹⁶⁹ Dragnes 2012

¹⁷⁰ Eriksen Søreide 2014a

to focus more on strengthen the national defense within Europe, to participate in more global commitments or if financially possible, a combination of the two. Such a combination can be seen in Norway as the country focuses on both national and regional issues as well as participates in global commitments such as in Syria and in the Pacific.¹⁷¹

4.3 Overall conclusion – fulfilling the aim of the research

The aim of this thesis was to examine and discuss the historical and current pretexts of *to what degree the United States is rebalancing toward Asia and to discuss which implications it has for Europe*. Based on the method used, indicators studied and demarcations made, the conclusion is that during the time period studied, the United States has always paid attention to the Pacific Command. Within the declaratory policies studied, no degree of rebalancing toward the Pacific Command can be identified, but rather the opposite can be noticed within the implemented actions studied. The degree of rebalancing was high from 1985 to 2005, and today it is just maintained with no concrete evidence supporting a restarted rebalancing since 2011.

Despite this, the attention given to the European Command has decreased. The implications for Europe can be summarized as a paradox. As the United States is having a wider focus and risks overstretching its resources, the need for Europe to take care of itself has increased. At the same time, the need for European support to and from the United States increases as part of the burden sharing. This realization means that Europe, if providing support to the United States, increases its bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States and therefore can rely even more upon it. But at the same time, the United States does not want an overly strong or powerful Europe since it still would like to counterbalance all powers on the Eurasian continent. If addressed properly, the historically increased American focus on Asia is potentially a winning situation for European security.

With the results presented, how general are they and can they be applied within other research? The question will be discussed in two ways, first with the outcome of the study and second, with

¹⁷¹ Eriksen Søreide 2014a; 2014b

the method used. The outcome of the study can be used within the general debate of United States' focus from the Second World War to the present within the political and military power systems, but it cannot be generalized to other power systems or other nations. Maybe the attention given by the United States to the two power systems studied can explain other nations' behaviors, both friendly and adversarial. An example of this could be the increased focus by Norway within the Pacific Command and the discussion within NATO described in the general introduction.

The discussion above underlines the need for continuous discussion and scientific research related to not only those countries that are possible threats but also to neutral and allied countries. Such measures minimize the risk of misunderstandings, such as was addressed by scientist Daniel Byman in his article *Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism*.¹⁷² However, it must be done in a manner that does not result in negative consequences.

Regarding the method developed for this study, both the theoretical and the mixed method usage with emphasis on the statistical data provide results that can be of general use in further studies within this academic field. In this thesis, this method showed both a high level of validity as well as reliability. The outcome is based upon the comprehensive approach of studying both the declaratory policies and the implemented actions, with a combination of statistical data put in context and discussed with qualitative data, remarks and comments.

To end this thesis, a few citations will be used in order to reflect upon the method and data used that led to the results, including a reflection of the author's own ability to draw conclusions. The citations stresses the need for analyzing long time periods for mitigating the risk of drawing conclusions on the most recent "hype". The citations also stress the need for continuously studying and understanding the relevance of geopolitics when the politics of the United States is analyzed. The last citations reflect upon our ability to see or willingness to see and understand changes.

¹⁷² Byman 2006

First, a citation by Ronald Reagan who partly quoted Walter Lippmann:

... the behavior of nations over a long period of time is the most reliable, though not the only index of their national interest. For though their interests are not eternal, they are remarkable persistent ... There is no great mystery why this should be: the facts of geography are permanent ... thus successive generations of men tend to face the same recurrent problem and to react to them in more or less habitual ways.[continuing by Reagan commenting] Lippmann's observation is particularly apt. While it is commonplace to hear that U.S. National Security Strategy changes erratically every four to eight years as a result of a new Administration taking office, in reality there is a remarkable consistency over time when our policies are viewed in historical perspective. The core interests and objectives of this Nation have changed little since World War II.¹⁷³

Ending the thesis by leaving the reader to reflect upon the results of the findings:

Simply put, President Obama and I continue to believe that, Europe is the cornerstone of our engagement with the rest of the world and is the catalyst for our global cooperation. It's that basic. Nothing has changed.¹⁷⁴

Joe Biden, Vice President, Munich 2013

or

There are over two thousand years of experience to tell us that the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out.¹⁷⁵

Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart.

¹⁷³ The White House 1988: 1

¹⁷⁴ Biden 2013

¹⁷⁵ Liddell-Hart 1943: 115

Annex A Matrix for commonality when categorizing data

The following common principles, in alphabetically order, have been applied during the collection and categorizing of data. The list is not complete, instead it shall be seen as how different issues occurring while categorizing has been handled.

Object		Categorized	Comment
Agreements			
	Generally	Within the combatant command where it was signed.	If not obviously incorrect as the peace agreements regarding Bosnia in the 1990s; categorized within the European Command
	START	The European Command	The Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement (ABM) has not been counted. If added the number for the European Command would have increased even more.
Alliance/ Organization			
	ANZUS	The Pacific Command	
	ASEAN	The Pacific Command	
	AU	The African Command	
	EU	The European Command	
	IMF	Not categorized	
	NATO	The European Command	
	OAS	The Southern Command	
	OSSE	The European Command	

Object		Categorized	Comment
	WHO	Not categorized	
Cities		According to the city location within each Combat Command	
Events		According to where the event occurs	<p>i.e The Cuban missiles crisis = Southern Command.</p> <p>i.e Battle of the Coral Sea = Pacific Command</p> <p>i.e Battle in Tora Bora= Central Command</p> <p>if referred to as The Battle of the Coral Sea to Tora Bora = Central and Pacific Command</p>
Geographical areas			
	Hemispheric neighbours	The Southern Command	If not obviously including also nations direct neighbouring the U.S. Then also added to the Northern Command
	Middle East	The Central Command	
	Southwest Asia	The Central Command	If not obviously referring to areas within other combatant commands
	Western Hemisphere	The Southern Command	
Nations		According to the nation loca-	Bermuda: Within its combatant

Object	Categorized	Comment
	tion within each Combat Command	command localization. Former Soviet Union = European Command NIS = New Independent States, categorized as European and Central Command as the new nations referred to are located within bot Commands

Annex B Acronyms and Abbreviations

This annex contains acronyms and abbreviations commonly used throughout the thesis in alphabetical order

AFRICOM	The United States African Command
CENTCOM	The United States Central Command
DoD	The United States Department of Defense
EUCOM	The United States European Command
N/A	Not applicable
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORTHCOM	The United States Northern Command
PACOM	The United States Pacific Command
SOUTHCOM	The United States Southern Command
U.S.	The United States of America

Annex C Figures

This annex contains a list of all figures presented in order of appearance

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