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European Defence Challenges

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The future of European Navies

by Joanna Kidd

Introduction

All navies' main task is to defend their country against attack from the sea by a potential enemy. A second major task for navies, with the entry into force in 1994 of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, is to patrol and protect their maritime interests in their Economic Exclusion Zones. All European Union (EU) navies can carry out these two tasks, as they require similar naval forces, as did the Cold War. Then, the principal naval battle was envisaged as being a contest in blue water between Soviet and United States' (with some British and French support) nuclear powered submarines with other NATO allies protecting their coasts and their shipping from Soviet submarine attack.

The end of the Cold War has placed quite different, and more secondary, demands on navies. Obviously they must still meet their primary tasks of defending their coastline and shipping. But, in order to carry out the military interventions and campaigns likely in the post Cold War world any naval force needs to have the following four major capabilities:

* Expeditionary warfare – the ability to transport rapidly very large numbers of troops and their supporting equipment, materiel and supplies; which requires dedicated sealift and support ships. Cargo and transport ships can be "taken up from trade" or hired from the commercial shipping market; but doing so takes much needed time and is difficult because such ships are not specifically designed to convey military equipment. The slowness of operations using commercial ships can be illustrated by the Gulf War of 1990-1991, when it took the United States almost six months to convey its military equipment by commercial shipping to Saudi Arabia. Both dedicated military shipping and commercial shipping also require to be escorted by frigates, destroyers or cruisers.

* Power projection – the ability to project military power from the sea to the land; which requires land attack cruise missiles, sea borne aircraft and amphibious shipping.

* Operations in the littoral – the ability to operate within approximately two hundred miles of the target state's coastline; which requires platforms, such as diesel submarines and mine counter measure vessels, which can overcome the target state's sea denial strategy.

* Embargo operations – the ability to stop, search and prohibit the entry to the target state of sea borne trade; which requires a large number of escorts (destroyers/frigates/corvettes).

If taken as an entity, EU navies should be able successfully to carry out embargo operations and also should be able to operate in the littoral. But, they have very little ability to project power, especially when compared with the United States' navy, and even less ability to carry out expeditionary warfare.

EU navies' strengths

As can be seen from chart 1 below, EU navies are still geared, with their overwhelming emphasis on patrol craft, mine warfare vessels and diesel submarines, to defending their

coasts. In regard to the four naval tasks outlined above, such an emphasis does, however, have some advantages. EU navies have considerably more capability than the US navy both to operate in the littoral and to carry out embargo operations. In fact, the US could probably not operate in the littoral without EU naval support, were it to face a sea denial strategy from the target state in the form of mines and diesel submarines. Although it has the most advanced nuclear powered submarines in the world, they are not necessarily the best platforms with which to defend ones forces against enemy diesel submarines in the littoral. During the Kosovan conflict in 1999, for example, the US was so concerned at the threat posed to it from Yugoslavia's two elderly diesel submarines that a Dutch and an Italian diesel submarine were on permanent patrol in the Adriatic with orders to sink an enemy submarine as soon as it was detected. Similarly, the US navy could not, on its own, counter an enemy's substantial mine threat as was evident in the Gulf War when two of her escorts were heavily damaged by Iraqi mines.

EU navies' weaknesses

Power projection by means of sea launched land attack missiles and aircraft is generally the preferred method of influencing a target state by naval means. When carrying out such operations one's forces do not have to operate in the littoral but can stand back several hundred miles from the coast at far less risk of attack. EU navies barely have the capability to carry out such operations. The US has one hundred and thirty-three ships and submarines which can launch *Tomahawk* land attack missiles, the EU currently has two (both UK nuclear powered submarines). The US also has twelve 100,000t aircraft carriers; whereas France has one 40,000t and the UK has three 20,000t.

The EU's ability to carry out expeditionary warfare is even more limited. During the Cold War, as it was obvious that any war between the two sides would take place in central Europe, the bulk of western armies were stationed in central Europe. Therefore there was little need to transport troops and supporting materiel by sea; so neither the US nor the EU navies had a large sealift capability. Consequently it took six months to transport the troops, stores and equipment to Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Storm in 1990-91. Realising that the lack of sealift was a major strategic liability the US, after the Gulf War, ordered nineteen very large sealift ships; hitherto nine have been delivered. Each ship is 62,000t and can transport fifty-eight tanks, forty-eight other vehicles and nine hundred trucks. Amongst EU navies only the UK has sealift ships, having ordered six ro-ro ferries. These, however, are very much smaller than their US equivalents, being only 23,000t. The weaknesses of European navies are illustrated by chart 2 below.

Will matters improve?

The EU navies are extremely unlikely to improve their capabilities in either expeditionary warfare or power projection. Power projection assets are expensive – the UK paid £130mn for a mere 65 *Tomahawks* and its future aircraft carrier is expected to cost £750mn just for the ship. In contrast, assets for coastal defence are cheap. Furthermore, the EU's defence procurement policies are far less efficient than the US', as most EU countries have their own shipyards and defence industries and so generally order from them, rather than procuring jointly in order to cut costs. Attempts at joint design and procurement have been made, most noticeably the *Horizon* frigate programme of the UK, France and Italy. The three countries could not agree even on the basic design of the ship and the programme has been abandoned, with the UK now intent on designing and building its

future frigate on its own. EU navies might be able to increase their capabilities by assigning specific naval roles to certain countries for example, the UK and France could specialise in aircraft carriers and nuclear powered submarines; Germany and Italy escorts; the Scandinavian countries in diesel submarines and the Low countries in mine warfare. But unless all EU countries were always prepared to take military action together, a potential EU navy would lack key capabilities if certain countries did not take part.

A further factor limiting the likelihood of EU navies having an expeditionary or power projecting capability is that only three EU countries have a tradition in such activities and subsequently have navies organised to carry them out. France, the UK, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands, have navies used to operating across the globe and carrying out deployments of six to nine months. Other EU countries have no such experience of operating for long periods of time outside their own coastal waters. A vast change in both the organisation and the psyche of EU navies would be needed for them to carry out expeditionary warfare. There are a few indications that certain EU navies are beginning to adapt to these new operational demands – the German navy earlier this year deployed a small flotilla to South African waters for joint exercises and the Italian navy plans to become an all professional force by 2006, for example. But, such moves are merely a start to a process of change which will take at least a decade to implement.

In the medium term, therefore, the EU will not have a naval capability even one-tenth of the US' in terms of power projection and expeditionary warfare unless there is a massive increase in spending on naval platforms and weaponry. Such spending is almost certain not to happen.

Europe's most numerous naval platform by far is the patrol craft, of which she has over three hundred and fifty. Their principal role has been to carry out sea denial operations and as such they were procured in great numbers by smaller European navies during the Cold War as they were much cheaper platforms than diesel submarines. They are not wholly irrelevant to modern navies, as with the introduction in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of two hundred mile economic exclusion zones many countries now have very large areas of sea to patrol. Patrol craft are the cheapest means of carrying out this task and are obviously well suited to it. However, they are ill suited to the two secondary tasks, outlined above, which are placed on escorting ships. The proliferation of anti-ship missiles, diesel submarines and fighter aircraft means that escorting naval forces must be able to counter all these potential threats. Patrol craft are simply too small to be able to carry all the necessary weapons and command systems. Corvettes, if equipped with flexible vertical launch systems which allow a mixture of missiles to be carried, can carry out the task now required of escorts, but patrol craft cannot.

Chart 1



Chart 2



European defence and security capability: Land forces

by Phillip Mitchell

Introduction

The question on many people's minds over the past weeks and months has been "is it necessary or indeed possible to have a genuine, independent European defence and security capability?" NATO and the US have after all provided our security for over 50 years. The answer or answers are, of course, seen not only in the Kosovo operation but also in the unwillingness of Europe to adequately share the defence burden with our American allies. This, to put it mildly, has resulted in considerable disenchantment within the US administration. If we Europeans do not do more the Americans assuredly are going to do less, thereby weakening NATO and Europe.

Europe vs. the US

The UK's Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir Charles Guthrie, during a presentation to the Royal United Services Institute, provided some rather telling statistics in respect of the current European defence capability. These figures follow very closely those provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in their annual publication *The Military Balance 1999/2000*. Consider the following examples:

* The EU can place some 1.78 million people under arms; European NATO (excl. Turkey) about 2 million; the US about 1.37 million.

* The Europeans have 5 military satellites, the US 64.

* Britain and France have 4 carrier task groups, the US 12.

* Europe does not have a single strategic lift aircraft, the US 332.

* When it comes to defence spending, the US with just over a third of the population of NATO, provides over a half of the defence spending. US defence spending *per capita* is approximately 125% higher than the Europeans. Nevertheless, both France and Germany are looking at cutting around 3.5% from their defence budgets this year.

In anybody's language this must mean that Europe has got to do far more. Consider this one single fact - out of 2 million European NATO servicemen, Europe found it difficult to provide 2% of them for the Kosovo operation. The German minister of defence recently stated that: "The problem in Europe is not too much America, but too little Europe".

Land forces in Europe

It should not be forgotten that the European union comprises some 15 nations. Eleven of these 15 are members of NATO. NATO in turn has a membership of 19 countries, eight of whom are not members of the European union. Therein lie the dilemmas in the search for a European security identity: Can the European countries outside of NATO be easily and quickly drawn into the planning process? Will the primacy of NATO be devalued? Whilst the military and political debate will go on for some time yet, we should as of now be taking a much closer look at land forces in

relation to that European defence capability.

Readers will, of course, be aware that European defence capability has to be built within constraints imposed by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, more commonly referred to as CFE. The CFE Treaty was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990 and extends conventional arms control from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains. It would be true to say that the Treaty is generally regarded as a cornerstone of post-Cold War European security. The area of application includes all the land territory of the 17 European members of NATO and the remaining 10 CFE successors to the original Warsaw Treaty signatories. Forces of the United States and Canada stationed in this area are also subject to the agreement.

In essence the Treaty imposed equal limits of 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armoured combat vehicles, 20,000 heavy artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft and 2,000 attack helicopters – that the two "groups of states" (NATO and Warsaw Pact) could deploy and store between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains.

It is not the intention of this article to cover the Treaty in detail. However, it is worth bearing in mind that the signatory states have removed over 58,000 pieces of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) from their arsenals, mostly through destruction. The Treaty also introduced an unprecedented degree of military transparency through detailed information exchange on military command structures and arms levels, as well as an extensive inspection regime.

Of course the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the demise of its partner group the Warsaw Pact led inevitably to calls for the Treaty to be amended to reflect post-Cold War Europe. This was achieved on 19 November last year when national and territorial ceilings were established for TLE. These replaced the original group and zone limitations. Restrictions on the build-up of forces in specific regions (particularly central Europe) and confidence through transparency are also part of the adapted treaty's foundations. It should be noted that the specific limits for all 5 categories of TLE are in many cases lower than that allowed under the original treaty. The problem is, when considering European defence capability, that the equipment holdings of many states are even lower than that required by the treaty. As an example – Belgium is allowed a total of 300 tanks – currently she holds 155. Whilst Norway is up to strength in main battle tanks, holdings of TLE in all other categories are below agreed ceilings.

Equipment	Holding	Ceiling
ACV	218	275
Artillery	189	491
Attack Helicopters	0	24
Combat Aircraft	73	100

(ACV = Armoured Combat Vehicle)

It can be claimed that this adapted treaty will not resolve the interstate and secessionist conflicts that have plagued post-Cold War Europe. Indeed, it is Europe's attempts to solve these problems within the framework of the CFE Treaty that now exercise the minds of our leaders. Perhaps they should also consider how in the event of a major crisis, NATO countries will meet the equipment shortfall.

What can the EU provide in respect of armed forces?

There is no doubt that too many of Europe's armed forces are still focused on Cold War requirements. Today we require forces that are deployable and sustainable. Moreover, they need to be highly mobile and flexible. As already mentioned, there are 2 million European NATO servicemen. The fact that a large proportion of them are still conscripted represents a significant factor. Thus they are

of limited use both in terms of their deployment outside home territories and being sufficiently well trained to engage in a wide range of operations using modern weapons and equipment. The fact of the matter is that European countries have a particular problem in not having sufficient numbers of professionals, particularly specialists, to sustain a combined arms offensive operation of any significant size. Whilst it is true that conscripts from both Germany and Norway have served in Bosnia and Kosovo, these were volunteers and relatively few in number. Professionalisation of NATO's remaining conscript armies will increase the number of deployable soldiers, permit rotation and improve overstretch. Additional important factors include the professional soldiers ability to take full advantage of technological improvements in weaponry and greater unit cohesion, none of which can be obtained in 9 months of "conscript service."

Could we form a European army?

Romano Prodi, the European Commission president, says no. Indeed no one of authority in Britain is talking of a European army. Nations will want to retain authority over their armed forces and only national governments and national parliaments should have the authority to send their forces into areas where they may risk their lives.

Europe has in fact recognised its weakness and taken some steps to strengthen its capability. At the EU summit of December last year it was agreed to create within 3 years a rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops that would be available for a variety of missions within 60 days, when NATO as a whole is not engaged. The force would not be a European army; rather it would cover anything from humanitarian relief to peace support operations. Member nations would voluntarily contribute forces.

So here we are, 6 months later, and still no clearer as to how this figure of 60,000 soldiers is to be met. The UK and France are thought to be ready to assign 2 – 3 brigades apiece, each of up to 5,000 soldiers, accounting for some 20 – 30,000 troops, but their EU counterparts have so far been very shy about declaring their hands. It is perhaps unfortunate that the target number of brigades – 15 – corresponds to the number of EU member states – since quite realistically it is now being spelt out that the headline goal of 60,000 requires that the overall number be tripled to allow for force rotation. Can Europe find 180 – 200,000 troops? On top of this of course is the need for these forces to be equipped and supported with up-to-date equipment. There are deficiencies in this respect throughout Europe – and problems with the UK's infantry weapons and *Tornado* bomber fleet leave little scope for British self-satisfaction. At this point one might well agree with the French newspaper "Le Figaro", which described the EU as an "economic giant, a political dwarf and a military larvae".

The European Corps - or EUROCORPS- has been put forward as an embryonic European rapid reaction force. EUROCORPS was founded in 1992 on a French and German initiative and has its headquarters in Strasbourg. It can be described as an adoptive rather than a natural child of NATO. The problem here is that it has developed away from the mainstream of NATO and is a fully multinational headquarters rather than one dominated by a single or lead nation. Only last year did the Eurocorps bow to the commonsense inevitability of accepting English as a headquarters language. The point of highlighting "lead nation" is because in the KFOR operation successive and successful force headquarters have been led by the ARRC under General Sir Mike Jackson and LANDCENT under German General Klaus Reinhardt. EUROCORPS has now been given the opportunity to command KFOR and despite its imperfections could be the nucleus

of Europe's developing capability. The KFOR experience will certainly enhance Corps-NATO compatibility, however whether EUROCORPS could become the second ARRC is still open to question.

The capability gap between ourselves and the United States has already been commented on. Moreover, this gap is growing increasingly wider. Europe needs to narrow it. We have to deliver forces configured for expeditionary operations or NATO and Europe could be irrevocably damaged. The reality is however described by General Klaus Naumann former chairman of NATO's military committee when he stated that "The European Union's plan to create a viable rapid reaction force for crisis management by 2003 is unlikely to be achieved on time."

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This article has presented a brief outline of European land force capability which hopefully has given a flavour of some of the problems that lie ahead, problems that in later years members of the Norwegian armed forces may be called upon to help solve.

Current trends in the Russian Navy

by **Joanna Kidd**

Introduction

The most obvious trend in the Russian navy over the past decade has been decline: Decline in numbers of ships and submarines; time spent at sea; overseas deployments; manpower; building of new ships and submarines; and of course in funding. This article will review the overall decline in the navy's strength, but will argue that, with the Vladimir Putin presidency, the decline has most probably reached a plateau. The probable levelling off of the decline can be traced to three factors:

* Firstly, that President Putin is continuing, but in a much more assertive way, to reorganise the Russian military and so far this year has already promulgated a new national security concept and a new naval doctrine.

* Secondly, President Putin is intent on restoring an ocean going capability to the navy because he is determined both to promote and defend Russia's interests on the high seas and because he is impressed by the navy's leaders, particularly its head, Admiral Kuroyedov.

* Thirdly, that Russia's economy is now growing, albeit not rapidly, so that more money is available to the central government to spend on defence.

Overall decline

Overall decline in strength has not been limited to the Russian navy alone; all major western navies have reduced their strength very considerably as the "peace dividend" has been called in. The US navy, for example, now has about two hundred submarines and principal surface combatants whereas in 1990 it had about three hundred and fifty, and some missions deemed essential a decade ago are now being scrapped. However, the Russian navy's decline has been so precipitous as to stand out from this general trend. Strengths in some areas such as frigates and diesel submarines are now about one tenth of the 1990 numbers and all types of submarines and surface combatants have declined in numbers by half, and many by three quarters, since then (see chart 3 below). Furthermore, no new principal surface combatant has been launched since 1993 and no new attack submarine since 1994, so the fleet is an ageing one.

Operational Decline

As important as the decline in numerical strength has been the decline in the operational capability of the ships and submarines left in the inventory. Even though there are now far fewer ships and submarines to maintain than a decade ago, the Russian navy has been barely able to afford to pay for the fuel, electricity and shore maintenance to keep their depleted inventory seaworthy. Time spent at sea by both submarines and ships has declined very considerably; the United States' State Department reported that in 1998 sea duty for fleet submarines fell by 25% and for surface vessels by 33% in that year alone; the fiscal situation for the navy was described as "dismal". An example of how strained the situation has been can be indicated in that the Northern Fleet in June 1999 carried out "West-99", a major strategic command and

staff exercise, and in so doing used up its entire annual fuel reserve. Lack of money for fuel is a problem shared by many western navies – the Royal Navy being particularly badly affected – but not to the same extent as the Russian navy. During the Kosovan crisis in 1999 the Russian Defence Ministry and the Black Sea Fleet several times publicly stated that a flotilla of surface ships would be sent to the Adriatic. However, throughout the crisis the navy was able to deploy only one surface ship, an intelligence ship, to the region. Presumably the navy could not afford, even during such a conflict, to send any more ships to sea. This lessening ability to send ships or submarines to sea has also had severe effects on the fighting efficiency of personnel, which has declined commensurately.

New Strategic Doctrine

Putin's more vigorous approach to reorganisation of the military has already been shown this year. On 14th January 2000 Russia published a new National Security Concept. The Concept has been widely interpreted as increasing the emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons, in part because of the depleted condition of her conventional forces, in the defence of Russia should she be attacked. This shift in emphasis has significant implications for the Russian navy as, if implemented, the Start II provisions will ensure that by 2003 60% of Russia's nuclear missiles will be carried by her nuclear powered ballistic missile carrying submarines (SSBNs), as opposed to 43% now. In line with this new strategic concept, a new naval doctrine was published on 4th March 2000. It reflects the increased importance of SSBNs by making "the maintenance and qualitative renewal of the men and equipment of the naval strategic forces component, and the guarantee of their required level" the main priority for the navy. Some additional money has been given to the navy in order to fulfil her increased strategic role. At present, it is intended to keep only the seven *Delta IV* SSBNs in service and their refitting, being undertaken now, will probably use almost all of the naval strategic budget. The earlier *Delta* classes are being scrapped and there is no money to keep the *Typhoon* SSBNs in service for more than a few years. More importantly, the *Delta IV* SSBNs will have to start being withdrawn from service in 2015 due to their age. Their intended replacement, the *Borey* class, which is still in development, has chronic design problems. Unless very considerable resources are given to the *Borey* project within the next five years, by 2015-2020 the Russian navy will not have any SSBNs. The new naval doctrine does make "developing new generation strategic missile submarines, modernising and repairing existing submarines of this class, and developing and producing missiles for them" the navy's priority over all other platforms and weapons so one would assume that money will be found to resolve the developmental problems with the *Borey* class.

Basing of the remaining SSBNs has been stated publicly to remain shared between both the Northern and the Pacific Fleets despite persistent rumours that the strategic element was going to be removed from the latter. As Admiral Kuroyedov, head of the Russian navy said on 27th August 1998, "On the question of submarines [...] I will repeat that the naval strategic component consists of two fleets, and this will continue to be the case". However, in the same speech he also stated that, "There is a plan to create a northern strategic bastion of Russia. That idea has now to be developed into a blueprint." It would appear that this blueprint is now part of the wider plans for military reform, and so remains to be implemented.

Other Priorities in the New Naval Doctrine

Although primarily a land based power, Russia has an extensive coastline; maritime

borders with several states; a very large economic exclusion zone; carries out considerable seaborne trade; and still has a large ocean going merchant fleet. For these reasons it is in Russia's strategic interests to have an ocean going navy. The doctrine reflects these interests by stating that "Russia's interests on the world ocean stipulate that in the political sphere her naval priorities" should be:

* To ensure the Russian Federation's guaranteed access to the world's oceans and spaces

* To exclude discriminatory actions with regard to it or its allies by individual states or military political blocs

* To prevent the domination of any states of military political blocs whatsoever on the world's oceans spaces, which have important significance for the realisation of Russian Federation state interests, especially in the adjacent seas

* To settle existing political and international legal problems of the use of the world ocean on terms that are advantageous for the country

* To focus the efforts of the states on the peaceful exploration and use of the world ocean

Obviously, Russia has not suddenly acquired these maritime interests; it has had them during the past decade of decline. However, certain factors such as the embarrassment of her failure to send more than one ship to the Adriatic during the Kosovan crisis in 1999 compared to NATO's fleet of more than forty ships and submarines and the fact that several Russian tankers have been detained in the Gulf by US naval ships carrying out the embargo of Iraqi oil have increased the importance attached by the Kremlin to naval matters. The naval doctrine expands upon this by stating that "the urgency of the defence of Russian Federation state interests on the world ocean is increasing as a result of a substantial change of the geopolitical situation in the world and the emergence of new threats to Russian Federation security in the sphere of naval activity." It states that the primary threats are:

* The restriction of the opportunity for the Russian Federation to access the world ocean's resources and spaces and major international sea lines of communication, especially in the Baltic and Black Seas

* The stepping up of the leading naval powers' naval activities, the change of the correlation of naval forces not in favour of the Russian Federation, and the improvement of the military capabilities of the naval forces of the leading foreign states, and economic, political and international-legal pressure on the Russian Federation with the goal of restricting its naval activity

* The expansion of the scale of unauthorised harvesting of the country's natural maritime resources, and the dramatic growth of foreign influence on its naval activity

* The unresolved nature of an entire series of complex international-legal issues, which affect, first and foremost, the legal status of the Caspian and Black Seas, and the Sea of Azov, and the presence of territorial claims against the Russian Federation by a number of neighbouring states

* The increase of the rates of lag of the qualitative indicators of Russian naval weapons behind foreign states' naval weapons

Future Plans

In order to start combatting these perceived threats, President Putin announced to the Russian Security Council on 23rd November 1999 that the navy is to resume operations in areas of the world not visited in recent years, most particularly the Baltic and the Mediterranean. The navy's biggest surface combatant, the aircraft carrier *Kuznetsov*, is supposed to deploy to the Mediterranean in August and September 2000, accompanied by a destroyer, a frigate and a support tanker. The navy's share of the 2000 defence budget has been increased, so one would expect that the deployment will be able to be paid for. Obviously, one prominent deployment does not mean that the Russian navy has reversed its decline – the *Kuznetsov* did deploy in 1996, for example, – but it is perhaps an indication that the end of its nadir has been reached.

A very large and sustained increase in the navy's budget will be required to make the entire fleet seaworthy. The Russian economy is growing and, if the navy remains a priority for Putin, one would expect the navy's budget to continue to increase. However, it is unlikely that the budget will be expanded to such an extent that all the fleet will be made seaworthy within the life span of the doctrine i.e. to 2010. Priorities for the navy, after the strategic submarines, which are separately funded, would probably be attack submarines, guided missile destroyers and frigates, the *Kuznetsov* and support ships to enable global deployments. The doctrine itself is somewhat more ambitious, stating that, for Russia's naval threats to be met, the following must be carried out:

* Building attack submarines and surface ships, including aircraft carriers, with enhanced combat capabilities equipped with precision-guided strike missiles and anti-submarines warfare weapons.

* Developing ship and shore based multirole aircraft and standardised shore based reconnaissance strike systems

* Focusing efforts on restoring, modernizing, and maintaining the combat readiness of existing military systems, complexes and weapons.

* Equipping primarily constant readiness formations and units with modern weapons and military equipment

* Reducing the product list of naval equipment and weapons, shifting to the construction of standardized combatants, support vessels.

* Enhancing the combat potential of naval force groupings by building up the strike, information and other capabilities of naval equipment and weapons

* Enhancing the efficiency, reliability, secrecy, and stability of communications and command and control

* Exploring and equipping the world ocean as a possible sphere for the conduct of combat operations through the creation and deployment of a unified situation coverage system on the world ocean

Such a list is in line with the ambitions of medium sized western navies such as the UK's and France's. Indeed, it is noticeable that the current size and structure of the Russian navy is not that dissimilar from the Royal Navy's: in terms of principal surface combatants they are almost exactly the same. Russia retains a considerable advantage in submarines, her traditional strength, but is likely to reduce these numbers further in the near future although still retaining her relative lead (see chart 4 below).

Should the Russian economy keep growing and if the central government retains a mod-

erately reformist outlook, in the long term one would imagine that the Russian navy will keep its current size and structure, but will significantly improve its operational capability so that its inventory is seaworthy. Regional deployments, particularly by surface combatants, to neighbouring seas and also to areas of strategic interest such as the Gulf could then be carried out on a regular basis so as to maintain and increase Russia's maritime interests.

Chart 3



	SSBN	SSGN/SSN	SSK	CVS	CCG/CCGN	DD/DDG	FF/FFG
1990	61	114	114	5	43	31	148
2000	21	28	16	1	7	17	10

Chart 4