



## Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces and Military Operations



Lt Col Lena Kvarving (ed)

Norwegian Defence University College

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Military Operations



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Editors:

Commander SG Jan Tore Nilsen and Lieutenant Col Pål Stræte

For information about the Monographic Series:

Norwegian Defence University College/The Defence Command and Staff College

Postboks 800 Postmottak

2617 Lillehammer

e-mail: [fhs.kontakt@mil.no](mailto:fhs.kontakt@mil.no)

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## Foreword

The conference on “Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces and Military Operations” arranged by the Gender Project at the Norwegian Defence University College (NDUC) 17th of June 2011 was a great success and marked an important milestone for the Norwegian Armed Forces’ work to prevent such atrocities.

The conference emphasized an important realization: There is a clear link between how we deal with internal issues on sexual misconduct and our ability to deal with issues related to sexual violence in international operations. This is something I take very seriously and will keep focusing on.

Unfortunately, I was unable to attend the conference in person. However, this conference report gives me and my fellow soldiers the opportunity to study the clear message and interesting insights from both civilian and military experts to learn more, to understand more, and eventually all become better soldiers.

I congratulate the NDUC on their ability to put difficult and demanding issues on the agenda, and remind you of the responsibility we all have to act according to our core values as soldiers; with respect, responsibility and courage.



Harald Sunde  
General  
Chief of Defence





# Introduction to the report

Dear Reader!

You may have experienced a colleague telling you about a great conference he/she attended, upon which their enthusiasm and professional appraisal making you really wish you had been there. The conference on “Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces and Military Operations,” arranged by the Gender Project at the Norwegian Defence University College in Oslo 17<sup>th</sup> of June 2011, was that kind of a conference.

By taping and transcribing the presentations, assisted and approved by the contributors, we are happy to offer a conference report. The report seeks to provide the insights and sentiments of the conference to those unable to attend, as if they were actually there.


The speakers were given the opportunity to clarify the transcripts and made minor changes, or added comments, to better get their message across. It is, however, important to emphasize that the ultimate responsibility for the content of the presentations belongs to the speakers, not their associated institution. The report outline is, with only one adjustment, as conveyed during the conference. I decided to start the report with the Norwegian Minister of Defence, Grete Faremo, together with the keynote speaker, UN Special Representative Margot Wallström, to emphasize the relevance of the contributions. Any mistakes, misquotes, spelling or grammatical errors is my responsibility alone. All the speakers did an outstanding job, and their contributions were complementary in ways that reinforced the interconnectedness of the main conference topics.

I would like to thank former gender advisor at the Gender Project; Lillian Angelo for her idea for the conference, present gender advisors; Cecilie Fleming and Anita Schjølset for embracing the idea and turning it into a unique and great program and together with Ole M. Totland contributing in so many ways to make the conference a reality.<sup>1</sup> For the first time we were able to unite military experts and academic researchers to talk about tough issues related to sexual violence, sexual harassment and the consequences for military operations. This report’s sole purpose is to keep the issues on the agenda, educate the public and ultimately contribute to ending sexual harassment and sexual violence.

<sup>1</sup> The Gender Project has gained two new members since the conference was held; Lt Col Birgith Andreassen and Maj Elin Rørvik.

The work behind this report has been tedious, but convinced me that the messages conveyed during the conference need an even bigger audience.

I hope you enjoy the report!

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Lena P Kvarving". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large loop at the end of the last name.

Lena P Kvarving  
Lieutenant Colonel

Leader Gender Project at the Norwegian Defence University College



Norwegian Defence University College

# Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces and Military Operations

Oslo, June 17, 2011  
Gamle Logen, Grev Wedels plass 2

## CONFERENCE PROGRAM

- 08:30 - 09:00 Registration and coffee
- 09:00 - 09:10 Welcome **Rear Admiral Louise K. Dedichen**, Commandant  
Norwegian Defence University College
- 09:10 - 09:30 Keynote Speaker **Margot Wallström**, SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict, UN

**Session 1 09:30 - 11:10**  
**Conceptual Framework for Handling and Responding to Sexual Violence**

Chair: **Cecilie Beise Fleming**, Norwegian Defence University College

Speakers:

**Letitia Anderson**, UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, "Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice"  
**Loredana Alemanno-Testa**, NATO HQ, "NATO's Action Plan for Implementing UNSCR 1325"  
**Ann Livingstone**, PhD, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, "Training Military Personnel to Respond to Sexual Violence"  
**Col. Tom Hermansen**, Deputy SSR Coordinator & **Guillota Ayele Ayivi**, SGBV Coordinator, MONUSCO, "Training and Mentoring the Congolese Armed Forces on SGBV Prevention and Response in a Security Sector Reform Framework"

Discussant: **Sidsel Aas**, Consultant, DCAF

Discussion

11:15 - 12:15 Lunch

12.20 -12.45 Intermission **Grete Faremo**, Norwegian Minister of Defence

**Session 2      13:00 - 15:15**  
**International Implications of Framework**

Chair: **Ole Magnus Totland**, Norwegian Defence University College

Speakers:

**Ragnhild Nordås**, PhD, PRIO, "What Do We Know About Sexual Violence in Conflict?"

**Mia Bloom**, PhD, Penn State University, "Sexual Violence as Recruitment Base for Terrorism"

**Marsha Henry**, PhD, LSE, "Why is Handling and Responding to Sexual Violence a Military Responsibility?"

**Major Fred Tanner**, US Army, "Female Engagement: Experiences from Iraq, Africa, and Afghanistan"

**Col. Anthony Atolagbe**, UNAMID, "Good and Bad Examples of How to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Violence: The Case of UNAMID in Darfur"

Discussant: **Louise Olsson**, PhD, Folke Bernadotte Academy

Discussion

15:15 - 15:30    Coffee Break

**Session 3      15:30 - 17:15**  
**National Implications of Framework**

Chair: **Anita Schjølset**, Norwegian Defence University College

Speakers:

**Capt. René Hudribusch**, PhD, Austrian Armed Forces, "What Do We Know About Sexual Harassment in the Armed Forces?"

**Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørsv**, PhD, University of Tromsø, "How Does Military Culture Affect Handling and Responding to Sexual Violence?"

**Nate Galbreath**, PhD, Ret. US Air Force & Pentagon SAPRO, "The Effects Associated with Sexual Assault and Combat"

**Lt. Commander Jarle Eid**, PhD, Norwegian Defence Medical Services, "Sexual Harassment, Military Psychology and Operational Effectiveness"

Discussant: **Anders W. Berggren**, PhD, Swedish National Defence College

Discussion

17:15 - 17:30    Closing Remarks

**Lena P. Kvarving**, Norwegian Defence University College  
**Håkon Tronstad**, Commandant,  
Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College

# Opening Remarks

*Lt Col Lena P. Kvarving*

General, Admiral, Honoured Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen.

I am Lt Col Lena Kvarving, Manager of the Gender project at The Norwegian Defence University College, together with the rest of the Gender Project Team, the Gender Advisors Cecilie Fleming, Anita Schjølset and Ole M. Totland - we will do our best to guide you through the conference today, so please – do not hesitate to ask us questions during the breaks, if there is any way we can be of assistance.

We have an excellent program for you today, so let's get started. First to the welcoming address – The Commander of the Norwegian Defence University College, Rear Admiral Louise Kathrine Dedichen



# Welcoming address

*Rear Admiral Louise K. Dedichen*

Special representative, ladies and gentlemen. As the Commandant of the Norwegian Defence University College I am honoured and proud to welcome you to “Gamle Logen” and to the first international military conference on “Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces and Military Operations”. And to all of our international guests, it is a pleasure to welcome you to Oslo and Norway.

First, I would like to thank each one of you for making this conference a priority and for coming here today. I am especially pleased to welcome all our international guests and contributors, representing national and international organisations and institutions in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Ireland, Estonia, Rwanda, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal, Argentina, Guatemala, Canada and the United States of America.

I am also pleased to welcome all of you from my own organisation. I know how difficult it is to find time in a busy schedule and would therefore like to commend you all for being here.

Finally, I would like to extend my special thanks to those of you who have come here to contribute, as speakers and as participants in the debate. Your commitments and your initiatives are important for us all. I am deeply grateful for your contributions.

I am very proud of our conference program, which includes some of the most significant contemporary authorities on military operations and sexual violence in conflict. We also have with us representatives from our own political and military leadership to help us make this conference not only a theoretical debate, but also provide a pragmatic approach to dealing with sexual violence in military operations.

With your commitment, however, I would like us to focus not only on the work being done in the Norwegian Armed Forces, but also on the challenges that we are all confronted with every day, in the theatres as well as in the political and military decision-making forums.

It is therefore with the deepest respect I ask you to focus on an important and serious matter that have fundamental and comprehensive consequences for thousands of people’s lives; individuals, families and communities around the world, every day.

The conference has been organised by the Gender Project at the Norwegian Defence University College. The project has a mandate to support the Norwegian Armed Forces with the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 and gender perspectives in their military operations.



The project has only been operating since 2010. However, focusing on operationalizing Security Council Resolution 1325 and institutionalizing a gender perspective through our operational education, analysis, structure and planning, the project's initiatives have already had a significant impact on our operational practice.

I would like to thank our associates in the National Defence Staff and National Armed Forces Joint Headquarters who have recognized both the need for responsible leadership and the challenges that our missions are confronted with in theatre. Confronting sexual violence as a crime of war requires not only for us to understand local culture and violent practices, but also for us to redefine our own operational standards as well as our self image as both a war fighting and a peacekeeping organization.

I would also like to thank especially our associates in our Nordic neighbour countries, in NATO and in the UN. The experiences that we share with you, is of great importance to us all, as the implementation processes taking place in the Norwegian Armed Forces need to be rooted in international law and practice. Today, we hope to gain from your experience as well, and that this would help us all to do an even better job.

However, important work remains before we can say we have met our international obligations. Despite our focus here today, and despite the priorities already made, we are in great need of further effort and further commitments, both in the political forums and in the Armed Forces, not at least among our leaders, who are both administrative, operational and social responsible for the organization that we lead and command. And the task of developing guidelines on how to handle sexual violence in our visions has been given our national defence. But the work to operationalize the required standards still remains. And I hope and believe that this conference will contribute positively to this process, and in the long term strengthen our operations, our common responsibility and capability to carry out our mandate.

Sexual violence in warring conflict is not a new phenomenon. Used deliberately, targeted especially on women and girls, this is a well-known strategy for causing physical injury creating lasting traumas and suppresses both individuals and communities, socially and politically, in all types of conflicts.

However, since the mid 1990's we have seen a growing awareness and a greater commitment from the international society to deal with this brutal and destructive part of war. And with the Security Council Resolution 1820, United Nations draw the conclusion that the international community has not taken the responsibility to protect women seriously enough, and children and men affected by rape and sexual violence in wars and conflicts. As a consequence, sexual and gender based violence are still used effectively as a weapon in conflicts around the world every day, even in conflicts where Norway and our allies are involved. And the international criminal court investigation of war crimes

committed by colonel Mohammad Kaddafi's forces in Libya, points precisely to the issue that we want to address with this conference.

How can we, as actors and contributors to international peace and security, protect the victims of sexual violence and prevent the use of sexual violence as a strategic weapon in conflicts in our areas of operation? As leaders, and as contributors to this debate, it is our common responsibilities to take this issue seriously and to implement the measures we believe are necessary to fight these crimes of war. On the other hand, today's widespread acceptance of sexual violence as a natural consequence of war indicates not only a lack of knowledge, but also a lack of responsibility to confront attitudes and values that accept sexual violence, physical or psychological, as a legitimate use of power. As a result, sexual harassment and other forms of sexual and gender based violence also takes place in our own organization. This, again, has great impact, not only in our internal organizational commitments, deterioration of interpersonal relations and decreased moral, but also on military operations itself.

However, little attention has been put to external limitations and consequences of these conditions. Internal incoherence caused by sexual harassment may hamper the effect of the operation and compromise troop security, and it may affect the troops' ability to handle conflict related sexual violence or engage in preventive action against the use of sexual violence. Using our authority and leadership to confront the attitudes, values, and cultural practices that allow sexual harassment to take place, therefore comply with the provisions of the United Nations Security Council's 1325 and 1820, to prevent and protect the civilian population against the use of sexual violence in conflict.

I now have the great honor and opportunity to introduce the most distinguished guest, and also one of the most important authorities on today's topic. United Nation's Secretary General's special representative on sexual violence in conflicts, Miss Margot Wallström. Miss Wallström serves as chair of the inter-agency network, UN Action against sexual violence in conflicts. She has been an advocate of the rights and needs of women throughout her political career. First, as minister in the Swedish government, and later as Environment Commissioner and Vice President of the European Commission. Her many distinctions include several honorary doctorates and awards for work on sustainable development and climate change. She was voted Commissioner of the Year by the European Voice Newspaper in 2002, and in 2004 she co-authored the book "The people's Europe, or why it is so hard to love the EU?" She was also the co-founder of the European Union's inter-institutional group and key supporter of the 50-50 Campaign for Democracy by the European Women's lobby, where she worked to promote a more gender balanced EU. Miss Wallström has long played a leadership role in raising awareness about the urgent need to implement the United Nations Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security and conflict related sexual violence.

Before I leave my word to Miss Wallström, I want to use this opportunity once again to express my deepest gratitude to you all who have made the priority to come here today as participants and contributors to this conference. I sincerely hope that you will enjoy the program, as well as your stay in Oslo, and I wish you all good luck and I look forward to an exciting and interesting day.

Thank you very much for your attention.

# **SRSB on Sexual Violence in Conflict, UN**

*Keynote speaker: Margot Wallström*

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Dear colleagues.

Thank you very much for those kind words of welcome. For me this is indeed a very special occasion. Unthinkable only a few years ago, I guess, that a special representative on conflict-related sexual violence would be invited to a place like this and with an audience like this. So I am going to say a few words about conflict-related sexual violence, but I would actually like to talk about men, because I imagine that most would think this is about women, women being most of the victims and survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, but I really want to talk to you as men.

In the words of one peacekeeper in Darfur: "If you want me to fly, first give me wings and then say if I flew well." What he expressed through this statement is that men as peacekeepers now are expected to do a very different job in many ways and need to be well resourced and prepared. Because most of the peacekeeping mandates today contain a provision about the protection of civilians. If you want to protect civilians, this is not a task that can be gender blind. Civilians are not only men; civilians are also women and children. So it means that you will have to ask: Where do women go? Where do women live? What are women's needs? – in order to be effective. And, of course, this is in the end not only the right thing to do, but it is also very important for the credibility of any peacekeeping operation.

I have observed how for example MONUSCO in the DRC, conducts market escorts that have improved women's sense of security and enabled them to resume trade, and it also allowed men to come with those market escorts. This contributes to development. In Darfur, firewood patrols and the construction of fuel-efficient stoves have reduced the number of rapes. Simple things, but very important: If women are unable to safely collect firewood or access markets or water points, if girls are unable to safely get to school, then socio-economic recovery of course will be stalled. These are the long term effects of not understanding what the protection of civilians mandate really contains. So it has to do with our own credibility, with your own credibility also, as peacekeepers.

I want to say something to men as soldiers and as commanders, because this is really about a response to the changing nature of war and conflict. And, of course, you all here know better, but public opinion I still think assumes that many of today's wars and conflicts are like the traditional ones, with two well-trained, well-disciplined armies on a battle field. But we know that this is not how a modern war or conflict looks. It is very often intra-state, civilian wars, it is between groups that are difficult to control, and it is in very remote

areas or in the jungles of the DRC, for example, and other areas as well. Very rarely are they disciplined or with some kind of command order that is easily identified. That leaves women and children on the frontlines of war. It means that civilians make up most of the casualties.

We met with people in an IDP camp, and we asked them "What about rapes here?", and they said that luckily there were no rapes in the camp. But as soon as women left this camp, they ran a high risk of being attacked, raped and killed. So we asked the men: "Why don't you go with them?" or even: "Why couldn't you make it the men who actually fetch water or fire-wood?" – Which they thought was a hilarious idea. We said: "But why don't you go with them?" They looked a bit surprised and said: "Then we can get attacked!" So does it mean that we sacrifice the women? We know that they will be attacked, but it is a lesser evil than having the men maybe being attacked and killed. Is this how we look at it? Is this what we have arrived at? This is something to discuss and reflect upon.

As commanders, you have to make sure that the message is clearly conveyed that there can be no impunity for this type of crime. "This will not happen on my watch. You will be punished; you will be pursued if you commit such a crime." We should also talk about men as victims, because today men and boys are among the victims of sexual violence; I still remember a young man who we met in the DRC in a panel where we interviewed for a reparation scheme. This young man told us that he did not even know about rape before. He was totally traumatized. He said: "I have nothing left. I have the shirt, the clothes that I have on my body, but that is all." He lost his wife and his child, and is now totally lost in a world that he could no longer really understand and in deep shock over having been gang raped, while hiding in the forest.

This is maybe something that we have to mention more and more often. It is not only, although it is still primarily, women or girls who are victims of sexual violence, but it is also boys and young men. Does this mean that we can mobilize more men to fight with us against sexual violence in war and conflict? I hope so. I hope that it means also that the empathy or the deeper understanding of what kind of crime this is, and what it does to a person's dignity, will help us.

I am talking to men as decision makers, because this is, as I said, not exclusively a women's issue, but a human rights issue. We expect men as decision makers to take this into account, to make sure to make room for women at the table where decisions are being made, to make sure that there is not one peace agreement, peace accord, made without women being present, because you exclude half of the population. And there can be no peace without peace for women. So we have to make sure that we correct the imbalance that has existed over the years, and of course also in recognizing this as a crime and something that you have to follow up, to offer psycho-social counseling to understand the deeper effects of this after the war in trying to restore peace.

I also would like to address men as husbands, village or religious leaders. There is so much still to do to avoid the fact that women are the ones who feel the shame. They are the ones that carry both the blame and the shame of being raped, not the perpetrator. Do we know of any other crime where this is the case? That we put the blame on the victim? Why don't they come forward and report rapes in Libya and other countries? Because they may risk being flogged or accused of adultery. In some countries they risk being stoned, and in some countries the legislation or the informal rules say that you actually need four male witnesses to report a rape. Have you ever heard of somebody reporting a rape case where there are four male witnesses? And if there were four male witnesses, why didn't they intervene and help the woman? But this is the case, so this is of course very effective in making sure that no rape cases are ever reported. There is still so much to do when it comes to legislation and rules to allow for sexual violence to be recognized as the crime that it is.

And, really, this is the basic challenge, to understand that this is not a lesser crime. It has until now been placed lowest in a false hierarchy of war horrors. And even in some trials the perpetrators themselves have expressed this in the words: "But I could have killed her..." So they mean that that would have been worse and this is actually a lesser evil. But women don't look at it that way. Instead, in for example Bosnia, women still tremble when they talk about what was done to them 15-16 years ago. They said to me: "They took my life without killing me. I go on living only because of my children. But my life and my dignity have been taken away." I think it is exactly the same for many men, who are also victims of sexual violence. But we have to understand that it is not a lesser crime, because it affects not only the individual, it affects her family, it affects the whole society. It can also destroy her capacity to contribute to the economy in her village or in her country. And women, as you know, are very often the backbone of the economy of their villages, they are the ones who bring produce to the market etc. So this is what it does. An effect that will be felt for generations to come. But it is not inevitable. I truly believe that we can put an end to it. But it requires that men and women stand side by side to say: "This has to stop. It will end now."

So that is why I will finish with a challenge to all of you here, to Norway and to all of you participants: Why is rape used as a weapon of choice today? We have seen how it can spread fear and terror. We can see how it can be used to displace people. This is what we can see in Libya today, but it is also used for ethnic cleansing, to destroy a village, and to destroy a society.

I expect from you, or I would wish from you, first of all, that you can help to put it or to keep it on the peace and security agenda, and continue to treat it as a peace and security threat. We can continue to describe it as the war crime it is, to make sure that the rules are well-known and respected, to include this in the training on international humanitarian law, which has to include obligations

relating to the protection of women. I think we can spread the good examples, and you will soon hear from Letitia Anderson in my team also how we can do that. I think the MONUSCO market patrols and other examples are good practices that we can make sure are known generally.

I think you can put Norway in the forefront of the fight, and maybe you can also challenge others. I believe that you here demonstrate already the level of gender equality in your country. In this part of the world you demonstrate the professionalism by which you take this on. You demonstrate the kind of discipline we expect from those in uniform. I think that this issue is not yet included in military training everywhere. Maybe you can be the ones who show how it can be done, what kind of modules of training can be inserted or can be added to your curriculum, that this will be a natural part of any education. It has to be done in the kind of scenario-based training that you will hear more about, so that it is realistic, that it is relevant to all the soldiers in any national army or in our training of peacekeepers, so that we see how important an issue it is, and also that we can actually root it out. And with your help, I am convinced that we can.

Thank you very much for listening to me, thank you for inviting me and my team – I think this conference is a great beginning, and I hope that our cooperation will continue.

Thank you very much.

# **Introduction to Minister of Defence Grete Faremo**

*Lt Col Lena Kvarving*

General, Admirals, Honoured Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen.

In order to keep focusing on the important issues presented in resolution 1325 and related resolutions, we need leader commitment. Our next speaker is a shining example of a leader committed to doing the right thing when it comes to resolution 1325, willing to put these issues on the agenda, pursuing results and takes the role as a front runner in issues related to gender perspectives in military operations and equal rights.

She has had an impressive career both in the corporate world and in politics. She has been Minister of Development Cooperation, Minister of Justice and Minister of Oil and Energy – to mention a few, and today she is here in the capacity of Minister of Defence. I am honoured to present to you: Grete Faremo





# Address by Minister of Defence

*Grete Faremo*

Dear All,

Let me start by thanking the "gender-project" at the Norwegian Defence University College for initiating this conference. We need to combine our efforts and skills in order to make progress in the work against sexual violence in conflict. Additionally, greater political determination is needed.

I would like to especially thank Margot Wallström for visiting Norway, attending this conference and for giving such an inspiring lecture. Her unit at the UN is making great progress. And I am convinced that the report she presented today; "UN Action's Analytical Inventory and training guidelines", will benefit us greatly in the future.

Sexual violence demands a broad approach. Our primary focus should be on women's need for protection, in war and armed conflicts. Furthermore, we have to underline the significance of female participation in the prevention and resolution of conflict and in peace-building. Women are both victims and agents of change. This balanced perspective is essential.

Women are particularly vulnerable and often targets in war and armed conflicts. They have had little influence on conflict resolution and peace-building. They now need to be included. Their equal right to participation is undisputed. Furthermore, they have the ability to play an important role. Just look at women's involvement in conflict resolution in Liberia.

It is important to remember that the initiative for resolution 1325 came from those women who had experienced armed conflicts, suppression and physical violence. In some conflict areas, being a woman is more dangerous than being a soldier.

This challenges the traditional concept of security, which traditionally has been state-centric. The new security dimensions do not only concern states, but human security as well.

This begs the question: What does security entail to women?

My address today will firstly focus on why women's need for protection and women's right to participation are important security policy issues and concerns for the Norwegian Armed Forces.

Secondly, I will turn to Norway's implementation of resolution 1325 and the role of the armed forces in this regard.

Norway is engaged in multiple international operations, and our most extensive engagement is currently the operation in Afghanistan. This is not a conflict where sexual violence is being used as a systematic weapon of war. Nevertheless, women's rights have suffered serious setbacks due to 30 years

of civil war, and women in Afghanistan are to a great extent victims of gender based violence.

In other conflicts where Norway has been or is engaged, such as the Balkans and in Africa, sexual violence as a weapon of war is present. And the tales coming out of Libya are alarming. We may be sure of one thing: We will face it again.

We may expect that different parties to armed conflicts in which we are engaged, utilize sexual violence as a weapon of war. What do we do about this? To what degree do our forces address women's need for protection? Can their involvement contribute to enhancing women's involvement in political processes?

Soldiers are role-models and have to behave responsibly when partaking in international operations. Apart from the obvious adherence to the code of conduct, what attitudes and values are they exhibiting? How do they behave toward the women they encounter? How do they behave toward their female comrades? In mentoring local military personnel, what values do they communicate?

Why is it important to have a gender perspective in international operations?

- Better fulfillment of our mandates. Our mandates dictate that we contribute to security for the whole population — women and men alike. This can only be achieved through implementing a gender perspective.

- Human rights. By having a gender perspective, we can better contribute to ensuring the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts.

- Operational effectiveness. Having a gender perspective will enhance the operational effectiveness of our Armed Forces, for instance by contributing to greater situational awareness.

Engaging women is about security and smart policies; about creating the best solutions possible and the most prudent policies. Peace processes where half of the population is excluded are not sustainable.

Women are pivotal in improving local conditions in fields such as health care, food production and education to mention some – and as such in contributing to building democracy and sustainable peace. Around the world, war and peace are too important to be left to men only.

It is counterproductive to neglect women. This is why it is so important for us to counter the occurrence of systematic sexual violence perpetrated against women, as these crimes do not only come at a terrible cost to each of the women - but to the local community as well.

Norway wants to be at the forefront of international efforts to counter systematic use of sexual violence in conflict. This is why I tasked the Norwegian Armed Forces in 2010 to develop guidelines on sexual violence in conflict. This work has not yet been completed, and I look forward to receiving the recommendations.

## **Implementation of 1325/1820 in the Norwegian Armed Forces**

How do we implement the obligations laid out in resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions in our armed forces and in international operations?

In 2007, the Norwegian Armed Forces were directed to implement resolution 1325. And it is no secret that the armed forces have struggled with realizing this task.

This is why we have produced a list of 21 measures for the defence sector to assist the implementation. We must turn words into action.

Our focus is first and foremost on the application of a gender perspective in operations. We need to increase knowledge about what this entails. An institutional and holistic approach is required.

Secondly, we must hold military leaders accountable. And let me be clear on this. I want all leaders of all ranks in the Armed Forces to implement this. Personal preferences concerning the relevance of 1325 have no place here. I want to see leaders instructing their units and demanding results. I want to see military leaders at conferences like this one. There is much here to learn, for them as well.

Thirdly, we are working to recruit more women. Female soldiers and officers are important assets for doing a better job in operations abroad in general, and also in relation to 1325, as recognized by, and called for in resolution 1325. That said, we need to stress that implementing 1325 is the responsibility of the entire international community – not just that of women or female military personnel.

I often hear people in the Armed Forces complain that resolution 1325 is ambiguous. How can we be more concise? This entails how our soldiers patrol, who they talk to, who they meet, how they create security around areas where women meet, and how they can provide protection for girls on their way to and from school. We have to understand women's security needs in order to meet them. And we have to listen to women to ensure those needs are met. By engaging women we gain a better understanding of the situation where our soldiers operate. At the same time, we must ensure that our approach does not expose the women to risks they themselves are not prepared to face.

Let me add that if 1325 and all it entails sounds complicated and ambiguous – well, then, take the time to educate yourself and your staff. A conference such as this one provides an excellent opportunity. I salute all those attending the conference today.

## **Institutional Approach**

If we are to succeed with the implementation of 1325, we will need the organization on our side.

This in turn means that the Norwegian Armed Forces must strengthen its ability to include a gender perspective in the planning, execution and evaluation of operations, as well as training and education.

Prior to an operation, a gender-analysis of the area of operation should be conducted. Routine instructions on how soldiers and officers should behave in the field must be reviewed and revised. And eventually reporting must include gender-specific activities.

We will support academic discourse on the subject, to gain more knowledge on the issue. We will consider coaching leaders and other key personnel. We will recruit more women to operational units. By the end of 2011, guidelines for countering sexual violence in war and armed conflicts will be in place.

Implementing a gender perspective in military operations is largely about changing attitudes and gaining a new perspective on how we perceive our military missions. It is demanding work. Which is why I am exceptionally pleased with the Gender-Project at our Defence University College. Ever since its launch a year and a half ago, the staff has been working diligently with lecturing and educating the armed forces. Attitudes can only be changed through knowledge and experience, and by making our military leaders prime stakeholders in this endeavor. They cannot rely solely on the Defence University College to do the job. They must themselves seek the knowledge and pass it on to their unit.

To carry out 1325 our forces are engaging local women. We are identifying possible female agents of change. We are meeting with local women leaders and representatives in our PRT in Meymaneh, we are improving the competence of our personnel and we have established new positions and functions. We are starting to report on the progress of our work.

We have a gender field advisor in our PRT in Meymaneh, who is dedicated towards ensuring the integration of a gender perspective in our operations. The gender field advisor is leading the female engagement team in the PRT.

Additionally, we have a full-time Gender Advisor in the ISAF HQ. And we are deploying an officer to the NATO Training Mission — Afghanistan (NTM-A) in Kabul. He will advise Afghan officers and police about gender and human rights. This is an excellent example of how 1325 is not only about women, but equally about men, our male soldiers and local male powerbrokers.

Much work remains. In Afghanistan our approach should be permeated by a gender perspective – not just from a few specialists, but from the entire organisation.

Our military forces are training and mentoring the Afghan forces to protect and respect local woman. By doing so, we hope to influence men's attitudes towards women. The latter is probably the most important part of what we do to prevent sexual violence against women. The brutal sexual assaults against women in the Congo and other countries are not only part of military strategies. They are expressions of sexual aggression and hatred against women.

This is why Defence and Security Sector Reform is such an important measure to prevent sexual violence against women. It is an important tool in assuring a continued focus on gender – and it is key to making important

changes possible. I believe this tool has not yet been used to its full capacity. Norway is deeply committed to Security Sector Reform, in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, in the Horn of Africa and we are considering stepping up our efforts in Sudan. From the defence side, this is one of the most important measures we undertake to contribute to the implementation of resolution 1820.

### **A larger portion of women in the Norwegian Armed Forces**

Resolution 1325 calls for an increase of the number of female military personnel in the armed forces. More women will ensure a more competent force, a broader spectrum of competence. Research shows that women have a tendency to be more dialogue-oriented and may bring a different mindset to conflict resolution and prevention. Furthermore, female military personnel often send important signals to the local population. Increased recruitment of women provides the armed forces with more tools for the toolbox.

We know one thing; we are no better abroad than we are at home. If the leaders and employees of the armed forces are not conscious about equality and human rights, such issues may be easily forgotten in operations. We not only bring our weapons, we also carry our values. Let us be aware of and honor these values.

We have a job to do at home as well. According to a new survey, sexual harassment and assault occurs in the Norwegian Armed Forces. We have various surveys showing different figures. Typically, the number of women who have experienced such treatment is significantly higher than men. Now we are working to find out more. Such findings are completely unacceptable. Appropriate measures are being implemented.

Let me assure you that I will monitor progress in this area. It is related to today's topic. There is a limit as to what we tolerate — among our own, alliance partners or local associates. On several occasions, the ISAF command has expressed criticism about Afghan development adverse to the promotion of women's rights. ISAF is not willing to defend governments regardless of their agenda or human rights record. Therefore, we cannot either. Let me remind you that if we neglect women and women's rights we actually make a conscious choice — for the suppressors of women.

### **Conclusion**

I hope this will be a day of learning for us all. I would like to finish by thanking the Norwegian Defence University College for organizing this conference. Today's conference is historic in its focus and expertise.

Let me call on all good forces to combine in the effort to combat sexual violence in war and conflict. We have our work cut out for us!

Thank you for your attention.



**Session 1**  
**Conceptual Framework for Handling  
and Responding to Sexual Violence**





# **UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, "Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: The Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice and Scenario-based Training for Peacekeepers"**

*Letitia Anderson*

Thank you, I am delighted to be here. I think when it comes to gender equality and advancing women's rights, military institutions are often regarded as the 'final frontier'. But in the context of conflict-related sexual violence as a Protection of Civilians challenge, the security sector - including military components - has a critical role to play and a critical impact on women's security.

Dag Hammarskiöld, the second UN Secretary-General once said: "Peacekeeping is too important to be undertaken by soldiers, but soldiers are the only ones who can do it." Clearly, in integrated peacekeeping missions, soldiers are not the only actors, but they are one important piece of the overall protection puzzle. This is especially true when mass rapes occur in remote, volatile areas that can only be reached by well-equipped patrols – in places where it might be too precarious even for police or humanitarian actors to operate. In this context, the quote I mentioned captures a central tension between the training soldiers generally receive, often in conventional war fighting, and the complex demands of contemporary multi-dimensional, multi-faceted peacekeeping operations. The latter often require close interaction and consultation with host communities, as well as the ability to respond to new and non-conventional security threats.

As you may know, conflict-related sexual violence has recently been recognized by the UN Security Council as a tactic of war, a threat to security, and an impediment to peace-building. The Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice, which is the document that I will discuss today, captures some of the promising practices, tasks and tactics by the military components of peacekeeping missions to address it.

To put this recent progress in perspective, it is worth recalling that sexual violence has traditionally flown under the radar of regional and international security institutions. It has, for a long time, been dismissed as the random, isolated acts of a few renegades, an inevitable byproduct of war or merely part of wars' collateral damage. Over the past three years, however, it has been decisively elevated to a place on the agenda of the world's paramount peace and security body, the UN Security Council. This is reflected in a series of

resolutions that represent a breakthrough in Security Council practice, namely 1820 (of 2008), 1888 (of 2009) and 1960 (adopted in December 2010). As a result, sexual violence has increasingly been featured in Protection of Civilians mandates given by the Security Council to UN peacekeeping missions. This has resulted in a dramatically increased political and media profile for an issue once called ‘history’s greatest silence’.

From having long been considered the world’s least condemned war crime, sexual violence is now central to a number of ICC (International Criminal Court) investigations, including at the level of command responsibility, as seen in the Bemba trial concerning the conflict in the Central African Republic. In the peacekeeping arena, sexual violence as a tactic of war by belligerents and spoilers to the peace has tended to be conflated with, or even eclipsed by, the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers themselves, which has a much higher media profile. In 2009, when our team travelled to various peacekeeping missions to broach the subject of proactive responses to sexual violence as a tactic of war, we had to spend the first half of every meeting explaining that we weren’t there to point the finger at military components themselves regarding conduct and discipline, but that we were talking about preventing and deterring sexual violence as a proactive protection task.

Moreover, the knowledge base on the causes and consequences of sexual violence has traditionally been one-sided. It has been largely based on the anecdotal experiences of survivors, rather than on an understanding of the motivations of the perpetrators, the restraining and enabling factors that relate to the conduct of armed groups, State and non-State actors. This is particularly important, because we cannot prevent what we don’t adequately understand.

The UN now has a mandate to engage in dialogue directly with State and non-State actors to obtain protection commitments to refrain from sexual violence and to leverage the credible threat of listing, that is the ‘naming and shaming’ or ‘blacklisting’ of perpetrators, and of sanctions. This enables us, especially with armed groups that have a political agenda or political aspirations, to leverage concerns related to their international image, as well as the threat of measures like travel bans and asset freezes, to try to effect behavioral change.

Most dramatically, there has, in recent years, been a shift from sexual violence being seen as exclusively a women’s issue, relegated to what is often called “the pink ghetto of gender”, to viewing this in a Protection of Civilians paradigm. This paradigm shift is important because it opens the door to a broader constituency or set of stakeholders, and breaks down the traditional schism between ‘hard security’ and ‘human security’. It underscores that the ‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda is indivisible from the agenda of ‘International Peace and Security’. It shifts the terms of the debate from reacting to sexual violence like any other tragedy or public health problem, to preventing sexual violence like any other security threat. As a result, I think we have seen

a genuine mainstreaming of this issue. Increasingly, we see sexual violence included on the agenda of meetings about the Protection of Civilians, on civil-military coordination (CIMIC) conferences and of meetings such as this one. I think cultivating non-traditional champions, such as Generals, as well as gender experts, is an important part of this process. Peers speak most persuasively to peers. And this is particularly true in military and police circles.

In his 2007 report on the Protection of Civilians, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon pointed to “the lives destroyed by sexual violence in conflict” as exemplifying our collective failure to ensure effective protection. He stated: “In no other area is our collective failure to ensure effective protection for civilians more apparent than in terms of the masses of women and girls whose lives are destroyed each year by sexual violence perpetrated in conflict”. Similarly, in 2008, General Patrick Cammaert, a former Force Commander – in the quote that is shown on the slide –said that “it has probably become more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier in contemporary conflicts”, and that, when he was Deputy Force Commander of MONUC, the sexual violence that he witnessed in Eastern Congo was among the worst atrocities he had ever seen in over thirty years of military service.

When people from the military speak like this, it resonates broadly with other members of the military and opens new doors for engagement. General Cammaert made these remarks at a 2008 Wilton Park conference, at which we posed the question: What role can military components play in preventing and addressing conflict-related sexual violence? It became clear from that discussion, involving peacekeepers with recent or active service, that they had developed enterprising solutions and responses in the face of sexual violence in their areas of operation rather than be bystanders to atrocity. However, these responses were largely improvised and ad hoc, and members of the military were clear that they cannot continue to operate in an environment of ambiguity: that is, in the absence of doctrine, in the absence of clear training, and in the absence of explicit mandates.

Our team then visited several peacekeeping missions to try to validate some of the tactics and tasks that we had collected. In June 2010, these were launched as the Analytical Inventory that is available today. This document is essentially a compilation of promising practices. We don’t call them ‘best practices’, because we are still at a stage when we cannot definitively say these practices have been experienced by women as ‘best’; the aim is simply to capture strategies that have been employed in field missions and convert them into scenario-based training on the ‘how to’ of sexual violence prevention and response. This training will enable peacekeepers to recognize and react more swiftly and appropriately to sexual violence as part of their operational readiness standards. The exercises also provide a tangible demonstration that prevention is possible.

This new training package has been pitched to Troop Contributing Countries as part of a concerted effort to give peacekeepers the tools they need to succeed. The scenarios aim to immerse potential peacekeepers in a hypothetical situation, asking them to formulate appropriate courses of action (COA). So, for example: the scenario is provided that women are routinely being robbed and raped on their way back from market in your area of operations. How do you respond within your Rules of Engagement and mandate? How do you link up with other mission components, like Police, Human Rights, or Civil Affairs? How do you take steps to prevent the repetition of such violence in future? This invites participants to think through how they would respond if confronted with that reality. The training package consists not only of case studies, Power Points and scenarios, but also of film clips to show prospective peacekeepers, who may never have left Dhaka or New Delhi and are about to be deployed to Darfur or the DRC, what the operating environment or ‘risk environment’ actually looks like. And, more specifically, what it looks like through the eyes of women.

The UN has established a ‘mobile training support team’ to roll this training out in major Troop Contributing Countries at their request, and in 2012 we hope to do an evaluation by going back to relevant peacekeeping missions to find out whether this increased recognition and attention to good practice has created a virtuous cycle of greater confidence, better preparedness and improved practice over time in confronting the challenge of sexual violence as a tactic of war and terror. In assessing the evolution of practice, it will also be important to identify residual gaps and challenges. The Inventory is conceived as a continual work in progress, given the changing face of conflict and the evolving nature of peacekeeping missions. We continually have to adapt training standards to suit the circumstances. The Inventory and indicative training scenarios reflect the reality that we are facing a moving target.

I will highlight just some of the tasks and tactics reflected in the Inventory. Some of the short-term, kinetic examples include: preventive physical patrols and protection tailored to women’s mobility patterns, such as firewood patrols, water-route patrols, and market escorts. Examples from eastern DRC include sealing off the market entrance for the duration of women’s trade, so that there would be a ‘weapons free zone’ in which women could work safely. There have been various levels of success associated with these patrols depending on how well they are coordinated with women’s movements, whether women are aware of the timing or calendar of patrols in advance, whether there are women who are able to accompany the patrols so they are not seen as intimidating, and whether effective outreach to women civilians is undertaken beforehand. Also, we need to think critically about the quality, not just the quantity, of patrols: Are we talking about patrols on foot that really penetrate into the community, and night patrols in places where women are not safe, or is it just a matter of

going from point A to point B on the main artery in your APC?

We also documented innovations like Joint Protection Teams, namely mechanisms for increased civilian-military interface or patrolling from a joint team-site, quick impact projects (QIPs) and substitution efforts like the provision of fuel-efficient stoves, which reduces the need for women to venture beyond camp perimeters, at great personal risk, to collect firewood. This technique also reduces the need to disperse the force and dilute troop density by sending patrols out after every group of women who goes in search of fuel. So in essence, this substitution or quick impact project doubles as a kind of front-end prevention tactic.

Other interesting practices involve working with communities to enable them to raise the alarm swiftly in the face of emerging threats, so-called ‘village vigilance’ or ‘village defence committees’ that can activate a quick reaction force to dispatch to the area in a timely manner, and cordon and search operations that demonstrate how liaison with women can enhance situational awareness regarding the location of threats or weapons caches. Equally important are improved community liaison strategies, such as making sure that we don’t just consult with the first Sheik or other male elder who steps forward, but consult in a way that is representative of the community as a whole. In fact, consulting with women can set an example and set the tone for the rest of the community, showing that women are valued contributors to the consolidation of peace, and that they have a voice in matters of security. Often the behavior of peacekeepers is emulated by the community – indeed, the presence of women in peacekeeping missions can serve a positive role-modeling effect. For example, the all-female Formed Police Unit (FPU) in Liberia is widely credited with helping to triple the number of women applying to join the Liberian National Police Force. In addition, the all-female FPU took certain proactive measures like community self-defence and security awareness training for women at a number of schools and community centers, in a context where rape remains the most frequently reported crime many years after the close of civil conflict.

It is clear from the research undertaken in the course of compiling the Inventory, that peacekeepers often have an indirect or derivative role in securing the environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid, including logistical support in transporting PEP kits (Post-Exposure Prophylaxis) to prevent HIV transmission after acts of sexual violence, given these need to reach survivors within 72 hours. They can also play a role in supporting gender-sensitive camp design and management, as we know that the location of lighting and latrines in refugee or displaced persons camps can have a security dividend for women, as can efforts to ensure that camps are constructed in a way that is responsive to women’s specific security concerns.

In the context of DDR processes, following up on ex-combatants who have been reinserted into civilian communities can be an important protection acti-

vity. A number of women in the DRC told me that 50 dollars a month does not convert a combatant into a civilian; sometimes it converts them into a more proximate threat to civilians, because they continue the patterns of violent conduct and predation acquired during years of conflict. So it becomes important to ask the questions: What follow-up can we do to support communities receiving and reintegrating former combatants, and what options are available to ex-combatants in terms of employment and vocational training? Also, it has been shown that having more women at DDR cantonment sites makes women who have been associated with armed forces more likely to come forward and participate in the disarmament process. There have also been examples where peacekeepers have intervened to secure the release of women who have been held as sexual slaves or in trafficking scenarios. In sum, there are a range of tasks and tactics used to combat sexual violence, and there are different ways of executing these tasks and tactics in different operational settings.

When we considered why one practice seemed more effective than another, it was generally due to the following ten common concerns, listed in the Inventory as ‘Ten Emerging Elements for Effective Response’. The first is when the mission has the ability to ‘see’ the risks facing women and girls and conducts gender analysis as a routine part of security assessments. Often you only see what you are looking for, and sexual violence may be invisible in chaotic, conflict-affected settings, often brutally and deliberately silenced, so carrying out a basic gender analysis can enhance the situational awareness of the force, and is a basis for giving better advice to your commanders to inform planning decisions.

Secondly, exemplary leadership on the part of the Force Commander has a significant impact on whether the force will be responsive to this issue. The third point is that training without the ability or willingness to respond is nugatory: there must be willingness and wherewithal to respond to sexual violence even in unconventional spaces, such as private or semi-public spaces. Fourth, community-driven strategies and close community liaison, including through having female interpreters available, can help to ensure meaningful dialogue including with local women who are typically hardest to reach, which has a huge impact on the overall effectiveness of the strategies. Fifth, a policy of promoting gender balance in the process of force generation helps to ensure more women are deployed as uniformed or civilian peacekeepers and as military observers. Women tend to have a comparative operational advantage in sexual violence outreach and response, which enhances the ability of the force to reach the community as a whole.

The sixth factor involves recognizing and rewarding promising practice and profiling successful initiatives while imposing consequences for non-performance or omission. Seventh, it is critical to engage in capacity building of the national authorities, the role of the UN being not to supplant, but to support,

the national security sector and to leave a legacy of a security sector that is accessible and responsive to women. Building national capacity to prevent and punish sexual violence should be part of the exit strategy of any peacekeeping missions. The eighth factor is robust coordination with other protection stakeholders; humanitarians often have better proximity to the affected communities. Ninth is clear guidance on mandate interpretation and how sexual violence fits within the Rules of Engagement (or ROE), so the various responsibilities are clear, from command to platoon level. Finally, the tenth emerging element for a successful intervention is to ensure personnel undergo scenario-based training, like the modules that we have recently developed, requiring participants to engage in the thought process of applying the ROE to the situation at hand. Such training can help uniformed peacekeepers to be operationally ready to confront sexual violence as a war tactic and impediment to the restoration of security. Pre-deployment and in-mission training, coupled with adequate human and materiel resources, is critical to success.

They say in the Australian Defence Force, and I believe it is a widely used expression, that “if the only tool in your box is a hammer, all your problems look like nails”. The point is that contemporary peacekeepers need more in their tool box than a hammer. There may be a need to be more creatively configured for so-called ‘soft soldiering’, having more logistical and engineering capacity, having more level-hospitals, being able to build the trust and the confidence of the community, often referred to as ‘winning hearts and minds’, or ensuring that a peace and security dividend flows equally to all components of the host community, including women and girls.

In the case of the mass rape in Walikale in Eastern Congo last July and August, the forces had actually been in the area for less than one month, others have told me less than one week, when the atrocities occurred. So if we wait for in-mission training, it will always be too late. There is a great need for pre-deployment training as part of operational awareness. And the aim is really to replace improvisation with systematization. I would not say ‘standardization’, because often best practice replicated in inappropriate circumstances, can become worst practice, or, as we call it in the UN, ‘lessons learned’, (as you can imagine, we rarely say ‘worst practice’ in UN language!). The point is that we need to systematize and normalize the response, without prescribing a ‘one size fits all’ approach, when clearly there is a need to tailor strategies to suit the context.

On the slide is a quick snapshot of how the Inventory is being rolled out today. It has been presented in Bangladesh, Nepal and India, some of the largest UN troop contributors, and also presented at the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Training Centre. We have planned a briefing to all Military Advisors of Permanent Missions to the UN in New York.

In terms of some future directions for our collective efforts to combat sexual



violence – I think the Inventory is an example of the importance of capturing and disseminating success stories, not just horror stories. I think it is much more motivating to show the modest interventions that can actually have an impact and make a difference, especially as sexual violence has been steeped in a sense of historical inevitability. Obviously, peacekeeping is never the panacea and the point is to work with national authorities and mobilize them to end sexual violence. Finding effective ways to engage with non-State actors and armed groups is an on-going challenge, but there are cases where sexual violence has not been used in a conflict scenario by an armed group. That is, there are negative and asymmetrical cases we could look into to inquire why rape was not part of the repertoire of violence, and how an armed group managed to narrow its repertoire of violence to exclude certain atrocities against civilians. Reflecting on variation in this way underscores that rape in war is not inevitable. Another forward-looking challenge is the need to obtain real-time information (or intelligence) for prevention and real-time response. There is also a need for sustained political resolve and resources to ensure that we are not continually asking peacekeepers to do more with less.

Let me give one concrete example, in case there are any cynics sitting in the back of the room, which highlights how the Security Council resolutions have actually been applied for real-world impact. In the mass rapes in Walikale, eastern DRC, which attracted unprecedented media, public and political outrage, the Security Council responded in a way that I have never seen before in almost ten years of working on this issue. They hosted an Open Debate, which featured the Assistant Secretary-General of DPKO and the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict followed by a closed consultation where they looked at concrete recommendations for improving the response. As a result of that, sexual violence is now included on the front page of all SITREPS, that is Situation Reports, transmitted from the field to headquarters. They also discussed how to improve communication, how to make sure there are community liaison interpreters affiliated with the military component, and how to intensify patrols in the affected area. The Security Council issued public statements expressing a willingness to impose targeted and graduated measures (meaning, sanctions) against the perpetrators and following the visit of the SRSG to the DRC, we saw a high-profile arrest, with MONUSCO support, of so-called “Lt. Colonel” Mayele of the Mai-Mai, who was allegedly associated with the mass rapes. We have seen increasingly swift and serious responses to cases of mass rape as a core part of collective efforts to protect civilians and to deliver a comprehensive response to the needs of survivors.

Ultimately, practical tools like the Inventory and scenario-based training modules are efforts to translate the normative, policy and legal progress we have seen at the global level into improved security at the level of the village in Eastern Congo, the IDP camp in Darfur, the hinterlands of Liberia, or the

mountains of Afghanistan. This is in recognition of the fact that there can be no security without women's security. In other words, enhancing women's safety enhances situational awareness, it enhances force protection by building trust and confidence with the host community, and it enhances your prospects for mission success. As the Inventory shows, the new Security Council resolutions calling for an end to sexual violence are not just aspirational – they are operational.

Thank you.



# NATO's Action Plan for Implementing UNSCR 1325

*Loredana Alemanno-Testa, NATO HQ*

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much for having invited me to this conference. I am really honored to speak to such a distinguished audience. Today I would like to brief you on what NATO has accomplished with regard to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 into its NATO-led operations and missions.

As you know, each NATO Ally contributes to the ISAF and KFOR operations. Each Ally individually adheres to the principles of the UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions, including the one on children in armed conflict and sexual violence in armed conflict.

Since 2010, and therefore I would say that it is rather recent, NATO as an Alliance has been looking to find ways to implement these resolutions into NATO-led operations and missions in a collective manner. This initiative gained momentum on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of UNSCR 1325 last year. At that time, a number of defence ministers approached the NATO Secretary General, Mr Rasmussen, to draw his attention to the fact that it was time for NATO to have a coordinated approach to this issue. The Secretary General himself became a champion of this and he support the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 in a very concrete fashion. In fact, we pride ourselves in saying that on this topic NATO is aiming at tangible outcomes from the outset. I am going to explain to you how and why.

In fact, in order to meet the requirements of defence ministers the Allies, together with ISAF and KFOR non-NATO contributing countries, worked very hard to define an action plan that would allow a generic implementation of UNSCR 1325 in NATO Operations , as well as a specific implementation in these two particular operations. As you can see on this slide, the NATO Action Plan was endorsed at the highest possible level at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, in November 2010. It was elaborated in the Operations Policy Committee – you know that NATO works by committees and reaches decisions by consensus. The Operations Policy Committee is one of the highest bodies of the Alliance and reports directly to the North Atlantic Council. It includes national representatives from both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence. The OPC provides strategic political- military advice to the Council on all issues related to operations and therefore it made perfect sense to ask the OPC to take on board the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in NATO-led operations and missions.

The concrete aspects of the NATO Action Plan are to be underlined. The Plan

contains approximately thirty goals and within each goal there are a number of actions that are expected. NATO entities and committees are identified to lead in each particular item and they are also responsible for reporting progress.

The Plan is very much focused on operations and is structured in a way that easily identifies actions to be conducted as part of crisis management and operational planning, training and exercises, and the conduct of operations in ISAF and KFOR. It reflects a top-down approach in the sense that it was mandated by Heads of State and Government. It assigns specific responsibilities to NATO bodies such as the International Staff (of which I am a member), the International Military Staff, and NATO Commands throughout their long chain of command.

It does expect deliverables by specific deadlines. There are no ifs or buts: all those NATO bodies and NATO staffs have to deliver.

The Operations Policy Committee imposes a very tight battle rhythm, and in fact, as we speak, the Action Plan is being revised. It has to be revised initially every six months and indeed we have now completed the first six months of its implementation. Furthermore, as you can see from this slide, we must produce a progress report to Foreign Ministers by December 2011 and to the next NATO Summit.

What are the challenges and the strengths of the Action Plan? As I said, the strength of course is that it is mandated top-down, that it defines who needs to do what, by when. But there are a number of challenges that come with it. As you may imagine, the implementation of the Action Plan requires the intervention of many actors at different levels, ranging from the strategic level at NATO HQ itself, to NATO Commands and their own chain of command, and to the Office of the Senior Civilian Representative in the case of Afghanistan. Therefore, one of the biggest challenges is to collect all the good work that is being done at each level and make sure that we can derive some best practices.

To this purpose we have organized a number of activities and among these are briefings by the Nordic countries - In fact, I must compliment you, the Nordic countries: You are much more advanced with regard to gender perspectives than many other countries - We would like to offer the Nordic countries a forum to be a role model. We have invited for example a Swedish Mobile Observing team to brief the OPC. Through their eyes, the political and military masters of NATO have been able to see how the inclusion of female soldiers can impact in a very positive way the conduct of the ISAF operation, as well as have a positive influence on the lives of ordinary women in Afghanistan.

It is important that the effects of adopting a gender perspective in operations be tangible and valuable for the achievement of mission objectives. As you may imagine, another big challenge is to convince certain commanders of the usefulness of dedicated gender advisors in the chain of command. In every country resources are scarce and in NATO operations the situation is

not different. Therefore it is very important to make sure that through our work, through the implementation of the Action Plan, we can answer two key questions: How can commanders benefit from the role of gender advisors in conducting an operation in a hostile environment? How can gender advisors and their commanders impact positively the lives of local women – the other half of the population, that is- so that they can indeed win the hearts and minds of 100 per cent of the population?

In order to facilitate progress reporting, we intend to organize a number of events at NATO HQ (seminars or workshops). NATO countries have not yet discussed this opportunity, but the International Staff will propose to gather both the theorists and the practitioners of gender perspectives and draw up a list of best practices, so that we can identify what has been done, what has worked well in operational areas and what has not, with a view to providing a better guidance to our political masters as well as to our commanders in the field.

As UNSCR 1960 was adopted just after the Lisbon Summit, this particular resolution is not mentioned in the Action Plan. However, the Action Plan does refer to the UNSCR 1325 and its related resolutions. Indirectly, this subject is tackled in there as well. For example, there are two goals in the Action Plan and they relate to Afghanistan. One of these is the following: The chain of command is to issue guidance so that gender perspective is taken into account in capacity building programs under the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan. This means that we are encouraging the recruitment of Afghan women in the Afghan National Police. As you know, female police can have a crucial role in preventing sexual violence or ensuring that sexual violence is addressed as soon as it happens. Although this is of course an Afghan-led process, we encourage the hiring of a greater number of Afghan female police, because their role in patrolling or their role in holding for example female shuras is very much a means to prevent and combat sexual violence and to be closer to the female community, which in the traditional Afghan culture is not usually listened to.

I would like to point out that NATO also has other initiatives. There is – and you can find it on the website – a Bi-Strategic Command Directive for integrating UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in the NATO command structure, including measures for protection during armed conflict. There is also a policy which has been elaborated at the level of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. It is being reviewed as we speak. Then there is a NATO building integrity initiative which is being implemented with the cooperation of the Afghan government, which provides support for a broad range of activities to combat corruption and promote good government. In this particular case NATO will host an event for Afghan businesses led by women.

Therefore, as you can see, we are in the process of implementing UNSCR 1325 and gender perspectives in NATO operations through a wide spectrum of actions and initiatives which aim not only at changing the mind sets of our

political masters and commanders, but also at influencing the local population so that they also change their own mind set and improve the lives of local, ordinary women.

Thank you very much.

# Training Military Personnel to Respond to Sexual Violence

*Ann Livingstone, PhD, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre*

Good morning. Let me thank the organizers on behalf of the Pearson Centre for the kind invitation to be here. It is quite an honor and I am very pleased. I do also want to apologize for my attire; I do know how to dress for conferences, but my luggage has gone walk-about some place and I have no idea where it may show up.

Training military personnel to respond to sexual and gender based violence is a part of the PPC's work with uniformed personnel. We have been working with police since 2004, military personnel since 2008, and we conduct training in places like Congo and Darfur and in Latin-America. We use applied research, we use lessons learned and good practices that many of you in this room provide. Our approach to training is based on adult learning methodology that we know is very useful. Adults remember 90 per cent of what they do and 20 per cent of what they hear. So scenario based training using case studies is the way that we work. I make my staff limit Power Points to no more than six, and the rest of the time is spent in small groups and in working through case studies.

The structure of the presentation today is: I want to just briefly touch on the changing nature of conflict, look at the impact of conflict on women, the role for military personnel of training, and some recommendations that we have created over time.

Because I am an academic, I think context is very important, and I think we sometimes forget the magnificent changes that occurred with the end of the cold war, when inter-state conflict of warfare came to basically an end, and we now have intra-state conflict. However, I would suggest that much of our training within our military frameworks and with the military colleagues and to some degree with police still assumes that the enemy is going to come through the Fulda Gap and we need to be prepared for that. But in reality, when we look at intrastate conflict I would suggest that what we face is what General Rupert Smith named war amongst the people, and is by far a better way of thinking about how we need to train for this landscape of conflict.

When we talk about sexual violence, I think we are oftentimes disquieted by the topic and we lump it together as mass rape or mass something, rather than looking at the various kinds of sexual violence there is that we are going to have to deal with. Each one of these has a different response that is going to be needed by the first responder being a military peacekeeper or a police



peacekeeper. Having a clear idea of what this mean will affect how we train, how we think, how we respond, and fundamentally how we listen.

We can also talk about the impact on women, and I can give you statistics, and we can all talk about statistics. But I find that statistics are very numbing. 50 000 of that and 75 000 of something else, and 200 000 of something else, makes us inured to the reality that behind every number is a face. And behind every face is a family. And behind every family is a history. And behind every history is a contributor to peace and security. So I would like for us, when we talk about this subject, to really understand the variations on the theme that there is on sexual and gender based violence.

We also find that many of the individuals that come as peacekeepers themselves have experienced the greatest violation of their being. They never had a chance to deal with it, and that also complicates the landscape.

As we have thought about how we prepare people to be trained to be good peacekeepers military and police, we have come up with a model that we think is quite useful in training. We use a conflict tree to assess the factors which impact on how we train peacekeepers to respond to sexual violence as a tool of war. There is a difference between a cause and a factor that contribute to vulnerability. I am going to use the phrase "uniformed peacekeepers" that get my military colleagues and my police colleagues in the same category. We tend to think of factors that contribute to and causes of a little bit differently, so one of the first things we have to do with them is to say, right, this is what you are dealing with, there are whole series of factors whether it is cultural, or religious, or historic, or economic, or the socially constructed roles that you are dealing with. That is a factor that you look at. And how you listen, how you observe, how you data-collect, how you do your intelligence gathering impacts on responding to sexual and gender based violence. There are causes, whether it was an economic border crossing, or whether it was an inter-tribal warfare, or whether it was something about stealing a chicken from somebody else that created the sexual response or violence response. That is a cause. Knowing what you are looking for will impact on how you think of training and how you think of responding. It will impact on you as a military and police person for how you do your particular work.

We spend quite a bit of time on this, understanding what the acts are, the variety of acts, what the causes and factors are, and then: What is the impact in your area of operations? How does this affect the peace and security? How is this going to have a long-term impact on your mission, and how is it going to have an impact on how you mentor, work with, advise your national counterparts. Because many of the mandates now have the military or police doing advising and working with their counterparts.

We tell them that we can never be far removed from the notion that "you are going to leave". The folks that stay are going to have to live with the impact

of your having been there. So make sure that the response you have to sexual and gender based violence is the appropriate response that has credibility and legitimacy and does not destroy the mission. That is quite a sobering moment in the training, and we spend about literally half a day on this, with a whole series of exercises and activities. They get a small burst of information and they go off into small groups and some scenarios and try to sort their laundry list of how they would respond to this issue.

Because we are talking specifically about our colleagues here, I would suggest to you that the key role of military personnel has shifted dramatically with the change into intra-state conflict. First of all, the military responsibility for creating a secure environment has not changed. But how they do that, secure the environment, has changed, I would suggest. In today's armed conflict context, oftentimes military peacekeepers are the first point of contact with local populations, and oftentimes maybe the first point of contact with victims of sexual violence. So when we are talking about that role that is a substantively different role than perhaps my colleague Fred was trying to do.

How do you patrol in this kind of environment? How do you investigate in this kind of environment? What is the procedure and policy and protocols to being a first responder. How do you listen? How do you interview a woman? How do you interview a child? How do you interview a man? How to ask the right question will oftentimes have an impact on how you are viewed as legitimate or credible. As a military peacekeeper, you want to be, you must be, legitimate and credible.

The military peacekeepers oftentimes are mandated to help influence national security forces through training and mentoring. How you respond is being observed. If your response is to marginalize this as "the girl thing" or "we really don't know what to do, so we do very little" is observed by the very individuals who are going to have to take up this mantle when the mission is gone. So this business of knowing how your roles have changed becomes even more critical.

Where are the woman peacekeepers? If you look at the statistics in terms of women involvement in military and police peacekeeping, it is relatively small. The idea of recruiting female military peacekeepers and female police officers is also important.

Another issue that we look at when we talk about the changing role of military personnel is how to do the trend analysis? How to do reliable data gathering? How do you do intelligence gathering by walking around the market? What do you mean by monitoring movements? How do you observe? What are you observing? Do you know what to look for? How do you profile a perpetrator? Is the area with former child soldiers? Is it an economic drive? What is the profile of the perpetrator? What are the common characteristics of the attacks – because there is always a pattern! What are the co-ordinations that you have with your police colleagues, both inside mission and outside mission?

Oftentimes the military response to the training is "But that's not our job". Our response is "It is your job", because the world has shifted on its axes.

When we do gender training at the PPC, we have a model that is used for the police training. As we are getting ready to go to the Congo in July, this is the integrated training that we are doing with military and police in the same classroom with the smattering of civilians, which I think is going to be extraordinarily exciting. The focus of that course is going to be: What is actually SGBV?<sup>1</sup> What is its role in conflict prevention strategies? And let us do a conflict analysis again. Not only do we need to do an analysis of the causes and factors of SGBV, but we need to do a conflict analysis. Because the conflict analysis helps us understand the context in which this action is taking place. And oftentimes that is not done very robustly.

We also train our participants to measure their effectiveness, because we must remember that training changes somebody's life forever. So if you are going to be monitoring and evaluating your impact, this is a spider map that one of the participants drew of the skills that were enhanced in terms of monitoring and advising.

Recommendations are again fairly clear. Pre-deployment training is a national responsibility. And it needs a champion. I think oftentimes we relegate this whole subject to the 35 minutes or 45 minutes in a staff officer's course. I would suggest to you that it is far more critical than that, and I would suggest to you that if the leadership at the very top level from a minister of defence to a minister of interior to a minister of foreign affairs is not behind this and does not firmly set the standard for it, that the training for this is a non-negotiable, we will tend to have military peacekeepers and police peacekeepers who are less than fully useful on the ground. And I must say that the issue is too dangerous to leave unattended, because sexual and gender based violence is a huge peace and security issue and cannot be ignored.

My time is up, so I must sit down. I will be happy to answer questions as they come up.

Thank you.

<sup>1</sup> SGDV: Sexual and Gender Based Violence.

# Training and Mentoring the Congolese Armed Forces on SGBV Prevention and Response in a Security Sector Reform Framework

*Col. Tom Hermansen, Deputy SSR Coordinator*

*Guillota Ayele Ayivi, SGBV Coordinator MONUSCO*

Tom Hermansen:

Ladies and gentlemen!

Thank you very much for this opportunity to come from Kinshasa in DRC to tell you about our experience. You have got quite a lot of the framework and also recommendations that have been given, and we have tried to implement some of these in Congo and we just finished up some training, and that is why we would like to share this experience. I have brought with me my colleague, Guillota Ayivi, who has been the program coordinator or officer in this training.

*Due to the fact that Hermansen and Ayivi have ended their engagement in Congo, we will only publish the following talking points on training and mentoring the Congolese Armed Forces on SGBV Prevention and response in a Security Sector Reform Framework that was approved prior to the conference (red.)*

## **Overview**

“Uniformed persons” are suspected to account for the vast majority of the incidents of sexual violence perpetrated in Democratic Republic of Congo, including foreign armed groups, Congolese irregular groups, the National Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), and, increasingly, civilians, that often are demobilized former combatants.

In response to this phenomenon, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1794 with the support of the UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict Network, MONUSCO and UN agencies have developed a Global Strategy for the Fight against Sexual Violence in DRC, through a multi level consultation process: provincial, national and international institutions engaged in programs and advocacy on sexual violence. The Strategy was formally adopted by the

Government of the DRC on 1 April 2009 and was incorporated into the UN International Support Strategy for Security and Stabilization (ISSSS) dedicated to Eastern DRC (the conflict zone).

The Sexual Gender Based Violence Strategy in DR Congo has five components: each component is coordinated by a specialized UN agency that developed an action plan to implement the strategy:

- Component 1: Protection and Prevention (UNHCR - UN High Commission for Refugees)
- Component 2: Ending impunity for perpetrators of crimes (Joint Office of Human Rights-JHRO)
- Component 3: Reform of the Security Sector (Security Sector Development Unit/MONUSCO)
- Component 4: Multi-sectorial assistance to victims (UNICEF-United Nations Fund for Children)
- Component 5: Data and mapping (UNFPA - United Nations Population Fund)

The third pillar coordinated by MONUSCO Security Sector Development unit has as mandate, to facilitate the political consensus between the international community actors and the DRC Government on key issues addressed by the Security Sector Reform. Among these issues:

- To ensure the census and the numerical control of the Congolese army;
- To ensure the garrisoning of the national armed forces into proper barracks;
- To ensure the regular payment of their salary;
- To build and/or enhance their technical and institutional capacities
- To set-up a vetting mechanism to evict the elements suspected of having committed human rights violations.

The Security Sector Reform pillar of the Sexual Gender-Based Violence Strategy aims at ensuring that MONUSCO Security Sector Development unit incorporates in its broader agenda, concrete practical initiatives that effectively assist in combating sexual violence in DRC. Key aspects of this are a focus on:

- i) The training and awareness raising amongst the DRC security forces and agents on ethical issues
- ii) Holding the chain of command accountable, and
- iii) The establishing of a vetting mechanism.

SGBV strategy implementation: Enhancing Congolese Armed Forces capacities

MONUSCO Security Sector Development is currently implementing a training program on sexual gender based violence and related topics. This program aims at enhancing the technical and institutional capacity of the Civic and Patriotic Education Service (SECP) of the Ministry of National Defense and Veterans (MoDV), which is in charge of fostering moral within the army and coordinate the ethics training provided by the several stakeholders, in accordance with the national directives and constitution.

The main objectives of this program are to reinforce technical and institutional capacities of the FARDC through the SECP and promote standardized training policies and didactic materials, owned and handled by the Congolese national counterpart.

The program main activities consist of:

1. Developing standardized modules
2. Developing didactic material
3. Training 130 military trainers
4. Sensitizing 2000 troop soldiers
5. Providing the SECP with office furniture
6. Rehabilitating SECP office premises

Training the Congolese military armed forces: towards standardized training modules

With the “reintegration process”, former rebels were integrated to the national armed forces that lead to a composite army with different backgrounds and professional levels. Military assignments and/or promotions were dictated by politico-military affiliation criteria rather than merit and competences. The actual FARDC officers are mostly unaware of the basic principles of military justice and main legal instruments related to protection of civilians and human rights promotion. To compensate the political vacuum, the international community is providing ethics training to FARDC without having a national guidance and orientations.

To actually assist the Ministry of National Defense and Veterans with the elaboration of a standardized training politics, MONUSCO/SSD supported the Civic and Patriotic Education Service (SECP) in the elaboration of 6 training manuals comprising 16 modules<sup>2</sup>. The Congolese Military Chief of Staff will introduce those modules to the MoDV for their political validation. With official

<sup>2</sup> Train-the-trainer sessions with pedagogical tools and practices were also provided.

modules, the international stakeholders will necessarily transit via the SECP to provide and training related to ethics: the main goal is for the Government to guarantee the coherence of the ethic training that are conducted in DRC:

1. Democracy, security Sector Reform and Military Justice
2. Human Rights
3. Child Protection
4. Gender mainstreaming in the Defense Sector
5. Sexual Gender Based Violence: health and medical implications, legal application of SGBV infractions, prevention and protection of civilians
6. Law of war/International Humanitarian Law

In this framework, MONUSCO/SSD organized a “workshop on FARDC training harmonization” with the participation of experts from 48 institutional (Ministries/national services) and non institutional (civil society), national and international (UN agencies and international organization) structures to harmonize the training modules.

Training prerequisites: the selection process

Prior to the training, the future trainees were selected according to their technical aptitudes and their moral profile. The officers firstly went through a written and an oral test. The successful candidates were submitted to a screening process conducted by a joint team composed by the UN Joint Human Right Office (UNJHRO), MONUSCO/Child Protection unit and the Joint Military Analysis Cell (JMAC).

Training the Congolese military armed forces: the training itself

MONUSCO/SSD conducted 3 training sessions in the 2 military regions counting one of the highest rates of sexual violence in Congo: 50 officers were trained in the 9th military region<sup>3</sup> and 50 in the 10th<sup>4</sup>.

Out of the 6 training manuals, 16 modules were taught:

- Module 1: The basics of democracy and reform of the Security Sector
- Module 2: Democratic integrated citizenship
- Module 3: Military leadership in the military reform process

<sup>3</sup> Oriental and Ituri Provinces

<sup>4</sup> South Kivu Province

- Module 4: Human Rights
- Module 5: Child Protection
- Module 6: Basics of International Humanitarian Law
- Module 7: Principles of International Humanitarian Law
- Module 8: Overview of gender issues in DRC society
- Module 9: Violence against women
- Module 10: The role of gender in the Security Sector Reform
- Module 11: Security and protection of victims of sexual violence.
- Module 12: Preventing sexual violence and health implications.
- Module 13: Legal framework of lawsuits related to sexual violence.
- Module 14: Sexual violence and HIV
- Module 15: The Code of Conduct
- Module 16: Methodology of the elaboration pedagogical and teaching tools

The training methodology was based on interactive and participative approaches. Each training session started with a so-called “identity workshop”, where trainees were asked to introduce themselves and declare their identity. Grades were taken off to ensure equity and equality of treatment among the trainees. A code of conduct for the training was established by the trainees for their own discipline.

Holding the chain of command accountable and monitoring the training

30 high-ranking officers were briefed on the training content and the sanctions provided by the law in case of extortion committed by the soldiers under their command.

A “sensitization set” was delivered to the trainees and their commandants, composed by the code of conduct, cartoons, the training manuals and three tools: they were jointly developed with the SECP to ensure the programming and the monitoring of the sensitization sessions to be delivered by the 100 trained officers to the 2000 troop soldiers and for which, the military region commandant, is fully committed.

The SSR military section will be involved in the sensitization process and will accompany the training officers in their mission.





## Q & A Session 1

*Discussant Sidsel Aas, Independent Consultant*

Thank you to all of you!

It has been really interesting to listen to all the different initiatives that have been taken as to how peacekeeping operations can increasingly strengthen our efforts on how to react to sexual violence in conflict. As we know from the UN resolutions, peacekeeping missions are increasingly being specially mandated to address sexual violence. As somebody already has mentioned, UN Security Council resolution 1325 recognized the importance of specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel, and the protection of special needs and human rights for women and children in conflict situations. Further, it also invites states to incorporate these issues into their national training programs for military and civilian police personnel prior to their deployment.

In addition, as you probably also know, resolution 1820 do require that security actors respond to sexual violence with as much determination as they would to any other atrocity. In this, how are the peacekeepers and the military personnel equipped to meet the challenge of sexual violence? I think that what we have heard from the panelists here today is that there are a lot of great initiatives to increase and strengthen the efforts by the peacekeeping operational personnel and the military personnel, to how they can meet or react to sexual violence in conflict situations.

Starting with Letitia from the UN, I think the inventory and training guidelines for military peacekeepers are very comprehensive, and I have a lot of good examples and strong training tools for future operations as well as future training. I am so happy that you did not want to say best practices, but you wanted to moderate that into good practices, as I understand that a long term impact has not really been measured, and is something that you are going to do next year looking at the different missions.

Given these good practices, I am thinking: What would it take to make it standard practices for all missions and peace operations in different contexts? And what would it take, as this is a national responsibility, and of course with all the different nations being involved in UN peace operations, what would it take to make this a standard practice for all the different nations involved?

I would also like to congratulate NATO on their action plan for implementation of 1325. I am just a little bit curious as to how you are responding to sexual violence in conflict especially within the action plan. You said a little bit about how you were training or made it a point to train female officers and female police officers in Afghanistan, so they could respond to sexual violence in Afghanistan. But I am just curious as to how this is implemented into the

action plan as to how the different NATO peace operations will respond to sexual violence in their peace operation efforts.

I was also very inspired by you, Ann Livingstone, as to how you are doing your training. I also think how you go into the field of gender based violence and sexual violence and trying to understand where this does come from in all sorts of contexts of peace, not just in conflict, and understanding the empowerment of women as an important issue when combating sexual violence.

You also touched upon this – some of you or all of you have touched upon this – the importance of recruiting more women into peace operations. But, as all of us know, the number of women in the armed forces, and also the number of women that are involved in peace keeping operations, are still quite low. This morning, when we listened to Margot Wallström, who wanted to address men especially, and you also said something about how to involve men, I would like to know a little bit more about how to involve men and how to strengthen men's understanding of their responsibility in their work to combat sexual violence.

Lastly, Congo. I was also very inspired to hear about your training program in Congo, and also that from the report launched by Human Rights Watch in 2009, I think you have taken a lot of the recommendations from that report into your training, which I think is very interesting. At the same time it is the chain of command – I think it goes for all of you – the chain of command is very important. Who takes part in these training programs? Will the commanders also take part in the training programs? And how is the responsibility put back on the commanders, as this will in the end be their responsibility?

I started out just jumping into all these questions. But, of course, I would advise all of you to ask questions to the panelist, as I think this should be a two-way conversation. I have given you some questions now, which I hope you can respond to very quickly, or very shortly, and then I would open for the audience to come with further questions. And I would also kindly like to ask you to be very short, as that will give the possibility to many of you to ask questions. We do not have a lot of time, but we will spend the time we have, and I would also encourage you to ask things that you have not been able to ask or answer in the session. We will have a long lunch where you will be able to interact and ask further questions.

I will start with Letitia, and then we will give you presentations.

**Letitia Anderson:**

I think the way we move from promising practice to standard practice can be expressed in four key principles or four key steps. I think the first step is for the Security Council to expressly include conflict-related sexual violence in the mandate, in the first place, of all peacekeeping missions. The second step is for all troop contributors to include conflict-related sexual violence as part of their pre-deployment training curriculum, at both the strategic planning or

command level and at the tactical, operational level. The third step is that senior mission leadership in all peacekeeping operations hold the force and the Force Commander accountable for delivering on implementation of this aspect of the mandate and that the Security Council not just outsource the whole exercise to the mission, but follow up periodically and ask questions about what resources are required, and what the challenges to implementation are, as indeed they did in the wake of the Walikale mass rapes in DRC last year. Fourth, I think all ‘end of tour’ reports by the participants of military components of peacekeeping missions have to expressly capture their experience in responding to conflict-related sexual violence, the challenges and lessons learned from implementing that mandate, as part of building an institutional memory.

Thank you.

**Loredana Alemanno Testa:**

One of the areas where we address this issue is definitely through training. We are trying to enforce training on UNSCR 1325 at all levels. One of the goals in the NATO Action Plan is indeed to adapt course curricula in all NATO training and education facilities to make sure that this is taken into account and not just with a briefing here and there, but through mainstreaming and focusing on this aspect in a wider manner. As NATO, we cannot tell nations what to do, but the NATO Action Plan encourages nations that have not yet done so, to address UNSCR 1325 and the implementation of similar resolutions into their own curricula. What we would like to see happen in the context perhaps of lessons learned and collection of best practices, is to see a wider number of nations that are a step ahead of others, or nations who have a wider experience than others, to open their national training courses to other allies and other non-NATO contributing countries from ISAF and KFOR. That could be a way to start. With regard to Afghanistan, NATO/ISAF NTM-A’s training of the Afghan National Police also addresses sexual violence and domestic violence. Other nations that provide training in a bilateral manner do that as well.

**Ann Livingstone:**

Two questions: One on the importance of recruiting women into the uniform services absolutely. What we have found is that if we are consistent with mentoring, advising, consulting; our experience has been that after four to five years we can see lasting change. One of our examples was working in Sierra Leone for a period of five years. They did change the law to allow women to join the gendarmes, and they credited the training that they had over time with the center in awareness raising. So, I think it is about a consistent, small-step approach, but also battles of cultural realities about how women are socialized to function in the society. We, as outsiders, are not going to change that any time soon, so it is recognizing what is within the room of the possible, and not, over

reaching, as Louise said, to be a little bit modest in our assumptions. In terms of how we find it most useful – if I could find a general who is confident, robustly blustering about the SGBV issue, I will have a man give that talk. Because if I could get a general up there saying ”this is important, because it is a security issue in our world”, then I get “by-in”. We have to remember that the Pearson Center does most of its training, not in Canada, and does most of it among the top troop contributing countries. I will take my gift where I can get it, and it is generally if I can get a guy stand up there and have this hard conversation, and it does begin to change some of the approaches that we get over the long term. Thank you.

**Tom Hermansen:**

I just want to comment on how to make the chain of command responsible. After we completed the training at one location, we had a one day of sensitization with high ranking officers of the trainers. On my slide you can see from one the opening of the course in Bukavu (South Kivu), where also the Governor of South Kivu participated and proofed the political importance of this issue. The high ranking officers are coming from the military region and the different units. They are explained very carefully that they have got new trainers and these trainers have to make their plan for the sensitization of their troops, send this plan to the commanders who need to sign/approve it, and then send it to CESP in Kinshasa, where we have the General himself to make the follow up. That is the General speaking right there on my next slide. And that is also important to note; he is actually there at each of the locations, telling them about the code of conduct, why this is important, and that their training of the troops are supported by the president. The Ministry of Defense is also participating to really underline that this is important. After they have made the plan, these new trainers have to report monthly through the chain of command the progress of their work. It has to be signed by their commanders before it goes into Kinshasa again. We will get a copy of this report as well, isn't that part of the deal, Guillota?

**Guillota Ayele Ayivi:** Yes.

**Tom Hermansen:**

So it should be transparent. They really want us to be part of the next step of actually doing the training together with them, which starts in September.

**Sidsel Aas:**

Thank you. Now I would like to open the floor, so if anyone have a comment or question, please!

**Q:**

I had two quick questions and it was for the panel in general, because it touches upon many of your presentations. The first question is with regard to the increase in sexual violence in Afghanistan. We do not have a lot of statistics and something that Dr. Livingstone pointed out, and so I apologize to Dr. Livingstone – you said you do not necessarily want the statistics, but sometimes it is important to be able to see the extent of the violence. If we are not getting a lot of reports because there are so many social sanctions for the women coming forward, are there other proxy methods we could use, for instance the numbers of self-emulating women in Afghanistan is shocking. There are hundreds and hundreds of women self-emulating every month. So I am wondering if whether perhaps in your assessment, there might be a connection, because the women would not necessarily come forward to report the crimes, they might be doing something else. The second thing is also a very general question for anyone who wants to answer: Do you see differences in policies and the way you need to implement them in conflict zones in general versus in displaced refugee camps, in displaced persons' camps. Do you have a different set of tools for these two kinds of locations?

**Sidsel Aas:**

I am going to take three questions first, and then I will let the panel answer afterwards.

Please!

**Q:**

Thank you – all the presentations were very clear. But I have one question concerning the NATO briefing. The concept used there; you referred to the concept "NATO's operations and missions". In my world, I have always thought the UN had missions and NATO actual military operations. Could you please enlighten me on the concept "NATO missions"? What is the difference between those? Thanks.

**Q:**

I am from the Office of ... sexual violence in conflict. My question is: How do we breach the communication barrier between peacekeeping officers and the communities? I am talking actually even beyond the language, but also maybe the messaging within communities. The second question actually, is about how do we also balance for example the support to armed forces to prevent all this sexual violence, and limitations with regard to demobilizing for example troops that for example have been involved in sexual violence, but integrated maybe through peace processes? I remember in February we met President Kabila, and he said that he had 150 000 troops, but he knows that at least 50 per cent

of them are either illiterate or criminals, but are in the armed forces because of the peace processes and so forth. He does not have the money to construct barracks or to actually demobilize them from the armed forces. How do we actually balance maybe through long-term investment or support to the government? Thank you.

**Sidsel Aas:**

I think the first and last questions were to all of you, while the second question was maybe especially for NATO. So I suggest that you answer that question first, and then I will give you all an opportunity to answer the first and the last question.

**Loredana Alemanna Testa:**

With regard to the difference between the words “operations” and “missions”, it is a question of terminology. We have an operation in Afghanistan, ISAF, but we have a NATO Training Mission in Iraq, NTM-I. In Iraq NATO trains the Iraqi security forces.

The NATO Training Mission of Afghanistan, NTMA, is within the wider NATO ISAF operation, while NTM-I is standalone. The NATO Action Plan applies to all NATO-led operations and missions.

**Ann Livingstone:**

I can speak, not to Afghanistan, but I can speak to our experience on the places when we are looking at; Are there other proximate indicators? I would suggest there are. I think this is where the training of military and police peacekeepers particularly in community based processes, congregations with local women’s clubs, congregations or just organizations watching the market place, sharing of information among other stakeholders becomes a very interesting way to figure out what is really going on underneath the non-verbal conversation. And, again, that is where training comes into place. How do you observe, what are you observing, how do you manage that information, how do you share that information, how do you coordinate that information, both vertically and horizontally.

**?: speaker not identified (ed.)**

With regard to Afghanistan, specifically, NATO does not have a policy on this specific point, so what I am going to say is on my personal capacity. We have all read in the press that there are a number of women shelters in Afghanistan. They are run by NGO’s and that there is an attempt by the government to take them over and to manage those shelters. That is a concern to a number of Afghan women. I can also say that when the deputy minister for women affairs visited NATO – she has been visiting NATO two or three times already, she has each

time raised her concern regarding the possibility that the reconciliation process in Afghanistan may be due to the rights that have been so painstakingly acquired by NATO women in Afghanistan. So there is no straight and clear answer to that, I am afraid. We just have to remain vigilant. As nations or as NATO we can all support the government of Afghanistan making sure that the human rights, which are enshrined in their own constitution, are indeed respected in the field.

**Sidsel Aas:**

Would you like to answer the last question?

**Tom Hermansen:**

Yes. I can try, I am not quite sure if I got it right. If we are talking about how to meet the conditionality policy when we support the Congolese armed forces (FARDC), we can for instance look at our logistics support when they are doing an operation in the East. The FARDC request logistic support from MONUSCO, who conduct a screening process. We request the names of the commanders of the different units, and then we check whether they have a clean history or not. If it is clean, we can provide logistic support. If it is not, then the battalion is not eligible for any support by MONUSCO, if it is transport or whatever it should be, even also training. We have the same concept for the SGBV training; both the trainers themselves have to go through this process and also the high-ranking officers. Then you could argue; Is it a good thing that you should exclude the high-ranking officers from the sensitization on the training in their unit because they have a bad history? That means you are excluding them from getting this information and also be responsible in the chain of command, so you can really discuss that part. But it is a very clear decision that we should just follow the conditionality policy as it is, so we just have to do it like that. That means all the high-ranking officers that was part of our training program had gone through the screening process.

**Q:**

For the moment, in the European peacekeeping missions, it is mandatory to have at least one gender advisor per mission, but there is an extreme difficulty of finding people to fill these positions. What can be done? Is there some training that you know of to train the gender advisors? Because we have a lot of people, women and fewer men, that have a human rights background, but do not really have an operational background, and we have military and police and so on that not necessarily have the human rights framework. Is there some kind of training, or what can be done to increase the expertise so that we can actually deliver?



**Sidsel Aas:**

I think that question can also be taken into lunch, because I think we will have people in the audience that could also give you good answers to that, as how this is done in different countries. But please, anyone in the panel? Letitia.

**Letitia Anderson:**

I think it is a great question, because in a way we do need to cultivate a new cadre of professionals that marry the gender analytical skill-set with the operational skill-set, someone who can at once speak to the Force Commander and speak about women's rights in communities and bridge that traditional divide between operational military and police personnel and people who work on women's rights and gender issues and have the gender analytical lens. In the UN, we often draw upon the GENCAP (Gender Standby Capacity) roster; or the PROCAP (Protection Standby Capacity) roster. They may not equate exactly to the profile that you are referring to (both human rights and operational experience), but I think the fact that the Security Council has now mandated Women's Protection Advisors (or WPAs) in missions, enables us to cultivate that expertise even more deeply. I think Sweden has perhaps the right profile in their Gender Advisors to the Armed Forces, but that I think is a sui generis, or one of a kind, practice and I do not think many armed forces have gender advisors on actual operational interventions in the same way. So it is a challenge, and I think it is on our horizon to deepen the pool of expertise.

Thank you.

**Sidsel Aas:**

Ann – a short, short comment on that!

**Ann Livingstone:**

Yes, very quickly. I would commend all of us to read the civilian capabilities report that has come out from under David Harland's work, really looking at what I call "the blue briefcase brigade" is going to look like, which will include the wide ranging expertise that you are mentioning. I think we are on across with some substantive changes because of that report.

**Sidsel Aas:**

Thank you so much to all the panelists, and thanks to all the people that ask questions. I once again want to say how inspired I was by listening to you and all the very good initiatives that have been taken, and I hope that these initiatives and these examples and reviewing this training and evaluating this training, will be made accessible to the different armed forces in the different countries that do take part in international operations and peacekeeping operations.

Thank you so much to all of you.

**Session 2**  
**International Implication of Framework**



# What do we know about Sexual Violence in Conflict?

*Ragnhild Nordås, PhD, PRIO*

Good afternoon. The organizers have impressed me a lot, I am very happy to be invited to talk to you. Thank you so much for that. I was given this topic to talk about, and as you can all see, it is a vast topic. What do we know about sexual violence in conflict? Clearly, I can only say some things about that. I cannot cover everything. Although we do know quite a lot, there are still some very major gaps in our knowledge. As a researcher, of course, we have to say that there is a lot of research to be done, but I think in this case this is actually true.

Some of these things have already been mentioned earlier today, so I will go through some of the things pretty briefly. Sexual violence in conflict has been recognized now as a problem of international security, and it is a possible weapon of war and genocide. When we talk about sexual violence we include various forms. It includes rape, sexual mutilation, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and enforced sterilization. What is very important to keep in mind, is that sexual violence is not only committed against women by men. We do have female perpetrators and male victims, as well. Sexual violence includes acts that are committed directly by force, but also in a coercive environment, so that people have no realistic possibility to oppose what is being committed against them.

One of the things that has been recognized lately in the literature about sexual violence, is that the extent and the forms of sexual violence vary dramatically. Our existing knowledge has to a large extent focused on those cases where we know that there have been an extremely high levels of sexual violence such as in Bosnia and Rwanda, and also Sierra Leone, and more recently in DRC. But there are also cases where there is more limited use, and there are groups that do not engage in this behavior as much as other groups. This is variation we do not have a clear understanding of, and we therefore need a broader sample of cases to look at to capture the whole variation in extent and form of sexual violence.

Sexual violence has been presented as a possible tactic of war. People in the academic research have talked about how sexual violence can be a tool used to displaced populations out of areas, as a form of ethnic cleansing. It is a way to terrorize populations, so even if they have not been the victims of sexual violence yet, they might move out of an area because of fear of sexual violence. It can also be seen as a way of punishing populations who do not comply with whatever the armed group in question wants to get from the population, such as intelligence and assistance of various kinds. It can also be used as a recru-

itment tool, which I guess the next speaker, Mia Bloom, will talk more about.

The recruitment is seen both as a way that armed groups might create bonds within their own organization, and a way that if you have been the victim of sexual violence, then later on you are easier recruited because your respect in society, for instance, has been diminished, and you do not see any other options for you.

The other way of seeing sexual violence is not to see it as much as a tactic, but more as a collateral damage or something that is more opportunistic and driven by individual interests instead.

As I said, there are a lot of variations and forms, and many of these things have been mentioned already today, the different forms of sexual violence. It can be very targeted towards specific groups or individuals, or it can be more random. It can be committed by individuals, or it can be committed by groups, and also sometimes it is forced upon one victim to commit sexual violence against another victim of violence. It is not necessarily only the armed groups that engage in this behavior themselves.

Sexual violence sometimes occurs in private settings, but it also very often occurs in public settings to spread terror in a community and to further increase the shame associated with these atrocities. It can be targeted towards women, men and children, and there is variations over time as to when this behavior increases and decreases, as well.

There are four main perspectives that we have look at in the literature explaining sexual violence. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they are different entry points into understanding sexual violence. One way in a more structural, overall perspective, is to see that gender inequality is a structural factor that might facilitate sexual violence that would reduce the norms against this type of behavior. Another thing that is very often put forward in the structural perspective is to see sexual violence as a result of militarized masculinities.

People have also talked about how different types of conflicts might be particularly prone to sexual violence, for instance, it has been claimed that it can be a strategy in ethnic conflicts in particular because it breaks up societies and makes it more difficult to live together after a massive sexual violence has occurred, and it is a way also, like I said, of terrorizing populations to leave an area. Related to that, it is often seen as something that occurs a lot in genocide or wars, wars that include mass killings.

At group levels, looking at different armed groups in particular, the claim has been made in the literature that sexual violence and other violence against a civilian population is something that is mostly done by loot seeking in non-ideological groups – and these groups might even be the favorite group to enter into by certain types of individuals – that have more aggressive tendencies, for instance. Other group level explanations talk about the ideology of groups and the norms that exist within groups as one way of explaining why there is

more sexual violence by some groups than others. There is also a literature on training and education within groups and how that can actually produce a variation, mostly saying that certain forms of training and education can limit the sexual violence that we have seen. A last explanation of variation in sexual violence is the socialization mechanism where sexual violence is seen as an organizational building tool. It is used instrumentally by certain groups to create a stronger group for themselves.

At the individual level a lot has been written about wars constituting context where there is an opportunity for men to rape with impunity, and that certain men or most men (in some of this literature), have a tendency to want to take advantage of these situations. It could also be seen as a substitute for consensual sex. This is another individual level related explanation.

But there are many reasons why some groups and some leaders particularly of military organizations and armed groups see reasons for restraint in terms of sexual violence. There is a lot of talk about sexual violence being a strategy of war, but it is not necessarily a tool that you want to apply in all contexts. A lot of strategic reasons, normative and also pragmatic reasons, have been put forward why some groups and leaders of groups choose to try to control this behavior. Sexual violence could interfere undermine commanders' control their troops, and by using sexual violence there is a risk of losing the support of populations that you have an interest in later on controlling or using for intelligence gathering and so on.

The other more normative reasons have to do with that you have an ideological commitment to certain ideals, and committing sexual violence would go against those ideological commitments. In some ethnic conflicts it can also be seen as if you commit sexual violence against the enemy, then you are polluting your own group.

There are also some more pragmatic reasons. Sexual violence can be seen as in a battle field it is not an effective way of conducting war. It is a time-consuming activity, and it also involves a high risk of diseases.

In terms of some of the findings, there are a lot of case studies out there, of various conflict situations, but there are very few overarching global studies. I will focus on some of the few existing ones in that area. One study came out in 2007, by Christopher Butler et al. looked only at state security forces and found that if these forces have accountability and tight control, they are actually less likely to commit sexual violence. This might not be a surprising finding, but it does show that commanding control is actually possible to restrain sexual violence. There is a later study by Dara K. Cohen, who shows that groups and armies that use forced recruitment are more likely to commit sexual violence. This is an important finding because if you want to have the most efficient ways of intersecting and avoiding sexual violence, then targeting these types of groups is maybe one of the more efficient ways of going about that.

As a researcher, I see a need for more rigorous analyses of variations in sexual violence. As of now, we of course should do whatever we can based on our current knowledge, but I think that we can improve the efficiency in what we do in preventive measures if we have more systematic data and better understanding of the patterns of variation in sexual violence.

For that purpose I am part of a research group that is doing a global data collection on sexual violence in armed conflict. We are collecting data on all conflict actors in all armed conflicts in the time period 1989-2009. We might also continue after 2009 and produce annual updates of this data, if we have the necessary funding to do so. The other thing that I usually point out when I present this project, is that we also have three men in this research group. This is of course very important also from the researchers' perspective. This topic needs to be researched also by men.

I am going to show you very quickly some findings from a pilot study that we have done on sexual violence in African conflicts. We covered twenty countries. This involves 28 conflicts that were active in this time period from 2000-2009, 177 conflict actors, including state militaries, rebel groups and militias, 2326 units of observation - a small sample of what hopefully the global data set will be, but it is a beginning. So we see already from various aggregated measures that there are variations in the reports that we see of sexual violence in these conflict countries. Several countries here have reports of massive and systematic levels of sexual violence, but there are also several conflicts where there have been very few reports. A main overall finding for Africa is that not all conflict actors commit sexual violence. It is very often committed by state armies. It is not only a problem for rebel groups. The changes over time for different conflict actors are that they commit more sexual violence at certain times than at other times. In Africa we find that this violence is mostly indiscriminate, it has not been very targeted at specific groups. It is very often committed at times when there is not much battle activity going on, and it is also often committed post conflict.

We see that for actually a majority of the actors that are in this pilot study, there is no reported sexual violence, but there are still 11 per cent of the conflict-actor-years in this sample where there have been reports of systematic and massive sexual violence. So, again, there is a variation here. Over time, we see some potential decreasing trend in sexual violence. However, I think that we could potentially read this trends as a form of polarization: over time, groups are either moving in the direction of clearly committing a lot of sexual violence, or making it a big part of their repertoire of violence, whereas other groups try to restrain this behavior and commit less.

Since I do not have more time, I cannot really elaborate on these points, but we have published a policy brief titled "Sexual Violence in African Conflicts"

(CSCW Policy Brief no. 1, 2011) which can tell you more. I will just do my concluding remarks to sum up. First, there are a lot of observed variations in sexual violence. We see these variations also within our African pilot study. This variation has not been explored much in existing literature on sexual violence, mainly due to lack of data, and particularly because of very limited systematic data available across a large number of conflicts and conflict actors. Second, one important finding from our study that is important to remember is that sexual violence is also a state army problem, not only a rebel problem. Third, we need to keep an eye on the post-conflict situation, because a lot of this violence keeps going on after warfare officially has ended. Fourth, although the findings that have been shown from this pilot study focus on Africa, sexual violence is not only an African problem. This is another finding in the literature. Sexual violence occurs in all parts of the world. Because of all these variations that we see, it is one main, overall lesson also, that rape is not inevitable during war, or sexual violence is not inevitable. It can be controlled. It is possible to do something about this problem.

Thank you.





# Sexual Violence as a Recruitment Base for Terrorism

*Mia Bloom, PhD, Penn State University*

Let me just start by saying thank you so much for attending this panel. I want to thank Anita and Cecilie for all the difficulties in organizing this conference. My research is partly funded by the Office of Naval Research of United States, Department of Defense. I am not a member of the military, but I am supposed to inform you that nothing I say represents the departments of the Navy or the Department of Defense. Any and all errors are my own, and this research contains my opinions and not those of the Department of the Navy.

As you saw from one of the previous Power Points I work on issues of why non-state actors, states and armed troops, rape women deliberately, systematically and on purpose. In my research, I have also started to notice an increase in vulnerability of women in conflict zones and especially at specific places like check points. As I did my research in Sri Lanka among the Tamil Tigers, it became very clear that women were targeted for sexual abuse during conflict, but also that those women who were abused sexually by Sri Lankan soldiers were then funneled into terrorist organizations. In many patriarchal cultures in which these women are targeted for gender-based violence, they are often held to blame for the attack. In such cultures the women's virginity is highly prized. Once raped, these women they cease to be marriageable. Those women who are already married, are vulnerable to divorce. In fact, their husbands may leave them. Furthermore, in certain places where an 'honor code' exists, these women face certain death from members of their own families for having been raped. This includes many Islamic cultures in addition to non-Islamic contexts. As something that was said earlier, women are victims and blamed for their victimization. So what became especially interesting for me was the intersection of women who have been sexually attacked during conflicts, and then women who increasingly participate in terrorist movements. Thus the sexual abuse of women during conflict became a source of women's motivation to join terrorist movements and engage in violence.

This is not something exclusive to Sri Lanka, as we see from my presentation. This is happening in a variety of contexts. This mobilization of women includes women's participation as suicide bombers as well as women's participation at all levels of terrorist organizations. Furthermore, gender based violence has emerged as a major issue of recruitment on the Internet for Muslims in Europe and Muslims in the United States. The fact that women are attacked in Iraq and Afghanistan is used to incentivize people to go and join the Jihad in Afghanistan

and Iraq, but also to participate in terrorist activities more locally in Europe and in the United States.

The major focus of my research up until recently has been on suicide terrorism. We are familiar with suicide terrorism that began in Lebanon; as well as in fact there has been a proliferation or even a contagion of suicide terror since the 1990s. Initially there were three countries, Kuwait and Sri Lanka and Lebanon in the 1980's. But from 1990 up till now, you see the tactic of suicidal terrorism has spread. I point this out here and I think it is important, because in a lot of instances people start to assume that suicide terrorism is only associated with countries in the Middle East, and further there is an assumption of some correlation, between suicide terrorism and Islam. However it is important for us to understand that there is not something specifically wrong with the Islamic faith. In fact, the research I have done has shown, that all of the major monotheistic religious traditions have at some point connected religion, death, martyrdom, resistance and willingness to die.

However, what has happened in Islam, as distinct from any of the other religious traditions, is that there has been several sheikhs and religious authorities who have come forward to legitimize this tactic, even though in the strict interpretation of the Koran, suicide bombing is antithetical to Islam, because Islam, like Judaism and Christianity is against suicide. Islam makes clear that it is against killing civilians, and Islam is very clear about not killing other fellow Muslims. And yet, if you look at any attack in Afghanistan or in Iraq – lots of civilians, lots of other Muslims are killed in addition to the bomber who kills himself or herself. So the tactic violates the major tenets of Islam, and yet the handful of religious authorities who have legitimated the use of suicide terrorism has in such a creative way, manipulated the text of Qur'an and the Hadith -- the sayings of the prophet. In essence, suicide terrorism is anti Islam nevertheless, a handful of clerics have green lighted its use by men and increasingly, by women. It also means that also other religious traditions, if they want to, could adopt this approach, as well.

Just as a general rule, the findings of my previous research argued was that suicide terrorism tended to be the tactic of first choice, it was very often associated with the 'second time around' i.e. a second iteration of the same conflict. So we do not observe suicide terror in the first Chechen war, but we do in the second; the first attack against a trade center did not use suicide bombers, but in the second; not in the first intifada in Palestine, but the second. So this pattern is evident time and time again.

There is an argument that suicide terror is rational response to occupation. I do not have to explain to you what I mean by rational, that it is rationally calculated and not a rational thing to do. By no means I think it is a good idea, and I think at a lot of times we talk to non-academic audiences and they do not like the idea of connecting rational and terrorism. But by rational I mean

that they make calculations, and a very good example of this is: When terrorist movements regardless of whether they are religious or whether they are secular, and regardless of their ideology, use a tactic they expect a pay off or a benefit. When they engage in a suicide attack that backfires, they tend to stop using this tactic. We have come to understand is that even terrorist organizations and leaders are circumscribed by their public opinion. And they have a public to which they must be responsive. If they engage in violence that exceeds what their constituents are willing to accept, they become obsolete. Drawing from the work of Donatella Della Porta, a well-known Italian sociologist, if groups engage in violence that far exceeds the levels deemed acceptable by their publics, they actually alienate themselves from their base. A notable example from the Al Qaeda in Iraq group springs to mind. Abu Musab al Zarqawi engaged in the public beheadings in 2004, 2005 in Iraq, which were filmed and aired on the Internet. This garnered significant criticism from within the Islamic and Arab world and was one of the reasons why many members of the main core al Qaida disassociated from Abu Musab al Zarqawi. In fact, according to one of the member of the US Special Forces team that killed him, one of the reasons they were able to get the information to locate him in the first place was because the core of Al Qaeda let this information slip into western hands. So any terrorist group, even al Qaeda can be perceived as having gone too far.

It is also important that, when talking about terrorism I do not want to fetishize one particular form of terrorism, because for the most part terrorist tactics are always used together and in conjunction. But what we tend to see is when terrorist groups use suicide terrorists and especially if they use a woman as the operative, we see a lot more interest from the media and from other sources compared to other non suicidal attacks. This is something o which I will return, because as I mentioned, when it is a woman who carries out the act of terrorism, it will likely get eight times more media attention than when it is a man. And finally, my unique contribution to the whole discussion of suicide terrorism is that when you have more than one terrorist group in the theatre of conflict, there emerge opportunities for the groups to compete with one another for the leadership of the community. If the population is receptive to violence, which is not always the case, you are going to see a ramping up of violence when the groups begin to compete with one another. We observed this spiral in Iraq as well as among the Palestinians. The more groups and terrorist organizations in one theatre of conflict, the more likely you are to start seeing this kind of increase in violence and use of a tactic that grabs the media's attention.

The civilians' perspective is continually important. As I mentioned previously, if a group goes too far they can alienate themselves. Both propaganda and framing issues are extremely important to ensure that the population is in fact receptive to suicide terrorism while targeting civilians. By that same token, if a population is receptive to using violence against soldiers and or civilians

of the other side, various groups will increase violence in order to distinguish themselves.

Over the forty years since the emergence of modern terrorism, we have observed real shifts and developments over this period of time. Going back to the modern terrorism starting in 1968 until the advent of the millenarian approach and End of days martyrdom that started oddly enough not among the Muslims, but with Om Shinrikyo, a Japanese cult. The use of suicide terror began as truck bombs against embassies or against physical infrastructures, and it has manifested in a variety of ways with the use of women used for target assassinations, for example against Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, and then finally the emergence of the internet has been very important. The Internet plays a role for the purposes of mobilization and recruitment. This is also an area in which women have started to play a very important role.

For those of you over the age of 30 in the room, some of you might remember the women from the PFLP and the Baader Meinhof in the 1970's who were extremely important in the Red Army Faction, as it is known. I had a very interesting conversation where someone said to me: Well, you know, Bader was a terrorist, but Meinhof was considered a criminal. When I thought how interesting it was to frame them differently based on gender. They were both doing the same things, but the men were labeled terrorists, but the women were not labeled as terrorists. Leila Khaled became a poster child for the Popular Front Liberation of Palestine as Mairead Farrel did for the provisional IRA. So as we talk about women and terror, people mistakenly assume that this is a recent development that began with the Chechens, after 2000, in the last eleven years. In fact, we have actually have women involved at all levels of terrorist organizations in the 1960's and 70's. Leila Khaled was made infamous for her participation in mass airplane hijacking in 1969, at the Zarqa base, which was the precursor to the events of Black September.

However, here are some of the women that I have spent some time with. The women of the LTTE comprised frontline units, and were extremely successful. Up until the Sri Lankan counter terror offensive in May 2009. They were very successful at various conflicts routing the Sri Lankan army, especially their tank battalions at the Battle of Elephant Pass. The success of the women's unit had a double effect not just because the military of Sri Lanka lost to the terrorists, but also there is an additional psychological effect of losing in battle to the women's units. Again, that is something to take into account as to understanding gender based violence, to understand how gender is used and manipulated in these cultures.

Basically, according to the Guardian newspaper report in 2009, there has been a group of Tamil women in custody and in areas under control of the government, and Tamil women caught during combat occurred from early 1996 that allege gross violations of human rights and especially of sexual abuse by

government forces. While I was in Sri Lanka conducting my field research with the Tigers, there were many roadside billboards, posters and pamphlets telling the Tamil women: "You will be raped [by the Sri Lankan military]. Do not be raped, join us". And the Tigers made a very clear connection that by participating in violence and become a Tamil Tiger, it was a way of protecting their honor and their virginity.

If we examine the events in Iraq: In 2007 Samira Ahmed Jassim was arrested for having arranged the rape of 80 girls in Diyala Province to turn them into suicide bombers for the organization Ansar al- sunna, an offshoot of Al Qaeda in Iraq.

Although women have been involved in terrorism from the beginning, what has changed is that women's roles within the movements appear to have changed, but also the ways in which women are recruited has changed. With Osama bin Laden's death it is very important that we take this into account. Bin Laden might have been reticent to use women in activist ways as front line operatives. But the younger generation of al Qaeda, emerging leaders like [the recently target assassinated] Anwar al Awlaki and even Omar al Hamami in Somalia, have very different attitudes and perhaps you might even call them progressive regarding the role of women in the Jihad. Women have been increasing in terms of their participation. Some of the reasons why the organizations use women have to do with the fact that they are better able to access a target, they are better able to inflict higher rates of casualty and damage. According to the terrorists with whom I have spoken, the women might be more disposable and easily manipulated although this varies by organization.

But here is the point; the women get more press and public attention than men engaged in the same activities. And the organization use women to convey the message of "do you need women to fight for you, aren't you a man?" This is something that you are going to see whether it is in Belgium, during the First World War, or even in the martyrdom videos of female Palestinian suicide bombers who argue "I will go fight instead of the men who cower behind me..." We also see on the Internet that using female operatives is effective in shaming men into participating. The Jihadists online, often these are women, use gender-based violence as a clarion call, that "your sisters in Islam are being attacked" and that if the men were REAL men, they would do something and join the fight. What my research has revealed is that if American soldiers are not engaged in sexual violence, the terrorists are willing to rape the women themselves and use this violence to recruit others.

What we have seen is that we have an increase in the number of women, but here is what is interesting, again from my perspective, I have not been able to go into jail to speak with some of the Palestinian leaders, but I have the messages sent. I asked them via a middleman whether the organizations, knowing that they garner so much media attention, select the more attractive women as

operatives? The organizations know that they are going to get eight times more press, and among the women who have become bombers among the SSNP in Lebanon, in Palestine and Chechnya, the female bombers are some of the most attractive women of their society.

We know for a fact, looking at the Chechen women's involvement, again there are allegations that Russian soldiers have been raping Chechen women according to a Duma order that allow them to invasively search and strip search any women wearing hijab. That ... as a Russian Duma order 209 came out around ten years ago. That is when we again saw a huge increase in women's participation in suicide terrorism. But some of the women, who have changed their mind at the last minute, have claimed that they were coerced.

Over the years we can also observe the changes in ideology; at the outset of the second Intifada when suicide terror became popular, it was Palestinian women who approached by the various leaders of Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad asking to be permitted to carry suicide operations. They asked to participate and they were turned away. In fact, Sheikh Yassin argued that Hamas did not need women to be martyrs since they had more than enough men. In one case a woman was turned away who wanted to volunteer and told: "Why don't you go down the street and go become a martyr for another group?" Which she did, for one of the secular groups who did not object to using women bombers. First the PIJ Palestinian Islamic Jihad relented to use women and the final hold out was Hamas. Again, once Hamas realized that there was a benefit to using women bombers, they adjusted their ideology to suit the exigencies of the time. There was a shift in the Islamic ideology of interpreting a woman's right to participate in Jihad, whether she had the same obligation as a man or whether it was a different obligation. Thus religious authorities began to debate a women's role and several came to the conclusion that women and men were equal in their obligation to engage in Jihad and this opened the door for more and more women to participate.

This is something that has now become a focal point within the Jihad community including groups like Al Qaeda. On the one hand, Mr. Zawahiri, who has replaced Bin Laden as the leader says, "al Qaida does not have women, we do not need women. " However at the same time, his wife, Mrs. Zawahiri issued an "open letter to my sisters' in Islam" which argued almost the reverse: "Oh yes, you can be a suicide bomber and you can achieve all these many things".

One of the innovations that women bring to the table is being able to represent themselves as being pregnant. As much as we have preexisting notions about the inherent peacefulness of women, an expectant mother bring additional expectations of her peacefulness. And this is precisely why they have created IEDs, improvised explosive devices that women wrap around their midsection to give the impression of late term pregnancy. Some analysts argue that the women are depressed or want to die. In fact, according to the strictest interpretations

of martyrdom, anyone who actually wants to die is not allowed to be a bomber. There is no real sacrifice or martyrdom if the person seeks death and actually wants to die. So I think we have a huge gap in our understanding of why women participate in terrorism and what some of the multiple motivations might be.

The last point I want to emphasize because it is relevant for the member of the military and the counter terrorists in the room: There is a direct connection between how the women are treated within conflict zones and whether or not the organizations mobilize women into terrorism. The more likely that women are targeted for sexual abuse, the more likely women will be funneled into terrorist groups. Even one lone case is sufficient to generate a huge amount of propaganda. The one case of Sergeant Steven Green, the American who rape and killed a young girl in Mahmoodiya was the single most reported story in the Arab media for the whole year. And although this was an isolate case of Green and co-conspirators, it gave the impression that all American soldiers given the chance would rape teen-aged girls.

The next thing to be aware of is the how terrorism continued into the next generation. As we have seen, bombers are getting younger and younger. The terrorist organizations are starting to recruit children. So as much as we have talked about women, one should also be concerned about the growing use of children by terrorist groups and how this will affect both their societies as well as the psychological well being of soldiers and peace keepers who might find themselves facing very young operatives in the future.

Thank you very much.





# Why is Handling and Responding to Sexual Violence a Military Responsibility?

*Marsha Henry, PhD, LSE*

Thank you very much. Thank you to Cecilie and Anita for inviting me here today. I am very pleased to be here, but I do have to say that Cecilie tasked me with a very difficult question. That question is: Why is handling and responding to sexual violence a military responsibility? Something to some extent I am very unqualified to answer. Probably most of you are much more qualified. So in thanking you for inviting me here I hope that this is not the last time that I am invited here, because I think that I am going to respond to this question a little bit provocatively. Hopefully I can gauge your response in the question and answer period.

I want to start a little bit by questioning the very presence of the military in responding to sexual violence. In particular I want to use the example of peacekeeping as an avenue to challenging the basis of this question. Although military peacekeepers originate from a variety of military backgrounds, they are generally trained in conventional military ways... that is, they are trained for combat and the discharge of violence. It is this very training that qualifies most for peacekeeping duty. For example, most of the peacekeepers who come as military observers or who are in senior ranks amongst the contingents, are usually required to have at least five years' service and some combat experience, although, again, some of these requirements are changing.

As such, military peacekeepers are deployed specifically because they already possess military capital, that is, military qualifications, experiences and affiliations. Scholars such as Betts-Fetherston as well as Charles Moskos and Laura Miller, have outlined some of the contradictions involved for those tasks to undertake peacekeeping duties. For example Betts Fetherston has argued that there is no switch inside a blue helmet which turns the soldier into a natural peacekeeper or peacemaker. Studies of peacekeepers' experiences reveal that their lack of training in peace promotion and conflict resolution, and the sometimes problematic sub-cultures of various branches of the military, may lead to their enactment of hyper-masculinity and violence against their colleagues and local communities. A clear example of this is documented, I think, in extensive length in Sherene Razack's work on Canadian peacekeepers and the violence committed by them in Somalia.

The paradoxical requirement of a peacekeeper that he or she be both a warrior and a humanitarian, means that peacekeeping is indeed a unique military labor. This work involves elements of martial and conciliatory security practice. On

the one hand peacekeepers may have been trained and socialized to enact in various forms of militarized masculinity, and at the same time prescribed codes of conduct and daily operations that promote peace and security, as outlined by institutions such as the UN. So, when thinking about military responses to sexual violence, these contradictory orientations need to be considered. You can just think about the conventional image of the peacekeeper, although, if you look at UN, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations' website, you will see a changing image of the peacekeeper. Traditionally, peacekeepers were often depicted in photographs either holding babies or handing out sweets to children. You will see a transformation in those images from that to more robust images where they are depicted 'in action'.

If we believe that these diverging objectives can coexist or be overcome, I think the question becomes, to what extent are contemporary soldiers adequately prepared for these multiple roles?

There is also the issue of the division of labor within peacekeeping, and this is one that is highly gendered. It is not too dissimilar to that in traditionally male-dominated professions. First, the majority of military personnel in peacekeeping missions are male. This is more so the case within the military wing as opposed to the police and civilian sectors. As such, there is little gender balance, and women unfortunately are underrepresented in both national militaries and in peacekeeping missions. Although there have been attempts to increase the number of female peacekeepers, there still exists a dearth of qualified and senior ranking women in military postings to peacekeeping missions. Putting women into key decision-making positions remains a challenge, especially for the UN. I believe that this continued imbalance may also exacerbate prevailing ideas about gender, gender roles and gender relations.

Addressing the gender imbalance may help to establish a change in the culture of various military organizations, and potentially pave the way to develop gender expertise and sensitivities to issues of sexual harassment and violence within militaries and sexual violence in conflict. This change in culture may also lead to some more positive outcomes within peacekeeping missions. For example where peacekeepers have a reflective understanding of gender and gender relations within their own profession, they are likely to be more sensitive to the gender skewed experiences of conflict.

But, again, there are limitations to this. An example is the deployment of an all-female peacekeeping force in Liberia. In addition, I have documented in my own research the contradictory experiences of female peacekeepers in the Uruguayan military. In both of these cases it was found that some of the duties that female peacekeepers were tasked to do, did not involve extensive interaction with local communities. Some of the work, for example, that the Indian squad did was close protection. They are also trained specifically in riot control and crowd control. This perhaps may put an added burden on female

peacekeepers if they are expected to be doing gender sensitive work, when they are actually not trained specifically in that area. Again, not necessarily a reason not to encourage the recruitment of female peacekeepers, but there needs to be some discussion about some of the challenges.

Then there is also the division of labor within the larger peacekeeping mission, which I think is important to consider when thinking about military responsibility. Who is responsible for what humanitarian work? Humanitarian NGO's with years of experience, a range of gender specific expertise, and often a relationship of trust with local people, and who may have been working with these communities over a long and consistent period of time, may feel that they are best placed to meet the needs of conflict and post-conflict situations. They may feel the military presence to be undesirable for a number of reasons. First, in contacts – and I think this is important in relation to some of the issues raised in previous presentations. Where communities have experienced high levels of violence, it is often the case that this violence has been perpetrated by formal or informal militarized groups – gangs, militias, rebels. Sexual violence used as a weapon of war and during times of conflict, has a militarized nature to it, and it may be very difficult for military personnel to be seen as different and distinct from other perpetrating groups. One example that I have from my research in Haiti: local women often talked about how they saw Brazilian peacekeepers playing football with local gangs, local militias, and they began to see the local militias dressing more and more in militarized uniforms, as they began adopting camouflage. They found it very difficult to disassociate these two groups. Something to think about. In addition, incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers may inhibit their ability to offer support and services, because their reputations have been compromised. Second, military personnel do not necessarily deploy to areas for long periods of time, in contrast to some NGO staff, who may spend several years in post. If peacekeepers are on a six months or a one year long deployment, they may not have a chance to develop trusting relationships with local communities, something that is likely to be essential for effective management of trauma associated with sexual violence. Third, and I think most importantly, militaries do not generally specialize in dealing with sexual violence as a consequence of war, but – again – this is changing. For many, the involvement of the military may be seen as both a militarization and a colonization of humanitarian work. However, personnel trained specifically in this area, would mean that militaries could offer that expertise and share knowledge with civilian police and other personnel. I think, again, as has been developing with the DPKO as was demonstrated this morning, this could be an ideal area to develop, considering that most militaries have medical personnel and by extension could include other alternative medical health and counseling services, offered in collaboration with local and international NGO's. Especially since militaries have extensive experience in both conflict resolution and

conflict management. In my previous research I found many peacekeepers from a variety of military backgrounds to exhibit an advanced knowledge of cutting edge management thinking and practice, and to exhibit empathetic approaches in their everyday work with other communities and cultures.

I think that there are multiple responsibilities to protect and defend alongside duties of care, and I think that this contradiction can sometimes cause considerable confusion within the humanitarian landscape, for peacekeepers, for humanitarian personnel and for beneficiaries. I think other issues like force protection and operational effectiveness may not always be compatible with the objective of handling and responding to sexual violence in the most appropriate ways. A classic example that other peacekeepers at the Netherland's Defence Academy have been using to think through doctrine and advanced doctrine, is around the ethical quandry that a peacekeeper might find himself – and I say himself, because the majority of peacekeepers are male – the quandry that he might find himself in when he comes across a local woman, say, on the roadside when he is on patrol, shouting and trying to flag down a vehicle in order to help her. Force protection is clearly important; and to add to this, part of the internal security practice is that peacekeepers are not supposed to give unauthorized ride to individuals who are not part of the UN personnel.

How might expert training aid the peacekeeper and let's say, the local women? - is something militaries need to think about. Thus, after saying that there are many reasons why, in practice, militaries should stay as far away as possible from sexual violence as a professional area, there are also compelling reasons why contemporary militaries should make space in their professional remit to deal with issues of sexual violence inside and outside of their institution. I think, as this workshop highlights, many governments and their national ministries have been taking up the challenges afforded by 1325. Gender mainstreaming and commitments to gender equality policies mean that national institutions, such as the military, need to take very seriously the gender imbalances in their work force and some of the consequences of this gender imbalance in relation to doctrine and practice locally, nationally and internationally.

I think that the last couple of points that I want to make, is that I think one of the ways for ( although this is not what I have been tasked to do today but in thinking about why the military should take responsibility I am often thinking about how they could do that) the military to respond could be to seriously develop in-depth gender expertise within the military itself, and to deploy a kind military capital or view it as a military resource or to develop a gender capital or a gender resource. Thus, gender expertise would be seen as something to be invested in. Certainly, here today I have seen evidence that the Norwegian forces in particular have an abundance of gender experts and gender expertise, and I think it is a matter of funneling some of that.

I think the issue of gender sensitivity training, for example, is not currently

sufficient. An example that I can give from attending gender sensitivity training in Liberia for probation for prison officer staff, which is exactly the same course that is offered to recently deployed military personnel ...



# Female engagements; Experiences from Iraq, Africa, and Afghanistan

*Major Fred Tanner*

The purpose for this presentation is to speak about my experiences in sexual violence in the contemporary operating environment, and how our techniques, tactics, and practices have evolved over the past 10 years. But first of all, I want to begin by emphasizing that I'm speaking from my own experience and not from a position of US policy. I will be speaking strictly from my experiences in what we refer to in the US Army as "MTOE" units. Those experiences include an Infantry company commander in Post-Invasion Iraq, Stability Operations 2003-2004, and Security Sector Reform Advisor in Horn of Africa 2006-2008, finally being a battalion operations officer in Afghanistan 2009-2011. While we in Iraq in 2003 were primarily tasked initially to defeat Saddam's army, the role was very different in the Horn of Africa. In 2006 it was much more what you would call the intra-theatre war in terms of preparing various African nations and progressing their militaries for them to defeat their own internal conflicts. Finally, the last experience I will talk about is, I have nearly two years of experience in Afghanistan, this time as an operations officer at a battalion level, and also that was the first time that we were formally introduced to female engagement teams, and I will conclude with that.

I will speak about my experience chronologically as I believe it's important to note the time and frame and context, as what I have seen in the 9 years is a developing recognition of addressing gender issues.

What I tell you up front, is what I found in the course of this morning listening to this morning's presenters is that many experiences that I want to relate to you have been addressed, and I can validate for my own personal experience that they did occur. One of my takeaways is that I am very impressed with all the panel speakers this far and just how in tune you are with some of the challenges that we face at the tip of the spire, for lack of a better term.

In preparing for Iraq in 2003, we received no pre-deployment training with regard to instructions on how to deal with Host (as in the nation that is hosting us) nation sexual violence. Any kind of sexual violence training we received during this time frame was solely focused within our own organization of what was referred to earlier as blue-and-blue, the prevention of sexual harassment, sexual assault of soldiers within my own company. I say that, because in the United States Army, unlike some militaries, within the infantry there are no females assigned, or I should say: organizationally there are no females. That being said, in practicality and for the first time in 2003 we expected to have



females assigned within our company in terms of linguists, counter-intelligence and intelligence along with psychological operations. Based upon that, we did place an additional emphasis on preventing or protecting those females from predators both within the company and also outside the company.

I am happy to report that during that year-long term in Iraq, I witnessed no – or I was a party to no – male and female gender violence issues, either within our ranks or with the working in the host nation population. I am not so naive to believe that they did not occur, certainly within the local population with Iraqi women. But some additional contact is probably helpful. In 2003 and 2004 the military kind of stands and interaction with women was be respectful to their society by not talking or engaging to their women. Thus are my interactions with Iraqi women during that year-long deployment were extremely limited, and often relegated to simply segregating them while we conducted raids or searches of various subjective. We did, however, – or I did however – experience male on male sexual violence, both within the host nation and the host nation and the military, in that case the Iraqi National Guard – as it was referred to then, as well as within my own organization.

We addressed those in two very different fashions. For these within the Iraq National Guard as well as – I found this both in Iraq and in Afghanistan – there seems to be a cultural acceptance of a stronger, almost a prison-like mentality, of stronger, more dominant males being able to sexually assault weaker or inferior males. This practice was initially put out there without any attempt to hide it by the Iraqis. When it was made clear to them that this was unacceptable and would not be tolerated, we did not see it again, but I doubt very much it stopped completely. That is not to say that we buried our heads in the sand, but one should actually keep in mind that in the course of what was then emerging in uncertainty in terms of your ability to focus on your partner force along with the enemy along with your own unit or formation. There are only so many hours and days and only so many people that you can deal with. I do not want to give the image that it was accepted as acceptable behavior, because it was certainly not, but our ability to stop it was pretty limited to relate back to only having a – I had a lot of different nails or a lot of different fasteners, but only a hammer at that point in my tool box.

Ironically, the only other sexual violence issue I did address – and I think it is valid because in the course of our discussion today, I think there is national focus to focus on male and female sexual violence, and that is certainly an important issue. Ironically, the only issue I addressed during that year in Iraq, was actually a soldier-on-soldier sexual violence, when one soldier was caught molesting another soldier. I take away from that our response was very different in that case. Clearly, this was in our case a criminal matter, to be handled by the criminal investigation portion of our military. But what I found most significant during that entire event is that after that soldier – the initial accuser – came

forward, four other soldiers came forward within the same unit, to say that that soldier had also molested them. To me, what it highlighted is that I think it is probably far more prevalent both within our own militaries and certainly within our partner nations and their society, than is given credit to at this point. In terms of emerging issues, I think as gender violence in general progresses, or rather that the recognition of sexual gender progresses, you will see a greater focus or a greater awareness on male and male sexual violence.

The next ... I will speak to you about, is my experience in the Horn of Africa. That was much different both in terms of both the mission, obviously, and our ability to react to that mission. There, in certain circumstances, our overarching mission in the Horn of Africa was to improve certain African militaries to defeat both external and internal threats themselves. When we say the Horn of Africa, I am specifically referring to the countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya. Within all these countries over a course of fifteen months, at some point or period, I was responsible for training, implementing training and then advising and assisting those various nations' militaries mostly in cannon and certain sea operations. In that case, we were told – specifically, in fact, we were directed and mandated – in many cases to address both gender violence, but more in a larger law of armed warfare or conflict, human rights' issues and training. I have to say that in terms of techniques that were used there, first and foremost – and this has been touched already today – was our ability or our requirement to absolutely set the standard for the host nations that we were training. I could not emphasize enough the importance of your conduct and how it is perceived – and when I say this I speak to the fellow military members in the room – that when you are training the host nation military, you are absolutely underneath the microscope 24/7 and the requirement for your need to set the example in all things to the point where we would make specific instances to ensure that when we needed subject matter experts, we would bring women in to teach us whatever those specific subject matters might be in order to kind of change the lens in which women were viewed at within their military.

The second thing in that what we have already said, is that the Power Point generally is ineffective. Situational training is much more effective. So that was incorporated. And that does not only refer to only gender violence, it is kind of an overarching statement that you could use for any kind of training. Everything we did had some kind of, if not gender based, a certainly human rights based element to it in order to integrate it into our training.

That is a kind of the good news part of our story. The bad news part of our story is that I was still not resourced to react. All those I refer to is kind of pro-active and preventing. Basically, I am training the military to prevent them from doing that. What I did not have the ability to do, was train that military to react when they encountered due to a spoiler or an in-searching group. Again, we were much less prepared to react to sexual violence than we encountered in

the field as a result of that. When it did occur and when we did come across it, the general direction I would receive from either the defence attaché or the US Embassy, was that "this is a fill-in-the-blank country's problem and it needs to fit in the blank-country's solution", which is certainly true to a degree, as that solution needs to be sustainable, but at the same time you have to balance that with just kind of "this is too complex of a problem for us to deal with". I think forums like this is a great way in terms of progressing that issue, and I will talk more at the end in terms of how I think ultimately we will reach a conclusion.

Finally, I will talk about my experience in Afghanistan. This occurred from 2008-2011. Training for dealing with gender violence again was similar to my Iraq experience in this case. We were much more focused on and rightfully so, a defeat of IED and the network that supports them, than we were in terms of responding to gender violence. I do not say that to make light of gender violence, it is just the again argument of limited resources, read: time, and unlimited problem sets which you are forced to deal with.

One change from my Iraq experience was the incorporation of female engagement teams. I am not here to preach female engagement teams as a cure to gender violence, but it certainly was a progression from – "oh my god, I am getting three females assigned to my company, what am I going to do when we are in a patrol base" to "here is a female engagement team during your pre-deployment training; figure out how you are going to utilize them and incorporate them in operations". That being said, I have to confess in twelve months of being an operations officer within Afghanistan, it never did occur to me to use the female engagement team to gather atmospherics on gender violence.

That being said, of the numerous female engagement team leaders that I worked with, never once did they come to me and said "sir, we can potentially gain some information for you in regards to atmospherics on gender violence in this area". Generally, female engagement teams were used to confirm or deny information we already had along with the other enablers I had in planning and executing operations.

The other point I mentioned in terms of female engagement teams since they are kind of *soup du jour* (literally translated to soup of the day, which is to say it's trendy or "en vogue" right now), is that the training utilization of female engagement teams are still very nascent in terms of the Army. The female engagement teams that I had were all taken out of hide – what we call taken out of hide, which is to say that all these women had other jobs that they had to perform daily, so it really disrupted the continuity in terms of being able to keep them for any kind of prolonged period of time, because they had to get back to whatever job they were doing. Similarly, at least in my experience, there was no standardized pipeline that they came through in terms of skill sets. Oftentimes, in order to be on the female engagement team, all they had to do was be a female. That generally boiled down to that "now you are

dealing with a personality in terms of a confidence and skill set and what they can achieve for you”.

In terms of things that I would improve in the future as I conclude here: One is – and we have talked about this already – you need to get buy in (ownership and belief) at the top. We have a saying: ”What my boss finds interesting, I find fascinating”. As have already been spoken to you, senior level engagement and allowing them to or then emphasizing the use of or the awareness of gender violence, is important. The second piece is: The female engagement team provides a vehicle. There are certain practices that we use within our own army now to prevent blue-and-blue violence, and those same practices need to be exported and incorporated in the female engagement training.

I am sorry I have no more time to speak about this today. I appreciate your time, and I would like to close and saying that you guys are absolute on point here in terms of being in tune with the issues. I walked away here very enlightened in terms of what I could have done and what I will do in the future as an operations officer to mitigate gender violence. I will look forward to your questions shortly.

Thank you.



# Good and Bad Examples of How to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Violence: The Case of UNAMID in Darfur

*Col. Anthony Atolagbe*

Conflicts of war have been catalysts for change, devastation and humiliations. Adversaries have had to use all sorts of strategies to overwhelm the opponents through the use of superior firepower, maneuvering tactics, propaganda. In the course of such conflicts, combatants take advantage of their possession of arms and other weapons to commit atrocities as well as other actions against human beings. There have been so many of these acts, usually perpetrated against defenseless persons, especially women, girls, children, and sometimes men. International organizations in collaboration with the other concerned bodies have adopted several approaches built on concepts and principles of civilian protection to combat the trend. These approaches are developed towards mitigating demeaning acts like sexual violence. There however, seem to be a situation in which different conflict environment evolves with its own face and trademark.

The conflict in Darfur, which started in 2003, is one that can be best described as complex, due to its multidimensional nature. The government embarked on a counter insurgency operation in Darfur, and the forces on both sides exploited the situation by taking laws in to their hands to commit sexual atrocities. These actions had devastating and long lasting effects on the victims.

The UNAMID has been a major instrument in the front line of the campaign for protection of civilians through prevention and providing responses within its operational capabilities. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to briefly highlight the good and the bad examples of preventions and responses to sexual violence in the Darfur region, which is the UNAMID area of responsibility. In this direction, the aim of the paper is to highlight responses to sexual violence in UNAMID area of responsibility while identifying the challenges. The scope will cover an overview of the Darfur conflict, Efforts of UNAMID and then conclude with the Challenges.

Sexual violence was prevalent in Darfur region during the conflicts in which there were cases of sexual abuses accompanied with destruction to lives and property. Sexual violence was perpetrated by the identified forces, who also viewed their acts as of spoils of war that they needed to enjoy. The victim who rebels is usually rewarded with killing as sexual assault became a strategic weapon to cause panic and awe.

At this point, something immediate had to be done, and a structure put in

place in order to stop this and other violent acts. The African Union Mission was deployed in the midst of this crisis in an effort to protect the innocent civilians, but their spread was limited, due to low number of troops. The AMIS troops were “re-hatted” as the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur. Upon the entrance of the United Nations it was mandated under resolution 1769 to protect civilians, assist humanitarian agencies and assist in the observance of rule of law. The Darfur Peace Agreement exists today, but there only seem to be semblance of the ceasefire, which is broken by any of the parties to the conflict who feels aggrieved, from time to time.

The UNAMID has been able to take necessary steps in the implementation of its mandate toward this direction. Though, highly reduced, acts of sexual violence are still perpetrated on the internally displaced persons, as well as women and girls who embark on their daily routine activities like drawing water and fetching firewood. The records of sexual and gender based violence, thanks to the UNAMID efforts has experienced a remarkable fall. We are well aware that we have Resolutions 1325 and 1820 and the Rome statutes. These have only been of help to those who are advocates and some activists within the country, who have not been able to make serious impact required to put a stop to these activities.

It is necessary to briefly highlight the impacts of sexual violence on the victims. Cognizant of this, we will all find the need to take collective action toward awareness, mitigation, assistance and a final stop to sexual violence across the globe. These impacts are inexhaustible though, and they include victim stigmatization, unwanted pregnancies, child abuse and others like transmission of sexually transmitted diseases. The UNAMID, as the organ of international community, has the mandate to protect civilians in order that the perpetration of this violent act will be stopped. In this direction, UNAMID is organized for the implementation of this mission mandate through its military, civilian and the police units, including female police.

On the efforts of the UNAMID, It will be necessary to discuss this aspect in relation to prevention and response methods. The good examples consider the strength of the military force within our deployment which represents about ninety per cent of the total force that is required. This is based on a contingency plan that was drawn up at the inception and which is subject to regular reviews. These troops cover about 65 per cent of the land area within operations environment. That is, to a large extent, we have access to most of the areas covered by our troops. In these locations, the force provides robust patrols to boost the confidence of the populace and provides support to agencies for humanitarian delivery.

The UNAMID police are also constituted into various units, which include the formed police units and police advisors. The formed police units carry arms and have the task of escorting women into the bushes to fetch firewood and

draw water. Additionally, UNAMID has the police advisors who guide the local policemen and women on international standards. The female elements of the UNAMID police are usually assisting the women in the conduct of their daily routine activities and giving assistance to victims of abuses. UNAMID police has given medical aid in form of quick impact projects to victims of sexual violence who experience pregnancy, VVF and sexually transmitted diseases.

UNAMID also has other awareness programs organized by its authority and sections like the establishment of gender advisory units. This is in collaboration with the Darfur state committee on gender based violence. They collaborate through the organization of gender based violence awareness programs and other social awareness programs.

On the part of the international staff, staff officers, military observers and correction officers, induction training is usually organized in order to create awareness. The induction training is mission specific and provides necessary information on the operations environment that will guide all personnel to be inducted. UNAMID has the conduct and disciplinary units to instill discipline on her staff involved in sexual exploitation.

Taking on some reverse aspects of the responses, we have the Sudan law of 1981. It punishes women who get pregnant outside marriage and you may go to jail if witnesses cannot be produced. This does not allow allegations by victims to be treated under international standard.

The challenges that UNAMID faces on the field include language barrier as the country is Arabic speaking. The mission experiences restrictions by local officials as the mission operates within a sovereign state. When the military and police and other officials embark on patrol, the local officials remark that they were not informed before coming. Victims and their family members do not also want to report the sexual abuse cases because they are scared of reprisals from the perpetrators. Sometimes women become victims of such attacks while proceeding on visits to other IDPs, and they do not seek escorts to do this. Also, the cases are under-reported, because people are afraid of arrest in which you might be required to make a proof. The operations environment also lack accessible roads. The mission operates under poor road conditions while the climatic is also harsh. This especially is in cases where patrols by peacekeepers are interrupted by “haboob”, a whirlwind situation accompanied with dust that engulfs the environment for between 3 to 4 hours. Driving in the rain is like in quick sand around the “wadhis” where patrols vehicles get stuck and recovery takes a long time. Thanks to college authority, other speakers and the audience here. It is really a great opportunity.

Thank you.





## Q & A Session 2

*Discussant Louise Olsson, PhD, Folke Bernadotte Academy*

Thank you, Ole, and thank you to the organizers for inviting me here. Thank you also very much to the panellists for very interesting presentations. They present me with the huge challenge of trying to sum up the common lessons learned and themes from this panel. After summing up, I will ask the panellists two questions, since we have such an interesting mix of practitioners and researchers here, which I think we should really draw on. Then I will open up the floor for questions. I encourage you in the audience to start thinking already now about what you would like to ask the panellists.

How many of you have seen a TV program called Myth Busters? For those of you that have not, it is a program which identifies Myths and Urban Legends and then tests their value against facts. I would say that these presentations do just that. Thereby, they bust three of the myths that exist on sexual violence in armed conflict. These myths are serious as they make the problem of sexual violence seem impossible to address. Thereby, they might prevent us from taking effective action to stop the violence.

Firstly, one of the main myths that exist is that sexual violence is inevitable. I wish it was a joke to call it 'the ancient Greece myth', but I do not know how many reports I have read about this problem that actually started by referring to ancient Greek plays as proof of sexual violence being an inevitable effect. If this is a myth, what do we then actually know? Well, what these panellists show with all clarity is that, yes, sexual violence has been used in conflicts over time – it is not new – but it is very wrong to treat sexual violence as an inevitable effect. There is great variation between conflicts in the forms of sexual violence that exists and how it is used. Moreover, as we have heard several times today and as Dr. Ragnhild Nordås' presentation shows, a large part of all warring groups do not even use sexual violence in armed conflict. Other actors may start to use some forms of sexual violence but do not keep up the practice through out the war. This means that we have too much variation for it to be inevitable. Because when a researcher says that there is great variation, this means that the violence appears and disappears depending of concrete causes, actions and behaviours. It is not something that just inevitably happens.

So, the presentations teach us to bury the myth that sexual violence is inevitable. This also means that sexual violence can be addressed in regular military analysis by identifying the usual question of 'why, who, what form, when and where'.

Secondly, there is a myth that if we only stop the war, sexual violence will disappear by itself. This myth is dangerous as it can lead us to believe that we

do not need to take specific actions to stop this form of violence. It will ‘work itself out’ if we only deal with ‘the war’.

As these presentations show, this is not true. Sexual violence is part of the war but has to be analyzed as a separate category of violence. For example, sexual violence can get worse when the fighting dies down on the battlefield(s) and it can continue after the peace agreement has been signed. Sexual violence can also have separate effects on the conflict dynamic compared to other forms of violence. For example, sexual violence can continue to generate security problems for both men and women over time. As Dr. Mia Bloom’s presentation shows, this is particularly true regarding the connection between sexual violence and the recruitment to terrorist activities. In addition to sexual violence being used deliberately in war, it can also increase as an effect of how war destroys a society. For example, it can be the result of the break down of the rule of law or of the traditional norms which otherwise prevent violence. Therefore, it is important to analyze the causes behind the occurrence of sexual violence if we are to successfully address it in the specific conflicts settings in which it occurs.

Thus, we can say that the facts presented by the panellists mean that we can bury the myth that this form of violence will disappear by itself without having to take concrete action. As the presentations by Colonel Anthony Atolagbe and Major Fred Tanner gave ample examples of, there are also concrete Best Practices developing on how to analyze sexual violence and how to include it in regular operational analysis and planning.<sup>5</sup>

The third, and final, myth busted by the panellists is that sexual violence only affects civilian women and girls. This assumption often brings with it the conclusion that sexual violence is not in any way related to regular military operations. As the presentations show, this is not true. Men and women, girls and boys can be the targets. The collection of information needs to be adapted to that fact. Moreover, sexual violence is not a ‘civilian’ problem as it can serve a political purpose (by political we mean that it is done to achieve an objective in the war) or have political consequences (that is, be utilized to forward the interests of warring parties). For example, Dr. Bloom’s presentation shows how sexual violence is used in propaganda with a substantial effect. This means that sexual violence can have military consequences. Thereby, sexual violence can have an effect on the military operation’s ability to reach its objective of creating stability and security. Moreover, as Major Tanners’ presentation display, the case may even be that the local troops, with which an international operation collaborates, can be responsible for sexual violence and abuse. How do we address that?

The presentations thereby bust the myth that this is a ‘civilian problem’ of

<sup>5</sup> See also Louise Olsson, *Gender Equality and the United Nations Peace Operations in Timor-Leste*, Brill Publishers:Leiden, 2009 for a discussion on how peace operations affect the levels of violence against women and men.

no consequence for conducting military operations. Today, it is also important to consider that even in a situation where systematic sexual violence was being directed mainly at civilians, it might still constitute a ‘military problem’. Being professionally prepared to prevent and halt sexual violence has become a must as ‘Protection of Civilians’ has broadened the responsibility of many peace operations. According to UN Security Council Resolutions 1820, 1888 and 1960, systematic sexual violence is a threat to international peace and security.

Instead of maintaining these myths, we must base our actions on facts. The next step – a major lesson learned from the panel – is that these facts then need to be translated into operational practices. That is, regular military competence is needed when addressing the problem and turning an awareness into effective action. This effort can be assisted by several tools, such as increasing general gender awareness and utilizing subject matter experts in the form of Gender Field Advisers. However, as Dr. Marsha Henry’s presentation pointed out, this work must also be part of a comprehensive approach to assist the creation of peace. In this, we need to consider which actor – military or civilian – who should be responsible for which aspect of addressing sexual violence and how we can work together.

I will now end by asking the panellists two questions. The first is directed to the three researchers: What is the ONE main concrete thing from your presentation that you think that the Armed Forces should take with them in their continued work to practically address this new form of responsibility? The second question is directed to the two military officers: Although we strive to integrate gender in, and combat sexual violence through, regular military operations, we often seem to fail. What would your advice be to succeed in integrating this knowledge into the regular work?

Researchers, would you like to start answering?

**Mia Bloom:**

Louise, as always, you do such a wonderful job, to be able to get in some material, pull out the few colonels that are the most important. From my military perspective, because I work so closely with very often either the US military or the British military forces, it is important to know that what happened in the field has a direct impact on future mobilization and recruitment. So that the example that I had to unfortunately skip by, the Abeer Janabi attack of the fourteen year old girl in Mahmudiya, does not indicate a trend in US military. In other words, US military is not routinely stalking 14 year old girls, raping them, killing their families and burning them. However, that was the most publicized story in Arabic in 2006, when it happened. The point is to say that a small incident can be blown completely out of proportions in making any military force look particularly bad and incentivizing thousands of people to take up arms.

At the same time, in the absence of these kinds of attacks either by coalition NATO or other military personnel, the organizations themselves have started raping women. There is a real lost opportunity there in terms of creating some counter-narratives. So for people like yourself that work within the field against gender based violence, to emphasize that in fact, yes, we know our sisters in Islam are being raped in Iraq, but they are being raped by a Sunnah to turn them into bombers, is a story that really did not get nearly enough press, given the imbalance of focus and attention given to the Abeer Janabi.

So I think that on the one hand it is, sort of, "be careful what you do, also be aware of what is going on". The foul thing is, and this conforms to some of the mandates of 1325, more women in the field to be able to deal with the other women, like the units that the major mentioned, are really crucial, things like the daughters of Iraq or a good transition. But before there were the daughters of Iraq, you had female units searching in border points and check points. And I think it is very important to understand that if the women are not checked, they are an ideal weapon. If they are checked basically by men, you are shooting yourself in the foot. So it is a win-win strategy for the terrorist, because they are not anticipating, in fact, that militaries will be able to count on more women recruits to help, act as go-betweens, talk to the women, search the women if need be, but also provide a person who is willing to listen in cases of violence. So I think that they are the two takeaways for the military. Thank you so much for your time.

**Marsha Henry:**

I guess the thing that I would say is based on the research that I have been doing with peacekeepers and with UN civilian peacekeepers, as well. Unfortunately, it sounds very negative to say this, but one of the things that motivates UN employees is the threat of failure, and I think on the course that I mentioned in my talk on the gender awareness training course, at the end of the two days the gender advisor in the mission was so frustrated by the refusal to take on some basic tenants about gender relations by many of the personnel, that she failed all of the entire class of candidates and made them retake it. That has some non-motivating consequences, as well. I am sure people can get through these courses either way, without really believing things or without really taking it on-board. But I guess I would say that the way I have shifted in thinking about that training, is to really emphasize that having a certain kind of gender knowledge is part of developing a professional skill. I think if you can make having a certain base of knowledge as part of your professional remit, it takes gender – to me, gender knowledge and knowledge about sexual violence – out of the personal context to a certain extent and puts it into the realm of professional expertise, professional knowledge and professional development.

**Ragnild Nordås:**

Thank you very much, Louise, for summing up the panel. I think that you definitely pointed out some important myths that are out there as two very difficult questions, so it is like putting up answering. Mostly in the research that I have been involved in, we are trying to find these patterns of the variations in sexual violence. The long-term purpose of this, of course, is to try to find better early warning systems, more effective intersection points when things can be done. When do we expect things to increase? In what locations? By what actors? In what forms? – And so on, to be preemptively aware when we see a potential situation escalating. That said, though, I think what you point out is most of the important myths that we need to bust, is of course this notion that sexual violence is inevitable and that it will always occur, this notion that “boys will be boys”, this is just what happens in war, and so on. That is the main take-home message, but it is important to know for militaries and for others as well, but it is not necessarily concrete enough.

I think that my work is focused on trying to find out how we could get the most out of the limited resources that we have, what are the actors we need to be aware of, at what time, and in what locations, so that we can early on be able to intercept before things escalate out of control. But exactly how the interventions should be done, I do not feel I am necessarily the right person to respond to that. That is also maybe the case when it comes to how to implement gender into the operational and military procedures, as this is also not my area of expertise. Maybe I should just leave that to people with more military expertise to answer.

**Louise Olsson:**

Thank you. We will turn to the practitioners.

**Fred Tanner:**

In terms of how we should operationalize the lessons learned of what we have spoken about in the panel today, would be to take it a step further beyond senior leader by-end. Essentially, what it becomes is you need to make leaders accountable and evaluate leaders on their ability to respond to sexual violence in conflict areas. When I think back to each of the four deployments I had and the numerous situations that I have had to address prior to deploying, at no time was I evaluated or asked to respond to any kind of situational training in sexual violence. To picture what I think would be the ideal end status prior to the next deployment at the mission rehearsal exercise of win-win would be, if you have leaders that are going through some kind of situational training exercise where they would have to deal with gender violence or sexual violence, they have to deal with it, they are evaluated upon it, and then, even better, if there is a matter of a political appetite to expand the military any further, but I do see the role of

the gender advisor. You link that learning experience in terms of how to deal with gender violence, and you also bring into and you connect it now with what a gender advisor can do for you as a military organization. I think that is really the win-win in terms of end state. I am not sure how achievable it is, given at least my country's current economical issues, the financial issues and the pending downsizing of our military, even without the gender advisor, just getting it into the pre-deployment training would be recommended.

**Anthony Atolagbe:**

I think Tanner has actually captured the essence of the first question. I would just go to that which affects the mission, which is the UNAMID. Currently, there was a military capability study that was conducted between the military planning section and the UNAMID towards the end of 2010. A report was written, having carried out an assessment of the entire operations, as it affects the military, the civil and the police. Just about three weeks ago, aspect of the report was tabled for study once more. The highlight of the study is that there is need for more robustness on the part of the military in conducting their patrols such that at any point that you get to certain areas, your robustness should give patrols access, for the conduct of assigned tasks. It is only then that the aspects of SOFA can be achieved and the mission mandate also be pursued adequately.

In this area, where we really have problems was in the area of patrol. For instance, if a patrol is attacked, it needed to have adequate capability to respond. You need to have adequate response or get immediate support. Initially, we did not have attack helicopters, but the mission got attack helicopters from Ethiopia and in due course, from Rwanda as part of the implementation of this study. So I think with some level of firepower behind patrols who are going into some difficult areas, we will be able to instill some respect and fear in these perpetrators of violent acts and pursue the mission mandate.

In other areas, as it affects the addressing way to combat sexual violence, we conduct training for military and staff officers at the point of coming into the mission. It ensures that these personnel are educated on how to go about their interactions with the people as training is mission specific. Also, troops of contributing countries are also educated as part of pre induction training.

The challenge here is that, the mission also experience air restrictions into some areas where the militia are actually concentrated and they continue to engage in conflicts. They fight most of the time there, so we are not allowed to fly within those areas, but as much as possible we close in on some of these places and we want to ensure that humanitarian hubs are established in these places. People within most of these areas are not reachable, and for this reason UNAMID insisted that team sites have to be established around some of these locations. The mission conducts air reconnaissance while expansions across the AOR continue through opening of new team sites.

So, generally, we are moving forward and we are hopeful that by the time the implementation is completed, the mission will be repositioned to do more. Thank you.

**Louise Olsson:**

Thank you. Now we open up the floor for questions. I will take two or three questions and then handle it back to the panel.

**Q:**

Thank you very much for very interesting briefs. I have to quote the major from the US Army: "I'll walk away enlightened", probably, and hopefully later today. I have one concern. I have been in the business of training operators prior to deploying, and I do believe that it is of critical value to actually train the officers and shoulders for the real situation they will meet once in theatre. I do believe that when we discuss gender and prepare our officers and soldiers for gender related issues, we very often mix the real situation with what we do believe is the political correct situation. Let me give you an example.

When we train our military maritime special forces for deployment to Afghanistan, we prepare them for gender related issues linked to women's situation in Afghanistan. We have scenario type training in order to prepare them for that. When I speak to my colleagues returning from Afghanistan, they sometimes tell me that from their experience there is different issues that might be of even more importance, for example sexual exploitation of children in Afghanistan. What do we do? We have already heard that there are limited resources and unlimited problems. What do we do in a situation where gender is very important – obviously, it is very important, and we need to take it into account when we prepare ourselves. Can focus on one vulnerable party in the conflict make us less capable of taking care of other weak parties in the conflict?

**Q:**

I have a comment on the presentation of Major Tanner. I think an invader force has a responsibility. When the Americans moved into Iraq, they should not really repeat the kind of mistakes that they did. One example is too many. Talking about those children maltreated by American soldiers, talking about the pictures we saw from Abu Graib prison – a few examples of that nature contradicts, really, what you mentioned earlier in regard to the US should set an example for the host nation. It is very unfortunate to say that you could not do it because of those failures, although in the US those examples might be tolerated by the society because the judicial system is working and those perpetrators are going to be punished, and so forth.

But in the case of Iraq I believe what happened destroyed really the whole notion of going into Iraq, toppling a dictator and so forth. What I would sug-



gest, really, to the Americans, is basically what the colonel mentioned earlier, to get better prepared going to Iraq and Afghanistan, to-morrow maybe to Iran and God knows elsewhere. Those are the mistakes that are not going to be forgiven by the people in those countries, and as you and other colleagues mentioned, that this is real playing in the hands of the most extreme elements in that region. So, for the sake of the people in those regions, do not repeat the mistakes that you did in the case of Iraq, because ultimately you are simply jeopardizing whatever moderate element groups that exist in the region. In other words, you are going there for a few years and then you get back to the US, but those people who have to live in the region have to live with those extremist elements that are going to capitalize on the kind of behavior of a few American soldiers had in Iraq.

**Q:**

I welcome all panelists' contributions this afternoon. For Marsha, I actually believe what you say, and I welcome the word that you use – professional – that it should not be just considered gender, that it should be part of our professional training. I actually see this as a human rights' issue. I do not separate it. I think all soldiers should be trained in basic human rights. So I accept your whole word and use of professional, because we are supposed to be professional soldiers.

On that point, I will move on to your second point, where you gender advisor in a certain mission failed a class. First of all, they should not have been there in the first place, because that is in-country, it is host nation. So I pose the question to you: If host nations are not carrying out that type of training, should they be allowed deploy[ing], in the first place?

To my two military commanders, I put the question to both of you: In Chad, the European Union, the method we introduced there was with focal points down at the lowest level. We are all talking about senior level. Yes you have to have it by and in the senior level, but it will be operational at a very, very low level. So if you concentrate too much on the higher level, you will actually loose out at the lower level, because of a lot of the higher level places end up just ticking a box for the national action plans. So what I would propose, that not alone at lower level, but that daily reports, weekly reports, multiple reports, the whole issue of gender based violence should be a paragraph, it should be one of our main paragraphs along with the operational and other briefs that we make. I will welcome comments on that. Thank you.

**Col. Anthony Atolagbe:**

I quite appreciate your contribution, and I also know that it is not in every circumstance that the senior leaders are usually held responsible. For example as I speak to you, we sent a patrol out, sometime in the month of April, and this patrol could not get to their destination. They were supposed to go and locate

a site, speak to the local community on how to get a team site there, but the local police officials stopped them. They turned back, but on their way back, they had a flat tire. One of the militia groups appeared on them and they had a discussion in which they requested for money and some few things and the patrol gave them the leftover of their food.

A report came and the minister of foreign affairs said that the soldiers who went on patrol so-and-so date were giving help to the other militia men and that they were seriously against that. This called for a very serious handling at the force headquarters. The force commander had to insist that an investigation be conducted. This is not related to sexual violence though, but I am trying to relate it to a situation where there is a failure in command, because it is not the force commander who actually goes on patrol. The FC found that there was some laxity on the part of the commander in this particular incident. As planned by the force headquarters, I think, the commander might be repatriated. We have had some other issues of repatriation which the mission has had to apply in order to show its displeasure.

The essence of some of these actions is not only to punish, but to see the seriousness on the part of the mission itself and to pass it to the commanders on the ground. Additionally, if you are given assets or work, surely you are supposed to go there and deliver and not for you to start negotiating any position the militias. So I believe that, as much as the senior commanders are held responsible, the junior ones also have got to be responsible for their actions. Thank you.

### **Major Fred Tanner:**

An answer to the first gentleman's question in regards to how to address the training issue in the beginning. I do not disagree, I would encourage it to keep gathering lessons learned and incorporate it in the feedback we receive from those who are returning from the field. I think we are on the level gradually now where we can be specific towards the AO's, especially when you are talking about special forces who routinely return to the same AO's. Certainly, based upon how progressive an area will be, will be dependent upon how in the lay, for a lack of a better term, gender violence will be. I guess the point I was trying to make in discussing this is, in the course of my pre-deployment training, I would probably go through a dozen counter-IED-lanes before I did with only one either child or violence or whatever, and not that there should be – I am not saying that it should be one-for-one, but there needs to be a better balance. That is what I would pass to you.

In regards to the second question from the gentleman in the rear, I am not sure I grasped your exact question. I think your point had something to do in regards to example setting, and specifically towards Abu Graib and the native percussions from information operations perspective, given the enemy the abi-

lity to exploit misconduct like the US soldiers conducted during Abu Graib. It is very easy for me here, within the confines of these walls, to get up here and say this is what we should do. It is a different story when you get there on the ground. I am in no way confining what those soldiers' actions were. No one, and I can say this, no one was more embarrassed than us service members that were serving in the country at the time, who had been risking our lives on a daily basis, to have that respected that we garnered to disappear in the course of a couple of photographs due to the lack of judgment of some individuals. No one is more aggravated by that than those of us who are honorably serving. What we can only continue to do, is train and keep our forces as professional as possible.

Finally, for the last question in the back in regards to NATO senior leader buy-in (getting senior leaders to recognize and support gender violence issues). Sir, I could not agree more of what you are saying. I think we are saying exactly the same thing. My point is that until senior leaders think it is important, junior leaders are not going to care. Ultimately, you are right. It is not the senior leaders that deal with these issues on a day-to-day basis, it is the junior leaders that need to, so when I described that perfect end-state, I am referring to a lieutenant on patrol, or sergeant on patrol, that is put in that situation in a training environment where he can be taught, they have a coach teacher and mentor and all that.

**Mia Bloom:**

I was going to jump in, if that is OK, to two of the points that you made. One about how do you protect various vulnerable communities, whereas I think it is important that we understand that precisely because military forces are becoming immune to certain kinds of attacks, they can harden their targets. There are huge incentives on the part of various and certain groups and terrorist groups to use younger and younger operators. So with something that requires training, but it is also something that will also require additional PTSD, psychological support, because it will be infinitely more difficult on soldiers who are ordinarily trained to protect women and children to have to start shooting them.

So it is going to have to be a set of standard operating procedure across multiple military organizations, because there will be instances when you are not sure if the child is involved. Perhaps they are look-outs. But there will absolutely be cases where the child is wearing an IED and how do you disable the IED and not necessarily completely kill the child. What we are seeing coming out of Pakistan is madrassahs that are specifically geared to getting the children to become suicide bombers. This is unlike anything we have seen before, where let us say for instance, the children grow up in ethnic conflicts and engage in an organization as a look out or a porter, then when they are older, they become more and more involved and they go in active service after

they are 16-17. These are children that are being deployed at a very young age and they have absolutely no concept of what they are doing. And they have no fear, because they are kids.

These are things that we have started to see in Afghanistan, where a six-year-old was told "just put this on and go and find some ANA soldiers and blow up". Juma Gul was his name. Even he knew that there was something not right about this scenario. In fact, he was able to get the IED taken off of him and he was embraced and lauded by President Karzai for his quick thinking. What this was also useful for, was that the whole Pashtun Wali of his village, who had never worked previously with NATO troops, completely switched and started to work with the NATO troops, because they was so outraged by the manipulation of a child at the age of six.

On a separate issue with information operations – and this is again where I am not in the military so it is easy for me to say – I think it is a very good thing to have the military, instead of try to hide an Abu Graib or the act of Steven Green is to make it very public, for two reasons. First of all to be a deterrent for any other soldiers who might think that there is a culture in which they can get away with it, that there is a culture of permissiveness that allows them to do, you know, "boys will be boys". But it is also important in the country for them to see that people are being punished. I think the worst thing that can happen, is with the military tribunals a feeling that things might be under the rug, and that there is really no justice. So, again, it is something to consider, it is definitely not the proudest moment and I would definitely agree that these are shameful things for the military, but at the same time it should be made public in a way that at least validates in the country people seeing, "oh, you mean the people from Blackwater do not just get off, because the rules of evidence do not transfer from Iraq to the beltway. So I think that there are two things going on, but with information operations it is something that the military needs to do a better job.

### **Ragnhild Nordås:**

I think there were some interesting things that were brought up here that we could think about. One thing that was mentioned was the professionalism. Although I am not a military person, I understand that in fact maybe militaries actually have an advantage in terms of dealing with these issues, because military organizations have been built as hierarchical organizations with discipline and professionalisms being two sides of the same coin. I agree in what was said here about when the top leaders and the commanders do not have internalized it and do not believe this is important, then it will not trickle down. But it will trickle down if actually the commanders are onboard and can say this and live by these principles in their own combat.

So, in a way, military organizations might have an advantage in dealing

with this. And I think it is very impressive what I have heard today about the training and how you set up the scenarios. There seems to be a lot of potential, actually, for having this as a part of the training. I do not think that there is any point of us assuming or believing that we need to have these long sorts of philosophical debates within the militaries about gender in general, or spend a lot of time on deep discussions about it. These are very standardized procedures and behaviors that can very easily, I think, be incorporated into the daily practices and the training, and that it should not take that more time. Not being in the military it seems to me that it can actually be quite easily added on to the existing training without too much ado. I do not know if you in the military disagree with that? I would be very interested to hear what you think about that with the actual experience that you have.

**Marsha Henry:**

Just on the first issue of gender issues being a priority, or certain gender issues being a priority, the project that some of the examples that I gave came from a project that I was working on that began in 2003, which was specifically to look at the issue of sexual exploitation abuse by peacekeepers at a variety of contexts. We found that everywhere we went, nobody wanted to talk about gender, and it was not just because it was a taboo subject. It was actually because, for a lot of people, it was not the main thing that they wanted to convey about their security experiences. So when talking to both peacekeepers and local communities, they had a whole host of other issues that of course have gender consequences and are connected with all sorts of gender issues. We could do a gender analysis of them, so it ended up that in the results of our research project we very much tried to honor what people were telling us. Some scholars have argued that a focus on for example male on female violence in particular in conflict zones also can be seen as a distraction, or can be used as a distraction, from other kinds of violence that are taking place that do not have a specific gender nature to them or other kind of incidents. For example, one of the issues that came up, significantly in every single mission we visited, was examples of corruption, both within the military and local organizations. These also have very specific gender consequences, so it is not to detract from that.

In terms of the professional skills, I will give you an example. One of the things that has consistently come up in this discussion again around sexual exploitation and abuse – I am just using this as an example – by peacekeepers, is that there has been this discussion amongst some practitioners, that not just that boys will be boys, but what do we do with groups of men who are deployed for a six months’ to a year, who do not have any access to consensual sex? I think this is a real problem. If we think about it in relation to professional obligations and professional responsibilities, I doubt we would have the same discussion about another professional group who was contracted. Although,

that is not necessarily to say that there are not necessarily engaging in sexual exploitation and abuse. But I think the kind of professional expectations that we have of soldiers, I think it is perfectly legitimate to expect them not to be engaged in activities that go against their own codes of conduct. I do not think that we need to necessarily provide them with more internet access in the hope that they will not rape local women or be engaged in other kinds of forbidden activities. So I think this issue of professionalization is very important.

I also think that there is an additional problem which is that sometimes peacekeepers and soldiers tend to use other national military groups as a kind of scapegoat for practices and problems, so they might say that "in our military we have dealt with this through whatever means, but that military over there or that group of peacekeepers over there are still involved in various activities" or "they are not promoting gender, because their culture does not promote that set of gender beliefs". I think that in peacekeeping missions it is very dangerous for us to divide these different forms of masculinity along cultural or national lines. I think we have to be quite careful to acknowledge violence both within military institutions and violence outside of them and look at the variation in those.

**Q:**

Thank you for allowing me to have the final question to the panel. This morning we heard a quote from Dag Hammarskiöld saying that "peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it". He is famous for another statement that we do not hear so often: "If you want to know do what is going on, ask the women". It is a pity that that quote is not as used as the first one. But never mind. A takeaway, I think, in terms of what the military can do, that is known but is worth restating, is that if you want to have control of your operational area, or as much control as you can have, and if you want to do a conflict analysis properly, you can never know if you have enough information. But you can always, or very often, make sure that you speak to everyone. And this is something that cannot be underestimated. Make sure that you speak to all communities, all stakeholders, all the groups vulnerable or not, and both sexes. Then it becomes a national standard operational procedure to speak to anyone, but to everyone. It does not become a gender issue, which also helps in what was just previously discussed, whether we make everything into a gender issue, but to include to make sure that we speak to everyone. Because we have different views. And this is all known, but I think it is worth mentioning again, in terms of takeaways for the military, that everyone has a bit of the whole picture, and to listen to everyone. This is more a comment than a question. Thank you very much.



**Session 3**  
**National Implication of Framework**





# What do we know about sexual harassment in the armed forces?

*Captain René Hudribusch, Austrian Department of Defense and Sport*

First of all I want to say thank you to Anita and Cecilie for the invitation and for giving me the chance to speak in front of this audience. I also want to say congratulations to you both and also to Lena and Ole for the organization of this event. I know how difficult it is and how much work it is, and you make a perfect job. Thank you for this.

I would like to start my presentation with a sentence: “If we do not talk about a problem, it doesn’t exist!” Because it looks if this is the way many organizations deal with the sexual harassment within their organization, especially against female employees. The attempt to ignore the problem and to negate the existence supports the offender and offends the victims. Sexual harassment is by no means a phenomenon which you will find only in a certain organization. No, it can happen anywhere. Therefore, sexual harassment is also a problem within military organization. This is the reason why the Austrian Ministry of Defence started a campaign against workplace aggression in the Austrian armed forces. Sexual harassment in military organization is still a taboo issue and therefore you will find just a little research on this topic. The reason for the limited number of research could be:

- The attempt not to admit the issue. (Organizational taciturnity)
- The shame which victims feel to talk about it. (Individual taciturnity)
- Coping strategies of female soldiers. (Therapeutic taciturnity)

A huge problem which I found out during my research was the fact that obviously the vast majority of the people under scrutiny does not know about sexual harassment and what it actually means. To specify sexual harassment you can use at least two ways. You can do it by explaining it, how it is defined by the national or international law, or you try to explain which methods of sexual harassment the offenders unconsciously or consciously apply.

Methods of sexual harassment could be for example posters of pinups and pornographic material in the working areas around the PC, to peep at someone, jokes with sexual content, gamy notes about the figure or sexual notes, unrequested invitation with a determinate aim, phone calls, letters, emails with sexual notes, advantages in the organization after sexual concession or the other way round, that you have disadvantages in the organization after sexual refusing, touch, request for sexual acts, or exhibitionism. Already a long list, but still not everything was told.

Very often sexual harassment is linked to physical touches or a request for sexual acts, but sexual harassment starts much more on a subtle and inconsiderable level. You can observe male employees telling jokes with sexual content in front of female employees which could harm or humiliate the females and this is already sexual harassment. Gerstendörfer (1997) figured out that the speech is a kind of weapon, which offenders use selectively as sexual violence against females to harm and humble them. Hornscheidt (2005) explained the necessity to create a feminist speech to displace this sexist speech and to avoid the impression that the male population is always dominating the female one. Referring to Gerstendörfer (1997) and Hornscheidt (2005), there is a need for more education within the organizations to raise the awareness that sexual harassment is not only the physical touch, it is also the speech. Especially in military organizations the use of misogynic speech is omnipresent. By giving weak soldiers or weapons female names the organization supports the sexist speech against females, it prevents the integration process and it supports sexual harassment.

There are different reasons for sexual harassment in organizations. Steurenthaler (1994) and Wardetzki (2005) figured out that one of the reasons for sexual harassment within organizations is the attempt of the organization to bear power over the women and to follow own interests. Because of this exercise of power the women in organizations are not self-determined and controlled by the patriarchy. Sexual harassment as a method of the exercise of power gives a single offender or a group the possibility to discriminate and to terrorize the victim and push him or her out of the organization. Therefore it could be possible that male soldiers use sexual harassment as a method of bullying to push female soldiers out of the organization to keep it a male-only organization.

Now I would like to give some examples of sexual harassment cases, workplace aggression and bullying in the armed forces of different nations.

USA 1991 the Tailhook scandal in the US Armed Forces shocked the American society about the conditions within the organization. During an annual event of the Naval Aviation Association Tailhook it comes to sexual harassment against female soldiers in a form which was not known before. Men touched women, ripped the clothes of their body and the male soldiers wore t-shirts with the slogan "females are property". Despite the scandal and the media attention there was no justice for the women. No one of the offenders assumed responsibility, they only got a warning or a fine.

Williams, a female US soldier who fought in the Gulf War wrote a book about her experiences and sexual harassment of female soldiers by male soldiers. During her duty in the mission male soldiers solicited sex or offered her money to undress herself in front of them. Jokes with sexual content or sexual allusions were on the agenda every day.

Israel, Levy (2003) describes in her research the role of female soldiers within the Israeli Defence Force as a sexual object. High-ranking officers choose female soldiers based on their look and treat them like a trophy. Very often sexual relationships arise between these high-ranking officers and the female soldiers, which became a central issue in the media, but they always discussed about the women and not about the men. So you get the impression that this misbehaviour is only in the responsibility of the women and not of the men.

Russia, Eifler specifies in her paper 2003 the role of female soldiers in the Russian Army and the problem of sexual harassment. Because of the high pressure due to the bad economic situation, female soldiers try to ignore sexual harassment or to take advantage of the situation in order not to lose the job or to face a complaint by the refused offender

Germany, Kümmel (2005) determined the opening of the German Armed Forces for women and observed bullying against female soldiers. Women became very often victims of gossip and misogynic jokes.

Concerning sexual harassment and bullying in the Austrian Armed Forces I wrote a PhD Thesis of my own accord to do a research in this interesting and unexplored field. Despite considerable effort on the part of the Austrian government to recruit females into the military, still there is the need to take more care about this topic and especially in research. Policy makers state that physical limits are the primary reason for high female drop-out rates. Several scholars indicate that the masculine and androcentric culture of military organizations coupled with the token status of female soldiers and gendered role attributions impede full integration and leave women in a weak position. The underlying hypothesis of my study is that conflicts rooted in the military culture with its diverse gender constructions result in workplace aggression and eventually cause high female drop-out rates.

In a survey in seven sub-units of the Austrian Armed Forces with a sample size of 443 persons I used standardized instruments to measure workplace aggression and specific culture types and attitudes toward women. My results show that women are more often affected by bullying than men, and all victims of bullying allege that they faced more than one offender. These results suggest that bullying and aggressive behavior against women is a collective phenomenon, unconsciously motivated/induced by micro-political differences rather than individually caused. Furthermore, I find significant relationships between perceived cultures, attitudes towards women and aggressive behavior.

Concerning sexual harassment within the Austrian Armed Forces I observed gender discrimination as a more significant problem than sexual harassment. But we have to keep in mind, that this result could be influenced by the shame of the victims to talk about this problem and especially in a military organization. There was one case of sexual harassment in my research and the victim and the offender was a man. So we can see that sexual harassment in military

organizations is not obligatory a problem of females in the role of the victims. It can also happen to the male soldiers as well.

After my PhD thesis and the publishing of the findings, 2011 the Austrian armed forces started an information campaign within the Forces with the topic “bullying”. With this campaign the male and female soldiers should get sensitized about bullying against soldiers, especially against female soldiers. With lectures and discussion rounds the soldiers receive information on the topic and also the possibility to get them self-heard and to receive contact addresses for face-to-face talks or further support. I’m sure that this campaign will improve the situation of female soldiers within the Austrian Armed Forces and this is the first step in the right direction to fight against bullying and sexual harassment.

Concluding we have to say with certain constraints that there must be a stronger focus of military organizations on the problem of sexual harassment and bullying within the organization. There is the need of further research if we want to understand the problem and to change the situation to make the working environment a safe place for all members. Therefore every country needs a stronger support by their MOD to do more academic research, to talk openly about the problem, which can occur in every organization, and to establish measures to avoid sexual harassment in the organization and to support the victims. Thank you.

# How military culture affects the handling and responding of sexual violence

*Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørvi, PhD, University of Tromsø*

I also wish to thank the organizers very much for allowing me to present during this really interesting conference. I want to pose two questions: How does military culture affect the handling and responding to sexual violence? This question, I would suggest, requires us to understand some of the key elements influencing Norwegian military culture, one important element of which is masculinity. Thus the following question looks like this: Can an improved understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Norwegian, masculine-influenced, military culture be used to enhance gender awareness in international operations, with the expected result that it will increase operational effectiveness by using knowledge, skills and logical ready present in the military system?

I do not yet have the answer to this question, but I would like to argue that this aspect has not been adequately investigated for its value to operational effectiveness. This is important because it is about using knowledge, skills and practices that already exist within the system, that emerge as a part of constant training and exercise. What I would like to focus on are some techniques that I have been learning and discussing with other colleagues to potentially enhance capacities within the military to deal with gender issues.

The background for what I am going to be talking about, comes from the research I have been doing on civil-military interaction, particularly here in Norway and based in many interviews— very many interviews, not just with people working with civil-military interaction generally speaking where gender awareness plays one of its most crucial roles, but also with people working in gender specifically. It is also based on collaborative work with people at the Swedish armed forces' joint development and experimentation centre, as well as work that I have done in the multi-national Experiment 6 on cultural awareness, that was part of the Norwegian delegation to that particular effort. In combination I have gathered a lot of input, a lot of it interviews, a lot of it also very anecdotal, but I think rather interesting stuff that maybe can contribute towards supporting the efforts of integrating a gender awareness in the military.

My work is generally speaking in security studies, so I look at a lot of these issues through a security framework. This particular discussion takes a look at this from a multi-actor security perspective, where we have multiple security perspectives that are relevant in specific contexts and trying to gain awareness about that. I also focus on a civil-military context - again, this is a multi-actor

context - and the tensions between protecting civilians while being warriors at the same time.

I want to step back from a focus on sexual violence and looking at gender awareness more broadly speaking and specifically in terms of masculinity, but then return to see how this impacts our understanding of sexual violence in military space. I want to take a look at is masculinity and the ways in which we can understand military expertise and training in this particular area.

In these interviews and discussions, generally, which I have had with people about gender, I experienced what can be called “moments”, I would say – or snapshots – that I have come across either at gender conferences or in interviews or just general discussions. For example, at a gender-and-military focused conference last year, one particular officer who was not part of the conference, saw that there is this gender conference going on at a location in Holland, where I was at, and he was just whipping by. He however took the opportunity and purposefully just looked at me and said: Gender is also about men, you know! And that was it. He was a little bit pissed off, actually – which gave, of course, his impression of what he thought that we were talking about. That was one snapshot, and that is not the first time I have ever heard that kind of comment.

Another time I was talking with an international group of military personnel, mostly Spanish, and we started talking about masculinity. It was all men, and they were talking about their impressions of masculinity, and speaking rather positively about it, associating masculinity with characteristics like strength, intelligence, discipline, leadership and so forth. Some of the guys said: “Can we say that?” They were expressing their views on masculinity and were very unsure: “Is that not like taboo for me, to admit this kind of thinking about it?” That was rather interesting that they were indeed uncertain about whether or not they could speak positively about their own views about masculinity (and femininity by the way).

Yet another example was in my discussions, talking to gender advisors. I was privileged enough to be able to go to Afghanistan and spoke to a number of gender advisors there. It was really interesting hearing some of them say: “I don’t actually focus a lot on gender, not least because I can’t” – in other words, coming down to “we have this position called gender advisor, but we do not have the funding for it”. We have the position, but it is not prioritized. We want to try to develop FETs, like the female engagement teams, but it is – like what was mentioned in the previous session – FETs cannot just be breasts in a uniform, you need to have people who are trained to operate as FETs. Just having women who actually have other types of jobs, have absolutely no training; cannot operationalize gender in a way that apparently it is supposed to be done. That was more of the challenges. So the problems that were mentioned to me ranged from perceptions of this thing called “gender awareness” that was about teaching military men about women, to gender advisors (male and

female) that saw the relevance of the approach but did not have the adequate resources to really implement anything. This is not to say that all was negative, but these impressions (above) cannot be dismissed or ignored. The benefits about a gender perspective were usually in terms of information Intel. If we talked to women we get 50 per cent more Intel about the area. However, not everyone understands even this benefit.

I have received comments from people in higher levels of command structures that say: "This stuff is useless, but we have to do it". There we get that political correct thing going on. Among some female personnel interesting responses also included: "That does not represent me". Because often the gender rhetoric when targeting women sometimes makes women who are military operators feel like they are subjected to a specific picture about women, a vulnerable distinction which focuses negative attention on female military practitioners.

So it is a very interesting topic, this business about gender. Although we have acknowledged here that it is not just about women, it is also about men, quite often we slide into that comfort zone, where we just talk about women.

At the moment there are a lot of efforts to try to increase gender awareness. There are many challenges in these efforts, but it is actually increasing. I see that not just from what have been discussed here, but also being aware of different courses that are made available. What is interesting to me is that there is not a very strong focus on masculinity and on military culture, which is a strange lack of focus, in my view. The reframing process that I want to talk about here is meant to complement and assist these sorts of efforts of including an understanding of the role of masculinity.

Why am I going to start talking about reframing and about masculinity? I want to take a look at how gender is generally perceived. This you can find in a lot of material like reports about 'how well are we doing gender integrating?' and 'is it functioning on the ground?' There are two sort of main critiques that I have taken away from a lot of these sorts of reports. The first is that gender is an uncomfortable subject in the military, not least because in these discussions the military is often the focus of critique; not least that military culture is criticized due to its masculinity roots, for linkages between masculine approaches and violence, and not least sexual violence. As well, the focus on gender integration is often considered in relation to military work but not always in a clear way. We have heard some other talk about this, as well, where the whole thing is "We are doing war fighting, and a lot of this gender stuff belongs to the civilian domain". Again, I am looking at the civil-military context where gender awareness is particularly relevant for military actors since there are times where civilian actors are not present; there are only military actors on the ground in a particular situation or in a particular operations area. So it is a necessity to have a certain amount of knowledge about what will be required in that operations area.



So the context that I have been looking at, as I have mentioned now, frequently is a civil-military context. It is not just about winning the war, soldier against soldier, but it is ensuring that civilians in particular are as little negatively affected as possible, and that during an operation both prior to, during, and after, that the concerns of civilians are going to be addressed. Because otherwise – really quite frankly – you will get a backlash. If civilian needs and civilian security is inadequately addressed, there can be repercussions in that civilians will respond negatively towards those military operations, that military, in the future. This is also a multi-actor security environment with various political mandates. I want to stress that about the various political mandates, because the ways in which militaries have to assess their civil-military situation depends also on the mandate. It could be responsibility to protect, could be part of the mandate, it could be a peacekeeping mandate, it could be a regime change/regime change support, a little bit like Afghanistan. There is a difference when militaries are there on the ground by consent of all parties versus their being on the ground and fighting some of the parties. So the dynamics change the relationship of the military operator to that environment, so the civilian environment can be very different, depending on the political mandate.

What role does masculinity play in all of this? Military culture is considered to be very much characterized by masculine values and masculine practices or ways of doing things. Actually, a lot of the literature on masculinity and the military focus on looking at this masculine culture in a rather negative light. I have just pulled off a couple of quotations here that take a look at the linkages between certain masculine values and practices in relationship to values. That includes largely things that are demeaning to women and to encourage promiscuity and encourages sexual violence. At the same time, there has been some interesting work – and again there has not been so much done on masculinity, but what has been done and more recently, is that we do not recognize the multiplicity of masculinities within the military cultural framework. We see that in civilian culture; there is a multiplicity of masculinities. And we have exactly the same thing in military culture. We are not able through the above analyses or assessments illustrated by the quotes, to actually explain the behavior of military personnel who do not act out, who do not use aggression, who are not sexually violent individuals and do not act out in terms of a hyper-masculine approach.

Therefore, the purpose here is to take a look at in what ways can we use masculinity, can we dig into military culture and its basis in masculine values to be able to support positively gender roles and also gender analysis, using knowledge, skills and practices which actually comes from the military system/culture itself. If we agree that there are linkages between masculinity and military culture (and considerable research has explored this connection), how do we address some of the current conclusions, which look negatively upon this relationship? Does this mean militaries should work against masculinity

and the practices associated with it? If we are going to say that masculinity is the problem, are we going to eliminate it from military culture? If we do that, we remove a core element of military culture. And that is not very likely or practical. There are a lot of those characteristics that are actually necessary to military functioning. There are gender practices already in place, with or without courses in gender to guide these practices. For example in key leader engagement, identifying leadership is a gendered practice. You will find out who has got the power in the area. More than likely you are doing a gender analysis already without really thinking really about it, but automatically seek out older men in the community (as a starting point). Wearing beards – in Afghanistan so many of the soldiers are going around in beards. That is a gendered practice – showing respect to the male portion of the community, using gendered practices to gain better access to certain people. So that is in the analysis: How am I going to connect with this community in a better way? How am I going to show my respect? That is a very gendered practice. As well as the identification of combatants; who do I think are the combatants on the ground? That is also a gendered analysis.

The thing is that we need a better understanding of the ways in which multiple masculinities operate in the military to try to generate the attitudes that we apparently want. If we recall the Minister of Defense; she talked about changing attitudes in the military to be more gender friendly. This process that I am talking about, is trying to look for what attitudes already exist that we can actually draw on, that will exist within military culture. These might be in the type of masculine characteristics which are not so often in focus, and have been mentioned a little bit now, like characteristics such as protection, responsibility, leadership, honor, discipline, professionalism. These are aspects that should be encouraged within the military. The military has these already. In what ways can we encourage these characteristics, often associated with masculinity as well, to support a stronger gender analytical framework? This has to be done in cooperation with militaries themselves and not from outside sources.

Essentially, what the ideas here is, is taking the departure point that military personnel are already gender experts. They are operating in a very gendered institution (not only is it male dominated by that the organization operates on what are strongly considered to be masculine characteristics and values), and in what way can we use the knowledge that lies there already, that is ingrained within each soldier and officer and has been a part of training and practices since “day one”, and from there attempt to have a better gender understanding of what sort of knowledge the military already use which can be used to enhance their own gender/cultural/civil-military situational awareness.

I will just mention the first goal of using the self-awareness of military culture masculinity as a tool for situational awareness on the ground. That way military actors can analyze and adjust gender awareness according to the

context. Because at the end of the day, no matter how many documents one gets on like 1325 and this and the other – one moment you should not shake hands with women, but another moment you can shake hands with women – military operators are going to have to figure this out on their own in a specific context. Therefore, it has to be driven in training right from the start. What better than to use the military culture they already have to try to enforce this type of training?

There is a process that I have been working with our Swedish colleagues on framing and reframing. What that is, is to try to find out what values and practices lie within military culture, actually be open about military culture, what it is all about? What are the masculine aspects about military culture? What are the ways in which we take a look at other organizations, also non-military organizations (such as NGOs), and what sorts of characteristics do they have or do we judge them by? Are those also masculine characteristics, or not? – Through reframing we try to get a sense of how we are actually framing our world with regards to assumptions about gender. And also understand how military themselves are projecting out to the civilian environment in which they are working.

Essentially, the idea is to strengthen positive masculine characteristics. Militaries get masculinity. This is something that is a part of the system and therefore can be used to recognize patterns of activities amongst actors. It can help challenge preconceptions about civilian environment and as well increase civilian situational awareness, help with force protection, protection of civilians, and create alternative ways of communicating. Some areas where this would be most useful – we are talking about the top leadership, that is definitely the case, but Intel, CIMIC, PST ops – I might just add as a little ploy – CIMIC actually has many functions that are very similar to what the gender advisors have, so here we have an opportunity to make use of already established functions to try to encourage a stronger gender awareness.

Thank you.

# The effects associated with sexual assault and combat

*Nathan Galbreath, PhD, MFS. Department of Defense  
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office*

Hi, my name is Nate Galbreath. As with the previous speakers, the opinions that I express do not necessarily represent the official policy of the United States Department of Defense.

That being said, since we have been talking about the theoretical today, I thought I would give you a little bit of the applied focus of a program to prevent and respond to gender based violence. Certainly, the Department of Defense and United States in general has its share of problems with inappropriate sexual behavior. It seems to be the main topic of conversation recently. By the way, for those of you who were wondering, Representative Wiener did resign today. So it appears there will be no more “sexting” from the House of Representatives.

I thought I should talk to you a little bit about our sexual assault prevention and response program and its background, research about sexual assault and combat, and then give you some key program points. I am certainly not going to be able to cover everything, but I should be able to give you a quick overview.

The Department of Defense has a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program largely because in 2004 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld began to get messages from downrange in Iraq and Afghanistan that our sexual assault victims were not being cared for in a way that they should be. So he put together a task force, which is typically how we do things in the Department of Defense: if you have a problem, you create a task force to address the problem and suggest solutions and recommendations. He put together The Care for Victims Task Force, and they took a ninety-day look at what we were doing in the Department of Defense in response to sexual assault by and against US Service members. All of the four military services – the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force – had programs in place to assist victims of sexual assault, but what we did not have was an overarching departmental policy, nor did we have one that necessarily reflected best practices of the civilian world.

Based on the recommendations of the Care for Victims Task Force, the Department created another task force, the JTF – Joint Task Force - on Sexual Assault Prevention Response. The JTF existed for a year, took the recommendations from the Care for Victims Task Force, and created the DoD policy on sexual assault prevention and response. The JTF eventually turned into the sexual assault office that I’m representing today. I was the first military deputy director of the office, and I assisted the Director, Kaye Whitley, for about three years. The JTF transitioned into a permanent office, the Sexual Assault

Prevention and Response Office –SAPRO --in October 2005. For the first two years, we put together a number of different policies to improve our response to victims. For example, we established improved training programs for criminal investigators and prosecutors. In addition, we created specialized positions that specifically take care of victims on our military installations all over the world.

After we took those initial steps, we realized that we should really be looking at the problem of sexual assault itself. While we can always improve how we take care of victims, there should really be no victims in the first place. There just should not be any at all. So we began to turn our focus to prevention in 2007. We contacted the experts in the United States that really were at the forefront of some of this work and got them together. I made them sit in the room for three days in Washington DC and I would not let them out until they crafted a prevention strategy for the Department. In 2008 we began to put the strategy in place. That is essentially the history of our program.

Just to let you know about the hierarchy of our programs, the office that I represent, the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, sits within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We are only a couple of steps down from – at least as far as our organizational structure goes – our senior leadership, and we try to brief our program information to them often. You may have noticed that Secretary Panetta, our new Secretary of Defense, just went through his confirmation hearings last week, and one of the questions posed to him, of course, was on sexual assault. Each of the military departments has their own headquarters level sexual assault prevention and response office, staffed by a program manager.

Just in case you were curious, I gave you the references for each of our policy documents that cover our sexual assault programs. If you go to <http://www.militaryhomefront.dod.mil>, you can download each one of these documents. DoD Directive 6495.01 and DoD Instruction 6495.02 are the Department of Defense policy documents that address the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs. While the Services must all follow this published policy, they have written corresponding policy documents that implement the policy at their Service level. You may obtain the Service policies by searching for them at the [militaryhomefront.dod.mil](http://www.militaryhomefront.dod.mil) website.

At the core of this programs a concept that promotes prevention of sexual assault. It is DOD policy to prevent sexual assault by establishing a culture where prevention thrives, where response and accountability all work together, and where we work to ensure the safety and wellbeing of all of our Service members. That is not just our people in uniform; those are families, kids, civilian workers, and contractors as well.

A little bit about research on sexual assault. The inquiry I often get when I lecture is: "How does the military sector to the civilian sector? The press suggests that the military has a worse problem than the civilian population – aren't

conditions in the military horrible?" The answer is yes and no. Sexual assault, regardless of context is horrible. However, there are some protective factors associated with the US Armed Forces, and there are circumstances that make the US military more difficult for sexual assault victims. There is really no other way to answer that. To demonstrate this to you, I have taken some national US studies, tried to break them down to their components, and identified some points of comparability. There are some reasons for why Department of Defense statistics look a little bit higher than sexual assault statistics for the general population, and I will show you those in just a second. However, one caution is that the military and civilian sectors aren't really comparable. The US Armed Forces are indeed a subset of the US society, but we have a different legal system, a unique culture, a much younger population, and a number of other key differences that make such comparisons problematic at best.

One of the classic studies that was done in the late 1990's on the incidence and prevalence of sexual assault in the United States was done by Tjaden and Thoennes. It was called the National Violence Against Women Study. They found that, in the United States in the twelve months prior to being surveyed, 0.3 percent of women and 0.1 percent of men indicated they had experienced an attempted and/or completed rape, which was defined as oral, vaginal or anal penetration. Those are the behaviors that they asked about.

My active duty population is a little bit different. We researchers do not all match our studies when we do them and so we pose our questions a little bit different. Every four years we draw a sample of about 100 000 military members, with a 25-33 percent response rate. We ask how many of them experienced an attempted or completed incident of unwanted sexual contact in the twelve months prior to the survey. An incident of unwanted sexual contact is oral, vaginal or anal penetration, plus unwanted sexual touching. So essentially it is a much broader question than what was asked in the National Violence Against Women Study. As a result, the Department has more people endorsing the problem -- it is more inclusive than the NVAWS. We found that 4.4 percent of women on active duty and 0.9 percent of men on active duty said they had experienced unwanted sexual contact. As you see, there is a wide difference between the two studies.

What contributes to this difference in incidence rates? Thinking about the demographics of the US Armed Forces, who comprises most of the active duty force? 18-25 year olds. This is also the demographic where most sexual assaults occur in both the military and civilian sectors. As a result, it makes sense that the US Armed Forces has a higher incidence rate of sexual assault than does the US population in general.

There is additional research that indicates that the US Armed Forces are on par with the civilian population, when you look at this age 18 to 25 year-olds group. Another study was done more recently by Dean Kilpatrick, who is our

national guru on studies of incidence and prevalence of sexual assault. He went out and surveyed a representative sample of both US women and college-aged women. About 1 percent of US women and – look at this – 5.2 percent of US college women experienced an attempted and/or completed rape (vaginal, oral or anal penetration) in the twelve months prior to the survey. While the studies are indeed quite different, I think there is a convergence here in the data: about 4 to 5 percent of younger women experience a sexual assault each year.

That, then, is really the conversation we should be having in the US. Sexual assault is not just a military problem. Sexual assault is also a problem that kids going off to college .. at least in the United States .. face as well.

Just to call out some differences between the studies, Kilpatrick used a bit narrower definition of sexual assault than what we use in the US military. Consequently, we are really comparing apples to oranges here. However, the bottom line is that these two statistics are really on par with each other.

Let's move on. In the US, about how many people currently are experiencing psychological trauma? The answer is about 3 to 4 percent. However, over the lifetime, 10 percent of women and 5 percent of men experience post-traumatic stress disorder.

What about the rates of PTSD in our troops that engages in warfare? What does that look like? We have some fairly good studies, and I have listed all the study sites on the slides. So feel free to look these up yourself. Back in 2004, our pre-combat rate of PTSD in four combat units that were studied in this one journal article was about 5 percent. This rate is largely on par with what we saw in the nation as a whole. However, after returning from their first deployment, about 12 percent had symptoms that would qualify for a PTSD diagnosis. We now expect that rate to be somewhat higher, given that people are on now on their third, fourth and fifth deployments. We have this expectation because of the findings of other research indicating that multiple exposures to trauma erode resiliency.

Another study found that, based on the pre- and post- deployment health assessments conducted on US military personnel, about 20 percent of our active duty and about 40 percent of our reservists experienced a traumatic event and noted symptoms that would qualify them to see a mental health provider for screening.

It is one thing to have symptoms of PTSD, but in order for it to be diagnosed; it must interfere with daily living. This next study conducted in 2010 essentially found that about one-fifth of our guard and one-fifth of our active duty experience PTSD symptoms that interfere with daily living when they come back from combat.

The US Department of Veterans Affairs takes a different approach than the Department of Defense when studying the problem of sexual assault in the military. Many of their surveys use the term Military Sexual Trauma. Military

Sexual Trauma, or MST, captures both sexual assault and sexual harassment experienced throughout one's military career. This is appropriate, as the mission of the VA is to treat people. As a result, they cast a wider net with the term MST. In the DoD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program, we only report sexual assault statistics in our annual report to Congress.

In this next study, the VA found that women who experienced military sexual trauma are about nine times more likely to have a diagnosis of PTSD. For males reporting MST, they are about three times more likely to experience PTSD than those that do not report MST. For both men and women, PTSD was just one of the problems associated with MST. Male and female veterans who experienced MST were also two to three times more likely to have diagnoses relating to depression, anxiety and substance abuse.

This next study is a little more difficult to understand. The authors asked respondents about their most upsetting trauma in their lifetime. If your most upsetting trauma was rape, then 46 percent of women and 65 percent of men went on to develop a diagnosis of PTSD. If your most upsetting trauma was combat, about 40 percent of men went on to develop PTSD. There were similar findings with molestation and physical abuse, but with lower rates of PTSD. But the surprising finding from this study was that more men than women developed PTSD from trauma associated with a rape. This study also indicates that that, for men, rape may also be more traumatic than combat.

As a matter of fact, we see this phenomenon replicated in another study of Gulf War veterans. This study found that men and women were more likely to develop PTSD from sexual assault than from high combat exposure. Military people in this study were not just people who were in a deployed area. Rather, these were people that were actually taking hostile fire. Once again, men who experienced a sexual assault were more likely to develop PTSD than women who experienced a sexual assault.

This next slide shows that we have a large portion of people joining the US military with a history of sexual assault.

This next study comes from a research program called the Millennium Study. It is being run out of San Diego, California. In the year 2000, the authors enrolled one hundred thousand active duty members to follow the impact of military life on health outcomes. This study will follow the participants for the next 20 years. One of the first study findings was that any prior assault, whether it be physical or sexual, doubles the chance that you are going to develop post-traumatic stress disorder when you are exposed to combat stress. So, if there is any reason for why you should have a sexual assault prevention and response program, I feel this is this reason. Victims of sexual assault should be offered treatment to restore some of the resilience that is lost through combat or through multiple exposures to violence.



Sexual assault has a number of implications for our warriors. Military people rarely come in for treatment or overtly say, "I'm having problems." Rather, they are more likely to have problems that have to be assessed by behavioral observation, such as alcohol abuse, aggression towards self and others, and avoidance of traumatic memory cues.

In addition to that, military life can complicate the experience of sexual assault. Some complications are listed here on this slide. Essentially, our military members are not free to leave. When they are sexually assaulted, they might have to stay in the same unit as the perpetrator. They cannot just move away. The victim also might be dependent on the perpetrator for safety or for food and shelter.

In the Department of Defense, we have been centrally tracking reports of sexual assault since about 2004. On this next slide, I have listed four years worth of reports. But as you know, reports of sexual assault do not tell the full story. It only tells you what is reported to military law enforcement. Anonymous surveys indicate that there are a whole host of reports that never come to the light of law enforcement.

We have two forms of reporting in the Department. With a Restricted Report, a victim may come forward for care and services. However, the victim does not have to participate in the military justice process. With an Unrestricted Report, a victim may also obtain the same care, but they also participate in a criminal investigation and prosecution. Most of our reports involve rape, aggravated sexual assault, and wrongful sexual contact – which is illegal touching of the genitals.

As I previously mentioned, most reports of sexual assault fall short of the incidents estimated to occur via anonymous surveys. This is called "underreporting." If you are going to do a program like this in your service, you really need to implement two measures: reports and estimated incidents. When I first started as the Deputy Director of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office in the Pentagon, my staff said that nobody knew how many sexual assaults there were that involved active duty military. I thought, "We measure everything in the Department of Defense – I know there has got to be some kind of data out there." So, sure enough, I found the Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members wherein such data is collected. This survey is repeated every four years by the Defense Manpower Data Center in the DoD. In 2006, we estimated that we had about 34,000 victims who experienced at least one incident of unwanted sexual contact in the year prior to the survey. Unwanted sexual contact captures a range of contact sex crimes between adults, from unwanted touching to completed rape. Again, these are victims that reported anonymously to us on a survey. However, that same year, I was only able to account for about 2300 active duty victims in reports made to Department authorities. In essence, only about 7 percent of the estimated number

of victims of sexual assault in 2006 made a report to a Department authority.

However, last year we got much better news. After four years of having a sexual assault prevention and response program, the Department experienced a significant drop in sexual assault --to about 19,000 thousand incidents. The 2,600 or so victims that were in our sexual assault reports to DoD authorities account for about 14 percent of the victims of sexual assault estimated to exist in 2010. You may think that an increase in reporting and visibility over the crime from 7 percent to 14 percent is not much. However, I do not know of any other institution the size and the scope of the US military that has been able to effect such a change. This is a very good thing: In 2010 there were one-third fewer sexual assaults against women and one-half fewer sexual assaults against men than there were in 2006.

As I have run out of time, I will very, very quickly run through my remaining slides. Essentially, the three program pillars of our program are prevention, victim care, and system accountability. We have a host of professionals that help our victims of sexual assault. I will be happy to talk about them a little bit later.

We have a strategic plan for the program. Our goals are to prevent sexual assault, to increase reporting, to improve our response to victims, to ensure the program works as designed, and then to publicize the good work we are doing. Over time, we want the number of sexual assaults estimated to occur each year to come down. We also want to increase the number of reports being made to DoD authorities. While we never expect that we will get 1 for 1 reporting of sexual assault, we think we can continue to improve from the 14 percent we currently receive.

On this next slide we have some of our social marketing materials. In our messaging, we want everyone to understand that sexual assault prevention is the right thing to do – it's part of one's duty. Sexual assault is primarily a readiness issue. Our latest campaign featured the slogan, "Hurts one. Affects all."

When we talk about prevention in the US military, we refer to bystander intervention. We are attempting to provide our people with the skills to identify those situations that might be a risk for sexual assault, and then safely intervene. For example, the text in this poster is: "So when that guy tried to cross the line with my wingman (a fellow airman), I got her out of there." That is the kind of behavior that we want to have happen.

Here is a brief public service announcement that we ran, too. [DVD is shown.] Our campaign is backed up with multiple web sites. This is a brand new website called "Safe Helpline." You can text, click, or call for assistance 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The Rape Abuse Incest National Network (RAINN) runs it for the Department of Defense. It just stood up last month in April.

I have exceeded my time, so thank you very much for your attention.



# Sexual harassment, military psychology and operational effectiveness

*Commander Jarle Eid, PhD, Norwegian Defence Medical Services*

Dr. Eid did not want to participate to the conference report with a transcript or reviewed transcript version of his speech. This resume is therefore my own subjective summary of his contribution to the conference and can under no circumstances be referred to as his statements. Dr. Eid's answers in the Q and A session are not included (ed.)

Dr. Eid started his presentation appreciating the opportunity to come and share some of his research and experience from about 25 years in the military as a clinical psychologist and researcher. He used a national perspective, with data from Norway, to present figures and numbers, risk and resilience factors and implications for operational readiness.

When he had studied the Norwegian civilian sector, data basically showed that repeated and unwanted sexual attention shared many similarities with bullying. But sexual harassment was different from bullying because of the clear risk group. You were more at risk if you were 35 and younger, and the numbers indicated that it was more frequent in male dominated occupations. Sexual harassment could be associated with high turnover and cause trouble for the organization. Same sex harassment was more hidden and had more serious consequences.

From the military studies, Dr. Eid referred to a recent report on unwanted sexual attention and sexual harassment among Norwegian conscripts. The average reported that 5.3 % had experienced unwanted sexual harassment in 2010. That was disturbing, because this is a slightly increasing trend from 2008 and 2009. And it made him wonder why? There was a clear increased relative risk if you were a woman conscript, but 2,9% of the men were also a substantial number.

Looking at the numbers from employed personnel from the Norwegian Armed Forces, he could see a similar trend. Younger employees reported that one out of five or four will report that they have been exposed to unwanted sexual harassment. The most frequent negative acts from employed members of the armed forces were the 17% that reported verbal comments with sexual content, jokes or sexist statements. 14% reported that they experienced remarks about their body codes or way of life. 10% reported physical contact with sexual implications, while 7% reported sexually charge, staring, unpleasant looks, pictures or objects of sexual nature as unwanted or unpleasant. Harassment can

take many forms, and come in all sorts of combinations. The data was average data from 6 000-7 000 employees surveyed. That should make people wonder what their unit is like.

Looking at the true cases from the same survey, they found that two females reported telephone calls with sexual contents, request for sex with promise of rewards, request for sex with threat of punishment – two women reported sexual assault. But at the same time nine men reported that in 2008 they were assaulted and attempted raped in the Norwegian armed forces, a higher number than the females. This told us, as was mentioned earlier in the conference, that it is important to remember that gender issues are about men and women.

The risk factors for harassment were summarized as being age less than 35 years, out of the normal context, deployed, sailing, poor communication with your leader, an unclear job role, lack of peer support, low cohesion – all factors that had been found to be associated statistically with increased risk of harassment. From this there could be a lot of potential operational consequences, for both conscripts and active duty officers.

Dr. Eid thought the way ahead would be to look at and work on the individual units and our service academies, to get more sophisticated surveys on our units, especially deployed ones. It would be possible to include gender issues to existing surveys. He also found it essential to bring behavioral sciences back into the Office of Education and the service academies. He emphasized that officers need better understanding of the dynamics in their own unit, because it would be an illusion to think that we would be able to go out and deal with gender issues on the international arena, if we were not able to confront and deal with gender issues in our own units.

## Q & A Session 3

*Discussant Anders Berggren, PhD, Swedish National Defence College*

Good day, everybody. Of course, initially, I would like to thank you for inviting me to participate in this very interesting conference. Secondly, one of the reasons why I quit as an officer was that I got my hearing impaired during exercise, so I may have some problems hearing in a room this size and with these acoustics. I am far too vain to use my hearing aids, so bear with me! If I am ignoring you, it is just my ears that do not work fine.

Session three – national implications of the framework; what have you heard and what kind of questions do that raise? The panel has been kind enough not to send in their material in advance, so I have tried to pick out the goodies while I have been sitting here. Well, two of you did. I must give you credit for that.

Starting off with Captain Hudribusch, who discussed the construction of gender, how the different constructions of gender may create conflicts within the military culture, and also discussed different aspects of sexual harassment, which Dr. Eid later on developed further in terms of different dimensions and equivalent. Dr. Hudribusch also hypothesized that sexual harassment eventually could cause a high female soldier dropout. That is an interesting point to make, because if that is the case that will contradict our possibilities to live up to UN Resolution 1325, with more women serving in our deployed units.

Dr. Hoogensen Gjørsvik talked about the dilemma of protecting civilians while being warriors at the same time. It was an argument that was raised from the troops. She talked about masculinity in an interesting sense, also remarked that gender is also about men, I think that was some quotation from interviews, or something like that, and that is also a question or a claim that is made every now and then in the Swedish Armed Forces. And also the very frank way of saying: "This is useless, but we have to do it. This is something we are forced to deal with, the gender perspective, Resolution 1325, we have to do it, but it is useless." I think we have something interesting going there, because – and I will come back to that – this is a challenge to really get the gender perspective in the broader sense really integrated into the military operations for the actual units that are deployed, so they can see the point of doing this when they are there. We also had an interesting point about the macho myth about the military. I worked with one of the special operations units in Sweden, and that was the most reflective unit I have ever met in terms of gender perspective and gender awareness. You should assume that this unit – consisting of mainly men but also a distinct group of women – should really be the machos of the Swedish Armed Forces. But they were the most reflective in terms of thinking about

gender awareness, but also how to integrate gender, how to deal with women within the troops, and the importance of having women within the units when they are deployed.

Dr. Galbreath, I think you made a very important point when you said that at one point you started to realize that instead of focusing on taking care of the victims, we should try to deal with the real problem. There should not be any victims at all, right? I think this is something we will come back to. How do we actually work with this on a daily basis with our troops, addressing that so we can minimize sexual assault, sexual harassment from the beginning, and not just take care of the fires when they hit the fan? The fires do not hit the fan, but you get the point? I will not discuss direct and indirect measures with you, but we can have a discussion later on regarding that.

Dr. Eid; Very interesting point you made that sexual harassment also is a problem for men, but it is not so often discussed. I am going back to Dr. Galbreath - you talked about the implications of men being sexually assaulted was a bigger problem than for women. That leads to the thought in direction about construction of masculinity and femininity and what sexual assault does with masculinity and so - very interesting point. There are a lot of things that Dr. Eid brings out that are very parallel to findings from the Swedish Armed Forces as well as the United States Armed Forces, especially your final point about the importance of having a stronger focus on units and leadership, and the importance of talks on the pre-deployment on an everyday basis.

If I dare to make a summary of the presentations we have heard, and what the challenges are, it would look something like this:

- SGBV takes its starting point in gender constructs, socially constructed and deeply rooted in the individuals.
- In order to achieve an increase in gender awareness during operations, including the topic of SGBV, we must affect the individual soldier, i.e. transforming policies and rhetoric on the political level into practice at the individual level.
- We must increase the knowledge among our units how gender awareness, including knowledge regarding SGBV, will increase the effectiveness of the military operations given their mandates, and how this truly is a part of military operations.

And this leads us to the following questions to the panel:

- Is there a relation between the internal and external gender constructs, i.e. can a unit be gender aware externally during operations without being internally gender aware?
- The taboo/resistance towards discussing gender and SH, including SGBV, is deeply rooted in the armed forces. How do we overcome that at the local level?
- Leadership is crucial in dealing with these issues, and establishing a

healthy and trustworthy organization. How do we do that?

Before I go into the questions I would like to share some results with you from our armed forces wide surveys on sexual harassment in the Swedish Armed Forces 1999, 2002, and 2005.

The overall purpose, from an academic point of view, was to test the following model, which we found empirically support for.




Figure 1. Model over sexual harassment (Estrada & Berggren)

Very briefly the model proposes that the higher the proportion men in an organization, and the worse the equality climate, the more sexual harassment. The model further postulates that there is a correlation between experiencing sexual harassment and the following variables: Job Outcomes, Psychological Outcomes, and Health Outcomes. I.e. the higher the frequency of sexual harassment, the lower e.g. productivity, well-being, and Health Satisfaction.

Apparently, there is a relation between productivity and internal gender awareness or in other words, Internal gender awareness is a presumption for external gender awareness.

I must make one more comment here. You can see the red arrow in the figure. What we see is that with a bad equality climate, even though people did not experience sexual harassment, it still affected their job outcomes,



psychological outcomes and health outcomes. And that also goes for men. All men do not approve of pornographic material, sexist jokes and stuff like that, but they are not allowed to talk about it, because this is assumed to be a part of the masculinity. But they do not like it, and it affects their productivity and their work environment.

We further asked the people that had experienced sexual harassment: "How did you deal with it?" In 1999 7 per cent approached the sexual harassment advisor, and 5 per cent filed a complaint. In 2002 those figures have increased. In 2005 it decreased. That is strange. "If you have reported sex harassment, to whom did you do it?" You can see the same pattern, that in 2002 you have an increase in who you report to, and then you have a decrease again.

<b>How did you deal with it?</b>			
	<b>1999</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2005</b>
<b>Approached the SH advisor</b>	<b>7 %</b>	<b>10 %</b>	<b>4,5 %</b>
<b>Filed a formal complaint</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>10%</b>




Figure 2. The figure shows the outcome on the question "How did you deal with the sexual harassment?" over the years 1999, 2002, and 2005. (Berggren & Estrada)

One way of understanding this decrease in the 2005 survey is that when they initiated the survey in 1999 people understood that this survey is actually the start of a change. The armed forces wanted to change something and they established an organization. People started to file complaints and what did they learn? It does not help. We can actually see in our data that people are feeling worse after filing a complaint than before filing a complaint, because the organi-

## If you reported it, to who?

	1999	2002	2005
My immediate supervisor	24 %	42 %	33 %
The supervisor of the person who was bothering me	15 %	27 %	24 %
Someone else in my chain of command	30 %	39 %	12 %
The sexual harassment advisor	7 %	10 %	1.4 %
The commander of the entire unit/base	2 %	12 %	7 %
The Inspector General (IG) office	2 %	3 %	0 %



Figure 3. The figure shows the outcome on the question "If you reported it, to who?" over the years 1999, 2002, and 2005 (Berggren & Estrada).

zation cannot deal with the question. They cannot take care of the victims; they do not actually prosecute towards the offender. So one way of understanding this drop that you can see here, is that the organization did not really live up to the expectations and they did not fill out the uniform. And people started to distrust the organization. This is a key issue if you really want to change the climate and the culture of an organization; it calls for a strong organization that can deal with the question.

Thus, the taboo/resistance towards discussing gender and SH, including SGBV, is deeply rooted in the armed forces. How do we overcome that at the local level?

Leadership is crucial, and we must have a healthy and trustworthy organization. How do we do that? That is my two initial questions to the panel.

### **Nathan Galbreath:**

One of the things that we did in the Department of Defense with our prevention strategy is that we went to each of the military services, and we talked to them about bringing their leadership on board. The Army led the way. The Secretary of the Army at that point was Mister Pete Geren. He told his folks to sponsor

a leadership summit. This was not just the guys on the ground, these were the three star and two star generals in the Washington DC area. Both the Secretary and the Chief of Staff, General Casey, came out. They all said: We want to talk to you about this problem of sexual assault. They brought on some experts and they talked not only about sexual assault, but also harassment as well, and the continuum of sexual violence.

That was particularly effective in letting folks know that this is a leadership issue: the Secretary of the Service and the Service Chief had it on their dashboard, and they wanted their generals to take hold of this problem, as well. The Army set up a general officers' steering committee for their program within the service, and then pushed it on down throughout the ranks.

Since that time the Air Force, the Navy and the Marine Corps have all done something very similar. They had a summit with their leadership, with their service secretary and chief, to show their senior most leadership how to support such a program. Until you have that "buy in" from the most senior level, nothing is ever going to happen. The major mentioned that to you. It does not matter what the people on the ground do, it is what their leadership says, and that ultimately influences the behavior of everybody down the chain. That was our approach.

**René Hudribusch:**

Our approach in the Austrian forces, as I have mentioned before, is the information campaign about bullying and workplace aggression, and we started with this campaign on the level of the military academy. We train now the cadets on the military academy, because they are the leaders of the future, they are the multipliers, and so we want to fight against sexual harassment and bullying in the Austrian armed forces. Later we want to go on with the other soldiers, with the recruits, and also at the same time we also want to work on the general staff level.

**Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørsv:**

You said a couple of things there that speak to how to move forward. The first was: if it does not make sense to them, they will not deal with it – and then link that up with internal gender awareness. I did not give myself enough time to go into the process that I and my Swedish colleagues are developing, but it is exactly that internal gender awareness which is already capsulated within military culture and in notion of masculinity. A number of things that need to be made clear is that masculinity is not just one hegemonic form in the military. I was saying that before. There are national differences of masculinity. In the United States it is going to be different than in Norway, than in Austria and whatever. Then you have different masculinities operating within the different units or different functions. Special Forces have certain masculinities exhibiting

in intern CIMIC.

The idea is to take a look at how do we generate an internal gender awareness? To do so, we actually have to take a look at masculinity. We cannot just avoid it and just say: Imposed from the outside here are documents about what gender awareness is about. We are not going to take onboard what military culture is about, and we are not going to make use of – well, there are two different ways we can go. We can either say: masculinity has been charged with causing part of the problem, like those quotes we are showing that there is linkages between forms of masculinity and sexual violence. We can either suppress masculinity or perception in any case of what that is, and just do what the documents say – in a bullet form. Or we can examine the different masculinities that are taking place in our military structures. Say: OK, let us just admit it; this is what our military culture is about. Fine, because there are aspects of masculinity that are very productive, very positive, that can be used towards preventing gender violence and towards supporting – in the case that I was looking at – civilian communities as well as within the military framework. The point is exactly that internal gender awareness is crucial. But I think we should stop ignoring masculinity and the role that it is playing.

**Nathan Galbreath:**

I think there is an interesting mixture here between a strategic approach to the problem, and the more personal/interpersonal approach in this panel as it pertains to the problem. It is very exciting.

**Q:**

Thank you very much for your presentations. I found that really a fascinating mix to conceptual issues raised and operational issues raised. I have a couple of questions that I am going to try and squeeze in. The first is that perhaps in my own presentation I exaggerated this divide between the warrior requirements in soldiers and the caring or humanitarian side. I want to really ask a question about whether we need to also challenge the myth of the macho military itself. Regina Tetzner has an article from – I think, I cannot remember the year exactly – 2005, where she argues that the military itself should not be seen as hyper-masculine, as ultimately macho. There are many feminine characteristics, or what she labels as feminine characteristics, within the military itself. If we were to take that challenge onboard, what would that mean for thinking about masculinity? There are a number of feminine characteristics and there are a number of issues around femininity that we would also need to take into account in our analysis of masculinity.

Just following up from that, I would want to think about some of the negative aspects of masculinity as it is manifested in military culture, because if we think about the examples of male and male violence, one of the primary reasons why

it is so taboo and why it is so difficult to deal with, it precisely because male and male violence feminizes the victim. So there is underlying message that we need to think about; there is an asymmetry in thinking about masculinity. So I was just wondering if anybody would like to comment on that.

The last question that I have is really about, Anders, the last slide that I think you showed, or the last point that you made, which was about the negative impact on male soldiers of this climate of inequality. I was just wondering, if we applied the typical masculinity concept of the patriarchic dividend, what is going on then that men – some men, perhaps – are not benefiting from sexual harassment? Does that mean that we are under caps of organizational change? Will sexual harassment be naturally eliminated if there is no direct benefit to men in power? Or is there something else going on? Could you comment on that?

**Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørsv:**

There is a mix, obviously, between masculine characteristics, as well as feminine characteristics in the military. The military is not just masculine characteristics. One area where this plays out, particularly, I know the Norwegian case best, is in civil military interactions. They might suffer from what is called a "dogooder-syndrome", which means "oh, we are actually going to care about the people, the civilians, who are in the operation area. No, they are not allowed to now. This has to do with a bit of Norwegian politics – Who is doing what. The NGOs should take care of civilian issues whereas the military are just there to, you know, "you can shoot them, but you cannot talk to them" kind of an attitude. Pardon me for really reducing the whole debate. It gets to that point in a sense, that you can be the warrior, but do not try to do anything else, because that is someone else's territory. That is largely wrong. Not only is it so that that warrior might be the only person or the only unit who can be doing something under given circumstances in an operations' area, because there are no other actors. But also the notion that our militaries cannot exhibit a sense of humanity when they see suffering and they cannot do something about it, and that it is not only about hearts and minds and buying the population. In fact, under international mandatory law they are obliged to take care of civilian populations when no other actors are there. And that is considered a feminine characteristic. And these two need discussion, but we don't! It is just – hush! Don't talk about it! Go shoot them, and then somebody else will take care of those more feminine things. And it is not helping. I will just leave it at that.

**Anders Berggren:**

We are running out of time. A quick question – bear in mind that my hearing is very bad. I think one question here is the challenge of the hegemonic masculinity, that everybody reconstructs over and over again, and if we approach this with Dr. Hoogensen's words, suggestions that we should understand and accept

the multiplicity of masculinities, we would erode the basic of the hegemonic masculinities and we would actually alter the power balance and how we look at masculinity and how that contributes to the relations between women and men. I think that is a crucial part.

Thank you very much to the panel. Thank you for listening.



## Closing remarks

*Lt Col Lena P. Kvarving*

Together with the commandant of the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College I have the distinct pleasure of sharing with you some closing remarks after this very informative and inspiring day. First of all, I will have to extend an overwhelming thank you to all the participants here today. We, the gender project at the Norwegian Defence University College, have only facilitated the event, brought you together, but it is you with your expertise and enthusiasm that inspire us all to keep working to prevent sexual violence, to prevent sexual harassment and to find tools and strength to deal with the situation when it does happen.

Our first session presented the conceptual framework for handling and responding to sexual violence. We learned about UN's inventory and training guidelines for military peacekeepers, NATO's Action Plan for implementing resolution 1325, before we had some very good examples on how to train and respond to sexual violence. The main message I take away from this session is that we need new and different education and preferably scenario based training. We might need to redefine the traditional view of the good soldier, and we might need soldiers with a new variety of capabilities. And we need to act to be credible, and realize that we are models of behavior whether we act or not. And finally, we need to hold our leaders accountable for progress in this area. And again; never to forget the faces behind the statistics of sexual violence.

Our second session focus on the international implications of the conceptual framework presented in Session 1, with examples and experiences from the field and the link to why this is a military responsibility. I guess we all had our moments of deeper understanding of the implications of sexual violence and the need to act as a military force. And I think that my moment of revelation came with the worriers as peacekeepers. Just think about that – those words put together. What does it mean? The consequences for education? For training? Our mandate? - And our possibility and ability to succeed?

Major Tanner's timely reminder, that this issue is both an internal and external problem, and very much so also a male issue. And the need for our military force to set good examples and to have all necessary tools in the toolbox.

Our final session focused on the national implications of handling and responding to sexual violence. I think that we can all agree that these are issues that we do not really like to talk about. First of all, because we do not want our organization to be the one that has alarming numbers when it comes to sexual harassment. Secondly, because we do not want to be an organization known to have been part of or witnessed sexual violence, human trafficking or other



unacceptable behavior, and not responded correctly. And definitely not when representing our king and country wearing a uniform with the Norwegian flag on our shoulder. We will all like to be known as the one with no negative incidents and leave a pristine impression on the rest of the world.

Our core values tells us, though, that hiding from the truth, refraining from addressing the difficult issues, will only leave us without credibility. No country is without negative incidents, but it is the willingness and the ability to deal with the incidents that will decide if we are respectable, responsible and bright. We have learned that sexual harassment in own forces has impact on our operational effectiveness, a logical consequence that we need to address.

So with this short summary of today's events, I would first like to ask the contributors and our international guests to stay put in the room after the last closing remarks, and then I am proud to leave the final closing remarks to the Commander of the Norwegian Defence and Staff College, Håkon Tronstad. The floor is yours!

## Closing Remarks

*Commodore Håkon Tronstad, Commandant Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College*

I would like to start by mentioning an experience I had from having the opportunity to work as a member of the US armed forces. I was on loan to the US for five years. I do believe they got tired of me, so after some weeks they told me that an expert is someone that is at least 3 000 miles away from home. I do believe they tried to stop my mouth. Unfortunately, I do live in Oslo. Oslo is my home town, so today I am not an expert.

The topic we have been discussing today, sexual violence in military operations; I have to admit that I have never witnessed sexual violence in a military operation, but, on the other hand, I have been commanding the Norwegian fleet for five years and I do know that we have a real problem with sexual harassment in the Norwegian fleet, which is an issue we need to take very seriously. The topic we have been discussing – sexual harassment, sexual violence – is both depressing and important. We cannot ignore the problems. If we try to ignore them, we will never do anything in order to make the situation better.

I do believe Dr. Louise Olsson hit the nail on the head when she told us that this conference could be compared to the TV show *Myth Busters*. I really had several eye openers to day. I have learned something new and I do believe that some of my colleagues wearing uniform are in the same situation today.

I found the input from a very experienced operator, Major Fred Tanner from US Armed Forces, of value. He told us, or he reminded us, that we have limited resources, but unlimited problems. That is probably a very good definition of the situation. Then Dr. Marsha Henry – if I do not quote you correctly, please apologize – said that there is no switch inside the soldier's helmet to turn the war fighter into a peacekeeper. I do believe that was brilliant. She also had a recommendation. If we want to do something in order to improve the situation, we need to develop in-depth gender expertise. That is probably the best course of action.

At the Norwegian Defence and Command Staff College we are focusing on educating our future military leadership also in the aspect of gender. Obviously, we need to put even more focus on that, but that is my duty, that is my goal.

We have been given the task of implementing gender standards into the Norwegian Armed Forces, and you have already listened to the leader of the Gender Project, Lieutenant Colonel Lena Kvarving, and you know we are in good hands. You know we have people working with the issue, and you know that we have put focus on this.

I would really like to thank the Gender Project, Lena Kvarving, and her colleagues in the Gender Project. This has been a very, very useful conference and I hope that the rest of you agree with me on that.

To the rest of you, who have travelled far to participate in the conference, we really appreciate your participation. This would have been a completely different learning experience for the natives, for the people living in the community here in Oslo, if you had not participated. This is a very, very useful participation on your side.

To the speakers, who have come far to participate – I am impressed. You have managed to focus on very important issues. I do believe that you still qualify to call yourselves experts when you return home.

To all of you – thank you for great participation, interesting arguments. This has been a very useful Friday.

Norwegian Defence University College

**Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces and  
Military Operations**

Oslo, June 17, 2011  
Gamle Logen, Grev Wedels plass 2

**BIOGRAPHIES OF SPEAKERS  
(in alphabetical order)**

**Louise Olsson (PhD)** is a researcher and project manager at the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden, and has a PhD from the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. Her main research areas are peace operations and international conflict resolution. Olsson published the book *Gender Equality and UN Peace Operations in Timor-Leste* at Brill publishers in 2009. The book focuses on the effects of peace operations on political participation and security equality for men and women in the host country. She has also co-edited two special issues (in *Security Dialogue* and *International Peacekeeping*) addressing a wide range of gender-specific dimensions of security policy and international peacekeeping. At the Folke Bernadotte Academy she is responsible for organizing a Research Working Group on UNSCR 1325 to promote empirical research of value for peace operations and international conflict resolution. In addition, Olsson has worked with applied research as a project manager of an international project on the use of UNSCR 1325 in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (published at FOI 2009) and conducted a study on the use of gender-specific pre-deployment training in the EU's CSDP missions. Olsson has extensive pedagogical experience and has been the Director of Undergraduate studies at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. She lectures on the broader effects of peace operation and conflict resolution, specifically in relation to UNSCRs 1325 and UNSCR 1820 to students, policy makers and practitioners.

**Ragnhild Nordås (PhD)** is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). She holds a PhD in

political science from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, NTNU. Nordås has conducted research on various aspects of political violence, including religious conflicts, state repression, demographic factors in conflict, the climate change-conflict nexus, inequalities, and child soldiering. Her main current research projects focus on (1) developing a global database from 1989-2009 on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts (SVAC), (2) a database on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) by Peacekeepers from 1999 to today, and (3) mapping the motivation and modus operandi characteristics of non-state conflict actors. Nordås has been a research fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School, and the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. She has received post-doctoral funding from the Norwegian Research Council and project funding from the National Science Foundation in the United States. Her work has been published in inter alia *Political Geography* and *International Studies Quarterly*.

**Mia Mellissa Bloom (PhD)** is an Associate professor in International and Women's Studies at the Pennsylvania State University and a fellow at the International Center for the Study of Terrorism. She is the author of *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press 2005 and 2007), *Living Together After Ethnic Killing* edited with Roy Licklider (London: Routledge 2007) and *Bombshell: The Many Faces of Women Terrorists* (Toronto: Penguin 2011). Dr. Bloom is a former member of the Council on Foreign Relations and has held research or teaching appointments at Princeton, Cornell, Harvard, and McGill Universities. With research foci in Ethnic Conflict, Political Violence, and the mobilization of women and children into terrorist networks, Bloom's work bridges theory and policy issues. Bloom has a PhD in political science from Columbia University, a Masters in Arab Studies from Georgetown University and a Bachelors from McGill University in Russian and Middle East Studies. Bloom speaks nine languages.

**Capt. René Hudribusch** is Chief Instructor in the Austrian Armed Forces International Centre and Division Manager at the Gender Mainstreaming Department of the Austrian Armed Forces. René Hudribusch studied military leadership at the Military Academy of the Austrian Armed Forces and Business and Administration at the University of Vienna. He received his Masters degree of military leadership in 2004 and his PhD in Business and Administration in 2010. Since 2008 he has studied gender issues at the University of Vienna. His interests encompass organizational culture, workplace aggression, gender, liaison and negotiation and combating trafficking in human beings.

**Mrs. Loredana Alemanno Testa** has held several positions at NATO with increasingly higher levels of responsibility, progressing from technical to ma-

agement and policy areas. As head of the section dealing with the Implementation of Conventional Arms Control agreements and treaties, she chaired the NATO Verification Coordinating Committee on Conventional Arms Control. In January 2005 she became Executive Officer in the Operations Division and Head of the Division's Coordination Section, reporting directly to the Assistant Secretary General for Operations (ASG OPS). She is responsible for providing advice and support to ASG OPS in areas related to executive management and operations, including on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in NATO-led Operations and Missions. She is now leading NATO's efforts to implement the NATO Action Plan on Mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 into NATO-led Operations and Missions. In 2006 she received from the President of the Italian Republic the honorary title of Commander ("Commendatore della Repubblica Italiana"). Mrs. Alemanno Testa studied Mathematics and Physics at the University of Rome and conducted Computer Science studies at the National Research Centre, Rome, Italy.

**Anders W Berggren (PhD)** has a background as an officer in the Swedish Army, the armoured troops, but left the Armed Forces for an academic career. In 1998, Berggren commenced a position as a researcher at the Swedish National Defence College, where he established the Gender Research Programme funded by the Swedish Armed Forces. In 1999, Berggren conducted a major study on sexual harassment in the Swedish Armed Forces. This study has since been replicated by the Swedish Armed Forces in 2002 and 2005, the Danish Armed Forces in 2002, and by the Swedish Rescue Service Agency in 2007. Berggren defended his PhD thesis, entitled "Under-cover Operations in No-women's Land. The Swedish Armed Forces Through a Gender Lens," in 2002 and served, between 2004 – 2008, as scientific research director for a research programme entitled "Human Aspects in the Network Based Defence". Today his research interests are within the areas of leadership, organization, organizational culture, gender and critical theory. Berggren is currently doing research related to the transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces from a conscript system to an All Voluntary Force, mainly focusing on the relations between the new professional categories employed soldiers, NCO's, and officers.

**Sidsel E. Aas** is an independent consultant in the area of international women's and gender issues. She has been Head of Information for the Norwegian umbrella organization FOKUS (Forum for Women and Development), and editor of the FOKUS magazine and website, undertaking strategic work as well as developing policy papers. In recent years Aas has focused on the UN Security Council Resolutions on women, peace and security resolutions – 1325, 1820, 1888 and 1889. She holds a degree in world history, social policy and media communication from the University of Trondheim and has studied journalism at

Bodø University College. In 2010 Aas was engaged by Noref (The Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre) to conduct a qualitative mapping of good practices in international responses to sexual violence in conflict, whereupon she provided the Norwegian Government with recommendations on how to strengthen its effort to combat sexual violence in conflict. In 2010, Aas also wrote an annex to the Norwegian Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She is currently engaged by DCAF (the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces) to carry out a cross-country analysis of gender-sensitized human resource policies in the armed forces.

**Major Fred Tanner** (US Army) was commissioned into the Infantry in 1997 upon graduating from the State University of New York. Throughout his 14-year career he has served in a host of operational positions, including leading two different platoons and commanding three separate Infantry companies. Tanner has served in various conflict areas, such as Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan. In May 2011, Tanner completed his second tour in Afghanistan where he served as a battalion operations officer for 1st Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment. Currently he holds the position as the Regimental Operations Officer for the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment in Vilseck, Germany. Tanner is a graduate of the US Army Ranger, Jump master, Pathfinder, and Air Assault schools. In addition he is a graduate of the French Army's Desert Tactics Course. Tanner has been awarded with: the Bronze Star Medal (with Oak leaf cluster), the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Joint Accommodation Medal, the Army Accommodation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster) and the Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Clusters).

**Colonel Tom Hermansen** has been a colonel in the Norwegian Armed Forces since 2002. Since August 2010, Hermansen has served on secondment as the deputy adviser at the Security Sector Development (SSD) Unit in MONUSCO. Besides his military education, Hermansen holds an MSc in engineering at the Royal Swedish War and Staff College (1986-1988) and completed the NATO Defence College in Rome in 2002. Hermansen has worked in various positions with the Norwegian Defence Estates Agency between 1988 and 2010 and has served as a staff officer at the military NATO HQ in Mons, Belgium (1993-1996), a consultant for Norconsult International in Kuwait (1997) and a Defence Attaché at the Norwegian Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2007.

**Lt. Col. (ret. US Air Force) Nathan Galbreath, PhD., M.F.S**, is currently a licensed clinical psychologist and forensic science specialist in independent practice in the greater Washington, DC metropolitan area. He is currently serving as a subject matter expert for Booz Allen Hamilton in its support to

the Department of Defense's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, The Pentagon, Washington DC. Dr. Galbreath was assigned as the first Deputy Director of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office from 2007 to 2009. He retired from active duty on October 1, 2009. Galbreath entered the Air Force in 1989 after completing a BA in Spanish and International Affairs at the University of Puget Sound, Tacoma, WA. He was assigned to Howard Air Force Base, Panama, from 1989 – 1990 as a Special Agent for the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). He went on to serve a total of 11 years with AFOSI as an agent, a forensic science specialist, and a Special Agent in Charge at bases in New Mexico, Colorado and Utah. Dr. Galbreath earned a Master of Forensic Science from the George Washington University, Washington, DC in 1993, and a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology, from the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, MD in 2004. He serves as a professorial lecturer of forensic sciences at the George Washington University and is also an adjunct associate professor in the Department of Medical and Clinical Psychology at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences.

**Commander Jarle Eid (PhD)** has extensive service experience from various positions as a clinical psychologist in the Norwegian Defence Medical Services and as lecturer at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy. He is a national member of the NATO HFM-panel and recently hosted the HFM-205 symposium on “Mental health and well being across the military spectrum” in Bergen, Norway. His research and professional experience includes personnel selection, training and intervention following critical incidents and deployment. In collaboration with researchers from USA, Sweden, Belgium, Great Britain, and Norway his work includes more than 100 peer review publications, book chapters and international presentations. Most recently he co-edited a book on “Enhancing Human Performance in Security Operations: International and Law Enforcement Perspectives” by Charles C. Thomas publishers, and also has two chapters forthcoming in the “New handbook of military psychology” to be published by Oxford publishers in 2012. Eid is also a professor in organizational psychology at the University of Bergen and member of the research group for operational psychology.

**Colonel Anthony Atolagbe** is a seasoned infantry officer of the Nigerian Army whose experiences spans command, instruction and staff appointments. He completed his Higher Management of Defence Studies at the prestigious National Defence College Nigeria. Additionally, Anthony holds a Masters Degree in International Affairs and Diplomacy from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and Bachelor of Arts Degree in French from Usman Dan Fodio University, Sokoto. Upon completion of his Higher Management of Defence Studies,



he was appointed Deputy Director Combat Readiness in the Department of Army Standard and Evaluation, Headquarters Nigerian Army and later he was Deputy Chief of Staff in Headquarters 81 Division Lagos between 2010 and 2011. A knowledgeable and respected teacher, he was a Directing Staff and Chief Instructor at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Kaduna between 2004-2006 and 2007-2009 respectively. Anthony also has had several peacekeeping experiences as he was Commanding Officer of Nigerian Battalion (NIBATT) 6 in the African Union Mission in Sudan in 2006 during which he gathered enormous mission experience in the Darfur conflict. He was Staff Officer Grade one at the Headquarters 1 Mechanised Brigade. He was a Military Observer in the MONUC DR Congo from 2000 to 2001. He was Acting Commanding Officer NIBATT 21 (1997) and Adjutant/Operations Officer of NIBATT 4 (1992) in the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group in Liberia (Operation Liberty). He has been awarded fellow of defence college and passed staff college dagger. He has also been awarded the Silver and Golden Jubilee Medals, ECOMOG medals with NIBATT 4 and NIBATT 21; MONUC Medal, AMIS Medal with NIBATT 6, Forces Service Star Medal and Meritorious Service Star Medal. Colonel Anthony Atolagbe is currently the Chief J5 Plans in the Force Headquarters, African Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

**Letitia Anderson (Advocacy and Women's Rights Specialist, UN Action/Office of the SRSG-SVC)** is the Advocacy and Women's Rights Specialist with the inter-agency network, United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict (UN Action), chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. In this role she serves as speechwriter and ICC liaison, as well as undertaking strategic advocacy in relation to the Security Council and UN system, and popular advocacy to galvanize global condemnation of sexual violence as a tactic and consequence of war. Letitia previously worked for UNIFEM (now UN Women) in Governance, Peace and Security and in Communications. For UNIFEM, she conducted training for Security Council members, coordinated a Wilton Park conference on peacekeeping, and wrote news briefs on women, peace and security issues. She has designed and delivered peacekeeper training for UNITAR in Kosovo, Timor-Leste and Cambodia and trained members of the armed and police forces on women's rights in several countries. She has undertaken field research on sexual violence in the DRC, Liberia and Rwanda. Prior to joining the UN, Letitia worked as Policy Adviser on Women and War to the ICRC in Geneva, Legal Adviser to the ICRC Regional Delegation for the Pacific, and IHL Officer for the Australian Red Cross. She has co-authored two ICRC manuals on IHL, a tool for peacekeepers (Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice) and articles for Open Democracy

and the Journal of International Peacekeeping. Her law thesis focused on the irregular rendition of war crimes suspects.

**Guillota Ayivi**, 30 years old Togolese, French native. I studied Law in Paris II-Assas, have a master's degree in International Business and Development focused on Africa and South America, and a second master's degree in development policies and projects planning and management. I acquired experience through direct up and downstream projects development from design to implementation and assessment phases, and was involved in research, advocacy, project management and coordination in different contexts. I mainly worked on transversal issues, among which child labour (International Labour Organization/Senegal), gender promotion (United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change/Germany), and vulnerable people capacity reinforcement (NGO/Ecuador). I started a thesis on conflict prevention through education in Laval University in Canada that I put on hold since I joined the United Mission for Stabilization in Congo (MONUSCO) in August 2008. I have been mostly responsible for the creation of Security Sector Reform pillar of the Sexual Gender Based Violence Strategy, its coordination and implementation at the central level and in the Congolese conflict zone.

**Ann Livingstone, PhD, Vice President,  
Research, Education and Learning Design**

Dr. Livingstone joined the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC) in 2003 following her career as a university professor. During her university tenure, she was responsible for the design and implementation of interdisciplinary academic programs focused on international relations, economics and philosophy.

She is a graduate of Anderson University, Indiana, and earned her Masters at Vanderbilt University in Tennessee. Dr Livingstone did post-graduate studies at Oxford University (UK) and was awarded her Ph.D. in International Relations from University of Keele (UK). Her dissertation was an analysis of Canada's role in peacekeeping in Suez, Congo and Cyprus.

At the PPC, Dr Livingstone heads the Research, Education and Learning Design Department. The department is responsible for conducting applied research on emerging trends and issues in complex peace operations. As well, the department creates the learning products that are delivered by colleagues in the Programs Department.

Dr Livingstone was drawn to working at the PPC as it reflects her analysis that concepts of peace and conflict are best approached from a multi-dimensional perspective. At the PPC, she has the opportunity to research and work with the civilian, military, and police personnel who play a critical role in complex peace operations.

**Marsha Henry, PhD**, is Lecturer in Gender, Development and Globalisation. Prior to joining LSE, she previously taught at University of Bristol, University of British Columbia, Canada, the Open University and Warwick University. She read English at the University of British Columbia, Canada, before studying for a Master's in Gender and International Development and a PhD in Women and Gender at the University of Warwick. Following this, she held a postdoctoral fellowship at the Centre for Women's Studies and Gender Relations, University of British Columbia, followed by a return to the UK in order to take up a position at the University of Bristol in 2002 where she was a lecturer in the School for Policy Studies (2002-2006) and the Politics Department (2006-2009). Her research interests focus on three main research areas: gender relations in South Asia; feminist, diasporic and qualitative methodologies; and gender, development and militarisation. Her recent work has been concerned with security experiences in peacekeeping missions and two future projects include a study of peacekeepers leisure activities; and the experiences of female peacekeepers from the Global South.



The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security has put gender on the international agenda. Since then, the international community has renewed its commitment to UNSCR 1325 by adopting UNSCR 1820 (2008), UNSCR 1888 (2009) and UNSCR 1960 (2010) on Sexual Violence in conflicts. They recognise sexual violence as a tactic of war, war crime and crime against humanity and call for preventive actions and ending impunity. Fulfilling these obligations requires adequate handling of sexual violence in military operations and the prevention of sexual harassment within the ranks. The international conference on Sexual Violence, the Armed Forces and Military Operations in Oslo, June 2011, offered a unique forum for experts and practitioners to discuss the interconnectedness between these issues and to draw implications for the armed forces.

Targeting military personnel, keynote speaker and UN Secretary General's Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström, urged: "... As commanders, you have to make sure that the message is clearly conveyed that there can be no impunity for this type of crime. "This will not happen on my watch. You will be punished; you will be pursued if you commit such a crime." We should also talk about men as victims, because today men and boys are among the victims of sexual violence; I still remember a young man who we met in the DRC in a panel where we interviewed for a reparation scheme. This young man told us that he did not even know about rape before. He was totally traumatized. He said: "I have nothing left. I have the shirt, the clothes that I have on my body, but that is all." He lost his wife and his child, and is now totally lost in a world that he could no longer really understand and in deep shock over having been gang raped...

... It is not only, although it is still primarily, women or girls who are victims of sexual violence, but it is also boys and young men. Does this mean that we can mobilize more men to fight with us against sexual violence in war and conflict? I hope so..."