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UN Peace Operations and Intelligence

Can the Joint Mission Analysis Center succeed?

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Abstract

Can the Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC), as the dedicated and fielded UN intelligence capability, mitigate challenges in providing the United Nations (UN) Mission Leadership Team (MLT) intelligence that ultimately will improve the decision making process and enhance the ability of the UN to fulfill the will of the international community?

Throughout this paper, this is the driving question. To address the question, the paper explores the JMAC concept as described in UN policy and guidelines as well as experiences of UN peace operations[1] in the 21st century and particularly the ongoing operations in Mali and South Sudan. The paper will identify challenges that UN peace operations in general, and Mali and South Sudan specifically, have experienced. If the JMAC proves capable of mitigating these challenges properly, the JMAC concept can succeed.

UN peace operations have experienced a transitional development from peacekeeping operations under chapter VI of the UN Charter towards more peace enforcement and protection of civilians in line with chapter VII. Both operations require analyzed information[2] and information sharing at various levels, with various means, different actors, mandates and perceptions. There is extensive literature elaborating on Intelligence and the UN. Recently, the UN has produced Guidelines and Policy describing the role of intelligence and the JMAC, which, in combination with document studies and interviews, will serve as a theoretical basis for this paper. There have, furthermore, been several studies of JMACs in UN peace operation missions identifying numerous challenges. This study, however, might enhance our understanding of Intelligence in UN peace operations and to what extent the JMAC, using the Intelligence Cycle as a framework, is able to address intelligence challenges in the UN. Throughout the paper, and the discussion, the challenges are elaborated and discussed as to whether they pose limitations or possibilities for the JMAC to succeed in UN peace operations.

The findings from the research indicates that, though the JMAC concept has vastly enhanced UN capabilities in peace operations, there are some grave challenges that cannot be addressed

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[1] The term «peace operations" will be elaborate in more detail in chapter 1.3 and 3.
[2] Processed and analysed information is generally referred to as Intelligence within the Military.

by the JMAC alone. Intelligence in the UN is contested with a lack of coherent terminology complicating the understanding and discussion. Furthermore, intelligence in the UN and all the steps in the *Intelligence Cycle*, can be more effectively addressed if there is a responsible and accountable strategic entity that ensures information sharing at all levels from the field to New York. The paper concludes that the JMAC cannot mitigate key UN Intelligence challenges, realize its potential and succeed without an overarching intelligence body.

Acknowledgements

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1 Introduction

1.1 Theme and actuality

The United Nations (UN) was established on 24 October 1945 in the aftermath of two world wars and was dedicated, in the enduring words of the UN Charter, to saving "succeeding generations from the scourge of war." (United Nations, 2017a, p. Preamble)

Initially developed as a means of dealing with inter-state conflict, UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) have increasingly been used in intra-state conflicts and civil wars, which are often characterized by multiple armed factions with differing political objectives and fluctuating lines of command (United Nations, 2003, p. 1). Peacekeeping operations have traditionally been considered as instrumental in consolidating confidence among conflicting parties and monitoring the effective respect of the ceasefire by those who signed it (DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 1). One of the key principles of PKO has traditionally been to ensure the consent of the parties. As the nature of UN peace operations have been changing in the aftermath of the Cold War, some claim that consent as principle is being challenged.

Historically Peacekeepers are primarily associated with light armament solely for the purpose of self-defense in case they were attacked. These missions were authorized under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. A growing number of United Nations peace operations have become multi-dimensional in nature, composed of a range of components, including "military, civilian police, political affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender" (United Nations, 2003, p. Foreword).

From the 1990s to the early 2000 UN peace operations have been deployed in countries where consent was limited and security therefore a critical issue. The word peacekeeping did not reflect reality as the UN increasingly got involved in operations where there was no peace to keep. Traditional peacekeeping operations were repeatedly confronted with major human rights violations without having the means to stop them. Thus, a new generation of operations, the so-called "robust" peacekeeping operations were launched (DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 1). In these types of operations, the military component was authorized to use force, not only in self-defense, but also when necessary to achieve the mission's mandate.

UN Security Council resolutions in the first decade of the 21st Century introduced UN peace operations to less permissive environments sometimes with extremist groups and non-state actors operating asymmetrically with extremist ideologies or without clear political agendas (DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 1). The Council authorized missions to "use all necessary means" to carry out its mandate, and sometimes, a regional organization or a coalition of willing member states were authorized to execute the UN mandate. Mandates and missions crossing the Peacekeeping *Rubicon of Consent* were increasingly authorized with a Chapter VII Mandate or under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 1). Following this evolution, United Nations peace operations developed in complexity and are now generally launched as multi-dimensional operations involving highly specialized civilian, military and police personnel serving with various capabilities.

The threat imposed to both peacekeepers and local populations in some of today's peacekeeping missions marks a fundamental shift from the past, and may at times require careful interpretation of the traditional core principles of peacekeeping; consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate (DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 1). Despite these challenges, the United Nations has preserved its' position as an unique global forum for peace and security in the sense that it brings together the General Assembly (GA), the Security Council (SC), the Secretariat, Troop and Police Contributors, and regional organizations as relevant, and the Host Governments (DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 2). A combined and united effort to maintain international peace and security under the mandate of the Security Council can be the result.

However, fearing the loss of sovereignty, UN member states have historically been hesitant to provide the UN with an intelligence-collection mandate. The increased size, length and complexity of peace operations, compounded by severe security threats to UN personnel, have convinced nations about the need for a stronger UN intelligence capability, especially in the field (Ramjoué, 2011, p. 2). In 2015, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) clearly stated the need for timely, high quality and actionable information as central to effective performance. The Panel reiterated many of the findings and recommendations highlighted in the Brahimi report[3] 15 years earlier. Missions, they stated,

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[3] In 1999 Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to assess the shortcomings of the existing peace operations system and to make specific and realistic recommendations for change. The result is known as the "Brahimi Report" after Lakhdar Brahimi, the Chair of the Panel.

"suffer from reporting overload and yet the sum of that reporting often fails to yield the necessary information and analysis". The Panel advocated that the United Nations Secretariat "must overhaul the functioning of information and analysis structures and systems within missions to deliver significantly streamlined reporting, more effective information management and significantly enhanced analytical capacities" (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 58). The Panel, furthermore, underlined the need for information management at the strategic level, being the Secretariat.

The Panel further called on all Member States, including Host Governments, to share any information that may relate to the security of United Nations personnel (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 50). The recommendations from the Panel touched upon many important aspects that are discussed in more detail in chapter 5. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon's September 2015 report on "The future of United Nations peace operations: implementation of the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations" addresses the need to improve UN intelligence capabilities:

> *An effective system for the acquisition, analysis and operationalization of information for peace operations in complex environments is lacking. I have tasked the Secretariat with developing parameters for an information and intelligence framework that can support field missions in operating effectively and safely. .... The increasing use of armoured vehicles and technology, improved communications, information gathering and analysis, training and quality medical care, as well as guard units, are some of the most effective ways to keep our personnel safe, and I will continue to pursue advances across all of those fronts. (UN Secretary General, 2015a, p. 20).*

In parallel with the HIPPO report, there were several ongoing activities to frame Intelligence in the UN. The *JMAC Policy* and *Guidelines* documents were both published in 2015. The *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy* was published in May of 2017. Thus, this paper will provide a timely contribution to the general debate about the JMAC concept, UN Intelligence in general, as well as the development of an UN Intelligence policy.

The JMAC was introduced as a concept by MajGen Patrick Cammaert, military advisor to the Secretary General in 2003 (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017). Recognizing the changing nature of UN operations and sparked by the 2003 attack at the UN SRSG in Iraq in 2003, a firm understanding about the need for intelligence gradually developed, if for no other reason than to protect UN personnel. Intelligence suddenly became an important focal point of the UN in

order to enhance their peace operations capability. Since 2003 the JMAC has, when it has been established, been subject to different mandates, organization, staffing and focus. Nonetheless, the JMAC has been identified as the focal point for UN Intelligence in peace operations and with 14 years of experience - is it up for the task?

1.2 Statement of Problem and Research Questions

The overall problem throughout the paper is; *Can the Joint Mission Analysis Center succeed in mitigating key challenges to Intelligence in UN peace operations?*

In order to operationalize the problem, two supporting research questions have been developed. Each question consists of two parts that will be discussed in the same context;

    1A What are the key challenges of UN Intelligence?
    1B What are the impact of UN Intelligence key challenges?

    2A How can these challenges be mitigated?
    2B Is the JMAC capable of mitigating the key challenges?

1.3 Key terms

Throughout the short history of the Joint Mission Analysis Centers, it has experienced different set-ups and configurations. Besides experiences coming from the JMACs in Mali and South Sudan, the paper will use the generic description of JMAC as presented in the UN official documents. The JMAC concept will be presented in more detail in chapter 3.

Intelligence has many associations and definitions. In chapter 3.2, the term Intelligence will be explained in the context of UN peace operations.

The main challenge following the problem, and the basis for being able to present a conclusion, is how to measure success. Operationalizing the term *succeed* will enable a conclusion and furthermore define the method that will be used in this paper which will be elaborated in more detail in chapter 2.1.

The term UN peace operation requires some clarification. In most documents, especially of older origin, the terms *peacekeeping operations* covers all UN missions. As UN missions evolved, the terms *robust peacekeeping* and *peace enforcement* were increasingly used. More recently, the terms *multi-dimensional* or *stabilization* operations are used. The terms are used

inconsistently throughout UN official documents, which will be elaborated in more detail in chapter 3.1. Throughout the rest of this paper, the term *peace operation* is used consistently[4]. The term *peace operation* is understood as "an overarching umbrella" for all UN peace operation activities ranging from Special Political to peace enforcement missions.

2 Research design
2.1 Demarcations, Framework and Method

The main focus of this paper is UN peace operations in the 21st century. As there are several analysis and evaluation reports from the JMACs from 2003 until present day, there was no need to conduct a quantitative analysis of the JMAC concept to acquire a good understanding of the challenges. Furthermore, realizing the structural and operational differences between all current JMACs, it would be extremely challenging and time consuming to analyze or conduct field research to acquire new and up-to-date knowledge of JMAC practices. To restrain the scope of the paper and literature as well as providing a focused approach, two UN missions were identified as especially relevant to investigate in more detail – Mali and South Sudan. Both missions are currently operational, they are both in Africa, their mandates are similar; chapter VII peace enforcement operation, and both are multi-dimensional.

A limited knowledge of UN peace operations and the organization at the start facilitated an open-mindedness, both concerning literature and any possible conclusions to the findings. Lack of prejudices has been liberating in terms of analysis, enabling what Jacobsen refers to as a critical distance and analytical objectivity (Jacobsen, 2015, p. 38), though challenging in term of understanding UN peace operations and ensuring the consistency required in a master thesis.

As there are many actors involved in UN peace operations, each provide a different perspective that can be explored. Choice of perspective will limit literature, findings as well as the conclusion. The perspective in the paper has mainly been colored by international politics academics, military officers and UN documents and less by the Humanitarian,

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[4] Except for quotations and when peacekeeping is referred to as defined in UN Capstone doctrine of 2008.

Civilian and Police components[5]. The majority of literature has been provided by European and North American countries and literature posing important limitations. The references used are interesting and challenging considering the fact that the majority of UN peace operations take place in Africa and the main troop contributing nations are from Asia and Africa. This may have left out important aspects. But, as the JMAC is multi-dimensional in nature, it has been important to include more than just the military aspects and challenges in the paper.

Though UN peace operations in South Sudan and Mali are referred to extensively, the paper has a generic approach to UN, Intelligence and JMAC. It is important to be aware that some JMACs have different challenges than those included in this paper, and that challenges in one mission can be non-existent in another. The generic nature of the challenges, as will be discussed in chapter 4, therefore makes the findings relevant for future UN peace operations and missions as well as UN policy documents.

While secret information collection certainly may constitute part of an intelligence organization's function, intelligence may also refer to the analytical process and the products generated thereby. The intelligence analytical process – often referred to as the *Intelligence Cycle* – will constitute the framework[6] to investigate if the JMAC can mitigate UN intelligence challenges. Even though some question the relevance of the Intelligence Cycle, no one has come up with good alternative concepts that has earned the right to replace it. The *Intelligence Cycle* is used both by NATO and Norwegian Intelligence communities. There is, however, some small discrepancies between the NATO and *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle*[7]. Throughout this paper, the UN model will be used to frame the discussion. *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy* contains five elements; Direction/Tasking, Acquisition, Collation/Evaluation, Analysis and Dissemination as presented in figure 1. (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 5). In chapter 5, the *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle*[8] will frame the discussion about UN Intelligence challenges in peace operation.

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[5] Literature from humanitarian entities involving Intelligence is naturally limited.

[6] A framework portrays relationships among all the elements of the subject force, system, or activity https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Architecture_(military)

[7] NATO has four steps – Direction, Collection, Analysis and Dissemination whereas UN has five steps.

[8] The Intelligence Cycle will not be elaborated in detail as it serves a structural, not a theoretical purpose in the paper.

Figure 1: UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle

Decisions in the Security Council and available intelligence capabilities found the basis for Tasking and Direction. *Tasking* and *Direction*, step one in the Intelligence Cycle, refer to the process of identifying questions that need to be answered, specifying outstanding *Information or Intelligence Requirements* (IRs) in relation to those questions, and seeking this information through a variety of means. Tasking involves prioritization of scarce intelligence assets to answer the IRs.

Acquisition[9] refers to the process of obtaining data and information to serve as the basis for analysis. Acquisition can be done openly or with covert sensors. Effective acquisition requires direction and planning to ensure resources is used most effectively meet the IRs[10].

Data acquired by missions shall be recorded and stored in a manner that permits convenient comparison, evaluation, assessment, retrieval, analysis and reporting. *Examination* and *Collation* furthermore require that participating mission entities make use of standardized tools for the collation of data, including common databases, taxonomies and planned indexing and menus.

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[9] NATO uses the term *Collection*.

[10] This includes tasking assets within their capabilities and according to IRs, ensuring intelligence is reported in a timely manner and putting in place mechanisms to ensure corroboration and/or verification of information and data.

Analysis refers to the methodical breaking down of information into its component parts, to find interrelationships, and application of reasoning to determine the meaning of the parts and the whole.

Dissemination is the process of conveying intelligence to mission decision-makers and other relevant mission personnel. Peacekeeping intelligence products developed as part of the peacekeeping intelligence cycle may be disseminated directly by individual participating mission entities to their respective managers or jointly through the mission intelligence coordination structure.

Realizing that choosing a method is "a pragmatic choice to best define the research design best suited to address the specific problem" (Jacobsen, 2015, p. 41), the research questions (chapter 1.2) largely defined the structure of the paper and framed the discussion in chapter 4 and 5. The identification and impact of key UN Intelligence challenges in chapter 4, found the basis for the analysis as to whether the JMAC can mitigate these challenges. Some challenges might have strategic ramifications, but are still relevant to explore, as the JMAC is currently the focal point of UN intelligence[11]. Conclusions for each identified challenge will be developed using a taxonomy that is an adaptation and combination of standard risk management and intelligence report validation formats. There are no quantitative estimates available enabling a statistical analysis of JMAC success. As each JMAC is organized differently and each mission is unique. The taxonomy in table 1 and 2 will be used to classify the challenges and mitigation based upon literature and interview findings.

The *impact* rating in table 1 indicates the effect a challenge will have - high or medium[12] - on UN and JMAC ability to comply with *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy*.

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[11] Major Carsten Hagen confirmed in a meeting on 10 November that UNOCC believe that the JMAC has mandates that influence and support both the operational and strategic level
[12] As only key challenges will be addressed, no challenges with a *low* impact will be presented in chapter 4.

Table 1: Impact Legend

High	The challenge will severely affect the UN and JMAC ability to comply with Policy
Medium	The challenge can affect the UN and JMAC ability to comply with Policy

Probability rating in table 2 refers to the likelihood that the JMAC is capable to address and mitigate the challenge successfully. *Probability* is labelled as highly likely, likely or not likely.

Table 2: Probability Legend

Higly likely	The JMAC concept is higly likely capable to mitigate the challenge
Likely	The JMAC concept can possibly mitigate the challenge
Not Likely	The JMAC concept is most likely not capable to mitigate the challenge

Findings in literature, combined with interviews and the analysis in chapters 4 and 5, found the basis for a qualitative rating of UN Intelligence challenges and possible JMAC mitigation. The conclusions following the analysis and rating will represent either limitations or possibilities. *Limitations* and *possibilities* categorization is based upon the nature of the challenge and probability that the JMAC is capable of addressing the challenge. *Limitations* will suggest that the JMAC will not succeed, whereas *possibilities* can represent a chance for success if exploited correctly. The combination of the severity of the challenge and the probability for JMAC mitigation will be the indicators that will enable to answer the overall problem – *Can the JMAC succeed?*

Each key challenge will be associated with one step[13] in the *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle* to better structure the analysis. As visualized in figure 2 below, the research question analysis (middle circle) – key challenges and their impact followed by JMAC capability to mitigate – is structured by the *Intelligence Cycle* steps (outer circle). Combined they found

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[13] One challenge might be associated to several challenges, e.g. classification. The most relevant step will be used to better structure the analysis.

the overall structure and methodology for the paper. The analysis of key challenges will enable the paper to conclude whether the JMAC can succeed. If key challenges represents possibilities, it would be likely that the JMAC can succeed (inner circle) in mitigating UN intelligence challenges. Unresolved challenges will be limitations and remain key challenges.

Figure 2: Operationalizing key challenges and JMAC success

2.2 Literature Review and Interviews

Experiences from post-Cold War UN peace operations, followed by several high profiled UN reports in the last 17 years, as well as development of new UN concepts and publications, have raised the attention of Intelligence and UN amongst academics and scientists in the 21st century. Walter Dorn[14] has been a significant advocate for technological improvements and enhanced intelligence collection capabilities in modern UN peace operations.

In the last 2 years, several reports have provided important knowledge to the field of UN and Intelligence. The reports are especially relevant, as they have been developed by scientists and

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[14] Walter Dorn is Professor of Defence Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) and the Canadian Forces College (CFC). Among other things, he specializes in peace operations and the United Nations. He also served as a consultant with the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including on the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping.

academics with either an extensive intelligence background or knowledge of the UN in combination with field investigations of intelligence architecture in current UN peace operations. The All Source Intelligence Fusion Unit (ASIFU) experiment in Mali[15], with reports from Nordli & Lindboe and Rietjens & Waard, has provided important perspectives. As have the more generic approaches relating to information sharing, JMAC and situational awareness by Abilova & Novosseloff, Theunens and Willmot. The latter reports describe challenges regarding UN and Intelligence and Willmot goes far in recommending a strategic intelligence capability. Theunens provides some interesting perspectives in regards to terminology, suggesting that the UN should replace *Intelligence* with *Understanding*. Willmot advocates an improved UN situational awareness, and by comparing the UN with national systems, offers recommendations for the establishment of a UN situational awareness system. All the academic reports referred to in this paper are secondary sources.

Some of the reports referred to above define intelligence, some even use the Intelligence Cycle, but neither explore in a systematic manner whether the JMAC concept is able to address UN key intelligence challenges. The key challenges in this paper equals the indicators used to discuss if the JMAC concept can succeed. Combined with a comprehensive approach to UN peace operation terminology is where the paper stands out and contributes to the discussion about UN and Intelligence.

The primary sources mainly derive from official UN reports, documents and policies. The 2015 *JMAC Policy* and *Guidelines*[16] are both key to understanding the JMAC concept. The 2017 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) release of *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy* is important in trying to understand UN and Intelligence and is elaborated in more detail in chapter 3.2. The 2015 HIPPO report has provided important contributions to the understanding of key characteristics of contemporary UN peace operations and problems. All literature referred to above has provided a solid base line for understanding the complexity of not just Intelligence, but - even more challenging - the dynamics of United Nations in peace operations.

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[15] The ASIFU was an ISR unit with troops mainly coming from the Netherlands and Sweden.
[16] The JMAC Guidelines will most probably be replaced by A *JMAC Field Handbook* is currently drafted by UNOCC.

The qualitative approach with relevant reports, books and articles is supported by a variety of semi-structural interviews with representatives from academia, military, police, humanitarian entities and UN (see annex C). The interviews, lasting between 1 and 2 hours, have been exploratory, aiming to elaborate on perspectives within each profession based upon the research questions. Most interviews were conducted face-to-face, but interviews with Police and UNMISS were done using e-mail and *Facetime*. The interviews are referred to as semi-structural as no recording or pre-defined questionnaire was developed. Jacobsen refers to this approach as exploratory as the starting point for the interview, challenges and mitigation, should be open to all possibilities and aspects (Jacobsen, 2015, p. 64).

The research questions served as a starting point for the discussion. Limitations in time as well as a numerous different perspectives of each individual in many ways supplemented the information and my understanding deriving from literature. Within each field of expertise, they were able to broaden the understanding and explain the characteristics and challenges of each entity involved in UN peace operations. As these individuals present their own opinions, based upon their experience and perspective, I have been careful not to put too much weight on their contribution, but treat it as, what it is; the opinion of a very experienced professional within the "universe" of UN and Intelligence.

The interviews proved particularly interesting and relevant in combination with authors that had provided academic contributions being referenced in the paper[17]. The interviews served several purposes – firstly, it enabled more detailed elaborations regarding concerns and formulations in their academic work, secondly, they provided relevant background information, vastly enhancing the understanding of the topic, and finally, they were able to increase the confidence that references and focus of the paper were coherent and consistent.

Thus, according to Jacobsen, combining several ways of collecting data reinforces the qualitative investigations – more methods, perspectives and details about the same phenomenon increase the validity and enhance the level of precision of the research (Jacobsen, 2015, p. 173).

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[17] John Karlsrud and Stian Kjeksrud

2.3 Outline

The paper is organized in three main chapters. Chapter 3 presents the background needed to understand UN peace operations and Intelligence in the follow-on discussion in chapters 4 and 5.

Chapter 3 is descriptive and consists of four parts and introduces UN peace operations, UN Peacekeeping Intelligence, key actors in relation to the UN and Intelligence and the JMAC concept.

Part 1 provides a basic understanding of UN peace operation terminology and the evolution of UN peace operations in relation to mandate and characteristics of contemporary UN peace operations. An initial discussion and clarification on the term UN peace operation enables a more precise discussion in the following chapters.

Part 2 explores Intelligence in UN peace operations. First, Intelligence in UN post- Cold War peace operations is elaborated as these events are crucial to understand UN and Intelligence today. Second, UN and Intelligence, as presented in UN DPKO policy – *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy* – will be briefly presented in order to understand how DPKO relates to Intelligence. Finally, part 2 will present different layers and types of intelligence.

Part 3 presents a brief overview of the key UN organization involved multi-dimensional peace operations organization and external actors involved at the strategic and operational level, which are equally important to be able to explore UN peace operation intelligence challenges. Part 4 briefly presents the focal point of the paper – the JMAC concept - as outlined in UN documents.

Chapter 4 will discuss and distil the challenges and impacts of Intelligence in the UN. The chapter consists of two parts. Chapter 4 will explore 21st century UN peace operations to investigate what are the current challenges for UN intelligence in peace operations. This will be analyzed by looking at two ongoing operations – UNMISS in South Sudan and MINUSMA in Mali. Following chapter 4, a comprehensive understanding of key intelligence challenges and their impact on UN peace operations has been established.

Chapter 5 will analyze and discuss the challenges identified in chapter 4 to explore to what extent they represent limitations or possibilities for successful JMAC contributions to UN

peace operations. The discussion will be aligned with the *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle* - Tasking/Direction, Acquisition, Collation and Examination, Analysis and Dissemination. The analysis will investigate how, and the probability that, the JMAC can mitigate these challenges. The analysis and the findings will be summarized in a table in chapter 5.7, which will form the synthesis of the paper.

The conclusion will, following the chapter 5 discussion as to whether the key challenges represents limitations or possibilities, predict if the JMAC can succeed.

3 UN Peace Operations

3.1 An introduction to UN Peace Operations

UN Peace Operations – bridging the terms

Throughout UN documents, there is a confusing mixture of terms in which old terms are used to try to explain modern phenomenon. Traditionally, UN involvement in international peace and security activities has used the term peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping has become the term symbolizing what UN peace operations was all about and aligned with the key principle of the UN developed by Dag Hammarskjold; consent. Consent normally materialized in a peace agreement - founding the basis for a peace to keep. However, throughout UN history, the consent of the warring factions have been a subject of constant change, forcing UN forces to balance other key principles, impartiality and use of force except in self-defence, on a case-by-case basis.

The United Nations has developed a wide range of terms and instruments to ensure international peace ranging from Special Political Missions, observer missions, preventive actions, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace building, disarmament, economic sanctions and peace enforcement in UN peace operations. UN Secretary General's *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992 identified four major steps in international conflict management as undertaken by the UN (Macdonald, 1997, p. 5):

- Prevention, including Preventive Deployment
- Peacemaking
- Peacekeeping

- Peacebuilding.

These four steps combined with the term *peace enforcement* founded the basis in the DPKO Capstone doctrine of 2008, which is still referred to on the official UN web pages in relation to UN Peacekeeping Operations. Prevention "involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict". Peacemaking "includes measures to address minor conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement". Peace enforcement involves "a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression". Peacekeeping is "a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted". Peacebuilding involves "a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management" (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2008, p. 18).

Figure 3: Variety and relationship of UN Peace Operations (DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 2)

However, the boundaries between each step have become increasingly blurred. UN official Nadia Assouli[18] confirmed that figure 3 does not reflect how terms are used or how conflicts

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[18] Interview on 13 November 2017 (see annex B)

are perceived in the UN today. Peacekeeping does not restrict itself to an after ceasefire activity and the term, as it is being used, has merged with peace enforcement. According to Hough, peace-enforcement is "the creation of peace through the military support of one side of a conflict in order to force a victory or a stalemate that makes it rational for the opposing side to cease fighting militarily and to begin negotiating diplomatically" (Hough, 2007, p. 14). Successful peace-enforcement creates the conditions for peacekeeping. Following the logic of Hough, there seems to be a lack of an overarching term to capture the many aspects in UN missions.

To blur the understanding even more, following the Balkan operation in the 1990`s, the term robust peacekeeping was introduced. Robust peacekeeping, also referred to as chapter 6 ½ operations, is defined as "the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict" (Karlsrud, 2017b, p. 4). The distinction between peace enforcement and robust peacekeeping "is thus not about how much force is being used, but rather about the context within which force is being used" (Coning, Detzel, & Hojem, 2008, p. 4). According to Findlay there has been a confusion of peacekeeping and peace-enforcing mandates, referred to as *robust peacekeeping*, which seems to have "directly contributed to widespread confusion on the interpretation of the rules of engagement among troop-contributing countries and consequently contributed to the abject failure of the mission" (Findlay, 2002, p. 303).

The Capstone doctrine, in line with the 2003 United Nations *Handbook on Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operations*, expands on the Peacekeeping term by introducing the term multi-dimensional peacekeeping which is "also referred to as peace operations" (United Nations, 2003, p. 1). There seems to be no sound explanation to this lineation of the two expressions as multi-dimensional usually is referring to the complexity of the UN operations and that different entities – both UN related, international and national - are involved addressing both humanitarian, economic, military, state and social concerns in the conflict. As there is no UN standard for terms and definitions, new terms introduced by academics, UN officials and mission components confuse the debate about UN peace operation and intelligence.

In 2015 the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations was given the task "to ascertain their relevance and effectiveness for today and tomorrow's world" (High-Level

Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. iii). The name of the Panel indicates a clear shift in the understanding of UN involvement, from peacekeeping to peace operations, which is the term used consistently throughout the 111 pages document[19]. In the reply from the UN SG this consistency is no longer present. The UN can gain by defining and being consistent to the terms in use as it facilitates a common understanding and perception. Following the consistency of the HIPPO report, peacekeeping operations should be one separate activity under UN peace operations. To better understand the nature of UN peace operations terminology[20], figure 4 forms the basis for the paper;

Figure 4: The nature of UN Peace Operations

In figure 4, UN Peace Operations consists of Special Political, Peace Keeping, Robust Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement missions. The indicators defining the mission is (1) level of consent, (2) means being used, (3) level of violence from the parties and the UN, (4) the use of force and (5) level of UN impartiality.

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[19] Currently there is an ongoing process of re-organizing the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The proposal is to rename the organization to Department of Peace Operations and to include DPA and DPKO united under one Under Secretary General. The term will be more capable to embrace the full nature of modern UN peace and security activities.

[20] UN has an online database with definition, called UNTERM Portal. There is however, no relevant definition on the term Peace Operation.

Such an understanding might facilitate the discussion and understanding of 21st century UN peace operations and clarify the role of Intelligence in *preventive and Special Political Missions[21]* as well as *peacekeeping*, *robust peacekeeping* and *peace enforcement* missions if these terms still prove useful to understand modern UN peace operations. The current *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy* addresses only Peacekeeping. As figure 4 shows; Peacekeeping is one of several possible UN involvements, and the indicators pose very different challenges to the UN and Intelligence following the specificities of each conflict. UN Intelligence requirements must furthermore be defined prior, during and after a conflict, which are non-existent in UN current documents.

The term UN *Peace Operations* is used consistently throughout the paper to include all varieties of UN security and peace activities including *Peacekeeping Operations*.

Evolution of key characteristics of contemporary UN Peace Operations

The past twenty years have seen an exponential growth of UN peace operations in terms of breadth of mandate, scale and duration of operations. Where peace operators in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s were deployed primarily to monitor ceasefires[22], they are now deployed to investigate human rights violations, provide electoral support, manage combatant disarmament and reintegration programs, as well as supporting combat operations. This surge has required a five-fold rise in the UN peace operations budget over the past ten years[23]. However, while the overall capacity of the UN DPKO to plan and implement peace operations has grown in line with its increased human and financial resources, "UN capacity remains weak in the critical area of strategic information assessments, commonly known as intelligence" (Ramjoué, 2011, p. 2).

Though not a recent phenomenon, developed countries regularly lean towards focusing resources and efforts on selected regional or bilateral arrangements and organizations. Hence,

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[21] Preventive and Special political missions are, according to Nadia Assouli, restricted to DPA activities and are accordingly not included in the current DPKO produced *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy*.
[22] Traditional UN peacekeeping as we know it
[23] From US$ 1.5 billion in 1999 to US$ 6.8 billion in 2017. It has similarly led to a five-fold increase in UN personnel deployed to support peacekeeping activities, from 27,000 military, civilian and police peace operators in 1999 to over 110,000 in 2017 https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data-0

they divert resources that could otherwise have assisted the UN capacity to undertake complex peace operations, and thereby enhance its credibility. Developing countries, on the other hand, have fears that dominance of the UN by major developed powers will benefit their own interests. This fear resulted in protracted debates on humanitarian intervention and "a general trend among developing countries of opposition to the strengthening of the UN, when in fact their need was for the very opposite" (National Defence Coll Stockholm Dept Of Operational Studies, 2002, p. 53).

The centrality of Africa for 21st century UN peace operations is evident[24]. Over the past decade, the African Union (AU) has worked towards a coherent continental peace and security architecture, including in building the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises for the future. The effectiveness of UN peace operations in Africa is, however, undermined by the lack of sustained, predictable and flexible funding mechanisms to support AU peace support operations (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 63).

Furthermore, today's peace operations are multi-layered. They are not only established for maintenance of peace and security, but also "to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, support the organization of elections as well as to protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law" (DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 3). The more tasks a mission is mandated to conduct, "the more diffuse its centres of control, and the greater the probability of confused prioritization, contradiction or interference between operations" (Shetler-Jones, 2008, p. 4). By putting forward all-encompassing peacekeeping mandates and asking these missions to uphold peacekeeping principles, the Security Council "may be charging UN missions with the impossible task of trying to fulfil their mandate by continuously compromising on that same mandate" (Felix da Costa & Peter, 2017, p. 205). Acknowledging these challenges, the HIPPO Panel recommended a sequential development of UN mandates to provide a greater flexibility in deploying and adapting UN mandates to developments in the mission.

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[24] In 2015, 62.5 percent of UN peace operations and 87 percent of all uniformed UN troops are in Africa, whilst more than 80 percent of the annual peace operation budget is spent on missions in Africa (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 63).

Another distinct feature of modern UN peace operations, most importantly for the intelligence community, is the problem of identification and localization of the "enemy". Distinguishing between "terrorist" and "non-terrorist" groups may be difficult given the fluidity of allegiances between transnational "terrorist" groups and autochthonous groups with local grievances. Belonging to a terrorist group may also be "a seasonal activity, or be driven by limited livelihood alternatives". Labelling individuals or groups as terrorists in itself can be used as a political strategy to a conflict (Karlsrud, 2017b, p. 9).

Violent extremism has emerged under the cover of several conflicts, with evolving tactics that include social media expertise, regional networks, territorial control, extreme brutality and the systematic use of conflict-related sexual violence. In a number of conflict settings, it remains unclear whom mediators would engage, or what space there is for mediation efforts. Combined, all these factors contribute not only to an increase in the number of conflicts and their intractability, but also in some contexts to the "erosion of social cohesion and the legitimacy of the State itself" (UN Secretary General, 2015b, p. 2).

The reinforced focus on protection of the civilian in modern multi-dimensional peace operations has allocated military tasks that dovetail with the work of humanitarian agencies (Humanitarian Practice Network, 2013, p. 3). Managing flows of displaced people or delivering assistance, which both overlap with the mandates and concerns of humanitarian organizations, are aligned with obligations towards civilian populations embodied in International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In the eyes of many humanitarian actors, humanitarian aid has "become increasingly politicized as it has become incorporated into the stabilization agendas of the major Western donors, which have seen militaries undertake humanitarian assistance activities to achieve strategic or tactical goals in theatres such as Afghanistan". International militaries have also become increasingly involved in natural disaster response; the US military, for instance, has deployed to disaster zones 40 times since 2004. Given this increasing military involvement in humanitarian action, there is a growing need for humanitarian actors to evaluate how their constructive dialogue with the military can be improved (Humanitarian Practice Network, 2013, p. 3).

Following mainly negative experiences, the High-Level Independent Panel believed that UN troops should not undertake military counter-terrorism operations. The Panel recommended

that extreme caution should guide the mandating of enforcement tasks to degrade, neutralize or defeat a designated enemy. Such operations should be "exceptional, time-limited and undertaken with full awareness of the risks and responsibilities for the UN mission as a whole". In cases where a parallel force is engaged in offensive combat operations, it is important that UN troops maintain a clear division of labor and distinction of roles (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 10).

In UN peace operation, the mandate will define ambitions and indicate capabilities and the amount of forces needed to address incidents threatening international peace and security. Thus, significant legal and political constraints on UN activities arises from the mandate of the mission, usually "supplied by the Security Council, and the Status of Mission Agreement or the Status of Forces Agreement which the UN normally agrees to with the host state and/or the local authorities, including the combatants" (Dorn, 2003, p. 353). Willmot suggests including clear references to situational awareness[25] in future UN mandates. In relation to human rights, the UNMISS mandate states that UN should "monitor, investigate, verify and report" any violations. The consequences concerning the UNMISS mission provides three aspects that are equally important when it comes to situational awareness and intelligence; Protection of civilians is becoming more important, UN mandates are more complex and multi-dimensional, and, finally, the lineation between civilian humanitarian and military actors in UN missions is becoming more difficult to uphold.

Within the UN Charter, there are three chapters of particular interest as the mandates for missions are developed - Chapters 6, 7 and 8[26]. Without directly referring to the chapters, mandates have a clear reference to the chapters by defining the use of force, capabilities and actors invited to ensure compliance with the mandate. Additionally, regional and sub-regional organizations are becoming more prominent features in the global peace and security landscape, as was foreseen upon drafting Chapter VIII of the UN Charter more than seventy years ago. Regional and sub-regional entities bring long-standing relationships, depth of understanding, determination and often a willingness to respond. However, they also bring

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[25] In most aspects, situational awareness equals Intelligence. Having situational awareness requires gathering and processing of information.
[26] Observer mission is a typical Chapter VI peace operation; Peace Enforcement is a Chapter VII operation, whereas Chapter VIII indicates that a regional security organization, e.g. NATO or African Union, can take upon responsibility for the operation authorized by the UN.

interests, some of which carry potential risks to impartially managing conflicts. In the future, the Panel recommends that the UN should embrace a strengthened global and regional partnership with partners responding politically and operationally (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 13).

At the 2017 European Peace Training Community- seminar in Helsinki, main characteristics of contemporary UN peace operations were identified. The attendees highlighted that missions (especially in Africa) are increasingly armed with Chapter VII mandates, providing a robust mandate to carry out the various dimensions of the mission and protect civilians. As mandates become more driven towards protecting civilians, troops also have to become more willing to use force (Felix da Costa & Peter, 2017, p. 204). However, an important question was not really addressed: Despite the moral and legal obligations of the international community, are member states capable and willing to invest economic and human capital to defend and sustain a mandate as ambitious as protecting civilians? UN peace operations must be developed in the coming years as the USA has communicated a clear intention to reduce its UN funding. The result might lead to increased focus on cost efficient preventive efforts replacing expensive peacekeeping operations, which will have major impacts on UN situational awareness and intelligence concepts.

3.2 Intelligence in Peace Operations

A post-Cold War look at Intelligence and the UN

In the post-Cold War era, the question of intelligence had to be addressed as the United Nations doubled the number of missions and increased the number of troops deployed in the field by a factor of five. The complexity of these operations also increased, with the United Nations taking on ambiguous responsibilities in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, far from the traditional peacekeeping role of monitoring a ceasefire between standing armies. With size and difficulty came risk: more peacekeepers were killed in 1993 than in the entire preceding decade.

In April of the same year, a Situation Centre was created in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to provide a continuous link between senior staff members at UN Headquarters, field missions, humanitarian organizations and member states through their diplomatic

missions in New York. In addition to monitoring specific operations, it drew upon reports and open-source information to provide daily situation reports on all peacekeeping and some political and humanitarian missions. An *Information and Research Unit* was added in September 1993, beginning with a single intelligence officer seconded from the United States. In 1997, 111 "gratis" officers worked at DPKO; their home countries paid their salaries[27]. By the late 1990s this had become a politically contentious issue and the United Nations began phasing out the practice in the period 1998–1999, taking with it the *Information and Research Unit* (Chesterman, 2006, p. 5).

The UN experienced several significant failures - responses to conflicts in Rwanda and Sri Lanka and attacks against the UN in Baghdad and Mogadishu. With each successive failure, member states have expressed consternation at the UN's poor performance, followed by a group of experts mandated to review the UN's actions. Poor situational awareness has always been one of the reasons for failure. In response, the Secretary-General in office has attempted to improve the organization's situational awareness, but has often faced resistance "both internally from some departments and agencies and externally from the very member states that criticized the UN's performance" (Willmot, 2017, p. 25).

Concerned about the hypersensitivity of some if its members to the issue, the UN has traditionally shied away from openly acknowledging the utility of gathering and using intelligence information. Unofficially UN operations have, out of military necessity, gathered analyzed and shared information, albeit at a relatively basic level. UN missions have also cooperated with certain participating countries in obtaining higher-level intelligence information when deemed necessary (Findlay, 2002, p. 368).

The inconsistency of UN peace operations terminology was elaborated in chapter 3.1. Following the contested use of the term Intelligence, several substitutes have been used. The term *Intelligence* has been labelled with secrecy reinforced by the *Second* and the *Cold* war events. *Military information*, a more politically correct term in the UN, "became the dominating feature in UN peace operations, and there was little serious discussion of any form of UN intelligence capability for the remainder of the Cold War" (Chesterman, 2006, p.

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[27] Seconded officers from France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and United States formed an "Information and Research Unit" (I&R) with ties back to their home intelligence communities (Maceda, 2007, p. 59).

5). In the UN context, a range of terms are used by various actors to capture the essence of Intelligence[28], including information, analysis, assessment, intelligence, early warning, and information management. However, none of these terms are used consistently (Willmot, 2017, p. 23).

Following the deadly attack on the UN envoy to Iraq in 2003 – two logic conclusions were made; (1) UN must ensure that UN personnel serving in mission are protected, and (2) to facilitate the security of UN personnel more information about the adversaries – their capabilities and intentions were needed – in other words - Intelligence.

This event paved the way for Intelligence in UN terminology and planning activities. The term *Joint Mission Analysis Center* was introduced in 2003. By now, the JMAC concept has been adapted in most UN missions. The development of policies, handbooks and guidelines covering the fields of UN Intelligence and JMAC have followed. It is apparent that any development of UN intelligence concepts will be heavily shaped by a small group of Western nations. They, almost exclusively, have the knowledge, experience and global reach that is required. In the UN Situation Centre, 17 of the 24 (by 1994) staff were drawn from Western Europe, North America and Australia and generally occupied the senior positions. Procedures in the Centre were based on Western practices, while English is spoken and used for all written reports. Any extension of the use of technology in intelligence gathering within the UN, would most likely reinforce the dominance of Western powers, both practically and symbolically (Smith, 2003, p. 262).

As the mandates and operating environments of United Nations peace operations have evolved, as have the capabilities, processes and procedures required to gather and analyze information. In complex and dangerous environments, where asymmetric and transnational threats pose serious dangers to peace operators and negatively impact mandate implementation, there is a need for UN peace operation missions to better understand their

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[28] The 2014 UN Forces Headquarters Handbook adds to the confusion. The Handbook states that the U-2 Staff Branch deals with all matters concerning Military Information (MI) and military security operations within the Force HQ. U-2 Branch plans and coordinates the military information/intelligence requirements (DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 39). Annex L is the monthly report format. In section 1, the title reads Information/Intelligence update. At best this can be understood as a way of introducing and implementing the term Intelligence in UN peace operations, at worst a lack of definition and comprehensive UN peace operation intelligence terminology.

environment and context and to predict specific threats and opportunities enabling peace operators to effectively execute their mandates (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 1).

Some member states have an interest in influencing the Secretariat's analysis of the conflict and therefore give some of their confidential information to the heads of the units in charge of situational awareness. This mainly takes place between people of the same nationality. The UN needs to establish more clarity on the legal framework supporting or limiting intelligence sharing, particularly when it could have political implications for the mission's strategy or reputational implications for the mission (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 26).

My research has confirmed that the United Nations has, contrary to official policies and terms, a rich history of acquiring and interpreting information. Looking at the history of UN mandates, the word Intelligence has never been used. Words like investigate, supervise, support the implementation of, early warning, protection of civilians, protect as well as safety and security[29] all require information gathering activities in the UN both at the tactical, operational and strategic level. So, does the UN have intelligence?

UN Peacekeeping Intelligence

Classic Western military intelligence doctrine defines information as raw data, whereas intelligence is the "end result of processing this raw data and drawing pertinent conclusions". (Johnston, 1997, p. 6). In the UN SG reply to the HIPPO-report, he reaffirmed the need to develop "parameters for an information and intelligence framework that can support field missions in operating effectively and safely" (UN Secretary General, 2015a, p. 20). Several UN Intelligence documents have been developed and most recently the *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy* has been published enabling a more precise discussion relating to UN and Intelligence. The DPKO and DFS Policy defines *Peacekeeping Intelligence* (PKI) as "the non-clandestine acquisition and processing of information by a mission within a directed mission intelligence cycle to meet requirements for decision-making and to inform operations related to the safe and effective implementation of the Security Council mandate" (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 1).

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[29] All these word can be found in the UN resolutions relating to UN mission in Mali and South Sudan

Clandestine activities, involves "the acquisition of intelligence, conducted in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment of the activities because they are illicit and/or are inconsistent with the legal framework, principles, policies and mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations". Such activities are outside the definition of peacekeeping intelligence and shall not be undertaken by UN mission entities (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 3).

Analysis within Peacekeeping intelligence shall be "a whole-of-mission process that makes full use of all resources available to the mission according to the comparative advantages, including expertise in the local situation, languages and cultures; military and police intelligence analysis capabilities; and security threat information analysis techniques" (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 6). It is intended to (1) support a common operational picture, (2) provide early warning of imminent threats and (3) identify risks and opportunities (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 2).

Peacekeeping intelligence shall be stored and shared in a secure manner, ensuring proper access for those who require it for decision-making and operational planning. Confidential products shall be shared and disseminated on the basis of the *need to know* and *need to share* concepts, which require that intelligence should be disclosed to mission personnel if access to information is required for them to carry out their official duties (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 3). Hence, the Policy allows an extensive interpretation concerning matters relating to access, which provides personal and not structural and procedural preferences as basis for information sharing.

The parameters for the effective, responsible and ethical acquisition of peacekeeping intelligence shall be described in the mission's Peacekeeping Intelligence Support Plan(PKSIP). It will describe;

> Acceptable and unacceptable tools, techniques and procedures of peacekeeping intelligence acquisition by the mission, applicable legal obligations, and considerations that shall be undertaken when acquiring intelligence, based on the assets available to the mission and in line with operational guidance subordinate to this Policy.

The peacekeeping force must make clear to the parties that;

Collected intelligence does not reach their adversaries, that the main purpose of this intelligence is to facilitate peace negotiations and the successful execution of the peacekeeping operation, that it is the right and duty of the peacekeeping force to carry out intelligence collection, and finally, that the other parties are subjected to an identical scrutiny (Eriksson, 1997, p. 5).

Using the police as a reference: As long as the public knows that the police will not use surveillance for blackmail or to pass information about one's business to competitors, it accepts that police officers carry out surveillance. Police surveillance is considered a prerequisite for effective law enforcement for the good of society (Eriksson, 1997, p. 4). However, the PKISP aiming for transparency reveals the oxymoron of confidentiality and the need to protect information gathering and sources, which are needed in some UN peace operations.

Intelligence – layers and types

Military theoreticians often distinguish between the three *levels* of analysis: strategic, operational, and tactical. Applied on intelligence "they denote three things: the levels of command that intelligence serves, the kind of decisions it supports, and the levels at which intelligence is itself controlled, and the three get horribly confused" (Aid, 2003, p. 172).

Foreign Minister Brahimi and his panel recommended improvements to UN intelligence at the tactical, operation, and strategic levels. The report recognized that operationally and tactically, enhanced intelligence advances cease-fire monitoring, peace enforcement, and force protection. (Maceda, 2007, p. 47). In contemporary operations, however, NATO recognizes that traditional boundaries between the levels of warfare have less relevance in relation to intelligence (NATO, 2016, pp. 2-3).

The *compression of level* does not equal that one level or type of intelligence can address all matters adequately. *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy* do not provide guidance regarding strategic intelligence. The policy refers to *strategic planning*, *direction* and *guidance* and that the *Intelligence Support Plan* (ISP) should "describe the intelligence system supporting the mission and identify responsibilities for strategic, operational and tactical intelligence assets

that may be assigned to, or provide support to, the mission" (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 20).

According to NATO *strategic intelligence* is "required for the formulation of policy, civil-military planning and the provision of indications and warning, at the national and/or international levels" (NATO, 2016, pp. 3-1). The UN collects strategic information at its headquarters in New York (mainly the Secretariat with input from member states). Special Representatives of the Secretary General, or heads of mission, are evolving the strategic level in their interactions with UN headquarters, including with the Security Council and the UN Secretariat.

Operational intelligence is required at mission headquarters "to plan the most effective deployment of the UN resources in the various sectors and to be aware of the threat posed by parties to the conflict. This includes information about the intentions and capabilities of the warring parties and the character of the military activities" (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 15).

Tactical intelligence on the local situation is "required for the planning and execution of operations at the tactical level," according to NATO definition (NATO, 2016, pp. 3-1). Tactical intelligence or situational awareness of the local situation is required by all components of UN missions to carry out their functions, and by unit commanders to be aware of shifts in the local area and to carry out military patrols in an effective manner. This is the type of intelligence "missing from current UN multidisciplinary peace operations because there is no overall system for sharing information an analysis among mission components and because troops and police from different contingents have varying levels of experience and training in collecting information" (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 15).

According to NATO intelligence documents, intelligence can be divided in levels as well as the two following types: Basic intelligence "is intelligence, on any subject, which may be used as reference material for planning and as a basis for processing subsequent information or intelligence". It is produced as part of routine monitoring or on a contingency basis, for example as in the case with Orders of Battle. Current intelligence on the other hand "reflects the current situation at either strategic or tactical level" (NATO, 2016, pp. 3-2). It should tell

decision-makers why something is relevant for a mission (the so what factor) and include predictive assessment about the future. Basic intelligence requires trained, functional and dedicated resources to be able to provide the context and backdrop against which current intelligence is reviewed.

3.3 Organization and Key Actors

The Security Council establishes UN peace operations, which under the UN Charter is the organization with primary responsibility for international peace and security. In each case, a new mission must be designed and its components assembled to meet the requirements of that particular situation. The UN system is a complex network of entities, comprising organizations created by the Charter (e.g., Security Council and Secretariat), subsidiary organizations created by the General Assembly (e.g., Human Rights Council), funds and programs (e.g., UN Development Program and UN Children's Fund), specialized agencies (e.g., World Health Organization), and related entities (e.g., World Treaty Organization). The entities have differing, and in some instances competing, mandates, funding and governance, making UN guiding principles and organizational fragmentation difficult to avoid and challenging to overcome (Willmot, 2017, p. 60).

In June 2017, the total number of personnel serving on 16 UN peace operations was 112,294. The number of uniformed personnel was 95,544, where 80,067 were military. UN civilians represented 15,153 individuals. 127 countries contributed with uniformed personnel (United Nations, 2017b). The vast number of people, entities and locations with different cultural background and training make situational awareness and common effort challenging. Combined, the organizational and national constraints put upon the UN hamper its capability to advance the will(s) of the international community.

Planning and execution of UN peace operations involve many actors, both in New York at the strategic level as well as national and international entities in the mission area that are critical at the operational and tactical level. UN peacekeeping authority, command and control is established at three separate but overlapping areas with seamless links between strategic, operational and tactical levels as presented in figure 5. In the UN's case, the strategic level would equate to UN Headquarters in New York, where the Secretary- General and his staff sit

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with the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the headquarters of most UN organizations. For the UN, the operational level equates to the 'theatre' headquarters of its various missions around the world, for example, the old UNPROFOR headquarters in the Balkans or UNMISS headquarters in South Sudan. These headquarters are integrated civil/military organizations, with a Head of Mission who reports to the Secretary-General in New York. Finally, the tactical level comprises of the units on the line, doing the actual peacekeeping (Johnston, 1997, p. 8). To better understand intelligence in UN peace operations, the paper will look in some more detail at the actors in the strategic and operational levels.

Figure 5: UN Peace operations – the levels (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2013, p. 35)

The Strategic level

At the strategic level, there has been several attempts to establish an intelligence entity capable of supporting the Secretary General. As early as 1965, the Office of the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General was created. DPKO which is the dominating entity today was established in the optimism in the aftermath of the Cold War in 1992 as the strategic entity, responsible for "planning, managing, deploying, supporting and, on behalf of the

Secretary-General, providing executive direction to all UN peace operations" (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 20).

Following the suicide truck-bomb attack on the UN Headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Baghdad on 19th August 2003, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) was formally established on 1 January 2005. Since that time, the Department has been dedicated to support and enable the effective conduct of United Nations activities by ensuring a coherent, effective and timely response to all security-related threats and other emergencies (United Nations Department of Safety and Security, 2017). DSS has a *Threat and Risk Assessment Service* in charge of providing strategic assessments "through regional and country-specific threat assessments to support field duty stations and ensure the safety and security of all civilian personnel" (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 14). To execute their task effectively, they need information that in most cases equals the information needed for intelligence and planning activities.

In 2008, Department of Political Affairs (DPA) established a *Policy and Mediation Division*, which has a small analytical unit that provides policy support to field missions. DPA uses DPKO's documents on situational awareness, information collection, crisis management, and information analysis to support their work. Within DPKO, the *Office of Military Affairs* (OMA) has an Assessment Team[30], which comprised of eleven trained intelligence officers. Interviewees pointed out that "this team conducts limited outreach, so its products are not widely used or even known outside the OMA" (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, pp. 20-22).

The UN Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) emerged from DPKO's Peacekeeping Situation Centre in 2013. It was established with a broad situational awareness mandate, intended to support decision makers across the spectrum of UN operational departments and agencies. UNOCC represented a concerted effort to bring existing situational awareness capacities together, incorporating DPKO and seeking staffing contributions from other stakeholders within the UN system. Despite UNOCC has been successful in its 24/7 situation monitoring, current information reporting and crisis management support functions, it has struggled to fulfil its integrated analysis role. According to Willmot, this is partly due to a

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[30] As of July 2016.

"lack of departmental cooperation, insufficient authority, and inadequate staffing of its analysis capacity" (Willmot, 2017, p. 44)

Based upon the recommendations of the HIPPO report, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General furthermore created a three-person analysis and planning cell in March 2016. This cell has been tasked in particular with improving information exchange across the UN system, lifting the overall quality of analysis, and assisting lead departments in securing the resources and skills they need to plan effectively. However, the capacity of this cell seems to be very limited given the breadth of its tasks (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 21).

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is another key actor in the field of information gathering in the UN - being the principal administrator of the *Humanitarian Early Warning System* (HEWS). By definition, HEWS attempts to identify crises with humanitarian implications. The idea is to "apply multi-sector analysis of indicators, both long-term and short-term, and combine this with the evaluation of trends and in-depth field-based information, supported by an extensive database of base-line information". This process is aimed at "producing accurate and timely information on the likelihood of humanitarian crisis, which could be speedily communicated to decision makers at the UN" (Ekpe, 2007, p. 11). OCHA has desk officers collecting all information concerning their region from OCHA's field offices to feed into a daily situation report.

Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) with its mandate to monitor and identify human rights violations worldwide is an important actor with a global outreach. Finally, recognizing the information age, the Department of Public Information (DPI) with an open source monitoring capability is important as new information sources follow this technological advancement and the increased availability of information.

The UN's information sources at the strategic level furthermore include its member states (intelligence services), the UN specialized agencies, the media, and non-governmental organizations, in addition to its own field personnel. Frequently, governments have been an important source of warnings and critical information (Dorn, 2010, p. 278). Nations, UN members and particularly troop contributing nations, tend to provide national intelligence resources in UN peace operations outside the UN chain of command.

In summary, the total number of entities and actors involved in information gathering activities in New York at the strategic level is quite impressive. Above, only the key players at the strategic have only been briefly presented. However, to fully benefit from the allocated resources, structural and procedural improvements must be implemented. In line with the HIPPO report, compartmentalization could prevent the UN at the strategic level from making the most of the information it possesses.

The Operational level

The structure of a UN peace operation at the operational level is tailored according to the mandate and the mission. There are, however, structural commonalities relating to key actors involved in information processing in UN peace operations; A generic structure in integrated UN mission will normally consist of the Head of Mission (HoM) which normally is the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and his staff. The Chief of Staff is responsible for the JMAC and the Joint Operations Center (JOC). Furthermore, there is one Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) in charge of the political, public and legal aspects of the mission. The second DSRSG deals with all matters relating to Humanitarian and Residential coordination.

The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General/Resident Coordinator /Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG RC/HC) is essential in order to facilitate information sharing with all the UN entities in a mission. DSRSG/RC/HC, in agreement with the HoM, should ensure that the JMAC and relevant UN Country Team (UNCT)/ Human Coordination Team (HCT) entities have established methods for sharing information. They furthermore agree on the nature of participation of UNCT/HCT members in any regular JMAC consultations fora (United Nations, 2015, p. 7). The Force Commander is the commander of the Military Component and the Police Commander is responsible for the Police Component, both are organizationally aligned with the two DSRSGs. The key players, normally part of the Mission Leadership Team (MLT) in multi-dimensional peace operations, are depicted in a generic structure in figure 6 below.

Figure 6: Generic UN multi-dimensional peace operation organisation

At the operational level, there are many entities involved in information gathering. The JOC is the structure for coordinating operations and crisis response and for sharing information among all components of a mission. When properly staffed and organized, it has the capability to receive all information collected by field sectors and battalions, analyze it, and send it to the JMAC.

Political Affairs Officers should be given the opportunity to contribute to JMAC products in order to ensure that political aspects are covered most effectively. Although there should be no unwanted duplication between JMAC and the *Political Affairs Division* (PAD), as their respective focus of work is different, "*turf issues*" may arise. Given the specific role of PAD personnel, Theunens believe that integration into the JMAC is not advisable. Still, arrangements need to be made to regulate information sharing between PAD and JMAC and avoid overlap or information gaps (Theunens, 2017, p. 13)[31].

The Military Component, under the command of the Force Commander, have developed mechanisms to ensure that relevant information is reported up the chain of command to the U-2 cell. However, the current Deputy JMAC in UNMISS, LtCol Petter Vindheim (see annex B), raises concerns about the effectiveness due to communication, computer, intelligence and language deficiencies. Within the second uniformed component, the Police Division's

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[31] The possible merging of DPA and DPKO into DPO would facilitate a closer cooperation in–theatre as well as at the strategic level in New York.

Mission Management and Support Section (PD-MMSS) shall share relevant information with mission JMACs (United Nations, 2015, p. 6).

All matters relating to security and safety is the responsibility of the fielded UNDSS entity. Every mission will have a Designated Official who is the sole accountable authority in the security management arrangements. A Security Management Team (SMT) will be established in each country to facilitate this collaboration (United Nations, 2006, pp. 2-5). The SMT reports to the Designated Official who normally will be the DSRSG/RC/HC.

As when it comes to the Civilian Component, the *United Nations Country Team* (UNCT) is UN's highest level inter-agency coordination and decision-making body. The United Nations Resident Coordinator, the designated representative of the UN Secretary General, leads it. The Resident Coordinator in most missions equals the DSRSG who is dual hatted as the Humanitarian Coordinator. The UNCT drives activities at the country level and allows for all UN entities with activities in an operation "to work as a team in formulating common positions on strategic issues, ensuring coherence in action and advocacy" (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 38). Fielded UN entities coordinates with other UN entities in the field, but reports to the strategic level in accordance with their UN superstructure.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have usually a vast footprint in most multi-dimensional UN peace operations. Looking at the recent conflicts and supported by the interview with Karin Christoffersen (see annex B) NGO scarcely use OCHA to coordinate and facilitate exchange of information. NGOs mainly, if they do report anything from the field to anyone but their donors, use the online password protected *NGO-forums*. As peacebuilding starts, however, even OCHA coordinating role tends to recede into the background, and no single organization is facilitating collecting and disseminating of information. Even when data are shared, the level of detail often is not sufficient to achieve effective coordination. Furthermore, data on impacts or outcomes is exceedingly scarce (Robertson & Olson, 2012, p. 11).

NGOs operating in an UN peace operation are tied to the strains of their donors, their history in the area and local authorities. Currently, using South Sudan as an example, there are 96 national NGOs divided on more than 1323 clusters[32] and locations. There are another 107 International NGOs divided on 1811 clusters and locations[33]. This represents a massive humanitarian footprint vastly surpassing the military that is normally located in fewer locations with more troops.

UN Troops Contributing Countries (TCC) normally provide national intelligence capabilities in order to ensure the safety of their troops. Some because they do not believe the UN information gathering and safety mechanisms are sufficient to protect their troops, others because they have national interests in the region. Some countries make sure that individuals within UN missions report back to their capital concerning matters of national interest, thus making trust a major concern in many peace operations. LtCol Vindheim stated that, even within the JMAC, trust is an issue and that alternative "national lines of communication" limit the willingness to share information between civilian and military colleagues assigned to the same mission and unit.

Media and social media represent sources of information in UN peace operations as well as being a risk to the legitimacy of UN missions if troops and actions deviate from the mandate and international law.

The potential sources of information for the JMAC are many. In figure 6, the key entities mentioned are listed[34]. From the figure, however, it proves vital to report and merge information from the Humanitarian entities with the "uniformed sector" (represented by the JMAC) to create a comprehensive situational awareness.

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[32] A cluster is a UN categorization of different NGO focus areas and sectors, e.g. Food Security and Livelihoods.
[33] All numbers are retrieved from http://southsudanngoforum.org/3w/#2017 on 11 October 2017.

[34] The tactical level has not been elaborated on as it would mean going too much into details.

Figure 7: Key Information Processing Actors in UN peace operations

3.4 The JMAC concept

One of the things that makes the concept of UN intelligence an interesting object to explore is the restrictions imposed on it, primarily by the oxymoron of transparency and confidentiality. The multinational nature of the organization limits how the organization can gather, analyze and disseminate information within a mission. Furthermore, the UN Charter, particularly Article 2(7) on domestic jurisdiction, and the principles of state sovereignty, forbid the UN from collecting and analyzing information on member states and violation of their sovereignty. There is, however, an exception to this rule; chapter VII of the Charter, allowing multinational intervention. Broadly interpreted, this includes collection and analysis of relevant information with respect to threats to peace and security (Ekpe, 2007, p. 3).

Despite the obstacles deriving from the charter, the development of JOC and JMAC concepts were driven from the challenges experienced in the field. Military personnel realized

that military intelligence capabilities could not fulfil the entire information requirements of senior mission leaders. Major General Dallaire, the UN Force Commander in Rwanda during the civil war, pointed out that "it is this type of intelligence [operational] which is absolutely essential to the force commander in order to enable him to fulfil his mandate". General Dallaire furthermore argued that "the UN's primary [intelligence] requirement is for operation[al] intelligence" (Johnston, 1997, p. 8).

As Military Advisor to the Secretary General, Maj Gen Cammaert pushed the idea of a JMAC "as a central location for information to be received, analyzed, evaluated, and appropriately disseminated" (Maceda, 2007, p. 52). In late 2003, the UN's *Handbook on Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* briefly described the JMAC's purpose: "The JMAC is responsible for the management (collection, coordination, analysis and distribution of information and reports) of the mission's civil and military information in order to support the SRSG's and force commander's decision-making process" (United Nations, 2003, p. 69). The latter element is important for analyzing the performance and role of the JMAC. The UN started to form JMACs by 2005 with trial versions in ONUB (Burundi) and MONUC (Congo) (Maceda, 2007, p. 53). Because JMACs report to civilian SRSGs, civilian analysts lead the JMACs, although they may have a substantial military component. In 2006, a policy directing all missions to establish a JOC and JMAC was issued.

The JMAC concept has its origins in a military model of integration developed by NATO for the purposes of coordinating joint operations. It was developed in a policy process initially led by the military division of DPKO, with support from UNDSS and from advocates in the military and security departments. Early organization chart drafts for the JMAC envisioned a substantial and robust JMAC staffing with representatives from all relevant information and intelligence entities included in the mission (Maceda, 2007, p. 79). However, the DPKO policy directive covering JMAC depicts an integrated peacekeeping mission with liaison to the other parts of the UN, contrary to a model integrating the mission and UN funds, programs and agencies – which is the definition of 'integrated' in the Secretary-General's note of guidance of 2006 (Shetler-Jones, 2008, p. 7).

Recognizing the nature of modern UN peace operations all UN missions shall have a capacity to undertake multi-source integrated analysis and predictive assessments. Multi-dimensional peace operations shall establish a JMAC to meet these analysis requirements. In other mission

settings, the Head of Mission (HoM), in consultation with UNHQ, will determine whether the establishment of a JMAC is necessary in relation to the mission's mandate, capacities and operational environment (United Nations, 2015, p. 2).

According to the 2014 UN Force Headquarters Handbook, the JMAC generates medium to long-term integrated analytical products, providing the Head-of-Mission and Mission Leadership Team (MLT) with an in-depth "understanding of issues and trends, their implications and potential developments, as well as assessments of crosscutting issues and threats that may affect the mission's mandate implementation". Enhanced situational awareness and understanding supports the ability of senior mission leadership to identify, prevent, mitigate and respond to threats and opportunities to mandate implementation. The JMAC is not a decision-making body and does not replace existing management, command or decision-making structures at any level in the mission (DPKO & DFS, 2014, p. 15).

JMACs are entities established at Mission Headquarters level and are part of the Office of the HoM. Chief of Staff (CoS) and the Chief JMAC supports HoM in developing mission-wide instructions, setting out the mandate of the JMAC and its relationship to other mission components (United Nations, 2015, p. 3). JMACs must be able to "effectively incorporate political, civil affairs, protection, military, security, rule of law, DDR, electoral, gender, humanitarian, development, human rights, natural resources and any other mandate related perspectives in mission-wide information collection and analysis" (United Nations, 2015, p. 5).

The JMAC is normally co-located with the JOC. Whereas JOCs focus on day-to-day situational awareness, the JMAC generates integrated analysis and predictive assessments. Following the *JMAC Policy* from 2015, the work of JMACs should focus on "strategic, operational and contingency planning and it contributes to overall crisis management through the provision of integrated threat assessments and other analytical products and services" (United Nations, 2015, p. 3). However, experiences from Haiti shows that a JMAC can be successfully utilized at the tactical level to solve operational problems.

For effective mandate implementation, it is important that, from the outset, clear coordination and information exchange protocols are established within the mission, between the JMAC

and other mission components, as well as other stakeholders. The creation of an "information community" as a functional network linking the JMAC and different mission assets that contribute to providing understanding is a good practice for ensuring the efficient and effective use of resources (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2015, p. 6).

The JMAC should, according to UN policy, receive information from all components. For many reasons this has proven difficult in reality. Ramjouè presented the challenge of information flow in his 2011 article (figure 7). The JMAC has many potential source from whom they can received information, but only one body receives their reports – the Head of Mission normally the SRSG.

Figure 8: JMAC sources of information and output recipients (Ramjoué, 2011, p. 6).

The release authority of the JMAC products rests with the SRSG – a civilian with limited intelligence background that might hamper information sharing. Whereas JMAC products are usually only shared with a small number of clients, "procedures need to be put in place so that

other mission components can also benefit from the JMAC's work, and create the conditions for two way information sharing" (Theunens, 2017, p. 7).

The JMAC staffing is a mixture of military, police and civilians. A minimum number of civilian JMAC staff members in large missions provides continuity to the JMAC contrary to military and police colleagues, who are subject to 6 or 12-monthly staff rotations (Ramjoué, 2011, p. 5). A fully implemented JMAC in a UN multi-dimensional peace operation would ideally consist of individuals representing all components as well as some representatives from the UNCT. However, in reality JMAC in UN missions tend to vary in both staffing and organization[35]. Not all missions have fully implemented a JMAC, and UN missions with a sensitive political situation, like UNTSO in the Middle East, have no JMAC. Still, some commonalties in the staffing are included in a generic major configured JMAC as depicted in figure 9 below.

Figure 9: Generic JMAC Structure, source UN DPKO (2010), annexes to JMAC Guidelines

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[35] The JMAC staffing has varied from 30 in MINUSTA (Haiti), 17 in UNAMID (South Sudan), 8 in UNIFIL (Lebanon) to none in UNMIK (Kosovo).

4 UN and Intelligence – Challenges and Impact

4.1 UN and Intelligence – Experiences in South Sudan and Mali

Previous chapter provided a historical description of UN peace operations as well as Intelligence, whereas the following subchapter will provide examples and an operation specific understanding of intelligence challenges and their impacts in two ongoing UN missions; UNMISS in South Sudan and MINUSMA in Mali. These operations, in relation to UN Intelligence, have been subject to field research providing updated, relevant and detailed knowledge about the mission. Examples will provide an understanding of the key challenges the UN faces in the Intelligence domain.

South Sudan

On 9 July 2011, South Sudan became the newest country in the world, truly a multi-dimensional challenge for the UN. The birth of the Republic of South Sudan followed the culmination of a six-year peace process. The crisis, which broke out in South Sudan in December 2013, reinforced UNMISS and reprioritized its mandate.

In UNMISS, the *need to know* principle seemed to guide all parts of the organization. According to Nordlie and Lindboe the principle was seemingly issued directly from the SRSG (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017). Although sometimes a necessity, the *need to know* principle can be overemphasized, causing more harm than good. When several potential recipients of intelligence products are omitted – even those with an obvious need for the intelligence – the principle and procedures about security and classification are not helpful. The current deputy of JMAC in UNMISS confirms there are still challenges with regards to information sharing and trust both in general for the mission and internally within the JMAC. Firstly, this points to a serious cultural challenge. Secondly, it furthermore introduces a lack of adequate training of UN personnel, procedures and a robust IT- architecture, and finally the key impact the lack of trust in security mechanisms for handling of classified information between mission entities.

The *need to know* principle can lead to a system in which actors contribute with information to be processed, but receive little, if anything, in return. According to Nordli and Lindboe, recent information gained from field research in UNMISS paints a picture of information sharing mainly going upwards, and not sideways or downwards. External organizations fed their information into the JMAC, which only shared parts of its information with other entities such as political affairs and the J-2. The JMAC forward its products to the Deputy SRSG Political and the SRSG; less is shared with the rest of the MLT. (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017, pp. 22-24). Thus, UNMISS does have the need for a responsible entity to facilitate intelligence sharing at the operational level. Their findings indicate that UNMISS has;

> A need for structured intelligence processing in all of its intelligence entities. This requires competence standards (education), clearer intelligence dialogues, CCIRM, and proper use of all the information that already exists in the mission. Lastly, it requires an emphasis on a *need to share*, as well as a *need to know*. This would result in wider dissemination of products where possible and appropriate, to ensure that all possible recipients of intelligence receive the information they need to do their jobs as efficiently as possible (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017, p. 24).

Civil and military peculiarities generally discourages information sharing and co-location of military and humanitarian actors in complex emergencies. In South Sudan, contrary to this tradition and recognizing the grave security situation, some multi-mandated UN agencies have chosen to co-locate with UNMISS both in Juba and in certain state capitals (Civil-Military Advisory Group, 2013, p. 4). Information sharing between UN mission entities and the humanitarian actors is critical, but has made some important improvements. This can be related to that the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and UNMISS jointly developed "Guidelines for the Coordination between Humanitarian Actors and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan," endorsed by the HCT on 6 December 2013. This document indicates that "strategic coordination between the humanitarian community and UNMISS should be assured by the existence of a triple-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC," and that "humanitarians actors are not tasked by UNMISS, and vice versa. Taking into account different organizational approaches and mandates, the guidelines also acknowledge that;

> Coordination between humanitarian actors and UNMISS on protection of civilians (PoC) issues is essential to assure the timely two-way information exchange and early warning, consultative analysis, prioritization of geographical and thematic issues, and

distinction of activities, taking into account different organizational approaches and mandates" (International Organization for Migration South Sudan, 2016, p. 19).

A Civil-Military Advisory Group (CMAG), chaired by OCHA and attended by both humanitarian actors and relevant UNMISS sections, provides policy and operational advice on civil-military matters and UNMISS coordination issues to the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team (Civil-Military Advisory Group, 2013, p. 4). In 2013, OCHA's engagement with UNMISS took place through the Joint Operations Center (JOC) as the primary focal point at state level (Civil-Military Advisory Group, 2013, p. 4).

Mali

On 25 April 2013, the UN Security Council authorized Resolution 2100, which established *The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali* (MINUSMA). MINUSMA[36] has entered history as one of the deadliest missions in the history of United Nations (UN) and is of particular interest as it is the "first time a multidimensional peacekeeping operation has conducted operations in a theatre with on-going counter-terrorist operations" (Karlsrud, 2017b, p. 1).

Following increased pressure for UN peace operations to have greater ability to deal with the threat of targeted attacks from armed groups, the UN Secretariat in 2012 called on member states to help provide an "intelligence capacity" to MINUSMA. In response, the Netherlands and other European countries, provided the *All Sources Information Fusion Unit* (ASIFU), which is the most robust intelligence structure put in a UN mission to date (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 8). Simultaneously, the very name of this missions adds questions and confusion to what kind of chapter VII mandated operation MINUSMA is; *Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission*. As there was no peace agreement, there was no peace to keep. Does this kind of operation, a *stabilization mission*, represent a new branch of UN Peace Operations, or having in mind the inconsistency of UN terminology; are we still talking about *Peacekeeping operations*? The changing nature of UN Peace Operation requires an overarching conceptual framework to better understand the evolving nature of UN Peace

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[36] MINUSMA consisted of approximately 500 international civilians, 120 UN volunteers, over 1,000 policemen, and approximately 9,000 soldiers. The military troops originated from 41 different countries, including Europe (Denmark, France, Germany, The Netherlands), Africa (Egypt, Gambia, Niger, Senegal), and several others, including China and Bangladesh (Rietjens & Waard, 2017, p. 5).

Operations. Such a framework will have consequences for the development of UN Intelligence as the current Policy is only related to UN Peacekeeping.

In terms of practices on the ground, MINUSMA has been a laboratory for exploration and innovation in UN peace operations. When deployed, it included various capabilities for confronting asymmetric threats on the ground, drawing on Western experiences from counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations in e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq, and established the first explicit intelligence cell in a UN peacekeeping mission[37]. Due to national and classification constraints, the ASIFU did not provide UN mission leadership with all the required quantitative trend analyses, scenario-based documents, geospatial information-management tools, and network analysis, despite having the necessary tools to do so (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 23).

The ASIFU controlled many high-tech sensors, well-educated intelligence personnel, and a state-of-the-art information technology, including databases and command systems. These elements made the ASIFU a unique asset within the context of UN missions. While some political as well as military leaders believe that the ASIFU might be part of future UN peace operations, others warn that it might be controversial at best and could potentially intensify the divide among military, development, and humanitarian personnel. Moreover, integrating a high-tech intelligence capacity within a low-tech organization such as MINUSMA is likely to pose serious challenges (Rietjens & Waard, 2017, p. 4). The technological gap does not only relate to sensors, communication capabilities and databases.

To achieve the intelligence ideal, a seamless exchange of information, trained and professional intelligence operators must use standardized intelligence tools to manage and analyze information, combined with a common taxonomy to facilitate exchange and translation of information between all UN (and non) entities. However, acknowledging the challenges that NATO has in properly addressing these issues, the question is if it is realistic for the UN to aim for a seamless exchange of information. Besides cultural challenges, there are serious technological challenges that must be appropriately addressed in relation to

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[37] "An All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) is a military intelligence concept with its origins in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan" (Karlsrud, 2017b, p. 7).

collection, analysis and dissemination. The ownership of information and the national constraint imposed on information in theater is another crucial aspect that must be addressed upon defining the ambitions of intelligence in UN peace operations.

As NATO or UN missions are planned, intelligence preparations start with a baseline on which intelligence requirements, estimates and products can be planned and measured. For the UN, these could include an assessment of the warring factions' deployments, movements, and firing incidents, among others. "A clearly defined baseline provides a reference point for assessing developments in the field or the threat to peace, such as breaking a ceasefire agreement" (Ekpe, 2007, p. 17). Developing such a baseline, or according to traditional military terminology an *Order of Battle*, requires dedicated analysts prior to an operations start. A JMAC cannot be operating effectively from the start, if scrambled on an ad hoc basis once the international community blow the whistle. JMAC personnel must be trained on standardized intelligence tools and procedures must be adapted prior to each mission. Recruitment of individuals capable to understand the complex multi-dimensional environment is essential. To avoid the ad hoc nature, the JMAC would benefit significantly from having an overarching intelligence structure at the strategic level.

MINUSMA provides a very interesting example of conflicting roles, responsibility and accountability. The deployment of the ASIFU was not founded on a clear division of labor between the ASIFU and the JMAC. No formal coordination mechanisms was in place, leading to some duplication of work and optimizing conditions for personal rivalry and *turf wars*. Rivalry led the two organizations to act "on their own best interest, and cooperation developed a *quid pro quo* character". "Close ties between the first Dutch ASIFU commander and the Dutch SRSG at that time further fueled JMAC's anxiety towards ASIFU" (Rietjens & Waard, 2017, p. 20). Despite these challenges mechanisms were developed, again inspired by NATO practices, making the *Joint Coordination Board* (JCB) the main actor overseeing the intelligence cycle by synchronizing and de-conflicting requests and analysis among all components (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 24). In general, accountable leaders with incentives to act are essential to define roles and responsibilities whenever a turf war is imminent.

The ASIFU was not the only entity to which the JMAC needed structural and procedural clarifications. The JMAC and J-2 were co-located at the UN compound in Juba. The JMAC was considerably larger than the J-2, both in size and in its impact on mission decision-making. The co-location was to promote cooperation and information sharing between the two intelligence entities, but the relationship between them was characterized by a sense of rivalry. According to Nordli and Lindboe, informants from both the J-2 and the JMAC confirmed that the JMAC maintained a database of information that was continuously updated, but not shared with J-2. One interviewee stated that "the J-2 and the JMAC are only partly able to bridge the gap between the tactical and the strategic level of the conflict." In practice, the J-2 dealt with what could be described as the tactical level of intelligence, whilst the JMAC focused on the strategic level, leaving the operational level of intelligence in peril of marginalization. (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017, p. 21).

A range of recipients of intelligence, including personnel within the civil affairs division, UN department of safety and security, political affairs, the military column and a number of UN programs, had limited access to products from the J-2 and the JMAC. Common to all was" a conviction that they ought to receive more, particularly from the JMAC. The JMAC's products were not even shared with all members of the MLT – they were tailored for every recipient" (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017, p. 23). Lack of information sharing procedures at the operational level as well as intelligence culture are important take-away from Nordli and Lindboe regarding UN intelligence challenges.

OCHA coordinated information sharing with humanitarian actors, and the J-2 was allowed to send a representative to coordination meetings. One attendee from the J2 described: "Some of them are very willing to provide us with information. We try to build trust and relationships in these settings." Interviewees further stressed the informal way on how information was received – commonly not through structured channels or processes. One interviewee noted that: "the system works as long as it does not work as intended. [I]nformation collection and product dissemination is mostly done through informal channels that are reliant on personal relations." (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017, p. 22).

The enforcement of *need to know* principle is often necessary for a number of reasons, including the need to protect the source of the original information or the need to protect

future operations including force personnel (Dorn, 1999). This is particularly relevant to tactical intelligence products, where handling specific names and identities is inevitable. However, "the *need to know* is less relevant for operational and strategic level intelligence products such as analysis of conflict drivers and population sentiments". This is because such analysis products are easy to *sanitize* by omitting specific names of sources and other specific information which is likely to be less relevant at the operational and strategic level (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017, p. 28).

Frustrating, especially for military officers[38], is the absence of intelligence procedures in UN missions and the JMAC. Western intelligence methodology developed with the experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan is not used systematically. Lacking systematic forms of information collection results in a situation whereby having information does not necessarily result in its use. This is because information sharing based on personal relationships may lead to irregular intelligence production. Findings indicate that this may represent one of the great challenges concerning the access to information in UNMISS today – using what is already freely available in a systematic manner aligned with good intelligence procedures (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017, p. 22).

Furthermore, OSINT proved a very promising intelligence tool worth investing in. Not only for the OSINT team, but for most of the sensors, cultural competencies and language skills turned out to be very important. The extent to which the ASIFU's analysts and operators mastered these varied considerably. In many cases, soldiers lacked awareness of the complexity of the conflict, the history of Mali, and the ethnic sensitivities involved (Rietjens & Waard, 2017, p. 16).

4.2 UN Peace Operations Intelligence - Summary Challenges and Impact

Focusing on intelligence in the most recent UN mission, represented by Mali and South Sudan, some key challenges with various impact on UN Intelligence capability stand out.

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[38] Deputy JMAC confirmed that the logical sequence from Priority Intelligence Requirements cascading into Specific Intelligence Requirements, and then Essential Elements of Information is lacking.

Table 3 summarizes the key challenges and the impacts of UN and JMAC intelligence challenges as discussed in chapter 4.1. The findings found the basis for chapter 5 that will investigate if the JMAC can succeed in mitigating UN intelligence challenges.

Table 3: UN Peace Operation Intelligence Key Challenges and Impact

Intelligence Key Challenges		Impact
1	Lack of Authority and responsibility	High
2	National constraint	High
3	Rivalry and "turf wars"	Medium
4	Intelligence methodology and ethics	Medium
5	Collection capabilities	Medium
6	Open Source Intelligence	Medium
7	Standardization of Intelligence tools	High
8	Strategic Intelligence Analysis	High
9	Intelligence profession	High
10	Intelligence Culture	High
11	Information sharing procedures	Medium
12	Security and classification	High
13	Cooperation with non UN entities	Medium

5 UN Peace Operation Intelligence Challenges – JMAC Limitations or Possibilities

5.1 Introduction

"The United Nations has no intelligence", UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali memorably noted following the organization's operation in the Balkans in 1993. However, the "evolving responsibilities of the United Nations in peace operations have led to periodic consideration of its capacity to gather, or at least receive, intelligence" (Chesterman, 2006, p. 4).

Throughout literature and this paper, there is a clear sense of a widening gap between what is being asked of UN peace operations today and what they are able to deliver[39]. This gap can be – must be – narrowed to ensure that the Organization's peace operations are able to respond effectively and appropriately to the challenges to come (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 7).

In chapter 4, the key challenges of UN Intelligence in peace operations have been detailed. Following these findings, this chapter will investigate how and the likelihood that the JMAC, according to UN documents and practices, can succeed in mitigating the challenges. The *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle* will frame the discussion as to what extent the JMAC is able to mitigate these challenges.

5.2 Tasking (Direction)

Lack of Authority and responsibility

Critical in any multinational and military organizations are regulations concerning accountability and responsibility. The first element of the *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle* is tasking and the need to provide direction to the mission intelligence structure. According to *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy*, the Head of Mission is " ultimately accountable to the Secretary-General, through the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations for the mission's execution of the peacekeeping intelligence cycle" (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 13). Considering the close ties that the UN Country Team entities have with their New York offices and the different mandates as well as funding mechanisms, the Head of Mission in UN missions has more of a coordinating and facilitating role than managing a common unity of effort.

To better support the members of the UN country team, the 2003 Handbook states that the SRSG should "be informed of their priorities, identify complementarities, draw upon their expertise and work that knowledge supporting the overall political strategy". The SRSG can support the agencies, and the UN agencies can provide the SRSG with "in-depth knowledge

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[39] The Secretariat currently manages 13 sanctions regimes, 16 peacekeeping operations, and nine special political missions, and there are 131 UN country teams delivering humanitarian and development assistance in 161 countries (Willmot, 2017, p. 25).

of the local situation and their vast networks of local contacts and may implement important elements of the mandate, such as humanitarian and developmental assistance" (United Nations, 2003, p. 17). However, for various reasons accountability and responsibility remain a challenge.

As the entity, on behalf of the Head of Mission, responsible for collating information in peacekeeping missions, the JMAC knows that when they request UN entities for information they are imposing on their time. The JMAC has "historically had little beyond their thanks to offer in return, save the hopeful notion that the benefit of wiser integrated management decisions will trickle down" (Shetler-Jones, 2008, p. 7). The 2015 UN JMAC Policy addresses this issue as " all mission components, in particular relevant analytical entities, shall put in place mechanisms to share timely and accurate information with the JMAC to enable the production of its integrated analysis and predictive assessments" (United Nations, 2015, p. 3). A commitment by all actors to contribute toward the achievement of common objectives is fundamental, but it does not arise naturally, and "building it requires trust and managers understanding and commitment" (Shetler-Jones, 2008, p. 7).

At the very heart of this discussion, acknowledging that intelligence is interactive and must be integrated in operation, Johnston claimed that intelligence must be able to task collection assets (Johnston, 1997, p. 6). Even though the JMAC Policy makes a giant leap in ensuring that the JMAC can receive information and provide a comprehensive analysis and support the Mission Leadership, there are no mechanisms to ensure a transformation from asking to tasking. However, there are exceptions; In MINUSTAH (Haiti) the JMAC had authority to "task the tactical elements of the mission though these units had limited intelligence collection skills" (Gentry, 2010, p. 27). Unless the UN can define a central authority, both at the operational and strategic level, with clear responsibility, authority and accountability, coherent UN efforts involving intelligence would prove extremely challenging (Willmot, 2017, p. 61).

So where does this leave the JMAC? The JMAC is furthermore identified as the hub for operational intelligence. The *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy* and the *JMAC Policy* only encourage cooperation between various UN components. This is however a one dimensional perspective on UN intelligence. Haidi Willmot just recently investigated the UN capability to

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provide a comprehensive situational awareness in UN peace operations. Willmot findings indicate, knowing the UN system for years, that "existing situational awareness entities are not joined up into a coherent whole. Although interagency decision-making and coordination fora exist, they are seldom fed by systematically gathered and analyzed information. There is no overarching framework pulling the system together, harnessing the information". "Responsibilities are diffuse and accountability unclear" (Willmot, 2017, p. 14 and 61). Willmot`s brutal verdict of UN capability to gather and process information, indicates that there is a critical need to ensure a "line of command" concerning all matters relating to intelligence from the tactical to the strategic level. The UN cannot jeopardize Intelligence falling into an abyss of uncertainty and fractured responsibility.

UN Policy states that the head of Mission is responsible for the functioning of UN intelligence system in a mission. Abilova and Novosseloff claim that one of the main obstacles to a functioning intelligence cycle in UN peace operations is that senior leadership is unaware of the intelligence capabilities at its disposal. They are not trained or practiced in giving intelligence direction, or unwilling or unable to improve coordination among different structures (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 15). Thus, to address the root causes, there are convincing arguments why the JMAC cannot fully address the challenges relating to authority and responsibility at the operational level without a robust, responsible and accountable strategic intelligence entity.

National constraints

UN member states have repeatedly imposed informal caveats with the full knowledge of UN Headquarters, through their Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). MOUs tend to limit national contingents and what operations they will undertake. Units sometimes have to make the limitations clear to the Force Commander "often leading to a restrictive interpretation of their rules of engagement" (Guehenno & Sherman, 2009, p. 6). This confined motivation to contribute in UN peace operations equals the national caveats we find in NATO operations for the last 25 years. Any proposals to enhance the capacity of international organizations to use intelligence must therefore be tempered by the reality that "most states' participation in such organizations is geared more towards gathering intelligence than sharing it" (Chesterman, 2006, p. 4).

Transparency is a major obstacle to effective UN intelligence (Maceda, 2007, p. 9). In the Security Council, the five permanent members continue to look to each other and their own intelligence networks for "the truth", which they consider more reliable and less sanitized than information from the Secretariat. The remaining ten elected members of the Council generally do not have extensive intelligence networks, and thus rely heavily on the Secretariat for information and analysis to be able to participate actively in Council decision-making. "Security Council members not only need better information and analysis from the Secretariat, but they need it to be more frank and timely to effectively inform their decisions" (Willmot, 2017, p. 28).

To better understand national caveats, it is important to analyze the situation from the perspective of the nations. Eriksson provides an example; the intelligence requirements, as determined by the UN system, are not always accepted by the national contingents. A government may "interpret the mandate differently, a contingent may wish to avoid disputes with one of the parties involved in the conflict, or control by foreigners may be unacceptable to the contingent in question". A national contingent commander could occasionally decide that the UN's intelligence is insufficient for the safety of the unit and initiate independent intelligence operations (Eriksson, 1997, p. 7). Recent experiences from Mali, in which the Norwegian contingent commander, as holder of the red flag posed limitation on the use of the Norwegian C-130 aircrafts to the dismay of the Force Commander, serve as an example of the challenging middle ground between security concerns for national troops and upholding the UN mandate.

Occasionally, troop-contributing countries may have interests and ties that go against the explicit aims of the operation. "Such nations will hesitate to supply the operation with any intelligence and nor will they wish to see efficient G2/S2 cells or units" (Eriksson, 1997, p. 6). However, the institutionalization of JMACs is due in part to the proven need for operational intelligence, and an acceptance on the part of member states that a mission-level JMAC does not threaten sovereignty. A JMAC is, according to policy, established after the mission has started and operations focus on the mission area. The natural limitations of the JMAC area and tasks prevent neighboring countries with interests fearing that the JMAC "spying" on them. The sovereignty principle as we know from the Peace of Westphalia and from the UN

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Charter is a key obstacle to improve the overall ability of the UN to perform intelligence functions in support of peace operations. Hence, intelligence provides "the underpinnings of force protection, which is a key factor in military deployment decisions, especially among casualty-averse Western states" (Maceda, 2007, p. 61).

The UN has legitimate concerns about sharing information with external actors while maintaining the independence of its own system. However, it can do this while being open to the receipt of information from a diverse range of partners and nations. The UN should be open to receiving intelligence from any member state willing to share, but there should not be undue dependence upon it, and the information should be evaluated in the same manner as any other (Willmot, 2017, p. 64). " Irrespective of this dichotomy, information sharing by member states continues to be determined by national considerations rather than the information needs of the UN" or the JMAC (Theunens, 2017, p. 2). Based upon the recent experiences with intelligence in NATO operations, there are obvious reasons why nations will remain pivotal to information sharing.

Western nations consider it absurd to send troops to a sensitive area without the capability to analyze the situation properly. They furthermore cooperate in unofficial "clubs," often founded on traditional alliances. "Membership" is earned by proof of the ability to contribute with useful information and capability for handling the information in a responsible way. Intelligence sometimes functions as a form of currency – a fungible item that may be exchanged for other intelligence. The value of any currency, however, depends on its scarcity (Chesterman, 2006, p. 13). The exchange of information and the release authority of operational and sometimes tactical intelligence is often retained at the national and strategic level. The interrelationship between tactical capabilities and national strategic analysis capabilities has sometimes prevented tactical units from contributing with relevant information for the good of the mission. This poses challenges for the JMAC at the operational level knowing that national strategic intelligence is exchanged between national intelligence services. Exchange of strategic intelligence in UN peace operations could be more adequately addressed with a strategic UN "intelligence body" that can canalize and facilitate information sharing between national intelligence services.

The nations, not the UN, are dictating the ambitions relating to intelligence. Intelligence is a matter of national concern at the strategic level. This is the main reason why nations have been reluctant to allow a strategic capability of the UN. Contradictory, the same nations are the ones not enabling the UN to have a strategic intelligence entity that can "connect the dots". The JMAC challenges of national caveats and sharing of intelligence is thus something that needs to be addressed at the strategic level in the UN and cannot be solved in isolation by introducing a operational concept, which is what the JMAC and *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy* is.

Rivalry and "turf wars"

> JMAC produced 'target packages' with the required information for precision operations and quick arrests. One target was a gangster, Zachari, who had killed two Jordanian peacekeepers in November 2006. The JMAC target package included detailed maps showing the positions of tables, doors, kitchen and staff in that restaurant (Gentry, 2010, p. 23).

Every UN peace operation is unique in the sense that people, ethnicities, land and environment differ. Above Gentry provides a detailed and somewhat different description on the role and task of the JMAC in Haiti. The description is supported by Berdal and Ucko claiming that the JMAC was able to develop actionable tactical as well as operational intelligence. JMAC intelligence "proved critical to destroying the 'gang structures' in Port-au-Prince" (Berdal & Ucko, 2014, p. 6) much resembling the way Special Forces utilize intelligence[40]. Targeted individuals and target packs, though the operations had strategic value for the mission, is different from the intended use of a JMAC emphasizing on a predictive, forward-looking, comprehensive and operational capability.

According to Shetler Jones, JMAC's mandate is ambiguous because "UN policy is unclear about whether a JMAC's primary focus is on (1) mission security, (2) operational planning, or (3) long-term strategic mission planning" (Rietjens & Waard, 2017, p. 3). Shelter Jones provided his insight 7 years prior to the JMAC Policy publication. Rietjens and Waard forget to mention, that, though the Policy does not prioritize between the three focus areas listed

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[40] The JMAC in Haiti was supported by US intelligence capabilities and the chief JMAC was a former CIA operative according to professor Sarah-Myriam Martin Brulè at the JMAC course in Oslo 12-17 November 2017. Brulè is currently drafting the JMAC Field handbook that will be published in January 2018.

above, they are all covered. Having in mind that all UN missions are different, a JMAC Policy might benefit by leaving it to the MLT and chief JMAC to tailor how the JMAC should support and prioritize in UN peace operations.

During the MINUSTAH operation, UN faced an unprecedented luxury that also proved to be a challenge; two competing intelligence capabilities. The ASIFU supported troop contributions from "the countries that ski"[41] with recent experiences from Afghanistan provided a substantial intelligence contribution. According to Theunens, both the ASIFU and the JMAC would have benefitted from a better differentiation between information sharing, division of labor and tasking. A traditional division of labor between strategic, operational and tactical levels proved "counter-productive as these levels are most often closely intertwined in contemporaneous (asymmetric) conflict environments, and events or incidents can easily change dimension in the course of their development" (Theunens, 2017, p. 17). Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch have described malfunctions, which can arise when two separate organizational units focus their activities on the same task and environment; competitive clashes, redundancy of effort, and poor coordination. Given their overlapping task-settings and complementary features, Rietjens and Waard recommended to merge the JMAC and ASIFU into a single organizational entity (Rietjens & Waard, 2017, p. 21). Furthermore, looking at the way the UN have organized their situational awareness, information sharing and intelligence capabilities at the operational and strategic level there is a clear resemblance to a matrix organization. The bureaucratic rivalry – the turf wars - between UN entities can, maybe, be tracked back to Lawrence and Lorsch`s malfunctions.

In 2016 Abilova and Novosseloff stated that the "UN already has some of the right tools in place, whether at headquarters or in field missions, but it lacks the framework and mindset to use these tools in a cohesive and coordinated manner". To achieve this comprehensiveness, they claimed, the UN needed a proper intelligence doctrine. They underlined that the doctrine should not only be for the military components of missions but for "UN missions as a whole" (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 28). The current UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy recognize and describe the need to liaison with non-mission entities for the purposes of sharing intelligence and that participating UN mission entities shall make use of standardized

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[41] Interview with John Karlsrud. «Countries that ski» equals western and developed countries that differ from «the barefoot countries" being the developing countries.

tools to enhance interoperability. There are however technological and cultural "bridges to cross".

UN leadership should urge the various entities dealing with information analysis to share their products to overcome unfruitful *turf wars*. Willmot goes as far as to suggest that all UN officials should be evaluated to what extent they are capable to cooperate with relating UN entities (Willmot, 2017, p. 56). Another option to improve coordination could be to go back to the Brahimi Report's recommendation "to collect all UN structures dealing with analysis on the thirty-eighth floor of the UN building" (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 28).

There is a fundamental difference between the passive information gathering to ensure situational awareness and understanding in a Chapter VI setting, and covert information collection that could be confused with espionage, in peace enforcement/making settings (Theunens, 2017, p. 7). Should UN Intelligence only address Peacekeeping Operations? Theunens supports Abilova and Novosseloff addressing the need for an all-encompassing UN Intelligence policy. As recent UN peace operations indicate, peacekeeping operations, though still the main UN peace mission operation, is a limited one dimensional approach to UN and Intelligence. Intelligence is needed in all branches of UN peace operations. A policy should describe UN intelligence ranging from political missions to peace enforcement, from the tactical to the strategic level and finally, yet importantly, define information sharing tasks and responsibilities for all actors taking part in the multi-dimensional missions. Hopefully, the current policy can be seen as one step in this direction.

Whether UN peace operations that have a JMAC should maintain a separate U2 could be debated. TCCs providing staff to JMAC, in addition to U2 and national intelligence liaison elements, TCCs are likely to give priority to their national assets, to the detriment of the U2, making it more difficult for the U2 to provide a meaningful contribution. If the U2 and JMAC are integrated as one team, cross-fertilization between experienced civilian JMAC analysts and their uniformed counterparts will be greatly enhanced[42] (Theunens, 2017, p. 13). Instead of the JMAC, in addition to U2 and other UN entities monitoring (social) media in an

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[42] Theunens claims that a fusion of the military intelligence branch would improve military intelligence as it would reduce the learning time for uniformed personnel and mitigating the impact of high rotation rates.

uncoordinated manner, "a coordinated approach would allow all to rely on each other's experience and expertise" (Theunens, 2017, p. 13).

Expanding on Theunens concern, the co-location argument addresses the initial and conceptual JMAC discussion of centralization versus de-centralization. Should the UN peace operation actors provide staffing to the JMAC and hence reduce their influence to a body designed to serve the HoM, or should the JMAC rely on the actors to provide and forward information to the JMAC? To centralize the JMAC organization would require de-centralizing of information, thus vastly enhancing vertical and horizontal distribution of intelligence. This would make the JMAC more of an intelligence hub at the operational level, contrary to its current perceived role as an "advisor entity" of the SRSG.

Nations have concerns towards an UN Intelligence capability, as do UN entities in relation to how tasks and responsibilities should be managed. The rivalry, *turf wars* and internal bureaucratic resistance within UN entities does not serve the interest of optimizing UN Intelligence. Within missions, individuals or components may wish to be the ones to have the "exclusive" report on a particular event or issue. Actors outside the mission may resist sharing information with political and/or security actors, out of concern for jeopardizing their operations and the security of their beneficiaries and personnel. "UN entities can easily hamper information sharing and hide behind different funding mechanisms, procedures, mandates and lack of strategic unity of effort" (Willmot, 2017, p. 26). UN intelligence requires leadership and incentives to establish mechanisms to enhance inter-departmental cooperation above the JMAC and the operational level.

5.3 Acquisition

Intelligence methodology and ethics

Providing information about threats to peace and information gathering has always been at the core of UN peace operations. There are several potential Intelligence sources in UN missions. Media and NGOs have already been identified and represent a potential source of information. Furthermore, TCCs are normally an important actor providing integrated tactical as well as independent strategic capabilities. Within the TCCs and their military component there is a variety of possibilities – counter battery radars, tactical signals intelligence,

convoys, patrols, OPs, key leadership engagement and engagement with population (Maceda, 2007, p. 12). Intelligence resources are normally scarce and must be optimized to cover MLTs priorities.

Hugh Smith, of the Australian Defence Force Academy's University College Department of Politics, in 1994 demonstrated the need for an institutionalized intelligence function at UN Headquarters and in the field. According to Smith, "UN intelligence must be collected openly, and will probably become public knowledge sooner rather than later" (Maceda, 2007, p. 7). Dorn provides an important contribution to understand the complexity of UN information gathering activities. He presents information-gathering activities in a matrix ranging from prohibited (black) to permitted (white). Visual observation and public information are both clearly within what Dorn describes as the *white* area, whereas wiretapping and bribery are both within the *black* category. In-between there is a *grey* area where important legal, political, ethical and military aspects must be carefully balanced in order to prevent jeopardizing the consent of the parties. The mandate, available intelligence capabilities and the operational environment form the basis for the Peacekeeping Intelligence Support Plan (PKISP).

The PKISP describes "acceptable and unacceptable tools, techniques and procedures of peacekeeping intelligence acquisition by the mission, applicable legal obligations, and considerations that shall be undertaken when acquiring intelligence, based on the assets available to the mission and in line with operational guidance" (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 5). The PKISP is developed at the strategic level, but to what extent will it be publicly available to the factions? Transparency has traditionally been important in UN peace operations, but revealing the techniques and procedures of intelligence gathering is contradictory to intelligence culture and practice. Protection of intelligence gathering capabilities and sources are at the very core of Western Intelligence culture.

On several occasions, the ethics of UN information gathering activities has been in conflict with the methodology used at the tactical and operational level. The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) - focused on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction disarmament in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. Though not a peacekeeping mission;

It was the most intrusive information gathering operation in UN history. UNSCOM's mandate allowed it to interrogate Iraqi officials, perform intrusive, unannounced site inspections, and use its own aircraft to patrol anywhere in the country. The mission incorporated personal on-site inspections with high-tech collection including signals intelligence, and electronic surveillance (Dorn, 2003, p. 353).

Following the UNSCOM experience Dorn proposed some general rules to prevent overly aggressive intelligence gathering;

First, the UN should preferably not use deception in its information gathering. Second, the UN should be open to receiving information from defectors, but should not be encouraging them. Third, signals intelligence should be used only to the extent justified by the mandate. Forth, and finally, while the UN nay retain secrets, it should not make secret agreements with governments, especially the inspected state (Dorn, 2003, p. 370).

The UN generally does not need covert information because it rarely conducts targeted operations. Throughout history, UN missions have used informants and intercepted communications contrary to the recommendations by Dorn. UNSCOM is one example, UN mission in Congo another as Swedish troops used signal intelligence to support the tactical level. Interception of radio waves does not obey national borders and could potentially be used to listen not only to peace process spoilers but also to the host government and other troop-contributing countries or mission personnel. This could open a Pandora's box and increase mistrust among TCCs. (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 18). The political, reputational, and legitimacy costs of the UN aggressively collecting intelligence through communication interception, covert action, and informant networks would be extremely high (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 25). However, though tactical signal intelligence is not needed in traditional peacekeeping mission, it will severely enhance the capability to protect UN troops in what the paper refers to as *peace enforcement* operations. Thus, intelligence capabilities, methods and ethics must be discussed in the context of what kind of UN peace operation it supports.

Decision-makers primarily need information that gives them a comprehensive understanding covering all aspects of the operational environment. "The parties' perceptions and intentions are more important than their capabilities" (Theunens, 2017, p. 3). This understanding will not be defined in New York and will normally be subject to a bottom-up reporting and

understanding. In most 21st century UN peace operations, this understanding will be more effectively provided following the engagement of locals. As several peace operations cover a vast territory, having access to a dispersed population is difficult. Considering the vast areas involved, this cannot be done by the military component alone. Thus, information gathering and intelligence must include all mission entities in which the military is probably the least important one.

Furthermore, it can be challenging to identify representatives who genuinely speak on behalf of local people. Sometimes there is a tendency to engage with a small network of people, who speak English or French and use jargon familiar to the international community, but who may not represent their community. Finally, peace operations' engagement with civil society organizations may raise concerns with the host government unless these relationships are carried out with transparency (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 65).

The JMAC is partly capable of addressing challenges relating to intelligence methodology and ethics to ensure interoperability and an efficient collection of information. The PKISP, defining and limiting the JMAC and collection capabilities, is developed prior to the establishment and deployment of a UN mission. If the situation deteriorates, the JMAC would rely on the strategic level to enhance intelligence capabilities. However, chief JMAC is responsible to comply within the existing PKISP and defines to what extent intelligence methodology is used within the JMAC.

Collection capabilities

The prospects of the United Nations developing an independent intelligence-collection capacity are remote. Whenever intelligence activity of any kind is authorized, it tends to be within narrowly defined parameters (Chesterman, 2006, p. 4). John R. Bolton thinks that it even would be a mistake to allow the UN to develop its own intelligence gathering capability. He claims there is enough open source information generated within the UN system, by NGOs in the field, and by the UN's own people. However, that information is not currently brought together and analyzed for purposes of looking ahead and anticipating problems. Some

even claim that the UN would suffice with open-source information and selective requests for classified data from member nations (Lilland, 2001, p. 15).

In a peace operation, "every peacekeeper is a potential intelligence collector". With easy access to the conflict area and extensive interaction with the local population, peacekeepers are well positioned to gather intelligence about troop movements and cross-border or inter-group incidents (Maceda, 2007, p. 50). The UN deploys tens of thousands of staff, many of whom have valuable cultural and linguistic skills and who become privy to information through their daily interactions with local communities and political actors. This information is particularly "rich because of the wide geographical scope of the collection, that UN staff members are stationed in remote villages accessible only by foot or helicopter, and because it is gathered by a variety of staff, from human rights monitors to military observers". In this respect, UN information gathering capabilities represent a potential, whereas human and technical problems hamper information management and analysis that could "transform the streams of, more or less, raw data into actionable intelligence" (Ramjoué, 2011, p. 3).

The best information often comes from communities themselves. To avail themselves of this information, missions must build relationships of trust with local people, leading to more effective delivery of protection of civilian mandates and better protection for peacekeepers. Improved two-way communication strategies with communities are essential to understand their needs, to convey the limits of UN capabilities and to provide information to the civilian population (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015, p. 25). As soon as the first body bag arrives in any western capital, however, this perspective becomes theoretical, and the troops confine themselves behind gates or armored vehicles.

The preponderance of the civil affairs UN components is their interaction with the locals. It enables them to gather information on, monitor, analyze and report about a range of issues. Even organizing and training the locals have proved a significant force multiplier (Hough, 2007, p. 11). "They can contribute to a comprehensive understanding of conflict drivers, perceptions of the mission, mandate and the peace process, institutional capacities and gaps as well as the political relationship between the center and the periphery". The information that

is gathered and analyzed by civil affairs may contribute to baseline data on the country or feed into reports (Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, 2012, p. 140).

A crucial step toward enhancing intelligence capabilities is to shift from a culture of undervaluing routine patrols for collecting information and interacting with the local population, to one where human intelligence is viewed as critical to protecting civilians and UN personnel. "This is particularly needed in volatile environments where missions risk "bunkerization" for fear of casualties, instead of more proactively seeking information needed for their protection" (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 17).

At the tactical level, battalions rarely gather, process, and write up quality assessments, such as: patrol debriefs; minutes from meetings with local farmers and tribal leaders; after-action reports from civil affairs officers; and translated summaries of local radio broadcasts that influence the local.

> This vast and underappreciated body of information, almost all of which is unclassified, admittedly offers few clues about where to find insurgents, but it does provide elements of even greater strategic importance – a map for leveraging popular support and marginalizing the insurgency itself (Flynn, Pottinger, & Batchelor, 2010, p. 7).

Information gathering in a counterinsurgency differs from information gathering in a conventional war. In a conventional conflict, ground units depend heavily on intelligence from higher commands to help them navigate the *fog of war*. Satellites and spy planes controlled by people far from the battlefield inform ground units about the strength, location, and activity of the enemy before the ground unit even arrives. Information flows largely from the top down. In a counterinsurgency, Flynn claims, the flow should be reversed. The "soldier or development worker on the ground is usually the person best informed about the environment and the enemy" (Flynn et al., 2010, p. 12).

Flynn`s approach is based upon the understanding that the population is the *center of gravity* in a peace operation and population-centric information thus should be the focus of information gathering. In large, this population-centric information is in the open domain or available from other mission components, i.e. anyone in the mission who interacts with the

local population. Hence, properly coordinated Key Leader Engagement (KLE), including recording, archiving, and analysis (and sharing of the latter) of the information gathered through any interaction with members of local communities is important to enhance the institutional ability to understand the operational environment.

"The implications for the future are clear: the more complex, fluid and dynamic the peace support context, arguably the more Humint oriented the supporting intelligence architecture must become" (Rudner, 2003, p. 386). However, UN peace operations must be careful to leave interaction with the local population to specially trained Humint units. Interaction with the locals in the mission area should be a focus for all components in UN peace operations. Furthermore, interaction prevents alienating and distancing the UN force from the very population they are mandated to protect.

Besides people, intelligence gathering require technology and modern sensors. Soldiers from various nations now routinely deploy to UN missions with their national night vision equipment, which varies greatly in capacity between contingents.

> Aerial reconnaissance using digital cameras is [.....] increasingly common and proving to be an invaluable form of observation. In several missions, forward-looking infrared (FLIR) cameras have been deployed on helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. Other technologies remain desperately needed in UN field missions to enable effective early warning and proactive peacekeeping (Dorn, 2010, p. 279).

When launching the surveillance drone capability for MONUSCO, Under- Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous said that UN peacekeeping finally "entered the 21st century." Strategic mission assets such as helicopters and surveillance drones can be under the control of the military component in high-risk environments. Looking ahead, the redeployment of NATO troops from Afghanistan can pave the way for an increase in available high-tech intelligence capabilities. The UN can "offer Western member states theaters where troops can continue to deploy and maintain their capacities and capabilities, and UN peace operations can become an arena for sharing of experiences between traditional and new TCCs" (Karlsrud, 2017a, p. 284). But, as UN most likely will never have intelligence gathering capabilities, it is critical that the UN is able to fuse information from national high tech capabilities into UN

information management systems. Experiences from UNMISS[43], in which one nation provided satellite images to the mission, explains the delicate nature as TCC having direct access to information about varying factions which other government actively suppress.

In theater, the JMAC is limited to whatever the TCCs decide to bring to the mission especially in relation to high-tech sensors. Thus, more importantly is an enhanced JMAC cooperation and alignment of efforts with civilian entities to benefit from all UN entities scattered around in the mission area. As professor Sarah-Myriam Martin Brulè[44] stated, the JMAC can and must "foster a collaborative environment". The latter will, among other things, require in-theater training, agreed procedures and standardized information management tools to ensure information sharing of "sanitize-able" information and situational awareness in line with the "information community" that the *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy* describes.

Open Source Intelligence

The agents for information gathering and sharing are changing swiftly and a tremendous source of information comes from the Internet, social media and new forms of information technology. The UN "are currently developing *Diplomatic Pulse*, a tool to help to monitor official, open-source government information online. By the use of new data visualization techniques the aim is to make better use of the open-source data" (UN Secretary General, 2015b, p. 6). Open source data represents an enormous source of information, but unless analyzed by tools and trained individuals with local in-depth knowledge and language skills, inadequate analysis and wrong conclusion might be the result.

By combining open sources and the information generated by the sources currently available to the UN, there is probably enough information to provide whatever intelligence the UN needs. Twenty years after Johnston prediction, the amount of information has grown exponentially, the conclusion however, is still valid; "The primary requirement is to organize this so that it can be properly processed to produce the finished intelligence that the UN and its peacekeepers need" (Johnston, 1997, pp. 7-8). In 2014 Flynn stated that "we create as

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[43] Interview with Col. Petter Lindquist (see annex B).
[44] JMAC course in Oslo from 12 – 17 november.

much information in an hour today as we could download in all of 2004" (Theunens, 2017, p. 11)[45].

OSINT is by definition unclassified and can be shared with all troop contributing countries and non-governmental organizations. "While a modern, high-tech military operation will require more than OSINT can deliver, perhaps 80 percent of all information on any given problem is available from open sources, and at relatively low cost" (Maceda, 2007, p. 83). Estimates of the proportion of US intelligence derived from non-classified, publicly available sources ranges from 40 to 95 per cent, although a commonly accepted figure is 80 per cent. While the balance between classified and non-classified material is difficult to quantify precisely, for many subjects there is little doubt that OSINT is at least as important as classified intelligence. As Google's John Hanke put it; "ten years ago, this technology was the exclusive province of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Five years ago, it cost $14,000 for a single image. Now there's free, global high-resolution imagery"(Maceda, 2007, p. 88).

One of the strengths of social media is that it can provide near real time situational awareness of unfolding events. The traditional analytical craft of evaluation of the information, as demonstrated during the US Presidential Election in 2016, remains extremely important when it comes to social media. They can also be a vital source of information for humanitarian organizations in case of natural disasters. Social media is used by activists to disseminate their views and mobilize supporters. Statistics concerning the use of social media can provide a unique insight into the degree of influence activists or others have on public opinion, including the traction gained by calls for civil unrest or other mobilization.

With immense open-source information resources at its fingertips, UN headquarters has the potential to do good analysis, if only it could muster the political will to institutionalize the practice (Maceda, 2007, p. 9). OSINT can either be centralized at the strategic level, as suggested by Maceda, or decentralized at region or country level. A clear delineation about responsibility between UN entities should, in any case, be developed at all levels to avoid duplication of effort. Maceda recommended that OSINT could be used as a door opener for

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[45] In 2015, every minute, 3.3 million posts were added on Facebook; 422,340 tweets recorded on Twitter; 44.4 million messages sent via Whatsapp; 2.05 million e-mails sent; 55,555 pictures uploaded on Instagram; 400 hours of video uploaded on Youtube.

information gathering and analysis at the strategic level. Simultaneously, OSINT represents an opportunity for the JMAC at the operational level with marginal cost. However, OSINT is optimized when analyzed by trained people, adequate software and with a regional and country specific understanding.

5.4 Collation and Examination

Standardization of intelligence tools

In December 2015, the United Nations and the Government of Singapore[46] signed a Memorandum of Understanding to collaborate on the development of an information management tool in support of UN peacekeeping operations. The aim was to enhance situational awareness, enable trend analysis and early warning capacities in field missions. This is aligned with *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy* stating that " participating mission entities shall make use of standardized tools for the collation of data, including common databases, taxonomies and planned indexing and menus" (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2017, p. 6). A UN tailored information management tool is a giant leap in the right direction and the cooperation between UN and a member state is unique, as this will most likely involve an extensive information sharing capability. The overall aim of the MOU can, for structural, procedural or technical reasons, be challenging to realize.

The MOU can enable the UN to provide systems, much aligned with Lute`s recommendation from 2014 and the High Level Panel`s recommendation to provide "relevant and substantive training to field missions, improved internal information sharing, electronic records management and achieve data liquidity" (Lute, Bager, Dorn, Fryer, & Guha, 2014, p. 69). However, having UN *turf wars* in mind, it is important to underline that the information management project must be multi-dimensional in nature both when it comes to funding, support, development and use. This must be a project for the whole of UN and the signing of the MOU by the DPKO Under-Secretary should not allow increased resilience by UN entities in fear of "loosing" influence. Thus, all UN entities must be involved as functionality, taxonomy and reporting is developed.

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[46] The MOU was signed by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous, and Ambassador, Karen Tan, of Singapore.

The cooperation could provide an UN Peace Operation software platform that can facilitate exchange of information horizontally and vertically. Ideally, information-sharing standards should be developed so that all data is automatically interoperable, regardless of origin, language or security classification. Regardless of technology, the human factors will still require that trained operators on software and standards are dedicated to populate the database. Sometimes nations do provide information coming directly from national developed software with different taxonomy and sometimes even in the form of pdf documents. Without any conversion tool the information will be useless for language or taxonomy constraints unless it is loaded by hand into databases, which will severely slow data sharing (National Academy of Engineering, 2012, p. 24).

Looking at the experiences from Mali, the ASIFU put considerable effort into improving the flow of information from the regular battalions by offering training programs and providing them with computers and village assessment formats. Despite this support, the added value of the data brought in by these battalions remained limited. Rietjens and Waard provide several reasons for this including

> Illiteracy among African soldiers, limited English language skills among all personnel, both of which made it problematic to understand intelligence tasks or write after action reports, and the basic reluctance to gather and disseminate relevant information due to an unfamiliarity with the intelligence process.

Had ASIFU followed a "more organic path and put more effort into improving the stream of current intelligence coming from the main force's battalions—for example, by bringing in additional trainers and liaison officers—its own performance would most certainly have been enhanced" (Rietjens & Waard, 2017, p. 20). Intelligence tools require solutions that effectively can enable information sharing from one location, often remote, to higher-level headquarters, which often proves technologically challenging or expensive.

Information should, whenever possible, be collected in a standard format, using agreed taxonomy, to facilitate the collation process (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2015, p. 11). This sound straight forward on paper, but my experience from working in NATO is that

standardization to ensure interoperability among intelligence tools is extremely challenging[47]. First, most nations have their own national intelligence tools sometimes with a different taxonomy and exchange protocols. Second, taxonomy must be developed with a close cooperation between the users and the nations on the one hand and standardization and communication/technology agencies on the other. Third, once the taxonomy has been agreed upon, which is a time-consuming effort; the entities making use of the taxonomy normally have their own systems.

One common software, covering the needs of all UN entities from tactical to strategic level, is unlikely in the near future. NATO projects with capability and standardization development, involves NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) and the technical support of NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA). To sum up – standardization and agreed taxonomies sound great in theory, but is time-consuming and requires a responsible body at the strategic level to coordinate between all entities, support from the nations and UN as well as the support from UN standardization and technology entities.

The 2015 MOU will hopefully provide development and standardization of tools that can enhance UN entities to make use of available information. The development of these tools will be managed by New York, in relation to funding and inter-departmental coordination, but must be supported by the vast experience of JMAC analysts to realize its full potential. Thus, the strategic level, supported by Member States, has provided an opportunity to improve information management in UN peace operations. To fully benefit from the project, the JMAC community must support procedures to mitigate challenges relating to lack of NGOs reporting and to ensure that tools contain standardized JMAC reporting formats, products and procedures.

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[47] I worked at NATO Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff in the UK from 2011 to 2015. One of my tasks was to lead the process of harmonizing to NATO databases and develop a new NATO Electronic Warfare database.

5.5 Analysis

Strategic Intelligence Capability

Intelligence capabilities have always rested with states, not international organizations like the UN. The great powers demand control of their intelligence assets, and tend to maintain their control of information, thus creating an information asymmetry inside international organizations. Especially, the permanent five members of the Security Council enjoy this information advantage making them less inclined to approve an independent UN intelligence capability. But, as Robert Rehbein at Queen's College in Kingston Ontario correctly points out, "not even US intelligence has information about every point on the globe—especially in the countries where the UN often operates" (Maceda, 2007, p. 19).

Since the Peace of Westphalia, the nation state has been the responsible entity in international cooperation and mediation. Allowing supranational entities to enhance their influence, involves moving the power of balance from the nation state to e.g. the UN. Chesterman correctly points out that, "An independent UN voice is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of a UN operation. In other words, an autonomous analysis capacity frees the collective group from accusations of being a tool of the major powers" (Maceda, 2007, p. 21).

> Developing a capacity to evaluate provided intelligence should make the United Nations more independent: the organization could itself determine whether information is useful, rather than relying on national agencies deciding what the UN 'needs to know'; the capacity would give greater opportunity for the corroboration of different sources; and, if it led to more routine intelligence cooperation (Chesterman, 2006, p. 10).

The Brahimi report recommended an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat, though ignored, the proposal attempted to address the problem of a strategic analysis capability. Maceda advocates that JMAC developments do little to fix the problems at UN headquarters. He claims that a strategic intelligence doctrine and the capability to acquire and analyze OSINT could help the UN improve in this area. To counter the UN from deploying troops in the blind, any new mission needs a solid intelligence baseline. "Since the mission needs this information in the planning stage, a JMAC is not capable of creating this product—the JMAC has not been formed at this phase" (Maceda, 2007, p. 60).

NATO could in some aspects serve as a useful comparison to the UN, having a dedicated intelligence branch from the field to the strategic level. The strategic level is supported by several NATO entities; NATO Communication and Information Agency, Allied Command and Transformation and NATO International Military Staff in Brussels to ensure coherence between operations, policies, taxonomy and procurement of new capabilities. Though complex and challenging, there is no doubt that intelligence responsibility rests within the J-2 branch at all levels within NATO.

Looking at UN crisis management capability, several panels have recommended a strategic analysis capability with the permanent staff in New York, which of course is a matter outside JMAC sphere of influence. The lack of a permanent strategic intelligence capability severely limits JMAC capability at the very beginning of an UN mission. A strategic intelligence capability could be the basis for a coherent intelligence architecture within the UN, clarify the role of the JMAC and ensure an "intelligence voice" in the UNHQ to facilitate policy, procedures and procurement.

Intelligence profession

In NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1 – *Peace Support Operations* - NATO states that mission success relies on "personnel and organizations to be adequately led, trained, organized and equipped". This, in essence, professionalism, will "give it credibility with the parties and thereby the ability to achieve its operational objectives" (NATO, 2001, pp. 2-2). In UN peace operations in general, and the JMAC specifically, civilian and particularly national staff, are often present for longer periods of time than their military counterparts. Military staff mostly rotate every six to twelve months, preventing them from establishing relationships with the population and building trust (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 16). As UN intelligence structures are being planned these crucial facts must be taken into account.

Some JMAC leaders and Chief of Staff in UNMISS in 2013, Colonel Petter Lindquist, argue that they have access to almost all the information they need but lack the capacity to analyze it and transform it into plans. Improving the analytical capacity of missions has proven to be more difficult than improving their technological capacity (Theunens, 2017, p. 5). This is reinforced by Willmot claiming that "the amount of information that is useful is limited by their absorption capacity" (Willmot, 2017, p. 54). UN JMAC documents hardly mention the

importance of, and how to, improve analysis on the individual level and how training should be handled. *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy*, however, describes the need for standardized pre-deployment training and education for all personnel involved in all aspects of peacekeeping intelligence. How this should be done, and to avoid that UN personnel is withdrawn from the mission area to attend, as a student, course specific training must be addressed[48].

The continuity in the civilian personnel's service is a prerequisite for the creation of an institutional memory, backed up by databases. There is, however, a dependence on a limited number of individuals for analysis and understanding, to the point that "information is rarely institutional and shared less between stakeholders". When key individuals leave or are declared persona non grata, much of the knowledge and contacts are lost (International Organization for Migration South Sudan, 2016, p. 45). Civilians often have an extensive experience from the region and country. They have established relationships with key individuals, and their knowledge, often based upon "gut-feeling" is challenging to store in a database. This, however, should not refrain JMAC staff from systematizing and institutionalizing their knowledge. Deputy JMAC UNMISS highlights this as one of the main challenges in UNMISS today; Extensive personnel experience and contacts must add value and not replace the systematic approach to the Intelligence profession.

Uniformed personnel, who usually have limited tours of duty, could make effective use of this information in the initial phase of their deployment and enhance their situational awareness. This could provide additional value to their contribution besides bringing specific military or police expertise to the JMAC and facilitate liaison and information sharing with the uniformed mission components (Theunens, 2017, p. 5). A combination of civilian and uniformed personnel is essential for the JMAC and modern UN peace operations as intelligence structures with civilian, military and police information and analysts, "lead to more relevant products for protection activities" (Kjeksrud & Ravndal, 2011, p. 4). The added JMAC value presupposes internal and external information sharing.

Willmot, working as an UN information analyst, provides an important aspect concerning professionalism, situational awareness and intelligence contribution in the UN. While there is

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[48] As with the one-week Joint Operation Centre course at NODEFIC October 2017.

a wealth of talented and capable staff within the UN, she states, "The cadre of professional analysts is very small. It is primarily limited to JMAC analysts, security analysts, and information analysts working for some of the agencies. There is no sense of professional community binding them, and certainly no career path" (Willmot, 2017, p. 6). Analysts must be encouraged beyond their monthly salary to leave their chairs and visit the people who operate at the grassroots level – civil affairs officers, atmospherics teams, liaison officers, female engagement teams, willing NGOs and development organizations, United Nations officials and staff officers with infantry battalions (Flynn et al., 2010, p. 17). In some areas this would involve a significant personal risk. The larger question for the UN, according to Ramjouè, is how it can create incentive structures for staff to contribute to the collective rather than personal interests which is a problem in any organization where most personnel have very limited job stability[49] and where there is no clear career path (Ramjoué, 2011, pp. 13-14).

Based upon experiences from Afghanistan, Flynn advocates that brigade and regional command intelligence summaries should expand beyond regurgitating the previous day's enemy activity. Periodic topical narratives, on the other hand, elaborating on "economy, atmospherics, development, corruption, governance, and enemy activity in a given district will provide an understanding that is invaluable up the chain of command as well as down to subordinate units" (Flynn et al., 2010, p. 13). To ensure comprehensive analysis, JMACs should be properly staffed, with organic representation from all components—civilian, military, and police. All staff officers deployed to military intelligence functions should be trained intelligence analysts, and all civilian and police staff deployed to JMACs should have experience in information analysis, as well as political-military experience or country/regional expertise (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 28).

Organization charts of JMAC staffing from the very beginning of the JMAC-concept resemble a more integrated and centralized concept where all mission components and relevant entities should provide personnel to the JMAC. Such an organization would most likely have made the JMAC an efficient and comprehensive information hub. However, the current de-centralized structure has prevented the development of a robust intelligence

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[49] Most civilian peacekeepers work on short-term six-month or one-year contracts

footprint at the operational level. To access information and enhance coordination between entities other mechanisms were developed.

The lack of a professional cadre of intelligence operators is naturally beyond the scope of the JMAC to rectify. The JMAC is depending on UNHQ to facilitate staffing as they are the entity responsible for the dialog with nations. A professional cadre will either require (1) a clearly stated intelligence profession responsibility with incentives for inter-departmental intelligence cooperation within the UN or (2) a reorganization of intelligence related entities under one Intelligence branch. JMAC influence is normally limited to ensure JMAC specific induction training following the arrival of new members. However, to ensure that mission related procedures and reporting is optimized, the JMAC is responsible for training subordinate structures and intelligence and information individuals.

5.6 Dissemination

Intelligence Culture

The authority to disseminate intelligence products, the release authority, shall be clearly identified as part of the mission's *Peacekeeping Intelligence Support Plan* and internal guidance for participating mission entities. The dissemination of peacekeeping intelligence products shall be done "in compliance with the concepts as well as the [...] organizational requirements for information classification, security, handling, ownership and sharing" (United Nations, 2015, p. 6).

The Secretary-General's guidance on handling and dissemination of sensitive information specifies that information should be primarily made available on a *need to know* basis. Dissemination to heads of components, UNHQ, and as appropriate with the UNCT, should however be encouraged to ensure a two-way information flow.
Experiences show that information from the JMAC is severely restrained to HoM or tailored to the actual component requesting the information. This differs from the JMAC guidelines that encourage an "information community" to enhance information sharing which has been done recently in UNIFIL. The documents cited above are contradictory as to how information sharing of intelligence in UN peace operations should be handled, which leave it to the discretion of chief JMAC and HoM to decide how to disseminate information.

At the strategic level, DPKO, the Department of Political Affairs, and the Department of Safety and Security all have designated units for information and analysis located on the same floor in the Secretariat building, but communication among them is insufficient." There is no system for sharing information and analysis among all stakeholders, and current arrangements are too dependent on personalities. Moreover, structural mechanisms to synchronize, coordinate, and de-conflict different analyses are generally lacking "(Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 19). The good news, according to Steele, is that "most of the huge stores of information collected and stored by the various UN agencies—is not secret. The bad news is that most of this information is not digital and usually not in English". The problem of information sharing, therefore, is one of culture and conversion. "A culture that fosters information-sharing must be created", along with a capability that permits ''just enough, just in time'' conversion of analog information into digital information (Steele, 2006, p. 11).

Uniformed personnel at the operational level, may be discouraged to share information with the JMAC because they doubt the mission's capability to protect classified information given the absence of secure communication means and the UN's lack of "*intelligence-culture*" (Theunens, 2017, p. 8). A report by the UN's *Office of Internal Oversight* (OIO) furthermore reveals problems which are both structural and political in nature, and which stand in the way of effective use of consolidated analysis at both the headquarters and in the field (Ekpe, 2007, p. 18). A closer look at OCHA's operations reveals problems that stand in the way of fully exploiting information assets to effectively coordinate humanitarian emergencies. Among these are a "deliberate reluctance and mistrust among agencies to share critical information rapidly, and a lack of understanding in what should be reported by the field disaster management teams to the resident coordinator" (Ekpe, 2007, p. 18).

In reforming its analytical capacities and capabilities, the UN should focus on improving its current structures and on strengthening information analysis and sharing more than information collection. The UN should "prioritize developing a comprehensive information-management system rather than new intelligence infrastructure, which most member states are likely to oppose for reasons of funding and politics" (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 8). What it comes down to, is a responsible body, from the field to New York that can analyze

information and provide a predicative assessment of "so what" to decision makers. In the military culture, this is called intelligence architecture.

Nordli and Lindboe provide a great example of how people transform culture and how closely linked it is to procedures and policy. During the first year, the policy of the ASIFU was to disseminate products to the largest possible audience. Dissemination was based on the *need to share* principle. When necessary, products were subject to sanitization[50]. JMAC products, which should be focused at the operational level, could be shared without jeopardising source confidentiality or security with the right resolution. Thus, dissemination of products should be both possible and desirable in order to ensure that the entire mission and external entities receive timely information to support their decision-making processes (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017, p. 20).

A shift in the dissemination policy evolved as products were being disseminated on an increasingly stricter *need to know* basis (Nordli & Lindboe, 2017, p. 18). Though, there might be sound reason for this change, it supports the arguments of Nordli and Lindboe, that, in theory, nothing is preventing operational level intelligence entities to enhance information sharing. Willmot, however, correctly warns that information flow must not be unidirectional. "It is critical that the system does not only pull information into the center, but also pushes it back out to the contributors (Willmot, 2017, p. 59). In 2004 Steele predicted that the modern leaders of intelligence cultures must be public rather than secret and share rather than steal (Steele, 2004, p. 7). Someone would claim that leadership creates culture, in this case; UN intelligence culture needs a responsible and accountable authority.

The presence of national staff within UN missions, as well as general lack of confidentiality, can be serious impediments to parallel forces sharing information with UN missions. Intelligence and information sharing is about trust. The UN's assets, particularly following its geographical reach and the diversity of its staff, are "often underused or misused in missions and in headquarters" (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 27). Ramjouè findings support this, stating that "information sharing is mostly based on personal connections rather than institutional standard operating procedures" (Ramjoué, 2011, pp. 13-14). This trust can be

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[50] The process of removing sensitive information from a document or other message, so that the product could be distributed to a broader audience.

reinforced with separate secure systems to handle sensitive information across different mission components supported by guidelines for sharing information and protecting sources. Particularly, it must decide "who will have access to what information—that is, how to balance the need to know with open, transparent processes and a culture that incentivizes the *need to share*" (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 29).

> The military must move beyond rhetoric that favors greater information sharing, and should ensure that it gets the incentive structures right. Senior officers must take the lead on such issues rather than delegating them to information technology, civil affairs or public affairs personnel. Soldiers must be provided with new and clear regulations on what does and does not need to be classified. Those who over-classify information must be reprimanded, and those who share information that leads to positive outcomes should be rewarded and publicly praised for doing so (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 3).

To ensure efficient dissemination of intelligence in UN missions, the JMAC and MLT must be the key players in developing this culture. Though policies and training are important, and acknowledging that personalities play an important role, culture is a matter of trust and leadership. Trust is efficiently developed when humans interact, share a common goal and respect differences in mandate and tasks. Thus, the JMAC has a vital task in building trust among all relevant information actors in the mission and find mechanisms that will exploit commonalities and suppress divisive factors. However, as long as the JMAC does not have tasking authority, only a coordinating role, both leadership and culture might be hard to find. The in-theatre face-to-face interaction nonetheless provides the JMAC with possibilities to exploit the desire for improved information sharing.

Information sharing procedures

In all missions improved information sharing procedures are necessary to ensure that the JMAC is able to fulfil its intelligence mandate (Ramjoué, 2011, p. 2). Though the military component has challenges in relation to the JMAC, Ramjouè`s findings indicate that most JMACs "obtained better cooperation from military teams than they did from their political, civil and/or electoral affairs colleagues" (Ramjoué, 2011, pp. 13-14). JMACs are required to produce integrated analysis and assessment, but there is "no requirement to include information and analysis from country teams or to share the analytical products with them".

Where the mission and UNCT are integrated, the Resident Coordinator will receive JOC and JMAC products; otherwise, practice varies across missions (Willmot, 2017, p. 51).

For intelligence to be effective at the UN, it requires processes and structures that ensure it can be shared and stored securely. These structures need to be governed by strict rules and procedures, tasking, and guidance (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 3)

In principle, there are two main approaches to information sharing. First, we have the traditional "push concept" in which information is forwarded by using dedicated email addresses. The "push concept" has advantages, but is increasingly being replaced by a web- and standards-based, open information-sharing environment, also referred to as the "pull concept". Such an open information community allows anyone with access to get any information available that has been uploaded to the network.

Lack of shared database and hybrid platforms built specifically for sharing information has prevented total coordination and cooperation among civilians and military segments. A number of technical challenges hinder effective information sharing. Most organizations have their own information systems with limited access for other actors. The sites normally require passwords, and several systems only allow people to join if they are specifically invited or sponsored by another user or administrator. Sites also tend to be poorly designed and ill-suited for individuals with relatively poor web connections. (Humanitarian Practice Network, 2013, p. 20).

Willmot claims that a comprehensive UN information sharing protocol, setting out what kind of information are to be shared with whom, for what purpose, and how the information is to be handled and used "would bring clarity, predictability, and accountability to the process" (Willmot, 2017, p. 71). Military institutions that request information from civilian agencies must be prepared, when requesting the information, to explain how it will be managed and for what purpose it will be used. "Civilian organizations will be far less cautious about sharing information with the armed forces if they can be sure that it will be used for beneficial purposes, such as reconstruction or humanitarian assistance to vulnerable communities in highly insecure areas". Furthermore, they must ensure that it does not feed into intelligence or targeting processes, and the armed forces should be "ready and willing to explain what ultimately came of information provided by civilian organizations" (Humanitarian Practice

Network, 2013, p. 22). Improved understanding and training in information sharing and reporting based on a common understanding that not all details must be included, would benefit reporting between civilian and military actors. Several information requirements in a multi-dimensional conflict can be fully addressed by civilian UN and NGO entities without compromising their sources or endanger their field workers, and in most cases NGOs might actually benefit from a better UN situational awareness.

The JMAC can ensure that there are information sharing procedures in place to enhance situational awareness among the MLT as well as the different entities in the mission. Currently this is outside the mandate and task of the JMAC. By adapting policies and procedures to enhance JMAC`s role in facilitating information sharing in UN missions, the JMAC can be pivotal in improving UN intelligence and peace operations.

Security and classification

The Final Report of the 2015 *Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation* in UN Peacekeeping emphasizes the importance of secure communications and of analytic support tools for JMACs. The UN has no secure communications and all computers are connected to the Internet both at the strategic and operational levels. The lack of an appropriate and secure UN system for sharing information undermines the protection of missions, especially in asymmetric threat environments, and makes partners reluctant to share some of their information. No secure means of communication, even in a Chapter VI-setting like UNIFIL seriously hampers information sharing (Theunens, 2017, p. 8).

Improvements are needed in the UN's classification and information security systems both at headquarters and in the field and a natural starting point is within the intelligence bodies (Theunens, 2017, p. 10). This includes the labeling of sensitive information as *confidential*, *strictly confidential* and *unclassified* by the originator of the information. *JMAC Guidelines* underline that Chief JMAC shall develop "security procedures that cater to the peculiar information security classification and security requirements in close cooperation with UNDSS, the Peacekeeping Information Management Unit, and DPKO–DFS Communication and Information Technology Section " (United Nations DPKO & DFS, 2015, p. 10). This requires that security procedures, intelligence architecture and flexibility is included as

software are developed. The development of tools for JMACs should be coordinated with UN partners to facilitate "interoperability" and ensure the efficient use of resources.

There are situations where humanitarian or UN actors possess information that is classified and that cannot be shared with others without compromising the identity of the source or exposing individual(s) to potential risk. In such cases, information will not be shared between UN missions and the humanitarian community. Humanitarian actors will not share information if they believe that this could imperil the safety of civilians. For this reason, they will generally seek to" protect the identity or locations of civilians if such information might be used by armed groups for targeting" (Civil-Military Advisory Group, 2013, p. 7).

There is a lack of awareness of the parameters used for classification of information, and following the field research of Abilova and Novosseloff many interviewees reported that the "usage is haphazard". While some classified documents and information are shared, sharing is largely dependent on personal relationships and meetings (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 25). Thus, the preferred standard for sharing information is personal trust, not UN classification standards. Informal intelligence reports thus circumvent the established checks and balances within the intelligence system and raise issues of control, accountability and authenticity. Unless developing a "qualitative control, qualitative technical improvements in collection and dissemination can actually undermine the efficacy of the overall system" (Dupont, 2003, p. 31).

Haphazard classification of intelligence in the UN raises concerns. The Secretary General`s bulletin consisting of four pages from 2007 is the authoritative publication being referred to in relation to security, classification and handling of information. However, it does not address procedures concerning exchange of information between the uniformed components, civilian components and non UN humanitarian assistance entities. In NATO documents these procedures are described in detailed in numerous documents because of their sensitive nature.

To improve information sharing, the UN and JMAC are in desperate need for enhanced policy and procedural regulations on how to ensure then security and safety of information and sources. JMAC security and classification procedures must derive from policies and procedures being developed at the strategic level with the approval of the member nations.

Most regulations and policies could be directly incorporated into new software being developed. JMAC can only support the regulations by upholding the principles and procedures that define UN security and classification regime. If the strategic regulations do not fully enable JMAC to operate according its mandate, these concerns must be addressed by the JMAC.

Cooperation with non UN entities

Civil humanitarian organizations try to maintain their workers' safety by not taking sides in conflict and working to relieve all social suffering. NGOs can provide insights into local dynamics that affects the protection of human security, but they do not want to be involved in implementing a counter-insurgency strategy. Local groups need to trust an organization to tell them the mechanisms through which recruitment to insurgency groups is occurring. The "protection of those sources and of that information is something that builds trust over time" (National Academy of Engineering, 2012, p. 17). Thus, NGOs often do not even want to indicate their exact locations on publicly available information sources.

Afghanistan has come to be seen as a laboratory for the development of civil–military coordination and information sharing. However, while numerous information-sharing portals have been established, none has emerged as the single hub for coordination between civilian organizations and military actors. Still, after years of cooperation military personnel often do not understand and sometimes do not even like NGOs, as illustrated by these quotes "NGOs clog up my battle space." "They are in the way." "NGOs don't want to be seen with us in uniform." "Stereotypes exist in both directions, and both sets of stereotypes are damaging" (National Academy of Engineering, 2012, p. 11).

In general, the goal of humanitarian organizations is to protect human security, whereas the goal of government agencies and the military is to advance national security interests. Data sharing is more likely in situations and contexts "where the missions of civil society organizations overlap with those of the military and government". When missions are in conflict, data sharing is more difficult (National Academy of Engineering, 2012, p. 18). The evolution of UN operations in the 21st century towards more protection of civilians, in theory, should narrow the gap between military and the humanitarian organizations objectives. Thus,

exchange of information between civilian and military might increase if protection of civilian continue to be a defining aim of UN peace operations.

The use of information could have positive or negative consequences. Will the military use information provided by civilian organizations for targeting purposes? The fears "particularly relates to the human rights and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) entities, which often have some of the best access to information from the communities they work with but are reluctant to share it with the mission's military component" (National Academy of Engineering, 2012, p. 20). These actors fear that their independence, neutrality, or impartiality is further eroded if they are seen as cooperating too closely with the military component. Especially as the sustainability for the military is often short term, whereas NGOs tend to look at issues for decades in a more open and extended context. Sanitization of information can prove challenging as some humanitarian actors operate in geographical areas, sometimes all alone, and any reporting from an area can easily be traced back to the originator.

Civil–military information sharing systems should, according to Humanitarian Practice Network, be established through a collaborative process. Upon reading *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy*, which hardly covers any humanitarian aspects (including UN entities), those developing the Policy (DPKO) have disregarded maybe the two single most important experiences to facilitate information sharing – collaboration and trust.

Cooperation between UN intelligence mission entity, currently embodied with the JMAC, and civilian humanitarian entities do present several opportunities. Though there are differences in perception and tasks, there is a common humanitarian ground that can be exploited. Trust is critical and must be based upon personal relationship and reassurance about the ability to handle information and protect sources. The crucial and feasible role of the JMAC, despite all the hurdles, would be to ensure that a collaborative environment is developed in the mission area.

5.7 A summary - limitations or possibilities

The Intelligence Cycle has framed a discussion leading to an enhanced understanding of

Intelligence in the UN and to what extent the JMAC is able to address intelligence challenges

in UN peace operations. A summary of the findings are listed below in table 4;

Intelligence Cycle Step	Challenges	Impact	Mitigation	Probability	Limitation/ Possibility
Tasking					
	Authority and responsibility	High	JMAC needs a robust, responsible and accountable overarching intelligence entity	Not likely	Limitation
	National constraints	High	Intelligence is a matter of national concern at the strategic level	Not likely	Limitation
	Rivalry and Turf Wars	Medium	Incentives to enhance inter-departmental cooperation can primarily be developed outside the operational level	Not likely	Limitation
Acquisition					
	Methodology and ethics	Medium	Intelligence methodology and ethics is defined at the strategic level limiting JMAC to comply to approved standards	Not likely	Limitation
	Collection capabilities	Medium	JMAC cannot influence which high-tech sensors TCCs bring, but support procedures and training of UN entities to provide info	Likely	Possibility
	Open source intelligence	Medium	Available information at low costs enables JMAC to utilize open source if roles and staffing is prioritized	Highly likely	Possibility
Examination, evaluation and collation					
	Standardization of UN intelligence tools	High	JMAC can take advantage of the MOU to enhance information sharing while ensuring procedures to receive info from non UN entities	Likely	Possibility
Analysis					
	Strategic analysis capability	High	JMAC must rely on a strategic capability to clarify role and responsibilities in UNHQ in order to enhance JMAC (initial) support in peace operations	Not likely	Limitation
	UN intelligence profession	High	JMAC rely on UNHQ to facilitate staffing. A systematized career and recruitment structure is needed. JMAC conducts mission specific training	Not likely	Limitation
Dissemination					
	UN intelligence culture	High	JMACs coordinating role is limiting its capability to build trust and a sense of shared purpose, procedures and culture in missions	Likely	Possibility
	Information sharing procedures	Medium	JMAC can enhance in-mission intelligence information sharing procedures if mandated	Highly likely	Possibility
	Security and classification	High	The JMAC procedures must derive from security and classification policies and procedures being developed at the strategic level	Not likely	Limitation
	Cooperation with non UN entities	Medium	JMAC must found a basis for collaboration and trust	Likely	Possibility

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[51] *Table 4: Summary of findings - limitations and possibilities*

The main contribution of the paper is the systematic approach to understanding UN intelligence key challenges in relation to the *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle*.

The findings indicate that the JMAC is less likely to succeed in all matters relating to responsibility, authority and vital national concerns. Unless there is a strategic intelligence entity that can support the JMAC and be a constructive counterpart to UN member states, UN key challenges related to *Tasking* will remain unresolved.

When it comes to *Acquisition*, the vast UN footprint in multi-dimensional operations combined with open source information represent an opportunity that can and should be exploited by the JMAC. It would, however, be enhanced if inter-departmental coordination at the strategic level is improved.

The JMAC community has been given an excellent opportunity to benefit from the MOU that will provide the UN with an improved information management capability. The MOU can vastly increase the UN capability of *examination, evaluation and collation*. The UN intelligence and JMAC community must ensure that the IT-architecture is flexible and enable all UN entities to share information with "information communities" on a *need to share* basis.

All matters relating to *Analysis* in chapter 5 is beyond the influence of the JMAC. UNHQ must facilitate and systematize intelligence training, recruitment and tools.

As for *Dissemination,* the JMAC supported by the MLT can foster a mission environment of collaboration and trust, "intelligence culture", by defining common in-theatre procedures that can enhance information sharing between UN entities and NGOs.

6 Conclusion

The paper has been aiming to identify UN key challenges in relation to Intelligence and consider their impact on UN Peace operations. Furthermore, the paper has discussed if and how the JMAC can succeed in mitigating these challenges.

Following the introduction and the research design chapters, aiming to create the framework for the paper, chapter 3 explain how UN peace operations have evolved by specifically understanding terminology, mandate and the key characteristics. Departing from UN peace operations, chapter 3 further introduced intelligence. The chapter presented a post-Cold war look at UN and intelligence, UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy and enhanced the understanding of Intelligence according to different layers and types. Furthermore, it introduced the main actors at the strategic and operational level and finally the JMAC concept, the latter as described in UN official documents.

Chapter 4, using UNMISS and MINUSMA as current examples, served as a basis to identify key UN Intelligence challenges and their impact.

Following the five steps of the *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Cycle*, chapter 5 discussed UN key challenges and how the JMAC potentially could mitigate the obstacles. Chapter 5 finished with a summary of the findings and conclusions for each step of the Intelligence Cycle.

The findings indicate that, though the JMAC concept has enhanced UN capabilities in peace operations, there are some grave challenges that cannot be addressed by the JMAC alone;

- Peace Operations and Intelligence in the UN are contested with a lack of coherent terminology complicating the understanding and discussion. The paper provides a comprehensive understanding of 21st century UN peace operation terminology to better guide future discussion of UN peace operations and the role of Intelligence in the UN.

- Intelligence in the UN and all the steps in the *Intelligence Cycle*, can be more effectively addressed if there is a responsible and accountable strategic entity that ensures information sharing at all levels from the field to New York. The discussion concludes that the JMAC cannot mitigate the majority of key UN Intelligence challenges, realize its potential and succeed without an overarching intelligence body.

The UN provides several possibilities for unclassified future research about Intelligence. Further research about UN and Intelligence could look into; (1) how the strategic level should develop structures, procedures and technology to provide the strategic backbone needed to support the JMAC concept, (2) explore the variety in UN peace operation terminology to contribute to a more systematic and coherent discussion about Intelligence and UN peace operations and (3) can cost efficient preventive efforts replace expensive peacekeeping operations? The difficulty of producing military intelligence in UN missions does not necessarily come from the number of units involved, but "the level of attention given to intelligence" (Abilova & Novosseloff, 2016, p. 21).

7 References

7.1 Annex A List of acronyms

ASIFU   All Source Information Fusion Unit
AU   African Union
CMAG   Civil-Military Advisory Group
DFS   Department of Field Support
DPA   Department of Political affairs
DPI   Department of Public Information
DPKO   Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSRSG   Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
DSS   Department of Safety and Security
GA   General Assembly
HCT   Humanitarian Country Team
HIPPO   High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
HoM   Head of Mission
IOT   Integrated Operational Team
ISP   Intelligence Support Plan
IR   Information or Intelligence Requirements
JCB   Joint Coordination Board
JMAC   Joint Mission Analysis Center
MINUJUSTH   United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
MINUSMA   United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH   United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MLT   Mission Leadership Team
MOU   Memorandum of Understanding
NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation
NODEFIC   Norwegian Defense International Center
OCHA   Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR   Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights
OMA   Office of Military Affairs
PAD   Political Affairs Division
PD-MMSS   Police Division's Mission Management and Support Section
PKI   Peacekeeping Intelligence
PKISP   Peacekeeping Intelligence Support Plan
PKO   Peacekeeping Operations
PO   Peace Operations
SC   Security Council
SG   Secretary General
SRSG   Special Representative of the Secretary General
TCC   Troops Contributing Countries
UN   United Nations
UNDP   UN Development Program
UNHQ   United Nations Headquarters
UNMISS   United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNOCC   UN Operations and Crisis Centre

7.2 Annex B Exploratory interviews

Date	Name	Where	Work experience
21 September	Karin Christoffersen	Norwegian People`s Aid - Oslo	Senior Advisor Norwegian People`s Aid Advisor to OCHA in UNMISS from Feb. 2014 to Feb. 2016
11 October	Ann-Kristin Kvilekval	E-mail	Police liaison to FOH and several UN missions
18 October	Petter Lindquist	Norwegian Defense Staff and Command College - Oslo	Colonel and Chief of Staff in UNMISS in 2013
23 October	Stian Kjeksrud	Norwegian Defense Staff and Command College - Oslo	Scientist at FFI – specializing in UN and Intelligence
24 October	John Karlsrud	Norwegian Defense Staff and Command College - Oslo	Special Advisor to SRSG Chad in 2007 and Senior researcher at NUPI
11 November	Petter Vindheim	Facetime	LtCol and currently Deputy JMAC in UNMISS
13 November	Nadia Assouli	Norwegian Defense Staff and Command College - Oslo	Analysts in UNOCC and responsible for drafting *UN Peacekeeping Intelligence Policy*

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