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Lessons not Learned

The Use of Force in Peace Operations in the 1990s

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Introduction

Before he assumed command of United Nations (UN) forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 1995, General Rupert Smith, on different occasions and before various audiences, presented his views on the "object and utility of the use of force in intervention operations" after the Cold War. The central question he raised was why the threat of and the actual use of force had often ended "with disappointing or unlooked for consequences".¹ A basic reason, he suggested, was that "we had been unclear as to what it is we expect the use of force or forces to achieve as opposed to do."² This study questions whether governments and international organisations have properly grasped this fundamental distinction and the consequences that flow from it.

The article is concerned with the use of force in "peace operations" in the decade of the 1990s. As a category, "peace operations" has become a catch-all phrase, where the term "peace" or "peace support" has less to do with the operational environment and the specific challenge it poses to an intervening force, than with the wider objective which, it is hoped, military action will help to promote.³ These operations are, ultimately, about righting wrongs and advancing wider humanitarian purposes. As such, they are supposed to transcend the pursuit of narrowly defined interests and national ambitions. Thus, the second UN Mission to Somalia (UNOSOM II) was deployed in May 1993 to assist "the Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political life"⁴. NATO and UN military action in Bosnia in late August and early September 1995 were designed to prevent further "ethnic cleansing".⁵ Both these cases involved what, according to many, ought properly to be considered a distinctive sub-category of peace operations, namely "peace enforcement". It is this category and its supposed utility, both as an analytical construct and as a key to understanding how force has in fact been used in the 1990s, that provide the main focus for this article.

The view that "peace enforcement" constitutes a type of military activity that, whilst "coercive in nature", remains distinct from "war", has

been embraced by the armed forces of several countries, all of them understandably anxious to provide appropriate doctrine or guiding principles for their armed forces engaged in a growing number of international operations.⁶ While different names have sometimes been used – French doctrine staff, for example, speak of "peace restoration" operations (*restauration de la paix*) – the basic idea of "peace enforcement" rests on two key assumptions.⁷ The first of these is that military force, even though it involves coercion, can be used impartially to ensure compliance with a given mandate without designating an enemy. According to extant United Kingdom doctrine, Peace Support Operations (PSO) operations "are neither in support of, nor against, a particular party, but are designed to restore peace and ensure compliance with the mandate in an even-handed manner".⁸ John Ruggie has expressed the same basic idea, arguing that force can be "used impartially, meaning without *a priori* prejudice or bias in response to violations of agreements; Security Council mandates, or norms stipulated in some other fashion".⁹ The second assumption flows directly from the first: using force in this manner, precisely because it is "impartial and even-handed", will not prejudice the political outcome of the conflict in question.

There is something superficially appealing about this approach and much of the doctrine literature where it is elaborated is sophisticated and undoubtedly valuable as a means of instilling a "peace operations"-mindset among soldiers, especially among those whose traditional focus has been on high-intensity warfare. Yet, the necessarily abstract and generalised character of this literature has certain striking limitations when it comes to understanding how military force has in fact been employed in support of humanitarian objectives over the past decade. Humanitarian or moral imperatives have clearly assumed a more prominent role in the minds of policy-makers, but decisions regarding the use of force and, above all, the manner in which force has actually been employed, have also been shaped by a range of other motivations and constraints. These have included considerations of prestige and credibility; competing perceptions of national interest; historical memories and fears; bureaucratic politics; and,

not least, the particular outlook and personalities of key decision-makers. These sorts of influences, whilst often difficult to quantify, have always been present when governments make decisions about the use of military force. Other factors, notably the aversion to casualties and the unique pressures of modern media, are arguably more specific to the post Cold-War era. These have also influenced both the character and pattern of interventions in important ways.¹⁰ The experience of "peace operations" cannot be dissected for "lessons" without an awareness of these wider considerations. And while doctrine and doctrinal revision have a role to play, the more urgent need is for political decision-makers to rethink, on the basis of what is now a significant body of experience, the requirements for the effective use of force, that is, to think of military force in terms of what it can achieve as opposed to what it can do.

The Use of Force in Somalia and Bosnia: Argument in Brief

To this end, this article concentrates specifically on developments and decisions regarding the use of force taken during the critical period of two operations: UNOSOM II in Somalia and UNPROFOR in Bosnia. The former case involved American troops, nominally as part of a larger UN operation, in the impoverished and war-stricken country of Somalia in the summer and autumn of 1993. During a five month period, American forces were used in a "peace enforcement" capacity against forces loyal to Mohammed Farah Aydeed, an armed faction leader or "war lord" whose physical capture the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, had persuaded the American administration, was critical to the success of largest UN operation to date. The second case examined covers the military action and, significantly, the background to it, by NATO and the UN in late August and early September 1995 against Bosnian Serb forces throughout Bosnia; an action which helped pave the way for a permanent cease-fire among the warring factions after four years of bloody and brutal fighting.

One reason for re-visiting these cases is that the "international community" is still very much living with the consequences of the actions that were taken in each case. American policy towards peace operations generally, and the UN and Africa in particular, remain profoundly shaped by the events in Somalia. In Bosnia, military action in August and September 1995 helped create the conditions for a peace settlement to be negotiated in Dayton; a settlement which remains in place, even though the country has increasingly assumed the character of a trusteeship with limited signs of genuine integration among its constituent parts. The background to "Operation Deliberate Force" in 1995 is also of interest for another reason. The decision by NATO leaders to launch an air campaign against Yugoslavia in March 1999 and the associated belief that a "short, sharp, shock" against the regime of President Slobodan Milosevic would do the trick, were based on a particular and, as will be argued more fully, incomplete and simplistic reading of unfolding events in 1995.

There are two further reasons, however, why these cases deserve to be examined together. First, in each case, the use of force was tied to the promotion of a broader humanitarian objective. As such, they both reflect a trend whereby the use of military force internationally has increasingly come to be justified on humanitarian grounds. As indicated above, this is not to suggest that in either Somalia or Bosnia other motives did not influence the calculations of decision-makers and helped spur them into action.¹¹ Nor is it to suggest that there was complete convergence of views among states about the need for enforcement action to be taken. Yet, while it is true that Chapter VII of the UN Charter, concerned with the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security, was invoked as a legal basis for military action in each case, these were not Chapter VII actions along the lines of the Gulf War. In 1990-91, a broad and unlikely coalition of states rallied behind the Security Council's decision to reverse, if necessary by use of force, the entirely unambiguous case of Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. By contrast, in Somalia, Bosnia and later in Kosovo, an intolerable situation, involving suffering and human rights violations on a scale offending the "moral conscience of mankind",

was deemed to have arisen within a country, and Chapter VII was used, in part, as a procedural device enabling “tougher action” to be taken.

The second reason for investigating these two cases together is that the level of force employed in both cases was designed to impose a solution or force an outcome by coercive means. The decision to take such action arose out of a conviction that relying on the consent and good will of the parties would only prolong an unacceptable situation. Indeed, disillusionment with consent-based peacekeeping, where the use of force had been restricted to self-defence (albeit with some variations in the interpretation of what constituted self-defence), provided an important backdrop to the decision to use force.

It is necessary to stress what this article does not address. It does not cover the contentious issue of the legitimacy of military action in each case. It does recognise, however, that while the record of humanitarian action in the conflicts of the 1990s is uneven, and that the principle of humanitarian intervention itself has been applied with conspicuous inconsistency, a significant change in the normative climate has taken place.¹² Specifically, the view that what happens within a country should not be a matter of international concern has lost some of its force, or rather, has been tempered by countervailing pressures at least to consider intervention in circumstances involving human rights violations on a “massive” scale. The chief concern here is about the actual use of force in support of humanitarian objectives. In brief, the argument put forward is not that enforcement should be ruled out as an option for decision-makers, but rather that the military and political consequences that inevitably flow from such action need to be carefully considered and not simply wished away. In its political and military consequences, enforcement cannot be impartial. As with the decision to commit military forces historically, enforcement action in support of humanitarian objectives requires tough and difficult choices; choices that some of the doctrinal literature on “peace operations” in the West, if only inadvertently, has tended to underplay.

I. The Lessons from Somalia, 1993

In January 1991, after more than twenty years in power, President Siad Barre was forced to flee Somalia after a protracted and highly destructive period of civil war. Barre, an autocratic and ruthless ruler who had come to power in a military coup in 1969, left behind a depressing legacy of disintegrating institutions and economic mismanagement on a grand scale. His desperate attempt to hold on to power in the late 1980s resulted in a brutal civil war against an alliance of clan-based factions whose one common purpose was the ouster of the hated dictator. Partly for this reason, Barre’s removal only hastened the collapse of the Somali State as factions, previously allied against him, were unable to agree on the basis for a new political order. The result was a profound “crisis of legitimate authority”.¹³ In the summer of 1992, fierce rivalry and intense fighting between the two main factions of the United Somali Congress led by Mohammed Farah Aydeed and Ali Mahdi Mohammed respectively, thwarted the efforts of a small-scale UN mission (UNOSOM I) to supervise the delivery of relief supplies to the country.¹⁴ It was against the background of these developments – a collapsed state, continued fighting, and a large-scale famine – that Boutros Boutros-Ghali, asked the United States in late 1992 to lead a military task force (UNITAF) to Somalia that would secure humanitarian relief operations and, at the same time, prepare the ground for a second and much larger UN mission (UNOSOM II). The continuing precariousness of the situation in the country in early 1993 was deemed to require a more forceful mandate for any follow-on force. Consequently, the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was “endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter” and became, in the words of the Boutros-Ghali, the “first operation of its kind to be authorised by the international community”.¹⁵

Presenting his plans to the Security Council in March 1993, the Secretary-General envisaged a role for UNOSOM II that involved far

more than simply the continuation of UNITAF's efforts to establish "a secure environment for humanitarian assistance".¹⁶ Indeed, Boutros-Ghali called for a mandate that:

*would also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's constitutional structure; achieving national reconciliation, [and] recreating a Somali state based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.*¹⁷

Legitimate questions have been raised about the appropriateness of adopting such an ambitious mandate given the nature of the crisis in Somalia at the time. In particular, the emphasis on recreating a Somali State has been viewed by prominent some scholars, as well as by some experienced NGOs, as running counter to "powerful economic and social forces in contemporary Somalia militating against any central or centralizing political arrangement".¹⁸ Mark Bradbury of OXFAM, writing in 1994, pointed out that "centralised government is the very thing that many Somalis have been fighting against".¹⁹ A related criticism centred on the failure by outsiders to take proper account of the "cultural specifics of the Somali context".²⁰ Yet, as Menkhaus also perceptively notes, while the various critiques of the UN's approach to reconciliation in Somalia "grew louder and more caustic" as the situation deteriorated in 1993, "collectively ... they often contradicted rather than reinforced each other".²¹ What is surely beyond dispute is that the general nature of the objectives spelled out by the UN in March 1993 could only be achieved with the support and involvement of the Somalis themselves. This meant, as far as the central focus of this article is concerned, that military operations would have to be subordinated to and closely co-ordinated with political efforts to control violence and set the country on the path of reconciliation. In the event, American-led military actions from early June 1993 onwards, actively encouraged by Boutros-Ghali himself, were to have the very opposite effect. Still, even as

the situation on the ground deteriorated in the summer of 1993, UN and US officials continued to maintain that they were not in Somalia to fight a "war", and that actions were not directed against any one party as such. It was a "peace enforcement" operation with Chapter VII powers and the mission was not to fight an "enemy" but to ensure that Security Council orders were implemented. That, at any rate, was the theory.

Shortly after the killing of 24 Pakistani UN peacekeepers on 5 June 1993, the Security Council passed a resolution condemning what it described as "premeditated armed attacks launched by forces apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA)".²² A Commission of Inquiry, set up by the UN to investigate the circumstances that had led to the deaths of its personnel, concluded much later that "in the absence of a more convincing explanation from the USC/SNA", it believed that the SNA had indeed "orchestrated the attacks" on 5 June.²³ It could find no "conclusive evidence", however, to support the view that the attacks had been "pre-planned and pre-meditated".²⁴ Encouraged by Boutros-Ghali, Security Council Resolution 837 was nevertheless interpreted by the US leadership in Mogadishu as requiring a significant escalation in the use of force, including the targeting of the senior hierarchy of the SNA.²⁵ While professedly still not taking sides in the wider Somali conflict, a new phase of operations began on 12 June 1993 with a series of night and day-time attacks by American forces of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) aimed at destroying weapons sites and Radio Mogadishu controlled by forces loyal to Aydeed. Within weeks, Jonathan Howe, Boutros-Ghali's American Special Representative in Somalia, had also announced a \$ 25,000 bounty for the capture of Aydeed who was increasingly described as an obstructionist warlord.

The key issue here is not whether Aydeed could or should have been more unambiguously linked to the attack on UN forces; indeed he already had more than enough blood on his hands. The real question was whether the strategy adopted in response to that attack was the wisest policy under the circumstances. The Commission of Inquiry, whose final report Boutros-Ghali initially sought to suppress, noted laconically that it was

“arguable whether Resolution 837 really envisaged the bombing of houses, garages and meetings.”²⁶ In particular, the Commission singled out, as have most accounts of UNOSOM II’s history, the decision to attack the house of Abdi Hassan Awale on 12 July 1993. Awale’s house was described at the time as a “major SNA/Aydeed militia command and control centre” but on the day of the attack, it was serving as a meeting place for elders, clansmen, intellectuals and militia leaders. The aim of the “Abdi House” attack was to “eliminate the SNA command centre and its occupants”²⁷ To this end, and in order to preserve the element of surprise, US forces abandoned the policy of prior notification before an attack which had been practised hitherto in an attempt to minimise collateral damage. In a carefully researched and graphic account of US military operations in Mogadishu, Mark Bowden has described how on that day, sixteen TOW missiles slammed into a meeting of unsuspecting clan elders and religious leaders.²⁸ The attack was estimated by the International Red Cross to have killed more than 50 Somalis and injured a further 170. According to Bowden, “among the elders present at the meeting were religious leaders, former judges, professors, the poet Moallim Soyan, and the clan’s most senior leader, Sheik Haji Mohamed Iman Aden”.²⁹ The attack, for which President Bill Clinton’s specific approval had been sought,³⁰ did “more than any single act to stir up local support for Aydeed and the Habr Gidr, and turned many moderate Somalis who had supported the intervention against the international mission.”³¹ The Commission of Inquiry rightly concluded that after the 5 June incident, and more unambiguously so after 12 July, the UN had become involved in what amounted to a war against Aydeed’s SNA in Mogadishu. Its report perceptively added that “presumably the war, when it started, followed its own dynamics”. The climax was reached on 3-4 October 1993, when 18 American soldiers were killed and 78 wounded in a fire fight which resulted in the death of possibly as many as 1000 Somali civilians. The Washington Post aptly described the departure of US troops from Somalia as a “guns-cocked withdrawal”.³²

What, then, are the wider lessons from UNOSOM II’s involvement in Somalia between May and October 1993? The first and most obvious

lesson is that one cannot wage peace and make war in one location at the same time. As noted above, legitimate questions have been raised about the manner of the UN’s involvement in Somalia in the early 1990s, especially its lack of sensitivity to and understanding of the political reality of Somalia. This is not to suggest, however, that once UNOSOM II deployed in the country in May 1993, the course of events was doomed to follow the disastrous path described above. Gerard Prunier has shown how French troops, although deployed in a “less tense” area of the country, were able to achieve a significant measure of stability and progress in their sector by adopting a “very minimal, close-to-the-ground, down-to-earth approach”, in sharp contrast to American forces in and around Mogadishu.³³ Likewise, Robert Patman in a comparative study of US and Australian policy in Somalia, argues persuasively that Australian soldiers were able to achieve an impressive amount in a short period of time (17 weeks) by adopting a radically different approach to that of US troops. Operating in the area around Baidoa - known as the “city of death” until Australian troops arrived - they “managed to create a stable situation ... where relief agencies could freely operate and fulfil their work”.³⁴ The key to the comparative success of the Australian contingent, according to Patman, was similar to that of the French: a community-oriented style of operations, low-tech and participatory. These experiences suggest that there were certainly alternatives to the US mode of army operations. Yet it cannot be concluded from this that what happened in Somalia was simply a case of “peace enforcement” that went awry.

“Peace enforcement” doctrine emphasises that force can be applied impartially if the focus of military action is firmly geared towards ensuring compliance with a given mandate. The difficulty with this is that all Security Council resolutions, without exception, reflect a measure of political compromise which in turn lends the mandate to differing interpretations. In some cases, the nature of that compromise has involved the commitment to an operational “end state” so vague as to provide little or no basis for translation into realisable military objectives. The case of Somalia illustrates how the adoption, interpretation and evolution of a

mandate, including the question of the use of force, depend critically on the interplay of personalities, competing motivations and constraints of the kind alluded to above. Resolution 837 was rushed through the Council and left a number of questions about implementation unanswered. Boutros-Ghali's personal commitment to the Somalia operation and his direct involvement in decision-making turned out to be critical to the course of events. His subsequent claim that he was "obliged" by the Security Council to take the actions that he did is anything but convincing. In his memoirs, Boutros-Ghali recalls how the aforementioned and critical Abdi House attack had in fact given rise to a "debate" about the way forward.³⁵ Along with Madeleine Albright, he was convinced of the need to capture Aydeed and dismissed, then as he does in his memoirs, those who claimed to have "understood" the Somali people. These included the Italians (he regrets having brought them along in the first place); Mohamed Sahnoun (the highly capable UN Special Representative who he had first asked to undertake a fact-finding mission to the country in March 1992); and senior officials within the UN Secretariat. In fact, Boutros-Ghali's own approach to the UN mission and specifically to the Aydeed coalition was fatally compromised by his previous involvement in the region as a senior Egyptian minister. Indeed, as Compagnon makes clear, in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boutros-Ghali was closely involved in support of Barre until the very end. This was always likely to colour his judgement about the "impartial application of force". It certainly influenced the attitudes and perceptions of Somalis.

The call in such cases is, of course, for the Security Council itself to ensure greater clarity of mandates, and much ink has been spilt in the 1990s by commissions of "eminent persons" stressing the need for "better mandates". While this objective is laudable, the adoption of Resolution 837 provides grounds only for cautious optimism. A senior British diplomat involved in the informal Council deliberations preceding the adoption of this critical resolution, recalls how the British government expressed "some concern" about how it had been "rushed" without an adequate assessment of its implications on the ground. He noted, however, that

London's central preoccupation and interest at the time were with events in Bosnia, where it had just played a key role in the drawn-out and politically difficult process leading up to the adoption of Resolution 836, extending UNPROFOR's role in relation to the so-called "safe areas" in Bosnia. Given this hierarchy of priorities and the fact that the US and Pakistan were pushing hard for a quick response to events in Somalia, the British view, understandably, was that taking the lead in Somalia (or even just raising awkward questions about "the way forward" after Resolution 837) was not in their "interest".³⁶ It belongs to the story that the American Permanent Representative to the UN at the time, Madeleine Albright, was pushing hard for an immediate and "tough" response in support of Pakistan, and that both these countries had spent much of the previous three months expressing frustration about what they considered to be French and British pusillanimity over Bosnia. Indeed, only two days earlier, Pakistan had abstained in voting on Resolution 836 extending the "safe areas" concept in Bosnia.³⁷ The adoption of 837 on Somalia is not untypical of the kind of dynamics that often drive the process of mandate formulation in the UN Security Council.

II. "Operation Deliberate Force" and the end of UNPROFOR's mission

UNPROFOR's involvement in Bosnia came to an end with the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina at Dayton in late 1995.³⁸ To many observers and policy-makers, it was the air campaign initiated by NATO against Bosnian Serb targets throughout the country in late August and early September 1995 (Operation Deliberate Force) and it alone, which "produced the results" that allowed agreement to be reached. This reading of the end-game in Bosnia has since been presented, and in many quarters accepted, as the central lesson for policy-makers regarding the use of force from that conflict. Indeed, it clearly informed the thinking of Western leaders and military planners in the run-up to Operation Allied Force, NATO's air campaign in Kosovo against the regime of Milosevic in

March 1999. In assuming, as was widely done, that the "short, sharp, shock" of a bombing campaign would quickly lead Milosevic to abandon his repressive policies in the province of Kosovo, Western leaders were looking to and citing as evidence in support of their chosen policy, the supposed effect of NATO's aerial bombardment in Bosnia.³⁹ This is a crude and incomplete reading of what eventually brought the Serbs to the negotiating table and the war to an end. Drawing lessons regarding the use of force in "peace operations" from that experience requires examining the combined effect of four major developments which by, mid-August 1995, had created the conditions for the effective use of force to be initiated. These developments did not reflect a carefully co-ordinated strategic plan based on political consensus in capitals about the "way forward". Instead, they came about as a result of events on the ground; the willingness and ability of certain key actors to respond to those events; and, ultimately, by the American-led preparedness to support Croatia and take advantage of its military successes against Serb forces in both Croatia and Bosnia in 1995. The first major development was the weakening of the military position of the Bosnian Serbs. This, however, had been substantially achieved well before the air campaign was launched. The dramatic success of Croatia's military offensives, first in Western Slavonia (Sector West) in May 1995, and later in the Krajina in August, had profoundly altered the strategic predicament of the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA). The Croat offensives, actively supported and strongly encouraged by the US (and to a lesser but significant degree by Germany) and eventually resulting in the single largest instance of forced population displacement in the brutal season of "ethnic cleansing" between 1991 and 1995, was one of the preconditions for the effective use of force in September. The full background to the Croat military successes involved the American decision to assist in the creation of a professional and combat capable force that could take on the Serbs (a process which started in the latter half of 1994).⁴⁰ American involvement also entailed assistance in the planning of operations; encouraging the Croat leadership at critical moments to pursue the "military option";⁴¹ and a readiness to accept, as distinct from condone, the more

than likely violations of human rights and reprisals that would inevitably follow as interior forces moved in and reasserted control over areas "liberated" by Croatia's "crack" combat brigades.⁴² The strategic significance of Croat victories on the battlefield, however, was clear: it decisively weakened the position of the Bosnian Serbs, both in terms of morale and strategic depth. The extent to which their position had been undermined became evident during the NATO air campaign a few weeks later when Bosnian Government and Croat forces (in theory, supposedly operating together) provided an effective land component to NATO's air campaign.

The second development that facilitated the use of force in Bosnia was the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops from isolated and exposed positions in Serb-controlled territory. Since the hostage crisis in May and June of 1995, General Rupert Smith, commander of UN forces in Bosnia, had been working towards this goal in order to reduce the vulnerability of UN troops to further hostage-taking.⁴³ Specifically, this involved the abandonment of the Weapon Collection Points around Sarajevo and Gorazde, the only remaining "safe area" in eastern Bosnia after the fall, at terrible cost, of both Srebrenica and Zepa to Bosnian Serb forces in July 1995. By late August, the process of concentrating forces away from exposed positions was nearly complete, with the significant exception of the remaining British troops in Gorazde. When a mortar round landed on the Markala market in Sarajevo on 28 August, General Smith, while seeking confirmation that the mortar attack originated from a Bosnian Serb position, stalled for time to allow British troops to be extracted from the enclave, prepare for artillery bombardment of Serb positions around Sarajevo, and allow enough time for Admiral Leighton-Smith at NATO's southern command headquarters to prepare for a sustained air campaign. Once confirmation had been obtained and the other elements were in place, both commanders turned their "key".⁴⁴

The third development facilitating the use of force, in addition to removing points of military vulnerability throughout Serb-controlled territory, was the creation by Britain, France and the Netherlands of a

Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) providing, for the first time, effective and accurate mortar and artillery support on Mount Igman near Sarajevo. This gave UN forces a capability that had hitherto been lacking to suppress Serb artillery positions around Sarajevo. When it was first announced that such a force would be deployed, it was unclear whether these reinforcements would be sent to assist a withdrawal or to help create the conditions for effective military action on the ground. At a meeting of senior UN officials, including the UN Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi, General Bernard Janvier and General Rupert Smith, held in Split on 9 June 1995 to assess the situation after the hostage crisis, Smith wished to know whether "we [are] going to use them [RRF] to fight? - If not, I am not sure I want them - they will just be more mouths to feed, and create expectations that I cannot meet."⁴⁵ By August, however, the RRF artillery was in place around Sarajevo and was to play a key role in the unfolding campaign. When Operation Deliberate Force got underway, British and French artillery proved, especially in the initial stages of the campaign, to be more decisive in sustaining pressure on the Bosnian Serbs than NATO air power. The effectiveness of air power was hampered - not for the first, nor for the last time in the Balkans - by adverse weather conditions.⁴⁶ The precise and sustained use of artillery in support of the air campaign allowed UNPROFOR to keep the roads around Sarajevo open; this, in spite of "concerns" expressed by senior UN officials in New York, even at this late stage, about "offensive actions" undertaken by the "peacekeepers" of UNPROFOR.⁴⁷

The final development which prepared the ground for effective use of force was the change in command and control arrangements for the use of NATO air power in support of UN forces that was made following the Srebrenica debacle. General Smith left the conference that had been convened in London in July 1995 to assess the "way forward" after the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa disillusioned about the lack of progress and the obvious divisions that persisted among major powers. However, steps were taken in early August to ensure more "timely and effective use of air power". These steps were enshrined in a memorandum of understanding between NATO and the UN, agreed between Admiral Leighton-Smith

(CINCSOUTH) and General Janvier (FC UNPF). The document included a more detailed description of operational considerations, including targeting and the conditions for initiation of operations. These conditions were now considered to include more than just direct attacks, and the decision to initiate operations was left to the "common judgement" of the senior NATO and UN commanders in theatre.⁴⁸

Taken together, all of these developments meant that the ground was prepared for a deliberate transition to military enforcement action, which thus far had been consistently rejected by the Security Council and troop-contributing countries. In the end, military force played a key role in bringing about a permanent cease-fire. This had involved, although resisted by some within the UN hierarchy, a taking of sides and a willingness to engage in war-fighting to bring about a decisive result on the ground. In an essay accompanying the British Peace Support doctrine of 1997, the events of mid-1995 and Rupert Smith's role in them are described as a "switching to peace enforcement".⁴⁹ Clearly, this was not "peace enforcement" of the kind which the doctrine itself set out to elaborate.

III. A Doctrine for "Peace Enforcement"?

Where does all of this leave the idea of peace enforcement as a form of "active impartiality" that somehow falls short of war? To raise the question is, of course, not to dispute the fact that the armed forces of many countries have been called upon (and will continue to be called upon) to act in situations that are "messy", volatile and dangerous by the standards of most traditional peacekeeping operations. The issue explored in this article is about the role and utility of military force in responding to such situations, and specifically whether the actual experience of "peace operations" in the 1990s lends much support to the notion that "peace enforcement" can meaningfully be treated as a distinct category of "peace support" operations. Three basic difficulties stand out.⁵⁰

In the first place, the fact that "conflict environments are grey and messy" does not automatically suggest that the solution is to locate "peace

support operations on a spectrum of force".⁵¹ Indeed, by doing so one is likely to "encourage the notion that there can be military fixes of deep-rooted political problems, a notion that may be exacerbated by the pressure for quick exit strategies".⁵² There is, in other words, a danger that faith in doctrinal innovation – not unlike faith in technological "fixes" and breakthroughs – may obscure the importance of maintaining a firm link between the employment of military force and the long-term political objective which the use of force is intended to achieve. This very basic point goes to the heart of the distinction which Rupert Smith was drawing in 1994 between what the use of force and forces can achieve as opposed to can do.

The second difficulty flows from the first: the idea that a "peace enforcement" or "peace restoring" operation can clinically apply force to manipulate the behaviour of various parties on the ground without designating an enemy while, at the same time, assuming that such action will not influence the political dynamics of the conflict, is seriously to underestimate the impact of outside military action on the local balance of military, political and economic interests in the kind of complex intra-state conflicts we have seen in the 1990s. It presupposes, in effect, a crude psychology and highly simplified rationality on the part of the "warring party". It is more likely that a warring faction which is militarily and politically disadvantaged by the actions of a "peace restoration" or a supposedly impartial peace enforcement mission, will take little comfort from not having been formally designated an enemy.⁵³ Similarly, the assurance that military action directed against a party will not prejudice the political outcome of the conflict, will not have much of an impact if the action itself is not linked to a broader political strategy aimed at bringing the conflict to an end. In Somalia, Aydeed viewed Boutros-Ghali as a sworn enemy of the Habr Gidr, intent upon strengthening the Darod clan at its expense and, to this end, using American military might under the guise of a UN operation. Boutros-Ghali's past involvement in the region only reinforced local suspicions and undermined any claims of impartiality. The fact that military action against Aydeed had the direct effect of shifting the local

balance of power in favour of his military rivals only confirmed to him and his followers that this was "war" and not "peace enforcement". While Boutros-Ghali's involvement in Somalia may offer a particularly blatant example of partial behaviour, the experience of other operations provides little evidence to suggest that "peace enforcement" can in fact be conducted impartially. The case of Somalia also raises the broader issue (discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper) of the challenges of outside military engagement in "non-Western" societies and cultures, where different "rationalities" may be at work, and where the State (in the Weberian sense) is either extremely weak or non-existent.

Finally, those who believe in the feasibility of disinterested and politically neutral "peace enforcement" may be overestimating the purity of the motives of those charged with restoring the peace, while underestimating the variety of different motives alluded to above – including power political and domestic ones – that influence and constrain governments in their decisions regarding the deployment and use of military force. The situation in central Bosnia in mid-1993 provides a good illustration of this difficulty. Those who have argued in favour of "active impartiality" as a means of dealing with violations of agreements and resolutions, often, and with good reason, refer to the failure to respond to Bosnian Serb military actions against Muslim communities in early 1993 as one instance where force should have been used more readily. "Active impartiality" as envisaged above, however, would also have required forceful action to be taken against Bosnian Croat forces who, with the active support of Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman, launched a brutal war against the Bosnian Government forces and civilians in Central Bosnia in 1993.⁵⁴ In a pattern of collusion repeated elsewhere, Croat forces in central Bosnia also received artillery and other forms of support from the Bosnian Serb Army.⁵⁵ For a variety of reasons, however, both the American and German governments were not prepared to sanction military action against Croat forces, even though it was perfectly clear to monitors, observers and peacekeepers operating in central Bosnia at the time that regular Croat forces, taking their orders directly from Zagreb, were active inside

Bosnia.⁵⁶ This in itself, one might legitimately argue, ought not to have prevented forceful action from being taken against Bosnian Serbs. The point here is merely that such action would not have amounted to politically neutral and disinterested “active impartiality”. To pretend otherwise would have been to disguise a very different reality.

Another example is provided by Operation Turquoise; France’s military operation in Rwanda from June to August 1994. This case is of particular interest since it apparently inspired the French military to formalise a doctrine for “peace restoration” operations. It is also cited in British doctrine as the “only peace enforcement operation thus far in which force has been used impartially”.⁵⁷ While it is clear that public and media pressure for involvement on genuine humanitarian grounds provided part of the background to the French government’s decision to send a military force, the claim that the resulting operation amounted to an “impartial peace enforcement” mission is simply not tenable. Indeed, the very suggestion that the operation was in some sense “impartial” must appear bizarre to observers on the ground at the time, and obscene to those who experienced at close quarter the murderous efficiency with which bands of interahamwe continued to work within the French-controlled zone. Before Operation Turquoise got underway, the French had continued, at least until late May 1994, to provide military support to the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR). It has been established, for example, that although an international embargo was imposed against Rwanda on 17 May 1994, at least five French shipments of arms were later delivered to the genocidal regime.⁵⁸ Although the subsequent operation was formally authorised by the UN Security Council, Operation Turquoise was in fact far from being just a disinterested humanitarian operation. The operation had the effect of creating a “safety zone” into which the “Hutu Power” leadership and elements of the FAR could and did retreat in large numbers. Indeed, according to Mel McNulty, many French soldiers assumed in advance of deployment that their “Turquoise brief” implied “a rearguard action in support of their beleaguered Rwanda allies, to allow them to retreat in good order and regroup”.⁵⁹ Philip Gourevitch, in his powerful and deeply

disturbing account of the genocide, observes how “from the moment they [French under Operation Turquoise] arrived, and wherever they went, the French forces supported and preserved the same political leaders who had presided over the genocide”.⁶⁰ “The signal achievement of the Operation Turquoise”, Gourevitch concluded, “was to permit the slaughter of Tutsis to continue for an extra month, and to secure a passage for the genocidal command to cross, with a lot of its weaponry, into Zaire”.⁶¹ Evidence of “partiality” rather than “impartiality” has come from a growing number of sources and investigations.⁶² The report of the international panel set up by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to investigate the genocide and “the surrounding events”, released in July 2000, summarises much of the evidence that has emerged since 1994.⁶³ While, unlike Gourevitch, it accepts and “applauds” that “some 10,000-15,000” were probably saved the operation, it also concluded that:

*beyond any doubt, their [French forces] other task was to give support to the interim government. Most of the genocidaire regime, large numbers of high-ranking military officers, as well as thousands of heavily armed interahamwe and the majority of the Rwandan forces (now called ex-FARE) managed to escape the RPF advance by retreating to the convenience of the safe zone. Indeed, France actually declared that it would use force against any RPF encroachment on the zone. Once it was clear that the RPF could not be halted, however, France took the next logical step and facilitated the escape of much of the Hutu Power leadership into Zaire.*⁶⁴

All of this suggests that Operation Turquoise provides a very poor model indeed for future operations and, if anything, highlights major difficulties with the French concept of “peace restoration”. It is simply impossible to isolate the dubious short-term “tactical” achievements of Operations Turquoise, whatever the admixture motives involved, from that of French policy towards the conflict and the region before, during and after the genocide.

Conclusion: The Use of Force and the Necessity of Choice

If these are some of the painful lessons from the “peace support” operations in the 1990s, what are the policy implications for the use of force? The first point to stress is that to question the notion of “peace enforcement” as a distinct category is *not* tantamount to opposing enforcement per se, and it certainly is not meant to suggest that one should in all circumstances seek to revert to the tried and tested practices of past peacekeeping operations. On the contrary, it only makes the choice of instrumentality starker by stressing that in a number of cases, peacekeeping *will not* be appropriate and hard decisions regarding the use of force will have to be made. By identifying “peace enforcement” as an area of activity distinct from war-fighting, one in which “escalation dominance” can supposedly be maintained, advocates of the so-called middle-ground options, whether intentionally or not, are allowing governments to avoid hard decisions about the implications of deploying military personnel. While the advocates of “grey area” and “robust” operations usually see these as progressive developments from an earlier and more timid approach, governments, judging from the record of Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere, tend to see them as a way of limiting involvement, and of avoiding the kind of decisions which the nature of the conflict may call for.

The debate on doctrine and the use of force in peace operations was not helped by the introduction of the notion of a so-called “Mogadishu line”. The idea of such a “line” gave the misleading impression, easily shot down by critics, that consent was somehow an absolute quality; either you possessed it or you did not. Quite clearly consent is not an absolute quality, and the aforementioned experience of Australian troops in Somalia shows that the margin of consent that does exist in “messy” or “grey” operational environments can be enlarged and built upon by an enterprising outside force. This is not, however, the same as saying that the basic distinction between consent-based operations and enforcement where the

logic of war and war-fighting must be accepted, is no longer valid. Asked to comment on a draft of the British Peace Support Doctrine in 1997, a highly experienced officer observed that “in war, however limited the objective or the resources allocated to achieve it, the need to break the will of the opponent and to bear the risk to those resources marks the difference from peace”. Recognising this distinction has immediate implications which decision-makers will need to think through more carefully than they have been prepared to do in recent years. One is forced back, in other words, to the question of what the use of force or the threat of its use can achieve rather than simply what forces can do.

Notes

¹*The Use of Force in Intervention Operations*, seminar presentation, IISS, 1994.

²*Ibid.*

³According to one recent book on the subject, peace operations “encompass a wide range of different missions, ranging from a handful of unarmed civilians or military observers to combat units with ten thousands of troops”. See Erwin A. Schmidl, ed., *Peace Operations Between War and Peace* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 1.

⁴Report by the Secretary General, S/25354, 3 March 1993, para. 9.

⁵In March 1999, NATO insisted that it was not going to war against Yugoslavia but was taking action to weaken the “ability [of Serb Army and police forces] to cause further humanitarian catastrophe”. Press Statement, Secretary-General Javier Solana, 23 March 1999, NATO.

⁶In the UK, the Permanent Joint Headquarters in 1997 issued *Peace Support Operations – Joint Warfare Publication 3-50, PJHQ*, (henceforth JWP 3-50). The Swedish doctrine for peace support operations is modelled, if not quite word by word, then very closely on UK doctrine. See *Joint Military Doctrine: Peace Support Operations, Swedish Armed Forces*, October 1997.

⁷For the French concept of peace restoration, see “Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, Aide-memoire by France”, A/50/869, S/1996/71, 30 January 1996, UN Document.

⁸JWP 3-50, paragraph 303.

⁹John Ruggie, "The UN and the Collective Use of Force: Whither or Whether?", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 3, No. 4, Winter 1996, p. 14.

¹⁰A recent example is provided by the nature of NATO's military action against Yugoslavia in March 1999; an operation that was constrained by measures designed to limit the exposure to danger for aircrews, as well as by a very public ruling out of the use of ground forces. These self-imposed constraints were necessitated in large part by the need to keep the fragile unity of the alliance together, itself a reflection of the political unease that existed in government circles about the depth and durability of public support for the campaign. These constraints severely limited the effectiveness of the campaign against Serb cleansing policies in Kosovo, the disruption of which was NATO's principal campaign objective. See note no. 5.

¹¹On the reasons for French involvement in Somalia in 1993, Gerard Prunier, a distinguished scholar of the region well versed in the inner workings of French decision-making on Africa, has observed that "the main concern of the French authorities had to do with domestic politics and the fear of any kind of mishap in the field". Gerard Prunier, "The Experience of European Armies in Operation restore Hope", in W. Clarke and J. Herbst, *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Colorado: Westview press, 1997), p. 136.

¹²For an early assessment of this trend, see Lori F. Damrosch, ed. *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993.

¹³Ken Menkhaus, "International peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia", in W. Clarke and J. Herbst, *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Colorado: Westview press, 1997), p. 43.

¹⁴General Mohamed Farah Aydeed was a member of the Saad sub-group of the Habr Gidr sub-clan of Hawiye, while President Ali Mahdi was of the Abgal Hawiye.

¹⁵Report by the Secretary General, S/25354, 3 March 1993, paragraphs. 58 and 101.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, paragraph 91.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸Menkhaus, "International peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia", p. 60.

¹⁹Mark Bradbury, *The Somali Conflict: Prospects for Peace*, Oxfam Research Paper no. 9, (Oxford: OXFAM, 1994), p. 4.

²⁰See Ioan Lewis, "Making History in Somalia: Humanitarian Intervention in a Stateless Society", *Discussion Paper 6*, The Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics. A trenchant critique along similar lines was also later provided by Mohamed Sahnoun in M. Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia", *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol. 5, 1994, pp. 5-11. See also Mohamed Sahnoun, *The Missed Opportunities*, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994.

²¹Menkhaus, "International peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia", p. 54.

²²That is the faction loyal to General Aydeed. UNSC Resolution 837, 6 June 1993 (my emphasis). General Aydeed established the Somali National Alliance (SNA) in October 1992.

²³S/1994/653, 1 June 1994, "Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to SC Resolution 885" (henceforth "Commission of Inquiry"), paragraph 186.

²⁴"Commission of Inquiry", paragraph 187. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's own account of the sequence of events between the killing of the Pakistani soldiers and the adoption of resolution 837 is misleading since it appears to suggest that Security Council action followed an "internal UN investigation" which had "revealed" that Aidid was "responsible". See, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished: A US-UN Saga* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 94-95.

²⁵On the US-led nature of operations, retired Admiral Jonathan Howe served as Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), while Major General Thomas Montgomery acted as Deputy Force Commander and, more significantly, as commander of US forces in Somalia, reporting to CINCCENT and with sole authority to commit the US Quick Reaction Force. Complicating matters further would be the arrival later that summer of the Ranger Task Force answerable to Major General William Garrison of the US Army Special Operations Command. The complete US domination of the command and control structure in Mogadishu, and the confusion to which multiple chains of reporting gave rise have been candidly acknowledged in several "after action" reports by the US military. See "An Analysis of the Application of the 'Principles of Military Operations other than War' in Somalia", The Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, (*White Paper*), February 1994.

²⁶"Commission of Inquiry", paragraph 231.

²⁷Ibid., paragraph 153.

²⁸Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down*, (London: Bantam Press, 1999), p. 72-74 and pp. 358-359.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰See Elisabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone, 1994), p. 274.

³¹Bowden, *Black Hawk Down*, p. 359.

³²"US to Leave Somalia With Its Guard Up", *The Washington Post*, 8 December 1993.

³³Gerard Prunier, "The Experience of European Armies in Operation restore Hope", in W. Clarke and J. Herbst, *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention* (Colorado: Westview press, 1997), pp. 139-141. For a journalist's perspective on the difference in approach and results, see Richard Dowden's description of the contrast between the "hope in Baidoa" and "mayhem in Mogadishu" in July 1993. "Mortars and wine in tale of two cities", *The Independent*, 15 July 1993.

³⁴Robert Patman, "Disarmament in a Failed State: The Experience of the UN in Somalia", Working Paper No. 162, Peace Research Centre, The Australian National University Research School of Pacific Studies, p. 33.

³⁵Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished: A US-UN Saga* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 95-96.

³⁶Interviews.

³⁷On the US response to the killing of the Pakistani peacekeepers, see Drew, *On the Edge*, pp. 319-320. According to Drew the resolution, which Albright was pressing for, "was largely drafted at the State Department".

³⁸The UN forces deployed in former Yugoslavia underwent various name changes in the period 1991-95. UNPROFOR refers here to the forces deployed under the Bosnia Herzegovina Command (BHC), initially headquartered at Kiseljak (1992-94) before moving to Sarajevo (1994-95).

³⁹The initial NATO plan in March 1999 was for a two-day bombing campaign with daytime pauses to allow Milosevic to back down. The initial target list included only 219 targets and, in the words of one NATO officer involved, the "prevailing opinion" at NATO was: "You show them some lead - boom ! boom ! - and they'll fold". Quoted in Steven Lee Myers, "Chinese Embassy Bombing: A Wide Net of Blame", *The New York Times*, 17 April 2000. More significantly, at the most senior level of decision-making, Madeleine Albright, confidently asserted early on that the air campaign would be a short one: "I don't see this as a long-term operation. I

think this is something - the deter and damage [sic] is something that is achievable within a relatively short period of time". See, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Interview on PBS Newshour with Jim Lehrer, March 24, 1999. For further evidence pointing to an excessively optimistic reading of the likely effects of a short air campaign on Milosevic's resolve, see also "Kosovo", *Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, Volume I, Report and Proceedings of the Committee*, 23 May 2000, pp. xxxix-xl.

⁴⁰For some of the background and detail on this, see interesting account in Brendan O'Shea, *Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia's Bloody Battlefield* (Phoenix Mill: Sutton Publishing, 1998).

⁴¹"With pressure for a cease-fire building, we urged Tudjman to do as much as possible militarily ...". Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 91.

⁴²The UN military observers and especially ECMM teams deployed throughout the area of Croat operations were able to document widespread atrocities in the wake of the offensive. Detailed testimony has also been presented to the ICFY. See "War Crimes Investigators recommend Trial for 3 Croatian Generals", *International Herald Tribune*, 22 March 1999.

⁴³Force Commanders's End of Mission Report, HQ UNPF, January 1996, D-6.

⁴⁴For the record, it is worth noting that Richard Holbrooke's account of the events leading up to the start of the air campaign, as well as developments during the campaign itself, are deeply misleading, implying as they do that Holbrooke himself played a key role in making the case for bombing. General Smith took the key decisions in Sarajevo without any consultation with Holbrooke. Smith was able to act in part because his superior, General Bernard Janvier, who had been markedly more cautious on the question of the use of force, was absent. For an account of these critical events see interesting and well-researched thesis by Linda Nordin, *The NATO Strikes over Bosnia-Herzegovina: Why on 30 August 1995?*, (MA Thesis, Stockholm University, Department of Political Science, February 1998). See also Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 99.

⁴⁵Memorandum of SRSG's mtg. in Split, 9 June 1995, also quoted at length in David Rohde, *A Safe Area* (London: Simon & Shuster Ltd./ Pocket Books, 1997), pp. 419-422, and Nordin, *The NATO Strikes over Bosnia-Herzegovina*, ft. 135 and 147.

⁴⁶The air strikes on 30 August 1995 started at ten minutes past two in the morning and lasted until little before five o'clock. RRF artillery and mortars

started at 0415 against 15 "planned targets" firing over 600 rounds. Air operations continued to be hampered by poor weather; a limitation which did not affect the use of RRF artillery and mortar.

⁴⁷In an exchange of cables, revealing of what the "Srebrenica report" would later refer to as "the pervasive ambivalence within the United Nations regarding the use of force", Janvier informed Kofi Annan (head of DPKO) in New York on 7 September that it did not make much sense to distinguish between the "defensive as opposed to offensive employment of artillery, mortar, or other RRF heavy weapons", and that "these terms should be avoided". The cable was in response to a "note" from Boutros-Ghali's senior political advisor, Chinmaya Gharekan, who on 31 August 1995 had expressed concern that: the "RRF is still operating in the offensive mode", adding "I trust that UNPROFOR will use RRF only in responses to attack". Cable: Janvier to Annan, Subject: RRF Action and UNPF Reporting, 7 September 1995.

⁴⁸On the NATO side this was Admiral Leighton-Smith and on the UN side Bernard Janvier. As noted above, however, Janvier's absence on 28 August meant that the decision was delegated to Rupert Smith. Force Commanders' End of Mission Report, HQ UNPF, January 1996, D-9.

⁴⁹JWP 3-50, Appendix 1-3.

⁵⁰The following draws, in part, on my "UN Peacekeeping and the Use of Force: No Escape from Hard Decisions" in Robert Patman ed., *Security in a Post Cold War World* (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd. 1999).

⁵¹Michael Pugh, "From Mission Cringe to Mission Creep ? - Implications of new peace support operations doctrine", *Defence Studies* No. 2/1997 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1997), p. 22.

⁵²Ibid. As Pugh pointedly adds, that "concerns about grey area operations cannot be dismissed as a case of academics wishing the world were a less messy place. On the contrary, an appreciation that situations are messy and volatile, leads to a concern that interventions do not create more mess in the long term".

⁵³British doctrine speaks of "corrective actions [...] taken for non-compliance rather than a desire to support or oppose a particular party". JWP 3-50, paragraph 303.

⁵⁴For the ferocity and full horror of this war which, especially in the US, never received as much attention as other aspects of the conflict, see S.B. Husum, *At War without Weapons - A Peace-keeper in the Bosnian Conflict* (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing Ltd., 1998).

⁵⁵ECMM HQ/Info Section, 25 May 1993, Subject: Mission Debrief.

⁵⁶The nature and extent of the involvement was brought out clearly in the case of *The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic* before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. See, "Text Read Out By Judge Jorda During The Hearing", *The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic*, ICTY, April 2000, paragraph 28.

⁵⁷Appendix 1, JWP 3-50, p. 1-5.

⁵⁸*Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the Genocide*, Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Vol. 7., No. 4, May 1995, pp. 6-7. See also Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (London: Hurst & Company, 1996), especially chapters 7 and 8; and *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance, African Rights* (London), September 1994, pp. 670-72.

⁵⁹See excellent and carefully researched article by Mel McNulty, "France, Rwanda and Military Intervention: a double discrediting", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1997), p. 39.

⁶⁰Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories From Rwanda* (London: Picador, 1998), p.158

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 160-1.

⁶²In my own and more limited number of interviews with observers who were deployed in Rwanda at the time (including both aid workers and UN military observers), I found that the setting up and the running of the French-controlled zone were seen as anything but "impartial", and that this was not simply a matter of "perception". Private interviews.

⁶³The International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, set up by the Organization of African Unity and released in July 2000.

⁶⁴Ibid. chapter 15, paragraph 68.