

One Size Fits All?

Multinationality and the
Smaller Partner

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Chapter 1

Introduction

If I must make war, I prefer it to be against a coalition.

Napoleon

Now that I have led a coalition, I have much less respect for Napoleon.

Marshall Foch

This study is about multinationality and defence. Defence is here understood as covering both the armed forces and the defence industry that produces their equipment.

Multinationality refers to two or more countries pooling their resources, often to achieve what would have been beyond the reach of one of them.

Multinationality is nothing new, the quotations at the top of this page may serve as pertinent reminders of that. Nevertheless, multinationality is now placed at the top of the agenda in the transformation processes underway in all the countries belonging to NATO. One of the reasons is that events in the last decade have resulted in a well of new information on the advantages and pitfalls of multinationality. In the ten years between 1990 and 2000, more than 25 military operations were undertaken jointly by the US and one or more of its European allies.¹ Coalitions have become an intrinsic element in Western warfare. Informed opinion on

¹ James P. Thomas, *The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions*, London: IISS, 2000, Adelphi Paper 333, p. 9.

both sides of the Atlantic agrees that coalitions are the shape of things to come. Likewise, a consensus prevails that, until now, too little has been undertaken by NATO's members to ensure that coalitions can be formed quickly and managed smoothly. The failure to do so has been further aggravated by the growing transatlantic gap in terms of sophisticated equipment, reducing the allies' ability to work together. Indeed, as one writer has stated, all things being equal, national contingencies are far more effective than multinational ones.² If that is so, why the increasing emphasis placed on multinationality by politicians, defence economists and scholars? Two factors are at play here; one is political legitimacy, the other costs.

Whereas a single country sending soldiers off to a conflict unavoidably will be suspected of acting out of purely national interests, a coalition is less likely to be accused of the same. During the Cold War, the need to defend the West against attacks did not lend itself easily to questions over legitimacy. Today, this is less the case. Actions outside the Alliance member area will easily give rise to questions over legitimacy. This is particularly the case if the action in question seems suited more to the strategic interest of one of the coalition members. The dominant US role in the coalition that attacked and subsequently occupied Iraq springs to mind, but other Western countries have been confronted with similar accusations. Such accusations are politically costly. One way to pre-empt these accusations is to assemble the broadest possible coalition.

Economic costs are the other factor listed. European defence budgets were sharply reduced during the 1990s; a trend that has only been reversed recently in a few of the countries. Much of this increase has been channelled into modern weaponry such as precision-guided missiles and

² Rachel Anne Lutz Ellehuus, *Multinational Solutions versus Intra-Alliance Specialisation*, Copenhagen: DUPI Report 2002/5, p. 8.

information technology. These are only part of the radical technological change in weapons and the way operations are conducted, labelled the Revolution in Military Affairs, RMA for short. These novelties come at a prohibitive price. But what may be beyond one country can be within the reach of two or more. Thus, countries are exploring new ways of either pooling their resources at all stages from research and development through procurement to the establishment of units with the most modern equipment.

The soldier's kit is of cardinal importance if casualties are to be kept low. If they are not, whatever support a coalition enjoyed at home and abroad will be undermined. A challenge to any coalition, and this challenge is so fundamental that it merits to be mentioned here in the introduction, is the need to maintain cohesion. Just how difficult that can be was poignantly underlined in General Wesley Clark's recollections of NATO's Operation Allied Force:

I talked to everybody. I talked to diplomats, NATO political leaders, national political leaders, and national chiefs of defence. There was a constant round of telephone calls, pushing and shoving and bargaining and cajoling, trying to raise the threshold for NATO attacks.³

Cohesion problems sometimes originate in the fact that multinationality will involve a transfer of decision-making to other forums than those under strict national control. National decision-making will be strongly influenced by other allies, in other words it will be less "national". This limitation on national sovereignty is deeply ingrained in all the problems related to multinationality. How countries try to mitigate the

³ The interview can be found at <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/clark.html>. For other analyses of the problematic relationship between politicians and commanders, see Derek S. Reveron, "Coalition Warfare: The Commander's Role", *Defense & Security Analysis*, vol. 18, no. 2, 2002, pp. 107–21; and Roger H. Palin, *Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects*, IISS: Adelphi Paper 294, 1995.

loss of sovereignty by creating a web of guidelines, reservations and guarantees to make the loss of sovereignty more palatable, is central to the analysis presented in this report.

One might be tempted to ask the question whether these challenges represent anything new? After all, NATO is by definition a coalition of states, planning has always been coordinated under the auspices of the Alliance. But multinationality has now above all become a far more complex phenomenon than in the past. During the Cold War, Allied forces would be integrated at corps or air-force wing level.⁴ The degree of multinationality varied, with the armies lagging behind the integration displayed in the navy and air force. Today, integration goes much further down, to battalion or air-squadron levels. The agreement reached at the NATO Summit in Prague in late September 2002 that NATO should establish a NATO Response Force composed of niche capacities offered by the member countries is an important step.⁵

The importance attributed to multinationality has triggered a wide range of transformations. Efforts are undertaken by clusters of countries to pool their research and development (R&D) resources and initiate joint procurement programmes; costs have increased and made it difficult to achieve the set targets unless projects include more than one country sharing the burden. This development raises a number of issues: what are the effects of joint command and control over the multinational units on the national scope of decision-making, how will the relationship between smaller and larger countries

⁴ Thomas, *The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions*, p. 10.

⁵ See Grzegorz Holdanowicz, "USA presses NATO to provide increased readiness forces", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 2 October 2002, p. 4. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson underlined that the new force, once established, would be "complementing but not duplicating or replacing other national and multinational capabilities for rapid military action".

within multinational units be affected, and finally how may this alter transatlantic relations?

All the questions raised here have an impact on the combat efficiency of the multinational units. This is clearly the most important issue. And it is an issue that deserves to be put more at the forefront of the debate than it has been in the past when multinational units were often formed as an expression of good neighbourliness (e.g. the Franco-German Corps) or for the diffusion of Western practice (Multinational Corps North-East). Now focus has turned towards military relevance. In other words to the principle that the countries in the coalition contribute skills or equipment the other participants value as an asset that will make a difference to combat efficiency. If not, the superpower may choose to “go it alone” and thus avoid having to take the concerns and needs of the smaller partners into account.⁶

The predicament of the smaller partner

The problems posed by multinational cooperation will appear very different to a larger power than to a smaller.⁷ The analysis presented here will be biased towards the roles allotted to the smaller partners, and smaller should here be taken quantitatively as based on the size of the contingent participating in a multinational formation. Although there are examples where the contingents do not differ much in size, as a rule smaller countries send smaller numbers. And this is easily a problem since similarity in size might provide a shield

⁶ This concern is strongly present in Michele Zanini and Jennifer Morrison Taw, *The Army and Multinational Force Compatibility*, Santa Monica: Rand, 2000. For an older and more general presentation of US concerns over Norwegian security and defence politics, see Richard A. Bitzinger, *Denmark, Norway, and NATO: Constraints and Challenges*, Santa Monica: Rand, 1989.

⁷ See Robert S. Jordan, *Alliance Strategy and Navies*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1990, especially ch. 4, “The American component of NATO’s maritime nuclear capacity”, pp. 119–49.

for the small against constantly being overruled by the larger partner. “Might” is intentional since similarity is no guarantee against being relegated to the role of a minion. The larger countries have more experience in multinationality, they have a larger pool of officers to fill command and control functions. Smaller countries will often lack these skills. That is unless they have pooled their men in peacetime and thus been able to gain the necessary experience in commanding large units.

Quite another area is equipment. Here the smaller partner will often be forced to follow the preferences of the larger, since interoperable equipment is a precondition for cooperation. Moreover, the bigger partner is in an advantageous position when it comes to bargaining for a better price than the small will ever be. Numerous procurement deals have been signed whereby one small country has either bundled together with others of equal stature, or joined a larger ally to cut prices. But the underlying difference in size emerges as a problem here as well. A smaller country may find it difficult to defend its interest in procurement matters when faced with the priorities of the larger members.

This puts the smaller countries in a predicament since their relevance as partners, and thus the influence they will be able to exert over operations, will largely depend on the assets they bring with them. If these assets are small, already available, or in the worst case irrelevant, they cannot be exchanged for influence. Larger countries will usually have a greater variety of capacities to rely upon; top of the class is the US as the only country capable of undertaking large-scale operations on its own. Smaller countries have less. This study will assess what the smaller countries do to increase their relevance, and how coalitions can enable them to “punch above their weight” and exert influence over decision-making. This is the reason why

smaller countries want to joint. The former Norwegian Defence Minister Johan Jørgen Holst once expressed it thus:

They obtain access to deliberations from which they would be excluded in the absence of alignment, and they assume responsibility for the management of interests and relationships that otherwise would prove elusive or beyond their influence. Alignment may increase the political clout that smaller countries can bring to bear in bilateral negotiations with adversaries or third parties, and it can help stiffen the back against intimidation.⁸

Another benefit is the fact that multinationality makes it possible for smaller countries to maintain military capabilities they would have been unable to maintain on their own. This was the main reason why the Dutch agreed with Germany to establish the German-Netherlands Corps in 1995. Based on the experience of commanding the corps, Dutch officers are eligible for similar posts when a coalition is established.

But if the Dutch motive for joining was capacity-based, the German was predominantly political.⁹ The German government has used multinationality to avoid suspicions of nationalistic aspirations. The decision to set up NATO Corps North-East stationed in Szczecin together with Poland and Denmark should be seen from this angle. Multinationality is also a means to prevent the renationalisation of the armed forces, i.e. to ensure that they can not be turned into tools of chauvinist politicians. This was the main reason for accepting Germany as a member of NATO in 1955 and Spain in 1982, and remains a valid explanation for the multinational units

⁸ Johan Jørgen Holst, "Lilliputs and Gulliver: Small States in Great-Power Alliance", in Gregory Flynn (ed.), *NATO's Northern Allies. The National Security Policies of Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands and Norway*, Totowa NJ.: Rowman & Allanhead, 1985, p. 261.

⁹ Martin Faust, *Betriebswirtschaftliche Probleme multinationaler Truppenteile*, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 2002, footnote 144, p. 57.

established with the participation of former Warsaw Pact members and NATO countries in the 1990s. But at the same time multinationality opens up channels for information and influence. Germany may be referred to as the prime example. No other European country is so deeply involved in multinational units; to quote one observer, it permits Germany to play on “three pianos – the national, the European and the Atlantic.”¹⁰

Yet, a few more comments are merited on how difference in motives for joining may cause problems. One may assume that if the motives differ, the willingness to deploy the units in conflict will vary as well. In any given crisis, the various members of a coalition will have different degrees of national interest at stake that will determine the strength and nature of their participation. Multinational units harbour the danger that one of the participants might choose to opt out. The Belgian Parliament for instance has decided that Belgian servicemen cannot take part in any operations in former Belgian colonies. The question then remains whether the multinational units will remain operational without Belgian participation? The Belgian reservation is a clear-cut case where the conditions for opting out are spelt out. The other countries may then have to consider the possibility of Belgium opting out.

Far more difficult, and probably more prevalent, are the cases where these reservations are not spelt out beforehand. A country often mentioned as a possible case is Denmark. Danish politicians have repeatedly criticised Turkey over its poor human rights record. The question therefore emerges whether Denmark would assist Turkey in case of a crisis in

¹⁰ Igor Mitrofanoff, “L’Eurocorps: mode d’emploi”, *Défense nationale*, vol. 48, 1992, no. 12, pp. 29–36, the quotation is taken from p. 30. For a survey of Germany’s multifarious multinational military involvements, see Françoise Manfrass-Sirjacques, “Allemagne: une mutation en profondeur”, in Patrice Buffotot, *La Défense en Europe, Nouvelles réalités, nouvelles ambitions*, Paris: La documentation Française, 2001, pp. 21–38.

Turkish Kurdistan, either in the form of national uprising embracing Kurdish areas in adjacent countries, or an attack from Iraqi or Iranian territories. If not, for instance the Multinational Corps North-East would be prevented from going. Alternatively, Denmark may choose to support the mission while at the same time imposing a strict set of reservations. If so, the range of tasks the Corps would be permitted to undertake may be so narrow as to question its viability.

Denmark is not unique. Disagreements between the contributors, especially Greece and Turkey, to ARRC (Allied Rapid Reaction Corps) have made both German and British observers wonder whether it will only be able to undertake peacekeeping missions in low-intensity conflicts.¹¹ One may assume that a country will not participate in missions perceived as contradicting explicit national priorities.¹² But this is foreseeable and poses less of a problem than the case if countries that might refrain from sending soldiers because the mission is perceived as too small or unimportant to warrant participation in what might cause a high number of casualties. This shows that multinationality is not only a matter of doctrine and increasing compatibility, but also represents a cultural watershed for many small members that have remained focused on territorial defence and may now find themselves engaged in armed conflict far away at short notice.

¹¹ Colin McInnes, *The British Army and NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps*, London: London Defence Studies, vol. 15, 1993, pp. 16, 46; and Deutscher Bundestag, Wissenschaftliche Dienste, Fachbereich II – Auswärtiges, Internationales Recht, Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Deutsche Integration, Verteidigung: *Erfahrungen, Probleme und Perspektiven militärischer Zusammenarbeit in bi- bzw. multinationalen Grossverbänden seit 1990 in Europa*, Reg.-Nr: WF II – 202/95, Ausarbeitung no. 26/96, Bonn 1995, p. 23 and 46.

¹² The German debate on whether the country may send troops to Iraq under an UN-mandate should be taken as a sign that this threshold may be lowered in time, especially if the costs in terms of loss of political relevance and in the case of Iraq economic contracts is perceived as too high.

For larger countries with a history of expeditionary warfare, this is of course not a novelty. A key challenge is therefore to create mechanisms that allow one country to opt out without rendering the remainder impotent.

So far, the problems confronting small countries have been focused on. Nevertheless, there are certain advantages attached to smallness that must not be overlooked.¹³ A smaller partner is less likely to harbour any ideas of grandeur and *ipso facto* leadership. What is sometimes euphemistically referred to as cultural differences when analysing French or Spanish attitudes to multinationality, may be taken as referring to cooperation problems stemming from their assumption that leadership will be transferred to them due to their size and military traditions. Two countries with these attitudes inside the same units is not a recipe for success. A smaller country is more likely to accept that the greater partners assume leadership commensurate with their contribution. When it comes to multinationality, smallness may thus be synonymous with flexibility and pragmatism.¹⁴

The predicament of Norway

The analysis presented here is not only biased towards the role of the smaller countries, but towards that of Norway in particular. During the Cold War, Norway was in a strategically important position as one of the gatekeepers of the Atlantic. This made it possible for Norway to gain attention and play an important role in NATO.¹⁵

¹³ In the extensive analysis of multinational force formations by Martin Faust, smallness is always synonymous with disadvantage, cf. Faust, *Betriebswirtschaftliche Probleme multinationaler Truppenteile*.

¹⁴ This point has frequently come up during interviews with Norwegian, German and US officers in the course of writing this study.

¹⁵ See Rolf Tamnes and Kjetil Skogrand, *Fryktens likevekt. Atombomben, Norge og Verden 1945–1970*, Oslo: Tiden, 2001; and Rolf Tamnes, *Integration and screening: The two faces of Norwegian alliance policy, 1945–1986*, Oslo: FHFS, 1986.

Reinforcement units were earmarked for operations in Norway in case of a Soviet attack. Large Allied exercises were conducted at regular intervals.

After 1989 this changed fundamentally. The improved relationship between the USA and Russia changed NATO fundamentally. Attention was transferred to security threats outside Europe. The fact that there was no longer the need to prepare for a massive attack from the east meant that less Allied attention was directed towards Norway. This was expressed in a reduced number of Allied exercises, a drop in the number of reinforcement units, and in the disbanding of Allied headquarters in Norway. Parallel to this development, the EU started to chart out a future military role for itself. Here, Norway is a mere bystander. As a non-member, its ability to influence developments is at best limited.

The increased emphasis within NATO on the demand that members should rely more closely on multinational units and develop the niche capacities these units need, has not been received without apprehension in Norway. The governments, irrespective of party colour, have tried to adapt to NATO's policies while at the same time retaining a national crisis-management capacity. The relationship with Russia is not without problems despite the general improvement in political and economic relations. The Norwegian interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty of 1920 is challenged, as is the Norwegian interpretation of the legal status of the 200-mile zone and the continental shelf around Svalbard. The delimitation line between the two countries' economic zones in the Barents Sea has not yet been agreed, while at the same time the vast energy resources in the sea bed in this area remain untapped. Should a disagreement arise, it would be imperative for Norway to have military capabilities to cope with the challenges. The shared border with Russia, the vast sea areas under Norwegian jurisdiction and their large fishery and energy resources, all imply that Norway has to face a range of tasks

that requires a variety of national military assets. This puts Norway in a special position compared to other European countries like for instance Belgium or the Netherlands.

Most of the reasons compelling Norway to explore the potentials for multinational force formations differ little from what is the case in other European countries. In addition, there is another factor that weighs strongly in favour of multinational solutions. Should a major crisis occur in the north, however unlikely that seems today, Norway would be dependent on Allied support. The end of the Cold War meant that the strategic importance of Norway to NATO was drastically reduced. Participation in multinational units, and Allied training and exercises in Norway are undertaken to prepare for such support and hence to counteract the loss of strategic relevance.¹⁶

Progress and structure

In the next chapter, a closer description of different forms of multinational force formations will be given. Common to all is the need to ensure cohesion. A precondition for cohesion is a common perception of the problems that have to be confronted and how they can be solved most efficiently. However, even when this is achieved the cohesion of the troops will be undermined if the equipment they bring along is not compatible. Compatibility has been a main concern for NATO since the beginning, and as will be shown considerable

¹⁶ These points have been repeatedly emphasised in official publications on the restructuring of Norwegian defence, e.g. St.meld. no. 22 (1997–98), *Hovedretningslinjer for Forsvarets virksomhet og utvikling i tiden 1999–2002*, esp. 3.3.2 “Politiske og militære endringer i NATO”; St.meld. no. 38 (1998–99), *Tilpasning av Forsvaret til deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner*, esp. 2.4. “Målsettinger med deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner”; St.prp. no. 45 (2000–2001), *Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005*, esp. 4.3.2. ”Alliert og internasjonalt forsvarssamarbeid”; and more indirectly in St.meld. no. 12 (2000–2001), *Om Norge og Europa ved inngangen til et nytt århundre*, esp. 9.5. “EU’s tredjelandforbindelser – en stadig mer integrert del av FUSP”.

progress has been achieved. But in recent years, a new array of sophisticated technology has changed the way in which troops can operate. Not all countries will be able to apply this technology to the same extent. This will have a negative impact on compatibility.

In chapter 3, attention reverts to the question of how multinationality affects the smaller partner, as exemplified by Norway. During the Cold War, the country's geostrategic location was an asset that could be used by the Norwegian authorities to gain support for their concerns. At the same time, cooperation with other Allied countries developed. International peacekeeping was another arena involving cooperation with troops from other countries. In a Nordic context, peacekeeping gained growing importance, as a field where all the countries irrespective of their security policy differences could pool their resources. This will be outlined in the final part of this chapter.

The main topic of chapter 4 is burden sharing. During the Cold War, numerous attempts were made to redistribute the costs of Alliance membership. The American side claimed that the Europeans were engaged not so much in burden-sharing as in burden-shedding. Numerous books and articles have been written on this topic, the quantity is a reflection of the intensity and animosity that came to characterise the debate. With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of terrorism as a new threat, much of what had been written was rendered obsolete. Yet, the basic problem of how to design a burden-sharing scheme that is perceived as fair by all participants remains valid.

But the burden that is to be divided has changed. Whereas NATO forces during the Cold War were focused on the defence of Western Europe against a well-known attacker, the enemy is now very different and he is confronted in countries outside Europe. This has raised a host of new questions, both concerning the skills and capacities needed for NATO to

remain militarily relevant, and the role smaller countries can play in the new force structures. This will be the topic of chapter 5. One might add that this task, which is complicated enough, would have been somewhat simpler if NATO had been left alone to dominate the stage. Militarily, this is very much the case, politically less so. In the course of the 1990s, the European Union has assumed an increasingly distinct security role that has been seen by many on both sides of the Atlantic as a challenge to NATO. Attention here will not be on the political dimensions of this development but on the consequences this may have for burden-sharing.

The study will end with a discussion over smallness and influence in military alliances. Based on the conclusions drawn here and on recent literature, an attempt will be made to answer when and how a smaller partner can matter.

A final word of warning is apposite. This study will not contain any clear-cut recipe for what multinational formations should look like, or the most adequate strategy for small countries in such formations. As will be shown on the following pages, multinationality is a multifarious concept, varying according to the mission and the countries included. But once established, all the countries have to face how the formations can be run as smoothly as possible without compromising military efficiency. Yet, at the same time, each country is eager to retain as much national control and influence as possible. It is this balancing act that will be mapped out here.

Chapter 2

Multinationality: An Outline

In this chapter, different aspects of multinationality will be outlined. It will focus on the organisational modes of military units with particular attention to command functions, as well as on how multinationality affects national defence planning. A dilemma for all the countries involved is that multinationality might boost military power, but it creates a web of interdependence that reduces the scope for national decision-making. This dilemma is particularly acute for smaller countries. Due to their limited resources, they will more often than not be the junior partner and thus be more on the receiving end of the decisions. Although this is nothing new, these problems have been considerably aggravated by the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (henceforth RMA). This is where we start.

The revolution in military affairs

The concept “revolution in military affairs” has been defined by Andrew Marshall, a specialist on military transformation, as:

a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies, which combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational

and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations.¹⁷

The new technologies Marshall had in mind were above all those that facilitated the collection and distribution of information to soldiers in the battlefield as well as between the soldier and the decision-makers. Ideally, RMA makes it possible to transfer precise information in real time; and all the agents will be able to act within the same informational framework. This had already been pointed out by Martin Van Creveld in his seminal book *The Transformation of War*.¹⁸ The key constituent of this transformation is, according to Van Creveld, information, its quality and its usage.¹⁹

Van Creveld could not have envisioned the rapid advances made in the application of computers to military operations. His focus was on the quality and usage of information. Much attention has been given to the hardware aspect of RMA. This is understandable not least since the choice of one system over another has a strong impact on interoperability. But the revolutionary quality is not so much the transmission of information, as how it is used. Even if the technology used is the most advanced and sophisticated available, the capacity to process the information, i.e. interpret and disseminate it, and then issue adequate instructions will remain the weakest link even in the case of one nation going to war with some of its own troops, i.e. when there are no linguistic or cultural barriers that must be crossed, and when cohesion may be

¹⁷ Andrew Marshall, *Revolution in Military Affairs*, Pentagon Paper, Washington D.C.: Strategic Assessment Center, 22 August 1997, p. 1. For an answer to what RMA is and is not, see Glenn C. Buchan, "Force Projection: One-and-a-Half Cheers for the RMA", in Thierry Gongora and Harald von Riekhoff (eds.), *Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs? Defense and Security at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000, pp. 139–58.

¹⁸ Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, New York: Free Press, 1991.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

assumed to be stronger than in multinational formations where language proficiency is poor. It may be of some comfort that even in nationally homogenous units, the application of new technology does not always yield the expected results. This was the conclusion drawn by a US Department of Defense's expert panel after assessing the impact of information technology on the US armed forces; according to their findings the capacity to digest the information received and act upon it was dismal.²⁰

Ideally, the information should endow the decision-makers in the command-chain with "dominant battle awareness", meaning that they will not only know what is actually going on at the very moment it occurs (real-time), but also increase their ability "to anticipate and counter all opposing moves."²¹ This is where one of the key problems of multinationality emerges: speed. For decision-making to be sufficiently rapid to be anticipatory in the sense understood above, the interpretation of the information available must be relatively unanimous among the decision-makers. They must understand the quality of the information, its limitations, and they must have a clear understanding of the resources available and whether they are capable of countering "all opposing moves", or in other words they must have the ability to react flexibly.

The change towards flexibility and speed has nowhere been more pronounced than in the case of the US military. Current conflicts require mobility, flexibility and sophisticated weaponry to support the men on the ground. A precursor of this change was Vietnam, the Iraqi war of 2003 is another apt illustration.

One of the lessons learned from the recent war in Iraq and its aftermath has been the value of network centric warfare (NCW), understood as the rapid exchange of information

²⁰ Kim Burger, "US must train 'thinking' troops", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 13 August 2003, p. 4.

²¹ Frederick W. Kagan, "War and Aftermath", *Policy Review*, no. 20, 2003.

between the soldier in the battlefield and his commander, and between regional headquarters and national authorities at home “[...] to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronisation”.²² Iraq proved to be the war without a front. Arthur Cebrowski, former vice-admiral and director of the US Department of Defense’s Office of Force Transformation, observed that Iraq was the war without a traditional battlefield, with military actions conducted by small units relying on a constant flow of communication with headquarters. “You can’t do a non-contiguous battlefield if you are not networked”, Cebrowski concluded.²³

The United States has been the undisputed lead nation in this field. The US armed forces conceptual strategy for military transformation, *The Joint Vision 2010*, and even more the revamped *Joint Vision 2020* underlines the importance of RMA for future warfare.²⁴ RMA is seen as a major tool in the achievement of complete control of the war theatre, in the words of the text “full spectrum dominance”. Although doubts have emerged over the extent to which RMA has transformed the US forces, in addition to the problematic impact it has on command, two further aspects are of relevance for this study. One is the fact that the European allies have so far lagged behind the US in the application of RMA innovations; there are political, institutional and economic reasons for this that will be discussed below. The

²² David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, *Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority*, Washington DC: DOD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 1999, p. 2.

²³ “What went right?”, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, 30 April 2003, p. 21. “Non-contiguous” refers to simultaneous attacks executed by small, mobile groups. This is a common element in what is referred to as ‘asymmetrical warfare’. See Christopher Coker, *Asymmetrical War*, IFS Info, no. 1/2001, Oslo: Institutt for forsvarsstudier, 2001.

²⁴ *Joint Vision 2020*, Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, June 2000.

second aspect concerns the problems created by differing technological levels for the national contingents making up the multinational units and how these differences can at best be ameliorated if not eliminated. Other differences contribute to what has been labelled “friction” in multinational units, i.e. linguistic and cultural barriers, national legal differences concerning the use of military means.²⁵ This friction impedes cohesion. Different measures are undertaken to reduce the scope of this friction: e.g. joint exercises and education exchange. These measures will be discussed later. Here, attention will be turned to the hardware origins of friction, in other words the problems caused by equipment differences.

Standardisation

As mentioned in the introduction, for multinationality to be military effective soldiers must form a cohesive unit. This is impossible unless the equipment they carry with them into the battlefield at least is compatible, i.e. that the equipment although different, functions similarly without any negative effects. Cohesion would be boosted if the equipment were interoperable. *Interoperability* has been defined as the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to, and accept information from other systems, units or forces, and to use the information communicated to enable them to operate effectively together.²⁶ Communication is not just a question of common language of command, but having computers that can exchange information without the need for cumbersome and time-consuming reprogramming. An even higher level is

²⁵ Friction is a concept deriving from Clausewitz’ *Vom Kriege*, where it is defined as sudden and unexpected problems: “Es ist alles im Kriege sehr einfach, aber das einfachste ist schwierig. Diese Schwierigkeiten häufen sich und bringe eine Friktion hervor, die sich niemand richtig vorstellt, der den Krieg nicht gesehen hat.”, Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, Bonn: Dümmlers Verlag, 1990, p. 261.

²⁶ Joint Staff (1999), *DoD Dictionary of Military and Related Terms*, Washington D.C.: Department of Defense.

reached when the equipment used is *interchangeable*. This is often the case in the NATO navies, where standardisation has made considerably more progress than has been the case on the army side, and this even includes multinational units like the German-French Brigade established in 1988 or the Eurocorps dating from 1993. In some cases, *commonality* of the equipment is achieved. This is the case when the different participants use identical weaponry, computer programmes etc. In these cases, the friction caused by having different nations working together, will be minimal, not least because the operators will use identical training manuals, often having been through the same schooling.

The problems caused by insufficient standardisation have been well-known in NATO since the beginning of the Alliance. Consistent efforts have been made to level differences, but since procurement is a national responsibility success has been patchy. This is a problem since the technological differences between allies impede interoperability.²⁷ This was one of the main conclusions drawn after NATO's campaign in Kosovo. Among the most serious was the lack of interoperable, high-volume secure communications. This hampered the ability to share information and process intelligence. The failure to do that created hostile feelings within the coalition, with some members claiming that vital information was being withheld. France openly criticised what they perceived as an indefensible US policy in this field. In the French white paper written after Operation Allied Force had been completed, the need to launch satellites for intelligence gathering thus enabling European forces to operate independently of US support, was underlined. The British lessons-learned report drew a similar conclusion. This points to the centrality of interoperable

²⁷ For a full survey, see John E. Peters et al., *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force. Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation*, Project Air Force, Santa Monica: RAND, 2001, pp. 56–69.

communications. Achieving that has both a technical and a policy aspect. Technically, it is primarily an economic and industrial question: what to acquire, at what price, and from whom. Policy-wise, the interoperability of communications is more tangled since it concerns which countries should be given access to information. This has not only been an issue of French dissatisfaction, but also of new NATO members. Poland and the Czech Republic failed for long to implement the necessary security procedures and were thus barred from receiving sensitive information long after their membership had been finalised.

The Prague Capabilities Commitment agreed to by NATO in 2002 is an attempt to list the specific capabilities that should be developed to increase interoperability and thus narrow the gap. But this is a costly task. To overcome the gap, the European allies are forced to explore new ways of pooling their research & development resources as well as industrial production capacity. This will inevitably mean that even the countries with a large defence industry will find it difficult to maintain a large-scale defence industry serving national needs. One solution is to specialise.

Specialisation

Specialisation is often mentioned as one of the strategies that can be applied by the countries both to concentrate on areas where they have a comparative advantage, and thereby to spend the defence budgets more wisely. There has always been a degree of role specialisation within the Alliance. According to the decisions made at the Prague Summit, specialisation will be a cornerstone in the reforms of the Alliance in the years ahead. This will be discussed in greater detail later.²⁸ For the smaller countries, how far specialisation should be carried has been subjected to heated debates. Denmark is a case in point.

²⁸ See, p. 144.

With the eastward expansion of NATO into the Baltic region, the need for a defence primed to resist an attacker disappeared. Instead, the Danish armed forces are in a process of developing niche capacities that make them into relevant partners for international missions.²⁹ In a research report commissioned by the Danish Ministry of Defence, the conclusions are overwhelmingly in favour of developing niche capacities and disbanding the ideal of a balanced defence.³⁰ According to the report, for a small country the alternative to assuming the role as supplier of a special capacity, may be no capacity at all. Due to the size of defence budgets and the number of men, the larger can afford to maintain a wider range of capacities whereas the smaller are forced to choose. Once the choice is made, a reversal may be very difficult to achieve. The economic costs of reverting to a wider range of defence capacities may well be staggering, but so will the political consequences for a small country if it backtracks on its commitment to develop niche capacities. The result will be reduced willingness to take into account the interests and concerns of the smaller countries.

Another problem is that smaller countries might want to resist pressure for specialisation fearing that this might corner them with a responsibility for less attractive areas or capacities that they do not strictly need for other purposes. But it may increase their influence. A case in point was the decision by the Netherlands and Luxemburg to join Belgium and Germany in purchasing Airbus 400M transport planes. The Dutch plane was placed under German command and Belgium assumed responsibility for the one financed by Luxemburg. By purchasing the planes, the countries now have a capacity that allows them to exert influence. If operations will involve

²⁹ See the interview with Major General Leif Simonsen, Commander Tactical Air Command Denmark, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 18 December 2002, p. 32. He concludes that "Expeditionary operations are our raison d'être; if you cannot cope with that, you don't belong in the service."

³⁰ Ellehuus, *Multinational Solutions versus Intra-Alliance Specialisation*.

their planes, they will have to be consulted and present their conditions before a decision is reached. Similar considerations have certainly played an important part in the Danish decision of November 2003, to buy three Hercules transport planes from Boeing.

If specialisation means that capacities necessary for national crisis management are rescinded, the country's dependence on its allies increases; but so does its vulnerability to military pressure. During the Cold War, when Alliance cohesion was strong this was less of a problem. Today, when the members are more likely to pursue their national interests, paying less attention to the impact on Alliance unity, relying on assistance from allies may be perilous. This does not imply that specialisation should be rejected. Norway's situation undoubtedly makes this problem more acute than what is the case in, say, the case of Denmark, but the opposition to extensive specialisation in other, larger, countries deviates little from the arguments presented here.³¹

For larger countries, specialisation might also be an unattractive option since it will mean an end to independence, albeit a costly and possibly technologically obsolete independence. That being said, the incentives should not be overlooked. The most obvious, concerning cost, has already been mentioned. In addition, specialisation might lead to increased demand. If a member concentrates its resources into the development of a special kind of equipment, and does this cheaper and better than its partners, it will gain a foothold in markets that might otherwise have been closed. If successful, the enterprises will be left with a healthy profit. It will also mean that other countries become dependent on their products, and dependence means influence. This is

³¹ For a survey of the German debate in the wake of Defence Minister Struck's January 2004 Bundeswehr reform proposal, see Jens Krüger and Günther Lachmann, "Strucks Weltstreitmacht", *Welt am Sonntag*, 18 January 2004.

particularly attractive for a small country constantly on the lookout for ways of diminishing the drawbacks that comes with size. But as earlier mentioned, specialisation carries with it increased dependence on other countries for capacities that have been disbanded.

A country with a large industrial base and a correspondingly large research and development sector will find it easier to develop new products meeting new needs than a smaller one. Research also indicates that the degree of state patronage plays an important role.³² France is the prime example of an armaments sector consisting of huge industrial conglomerates that have thrived on etatist protectionism with correspondingly large problems once this protection was removed. Moreover, the degree to which the enterprise produces goods not only destined for the defence sector, i.e. dual-use goods, is an important indicator. If dual-commodities loom large in the production, these enterprises tend to be more flexible in their adaptation to new needs.³³ This has been a particularly prominent feature in the development of new products for the defence sector resulting from RMA, e.g. computer technology. Here, the size of the country, or indeed the firm, plays a lesser role.

Scientific and industrial cooperation

Since its inception, NATO initiated several large, multinational projects aimed at modernising members' equipment as well as developing new capabilities. Cooperation between the countries was regarded as desirable. The idea was that by joining efforts, costs would go down and national differences could more easily be levelled. Cost

³² See Claude Serfati (ed.), *The Restructuring of European Defence Industry: Dynamics of Change*, Luxembourg: European Commission, Directorate General for Research, 2001.

³³ See Jordi Mollas-Gallart, "Coping with dual-use: a challenge for European research policy", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2002, 40 (1), pp. 155–65.

concerns also played a role when two or more countries decided in favour of joint procurement of new products.

Acquisition remained a national responsibility. But NATO played a coordinating role through the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and its subordinate organs. In fact, NATO contained a plethora of coordination committees covering every stage from the identification of problems, to research and development. Common to all of them was that every member had a seat, a direct channel for information and influence.

NATO provided financial assistance for scientific and technological cooperation between the members. In 1957, the NATO Committee on Science and Technology was established. At regular intervals, NATO colloquia were arranged to let scientists present their findings. Norwegian scientists participated regularly. NATO funded research projects conducted in Norway. The member countries contributed financially to the committee. The Norwegian share was small, in the order of 1 and 2 per cent of all contributions. This did not impair Norwegian scientists' chances of benefiting from the scholarships handed out.

It is necessary to dwell upon the role played by scientific innovation for Norway. As a small country, it would often find that Alliance bureaucratic procedures were cumbersome, and that there was considerable conservatism within NATO and thus reluctance to accept new ideas.³⁴ Participation in projects launched by the Alliance provided access to new technology and the possibility of participating in technological development that might otherwise have been beyond reach due to insufficient domestic technological know-how and funds. The impact on the development of a Norwegian non-

³⁴ See Olav Njølstad and Olav Wicken, *Kunnskap som våpen. Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt 1946–1975* (Knowledge as Weapon. The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 1946–1975), Oslo: Tano-Aschehoug, 1997, pp. 363–70.

military high-tech industry has been considerable. An alternative would then have been to import the technology in question at high costs. The decision taken in the late 1970s to develop a satellite-based radio positioning/navigation system known as NAVSTAR/GPS is a case in point. For Norway, this was a project of the utmost importance. But due to the prohibitive costs involved, domestic plans had been stalled for years. In the end, the project was financed almost entirely by the US.³⁵ Numerous other projects received US funding. The sums varied greatly from year to year. In the 1960s especially, US and NATO allocations often made up more than a third of the total budget of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, the main centre for armaments development in the country.³⁶

In 1970, NATO set up the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society. The basic idea was that this forum should look into new societal problems traditionally outside the focus of the Science Committee. Among these were environmental disasters such as floods and earthquakes, pollution, labour conditions, and the influence of science on decision making. As is evident from this brief listing, the military component was difficult to identify. But the list shows an interest in issues of clear relevance to security in the wider sense. Norway participated in several projects. Results varied from success to total failure with the original plans scrapped. Here, a detailed account of the different projects will not be given, but some of the problems emerging from multinational procurement and industrial cooperation for Norway will be pointed out.

The positive consequences are more easily and rapidly summed up than the negative ones. Cooperation has constituted a channel for innovation for the enterprises

³⁵ St.meld. no. 11 (1979–80), *Om samarbeidet i Atlanterhavsaktens organisasjon i 1978*, pp. 23–24.

³⁶ The highest share was reached in 1965 with 65.5 per cent, cf. Njølstad and Wicken, *Kunnskap som våpen*, p. 503.

involved. It has often led to spin-off projects not necessarily related to defence contracts.³⁷ Judging from the material available, it seems as if Norwegian participation has been confined to the role of sub-contractor to the larger enterprises. The small size of Norwegian defence enterprises accounts for this.

Cooperation versus national protection

The lack of cross-country industrial cooperation has repeatedly been singled out as a major culprit of inefficient spending.³⁸ Pressure for liberalising this sector has been forthcoming both from defence experts, industry and politicians. A brief outline of the problems may explain why this has become such a topical issue.

Political protection of national defence industries has resulted in duplication of R&D efforts with several countries channelling resources to solve relatively similar problems. The enterprises need not pay attention to what their colleagues in other countries do as long as they can rely on their own defence sector to purchase the final product. With demand largely defined by national needs, production cycles will be far shorter than if the market were larger. Shorter production cycles mean higher unit costs. Keith Hartley, a renowned defence economist, has calculated that if European procurement were done purely according to market criteria, i.e. without paying any heed to national industry, savings would range between 10 and 17 per cent of total defence expenditure.³⁹ Needless to say these sums represent a sizeable

³⁷ Ivar Stokke, "Multinasjonale forsvarskontrakter", *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift*, no. 12, pp. 487–89.

³⁸ There is a wealth of literature on this topic, nevertheless, Keith Hartley and Stephen Martin, "Evaluating Collaborative Programmes", *Defence Economics*, no. 4, 1993, pp. 195–211, remains a methodological milestone.

³⁹ Keith Hartley, "A Single European Market for Defense Procurement", University of York, unpublished briefing, October 2000.

and welcome source of additional funding, were they ever to materialise.

Smaller countries are confronted with yet another problem originating in size. In most, if not all major contracts for import of armaments, considerable attention is given to offset agreements. The Norwegian Parliament has decided that “In special cases, offset requirements can be waived”.⁴⁰ These requirements specify how much the seller will purchase from the buyer to offset the total costs. Offset agreements may also specify that the seller use part of the sum paid on investments in the country importing the armaments. Offset is often decisive when foreign companies compete for a contract. A generous offset agreement may also come in handy for a government facing parliamentary opposition to a costly procurement agreement. But once signed, the offset part is not always implemented as agreed. In Denmark, unfulfilled counter-purchase obligations had reached a total of DKK 6.3 billion in 2003.⁴¹ There, the government decided to set up a state fund that would coordinate the different offset contracts and provide assistance for the foreign companies in their quest for a Danish partner firm. These efforts proved to be in vain. In 2003, the government decided to close the fund.⁴²

Failure to adhere to the contract is not the only problem of offset agreements. Armaments producers may also be in a position to leave a strong imprint on the offset agreements, not always to the liking of the importing country.

Nevertheless, there is considerable determination in many of the smaller countries to maintain offset agreements in some

⁴⁰ St.prp. no. 55 (2001–2002), *Gjennomføringsproposisjonen – utfyllende rammer for omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005*.

⁴¹ Max Stougaard, “Modkøbsaftaler strammes”, *Jyllandsposten*, 8 September 2003.

⁴² Thomas Dodd, “Denmark forced to scrap arms-venture fund”, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 13 August 2003, p. 20.

form.⁴³ Offset agreements may be instrumental in keeping national industrial know-how alive, but this comes at a price. Both in Norway and Denmark, economists and politicians have claimed that offset is expensive, leading to a final price between 3 and 7 per cent higher than would have been the case if the purchases had been made with no strings attached. Few have disputed these figures; indeed, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance proffered them as an argument in favour of moving away from offset agreements in the future.⁴⁴ But this was countered by pointing to the strategic implication of offset for Norwegian industry. It enabled Norwegian producers to gain access to know-how and foreign markets. Moreover, offset agreements made it possible to retain a domestic pool of experts that could be drawn upon when procurement was planned and foreign contracts negotiated.⁴⁵ Without the technical know-how domestic experts could bring to the negotiating table, the smaller country would have been in a far weaker bargaining position. This should be borne in mind when reading estimates such as the one referred to by Keith Hartley above.

Offset is by no means an arrangement peculiar to smaller countries. Most countries apply them, with the US as the notable exception. The American policy towards offset agreements is negative and US administrations, irrespective of party colour, have worked to have them dismantled. European countries have pointed to the fact that the US armaments market is in practice closed to the outside, and this is not only due to lack of European competitiveness, but US

⁴³ See below, p. 13 for the problems the small countries face within the EU on this point.

⁴⁴ Those arguing against offset drew upon Kjell A. Eliassen and Markus Skriver's brief comparative study of West European approaches: *European Defence Procurement and Industrial Policy: A comparative 6 countries analysis*, Norwegian School of Management, 2002.

⁴⁵ See "Gjenkjøp må brukes strategisk", *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift*, no. 10, 2002, pp. 4–6.

import restrictions as well. As long as this is the case, offset will prevail.

Although offset may be a disincentive, the attraction for larger countries to enter into an industrial cooperation with a smaller country may be the question of niche capacity, i.e. the smaller partner possesses highly specialised skills and production capacities the larger partner does not. Another issue at stake is procurement. The smaller country will make procurement commitments that will reduce the cost price of each item. This has a beneficial effect on all the participants. But it also means that the entire venture becomes very sensitive to each country living up to its commitment. If not, the costs will increase and the final bill will easily be quite a different one. This is another example of how multinational cooperation means reduced budgetary autonomy in that reductions in one country are immediately felt in others.

A further factor influencing cooperation is ownership. Privately owned enterprises are in general more focused on adapting to meet market needs; they are also in general more innovative than state run firms. This means, that privately owned enterprises are more prone to enter into close cooperation with counterparts operating under similar conditions. Especially in Europe, privately owned armaments producers have been quite dexterous in their ability to join forces and promote their causes at the European level.⁴⁶ The fact that they have chosen to do that at the European level should be taken as an indication of the need to distinguish between the political and the industrial level nationally. It would be misleading to assume that politicians automatically back cross-country cooperation. Industrial interests might favour a deeper, and perhaps different form of multinational cooperation than the politicians, but this might be a form that would sever the close linkage between state and industry, and

⁴⁶ See below, p. 134.

therefore alter, diminish or remove political tutelage from industry.

Ownership over European defence industry is being transformed with the state playing a less prominent role as direct owner. Different ownership modes are being explored, all aimed at making the enterprises less dependent on direct transfer from the public coffers. Whether state-owned or not, the state remains the largest customer with national defence at the receiving end. As will be pointed out later, this new-found freedom has been used to form larger units through mergers and acquisitions.

Organisation modes

As shown above, multinational cooperation confronts smaller countries with some uncomfortable choices, they will have to forfeit a wide range of products in favour of concentrating on key specialities that might be marketed with success. The alternative to this kind of niche production will often in the long run be no production at all.

This is in fact no less different from the factors compelling countries to search for ways of joining their units together. Cost is important here as well, and so is the fact that the end of conscription means less manpower. For the smaller countries this has had drastic consequences in that their ability to set up sizeable national units, and train the officers in the skills needed to command them, is effectively removed. This means that these officers will be precluded from holding command posts over larger Allied units. Multinationality solves this by letting smaller units from several countries be pooled together. But as in the case of industrial cooperation and specialisation, multinationality means less national autonomy. This is reflected in the way multinational units are organised.

Yet, national concerns are just one factor with an impact on organisation, another is cohesion. Cohesion depends to a large

extent on a common interpretation of the situation irrespective of national background. Cohesion is necessary if the unit is to respond flexibly to a crisis. This was very much at the forefront of the 1991 NATO Strategic Concept:

to ensure that at this reduced level the Allies' forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary.⁴⁷

But in the Strategic Concept passed eight years later, the tone had changed away from the somewhat conjectural “can play” and “when necessary” towards more forceful, conclusive formulations:

Alliance forces will be structured to reflect the multinational and joint nature of Alliance missions. Essential tasks will include controlling, protecting and defending territory; ensuring the unimpeded use of sea, air, and land lines of communication [...] and provide effective and flexible command and control facilities, including deployable combined and joint headquarters.⁴⁸

This was a reflection of the security changes, and the increased likelihood that these troops would be deployed to counter the new threats militarily.

To do that, the new concept underlined the need for “flexible command”.⁴⁹ This was not coincidental. A frequently

⁴⁷ *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, Press Communiqué S-1(91)85, Brussels, NATO Press Service, 7 November 1991, point 47. Emphasis added.

⁴⁸ *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Press Communiqué, NAC-S(99)65, Brussels, NATO Press Service, 24 April 1999, point 59.

⁴⁹ Definition of NATO command authorities: *Operational command*: The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics.

invoked point serving either as criticism or explanation for shortcomings in NATO efforts to create multinational forces, is the lack of flexible command structures. The security scholar Thomas-Durrell Young refers to this problem as perennially “vexatious” in his analysis of why NATO’s attempts to create multinational land forces were so half-hearted during the Cold War.⁵⁰

Young’s point has been supported elsewhere. Indeed, in the course of this study, how to marry multinationality with effective command was repeatedly pointed out as a difficult topic, and one where the practical solutions often had to be devised in the field.⁵¹ There are notable exceptions, especially on the naval side. But when looking at multinational army units established during the Cold War and even well into the 1990s, factors other than preparing the men for combat under a multinational leadership were at the forefront. Often the

May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.

Operational control: The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control to those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. *Tactical command:* The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by a higher authority (this concept is not been given a separate heading in the 2001 *Glossary*, despite the fact that “tactical command” is used repeatedly when command and control terms are defined. The definition here is taken from *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, Brussels: NATO, 1995). *Tactical control:* The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (Source: *NATO-Russia Glossary of Contemporary Political and Military Terms*, Brussels: NATO, 2001.)

⁵⁰ Thomas-Durrell Young, “Post-Cold War NATO Force Structure Planning and the Vexatious Issues of Multinational Land Forces”, in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), *A History of NATO: the First Fifty Years*, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 197–217.

⁵¹ Interview with Oberstleutnant C.P. Hinz, Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, Berlin, November 2002.

prime reason was to demonstrate good neighbourliness, e.g. Franco-German Corps, the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion; or to diffuse western methods, e.g. the Multinational Corps North-East. Based on a set of European examples, three of the most representative multinationality forms are identified as based on lead-nation, integration or framework principles. Under each heading, key characteristics are presented.⁵²

Lead-nation principle

One country, the lead nation, makes the largest contribution of manpower, i.e. the largest combat units. The other countries will draw upon the lead-nation's auxiliary functions, and they will be responsible for supplying services like engineers, military police, medical support etc. They can also be vested with operational command over units. Officers from the other countries may be attached to the staff, either permanently or on an exchange basis, virtually all positions of importance are held by the lead nation. However, in case of crisis the number of non lead-nation officers attached to the staff will be increased.

Equipment will be subject to national priorities. In none of the examples usually classified as belonging to the lead-nation category do all the participants have identical equipment. In peacetime, the units will exercise together with rotation schemes for officers implemented. But the units remain under national command. Only when a crisis emerges will contingents from the participants be subjected to the operational control of the lead nation. But the delegation of command authority will be closely linked to the character of the mission. National authorities will, as a rule, attach a

⁵² This division corresponds to the one outlined in *Multinationalität, Das Eurokorps*, Bonn: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 1996; and the one adhered to by Martin Faust in *Betriebswirtschaftliche Probleme multinationaler Truppenteile*, pp. 46–47. For another, albeit not too dissimilar categorization, see Ellehuus, *Multinational Solutions versus Intra-Alliance Specialisation*, pp. 18–20.

stricter set of rules to their soldiers' participation in combat operations than to peacekeeping.

Multinationality remains therefore rather limited. This is also why some experts either refrain from mentioning this type, or at best only cursorily. During interviews, some were surprised that this was classified as multinationality.⁵³ Nevertheless, this was for a long time the most common form of multinationality within NATO, and one may therefore claim that it has served as the starting point for more profound forms of multinational integration. However, it would be wrong to give the impression that this mode of organisation is a thing of the past. There are several examples of multinational units organised along the lead-nation principle. Among them are the II German/US Corps, and the 5th US/German Corps. The intentions behind the establishment of these corps were above all political, to tie the US Army to Germany.

Lead nation

<i>Corps II German-US</i> (Corps II GE/US)	
Established	April 1993.
Headquarters	Ulm, Germany.
Participant nations	Germany, USA.
Ministerial monitoring	The leadership of the Corps is German. Agreements are revised jointly every second year.
Organisation	Senior command positions almost exclusively German. In peacetime, 5 US officers and 1 junior officer are members of the staff. In case of crisis, the US contingency is increased. Working language is English.
Command structure	In peacetime, all units are subject to national command. If deployed, Germany assumes operational control over the US division. Logistics and medical assistance are divided along national lines.
Standardisation of equipment	Uneven, but strong efforts to increase the level of interoperability undertaken.

⁵³ One said in surprise "But this is the way we have always done it, it's nothing special". If nothing else, this attitude is an indication that multinationality has become deeply ingrained.

Integration principle

Here, multinationality permeates both staff and the troops. Command positions will usually be divided according to the size of the countries' contribution of soldiers in order to approach a proportional balance, exchanges of officers are well organised to familiarise them with the national procedures of the other participants. The general in charge assumes operational command in peacetime. Operational command means that the commander has the power to formulate the mission statement. He also has the authority to reallocate and reorganise the contingents under his command as well as to decide on which measures should be taken to achieve a defined target.

But multinationality stops short of issues pertaining to pay, social security, leave, and the legal basis for troop deployment. These issues remain subject to national politics. This may seem like minor details, but when questioning officers, as well as going through the material available, these issues are readily seized upon as irritating sources of friction. The lack of progress in these rather petty areas may also reflect a degree of reluctance within the armed forces against having been forced to engage in multinationality by what they perceive as zealous politicians. This seems to have been the case with some of Great Britain's multinational commitments where the military leadership has criticised multinational units for their failure to perform as cohesively and efficiently as purely national ones.⁵⁴

Examples of multinational units organised according to the integration principle are the Eurocorps, the 1st German-Dutch Corps, and the Multination Corps North-East.

⁵⁴ See Palin, *Multinational Military Forces*; Faust, *Betriebswirtschaftliche Probleme multinationalaler Truppenteile*, pp. 70–71; for an earlier, but poignant criticism see Colin McInnes, *The British Army and NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps*, London Defence Studies, no. 15, 1993, p. 28.

The 1st German-Netherlands Corps is an example of multinational integration that has proceeded quite successfully. National differences are manageable, the style of command broadly similar. The Corps contains virtually what is left of the Dutch army and due to the organisation of command presented in the figure below, this means that the German Heeresinspekteur (army inspector) has close to full command over the Dutch army. But political perceptions differ on what the role of the corps should be. Before the corps assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul in early 2003, the German side was particularly apprehensive about any efforts to extend the mandate of the mission outside Kabul or pressure from the US side to prolong the deployment. In the end, Germany agreed to let its contingent assume responsibility for the city of Kundus area outside the Afghan capital.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ The most noteworthy point in this decision was perhaps the German Minister of Defence Peter Struck's argument that Germany's security was defended at the foot of the Hindukush.

Integration principle

1st German-Netherlands Corps (D/NL Corps)	
Established	August 1995.
Headquarters	Münster, Germany.
Participant nations	Germany, the Netherlands.
Ministerial monitoring	Permanent bi-national committee.
Organisation	Headquarters have 300 positions, not all are permanently filled. Senior positions rotate every second year with one nation contributing commanding general, head of press and information, and some of the staff officers; the other country will fill the deputy commander's position, chief of staff, and the officers in charge of the command support group. Working language is English.
Command structure	In peacetime, the German Army Inspector and the Dutch general in charge of the army have joint command over the corps, but the commanding general has considerable autonomy in the fields of training, exercises and logistics, medical assistance. In case of war, each country can withdraw its contingent for national defence.
Standardisation of equipment	Uneven. ⁵⁶

Framework principle

Here, one country is responsible for command, administration and logistical support, making up the cadre for the multinational unit. For this reason, it will also fill most of the staff positions. Procedures within the staff will be conducted according to guidelines decided by NATO or along the SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) compiled by the framework nation. The other contributing countries will fill a defined number of staff positions according to an agreed key. In contrast to the integration principle, there is no fixed relationship between the size of national contributions and the number of staff positions or who fills which positions.

⁵⁶ Nevertheless, this was never referred to as posing much of a problem by any of my German interviewees. When asked about compatibility problems, they would as a rule point to the Franco-German Brigade.

Framework principle

ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)	
Established	October 1992.
Ready for deployment	April 1995.
Headquarters	Rheindalen, Germany.
Participant nations	Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Britain, United States.
Ministerial monitoring	Annual conferences with senior MoD officials, Senior Resources Committee.
Organisation	The commanding general is British. Of the approx. 400 positions in the headquarters, the British contingent makes up approx. 60 per cent, US and Germany 8 per cent each, Italy and the Netherlands 5 per cent each, with the remaining 14 per cent divided among the remaining 8 nations. The headquarters form a permanent core element; the different units assigned to ARRC can be called upon ad hoc to face a crisis.
Command structure	In peacetime SACEUR has operational command over ARRC Headquarters. If deployed, operational command is transferred to the divisions.
Standardisation of equipment	Uneven

The divisions above should not be exaggerated. Research indicate that even in multinational staffs organised along other lines than the lead-nation principle, the country contributing the most advanced equipment, the largest contingent of men, will often be in charge at all levels.⁵⁷ This is especially the case with a large US contribution, and notably even when the US officers in charge explicitly want to avoid an “americanisation” of the command structure.⁵⁸ The factors contributing to this development are not difficult to find: the US will often be the most experienced, and this is a highly prized asset. Moreover, if the technology gap is forbiddingly

⁵⁷ See Walter E. Kretchik, “Multinational Staff Effectiveness in UN Peace Operations: The Case of the US Army and UNMIH, 1994–1995”, *Armed Forces and Society*, Spring 2003, pp. 393–413.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

high, this will mean that US soldiers will be in charge of handling information. Unless this commodity is shared equally, one country's monopoly will rapidly become a grave source of friction.

The units' ability to react quickly to an emerging crisis depends on the participant nations commitments. The problems raised by a country's access to opting out from a multinational unit will be touched upon in greater detail later.⁵⁹ Suffice it to state that this problem is the least in the case of the lead nation because multinational integration is rather limited, and the lead nation retains most, if not all the key functions. A political blockade will have a much greater impact on the ability of units to react quickly if they are organised in accordance with the framework or integration principles.

Such a political blockade may be the result of legal differences. This is a topic that has been discussed relatively little in writing, although it will often be mentioned as a potential obstacle when units are to be deployed.⁶⁰ Countries differ as to how fast their troops can be deployed. Particularly cumbersome is the German parliamentary procedure requiring a recommendation from the defence commission followed by a plenary debate. This proved to be a serious impediment during the wars in Yugoslavia, barring a quick response from any contingents involving German soldiers.⁶¹

The ability to react quickly may also be impeded by the carefully-wrought command arrangements. The 1st. German-Netherlands Corps is a good example (table 2). The equal position enjoyed by the German army inspector and the Dutch

⁵⁹ See below, p. 117.

⁶⁰ Faust touches upon it in *Betriebswirtschaftliche Probleme multinationaler Truppenteile*, pp. 77–79.

⁶¹ Jeffrey S. Lantis has appropriately entitled his chapter on the German response to the developing crisis in Yugoslavia "Diplomacy and Delay", See Lantis, *Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification*, Westport: Praeger, 2002, pp. 79–106.

general means that in the case of any disagreement between the two, a harmonisation meeting must be called by the two countries' defence ministries, this is a time-consuming procedure. The Eurocorps has even greater potential for complete stalemate due to the high number of participant nations.⁶² Here, the commanding general gets his orders from a committee consisting of not only delegates from the foreign and defence ministries from the participant nations, but also members of parliament.

A more serious problem for multinational units is the legal differences separating the countries. There are clear differences as to what soldiers from one country can do compared to others. This has to be solved prior to deployment. Within NATO, it has been customary to work out a common Memorandum of Understanding the participatory countries have to agree to before troop contributions are made. That does not mean that the memorandum will level all national differences. For instance, the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed in Bosnia in 1995 consisted of units with very different rules of engagement depending on their nationality. This was solved practically by issuing each and every one with a "Soldier's card" specifying what he was permitted to do.

National differences also apply to standing multinational units training together in peacetime.⁶³ When questioned about what problems multinationality brought with it, German officers would mention seemingly insignificant differences like how damages and casualties are to be financially covered and by whom; labour protection; environmental damage; disciplinary procedures etc. Petty as they may seem, they all require time and considerable paperwork to overcome. In a

⁶² Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain all participate in the Eurocorps.

⁶³ For a survey of these problems, see Torsten Stein, "Rechtsformen multinationalaler Verbände", in *Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht*, vol. 40 (1998). no. 4, pp. 143–51.

recent analysis of the Multinational Corps North-East, these differences are referred to repeatedly as hampering efficiency and detracting attention from more important tasks.⁶⁴ The countries have tried to regulate these problems through bilateral agreements, but for a country engaged on many quarters like Germany, this has resulted in a legal patchwork requiring time and manpower to monitor and respond to queries.

The organisational affiliation may also be a complicating factor. Attention in this study is given to multinational units created under the auspices of NATO or the EU. These are the same men, but answerable to either of the two organisations depending on the circumstances. It does not end with just two since many of the units can also be deployed at the request of the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe, The United Nations, and until recently the West European Union (henceforth WEU). Who has the right of priority?⁶⁵ Only in a few cases has this been agreed on beforehand, one concerned Eurocorps where the WEU had priority over NATO. Another case, even more entangled involved Poland and the WEU. If the Multinational Corps North-East had been deployed on behalf of the WEU, Poland would have participated militarily, but since it is not a member of the WEU, how the country would have been granted political control remained unclear. The country could at any time have withdrawn its contingent

⁶⁴ Sven Bernhard Gareis and Ulrich vom Hagen, *Militärkulturen und Multinationalität. Das Multinationale Korps Nordost in Stettin*, Schriftenreihe des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Bundeswehr, Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2004.

⁶⁵ This question has been at the centre of NATO-EU relation since EU first started to contemplate a military force of its own. For a survey of the different proposals made to chart out a division of labour between the two see the collections of core documents published by the EU Institute for Security Studies: Maartje Rutten, *From St. Malo to Nice*, Chaillot Paper 47, 2001; *From Nice to Laeken*, Chaillot Paper 51, 2002; Jean-Yves Haine, *From Laeken to Copenhagen*, Chaillot Paper 57, 2003; and Kori Schake, *Constructive Duplication: Reducing EU reliance on US military assets*, London: Centre for European Reform, 2002.

from participation if it was perceived to be incompatible with national interests. With the demise of the WEU, this controversy belongs to history. Nevertheless, the emergence of similar problems in the relationship between the EU and non-members cannot be precluded.⁶⁶

The three different modes of organising multinationality presented here all try to resolve the problem of how command and control can be organised to satisfy the concerns of those involved without endangering efficiency. The different results depend on a number of factors. Among these the most important are size of the national contributions, and the causes leading to the establishment of the units. For example if the intention is to familiarise all the participants with western forms of command as in the case of the Multinational Corps North-East, rotation of command is implemented. This will also be the case if national contributions are of equal size.

There are some drawbacks to rotation that should not be overlooked. First of all, this is a costly procedure, economically as well as in terms of efficiency. New staff members require time before they are able to function effectively.⁶⁷ Especially in Germany criticism has been voiced against the time it takes before an appointment is made and the commander assumes his new position. Key posts have been left vacant for a long time, key decisions are postponed and operational planning is effectively stopped before the vacancy is ended. This problem, although disturbing in peacetime, only becomes pressing when operations have either

⁶⁶ An attempt to draw up a line between the EU and non-members is done in the St.meld. no. 12 (2000–2001), *Om Norge og Europa ved inngangen til et nytt århundre*, esp. 9.4.1. “Forholdet til tredjeland”. Here it is asserted that only countries making a significant military contribution will be given the same rights as full members. But even then, strategic command will be vested with EU’s Council or the Security Policy Committee. Non-members are barred from participating in those organs, a limitation admitted in the Stortingsmelding.

⁶⁷ See Faust, *Betriebswirtschaftliche Probleme multinationaler Truppenteile*, pp. 145–47.

reached an important stage in the planning process, or are being implemented. This was the case when the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps was deployed to Bosnia.⁶⁸

This discussion omits one very important aspect of multinationality, namely the ability to come up with practical solutions minimising the impact of national differences on efficiency. During interviews, officers repeatedly referred to unforeseen problems that had required flexibility from all the participants. National rules of engagement differed, and if one country was restricted from performing certain tasks, or patrolling a designated area, a way out was found.⁶⁹ The capacity to come up with compromises depends to a significant extent on leadership, on the commander's ability to instil confidence.⁷⁰ Sharing information and close consultations are necessary to arrive at a common perception of problems and how they can best be solved. But this rests on a more fundamental premise that has not been addressed so far: a clearly defined mandate for what should be achieved with the application of military means. Joint Endeavour and Operation Allied Force may serve as illustrations. Joint Endeavour (1995–97) was a multinational operation mandated by the UN to assist the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. This was a peace-support operation. Once the agreement had been implemented, the engagement would end. Operation Allied Force was different. Although phrased in other terms, this was war. Although the aim was to stop the

⁶⁸ See Michael Walker, "Multinationalität auf dem Prüfstand. Das ACE Rapid Reaction Corps im Bosnienereinsatz", in Bundesministerium für Verteidigung: *Multinationalität. Wehrtechnischer Report*, Frankfurt am Main: Report Verlag, 1996, pp. 12–17.

⁶⁹ Interview with Oberst Karl-Henning Kröger, Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr, Potsdam, 13 November 2002.

⁷⁰ This has been pointed out as one reason for General George Joulwan's successful leadership of Operation Joint Endeavour in Bosnia 1995–97. For an analysis of his leadership compared with that of General Wesley Clark, see Jacob Børresen, "Feltherren i vår tid", *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift*, no. 1, 2002, pp. 22–28.

ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population, the members disagreed over the choice of strategy. Moreover, the final status for Kosovo remained uncertain.

When all the participant countries perceive their vital interests as being under threat and necessitating a military answer, reaching consensus is possible. As Joint Endeavour indicates, UN-mandates will also weigh heavily in favour of participating. On the other hand, consensus is far more difficult once the threat is perceived differently by Alliance members. The disagreement over Iraq is a case in point.

RMA and command

The introductory quote from Wesley Clark's recollections point to the fact that politicians and military leaders will often view problems differently.⁷¹ The gap in perceptions is of course nothing new. Clausewitz wrote about this at length, and warned against juxtaposing them: "there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it."⁷² Clausewitz underlined the supremacy of politics. But whereas the political leadership retained ultimate control over the leadership and conduct of war, they should not and could not replace officers in the planning and conduct of operations. How to maintain this division of tasks has received renewed attention since the end of the Cold War.⁷³ Part of the explanation is the increase in multinational operations, maintaining political and military cohesion is more problematic within a coalition than if the

⁷¹ See footnote 3.

⁷² "Zwei Briefe des Generals von Clausewitz: Gedanken zur Abwehr", special issue of *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, March 1937, pp. 5–9, quoted in Peter Paret, *Understanding War. Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 129.

⁷³ Prominent among these are Palin, *Multinational Military Forces*; Thomas, *The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions*; Zanini and Morrison, *The Army and Multinational Force Compatibility*.

military operations were undertaken by a single country.⁷⁴ But the impact of RMA also accounts for the growing attention.

In the ongoing debate on how command should be adapted to take advantage of the possibilities inherent in network centric warfare, two schools of thought can be identified. One emphasises that the chief benefit in NCW lies in the extensive information now made available to the soldier at the tactical level. He remains in a superior position to choose how to respond to the challenges facing him compared with the decision-makers sitting in front of a screen somewhere far away. This speaks in favour of decentralised command, of more specifically what is known as *Auftragstaktik*. This is a German command concept, sometimes translated as mission tactics, where emphasis is given to innovation and flexibility in the implementation of a particular mission.⁷⁵

But not all countries apply *Auftragstaktik*. Whereas this is common in Scandinavia, the Netherlands and Germany, this is not the case in France or in the new NATO members.⁷⁶ French and for example Polish officers expect orders to be detailed leaving less scope for initiative than would their German or Norwegian colleagues. This difference sets clear limits as to how far down multinational solutions can be applied. If modelled on the lead-nation or the framework principles, integration is prevalent at the top level, with national units being commanded by their own officers. The Franco-German

⁷⁴ However, as General Clark vividly describes in his book, maintaining consensus among the participant countries was not the only problem on his agenda; differences within the political leadership in Washington added to his burden as well.

⁷⁵ For a brief definition of *Auftragstaktik* and how it may be affected by RMA, see Robbin F. Laird and Holger H. Mey, *The Revolution in Military Affairs*, McNair Paper 60, April 1999, esp. ch. 6 "Germany and the RMA".

⁷⁶ For a comparison between Germany and France, see Faust, *Betriebswirtschaftliche Probleme multinationaler Truppenteile*, 6.1.3.3.1.2 (sic), "Operative und taktische Einsatzgrundsätze"; on the problems of implementing *Auftragstaktik* in the Multinational Corps North-East, see Gareis and vom Hagen, *Militärkulturen und Multinationalität*, 4.4. "Führungsverhalten".

Brigade may serve as a contrast. It was established as a standing component of the Eurocorps in 1988. Since then it has been hailed as an example of European defence integration. Nevertheless, national differences in command mode have hampered integration since the beginning. A complete adaptation of either side's view and understanding of command is ruled out. Instead, a series of compromises have been implemented, e.g. French officers are less specific than they would be if they were commanding a purely French unit and their German colleagues adjust their orders as well. Although adjustments are made in other multinational units as well, this process is less demanding when national command traditions resemble each other, e.g. the German-Dutch Corps. Here, *Auftragstaktik* facilitates decentralised command.

Opposing the preference for decentralisation, is the view that real time transmission of information opens up for more centralised command and control: "The likelihood that greater experience and knowledge will reside at higher command echelons would seem to argue for centralising decision making and control to the fullest extent allowed by communications capacity."⁷⁷

Whether this will be the case probably depends less on the technological possibilities that RMA open up, than the character of the operation in question. In a fully-fledged war-like operation, commanders may be assumed to have wider command authority than in a low-intensity peace operation. This can be achieved in two ways: The commander may have operational command. If so, he has the power to decide how the units should be assembled, divided, and which tasks they should be assigned. He may also delegate command to the units below. Alternatively, the commander may only be given operational control. If so, he cannot dispose of the troops

⁷⁷ James R. Fitzsimonds, "The Cultural Challenge of Information Technology", *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1998, p. 16.

assigned to him or delegate command unless specified by his superiors.

It should be noted that in some cases, NATO multinational force commanders often have only *coordinating authority* in peacetime. The 2001 NATO *Glossary* defines this as:

The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more nations, commands, services, or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority.

This has been the case with the 1st United Kingdom Armoured Division/Danish International Mechanized Brigade; 3rd United Kingdom Division/Italian *Ariete* Mechanized Brigade; and 3rd Italian Division/Portuguese Independent Airborne Brigade.

National scope of action

All multinational participation means that some degree of national sovereignty is surrendered not least in economic matters. Participation in multinational units ties up parts of the budget and therefore reduces the scope for national decision-making. If a country suddenly reneges on its commitments, this will easily mean a greater share having to be covered by the other members of the Alliance. In the long term, others may be deterred from entering into an alliance with any country perceived to be an unreliable partner. Multinationality has thus turned defence planning and budgeting of one country into issues of utmost interest to its partners. For instance, the lack of progress in German military

reforms and the series of cutbacks in spending seen during the government of Gerhard Schröder cannot but have repercussions both on the different multinational units where Germany is a key member, but also on EU's ESDP plans.⁷⁸

On the other hand, participation in multinational units or projects may be regarded as a shield against cutbacks for the units concerned. Reductions in defence spending, ad hoc or not, are more likely to affect units that are not tied up in cross-country agreements. But if the multinational units are protected from reductions, the rest of national defence may be hit all the harder if defence budgets are reduced. Especially in those countries that maintain conscription, the resources invested in multinational units have created a division of the armed forces into an A team usually made up of professional soldiers with all the newest equipment, and the conscripts who will have to "make do and mend". More and more countries find that this gap is increasingly impossible to bridge, and have either done away with conscription all together (e.g. France), or have chosen a path where conscripts serve for a shorter time and are mainly used as a recruitment pool. Germany and Norway both belong in this category.⁷⁹ However, although multinationality may offer a degree of protection from cutbacks, it would be misleading to presume that units will be guaranteed sufficient funding in the future.

⁷⁸ "Bundeswehr wird erneut verkleinert", *Die Welt*, 2 October 2003. For a critical analysis of German defence reforms, see Martin Agüera, "Reform of the Bundeswehr: Defense Policy Choices for the Next German Administration", *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 21, no. 3, 2002, pp. 179–202. Agüera points out that one of the major deficiencies is in the field of command and control. This hampers interoperability both within the German armed forces but also with the country's allies.

⁷⁹ This is the main idea behind the German Defence Minister Peter Struck's reform proposals presented in January 2004. See Karl Feldmeyer, "Verteidigungsbereitschaft fällt", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 December 2003. Conscription as a basis for recruitment is explicitly mentioned in St.prp. no. 45 (2000–2001), *Omlæggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005*, section 5.6.1 "Prinsipper for praktisering av verneplikten".

With the introduction of the EU monetary union national budgeting became subject to much stricter guidelines, it lost its flexibility. This puts defence budgets in a vulnerable position since this is virtually the only area where cuts can be made without alienating a large section of the electorate. Not surprisingly, in the run-up to the implementation of the EU currency union this expenditure on the armed forces was reduced.

The danger of alienating the electorate may also compel the politicians to abstain from participating in a multinational operation. If the risk of casualties is high, governments will be unwilling to deploy soldiers unless the mission is regarded as having a direct impact on national security.⁸⁰ It should be added that aversion on the political level will often be supported by the military top echelons; in a US survey on attitudes towards military intervention the military elite was more casualty-averse than the political leadership. The greatest level of acceptance was found in the electorate.⁸¹ But casualties may not be the only factor weighing against participation; a government may also interpret military action as contradicting international law and for these reasons opt out.

There may also be strong political reasons speaking against letting a specific country participate. This was most recently illustrated when the US refused to let Turkey send troops into northern Iraq following the defeat of the Iraqi Army. The Kurdish population would have interpreted their presence as a provocation.

The European split over Iraq highlighted how differing political perceptions of threats and the way to counter them will make countries inclined to abstain from participating. The

⁸⁰ See Pascal Girardin, "Casualty Aversion in Tepid War", *Connections*, no. 2, 2003, pp. 99–124.

⁸¹ Jeffrey Record, "Force Protection Fetishism", *Aerospace Power Journal*, Summer 2000, pp. 4–11. In this article, Record claims that the US political and military elite suffers from a "Vietnam syndrome" not found in Europe.

problem that emerges is that actions that are in the collective interest may fail to be undertaken due to disincentives at the national level. The problem emerges under conditions of non-excludable public goods. This means that the benefits resulting from one action will apply to all the members even though only a few have contributed to the final positive outcome. Thus participants have a strong incentive to free ride, i.e. to keep the national input at a minimal level assuming that the others will bear the brunt of the collective costs. How to avoid this quandary has been addressed in much of the literature on multinationality. The conclusions have tended to be rather vague, usually underlining the need for flexibility, so that a mission is not rendered impossible if one country should choose not to participate. But on the other hand, this flexibility should not be so large as to provide so generous an exit strategy that all but the most committed leave the stage since the political costs of opting out are negligible. It should be added that the desired flexibility is only possible if specialisation is not carried too far, i.e. that other countries can offer the necessary skills and capacities.

But what if a country defaults not on participation in an operation, but on its commitments to develop an agreed capacity? This is an issue rarely addressed in the political statements, articles or books on multinationality. Occasionally, the need for flexibility is underlined, usually taken to mean that if one country backs out for political reasons, another country should be able to cover the gap. Although this recipe raises some difficult questions concerning how far specialisation should be allowed to proceed and whether some sort of duplication should be encouraged, failure to deliver the agreed capacity is not necessarily due to political reservations. Economic problems may bar a country from engaging in lengthy missions.⁸²

⁸² This question has already been raised, see *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense 2002. A Report to the United States Congress* by

Privatising the fringe benefits is one strategy to reduce free-riding.⁸³ This means that access to these benefits should be restricted only to those that have contributed to the operation. This is the policy applied by the current US administration to the rebuilding of Iraq. Only the countries that supported the war are permitted to participate in the tender for the reconstruction contracts. This move has resulted in sharp protests from Germany and France, the two NATO countries that were the most adamant opponents of the war.⁸⁴ The political price was an increase in transatlantic tensions.

Norwegian participation in Operation Enduring Freedom

In the discussion above the importance of national rules of engagement defining what a national contingent can do, was underlined. This is not the only way national control is exerted. Frequent contact, transmission of information, all play an important role. Before ending this chapter, some comments on the Norwegian experience as participant in Operation Enduring Freedom (henceforth OEF) may throw some light on how this has been done.⁸⁵

The US was the lead nation with most of NATO's 19 allies being directly involved in the operations. Although the US outsized their contributions, the allies could offer skills and

the Secretary of Defense, Chart I-1, "Defense Spending as Percentage of GDP".

⁸³ See Thomas S. Szayna et al., *Improving Army Planning for Future Multinational Operations*, Santa Monica: RAND, 2001, p. 39.

⁸⁴ See Radek Sikorski, "Losing the New Europe", *Washington Post*, 7 November 2003; and Michael Stürmer, "Die europäische Illusion", *Die Welt*, 24 September 2002.

⁸⁵ For a recent analysis on a recent case of multinational operations, see Major Erik Guldhav, "Politisk kontroll over norske styrkebidrag i internasjonale koalisjoner. Erfaringer fra operasjon Enduring Freedom", in Torunn Laugen Haaland and Erik Guldhav, *Bruk av norske styrker i kampen mot internasjonal terrorisme*, IFS Info, no. 3, 2004, pp. 6–16.

capacities that were in high demand.⁸⁶ This also applied to the Norwegian contribution.⁸⁷ A further difference was the rules of engagement with the Norwegian ROE being stricter than those valid for the US troops. This concerned in particular the F-16 planes. Their role was subjected to considerable attention and debate in the Norwegian parliament and media. Reports had been published on US bombs hitting civilians instead of Taliban positions. If Norwegian pilots were discovered to have committed similar mistakes, political support would be undermined and pressure to withdraw from OEF would have grown. Norway was not alone on this point. The Norwegian planes were deployed together with units from Denmark and the Netherlands with broadly similar ROEs applied to all. Norwegian, Dutch and Danish authorities cooperated closely during this phase to ensure that the national limitations were respected.⁸⁸ Periods occurred when the planes were used less than expected and the US side relied exclusively on their own resources. The reason for this seems to have been American dissatisfaction with the stricter European ROE, although this dissatisfaction was never openly voiced.⁸⁹

The ability to do so depended on information and access to decision-making. This was ensured through the deployment of Norwegian officers at the US Central Command

⁸⁶ Balances changed with the introduction of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force was deployed in January 2002, here the European contribution is significantly larger.

⁸⁷ This included special forces, mine clearance units, F-16 and transport planes, and Norwegian crews manning AWACS aircrafts monitoring US airspace. See “Status norske bidrag til “Enduring Freedom” og ISAF”, Forsvarsdepartementet, <http://odin.dep.no/fd/norsk/aktuelt/nyheter/010011-210120/index-dok000-b-f-a.html>

⁸⁸ “Avtale(r) mellom Norge og USA i forbindelse med norske kampply deltakelse i krigen i Afghanistan”, Forsvarsdepartementet, <http://odin.dep.no/fd/norsk/aktuelt/nyheter/010011-210085/index-dok000-b-f-a.html>

⁸⁹ See Guldhav, “Politisk kontroll over norske styrkebidrag i internasjonale koalisjoner”.

(CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida. Familiarity with US command proved a significant facilitator for the officer in question. His duty was to serve as a liaison between CENTCOM and the Norwegian political and military leadership. In Afghanistan, Norwegian officers were represented at different levels in the command chain. This meant that missions could be planned within the limits imposed by the Norwegian ROE. Much of the planning work as well as the actual action was greatly facilitated by the traditions for close cooperation between US and Norwegian special forces.⁹⁰ A potential challenge to the routines for consultation between Oslo and the local officers was the need for speedy decision-making. This led to a series of adjustments, and nothing indicates that communication caused delays.

Based on the conclusions available, the arrangements worked satisfactorily. Much of this was due to the US respect for national ROEs, and a command arrangement that provided the participant countries with information and access to decision-making. If not, a political backlash might result with countries opting out. The Norwegian Minister of Defence, Kristin Krohn Devold underlined this linkage in a speech on the reform of NATO's command system: "If there is insufficient inclusiveness and transparency, then our ability to contribute – to reach agreement among ourselves, to convince our parliaments and publics – will inevitably suffer."⁹¹

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Kristin Krohn Devold, "Transformation: Implications for the Alliance", speech given at Open Road, Norfolk, 20–22 January 2003, <http://odin.dep.no/fd/norsk/aktuelt/taler/p10001326/010011-090080/index-dok000-b-n-a.html>

Conclusion

Multinational force formations easily run the risk of disintegrating along national lines. In this chapter, how this danger can be reduced has been addressed. This has been done by looking at different aspects of multinationality ranging from equipment to the very organisation of the units. In the latter case, three contrasting kinds have been presented. It should be added though, that a given multinational mission will not be a carbon copy of any of them but rather display an array of *ad hoc* solutions arrived at because a particular problem suddenly had to be solved. Officers interviewed for this study would often refer to how a way out was found also in cases where a national contingency was subjected to tighter restrictions than the others and thus prevented from undertaking certain tasks or patrol certain areas. I had expected that this would cause friction, and perhaps tensions in the field, but none of my informants could confirm that. Joint commitment to a task counted more, and in some cases the fact that the officers knew each other from joint training, seminars or previous missions proved to be a great facilitator. That is not to say that tensions did not exist, but they seem to have been more restricted to the political level.

The influence of politicians on decision-making was addressed in connection with RMA. Political interference is nothing new. Numerous articles as well as a significant number of books have been written to elucidate these problems long before RMA was conceptualised. None contains any recipe for how these problems can be solved once and for all. The reason is most likely that both the degree of interference, and the remedies required to limit it, depend on the character of the mission and the number of countries involved. As will be pointed out repeatedly in later chapters, much will depend on perceptions. If the countries agree on what the problem is and the most effective way of solving it, interference will be less than if some of the countries involved

feel they are being dragged along into something that basically does not serve their interests.

Even in countries where RMA has made an impact, in particular the USA which is far ahead of other countries, results are mixed. The ability to digest the information made available by the computers and act upon it differs across the US armed forces. The European countries are lagging behind the US in the adaptation of RMA, although progress has been made especially in the wake of the 2002 Prague NATO Summit. Progress in this field will prevent the transatlantic gap in technology from becoming wider.

In the application of RMA, smaller countries will be faced with stronger constraints than the larger. Smaller countries have more restricted budgetary resources and they will be forced to choose, not only which sectors that should receive priority, but also with which countries they should align. These questions will be addressed in greater detail in chapter 5, but as will be pointed out in the following chapter, alignment and priority have been perennial issues in the Norwegian security policy debate.

Chapter 3

The Role of the Small: Norway

Smaller countries' limited ability to exert influence over planning and command is a perpetual problem in multinational force formation. Douglas L. Bland, a Canadian scholar who has worked closely with Canada's national military representatives to NATO's Military Committee, has summed up the problem thus: "Countries with small armed forces, and whose chiefs of defence have limited experience, have difficulty in winning support. This works against Canada, Denmark, Norway and Portugal."⁹² With the recent expansion of the Alliance, an updated version of the list would contain more names. Yet all of them will try to gain influence on decision-making that affects their security. The question is how? The most straightforward answer is by being present in the decision-making organs. The challenge for the small countries is to have their nationals in the right slots. To get there they will have to offer the Alliance a relevant asset.

Norway's chief asset has been its location. In return, the Norwegian authorities wanted credible Allied reinforcement plans for Norway in case of war. At the same time, they strived to maintain the largest scope possible for autonomous decision-making. This posed a dilemma, and how to pursue a strategy that balanced between what has aptly been called

⁹² Douglas L. Bland, *The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance. A Study of Structure and Strategy*, New York: Praeger, 1991, p. 180.

“integration and screening”, remained a perennial headache for Norwegian decision-makers and will be accounted for in the brief historical overview provided.⁹³ But the chapter has a more contemporary focus as well; the efforts undertaken during the 1990s to explore the possibilities for multinational efforts between the Nordic countries will be accounted for.

Relevant assets

Norway's location, especially its proximity to Soviet military installations on the Kola Peninsula, was a major asset for NATO during the Cold War. The German occupation of Norway during the Second World War had served to underline the strategic importance of controlling the Norwegian coastline. Its value to NATO was further enhanced with the Soviet build-up of bases on the Kola Peninsula serving the increasingly strong Northern Fleet. From these bases, vessels had open access to the Atlantic, not having to pass through bottlenecks like the easily controllable Danish Straits, Bosphorus or the Straits of Gibraltar. In a report approved by the US President from September 1948, less than a year before Norway signed the Atlantic Treaty, the importance of Norway to Western security was underlined:

The Scandinavian nations are strategically important both to the United States and the USSR, they lie astride the great arctic circle air route between North America and the strategic heart of Western Russia, are midway on the air route between London and Moscow, and are in a position to control the exists from the Baltic and Barents seas. Domination of Scandinavia would provide the soviets with advanced air, guided missile and submarine bases, thus enabling them to advance their bomb line to the West, to threaten allied operations in the North Atlantic, and to form a

⁹³ See Tamnes, *Integration and screening*.

protective shield against allied sea or air attack from the Northwest [...].⁹⁴

Norway was an observation post; monitoring and collecting information on Soviet activities was done from Norwegian territory. Norwegian policy was to strike a balance between deterrence based on Allied guarantees and at the same time provide reassurance to Moscow that Norway would not be used as a launching pad for an attack on the Soviet Union. Based on these concerns, the Norwegian government decided to impose a set of constraints on Norwegian participation in NATO, one at the time of entering, others being added in the course of the years. Central among these was the refusal to allow stationing foreign troops in peacetime, the exceptions being short-term training and Allied participation in exercises and the establishment of installations for command, control, navigation, warning etc. for Allied forces. Likewise, the stockpiling of Allied equipment to be used in case of an attack was permitted. As a further measure of reassurance towards the Soviet Union, it was decided that Allied exercises in Finnmark, the province bordering the Soviet Union, was not allowed. Likewise, Allied aircraft were not permitted to enter the airspace east of the 24 longitude. This limitation was also applied to Allied naval vessels.⁹⁵ During the 1950s, especially, NATO wanted to gain Norwegian approval for the stationing of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory. This was refused.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ National Archives, NSC 28/1, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Scandinavia", 3 September 1948, quoted in Olav Riste, "Was 1949 a Turning Point? Norway and the Western Powers 1947–1950", in O. Riste (ed.), *Western Security. The Formative Years*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1985, pp. 128–49, p. 144.

⁹⁵ St.meld. no. 94 (1978–79), *Forsvarskommissionens utredning og hovedretningslinjer for Forsvarets virksomhet i tiden 1978–83*, p. 72.

⁹⁶ For an analysis of Norwegian nuclear policies, see Tamnes and Skogrand, *Fryktens likevekt*.

Reinforcement

Due to the small size of the population and inadequate military means, Norway was heavily dependent upon Allied reinforcement in case of attack. How this was to be guaranteed and organised remained a prime concern during the Cold War. In the first post-war plan for the reconstruction of Norwegian defence, it was stated that “Norwegian forces must be able to resist on their own until we receive effective assistance from whoever will be our allies”.⁹⁷ When Norway signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the conditional mood could be dispensed with; yet the basic issue of Allied assistance remained on the agenda.

Only gradually was this answered through increasingly explicit arrangements for Allied assistance.⁹⁸ Although Norway would resist a Soviet attack, the question was for how long? Any long-term resistance would depend on it being “properly organised and strengthened by outside aid”.⁹⁹ But this tenet raised two problems, both dominating Norwegian security policy and therefore Norwegian-NATO relations ever since: What forms would this assistance assume; and how credible would the promise of assistance in case of attack be? Expectations had been running high at the time of signing the pact in April 1949. But disappointments soon set in, there seemed to be very little actual work being done despite the heightening of international tensions. Judging from British chiefs of staff papers compiled at the time: “The Norwegians should be told that they cannot plan on any direct air or land

⁹⁷ St.meld. no. 32 (1945–46), p. 3, quoted in Olav Riste, “Eit ‘minimumsforsvar’ for Norge, FK90 og spørsmålet om alliert assistanse”, *IFS Info*, no. 5, 1992, p. 6.

⁹⁸ For an analysis of this process, see Olav Riste, “Was 1949 a Turning Point?”, pp. 128–49, p. 144; and Rolf Tamnes, “Norway’s Struggle for the Northern Flank, 1950–1952”, in *ibid.*, pp. 215–43.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

assistance from the Allies, at any rate in the early stages of war [...].”¹⁰⁰

This perception was not limited to American or British military experts. In a lecture given by a Norwegian Major-General as late as 1955, the following conclusion was drawn: “Our starting point today should be the notion that we cannot expect the arrival of Allied ground forces to participate in the defence of Norwegian territory.”¹⁰¹

Gradually, measures were implemented making reinforcement far more credible. In 1960, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, (henceforth SACEUR) set up Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF). It was made up of five air transportable battalions with command elements, communications, engineer, reconnaissance, logistical support units and four combat aircraft squadrons. In the beginning, AMF Land was composed of units from Italy, USA, Canada, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Belgium and Germany, only to be enlarged with contributions from other Alliance members in the course of the years. The AMF was to be used primarily as a deterrent to be deployed rapidly to any location in NATO. It was meant to show unity of purpose and Alliance solidarity in any area under threat. The multinational AMF forces served a multitude of functions. Politically, they demonstrated cohesion. They would be deployed in crisis areas as a deterrent.¹⁰² Even small-scale Soviet aggression would be met with a strong force presence. The AMF would here function

¹⁰⁰ NA, RG 319, P and O 091 Norway TS, encl.: Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee on a British JPS report “Norway – Advice on Defence”, quoted by Riste, “Was 1949 a Turning Point?”, p. 145.

¹⁰¹ “Det vi idag gjør rettest i å gå ut fra er, at vi ikke kan gjøre regning med allierte styrker til lands for deltagelse i forsvaret av norsk territorium.” Major-General A.D. Dahl, “Noen synspunkter om den videre utbygging av Norges forsvar”, a lecture given in Oslo Militære Samfund, 8 November 1954, and printed in *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift*, 1955, vol. 125, pp. 1–19, p. 3.

¹⁰² Rear Admiral R.P. Breivik, “Sjøforsvaret og forsterkninger til Norge”, *Norsk tidsskrift for sjøvesen*, no. 6, 1982, pp. 2–7.

as “tripwires” reminding the Warsaw Pact to take into consideration possible retaliatory measures from NATO. Northern Norway was one area where a crisis might emerge that would require NATO presence. Nevertheless, the Norwegian government refused to grant the AMF permission to train in the region bordering the Soviet Union despite pressure both from both NATO and the Norwegian defence leadership. The government wanted to avoid any measures that could be regarded as escalatory by the Soviet side.

In 1968, the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) was established. Its roots go back to an Anti-Submarine Warfare Task Group, soon to become known as the MATCHMAKER squadron.¹⁰³ But STANAVFORLANT was the first standing peacetime multinational naval force, periodically including Norwegian vessels. It was subject to SACLANT command. It participated in exercises and made several visits showing the NATO flag throughout the NATO area. As in the case of AMF, the basic idea was to convey a strong impression of Alliance cohesion and solidarity.

A major step to make reinforcement more credible was taken in 1967 when the new strategic defence concept known as Flexible Response was adopted by NATO. The aim was to develop the ability for the Alliance to react flexibly to aggression irrespective of level. This also meant that NATO reserved the right to initiate a nuclear attack if conventional options had failed. Until the early 1980s, a number of measures were implemented in accordance with the new concept. In sum, the members increased their conventional forces, and improved reinforcements to areas deemed particularly vulnerable.

The Norwegian efforts to have Allied forces earmarked for deployment in Norway in case of crisis and war were

¹⁰³ MATCHMAKER was the name given to three consecutive exercises held in 1965, 1966 and 1967.

depended on airfields that could be used by US air reinforcements. In 1974, the US Air Force initiated the so-called Co-located Operating Bases (COB) programme to solve this quandary. Ammunition, drop tanks and equipment needed for maintenance were stored on airfields designated to receive the US troops.

All through the Cold War, the authorities in Oslo worked hard to have allies commit forces to Norway. A mere political promise did not suffice; troops would have to participate in exercises regularly to lend the promise credibility. Participation would also enable the Norwegian party to monitor to what extent Allied troops would be up to the task, i.e. the state of their equipments and the skills of their soldiers.

Holding time and deployment time were perennial concerns of both Norwegian authorities and NATO. There was little use in having an impressive list of units earmarked for reinforcement if the time elapsed before their arrival would be too long for Norwegian forces to resist an invading Soviet enemy. The issue was discussed repeatedly. In the course of the 1970s, detailed reinforcement plans were made specifying which troops should arrive when after an attack had been launched against Norway.¹⁰⁴ In this way, deterrence would be rendered more credible than had been the case so far. At the Washington Summit Meeting in 1978, the members agreed on the NATO Long Term Defence Programme. Of particular relevance to Norway was the decision that SACEUR should come up with a comprehensive plan for reinforcements to Europe. This was to be done in order to establish the designated deployment areas for the different units.

A final version was approved by the members in 1982. The plan broke with the principle of maximum flexible deployment of reinforcements. This had been central to all

¹⁰⁴ See Rolf Tamnes, *Oljealder*, vol. 6 in *Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997, pp. 74–76.

plans in force until then. For Norway and the rest of the Northern Flank, the 1982 plan did not mean any change in the list of units earmarked for assistance, but it opened the way for a far more direct linkage between the deployment area and the units themselves. The plan sub-divided the reinforcements into three: Forces allocated to the Principal Subordinate Commands (Baltap, South Norway, North Norway), forces allocated to the entire Northern region as a whole, and the strategic reserves that SACEUR could deploy in the Northern, Central or Southern region at his own discretion. Moreover, the plan contained procedures detailing how reinforcements could be requested. In case of war or crisis a demand could be made by the relevant national government. But for deployment to be executed, a unanimous decision would have to be reached by the NATO Council.

A survey of all the units that could be used by SACEUR for reinforcements could not but seem impressive. Nevertheless, a closer look revealed strong limitations. First of all, there was no automatic guarantee that all the units would be made available for reinforcements. A decision to deploy would depend on needs in other areas. Moreover, the reinforcement units were general-purpose forces and not all were trained to meet the specific needs in a designated area. The question of how to protect the forces if they were deployed after hostilities had commenced was another issue. Deployment time would depend on the transportation mode chosen, bringing a Marine Amphibious Brigade (henceforth MAB) by ship from the US east coast would require 14 days, with a military aircraft the duration would be shortened to four.

To secure rapid deployment while keeping airlift requirements at a minimum, the only option was to store heavy equipment, ammunition and supplies for reinforcements in the deployment area. But since this meant that an extra set of equipment had to be available for every reinforcement unit, costs were high. The extra equipment needed by one marine

amphibious brigade and stored in Norway was estimated to cost approx. \$300 million in 1979, at the time a prohibitively high sum. This sum would not be covered by NATO; having a unit listed on SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan list did not guarantee any economic support from Brussels. The bill had to be divided between the sender and the receiver. Usually, the member sending units would pay for procurement and maintenance of the equipment. The receiver would cover support functions, transportation and additional equipment required.

Allied exercises

For reinforcement to be credible, the soldiers earmarked for deployment in Norway would have to know the setting. They also had to be aware of the Norwegian side's level of competence. Both sides had to know what to expect from the other. This could only be achieved through regular exercises. Exercises were also regarded as a strong expression of Alliance cohesion and as visible signals of Alliance commitment to the defence of Norway. Thus, the number and duration of exercises held in Norway have always been interpreted politically, as a sign of Norway's significance to the Alliance.

Combined Norwegian-Allied exercises may be divided into two types, one covering staff exercises giving the military leadership the possibility of testing out decision-making procedures under different scenarios. Here, no real military forces were involved, but they gave the Norwegian officers the necessary training in commanding Allied forces if war or a war-like situation should emerge.¹⁰⁵ These exercises would often involve the same people and as an extra bonus close professional contacts were established.

¹⁰⁵ These exercises were known as *Keep Keen* in the 1960s, during the final years of that decade and during the next, they were called *Fallex*, *Three Sword*, and *Winter-Cimex*.

The other category included Express and Teamwork, both starting in the 1960s. In the Express exercises units from AMF cooperated with the Norwegian brigade stationed in Northern Norway. The aim was to lay the ground for smooth cooperation in case of Allied reinforcements to Norway. During the 1970s, this was expanded to include Allied reinforcements with heavily equipped units. Teamwork denoted maritime exercises under the auspices of SACLANT, NATO's Atlantic command. The area affected by the exercise was huge with command decentralised to operational headquarters located among the littoral states. Some of these exercises, like Teamwork 76, included large-scale amphibious landing operations in Mid-Norway. Teamwork were large-scale naval exercises with vessels from Britain, USA, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada and Germany. At times, French, Belgian and Danish vessels would participate. The purpose was to train for the deployment and reception of Allied reinforcements in Norway and Denmark. The number of ships increased considerably until 1976 only to drop sharply thereafter, reflecting the cutbacks in the US and British navies.

In addition to Teamwork, exercise Northern Wedding was started in 1970. The main purpose was to train Allied forces in the reinforcement of the Northern European Command. Like Teamwork, Northern Wedding followed a four year cycle.

In 1975, the Ocean Safari series was established with bi-annual exercises. Focus was given to the readiness of forces and headquarters in naval operations, with particular emphasis on the control over vital sea lanes.

The exercises indicated a strong Alliance commitment to Norway. The growth in the number of troops participating in the Express exercises may be taken as proof of this, going from 3800 Allied troops in 1964 to 17,000 twenty years

later.¹⁰⁶ But during the 1970s, US and British participation was reduced. This caused concern in Norway. US aircraft carriers spent a diminishing number of days in Norwegian waters. This did not change until the early 1980s when President Ronald Reagan increased the defence budgets. An additional factor was NATO's new naval concept, CONMAROPS passed in 1982; here the strategic importance of the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic was underlined. Growing Soviet naval capabilities had further aggravated Norwegian concerns. Particularly the Soviet naval exercise in the summer of 1985 led to renewed Norwegian pressure for increased and longer US participation during exercises.¹⁰⁷

In addition to the large-scale exercises, bilateral agreements opened for Allied countries to send troops for winter exercises. A prominent case was the agreement with Britain, whereby military units were sent annually to Norway to train in the very setting where they were likely to be deployed in case of war.

The exercises meant that troops from other countries could familiarise themselves with local conditions, especially sub-arctic winter conditions. The exercises received in-depth coverage in the military journals. Analyses were published to assess where improvements were needed. The views of prominent Allied officers were quoted; inadequate equipment, imbalances in the strength of land, navy and air units were pointed out.¹⁰⁸ A constant theme was the lack of mobility; European units did not have the necessary equipment to guarantee the transport of units over longer distances.

¹⁰⁶ Tønne Huitfeldt, *NATO and the Northern Flank*, Forsvarets høyskole, *FHFS notat*, no. 6, 1986, p. 26.

¹⁰⁷ This was clearly expressed in Defence Minister Anders C. Sjaastad's lecture entitled "Maritime Strategy and the Defence of Norway", given in Oslo Militære Samfund, and printed in *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift*, no. 2, 1986.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

Command

Exercises and reinforcement plans underlined Norway's exposed position as NATO's northern flank. The geographic location was an asset that endowed Norway with a degree of importance above its size as a small NATO member. Although not always taken into account, Norwegian concerns were listened to.¹⁰⁹ This was greatly facilitated by NATO's command structure, and the gradual build-up of institutional structures that facilitated the exchange of information and viewpoints.

During the early years, only the larger allies with sufficient bureaucratic resources were capable of exerting direct influence over the decision-making process. Norway differed little from other comparably sized members. This changed in the course of the 1950s when the institutional build-up of the Alliance made considerable progress. It became easier for smaller members with correspondingly limited resources to make their presence felt. Procedures were formulated in Paris, at the time the location of NATO's headquarters.

On lower levels in the command structure, Norwegian officers held positions enabling them to convey Norwegian viewpoints and transfer information to Oslo about contemporary and upcoming issues. Not surprisingly, having Norwegians inside the command structure was regarded as an important means of securing influence over the decision-making process, and as a channel of information back home. Apparently, aspirations were frequently disappointed, with Norwegian applicants often losing out in the competition with representatives from other member states. One explanation given was that Norwegians had too little

¹⁰⁹ This part draws upon the research done by Karoliina Honkanen, *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making, the Membership Experiences of Denmark, Norway, Hungary and the Czech Republic*, Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2002; and Bjerga and Skogrand, "Nato Planning and Decision-Making: A Small-State Perspective", forthcoming.

international experience.¹¹⁰ Serving abroad was regarded as a bonus, only to be enjoyed once in your career. In other countries, especially the larger members states, this was less the case and their officers therefore had a considerable advantage.

Allied Forces, Northern Europe (AFNORTH) was set up in 1951 in London. In 1954 It was moved to Kolsås, just outside Oslo. AFNORTH developed into a joint tri-service command with officers from six NATO-members serving. Since 1954, the commander-in-chief was always a British four-star-general. The post of deputy commander-in-chief was rotated between a Danish and Norwegian general. Rotation between the two countries also applied to the post of deputy chief-of-staff for joint operations. Thus, when a Norwegian officer served as deputy commander-in-chief, the deputy chief-of-staff for joint operations would be Danish.

In 1971, Allied Forces North Norway (NON) was established as a NATO command and located at Reitan, near Bodø in Northern Norway, where it remained until 2002. The commander was always a Norwegian. In peacetime it was a national command. In crisis or war, the Norwegian government could transfer command authority to NATO. The same year NON was set up, Allied Forces South Norway (SONOR) was established as a NATO command located in Oslo, and from 1987 in Stavanger.

Parallel to the build-up of a Norwegian presence within NATO was the continued emphasis given to the bilateral ties with Britain and the United States. This was a legacy from the war years when leading politicians had underlined the necessity for Norway to develop links with these two Atlantic states. One might argue that NATO was perceived as a “formalised framework for developing realistic plans for

¹¹⁰ See Rolv Eios, “Refleksjoner fra min tjeneste ved NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE”, lecture given at Oslo Militære Samfund, 28 November 1988, printed in *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift*, 1989 no. 1, pp. 1–9.

American and British military assistance to Norway.”¹¹¹ Norwegian security concerns were often raised bilaterally with London or Washington instead of using NATO, where not only bureaucracy might prove an obstacle but Norwegian concerns would have to compete for attention with other issues. One outcome was the bilateral Norwegian-American Study Group set up in 1976 to draw up plans for the defence of Northern Norway compatible with the doctrine of Flexible Response.

Division of responsibilities

During the early years of NATO, the division of responsibility between the Allied command system and national authorities caused concern in Norway. The question was at what point Norwegian troops would be transferred to an Allied command, and if so, would Norwegian troops be deployed outside the country?¹¹² Norwegian authorities were opposed to an all-out surrender of national command in wartime. The government worked hard to secure strong institutional safeguards permitting Norwegian influence over CINCNORTH and SACEUR decision-making. But this strategy was not without its paradoxes since strong Allied influence in the command structure was regarded as the only way of securing a strong commitment to the defence of Norway and adjacent waters.

In 1953 attempts were made to delineate national and Allied competences. It was decided that every intermediate Allied command leading NATO troops in Norway was to be held by a Norwegian national. This principle was further strengthened in 1958 when the highest ranking operational commands in Northern and Southern Norway were placed

¹¹¹ Bjerga and Skogrand, “Nato Planning and Decision-Making”.

¹¹² St.prp. no. 20 (1951), *Om Stortingets samtykke til at Norge deltar i opprettelsen av et felles kommandosystem og felles forsvarsstyrker for Atlanterhavspaktens land*, section “Forholdet mellom øverstkommanderende og de nasjonale regjeringer”.

within the national command chain in peacetime. The principle was confirmed in 1971 when the new principal subordinate commanders, COMMON and COMSONOR, were placed within the national command chain. In war or a crisis situation, the Norwegian government could decide to place the forces in the Allied command chain.

In 1961, an agreement was signed dividing the areas of responsibility between SACLANT, SACEUR and the signatory countries, Norway among them. The agreement opened for CINCNORTH operating maritime patrol aircraft over SACLANT waters. Nine years later, in 1970, Norwegian submarines were assigned to SACLANT. Operational control was to be exercised by the appropriate Principal Subordinate Commander, in Northern or Southern Norway.

In 1984, HQ AFNORTH was reorganised. Command was simplified. This was done in order to create a headquarters structure that could be adapted from peacetime work to a wartime role as smoothly as possible. German and Canadian representation in the headquarters was made commensurate with their contribution to the Northern European Command. The nationalities balance within the headquarters was thus redrawn and the Anglo-American dominance reduced. AFNORTH was not the only headquarters affected. All major European subordinate commands went through a similar reorganisation process.

Within NATO, the division between national and international responsibilities were worked out in the course of the years. Readiness and deployability remained national tasks. Deployment as logistic support remained mainly national responsibilities as well, although a clearcut line cannot always be drawn. NATO decided what national efforts could draw upon NATO funding, and to what extent.¹¹³

¹¹³ NATO operates two budgets: Infrastructure; and Operating and Maintenance. Cost-sharing formulae and annual budgeting processes are

Command issues caused tension between Norway and the US. In the 1970s and 1980s, the focal point was the size of the amphibious objective area (AOA), the land, sea and air space in which the amphibious commander for purposes of force protection, needed complete control with all movements in the air, on the ground and at sea during the critical landing phase. According to the USMC doctrine, the size of the AOA was so large as such most of Northern Norway including the Swedish ports in the region. The US requirement would have meant that civilian air traffic should be subjected to their control. The Norwegian authorities refused this transfer of authority outright. For exercise purposes a compromise was struck in that the AOA was reduced in size and tailored to fit the terrain. The theatre of operations was split in two with SACLANT having the responsibility for the sea area whereas the Defence Command North Norway maintained command authorities over land and airspace.¹¹⁴ How command and control would have been delimited in case of war, was not clarified.

Recent changes

With the end of the Cold War, international tensions eased. Together with Russias rapprochement with both NATO and the EU, the importance of the Northern flank declined with a corresponding increase in threats stemming from terrorism and instability in the Balkans, the Middle East and Northern Africa.

Few disagreed that the redrawing of the command structure was necessary to meet the challenges posed by new threats. This meant a stronger emphasis on flexibility and mobility. The number of sub-commands would have to be diminished

established separately for each. Since NATO does not have an operational budget, the members pay for their troop contributions individually.

¹¹⁴ Kjell Inge Bjerga and Kjetil Skogrand, "Nato Planning and Decision-Making".

both in number and size. Whereas the larger members would face fewer problems in making their presence felt even in a leaner command structure, the smaller countries could soon find themselves left with little more than a nominal presence and thus on the receiving end of the decisions made. Norway's geostrategic location had been a valuable asset during the Cold War and had ensured a degree of influence which was not commensurate with the country's size and armed forces; this asset was now less relevant.

The first change occurred in 1994 when AFNORTH at Kolsås was dissolved and the command over NATO's northern area was placed with newly established AFNORTHWEST in Great Britain. Although this meant less prominence for Norway, the already close relationship with Britain was further consolidated and this might have sweetened the pill somewhat. In 1997 it was decided that the command structure should be redrawn again, as a result, AFNORTHWEST was dissolved and a new AFNORTH, this time located in Brunsum in the Netherlands, was established in 2000. Its area of responsibility would cover the whole of Northern Europe, including Poland and the Baltic states once membership was finalised.

The enlarged area as well as attention paid to the needs of the countries in line for membership meant that Norway faced an uphill battle in the fight for attention.¹¹⁵ But more important was the fact that the 1997 reform implied the closure for Joint Command North located at Jättå outside Stavanger in Western Norway. Loosing this meant less ability to make Norwegian viewpoints felt. An alternative strategy was devised to change the remit of the headquarters into a joint warfare centre that would play a central role in the transformation of the Alliance's armed forces. The Norwegian trump card was the considerable efforts that had been invested

¹¹⁵ See Ståle Ulriksen, *Den norske forsvarstradisjonen: militærmakt eller folkeforsvar?*, Oslo: Pax, 2002, p. 239.

in the transformation of the Norwegian armed forces and the efforts to merge political and military leadership into a unified structure. Few other countries had a matching record in this field. In addition, Norway could offer excellent training facilities.

In 2003 it was decided that NATO would establish a Joint Warfare Center at Jåttå. The name fits the future areas of responsibility of the centre: Doctrinal development, operational planning, training and exercises. JWC will be subordinate to the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) co-located with the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in Norfolk, Virginia. ACT's prime task is to monitor and evaluate the transformation of the armed forces in the member countries to ensure that NATO is able to undertake missions jointly. The Center's work will be based on standards set by operational commanders.¹¹⁶ This will ensure that the most important sources of friction undermining cohesion and combat efficiency can be identified rapidly and minimised. The Center will be instrumental in collecting the lessons learned from multinational operations, and diffusing them to prevent past mistakes from being repeated. The Center will therefore have a key function in the transformation of NATO decided at the Prague Summit in 2002.

Multinationality by degrees

In this section, the ways in which multinationality affected the Norwegian navy, air force and army will be sketched before a closer look will be taken at the role played by joint education in fostering cohesion across national differences.

¹¹⁶ Remarks by Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani on the Joint Warfare Center Activation Ceremony, Stavanger 23 October 2003, <http://www.act.NATO.int>

Naval cooperation

Norway has long seafaring traditions and the navy has traditionally been strongly influenced by its British counterpart. The navy was to play a prominent role in averting Soviet attempts to seize control over the sea lines of communication (SLOC). The Norwegian Sea was of utmost importance to NATO in case of war. More than 90 per cent of total NATO reinforcements would be seaborne:¹¹⁷

The initial stages of a NATO naval war, therefore, are most likely to be a contest for the neutralization or disruption of the NATO receiving posts and a contest for the destruction of NATO carrier task forces. If the West could surmount these initial attacks, then the character of the war could change and a more protracted engagement might result, with surviving NATO naval units on the offensive and Soviet submarines focusing on the open ocean SLOC.¹¹⁸

This assumption was by no means confined to the American side of the Atlantic, but was widely shared in Norway and Britain as well.¹¹⁹ This may explain why the navy became deeply integrated into Alliance cooperation.¹²⁰

Naval cooperation had an important impact on the standardisation of equipment. National differences in this field impeded cooperation. Through a series of Standardisation Agreements, known as STANAGS, national differences have been reduced and as a result a comprehensive

¹¹⁷ Jordan, *Alliance Strategy and Navies*, p. 53.

¹¹⁸ Paul H. Nitze et al., *Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options*, Boulder. Col., 1979, p. 190.

¹¹⁹ Nonetheless, Jordan gives the impression that this was an American concern, see Jordan, *Alliance Strategy and Navies*, p. 35.

¹²⁰ This is also clearly reflected in the navy journal, *Norsk tidsskrift for sjøvesen*. The number of articles, analysis, commentaries, devoted to multinational cooperation by far surpasses those found in *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift*, this being mainly an army journal. The sense of continuity was strongly emphasised in Arne Grønningsæter, "Norge og NATO-samarbeidet", in *Norsk tidsskrift for sjøvesen*, no. 8, October 1953, pp. 306–11.

codification system covering most items needed down to the smallest nuts and bolts is in force. This means that the vessels do not have to rely on national lines of supply should an emergency arise. Furthermore, there is extensive commonality in ammunition. Fuel is, needless to say, universal. National differences do exist, especially in the systems procurement stage, but as far as can be ascertained, differences lessened in the course of the years. Technical solutions overcoming national differences have usually been developed, but not always applied. For instance the US and UK navies' satellite communication uses different frequency bands despite decades of close cooperation between the two.

Often referred to as the prime example of multinationality is the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), which was set up in 1967 as a permanent multinational naval squadron consisting of vessels from the navies of various NATO members. If a crisis should arise, other vessels could be added together with air and amphibious groups, transforming it into a larger task force. Constant training and exchange of officers assured a high degree of operational efficiency.

Air force

Multinationality, understood as the levelling of national differences, has been greatly facilitated in the air force by the reliance on the US for equipment and training common to most Alliance members. Some West European countries, i.e. France and Britain, developed their own production lines, but for smaller countries this would have been immensely costly. Even in the case of countries that have opted for a greater degree of national production, US technology has often played a key role.

As in the case of the navy, English was the undisputed language of communication. Pilots, whether military or commercial, had to be able to communicate in English. This was the language used by the internationally linked air-traffic

control systems. Like in the case of the navy, an Air Standardisation Committee has promoted cooperation.

Air defence systems have been fully integrated under the command of SACEUR, although the constituent elements are largely national. NATO has played an important role in the funding. NATO sponsored a tactical leadership programme to enable air forces from the entire Alliance to train and work together. Specifically, the focus was on the planning, and conduct of multinational operations at the tactical level.

Despite the progress made, technical differences persisted to hamper cooperation. This concerned particularly air-to-air refuelling. Similarly, air-to-air weapons were not universally compatible either. Nevertheless, this was mitigated through the NATO cross-servicing system regularly practiced by all the air forces and intended to solve precisely such problems by familiarising the different crews with each others' equipment. Likewise, it was used to pinpoint the areas where standardisation is required. Among these was identification-friend-or-foe (IFF) in both air-to-air and air-to-ground and at sea. A common system capable of resolving all the problems associated with security, anti-jam and spoofing, i.e. the spread of disinformation via electronic means, and which can be fitted to the different weapons systems at a reasonable price has not been found.

The army

Glancing through the volumes of *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift*, which despite its name caters mainly to the army's needs, cooperation within NATO, developments in the armies of allies etc. were not a priority.¹²¹ Especially during the first two post-war decades, close to the only reminder in this respect

¹²¹ This conclusion is further enforced by the fact that the few articles on multinationality, often are written by officers from either the navy or the air force, e.g. Commander Birger Dalen, "Norsk forsvar i NATO", *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift*, no. 5, 1971, pp. 209–28.

was the annual address given by the Minister of Defence which mentioned NATO cooperation, but then often in rather general terms. Articles from this period dealing more specifically with defence planning, acquisition etc. pay scant, if any attention to multinational cooperation. Of all the three services, the army has been the least marked by multinationality. The main reason is the close link between the army and territorial defence.

This was not an isolated Norwegian phenomenon. Compared with NATO's navies and air forces, the armies remained less affected by standardisation efforts. For instance, during the Cold War, the Allied army units deployed along the inner-German border had clearly delineated operational responsibilities and were supported by national lines of communication. Writing as late as 1995, Sir Roger Palin, research associate at IISS, took a rather sombre look at what had actually been achieved:

Commercial and industrial considerations, the fear of total reliance on another nation for a vital supply item, and of the desire to retain the ability to act unilaterally outside the confines of the alliance have resulted in a system run almost entirely on national lines.¹²²

Within NATO, cooperation has more assumed the form of co-ordination of plans. Below the level of controlling headquarters, no attempts were made to integrate or adopt multinational structures. In fact, before 1989 the examples of multinational integration were only the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force Land and the LANDJUT HQ.¹²³

¹²² Palin, *Multinational Military Forces*, p. 46. His views are supported by those of Wim van Eekelen, Secretary General of the WEU, "International Maritime Cooperation: the WEU Perspective", paper prepared for the Sea Power Conference, London 5–6 May, 1994.

¹²³ LANDJUT is a German-Danish corps established as early as 1962, for the defence of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein. This is the oldest multinational corps in NATO.

The two army groups in the Central Region were made up of national corps with their own lines of communication but working under an international headquarters. But in peacetime, these headquarters had no authority over the corps, and its role was limited to planning functions and participation in NATO exercises. NATO exercises attempted to train the national contingencies in their General Defence Plan role. Staffs would be coached in those aspects of their role that required multinational experience. During exercises, interoperability skills involving different units were trained with special emphasis given to communications. Plans also tried to take into account the strengths and weaknesses of the different units. Nevertheless, commonality in communications, munitions and equipment remained limited.¹²⁴ After 1989, the establishment of new multinational army units had little to build on; this situation was very different from the traditions found in navies and air forces.

Although the Norwegian army's lack of participation in any permanent multinational units differs little from other Allied armies, the extensive joint training and exercises conducted in Norway had a considerable impact on the army. It was usually the same units that were sent to hone their skills in Norway, and in the course of the years a close cooperative relationship was formed. This is clearly not multinationality on a level with the permanent force units established between Germany and France, the Netherlands and Germany. Nonetheless, during interviews, this regular form of joint training has been pointed out repeatedly as an efficient tool to reduce problems and make multinationality work.

Pooling in practice: NAEW

Norwegian participation in NATO's airborne early warning system is a prime example of the beneficial effects of multinationality. During the 1970s, the build-up of the Soviet

¹²⁴ Palin, *Multinational Military Forces*, p. 56.

Northern Fleet with home ports on the Kola Peninsula, and the strengthening of Warsaw Pact capacities to launch air attacks, forced NATO to build up a surveillance capacity as a response. In 1975, the NATO Military Committee recommended the introduction of an airborne warning and control system, known as NAEW (NATO Airborne Early Warning force). Three years later, a memorandum of understanding was signed between 13 participating countries, i.e. NATO less France and Iceland, for joint procurement of NAEW aircraft.¹²⁵ This turned out to be the most expensive commonly owned acquisition programme in NATO's history.¹²⁶ 17 aircraft were jointly owned and operated by 13 member countries.¹²⁷ The crews were fully integrated both in peacetime training and during operations. In addition, the tactical evaluation team was internationally staffed.

NAEW represented a breakthrough because it opened up for joint funding, acquisition, operation and maintenance costs. But it was not a deal swiftly or easily made. Arriving at an acceptable division of costs and benefits for the countries involved was a lengthy process. The most cost-efficient, i.e. cheapest way would have been to purchase all the planes and the radars needed from the United States, since the equipment was already in production there and units costs would have been lower if the production run had been extended to meet European needs. But if the equipment had been bought off-the-shelf, it would have affected the balance of payments in an unacceptable way especially for the smaller countries. Furthermore, the European partners were eager to extract as much spin-off as possible in the form of employment and access to US R&D. Thus, European involvement had to be included in some way to offset these factors. The offset

¹²⁵ In addition, Great Britain purchased 11 Nimrod planes.

¹²⁶ "The NATO Airborne Early Warning Force", <http://www.e3a.nato.int/info/default.htm> accessed 12 December 2003.

¹²⁷ In addition, Britain has a fleet of six aircrafts.

problem was solved through co-production agreements that certainly benefited European industry but had a detrimental effect on costs.¹²⁸ Nevertheless, NAEW is reckoned as a major breakthrough because it constituted a collective response to a collective need all agreed had to be covered, and it was done through pooling the resources.

The northern flank was designated a priority area for NAEW. Norway joined in 1978, with mixed feelings. The planes would require a base in Norway for maintenance and refuelling. The Norwegian authorities were concerned that this would have detrimental effects on the relationship with the Soviet Union. Norwegian participation therefore came with strings attached, among them clear limitations on the number of flights operating from Norway.¹²⁹ Norwegian concerns over access to decision-making was met in the NAEW charter where it was stated that Norway was to have decisive influence over the operational concept for employment in Norwegian areas of interest. Furthermore, operations here were to be controlled by the Norwegian military authorities. The Norwegian side insisted that operations plans should not undermine Norwegian efforts to maintain a low level of tension.¹³⁰

Outside money

Funding either by NATO or by the United States has played a key role in promoting multinational solutions. In recent years, the upgrading of the defence sectors in the new Central European members has received a significant boost through donations of equipment, favourable loans or direct grants.

¹²⁸ James R. Golden, *NATO Burden-Sharing, Risks and Opportunities*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983, p. 47.

¹²⁹ See Tamnes, "Flankeproblemet", pp. 112–13; and Arnold Lee Tessmer, *Politics of Compromise, NATO and AWACS*, Washington D.C.: National Defence University, 1988, pp. 138–39.

¹³⁰ St.meld. no. 39 (1978–79), *Norsk deltakelse i NATO's luftbårne kontroll og varslingsstyrke*, pp. 1–2.

This is not very different from what Norway and other European NATO-members received in the 1950s and 1960s.

During the early years of NATO, large amounts of US arms were donated to the new members under the auspices of what became known as the Weapons Assistance programme. In addition, NATO's members were entitled to draw upon the Alliance's infrastructure programme for the financing of projects of common importance. The funds came from the membership fees paid by each country, and with the US share reaching on average between 25 and 30 per cent, it dwarfed all others.¹³¹ NATO would cover a share of total project costs, the recipient country the rest. The division of costs would be decided on the basis of the recipient country's economic strength.

The investments in Norway conducted under the auspices of the infrastructure programme reached impressive proportions. By the mid 1990s, it had reached an accumulated total of 33 billion Norwegian crowns. Funding reached top levels in the 1950s and the 1980s, both times reflecting heightened international tensions.¹³²

The infrastructure programme proved doubly beneficial to Norway in that it had considerable civilian spin-offs. The construction of new airports, and the upgrading of existing ones, was partly financed by NATO. Likewise, telephone and radio communication throughout the country was vastly improved, and new cables tying Norway to Britain and Denmark were co-financed with NATO. During the first 15 years, equipment estimated to be worth NOK 6 billion was donated, a staggering sum at the time.¹³³

NATO investments in Norwegian military infrastructure played an instrumental role in the work for standardised

¹³¹ Tamnes, "Flankeproblemet", p. 64.

¹³² Ibid., p. 64; cf. table "Infrastruktur i Norge finansiert over NATOs budsjet" (Infrastructure in Norway financed through NATO), p. 77.

¹³³ T. Torsvik, "15 år i NATO" (15 years in NATO), *Norsk tidsskrift for sjøvesen*, no. 10, 1964, pp. 517–36, p. 524.

solutions assuring inter-member compatibility. The Norwegian officer Tønne Huitfeldt concludes in his analysis of the investments that they had two functions.¹³⁴ One was their practical value, i.e. they were needed to facilitate practical cooperation, but since they were also an expression of Alliance solidarity, they carried a strong political message.

Joint education

Joint education is another mechanism for instilling a sense of cohesion on men from different countries. National peculiarities are evened. From an early point in the history of the Alliance, officers from all sections of the armed forces were sent abroad for training. The basic idea was that by letting officers from different member countries follow the same curriculum, a common understanding of how a crisis should be met would be achieved. In addition, by getting to know each other, a better understanding of the cultural differences and therefore how a colleague from another country would perceive a problem, would ensue.¹³⁵

Some of this was done through bilateral exchange programmes whereby officers enrol in an educational establishment in another country for a short-term course or to receive a full education. In the latter case, the country sending the students may be unable to offer the necessary training. Nevertheless, despite the higher costs national education for officers was often maintained. The main reason was very often that without the national training, technical and tactical expertise would be dissolved and lost. These clusters could be drawn upon when procurement was planned and contracts negotiated. They provided small countries with a protective

¹³⁴ Huitfeldt, *NATO and the Northern Flank*, p. 22.

¹³⁵ For a presentation of Norwegian experiences, see Group Captain Annar Thinn, "NATO Defence College, tredve år!", *Norsk Militært Tidsskrift*, no. 11, 1981, pp. 547–50, 647.

buffer against being unduly pressed by the larger partners, be they allies or industrial contractors.

Joint education also covers joint educational establishments led and funded by the Alliance. The oldest, NATO Defence College was established in 1951, only two years after North Atlantic Treaty was signed. It was initially located in Paris, and then moved to Rome in 1966. The College is directly subordinated to the NATO Military Committee. Student were selected with a view to their future positions, or to quote the founding paragraph: “ [...] selected personnel who may be required to perform important duties in or associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to promote mutual understanding within the Alliance”.¹³⁶ Three vacancies were allocated annually to Norway, one usually given to a civilian, the other to a senior army officer. The navy and the air force alternated in filling the third position.¹³⁷

In addition to the obvious benefits of joint schooling listed here, yet another aspect applies strongly in the case of Norway, and one may assume in the case of other small countries as well. Participation was a way of demonstrating that even a small member brought skills and experience that were an asset for the Alliance. Earning the respect of other schoolmates was an effect that should not be overlooked, however difficult it may be to pinpoint. This seems especially to have been the case with Norwegian navy officers who often had longer sailing experience than their colleagues from the larger countries. Earning the respect of the other gave them a feeling that Norway was worthy of reinforcements, and that the recipients would be able to meet with the requirements this imposed.

¹³⁶ Founding paragraph quoted in Thinn, p. 647.

¹³⁷ Commander E. Eikanger, “NATO Defence College”, *Norsk tidsskrift for sjøvesen*, no. 5, 1981, pp. 31–33.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is often overlooked when multinationality is discussed. This is understandable insofar as larger nations are concerned. For their smaller counterparts, peacekeeping has been significant as a foreign policy tool, but also because it has involved a sizeable share of manpower.¹³⁸ Since 1945, Norwegian units have participated in around 40 missions abroad, close to 30 of them under a UN flag.¹³⁹

The largest of these did not take place under a UN flag, but was a part of the Allied occupation of Germany. From 1947 to 1953, a total of 50,000 uniformed men participated in what became known as the German brigade. The plans for a Norwegian contingent had been drawn up during the war. British authorities had originally asked Norway to come up with “a small division of 12,000 men”.¹⁴⁰ This was well beyond what Norway could contribute. In the end, Norway sent off a small brigade of 4000 men. The brigade was placed under British command. Sending off the soldiers to participate in the occupation was not a decision made without reservations. If the Cold War were to turn hot, Norwegian soldiers would be withdrawn to cover national defence needs.

Throughout the Cold War, Norwegian involvement in peacekeeping grew at a steady pace. The longest, and largest was the UN Interim Force in Lebanon set up in 1978. Over the course of the next twenty years, more than 21,000 Norwegians served there.

Peacekeeping was multinational in a broad sense in that missions were undertaken by units from more than one country, and these units had to cooperate to succeed. The degree of multinational coordination differed from mission to

¹³⁸ See Hirofimu Shimizu and Todd Sandler, “Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994–2000”, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 39, no. 6, 2002, pp. 651–68.

¹³⁹ *Forsvarets Forum*, no. 12, June 2003, p. 15.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

mission. But peacekeeping exposed the men to an environment that in every way was remote from what they knew, and they were forced to adapt.

Peacekeeping provided international standing and was therefore politically useful. It also provided small states with a niche that larger countries were reluctant to fill. Small states are less likely to be accused of acting out of imperialist motives. Moreover, peacekeeping did not require heavy, advanced or expensive equipment. And above all, it was relatively low-risk.

These distinctive features are no longer as evident today. Peace enforcement operations have contributed to this blurring. The kind of peacekeeping operations known from the Cold War period whereby the UN requested troops to monitor a truce or peace agreement, has been supplemented by operations that presuppose more military muscle. For smaller countries, this is not necessarily a welcome development. It is politically more difficult to commit soldiers to what are clearly more risky operations. This, together with increased costs, has triggered cooperative efforts between the Nordic countries to come up with a joint peacekeeping element that can be deployed when called upon. This will be discussed next.

SHIRBRIG

A Danish initiative taken in 1994 led to the establishment of the Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (henceforth SHIRBRIG). The then Danish Minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup and Koffi Annan, at the time head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, had discussed the need for fast and adequate reactions to limit and quell emerging crises. Both agreed that this required multinational forces that were not composed on an *ad hoc* basis, but units that were well integrated as a result of joint training and manoeuvres.¹⁴¹

¹⁴¹ [Http://www.SHIRBRIG.dk](http://www.SHIRBRIG.dk)

Denmark pursued the idea contacting other countries with a long peacekeeping record. Response was positive. Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Austria voiced their interest. In January 2000, all the countries with the exception of Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, had earmarked all-in-all 4500 men, sufficient to constitute a brigade.

The brigade is part of the UN Stand by System whereby countries report units the United Nations can call upon for UN-mandated missions. But the ultimate decision on whether to send soldiers or not rests with each contributing country. Within the brigade, there are two units trained to fulfil the same role. In this way, the brigade has an in-built flexibility rarely seen in other multinational units. The possibility that one of them might choose to refrain from participation is therefore unlikely to hinder deployment.

The units are stationed in their respective countries but are trained according to jointly agreed standards. They also meet for exercises. Running expenses are covered by each country, but once deployed on a UN peacekeeping mission, expenses are refunded by the UN. If a crisis situation arises, an advance command unit should be deployable within two weeks once the national parliaments have given their acceptance. For the main force, the time limit is 30 days. The brigade will not be deployed for more than six months. Once that period is completed, other peacekeeping forces must take over.

The leadership of SHIRBRIG is divided in two, the Steering Committee and the Planning Element. Representatives from all the participating countries meet in the Steering Committee. This is where political and economic decisions are made. SHIRBRIG's permanent military staff makes up the Planning Element. It is located in Høvelte in Denmark. Operational and logistical training for the staff itself and the heads of the SHIRBRIG units is undertaken here. In addition, the Planning

Element bears the responsibility for the development of common procedures and standards for SHIRBRIG.

The UN has called upon SHIRBRIG three times, although it has so far only been deployed once. The first time was in April 2000 when plans were made to send units to southern Lebanon in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal. But the withdrawal was completed sooner than the outside observers, including the UN, had expected, and an interim solution to enhance the capacities of the peacekeeping units already there had to be found at short notice. This urgency precluded the deployment of SHIRBRIG units.

The second and third time coincided. In late June 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea entered on a cease-fire agreement. The UN was asked to send peacekeeping units to police the agreement. The UN turned to SHIRBRIG. The SHIRBRIG countries agreed, but no decision was made on what elements to send before another UN request was transmitted. This time the UN urgently needed forces to assist the faltering United Nations operation in Sierra Leone. The SHIRBRIG countries rejected this request unanimously stating that this would overstretch the resources available. Instead it was decided that SHIRBRIG should support the UN mission in Eritrea.

Norwegian support for SHIRBRIG was reluctant. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was all in favour of Norwegian participation, with the Ministry of Defence supported by the Supreme Command expressing reservations. The Ministry feared that SHIRBRIG would be used for peacekeeping in regions and conflicts of little if any relevance to Norwegian security. Contributions to SHIRBRIG could potentially make it difficult for Norway to provide men for NATO missions. If so, SHIRBRIG could undermine Norway's credibility as an Alliance partner.

NORDCAPS

Norwegian hesitancy towards SHIRBRIG did not mean that the Norwegian government scorned the idea of joint Nordic efforts. Consultations between the Danish and Norwegian Ministers of Defence in the summer of 1996 led NORDCAPS, (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support). The idea was to provide a framework for Nordic participation in peace support operations mandated by the United Nations. Whereas SHIRBRIG was to be used for peacekeeping, NORDCAPS would be deployed to control armed conflicts.

Under the auspices of NORDCAPS, each country may report units available for peace-enforcement to a common force pool, but the decision to send them rests with the government of each country. Thus, there is no binding commitment enforcing a member state to join the others if they should choose to deploy theirs. But the aim was to come up with forces amounting to a brigade, a size that would be commensurate with the requirement of visibility and influence.

Joint exercises have been held annually since 1997. The idea is that only those units likely to be deployed in the field on a mission will train together. The exercises are instrumental in the development of common procedures as well as common command, control and communications systems. It remains the responsibility of each country to make sure that its men meet the necessary requirements to undertake the missions.

NORDCAPS is supervised by two organs: The Steering Group and the Military Coordination Group. The Steering Group consists of director generals or deputy permanent secretaries of state for defence from the contributing countries. The group meets every six months; the chairman rotates between the participants on an annual basis.

The Military Coordination Group meets every second month. Its members are senior officers. Pending on the issues on the agenda, they may bring with them national experts and

advisors. The Group is responsible for issuing military advice to the Steering Group. The chairmanship rotates on a bi-annual basis.

The only permanently staffed body within the NORDCAPS framework is the Planning Element. It fulfils a military staff function for the Military Coordination Group which also decides its size and function. The member countries assign personnel to the Planning Element, the norm is two officers from each nation. Experts may be temporarily assigned to the Planning Element if needed in the preparation for a specific task. The Planning Element is responsible for keeping the force pool up-to-date. Within NORDCAPS, NATO procedures and definitions will be used to the widest extent possible. This has certainly been facilitated by Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO's Partnership-for-Peace programme.

NORDCAPS represents a net gain for all the Nordic members. It helps overcome the dividing lines created during the Cold War. For Sweden and Finland, NORDCAPS is a step towards stronger westward links. On the practical level, NORDCAPS enables the countries to train their officers to take command over a multinational brigade. This makes them relevant in a wider context. This is one of the concrete positive results that can be attributed to NORDCAPS.

It is still too early to arrive at any lessons learned. But national restrictions make it questionable to what extent NORDCAPS will be able to react as swiftly as planned. This concerns in particular Denmark which has reservations about participating in any EU-led military mission, even if the EU were to request assistance from NORDCAPS.¹⁴² Likewise, Finnish participation is subject to constraints. Although Finnish soldiers may participate in peacekeeping, peace

¹⁴² "Danmark vil ikke kunne deltage med militære styrker i EU-ledede militære krisestyringsoperationer", bilag til Forsvarsministerens skrivelse af 24 November, 2000. København: Forsvarsministeriet, 2000.

enforcement is a closed option. Furthermore, Sweden harbours reservations against letting NORDCAPS be used in a NATO context. This makes a strange contrast to Norway, which despite not being an EU-member, has declared its willingness to contribute militarily to an EU-led force provided that Norway has access to the command structures. From a Norwegian perspective, Britain's decision to enter a cooperation agreement with NORDCAPS in April 2002 was a significant step forward. It would boost the credibility of the NORDCAPS arrangements, and it would do the same for the bilateral relations between Norway and Britain.

The scope for Nordic multinationality

If the Nordic countries are able to modernise their armed forces and develop niche capacities, they will make the move from nice-to-have to need-to-have when a coalition is assembled.¹⁴³ But whether this will mean that they pool their resources to form a Nordic segment within a coalition, is not yet clear. For all the countries, the attractions of cooperating with countries that play a leading role in a specific field supersede the wish to engage in binding and comprehensive cooperation with their neighbours.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, the complications ensuing from different Alliance memberships and individual reservations complicate the ability to act in unison. It should be added that this may not always be an impeding factor. Although it would have been far easier to push a particular Nordic viewpoint in the EU or NATO had all been members, the countries' memberships complement each other. To Sweden, Norway is a source of information on

¹⁴³ This phrase is borrowed from Major Jens Jørgen Hansen, *Forsvarsspecialisering i de nordiske lande*, Research-brief no. 8, København: Dupi, 2001.

¹⁴⁴ This was the conclusion drawn by students at the Norwegian staff college who had been working on the potentials for Nordic cooperation, Oslo 2003. This view has also been expressed during an interview with James Hursch, International section, Danish Ministry of Defence, January 2000.

proceedings within NATO, and Sweden and Denmark may serve in the same capacity with regard to processes within the EU. In some cases, Sweden has consulted Norway on changes to the PfP programme which Sweden has joined. Norway has subsequently supported the proposals in NATO.¹⁴⁵

Joining the PfP programme was a major part of Swedish and Finnish efforts to expand contacts with NATO.¹⁴⁶ Neutrality is no longer a guiding principle. Both countries have underlined the fact that national security is best maintained through extensive cooperation with other countries. Swedish official documents have underlined the need for a continued US engagement in European security.¹⁴⁷

Denmark has so far been similar to Norway in that both countries are outside the EU's common security and defence policy. The present Danish government has voiced its interest in scrapping the exemption in an upcoming referendum. On this, they enjoy the tacit support of the largest opposition party, the Social Democrats. But Danish defence debate and reforms already seem to be geared towards developing the capacities the EU will need.¹⁴⁸

Plans that have been discussed for possible joint Nordic efforts have involved strategic airlift, a capacity in short supply in NATO and in the EU.¹⁴⁹ On their own, the Nordic countries would not be able cover this gap. Instead, the

¹⁴⁵ For a survey of Norwegian-Swedish defence and security cooperation, see Rolf Tamnes, "Norge og Sverige: fremtidige strategiske partnere?", in Erik Rossander (ed.), *Föreningen FHS 1953–2003*, Stockholm 2003.

¹⁴⁶ See Njord Wegge, *Med Brussel som tyngdepunkt? Svensk og finsk sikkerhetspolitikk i det nye Europa*, Forsvarsstudier, no. 5, Oslo: Institutt for forsvarsstudier, 2003.

¹⁴⁷ "Utrikesdeklarasjonen: Regeringens deklarasjon vid 2002 utrikespolitiska debatt i riksdagen onsdagen den 13 februari 2002".

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*; and Michael H. Clemmesen, "NATO lite", *Weekendavisen*, 25 April 2003.

¹⁴⁹ Norbert Eitelhuber, "Europäische Streitkräfte unter dem Zwang der Bescheidung Partner der USA nur bei friedenssichernden Einsätzen", *SWP Studien*, no. 8, March 2003; Hansen, *Forsvarsspecialisering i de nordiske lande*; Ellehuus, *Multinational Solutions versus Intra-Alliance Specialisation*.

Nordic countries currently using C 139 Hercules planes could form a pool with other European countries holding these planes in their inventories for their transport needs. If pooled, maintenance costs could be reduced. Here pooling makes economic sense. When Germany and the BeNeLux countries decided to purchase Airbus A400M planes in 2001, it was decided that maintenance would be undertaken jointly with costs split depending on the number of planes each country has purchased. The ability of the Nordic countries to copy this may have been precluded by the Danish decision made in late 2003 to purchase three Hercules transport planes.

The way armaments production is structured and supported in the Nordic countries may also impede integration. Differences here reflect size. Sweden dwarfs the other countries with the sheer size of its sector. The production of fighter planes plays a key role, and is one product where Sweden is competing with US F-16 and Eurofighter planes for orders in a global market. Spending on research and development has remained consistently high with funds both coming from public sources and the firms involved. Sweden and Finland's non-alignment policy was reflected in a heavy reliance on domestic products.¹⁵⁰ The two countries cooperated industrially in some fields. In comparison, the Norwegian industrial base is much smaller, concentrating on a few niche products. In both Norway and Sweden, research establishments conduct a wide variety of work on the development of technology for the defence sector. In Norway, much research also concentrates on how imports must be modified to meet the requirements posed by the climatic and topographic conditions. In Denmark and Finland, research has operated much more on a "technology watch" basis, and thus had more or less the role as a channel of information on developments abroad to the national defence sector. These

¹⁵⁰ Domestically produced or not, Swedish aerospace industry remains strongly dependent on US technology.

differences cannot fail but have an impact on industrial cooperation.

Nordic industrial cooperation

Developments in the European armaments sector throughout the 1990s influenced the Nordic defence industries. These developments can be summed up in three words: Downsizing, integration, monopolisation. Important milestones have been the consolidation of British Aerospace, which after a series of acquisitions of smaller European firms, is now only surpassed by the US firm Lockheed Martin in turnover; and the merger of the German DASA with the French Aerospatiale Matra and the Spanish CASA into EADS (European Aeronautics, Defence and Space). EADS is now among the ten largest international armaments producer. The possibility that British Aerospace and EADS might choose to pool their resources with one gigantic European firm as a result, should not be ruled out. EU efforts to create a military pillar will influence European armaments production positively in the years ahead, although the final shape and size of the sector remains uncertain.

These developments triggered Nordic defence enterprises to explore the potential for cooperation. The limited size of the enterprises when compared with the larger European ones left them in a more vulnerable position to market changes. The drop in demand at the beginning of the 1990s hit all badly, but the Nordic countries had few protective buffers and found it hard to find new markets outside their own countries. If politicians and industry could work together, drastic cutbacks and closures could be prevented and the industry might emerge both "leaner and meaner". The political interest in furthering this process was also motivated by the desire to promote Nordic cooperation in a field that had so long been out of bounds, namely security.

In November 1992 the Nordic defence ministers decided to establish a working committee with the mandate to look at

the potential for closer cooperation in the production and procurement of armaments. Two years later, in December 1994, the four countries signed an agreement on this issue; the agreement was renewed in late 2000. In May 1995, the defence commands from the four countries jointly signed an agreement concerning armaments cooperation. This has been replaced by a more recent version in 2001.

The intentions behind the agreements were to provide a framework for mutual exchange of information on planning and procurement. The agreements can facilitate closer coordination and possible joint efforts in research and development, and procurement. This would in turn pave the way for increased interoperability, necessary not least for Nordic peace operations in the years to come. As the dates for the agreements indicate, they have not been in force long, and it is still too early to draw any definite lessons from what their effects have been.¹⁵¹ Indeed, in some of the most recently published evaluations of Nordic industrial cooperation in armament, they get little more than a polite mention.¹⁵² Nonetheless, the joint Nordic projects that have been launched have depended on political backing. One such example is NAMMO.

NAMMO is the acronym for the Nordic Ammunition Company. The company specialises in the manufacturing of ammunition, propulsion and demilitarisation technologies. It has approx. 1500 employees in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Germany. In many European countries the production of

¹⁵¹ There is a question of method at stake here. There is no register of firms that have entered cooperation agreements under the auspices of this agreement. Nevertheless, the importance of the agreement was repeatedly underlined by Norwegian and Swedish armaments producers at a Nordic-Central European round table on armaments cooperation arranged by the Norwegian Trade Council, Prague, January 2000.

¹⁵² E.g. Preben Bonnén and Teemu Palosaari, "On the Road to a Nordic Defence Co-Operation? Bringing Military Issues Back to Politics", paper presented at the conference *Norden at the Crossroads*, Helsinki, October 2002; Hansen, *Forsvarsspecialisering i de nordiske lande*.

ammunition has continued to enjoy a degree of state protection even more comprehensive than other defence producers. This could have spelt doom for a relatively small Nordic company like NAMMO, but the enterprise has managed to survive not least because it has carved out a niche for itself within propulsion technology.

But Nordic industrial cooperation has some less celebrated cases that should be included. Another venture where the final outcome deviated from the original, multi-Nordic plan was the Nordic Standard Helicopter Programme (NSHP). The firms behind spanned Swedish Aerotech Telub, the Danish Aerotech, and the Norwegian Astec Helicopter Services. The armed forces of all the four Nordic countries agreed to purchase 70 helicopters.¹⁵³ The project would have given the Nordic enterprises a competitive edge in the international market. Nonetheless, experts in all the countries involved had reservations about the wisdom of the project. In Finland, the need for a battlefield utility helicopter was doubted, and whether there was any common ground between Denmark's need for a search-and-rescue aircraft and the Norwegian emphasis on a multipurpose helicopter capable of undertaking both missions and logistics support was questioned.¹⁵⁴ Thus, in September 2001, Denmark announced that it backed out and would instead buy Westland/Agusta helicopters.

The Nordic Viking submarine project represents another project that faltered. Plans were presented in 1994 for the development and production of a submarine that could serve the needs of Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Originally, ten boats were to be produced for delivery between 2009 and 2016, with Denmark and Norway having ordered four each with the remainder destined for the Swedish navy. Yet, in

¹⁵³ CHC Helicopter Corporation, "Scandinavian Helicopter Logistics Alliance", Media release, http://www.chc.ca/press/april10_01_astec.htm

¹⁵⁴ Giovanni de Briganti, "Nordic Procurement must proceed", *Rotor and Wing*, August 2001.

2002, Norway withdrew. The government claimed lack of funds. Another cause, although never openly admitted, had been the wish to break the production monopoly of the German Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft AG, (henceforth HDW). This monopoly covered the production of submarines suited for littoral warfare used by the Nordic countries. When HDW purchased Kockums, the Swedish industrial participant in 1999, continued dominance was secured. As a result, Norwegian interest waned.

The few cases mentioned here share the characteristic that they all deal with defence industry in the traditional sense. The distinction between the defence sector and the civilian market is being blurred, and some comments should be made on how this affects small countries.

High-tech firms, especially within biotechnology or information technology, supply virtually the same goods and services to clients inside or outside the defence segment. These enterprises share a set of characteristics that set them apart from those that make up the defence industry sector. Their products are based on long-term research and development. Defence is only one of many customers, most of whom are found abroad. Operating in a highly competitive international market environment, these firms are quick to spot promising trends. Bavarian Nordic, a Danish firm, is a recent example of an enterprise that has managed to land a significant contract with the US government a vaccine against smallpox.¹⁵⁵ Other niche producers in the same sector suddenly discovered that their services are in high demand as a result of the increased apprehension over attacks with biological weapons.

The small size of these firms means that they lack the resources, financially as well as in terms of manpower, required for lengthy negotiations with large-scale clients such as those found in the US defence sector. The acknowledgment

¹⁵⁵ Morten Crone, "Ny dansk forsvarsindustri", *Berlingske Tidende*, 9 November 2003.

of this potential bottleneck has resulted in efforts on the part of some of the enterprise to exchange experiences and possibly cooperate not only with each other but with enterprises in other countries. Finally, being so thoroughly internationalised means that the choice of partner will not be influenced by nationality, but by what the firm in question has to offer. Whether the development sketched out here will lead to more Nordic multinationality is therefore uncertain. From the point of view of the firms the question appears irrelevant.

Conclusion

This chapter started out by asserting that the prime asset Norway brought into the Alliance was its geostrategic location. From Norway, Russian naval movements in northern waters and the military developments on the Kola Peninsula could be monitored. But this location was also a source of concerns over the viability of Allied reinforcement in case of an attack. Plans drawn up by NATO specifying what units would be deployed to Norway if the need should arise, were a direct response to these worries. To get accustomed to the topography and the arctic climate, large-scale exercises were conducted in Norway with participation of these units and Norwegian troops. The exercises were a concrete expression of Allied interest in the Northern flank. As shown above, neither the exercises nor this relationship was unproblematic. This concerned in particular command issues where national interests and US principles clashed. Norway wanted to use the command structure within NATO to promote national interests and to ensure integration. These two objectives are not easily compatible. The challenge of achieving the one without compromising the other remains equally valid today.

Another field that was used to enhance integration within the Alliance was education. Schooling abroad, the long- and short-term exchange of officers became the norm in both the

navy and the air force, to a lesser extent in the army. This gave the students an awareness of each other's national peculiarities that would be difficult to attain in any other way. This awareness is of considerable value since it will help reduce the adverse effects national differences have on multinational ventures. From a less altruistic perspective, training Norwegian officers abroad as well as enrolling students from Allied countries at Norwegian defence establishments was an important way of promoting Norway's credibility as an ally. And the need to demonstrate credibility is felt more keenly by a smaller partner than a large country.¹⁵⁶ But costs also played a role here, joint schooling meant access to know-how that would have been too costly to provide nationally.

With the end of the Cold War, the value of Norway's location to the Alliance declined. The improved relationship between Russia and the West meant that the likelihood of an attack on Norway had diminished drastically. Although there were some clear signs of tardiness in the Norwegian response to this change, NATO's transformation away from an exclusive focus on territorial defence to out-of-area operations was supported by the Norwegian political leadership irrespective of party colours. Nevertheless, the Norwegian perspective differed somewhat from that of the other European allies. Russia maintained strong military forces in the north, and it also questioned Norway's interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty and of the legal status of the zone and the shelf around the islands, something which constituted sources for concern to Norwegian politicians. From their perspective NATO remained a necessary safeguard for Norway, and without EU membership, one of the few forums where

¹⁵⁶ That is probably the reason why this is rarely, if ever mentioned in German or English literature on multinationality, whereas the outline for a comprehensive reform of Norwegian defence published in 2000 underlines this point. See *Et nytt forsvar*, Oslo: NOU, 2000, p. 38.

Norway had a say. Yet at the same time, it was clear that unless NATO was regarded as relevant by Washington, US interest would evaporate and the Alliance would be little more than an obsolete armed variety of the OSCE. Consequently, Norway supported the changes implemented within NATO towards more flexible, high-readiness forces capable of operating outside the membership area. This triggered a radical overhaul of Norwegian defence aimed at producing forces that could participate alongside Allied units.

Participation was one way of ensuring relevance within the Alliance. The change in headquarters that had been implemented to reflect new threats affected Norway negatively. The loss of headquarters and the influence that comes along with it was balanced by the decision to establish a Joint Warfare Center at Jättå which will play a key role in defence transformation in the Alliance.

One part of the Norwegian defence transformation was to explore the possibilities for multinational cooperation with the country's Nordic neighbours. The most notable results have been SHIRBRIG and NORDCAPS. Although national restrictions and different Alliance memberships limit the scope of what is possible, these differences have dwindled. This paves the way for new projects and forms of cooperations in training, education, logistics, research and development, procurement etc. The driving forces are easily discernible. By pooling their resources, smaller countries can expect to gain greater influence. This may be the case in peace operations, or in the negotiation for armament contracts. In the latter case, pooling means reduced costs. But pooling also implies that not only the benefits but also the burden is divided among the participants. That is the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Dividing the Burden

Burden-sharing is the term used to describe the different schemes for how defence costs are divided among the member countries in NATO. This refers less to the costs for NATO-funded projects, the lions share of these has traditionally been covered by the US, but to the size of national defence budgets. Burden-sharing has a profound impact upon the transatlantic relationship within NATO. Burden-sharing has been an intrinsic part of the transatlantic dialogue. More often than not, it has boiled down to the US side urging the Europeans to spend more to assure a greater degree of parity, and thus to reduce what US politicians have occasionally labelled as “burden shedding”.

This chapter provides a survey of some of the problems in defining an equitable scheme for dividing the burdens of common defence. As will be shown, during the Cold War much depended on how each country’s input was defined, and here differences abounded. With the end of the Cold War, the parameters for the debate on burden-sharing changed radically. The decision taken by the North Atlantic Council in June 1992 to let NATO undertake operations out of area was welcomed by the European members, above all since it seemed to imbue the Alliance with new life. This sentiment must have been dampened once it was realised that most European countries lacked the training and equipment needed for out-

of-area operations. This meant that the burden-sharing debate resumed, after a brief lull at the beginning of the 1990s when the viability of the Alliance was questioned. At this point, defence spending had slumped dramatically as most countries were eager to cash in on what was called the “peace dividend”. As shown in the table below, spending remained low throughout the 1990s when compared with the 1985 figures.

European and US defence expenditure 1985–2001 (figures in constant 2000 US dollars)

	1985		2000		2001	
	US\$m	%GDP	US\$m	%GDP	US\$m	%GDP
Belgium	6,223	3,0	3,212	1,4	3,017	1,3
Czech Republic	n/a	n/a	1,148	2,3	1,167	2,2
Denmark	3,161	2,2	2,395	1,5	2,409	1,5
France	49,378	4,0	34,053	2,6	32,909	2,6
Germany	53,303	3,2	27,924	1,5	26,902	1,5
Greece	3,521	7,0	5,528	4,9	5,517	4,8
Hungary	3,588	7,2	805	1,7	909	1,8
Italy	25,974	2,3	22,488	2,1	20,966	2,0
Luxembourg	96	0,9	129	0,7	145	0,8
Netherlands	8,991	3,1	6,027	1,6	6,257	1,7
Norway	3,129	3,1	2,923	1,8	2,967	1,8
Poland	8,706	8,1	3,092	2,0	3,408	2,0
Portugal	1,853	3,1	2,221	2,1	2,226	2,0
Spain	11,398	2,4	7,063	1,2	6,938	1,2
Turkey	3,470	4,5	9,994	5,0	7,219	5,0
United Kingdom	48,196	5,2	35,655	2,5	34,714	2,5
United States	390,290	6,5	304,136	3,1	322,365	3,2

Source: *Military Balance 2002–2003*, London: IISS, 2003.

Transatlantic tensions

The debate over burden-sharing has gone in waves. The causes triggering it had often less to do with concerns over NATO capabilities than domestic economic problems.

Whenever spending was cut to cover a fall in state income, defence budgets were affected. For several US administrations,

and in particular Congresses, this meant questioning whether US commitments to NATO represented too large a burden, a burden that would only be reduced by withdrawing troops from Europe.

This was the case at the beginning of the 1960s when the US side pressed for the West-German government to cover part of the costs of US troops stationed there. At the same time, the US engagement in Vietnam turned costlier by the week. The German government had at the beginning of the decade entered into an agreement over German purchases of US weapons. This was intended as an indirect offset payment for the US deployment costs. But by the mid-60s, budget problems made the German government ask to be relieved from the agreement. The US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara threatened to cut US commitments to Germany and insisted that the payments should be made as agreed.

McNamara's attitude had significant support in the US Senate. The majority leader Mike Mansfield introduced the first of what became known as the "Mansfield resolutions" calling for substantial troop withdrawals from Europe on the grounds that the Europeans were economically capable of paying more than they did.

Yet, US efforts, especially congressional efforts to increase European spending by threatening to withdraw troops in response to insufficient European input, have hardly been an unmitigated success. For instance, German offset commitments were in fact reduced when a new government took office in 1966.

In 1969, discontent was voiced on Capitol Hill over alleged insufficient European spending with the possible withdrawal of US troops being discussed as a retaliatory measure. This caused alarm. In response, the so-called European Defence Improvement Program was set up in 1970, embracing all the

European allies with the exception of Iceland, France and Portugal. The countries were referred to as the Eurogroup.¹⁵⁷

Firstly, as a result of the work in the Eurogroup, funding was provided for the implementation of an integrated communication system for NATO, as well as for improved protection of aircraft. Total costs were estimated at \$420 million; secondly, a five-year investment programme aimed at strengthening those national units assigned to NATO command was implemented. Total costs were estimated to lie between \$450 and 500 million. The third project embraced short-term measures to strengthen joint defence over the next two years amounting to \$79 million.

Progress was swift. Already in 1972, the financial details had been worked out and detailed planning completed. Norway contributed \$14 million, at the time equivalent to NOK100 million.¹⁵⁸ In return, the programme allotted \$105 million to investments in Norwegian military projects.¹⁵⁹ Norway chaired the group in 1974.

However, the Euro programme did not quell American dissatisfaction over insufficient European defence spending. In 1973, the US Congress decided that unless the Europeans covered the US deficit on the military balance of payments, American soldiers would have to be withdrawn to cover the gap. The disagreement over burden-sharing at this time was fuelled by the generally problematic economic climate. Inflation was high. This affected defence spending. Several countries were being forced to scale down already agreed plans.

The pressure from Washington notwithstanding, the US position on European payments and US troops withdrawals remained somewhat ambiguous. Congressional posturing was

¹⁵⁷ See St.meld no. 60 (1970–71), “Om samarbeidet i Atlanterhavspaktens organisasjon i 1971”, p. 9, and St.meld. no. 65 (1971–72), p. 12.

¹⁵⁸ St.meld. no. 60, p. 12.

¹⁵⁹ The main projects were the construction of protective hangars at military airports and upgrading of the garrison in Porsanger in Northern Norway.

balanced by successive US administrations emphasising that troop withdrawals would only be aimed at as a part of a wider framework agreement with the Warsaw Pact on mutual reductions.

Burden-sharing took a rather surprising turn in the 1980s with president Ronald Reagan's plans for a Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). At this time, a missile attack was regarded as the most probable form of Soviet-led attack against the West. Provided the shield covered both North America and Western Europe, SDI would have conferred public benefits to the European allies.

Defining the share

The debate on burden-sharing continued with increased force during the 1980s. The main positions did not change. Much of the attention was focused on how the member countries' share in the common defence should be defined. This proved to be a quagmire since there is no commonly agreed key as to how national contributions are measured.

An ally that supports NATO infrastructure more than others will focus on this despite the fact that defence spending is well below the average for the other members. Any evaluation will be confounded by alternative ways of measuring, the problems of comparing spending, and the multiple missions of the Alliance. Different analysts arrive at different results. Counting tanks is easily done, but numbers alone reveal nothing about their state and capability. Moreover, unless the tanks can rely on adequate air support, they run a realistic danger of being obliterated in case of war. Thus, spending money on tanks may look good on the budget and endow a country with a relatively greater weight than other Alliance members, but it says little about combat efficiency.

Furthermore, a comparison based on annual contributions, either selecting a given year or a brief period, may lead to the

wrong conclusions. Large procurement orders may boost the budget only to disappear the next year. Likewise, personnel costs may swing as a result of changes in peacekeeping missions, or foreign engagements. For instance, during the 1960s, the US war in Vietnam meant that the American defence budget alone accounted for approximately 70 per cent of total NATO defence expenditures. Thus, no automatic linkage between numbers and efficiency should be assumed.

To even out transatlantic differences in burden-sharing, NATO has usually resorted to urging the members to spend a fixed share of GDP on defence. A case in point was the three percent rule-of-thumb recommended at the 1977 London Summit.

Three percent was an arbitrary number arrived at after lengthy negotiations and represented the politically possible. Thus, the number was neither tied to a specific quantity or quality. It carried no promise that the money would be spent on what NATO needed to maintain its military credibility. Very soon, it was clear that the recommendation caused confusion. What could be included under the heading defence spending had not been specified. Disagreements also covered what indices to use as yardsticks (purchasing-power-parity, exchange rates etc.). The transatlantic gap, not as acutely felt at the time as now, was not reduced. In the end, far from all the European members reached, let alone maintained spending at or above three-per cent for the following years.

This example illustrates how the burden-sharing debate within NATO often failed to pass the first obstacle, namely that of determining the contributions forthcoming from each member.¹⁶⁰ There is another, far more pertinent problem

¹⁶⁰ For a detailed survey of the different accounting methods, see Golden, *NATO Burden-sharing*. A more updated version, taking into account the costs of enlargement, can be found in Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley, *The Political Economy of NATO, Past, Present and into the 21st Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, especially ch. 2, "Burden-sharing and related issues", pp. 22–57.

though, and that is agreeing on what the relevant targets are, and how spending can be directed to fulfilling them. This is a relevant goal not least with the competing security agendas of NATO and the EU in mind. If there is no agreement on the targets, the debate will often tend to be focused on generalisations like “Europe must spend more, spend more effectively, cooperate more”. This contrasts with the Prague Capabilities Commitment agreed in 2002 where a detailed list of tasks that had to be solved to ensure continued military viability was agreed.¹⁶¹ This should make it possible to avoid some of the pitfalls and problems described here.

Post-Cold War burden-sharing

During the Cold War, NATO's security was a public good. US engagement and the possibility of resorting to nuclear weapons in case of an attack, provided security for all the members irrespective of whether they increased their defence budgets or not. Adding new members had little impact on costs. The practical problems emerged once the bill was divided. Members valuing deterrence more than others would be inclined to spend above average on defence, whereas Alliance members attributing less importance to deterrence, would, as discussed previously, try to get a free ride.¹⁶²

The debate on burden-sharing after the end of the Cold War is intertwined with the decision taken by the North Atlantic Council in June 1992 to “support, on a case by case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including making available Alliance resources and expertise.”¹⁶³ From this rather timid beginning, out-of-area operations have increased in importance, in the new millennium due to the

¹⁶¹ See Golden, *NATO Burden-sharing*, p. 17.

¹⁶² See p. 57.

¹⁶³ Ministerial meeting of the NAC in Oslo, 4 June 1992, *Final Communiqué*, §11.

identification of international terrorism as a major threat to the West. This development could hardly have been foreseen in 1992.

Although few dispute the dangers posed by terrorism, perceptions differ on how the new terrorist threat should be fought.¹⁶⁴ It follows from this that differences also include what capabilities are needed and who can provide them. Running the danger of oversimplifying transatlantic differences, one may claim that the Bush administration tends to perceive security as a zero-sum game, either you have it or you don't. Europeans find this difficult to allow, not least because they have become used to living with a much higher degree of vulnerability both during the Cold War, but also due to repeated terrorist attacks. This translates into different views on how the threat can best be countered. Whereas the European side emphasises what is sometimes summed up as preventative diplomacy covering economic assistance, trade, political contacts and dialogue, the US side will attribute more weight to military means.¹⁶⁵ In 1999, i.e. two years before the terrorist attacks on the United States, the impact of this disparity in perceptions was described thus:

The transatlantic schism could turn fatal to the alliance in the event of a violent conflict with a WMD [weapons of mass destruction]-armed rogue over shared interests, in which European forces fail significantly to respond alongside US

¹⁶⁴ For an interpretation of how the fight against terrorism influences the Alliance, see Tom Lansford, *All for One: Terrorism, NATO and the United States*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.

¹⁶⁵ The seminal paper outlining the transatlantic differences post-9/11 is Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003. Kagan claims that the European predilections are due, among other things, to their lack of military capabilities.

forces [...] European militaries are not challenged by the same mission as their American cousins.¹⁶⁶

In the United States, this split has refuelled a long-standing debate on the benefits of alliances. Although *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* from September 2002 reaffirms the Alliance commitments, other voices recommending a “grand exit strategy” can be heard as well.¹⁶⁷ But the war against terror has also fuelled a sense of vulnerability; needless to say this has shaped the debate in the US more acutely than in Europe as to how this threat can be met with effective military means. One reply has been the need to speed up the establishment of military forces that are deployable “within days rather than weeks” according to one report written for the US administration.¹⁶⁸ The report was published in 2000, i.e. before the terror attacks in New York and Washington, and was primarily intended for a US audience.

The complaint voiced in the report should be borne in mind when attention is shifted to this side of the Atlantic. According to EU estimates, the military expenditure of the Union is roughly half that of the United States, yet they possess little more than ten percent of the US capacity to deploy and

¹⁶⁶ David C. Gompert, Richard Kugler and Martin C. Libicki, *Mind the Gap – Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs*, Washington: National Defense University, 1999, p. 7.

¹⁶⁷ *The National Strategy of the United States*, Washington D.C.: The White House, September 2002. The need for a concerted action with US allies is asserted in Chapter III “Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends.” A recommendation for leaving NATO, and other “entangling” alliances can be found in Edward A. Olsen, *US National Defense for the Twenty-First Century*, London: Frank Cass, 2002. Olsen is professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. For the opposite view professing that the Alliance can still function as a transatlantic bridge see Lansford, *All for One*.

¹⁶⁸ Eugene Gritton et al, *Ground Forces for a Rapidly Employable Joint Task Force, First-Week Capabilities for Short-Warning Conflicts*, National Defence Research Institute, Santa Monica: RAND, 2000, p. xiii.

sustain troops outside NATO's area.¹⁶⁹ And this tenth is poorly equipped to handle the new threats made visible on September 11. This necessitates a rethink and increased budgets. Dr. Julian Lindley-French, a UK defence specialist, has remarked that: "for the past ten years Europe has acted as though it only seemed prepared to recognise as much threat as it could afford."¹⁷⁰ The same was emphasised by Lord Robertson in a speech given in January 2002:

Orders of battle and headquarters wiring diagrams read impressively. Overall numbers of soldiers, tank and aircraft give a similar impression of military power. But the reality is that we are hard pressed to maintain about 50,000 European troops in the Balkans. And that a new operation would oblige most European countries to slash their contingents in Bosnia, Kosovo and FYROM to produce usable forces in any number.¹⁷¹

The change advocated by Lord Robertson seems to be in the offing, at least on the rhetorical level. In the summer of 2003, EU foreign ministers agreed to a draft outline of a security doctrine for the EU. The threat perception presented there, displays a number of similarities with the one the Bush administration published in 2002. Most importantly, in the EU draft, it is acknowledged that the soft instruments the EU has resorted to in its attempts to provide stability for neighbouring regions like trade, political contacts and

¹⁶⁹ Charles Grant, *European defence post-Kosovo?*, Centre for European Reform, Working Paper, June 1999, p. 2, identical figures were presented by Oana Lungescu, "Partial progress on 'EU' Army", *BBC News*, 19 May 2003.

¹⁷⁰ Julian Lindley-French, *Terms of engagement. The paradox of American power and the transatlantic dilemma post-11 September*, Chaillot Paper no. 52, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, May 2002, p. 63.

¹⁷¹ Lord Robertson, "The Transatlantic Link", Sälen, Sweden, 21 January 2002, NATO Online Library <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020121a.htm>, accessed 27 November 2003.

economic support, are insufficient when faced with an aggressive opponents. In that case, an armed response will be among the answers considered.

Afghanistan and Iraq

The problematic relationship between burden-sharing and transatlantic relations was fully illustrated both in the US attack on Afghanistan named Operation Enduring Freedom, and in the more recent war in Iraq.

After the September 11 attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty interpreting the attack on the US as an attack on all. The political support offered by the allies in the operations against the Taleban, was welcomed by the Bush Administration, and maximised in the public statements made. But the Allied contributions remained small especially during the initial phase when the Taleban regime was driven out of Kabul. One reason may have been the fact that none of the European allies disposed of precision-guided bombs, drones and electronic warfare equipment in sufficient numbers.¹⁷² Another may have been that limiting Allied participation ensured a smoother decision-making process. The defence expert Philip Gordon's conclusion goes beyond the issue of technical deficiencies and the widening gap in capabilities, when he sums up the US view of Allied participation as:

[...] politically useful but not particularly significant militarily. In this case it was reinforced by what many Americans saw as a key 'lesson' of Kosovo. Whereas many in Europe saw the Kosovo air campaign as excessively dominated by the United States and American generals, most Americans – particularly within the military – saw just the opposite: excessive European meddling, with French politicians and European lawyers interfering with efficient targeting and bombing runs, and compromising operational

¹⁷² See Peters et al., *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force*.

security. This time, the Bush team decided, would be different.¹⁷³

Gradually, European contributions to the war on the Taliban increased. With US attention turning increasingly towards Iraq, a larger European input could release US forces for deployment in the Gulf region.¹⁷⁴ The European contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom included both air power and ground combat troops in addition to the policing units sent in once hostilities had ended.¹⁷⁵

Yet the overall pattern that did emerge suggests one of division of labour and burdens. The principal Allied contribution was in stabilisation operations and in the humanitarian field. The US had requested that the European allies developed contingency strategies for possible operations in Afghanistan. In November 2001, NAC requested the civilian as well as the military organs of the Alliance to start drawing up plans for a wide range of missions should the US be successful in removing the Taliban from Afghanistan. This underscored NATO's relevance, no other organisation disposed of military forces that could be deployed in Afghanistan. Although the stabilisation operations – the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – was not formally a NATO operation, until August 2003 close to all the countries involved were either members of the Alliance or Partner states.

Although the US attack received the approval of the United Nations as a legitimate use of self-defence, European participation fell short of what the US and the Afghan authorities hoped for. This concerns in particular the forces

¹⁷³ Philip H. Gordon, "NATO After 11 September", *Survival*, vol. 43, no. 4, p. 4, pp. 89–106.

¹⁷⁴ See Christopher Bennet, "Aiding America", *NATO Review*, col. 49, no. 4, Winter 2001, pp. 6–7 for a brief survey of allied contributions.

¹⁷⁵ For the Norwegian contribution, see *Norwegian participation in Operation Enduring Freedom*, p. 58.

on the ground. So far, the number of men has been too few and insufficiently equipped to extend stability beyond the capital itself.¹⁷⁶ So-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams have been deployed to centres in the countryside. The US has tried to extract stronger commitments especially from the 1st. German-Netherlands Corps, which has been deployed in Kabul. Only after lengthy negotiations did the German authorities accept to extend their presence beyond the agreed deadline.

The German decision was taken not only to support Afghan peace, but also as a step towards improved relations with the United States.¹⁷⁷ The German government had excluded all German participation in the occupation of Iraq, a position that brought the bilateral relationship with Washington to a low point. A continued and enlarged engagement in Afghanistan is intended as the remedy to repair the relationship.

Germany was not the only country to signal its opposition to the US policy towards Iraq. The war against Saddam Hussein's regime soon ran into the very problems the Bush team had wanted to avoid in Afghanistan. The Franco-German refusal to back any UN resolution legitimising the use of force, was quickly translated into open disarray within NATO over the support to Turkey in case of war. On this, the two countries were joined by Belgium whose defence and foreign ministers declared that the port of Antwerp as well as Belgian airspace would be closed to the Americans.¹⁷⁸ The Belgian Prime Minister quickly retracted this amidst considerable embarrassment. Nonetheless, the point that the cohesion characterising the Alliance during the Cold War

¹⁷⁶ Katja Ridderbusch, "Auch die NATO drängt auf ein Engagement über die Grenzen Kabuls hinaus", *Die Welt*, 7 August 2003.

¹⁷⁷ Ansgar Graw and Martin Lutz, "Kanzler bleibt bei dem Motto 'Kabul statt Bagdad'", *Die Welt*, 12 August 2003.

¹⁷⁸ Luke Hill, "Belgium throws NATO into disarray", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 2 April 2003, p. 4-5.

clearly was a thing of the past, had been made abundantly clear.

In Norway, resistance to the Anglo-American attack on Iraq was widespread in the population. This challenged the traditional pro-American security policy. The government came up with a compromise. It refrained from expressing support for the war, but nevertheless agreed to send soldiers to participate in the post-war humanitarian efforts.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the difficult relationship between multinationality and burden-sharing has been explored. Burden-sharing has been understood rather narrowly in terms of economic and political costs. During the Cold War, the efforts by the American side to get its European allies to boost their spending resulted in arithmetical exercises often deserving the epigram “curiouser and curiouser.”

The main reason was the fact that national sovereignty remained relatively untouched throughout the period. National governments could decide for themselves how the defence budget was to be spent. It almost goes without saying that the final outcome often corresponded with the political agenda of the incumbent government and less with what military experts within NATO would have preferred. Once the Alliance was put to the test, in the Balkans in the 1990s, the results were rather mixed. US military supremacy led to some painful questioning both within NATO and within the European countries on how spending could be coordinated more efficiently in order to get a “bigger bang for the buck”. This debate triggered EU efforts to set up an independent armaments agency and military capacities under the auspices of the EU, efforts that will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

What has been emphasised here though, is that the US debate was rather different from the European, a difference

reinforced after September 11. The developments within the EU were regarded with suspicion by both the Clinton Administration and the present one and interpreted as moves that would undermine the transatlantic relationship. But even more fundamental questions are posed. Why get entangled in alliances with countries that are not militarily up to the task? And why have to depend on politicians likely to interfere in decision-making in ways impairing military efficiency? There are two that raise doubts about the relevance of the Alliance.

The questions overlook the fact that the European allies have shown their relevance in the 1990s in two important ways. One is by providing political support and thus legitimacy to US actions. This was important in the case of Afghanistan, but became crucial in the run-up to the attack on Iraq. The other claim to relevance lies in the sphere of peace enforcement and peacekeeping, this is also why the lessons from the 1990s were mixed and not so dismal that some observers have tended to conclude. Here, NATO proved itself an efficient organ, far surpassing the UN in American eyes. In an essay written for *NATO Review*, the editor Christopher Bennet suggested five different areas where NATO could contribute to the US anti-terrorist strategy.¹⁷⁹ They included humanitarian and peace efforts in the aftermath of the campaign; non-proliferation efforts to prevent states or actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; upgrading civil emergency capabilities; coordinating efforts and activities with other regional and international organisations; improving relations with Russia. A further two factors should be included: legitimacy and burden-sharing. By getting more countries to participate, it would be more difficult to accuse the campaign of being just an expression of US imperialist motives. By getting more countries to participate, the economic burden as well as the human toll will be spread

¹⁷⁹ Bennet, "Aiding America".

more widely. This will make a campaign politically more palatable.

Let us pause to consider the topic of humanitarian and peace operations. They have become an increasingly important part of military engagement in the post-cold war period, and this is an area where the European allies have accrued considerable experience.¹⁸⁰ NATO's operations in the Balkans, in particular peacekeeping in Macedonia underlined the importance of these aspects as well as NATO's ability to incorporate them. NATO functioned as the coordinator bringing together military units, IGOs as well as NGOs. NATO provided the security necessary for these organisations to be able to provide assistance to the civilian population. The efforts to increase capabilities for peace operations have been welcomed by the European members. This has also been linked to the doctrinal shift towards out-of-area operations.

Tom Lansford, in his analysis of the Allied response to the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001, concludes that the division of labour, whereby the European contributions were on the humanitarian side of the operations, was a sensible solution not only because it maximised what the Europeans were best at, but also because: "In this manner, the Administration restored one of the Cold War functions of the Alliance – that of a bridge between the United States and the West European Allies".¹⁸¹ Lansford's conclusion is very upbeat, and can be dissected quite easily. The war against Iraq shows clearly how fragile the bridge can be when a political consensus among key allies has not been reached before operations start.

There are other reasons why Lansford's conclusion should not be taken at face value. If a division of labour whereby the

¹⁸⁰ In 1992, the then Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, decided that preventive diplomacy should be included in UN peacekeeping operations.

¹⁸¹ Lansford, *All for One*, p. 132.

US, either alone or in coalition with one or two more countries, is responsible for “kicking in the door” with most Europeans relegated to the role of “shovel brigade”, the corrosive effects on the Alliance should not be underestimated.¹⁸² Such a division means that those Europeans that lack the capacity and political will to engage in high-intensity expeditionary warfare, will be deprived of actual influence over operations, but will easily find themselves saddled with lengthy and costly peacekeeping operations. Thus, both Lansford and Bennet recommend a continued division of labour, a division based on actual capabilities and comparative advantages, but nevertheless one that underlines US military dominance. This is hardly a recipe for improved transatlantic relations in the years ahead. If the security challenges affect both sides of the Atlantic, the military burden must also be shared more equally, and above all more effectively. How is the topic of the next chapter.

¹⁸² Stephen Larabee and François Heisbourg, “How global a role can and should NATO play?”, *NATO Review*, Spring 2003, pp. 13–17, p. 16.

Chapter 5

Dividing the Capabilities

If NATO broadens the scope of its operations [...] and begins to think of security as a global rather than a European issue – a redistribution of alliance roles will become increasingly important.

James R. Golden, 1983

Size was not a prominent issue in the last chapter. In this chapter, it will be. This is not least due to the important role small countries can play in the planned NATO Response Force (NRF) agreed at the Prague Summit in 2002. Many of the capabilities and skills required to make this force operational constitute the very niche capacities small countries can specialise in, Norway among them.

This raises the questions of the pitfalls and advantages of specialising addressed in previous chapters.¹⁸³ These points will not be restated here. But there is another quandary for the small countries that should not be passed over. The increasing vigour within the EU, especially among key EU countries like France and Germany, in the pursuit of independent military capacities answerable to the EU, must be included. For long the potential for conflict between the two projects was downplayed, not least by the supporters of EU's ambitions. Now, with both organisations pursuing separate projects, both the potential for conflict as well as the impact this will

¹⁸³ See *Specialisation*, p. 27.

have on NATO burden-sharing have become easier to identify. The small countries cannot have it both ways; they will have to choose between the EU and NATO. What these choices represent will be discussed below with particular attention given to procurement.

The focus on the EU's vigour is nothing new. European concerns over lacking autonomous capacities have been raised before. This was one of the reasons leading NATO's decision to establish a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in 1994. This is where we will begin.

Combined Joint Task Force

As a consequence of the change in NATO's doctrine opening up for out-of-area operations, the US proposed in 1993 to establish combined joint task force (CJTF) headquarters. This was agreed by NATO the following year.¹⁸⁴ The CJTF concept involved the development of easily deployable multinational tri-service headquarters. It was open to elements from non-member countries. CJTF could be called upon by other organisations than NATO, e.g. the UN or the Western European Union (henceforth WEU). CJTF would then be given access to NATO assets like command and control, transport and combat support functions for their own operations. This would insure that CJTF would be "separable but not separate".

The CJTF was supposed to be able to conduct large-scale operations. Below the joint headquarters, component headquarters for sea, air and land forces were to be established, all along strictly multinational lines. With the Europeans lacking sufficient capabilities, the US would have played a leading part here. Military exercises have been held to test the CJTF concept in practice (e.g. Strong Resolve in 1998).

¹⁸⁴ *NATO Handbook*, Brussels: NATO Office for Information and Press, 2001, p. 253.

The CJTF opened up for EU access to NATO resources in case of a crisis where US participation was not called for. This would mean that the duplication of assets, the EU developing parallel structures and resources, could be avoided. But it would also mean that NATO would be left with the final say as to whether access should be granted to the EU. France claimed that this amounted to granting the US the right to veto EU operations, and this was unacceptable since it would reduce the EU to minion status on security issues. At the Prague 2002 Summit, the French President Jacques Chirac declared that no NATO plans should be allowed to infringe upon the obligations the EU members had already agreed to in accordance with the 1999 EU Summit in Helsinki.¹⁸⁵ What this exactly meant was never explained. But it was just one of many, usually French statements attempting to carve out a separate space for a EU security role independent of NATO.

The basic idea was that the CJTF should provide the Alliance with a testing ground for the development of deployable command structures. Yet, the results were unsatisfactory. An evaluation of the CJTF written by prominent US security experts points to the problems posed by including countries with conflicting interests, motives, and differing degrees of commitments to the task.¹⁸⁶ There is nothing new in this, and it should be added that the evaluation is short on exactly what should be further elaborated to overcome “the uncertainties and idiosyncrasies likely to attend future operations.”¹⁸⁷ They do not provide any guidelines on how “effective political control over CJTF

¹⁸⁵ Statement made by President Chirac 25 November 2002 in Prague, quoted in Michael Meimeth, “Deutsche und französische Perspektiven einer Gemeinsamen Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik“, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 20 January 2003, pp. 21–30, p. 25.

¹⁸⁶ Peters et al., *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force*, p. 67.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

operations while simultaneously maintaining their flexibility” can be maintained.¹⁸⁸

In the aftermath of the Iraq war, it seems doubtful that the CJTF will be pursued with any vigour. The US will be disinclined to let their troops be put under the command of a multinational headquarters simply because of their lower efficiency when compared with a purely national command. The Danish brigadier Michael H. Clemmesen has written that the CJTF headquarters will serve as little more than training ground for officers from smaller countries.¹⁸⁹ It will provide them with the opportunity to learn how a large national command functions and little more than that.

The emerging role of the EU

The war against Iraq showed the profound differences in security political outlook among the European countries, and made it clear that the single European voice Henry Kissinger was once reported as searching for is still not a reality. Before Iraq, there were other, smaller and thus presumably more manageable conflicts that had left the EU utterly impotent.¹⁹⁰ Yet, Iraq was altogether on a different scale because it highlighted how threat perceptions differed. The Bush administration’s assertions that it would strive to maintain military hegemony, and if need be resort to pre-emptive military strikes to avert a threat, were regarded by many European intellectuals as being in direct conflict with the system of international law regarded as fundamental to European security.

This debate is far from over. The relevance to our context, however, is the impact it has on the EU’s endeavours to draw

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ See Michael H. Clemmesen, “NATO lite”.

¹⁹⁰ Most recently the Spanish-Moroccan crisis over a small island off the Moroccan coast traditionally used for grazing sheep; and the recurring Greco-Turkish quarrels over maritime rights in the Aegean Sea.

up a security policy that includes the use of military means. Although Iraq has definitely accelerated the process, these endeavours are not new. Early in the 1990s, the EU started to sketch the outlines for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). In 1992, it was decided to include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and the use of military forces in crisis management (the so-called Petersberg Tasks) into the Treaty on the European Union. This breathed new life into the Western European Union (WEU) and led to the appointment of a Secretary General and the establishment of a planning cell which would be responsible for assessing emerging crises and for the planning and handling of the WEU. The number of troops the WEU could draw upon was increased. The basic concept was that the WEU would act either independently or as part of a UN force in humanitarian operations where the US had chosen not to participate. Western European governments as well as the US expected that the WEU could serve as the coordinating body to resolve the problems common to multinational operations. Norway was satisfied with the WEU's new role. Although not having the right to vote on WEU decisions, Norway was granted an associate status that gave it access to internal processes, information and meetings.

But this turned out to be a brief interlude. The WEU's role changed in 1999 when the EU decided to build up its own crisis management and conflict prevention capabilities. A further step was taken at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 when the Union decided to build up the necessary institutions to undertake crisis management. The creation of a separate institutional structure was regarded with apprehension by the non-EU European NATO-members as a development that in the long run would undermine NATO. The US reacted with protests, a pattern later to be repeated

whenever the issue of creating parallel institutions accountable to the EU was on the agenda.

At the Helsinki Summit, it was agreed to establish an EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). The Petersberg Tasks would form the core of the RRF mission. A detailed list of what the new force would require was agreed at a Military Capabilities Conference held in November 2000. The following month, during the European Council Summit in Nice, decisions concerning the military and political command structures were made, although in rather vague terms, the reason being that any moves in this direction would easily be interpreted as a direct challenge to NATO. For this reason, the British government assumed the role of bystander. Yet, without Britain the project was in danger of foundering. Compared with the other European countries, Britain was a military lead-nation. Moreover, British participation would be regarded as an assurance by the more Atlanticist EU member states that close relations with the US would not be weakened. Although somewhat shaky at times, the British position remained negative until the November 2003 Naples meeting. Here, Britain signalled that it would participate provided that military planning were undertaken by an EU cell set up within SHAPE.¹⁹¹ The EU already has a 150-man strong military planning staff, but their mandate has been limited to “strategic planning”. Once operational the EU cell will assume responsibility for field operations.

Although the quantity targets set by the EU have not been met, the RRF has undertaken two missions. The first was in Macedonia lasting from March till December 2003, here the RRF took over peacekeeping from NATO. The second, which began just a few months later, was the so-called Operation

¹⁹¹ Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “Britain in secret EU army deal”, *Daily Telegraph*, 29 November 2003; “Durchbruch bei EU-Verteidigungspolitik in Sicht”, *Die Welt*, 28 November 2003.

Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Here, French-led forces provided assistance to UN humanitarian workers.

These operations have been test cases for the Union's ability to undertake military missions. As such they are important milestones in the development of an identifiable role for the EU in security matters, a role that will go beyond the traditional emphasis on preventative diplomacy. The next step is the development of a security doctrine. A draft was published by the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana in the summer of 2003.¹⁹² Here, the need to be able to counter threats with military means, and if necessary pre-emptively was implied. In some members states, this assertion was not well received. In many European countries, the US administration's statement that it would strike pre-emptively before a threat had fully emerged, is subjected to especially harsh criticism. Consequently, it was difficult to accept that the EU should assume a similar policy. For others like Britain, EU pre-emption would mean that the Union gave itself this option but without having the necessary means to carry it out.

The other difficult issues concern the idea of permitting some EU states to form a vanguard that can forge ahead with military cooperation under the auspices of the EU, yet without having to wait for others to catch up. This is not as innocent as it may seem. Lack of a clear division of labour with NATO has been one cause of delays. But now it is possible for countries that are less concerned with reactions within NATO to pursue their own agenda within the EU. This is what will be discussed next. Any final conclusion on the extent of compatibility between the EU force and US strategy depends on several factors. Since so little is clear at the time of writing, little more can be done than to sketch them out. Much will be settled once an EU strategic doctrine has been finalised. If the final version emphasises autonomy from NATO, and this

¹⁹² Javier Solana, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, European Council, 20 June 2003.

emphasis has a bearing on procurement and training, the effect will be to weaken NATO. If the opposite approach prevails emphasising linkages, and this is where the stress in the draft version is placed, interoperability and joint operations with the US NATO will be strengthened, but what is more important is that beneficial synergies will ensue.

A new alliance within?

The idea of a vanguard of states willing to pursue integration further than the majority can be found in several Franco-German initiatives.¹⁹³ But it was not this couple that launched the most radical proposal. Instead, it was to be the Belgian government that published a proposal for European defence integration.¹⁹⁴ This proposal went further than the measures already decided at various EU summits where the emphasis has been on cooperation and coordination. The Belgian plan included the establishment of a General Staff including the building of a suitable headquarters in Tervuren, i.e. not connected to the NATO complex. If carried out, it would have expressed the separation of NATO and the EU in no uncertain terms.

The Belgian initiative should not be read just as a response to transatlantic tensions, although Iraq certainly provided a golden opportunity to launch it, but was also a response to a report compiled on behalf of the European Parliament by Philippe Morillon, a retired French general.¹⁹⁵ As in previous documents, the linkage between foreign policy and the

¹⁹³ For the defence sector, this was perhaps best expressed in the two countries' proposal made in November 2002. It was entitled "Gemeinsame deutsch-französische Vorschläge für den Europäischen Konvent zum Bereich Europäische Sicherheits und Verteidigungspolitik". The full text was kindly made available by Dr. Eckhard Lübke, German Ministry of Defence, Berlin.

¹⁹⁴ *Die Welt*, 16 April 2003.

¹⁹⁵ *Report on the new European security and defence architecture – priorities and deficiencies*. Rapporteur: Philippe Morillon, European Parliament, 27 March 2003.

military capacities to support it is underlined. The technological gap between the US and its European allies is taken as an argument in favour of increased spending, Morillon concludes.¹⁹⁶

There is little difference between Morillon's conclusions and the admonitions expressed by Lord Robertson quoted earlier. Underlying them is the danger identified by François Heisbourg, director of the French *Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique*:

[...] if the present trends continue, there is a real danger that a three-tier Alliance may emerge; (1) the United States and a few select NATO members who can project power; (2) the bulk of the Alliance, which remains wedded essentially to a Cold War posture; and (3) the new members; whose forces are less modern than those of the second group.¹⁹⁷

Morillon claimed that this development could be avoided by a stronger European military. A large majority in the European Parliament supported the conclusions drawn in the report. But whether this will translate into concrete measures depends on two different problems, both similar to the ones confronting NATO. One concerns funding, this will be addressed later. The other concerns perceptions of security. Unless the perceptions are widely shared by all the members in a coalition, countries may choose to abstain from participating in a multinational venture, be it under the leadership of the EU or NATO. This is most likely a main reason why France and Germany have been such eager promoters of the vanguard concept, with the rather unexpected support of the Belgians thrown in. This merits a few more comments, hypothetical as they may be, with much still undecided.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 15

¹⁹⁷ François Heisbourg, "Introduction", *EU's Rapid Reaction Capability*, Seminar at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 10 September 2001, unpaginated.

EU efforts aim for troops that can be sent on peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions outside the membership area. These ambitions correspond closely to French desires to continue to play a leading role, especially in African politics. But, as one might infer, France would not be averse to having other countries share the costs and shoulder the burden. The old argument in favour of coalitions, namely that they lend a greater degree of legitimacy to the operations, should also be included among the French motives. A purely humanitarian operation in Northern Africa might entice other EU members, possibly the Mediterranean countries, to participate because they would be adversely affected by increased numbers of refugees if a crisis is not stabilised. But with the difficulties of drawing the line between this kind of operations, and warfare, participation will be hard-wrung. That is probably why the report underlines that the countries willing to participate must be able to forge ahead without waiting for the approval of the rest. The question then is whether or not the remaining states would be willing to share the burden of developing a military capacity that might be put at the disposal of just a few?

The answer seems to be no. The response to the Franco-German attempts to form a vanguard in the aftermath of Iraq, and even before that, have not been positive. Other countries have clearly signalled their desire to rein in this development if done in the name of the EU. The non-aligned members, Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Austria, have *a priori* difficulties in entering anything resembling a binding military alliance. But even to those EU countries that are members of NATO, the vanguard concept is not a popular one.¹⁹⁸ Their

¹⁹⁸ See Eckhart Lohse, "Allzu grosse Nähe", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 12 April 2003; Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, "France and Germany must work for all EU members", *Financial Times*, 19 November 2003; for an analysis of the position of the new members, see Kai-Olaf Lang, *Trojanische Pferde der USA oder proeuropäische Atlantiker? Die neuen Mitglieder der EU und ihr Verhältnis zu Amerika*, SWP-Studie S 46, Dezember 2003.

reservations are based partly on apprehensions over what the effects will be for the transatlantic relationship, partly on how the military pillar should be funded.

EU capacities and procurement

The missions in Macedonia and Congo show that EU's capacities despite falling short of agreed targets, are not insignificant. Plans have been drawn up for upgrading and procurement that will further enhance EU abilities to project power and engage in high-intensity combat operations. New ranges of weaponry like Eurofighter Typhoon are being prepared for entry into service within the next few years. When the Airbus A400M Future large Aircraft (FLA) is available, strategic airlift will be less of the bottleneck it is today. The EU is also developing its own intelligence satellites through the development of different systems like Helios II, SAR Lupe and Cosmos Skymed. Command and control functions are being upgraded through the application of more sophisticated computer technology. A lot of this work has been spurred on by the general drive for modernisation already agreed by NATO, but not all can be ascribed to the Alliance. The desire to have autonomous forces has been a significant factor. And the question whether this amounts to the duplication, so dreaded by many in NATO, will have to be answered in the affirmative. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the EU can expect to build up any degree of autonomy in crisis management without institutional capacities, in particular in intelligence satellites that do not duplicate NATO assets. A prominent German security expert, Hans-Christian Hagman has concluded that this development is not only unavoidable, but will lead to greater parity in the transatlantic relationship and may therefore strengthen it, indeed no

difference from what General Morillon had previously expressed.¹⁹⁹

But this is still rather far ahead. EU resources still fall short of what was planned at the Helsinki Summit and the following capabilities meeting. In the immediate future much will depend on the extent of EU coordination of the upgrading process. Plans have been announced for a new EU agency for armaments and military research. If so, it would mean that the EU finally does away with the article in the Treaty of Rome, reaffirmed in the Treaty of Amsterdam, where national defence industries are expressly exempted from the Union's competencies and trade in armaments remains excluded from inner market regulation. Arguably, this exclusion has been severely undermined in the course of time, but it has still meant that any explicit EU policy in this field, let alone financial support targeted exclusively for the defence sector, has been impossible. That does not mean that the EU has been without tools to influence defence production, albeit so far only indirectly. This has been done in three different ways: First, the Commission administers EU support for research and development. Officially, defence research is a national area of responsibility. But the strict separation of defence and civilian industry had proved increasingly difficult to uphold. In the course of the 1990s, the number of research projects including enterprises in the defence sector increased.²⁰⁰ In 1996, the Commission estimated that a third of all projects funded were dual-use, i.e. of relevance to the defence sector.²⁰¹ Secondly, in 1995, the Commission established procedures for license-free export of dual-use technology within the EU. And

¹⁹⁹ See Hans-Christian Hagman, *European Crisis Management and Defence: The Search for Capabilities*, Adelphi paper 353, London: IISS, 2002, pp. 58–59.

²⁰⁰ Burkard Schmidt, *The European Union and Armaments: Getting a bigger bang for the Euro*, Chaillot Papers no. 63, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 2003.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*

thirdly, the Commission has to grant its approval to all mergers, including those between defence enterprises.

The Commission's ventures into defence production have been spurred on by the development in the European defence industry in the early 1990s when demand dropped drastically. The politicians started to discuss possibilities for closer cooperation to salvage the sector. Yet talks at this level progressed slowly, at any rate with less progress than the contacts developing between the defence enterprises themselves. State subsidies would soon be a thing of the past. But the development of new weapons systems was certain to be a cost-intensive process, requiring funding the industry would find difficult to cover alone. One source of subsidies would then be the European Union.²⁰²

The need to expand cross-country cooperation had long been recognised. The question was therefore how the EU could further integrationist factors to promote this development. One measure, fairly easily done, was to loosen the criteria for getting EU financial support for research and development projects. In May 2003, this development took an important step forward with the need for an EU armaments agency being recognised in writing for the first time.²⁰³ At the same time, it was declared that the EU would release an initial €25 million for defence-related research, pitifully small when compared with the national budgets of some of the members countries, let alone the US.

For the armaments producers this was nevertheless an important signal that the Commission would look upon the

²⁰² For a survey of the different western attempts to create a joint European armaments sector, see Pierre de Vestel, *Defence Markets and Industries in Europe: Time for Political Decisions?*, Chaillot Papers no. 21, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1995; and Keith Hayward, *Towards a European Weapons Procurement Process*, Chaillot Papers no. 27, 1997.

²⁰³ Luke Hill, "EU force declared operational but capability shortfalls remain", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 28 May 2003, p. 3.

sector favourably, a change largely initiated by the armaments lobbies themselves. Their policies affect the position of the smaller countries within the EU. Two major organisations had been formed to represent European producers: EDIG (European Defence Industries Group) and AECMA (European Association of Aerospace Companies). In addition, a third but significantly smaller body representing the interest of shipbuilders was the European Marine Equipment Council.²⁰⁴ EDIG was established in 1976. The members are the national defence industry associations of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), but it has been expanded to include Sweden and Hungary as well. AECMA differs in that here not only the associations but large firms are also members. The firms have met with few obstacles in their efforts to influence EU decision-making. They have managed to establish “an important lobbying group that is largely unopposed, and this imbalance has impacted on policy.”²⁰⁵

This imbalance affects smaller producers. They have found it very difficult to gain the same access to decision-makers. When the strategies are drawn up for how a European defence should be shaped, and what role the European Unions should assume in this process, they tend to find themselves being left out. This was the case with the Framework Agreement concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the European Defence Industry from July 2000. France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden and Britain signed the agreement which this time was not merely one of many documents listing good intentions and praising the benefits of closer cooperation, but included explicit commitments on cooperation and trade. For instance a signatory must remove obstacles to the transfer of defence-related equipment to other

²⁰⁴ I am indebted to Dr. Jocelyn Mawdsley, Université libre de Bruxelles for information on this. See her analytical presentation in *The European Union and Defense Industrial Policy*, Paper 31, 2003, Bonn: Internationale Konversionszentrum Bonn, 2003.

²⁰⁵ Mawdsley, *The European Union and Defense Industrial Policy*, p. 14.

members unless the material in question endangers national security; likewise all mergers of defence producers or acquisitions that may endanger supply require that all other signatories be informed in advance; export procedures will be facilitated; the exchange of classified information between the signatories will be carried on according to a new set of more simplified procedures; the signatories are to harmonize national rules for the sharing, transfer and ownership of information in order to provide an impetus for the restructuring of European defence industry; joint activities in research and technology are to be encouraged; and sharing procurement plans are to be shared.²⁰⁶

In the drafts for an EU constitution drawn up in late 2002, proposals were made for a new institution to manage weapons procurement and research, leading to a common market in weaponry.²⁰⁷ This is explained as a logical follow-up on the already agreed decision to establish a 60,000 man strong military capacity under the auspices of the EU.

The impact this will have on the small member countries is not immediately clear. Yet, in the course of negotiations following the signing of the agreement, the abolition of offset agreements in transfers between the signatories was discussed. If implemented, it would undoubtedly benefit the larger countries and affect the smaller adversely. A possible compromise would have been the application of a system based on what is referred to as “juste retour”, meaning that a country receives orders commensurate with its investments.²⁰⁸ This had been adhered to quite rigidly in the construction of the Eurofighter, which delayed the process significantly as well as adding extra costs.

²⁰⁶ This presentation is based on the British Ministry of Defence’s *Explanatory Memorandum for an Agreement to facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the European Defence Industry*, London, 2001; and Mawdsley, *The European Union and Defense Industrial Policy*, pp. 16–17.

²⁰⁷ “Well they’re talking”, *The Economist*, 2 November 2002, p. 32.

²⁰⁸ Mawdsley, *The European Union and Defense Industrial Policy*.

The Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en Matière d'Armement (henceforth OCCAR), which was established by the defence ministers of France, Britain, Germany and Spain in 1996, advocates a radical break with the *juste retour* regime. Instead of looking narrowly at just one project where this may be difficult to achieve without the detrimental effects seen in the case of the Eurofighter, a wider portfolio should be taken into account when the national *retour* is to be defined. This may work well for the larger countries, i.e. the signatories to OCCAR, but for the smaller ones normally involved only in one large-scale project, this will be difficult to accept.

OCCAR might be only the beginning of greater EU efforts. Nevertheless, there are some important limitations that should be mentioned to show how cumbersome this process has been. The planned agency will be strictly intergovernmental in nature and not directed at the EU. This means that the EU as a whole can only implement solutions of a limited kind like streamlining export controls of dual-use goods. Defence procurement will remain a national priority and therefore still be subject to budgetary constraints, labour market needs and industrial competition. The planned agency is regarded as an improvement on the former WEAG. Their basic problem was that they always came up against competing national programmes, and lacked the clout to break with them to achieve genuine coordination. It is far from certain that the new agency will be able to complete this task. But according to one EU official commenting on the viability of a European armaments sector: "The question now is whether we do homeopathy through the [Commission] or die slowly."²⁰⁹

The test of the agency's viability is not only the issue of which countries join and which do not. France and Germany have declared their support and interest in the project, but their market is limited to Europe, and not even all of it since the new NATO countries seem more inclined to buy American

²⁰⁹ *The Economist*, 2 November 2002.

than European. The pivotal member is Britain. British armaments producers have been able to gain a profitable foothold on the US market. If Britain joined the armaments group, it could serve as a door opener to the US market. For the foreseeable future, European producers will have to rely on the European market for the sale of their products. Pressure has grown for an increase in defence budgets. The prime argument in favour of doing so is the sudden demand on the members' forces to engage in international missions (Afghanistan, Macedonia, Congo). But at the same time, the need to increase budgets in order to maintain procurement stability has been underlined. This is an argument that has very little to do with streamlining and efficiency, but all the more with protecting national interests and maintaining employment.

Likewise, it is important to reduce the rhetorical emphasis on a "European" armaments market filled with European producers catering to European priorities. First of all, many European firms are deeply intertwined with US firms making it difficult to draw a dividing line. A case in point is BAE Systems which has been portrayed as a British industrial champion after the merger of British Aerospace and GEC Marconi. Nevertheless, the foreign ownership share with American shareholders playing a dominant part, was so large that the then British Minister of Defence Geoffrey Hoon asked whether the firm was British any more. Ongoing plans for the merger of BAE with Boeing only serves to Hoon's suspicion.²¹⁰ The point is that the European industry is not as European as one might believe, and especially so after reading EU documents and the communiqués from the industrial lobbies. Especially the sub-contractors are found globally. In addition, much of the development in RMA is carried out by civilian firms in and outside Europe.

²¹⁰ See Mawdsley, *The European Union and Defense Industrial Policy*, p. 11, footnote 6.

There is another, transatlantic aspect that should be included here: The size of the US defence budget. This is where orders and thus the money are to be found. The degree of access to the US market differs greatly from country to country. Britain dwarfs all its European allies. BAE Systems is the sixth largest US defence firm. Moreover, numerous European firms, Norwegian among them, have benefited from the offset system and thus gained access to the US supply chain. The EU Commission will have to step gingerly to avoid creating any Atlantic divisions in its attempts to promote a European defence sector.

A question of funding

The amount of papers published on the ESDP is staggering. Communiqués, statements, articles and books have been published on its political virtues, meticulously noting each and every comma change.²¹¹ But so far, the EU has refrained from publishing any form of cost estimate. Moreover, the capabilities that the EU has listed as necessary for the Rapid Reaction Force to become operational, have been “described in verbal rather than quantitative terms.”²¹² This is usually the case when strategic airlift, enhanced high tech capabilities, advanced missile and air defence, with the need to increase interoperability with US forces always added, are always listed. A topic often glossed over is costs.

That deficiency is quite understandable not least since the final shape of the force remains to be seen. Nevertheless, a noteworthy attempt has been made by a group of European defence economists assembled for this purpose at the US

²¹¹ Nowhere with more enthusiasm than at the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris, formerly affiliated with the West European Union. See www.iss-eu.org.

²¹² Numbers from Benjamin Zycher and Charles Wolf, *European Military Prospects, Economic Constraints, and the Rapid Reaction Force*, RAND, 2001, p. xv.

RAND Corporation.²¹³ The sum they arrived at ranged from \$24 billion to approx. \$56 billion (US 2000 dollars), the lower level would imply heavy reliance on NATO capacities whereas the maximum would mean development of entire ranges of new equipment. Their focus was procurement costs, including research and development. Operations and maintenance were not included, although they could result in a further 30 to 50 per cent increase in the capital costs of equipping a European Rapid Reaction Force.

This begs the question of how this sum will be provided for. Previous comments on the state of the European economies should be recalled, as well as the fact that the EU enlargement process will represent an extra burden on an already cash-strapped Union budget. Three alternative answers may be given: economic growth resulting in larger military budgets; spending more wisely by reallocating means within existing budgetary limits; closer cooperation between European armaments enterprises and a unified European armaments market making wiser spending more possible.

The probability of any of them being implemented within the near future is unlikely. Economic growth in Europe has slumped. As shown above, armaments producers now cooperate more closely, but this is not according to any master plan drawn up in Brussels or elsewhere. The targets agreed in Helsinki and at the Capabilities Conference later on have only been partly fulfilled.²¹⁴ In the plans for an independent EU force, 2003 was fixed as the target date. According to the RAND report, it is unlikely that they will be met by the end of this decade unless economic growth resumes and defence budgets are increased. But as the report hints, this is bordering on the purely theoretical. Moreover, since the report was published, growth forecasts have gone through several

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ See Oana Lungescu, "Partial Progress on EU Army", BBC NEWS, 19 May 2003.

downward readjustments.²¹⁵ Also, the assumption that existing funding can be reallocated more efficiently and thus generate extra means that can be used to fund RRF is dismissed by the analysts. If defence spending was targeted exclusively to meet the need of the RRF, it could become operational within a few years. But the obstacles to such a massive reallocation are too towering to make this worth considering as anything but yet another theoretical exercise. That does not mean that the process within the EU will not impact on NATO. On the contrary, but the question is how. The picture of the relationship between the EU and NATO is a blurred one. Lord Robertson pointed this out during a speech held in Sweden in 2001 when he stated that:

At the political level there is already deep and effective practical cooperation between the two organisations, civil and military, working to ensure security in Bosnia, Kosovo and FYROM. Paradoxically, the EU and NATO cooperate together better in practice on the ground in Macedonia than they do in theory in Brussels.²¹⁶

But this cooperation is not between equals. The EU's stabilisation and democratisation efforts in the civilian sector have been considerable. Militarily, input has been limited.²¹⁷ Changing that would require increased financial resources from key EU countries, and not least, wiser spending. With the exception of France and Britain, this has so far not been forthcoming. Lord Robertson did not overlook this point in his speech:

²¹⁵ In the report, it was stipulated that the German economy would grow by 2.4 per cent annually throughout the current decade. See *Table 3, Current and Outyear Estimates, 2001–2010*, p. 19. So far, growth rates have been hovering around 1.5 per cent.

²¹⁶ Lord Robertson, “The Transatlantic Link”.

²¹⁷ See Eitelhuber, “Europäische Streitkräfte”.

The longer picture is much less optimistic. For all the political energy expended in NATO to implement the Defence Capabilities Initiative, and in the EU to push ahead with the complementary Headline Goal process, the truth is that Europe remains a military pygmy.²¹⁸

But due to the limited budgetary resources available for defence, procurement has been strongly politicised. This is perhaps more evident in the case of the new NATO members. The choice of weaponry, either US-made or European, leads to criticism from the losing party. This was clearly illustrated when Poland finally opted for American F-16 fighters. EU Commission President Romano Prodi expressed his dismay thus: “there is no joy in the fact that a day after signing [the EU Accession] Treaty in Athens, Poland signed a huge contract for the purchase of American fighters. [...] having your wallets in Europe, you cannot entrust to the United States the guaranteeing of [your] security.”²¹⁹

The Prague Capabilities Commitment

At the Prague Summit in September 2002, NATO members committed themselves to meet a list of priorities deemed necessary if the Alliance were to be able to intervene out-of-area and counter new threats. This list, called The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) represents a departure from recommending spending increases or setting generalised targets. The political background was aptly captured by the British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw who claimed that Europe was offering an “increasingly inadequate response” in effect leaving the US to shoulder a disproportionate share. According to Straw, this would prove “a recipe for resentment” in the US.²²⁰

²¹⁸ Robertson, “The Transatlantic Link”.

²¹⁹ *RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, Ukraine Report*, vol. 5, no. 15, 22 April 2003.

²²⁰ “Europe urged to boost NATO spending”, BBC News, 16 October 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2331943.stm.

In Europe, concerns have emerged over the impact of increased US spending on military technology. In 1989, i.e. well before the additional increases made in the wake of the September 11 attacks, Admiral Sir Jock Slater, former British First Sea Lord, expressed these concerns with the following understatement: “the money the US is now spending on digitisation is such that they could get out of step with their allies.”²²¹ Concerns over affordability had led the European allies to go for the application of new technology to upgrade already existing capacities instead of designing anything radically new. The inherent problem is that this incremental approach reinforced the status quo.

This was keenly followed in the United States. In a bipartisan US commission study from September 1999, the following sombre conclusion was drawn: “[...] the United States will increasingly find itself wishing to form coalitions but increasingly unable to find partners willing and able to carry out combined military operations.”²²² This was echoed in two studies written on the transatlantic gaps, one asking which countries could be singled out as having the needed “MFC [multinational force compatibility]”; and the other in much the same vein recommending that the US refrain from forming broad coalitions since the European allies are more often than not an obstacle to swift decision-making and even when they join their equipment is not up to the task: “It makes no sense objectively or in terms of vital US national interests which are territorially rooted in the North American continent, not the European continent.”²²³

²²¹ Alexander Nicoll, “Sea Lord Warns on Military Technology Gap”, *Financial Times*, 7 October 1998, p. 8. See also Lawrence Freedman, “War Designed for One”, *The World Today*, vol. 53, nos. 8–9, pp. 217–22.

²²² US Commission on National Security, *New World Coming: American Security in the Twenty-First Century*, Washington DC: Department of Defense, 15 September 1999, p. 64, p. 143.

²²³ Szayna et. al., *Improving Army Planning for Future Multinational Operations*, p. 3; and Olsen, *US National Defense for the Twenty-First Century*, p. 96.

This bodes ill for the European allies. Without the relevant capacities they would be left out not only of the actual operations, but from decision-making. Thus, it is no surprise that burden-sharing and combat efficiency were at the forefront in the attempts undertaken to endow the Alliance with the required capabilities to fight new threats. The Prague Capabilities Commitments were not the first. The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) agreed at the Washington Summit in 1999, was an important step in this direction. DCI was launched by the US as a reply to the lessons learned during IFOR and SFOR deployments in Bosnia. The lack of interoperability, mainly caused by US command and control superiority, had impeded cooperation considerably. The basic idea was to mend this by identifying the problems areas and translate them into close to 60 different projects. Once completed, they would ensure interoperability. Great expectations were tied to DCI, but few allies made the financial allocations necessary. Several factors were at play, the impending introduction of the Euro forced those Europeans that were about to join to reduce spending drastically in order to qualify, secondly there was the budding rivalry between DCI and the Petersberg Headline Goals. It gave politicians a good opportunity to oscillate between the two. The lack of specified goals and the impressive number of projects is misleading since the projects lacked the specific necessary to tie the European members to implementing the goals. This opened the way for burden-shedding.

But DCI suffered from too many targets being set and too few priorities being established. This was no secret, and at the Prague Summit in 2002, a new agreement was reached over the exact capabilities needed, and how to attain them. Niche capacities and role specialisations were no longer rhetorical phrases, instead it was agreed on what capacities and skills

were to be allotted to the separate members.²²⁴ This would prevent the Alliance from deteriorating into a mere discussion forum, a kind of OSCE with a stick. It would also retain the US interest in maintaining its engagement in European security.

The commitments made in Prague are the response to a new set of threats linked to terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The Commitments are interrelated so that together they will fulfil four key enquirements: Improved defence against weapons of mass destruction; NATO superiority in command, control, communications and computerisation; interoperability must be improved; finally, the troops must be ready for deployment at short notice, and they must be sustainable. Today, NATO has problems supporting larger units in combat with necessary supplies of equipment, food and men engaged in out-of-area operations over a longer period of time.

These recommendations were made in response to identified deficiencies. A further problem according to Lord Robertson was the dire lack of precision-guided missiles. These missiles are already available, it is more a question of the countries stocking up more. NATO's European members also had to confront the shortage of strategic air- and sea-lift capacity. A group of European NATO countries have agreed to procure jointly 180 A400M military transport planes. Although this agreement predates the Summit, no contract has so far been signed. Delays have largely been due to the lack of a final financial commitment on the German side. This delay means that the airplanes are unlikely to be built before the end of this decade.²²⁵ Thus, an interim solution is being worked out whereby the lease of the necessary capacity is suggested.

²²⁴ Nicholas Fiorenza, "NATO to Adopt Capabilities Plan", *Defense News*, 18–24 November 2002.

²²⁵ "Struck spricht mit Rumsfeld und Rice", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5 May 2003.

Germany has been put in charge of the group entrusted with the High Level Group “Strategic Airlift” established to work out the practicalities of a lease. Closely related to this is the European lack of refuelling planes whereas the US disposes of approximately 250 transport planes and tank planes, the European number is less than 20.

A further important decision taken in Prague was to establish a NATO Response Force (NRF) numbering approx. 21,000 men. By October 2004, contingents from the force should be ready for missions, for the entire force this deadline is 2006. It will be equipped with sophisticated armaments.²²⁶ These are to be highly skilled troops trained for combat against new threats. In terms of command, the new Allied Command Operations (ACO) commanded by SACEUR will have the operational lead for NRF. This covers the setting of standards, certification procedures for the forces, and exercises.

But the NRF project is not without clear pitfalls. With 26 having to be consulted before a go-ahead is given, the problems of political inertia and interference will remain. Another important hinge here is speed, and the ability of the countries to allocate the necessary manpower and resources once a crisis emerges. Lord Robertson has been particularly adamant on this point in the aftermath of the Prague meeting. There is little point in having a force ready to be deployed if one member of the coalition will have to await a lengthy decision-making process in parliament before a final yes is granted. The country Lord Robertson singled out for his criticism was Germany. The country is allocated a number of key functions, but without them the force will at best be left in a vulnerable position or even more likely be unable to go. This is a considerable unforeseen problem because the emphasis on

²²⁶ Or to quote NATO’s web page: “*whatever is required to make it a high readiness, credible force.*” See “The NATO Response Force – NRF”, http://www.NATO.int/shape/issues/shape_NRF/NRF_intro.htm.

niche capacities makes any coalition extremely vulnerable when a country opts out or delays the decision-making process.

It is necessary to question how much the lack of consensus within NATO over how the new threats should be confronted will impact the on NRF should it become an operational force. If opposition to an American-led coalition force should remain as widespread as was evident in the case of the war against the Taleban, and even more so over the war in Iraq, the NRF will be a lame duck. An even more acute problem is the growing popular perception especially in France and Germany, that US policies are a threat to global security, and not a means of safeguarding it. If this perception takes root in these two countries, let alone spreads to others, increasing defence budgets for NATO purposes will be an uphill battle for any government.

Norwegian niches

The Norwegian armed forces are in the course of implementing many of the general recommendations issued at the Prague Summit. Improved protection of personnel against weapons of mass destruction, and increase of national stocks of precision-guided air-to-ground missiles are among these. A concrete project has been launched for the acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles, so-called drones, for improved targeting surveillance and battle damage assessment purposes. Moreover, pledges have been made to contribute to the development of air-borne radars, refuelling planes and strategic lift.

Norway has been given the role as lead nation in the development of strategic sea transport. This is one area where Norway as a leading shipping nation already possesses considerable know-how and resources. Norway's role is further enhanced by the increased attention given to littoral warfare, a field where the Norwegian navy has developed

considerable expertise and may be said to enjoy a competitive advantage compared with other NATO countries. As a result of the lack of blue water navy opponents and of the war on terrorism, both Britain and the US have redrawn their strategies for how future conflicts will be fought and won.²²⁷ One point where their views have a direct impact on the relevance of Norwegian assets is their unanimous emphasis on littoral warfare. This amounts to a transition from naval warfare at sea, to from-the-sea maritime warfare.

Littoral warfare is one field where Norwegian priorities fit those of our closest allies.²²⁸ In 2000 a decision was made to purchase five new frigates.²²⁹ Apart from improving Norwegian capacities to patrol Norwegian waters and enhancing the ability to protect offshore oil and gas installations, the frigates will be a central element in NATO's naval response forces Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and Standing Naval Force Mediterranean. When considering the sheer numbers of frigates in NATO's navies, one might easily get an impression of abundance. But whether it is enough is questionable. The countries with the largest number of frigates in Europe, France, Britain and the Netherlands, have their vessels engaged in areas far away from the Continent and can therefore not be automatically relied upon. This was made clear during Operation Sharp Guard starting in the summer of

²²⁷ *Transformation Roadmap, Power and Access from the Sea*, US Department of Navy, 2003; *Naval Strategic Plan - the next fifteen years*, Royal Navy, 2003, <http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/1643.html>, accessed 2 December 2003.

²²⁸ Norway's role may be further enhanced if the US Navy's Littoral Combat Ship Project is dropped from the 2005 defence budget. This might be one point where the Bush Administration might slash development programmes to accommodate congressional concerns over the budget deficit. See Bradley Graham, "Military Spending Sparks Warnings", *Washington Post*, 8 March 2004. In 2002, Norwegian frigates, submarines, divers and special forces participated in operations *Active Endeavour* and *Enduring Freedom*.

²²⁹ Bonnén and Palosaari have claimed that the decision to purchase frigates constitutes a remnant of cold war thinking, see their "On the Road to a Nordic Defence Co-Operation?".

1993. Getting the required number of frigates to participate in this limited operation turned out to be an uphill struggle simply because the vessels were not available. One of the recommendations presented to Norway in connection with the PCC was the purchase of a new support vessel for the frigates, this has already been included in procurement plans.²³⁰

Another procurement decision that will enhance the navy's ability to participate internationally, was taken in 2003 when it was announced that new missile torpedo boats would be built.²³¹

Finally, the geographic proximity to Russia may, once again, become an asset for Norway. The energy and fishery resources in the Barents Sea tie the two countries together, and these are resources of considerable importance to both Europe and the US. Energy deliveries from Northern Africa and the Middle East are vulnerable to terrorist acts. Norwegian oil and gas are, together with deliveries from Russia, the only alternative. This alone implies that the strategic importance of Norway, although no longer marked by military tensions, nevertheless remains considerable. This importance can be turned into an asset provided that Norway maintains the military capacities that are requested. If so, Norwegian views and concerns stand a much greater chance of being taken into account. But this also calls into question to what extent the country should concentrate on the development of niche capabilities. With limited budgetary means, the ideal of a balanced defence sector capable of demarcating Norwegian sovereignty and interests will easily suffer. The official reply to this quandary is that the need for a strong military presence in the North has declined, and that the reduction in military presence is but the logical outcome of decreased tensions. The

²³⁰ »Prague Capabilities Commitment – modernisering av militær evne i NATO og norske bidrag», Forsvarsdepartementet, Oslo, 27 November 2002.

²³¹ Erik Solbakken, »Skjold-kontrakt signert», *Forsvarsnett*, 28 November 2003.

need to comply with the PCC is based on two arguments: First of all PCC is the *sine qua non* to maintain NATO's future relevance, and NATO remains Norway's prime security guarantee; secondly, if Norway fails to comply, its credibility as an Alliance partner will suffer.

The North Sea Strategy

NATO's changed focus, i.e. lack of emphasis on the Northern region, combined with a growing security role for the EU has placed Norway in a vulnerable position. As a response, efforts have been made to develop a more comprehensive framework for tying Norway closer to other countries with overlapping security interests. The result has been what the Norwegian Ministry of Defence has labelled 'The North Sea Strategy' embracing, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark. The strategy is a Norwegian concept, launched by the Minister of Defence Kristin Krohn Devold at the beginning of 2003 for a more integrated approach to the numerous bi- and multilateral forms of cooperation between Norway and the littoral states around the North Sea.²³²

Whereas relations between Norway and Britain go back a long way, naval contacts between Norway and Germany only started in earnest in the early 1960s. Danish submarine officers are educated in Norway. Dutch and British soldiers train in Norway.

Closer security political contacts through formalised meetings could compensate for the loss of relative stature and at the same time give Norway a necessary insight into EU developments where above all Germany, but also the Netherlands has stressed the need to develop a military pillar to enhance the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Both have, quite like Norway, traditionally displayed a strong Atlanticist view of European security. Like Norway, the

²³² Kristin Krohn Devold, "Mål og prioriteringer i forsvarspolitikken i 2003", lecture given in Oslo Militære Samfund, 6 January 2003.

Netherlands did not support the US war against Iraq but refrained from expressing its opposition as vocally as France or Germany.

The countries included in the strategy may all have their separate motives for being interested in closer cooperation with Norway. Attempts to decode them will not be made here. However, it is safe to assume that Norway's role as a major gas supplier to Europe, in particular to Germany, has played a role.²³³ Germany has an interest in cooperating with Norway in securing the country's energy supplies.²³⁴ On the other hand, German vulnerability affects Norway. North Sea platforms, terminals or pipelines might be suitable targets for an attacker wishing to destabilise the German economy. Nevertheless, Norwegian energy is an asset that makes the country into a relevant security partner. For both Germany and the Netherlands, access to Norwegian training areas has probably contributed positively in the decision to open the 1st German-Netherlands Corps to Norwegian participation.

Political considerations notwithstanding, the chief aim has been to let operational concerns define the development of cooperation. Ambitions are high. In the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Norway and the Netherlands in December 2003, a multinational approach to acquisition, maintenance, strategic air and sea lift, logistical support, the development of command and control system, exercises for all branches of the armed forces is underlined.

Force integration affects Telemark Battalion, the Norwegian unit which has been trained and equipped to meet the standards for NATO's Immediate Reaction Force, the force that will be deployed at short notice to meet an emerging crisis. Together with the German-Netherlands Corps, the

²³³ The Netherlands are a net exporter of gas.

²³⁴ The other main source of energy is Russia. If unrest were to break out in the Ukraine, the transit lines crossing Ukrainian territory might easily be blocked.

battalion will form part of the Response Force agreed in Prague.

Most progress has been made in the relations with the Netherlands where an agreement on exchange of equipment has been entered; a declaration of intent with a view to a similar agreement has been signed with German authorities. Although it is still early days, the economic potential inherent in the strategy is considerable. On the army side, joint efforts in ABC protection, procurement of artillery, and ammunition is mentioned. For the air force, strategic lift capacity, fuel supply planes, the development of new fighter planes, as well as closer operational cooperation, are mentioned as areas for possible cooperation. The navies stand to benefit from greater integration of the countries' frigates, the procurement of helicopters, the development of missile technology. Norway's expertise in littoral warfare makes it an attractive partner to others in this field.

NATO's Response Force and the EU's Rapid Reaction Force

When confronted with the issue of upgrading their equipment, NATO countries that are also members of the EU may be heading for a dilemma. Although the requirements defined in the PCC overlap with those desired by the EU, they are not identical. Claims have been made that the targets are more suited to long-range power projection and therefore US needs, than continental requirements.²³⁵ The countries' choice will have an impact on transatlantic burden-sharing. To a certain extent, this represents nothing new. During the Cold War, the larger allies shouldered a disproportionately large burden of the costs. A significant difference concerned threat perceptions. The Soviet threat provided 'common glue' keeping the members together and resulting in agreements on

²³⁵ D. Ochmanek, *NATO's Future: Implications for U.S. Military Capabilities and Posture*, RAND 2000.

how the threat should be countered. This is no longer necessarily the case. If perceptions differ between the countries, their willingness to contribute to joint operations will be influenced. Although dividing lines may run between the larger European states, larger countries with strong regional ambitions may find their plans opposed by smaller members lacking such ambitions.

It is necessary to underline that although the EU has made significant progress towards the establishment of multinational forces, support is far from unanimous when questions like command structures, extent of supranationality and institutional build-up are addressed. This concerns in particular Britain where the Prime Minister's very restricted interpretation of the EU's role as supplementary to that of NATO, conflicts with the French view where autonomous EU decision-making understood as independent from US interests remains a persistent theme.²³⁶

RMA: transatlantic differences

As mentioned previously, the US has made strong headway in the transition from platform-centric to network-centric warfare.²³⁷ Further technological development will define the exact reach of this transformation, as will the development of operational concepts and approaches that can best take advantages of RMA. This field is set to benefit considerably from the surge in US military spending seen in recent years.²³⁸

US supremacy represents a set of challenges to the European allies. The basic question is again one of perceptions, or rather

²³⁶ See front page of *The Daily Telegraph*, 23 November 2000, and equally relevant former US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's letter of warning against a widening rift between the US and Europe in the same edition, p. 29. For a French view, see Frédéric Bozo, *Où en est l'Alliance atlantique? L'improbable partenariat*, Paris: IFRI, 1998; and Philippe Moreau Defarge, *Les États-Unis et la France. La puissance entre mythes et réalités*, Paris: IFRI, 1999, especially pp. 50–57.

²³⁷ See Laird and Mey, *The revolution in military affairs*, p. 21.

²³⁸ Graham, "Military Spending Sparks Warnings".

whether RMA is an adequate reply to new security challenges. In the aftermath of the Kosovo campaign, opinions differed as to whether RMA provided any advantages for asymmetric operations and military operations other than war.²³⁹ RMA remained for long tied to high intensity conflict needs. Many Europeans perceived this as a vision of warfare out of step with the more likely threats. Instead of attempting armed conflict against a technologically superior enemy, adversaries would instead opt for asymmetric operations, in particular terrorist attacks against civilians and military personnel, urban warfare and guerrilla combat. This view had been reinforced by the impotence of western air power in Kosovo in preventing Serb forces from conducting ethnic cleansing. The Serb forces were able to conceal themselves in forested areas and to disperse among civilians. Allied planes attacking from high altitudes were incapable of discerning military vehicles from refugees.

The US perspective, and it had a strong following on this side of the Atlantic, was rather that Kosovo had fully displayed the technological gap and that the Europeans had to catch up. If not, their ability to undertake operations on their own would be limited, let alone to participate in coalitions with the US. This conclusion now seems to have been broadly accepted as several European countries have defined what RMA capacities that are within their reach.²⁴⁰

This is where the next challenge lies. The European countries are confronted with the need to carry out a military transformation enhancing both basic force projection as well

²³⁹ For a survey of these arguments, see Thérèse Delpech, *La guerre parfaite*, Paris: Flammarion, 1998, esp. 3–82; the French Ministry of Defence, *Les Enseignements du Kosovo*, November 1999, internet version, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/dossier/d36/capacites6.htm> p. 2; and Robert P. Grant, *The RMA Europe Can Keep in Step*, Occasional Paper 15, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2000.

²⁴⁰ See the conclusions drawn by a Franco-German-British-US working group: *Coalition military operations: The Way Ahead through Cooperability*, Arlington, VA: US-Crest, 2000, pp. 13–23.

as RMA capabilities, while at the same time ensuring popular support for the out-of-area operations the transformation aims for. Here the PCC represents a considerable step forward. The reason is that the Europeans, simply due to lack of close cooperation, have not been able to come up with an integrated concept of which RMA capacities that should receive priority. Some countries may to a lesser or greater extent, identify fields that are relevant from a national perspective, cross-national cooperation has been missing.²⁴¹ Whereas US comments often will tend to be dismissive of the European attempts in this field, here a few illustrations will be given to indicate that the picture is more mixed.

The European leaders in the adaptation of RMA are Britain and France. Already in the 1998 UK Strategic Defence Review a combination of advanced sensors and long-range precision-strike capabilities was recommended. France has already made headway in this field with the Apache air-launched cruise missile.²⁴² The procurement of Scalp-EG missiles with a range exceeding 250 km and one metre target accuracy is on the agenda. Italy has bought Storm Shadow missiles (the British version of Scalp), and an advanced German air-launched missile called Taurus has been developed and procured by the German armed forces.

These efforts were started before the PCC was announced. They meet one of the key deficiencies identified at the Summit. Another priority was information, surveillance and reconnaissance. France, Britain and Germany have already developed significant capabilities in the range of observation missiles and reconnaissance drones. France, Italy and Britain have developed national airborne ground surveillance programmes. German and French UAVs completed more than

²⁴¹ Ibid; Grant, *The RMA Europe Can Keep in Step*.

²⁴² This was the direct result of the lessons learned after Kosovo: "French participation in the air raids was reduced by the absence of equipment whose arrival with the forces is expected in a very short time." French Ministry of Defence, *Les enseignements du Kosovo*, p. 2.

200 reconnaissance flights over Serbia during the Kosovo campaign. France has led the development of a series of satellites called Hélios.²⁴³ A satellite centre has been established in the Spanish town of Torrejon. The Centre has already contributed to EU military operations in the Balkans. The military benefits of the planned Galileo navigation satellite system are even clearer. When completed, it will endow the EU with an extremely accurate satellite navigation system not subject to the control of the US.²⁴⁴

Likewise, the European allies are investing in digitised C4 systems. Both Britain and France have implemented a formation-level battlefield management system supporting units from brigade-size and above.²⁴⁵ The Dutch army has developed an Integrated Staff Information System based on commercial technology and made it into one of the most advanced command and control systems in the Alliance.

The European efforts in integrating RMA have so far been conducted on a national basis, with little cross-border cooperation. The PCC may provide the impetus to change that. But even if the European countries should do so to a far greater extent than today, US superiority will remain a fact. In recent years, the US defence budget has been increased at a pace that is beyond the combined efforts of its European allies. Does this mean that the requirements that have to be met for being regarded as relevant will increase? If so, the European allies, and above all the smaller countries will find that an increasing share of the budget is spent on meeting

²⁴³ Spain and Italy have also contributed financially to the development programme.

²⁴⁴ James Hasik and Michael Rip, "An evaluation of the Military Benefits of the Galileo System", *GPS World*, 1 April 2003. The radical changes in the EU's position on this issue can easily be detected when reading the Working Documents issued by the Union's Directorate General for Research, starting with the timid *Status Report on European Union Space-Satellite Policies*, published 17 March 1997, and going on to the European Commission's Space Action Plan adopted in November 2003.

²⁴⁵ See Grant, *The RMA Europe Can Keep in Step*, p. 13.

these requirements. For Norway where a balanced defence has traditionally been the desired ideal, this development means a move towards greater specialisation. Whereas for a country like Denmark, political opposition will focus less on the capacities forfeited than the political legitimacy of out-of-area operations.²⁴⁶

The PCC is in part a reply to these worries. First of all, the niche capacities identified are areas where the countries already possess comparative advantages. Secondly, PCC encourages cross-country cooperation. Many skills and capacities are too expensive to develop for one country, bi-, tri- or multilaterality makes economic sense. Finally, this cooperation might imbue the Alliance with a new sense of cohesion as well.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the division of capabilities has been discussed. An important attempt in this respect was the CJTF. It was intended both to enhance interoperability and to give the EU access to NATO assets.

Developments overtook CJTF. Within the EU, support has been growing for the development of military capacities. This is not just a French idea, although advocated most strongly by Paris it has gathered support in the other member countries as well. The unsolved issue for a long time was how the relationship with NATO should be organised. In the end, a compromise was reached whereby EU facilities are to be placed at SHAPE. This will be done to reduce US and its Atlanticist allies' suspicions that the EU will ultimately undermine NATO.

The EU's efforts have been encouraged by the larger European armaments producers. European capacities will mean new production orders. They have formed lobbies to

²⁴⁶ See "Forsvaret slipper for besparelser", *Berlingske Tidende*, 10 March 2004.

influence the European Commission's decision-making. The Commission has developed into an important institution regulating certain aspects of European armaments. Most experts expect it to be just a question of time before the Treaty of Rome is changed to permit the EU to regulate all aspects of armaments production directly. This is not a development automatically welcomed by all the smaller countries. The lobby organisations cater to the interests of big industry.

Parallel to the emerging military role of the EU, NATO has launched a reform process aimed at retaining the Alliance's military viability. To achieve that, a set list of priorities with special tasks allotted to each member was agreed at the Prague Summit in 2002. The countries will develop a set of capabilities that combined with those of the other members will provide the Alliance with the ability to react quickly and effectively to a broad range of new threats.

For the smaller countries, this is an opportunity to develop assets that make them into relevant partners. But it is also a concept with certain, well-known vulnerabilities. One of them is the danger that a country can choose to opt out, and thus deprive the coalition of a much needed input. This problem has been mentioned previously in this study, and as before no ready-made answer can be given. The only way this danger can be minimised is through a shared perception of security. A shared perception will also diminish the potential for rivalry between the EU's Rapid Reaction Force and NATO's Response Force.

Norway as a non-member of the EU is left with few cards to play. It will be barred from participating in the development of EU's defence and security policy. Cooperation with Germany and the Netherlands, and strengthening the bilateral relations with other EU members, may at best yield information about the EU's current process. In order to remain a relevant partner, Norway must adapt to these

changes. But this will hardly be a reciprocal relationship; EU will influence Norway but not vice-versa.

The Norwegian authorities have come out strongly in favour of the PCC. Compliance with the decisions made in Prague is emphasised in numerous official documents and has also played a decisive role in defence planning. This is done in order to show that Norway is a trustworthy ally. Moreover, NATO remains not only Norway's ultimate security guarantee, but also an indispensable channel for influence. How a small country can hope to influence a larger partner will be discussed in the next, and final chapter.

Chapter 6

Summing up: Size Matters

Size matters. Whereas large states can count on military strength, or economic strength as indicators that grant them a place at the table when decisions are made, a small country cannot, that is unless it possesses assets that make it a relevant partner for a multinational coalition.

How to achieve relevance was pointed out in the introductory chapter as a key challenge confronting small countries. This is not a quest without costs, and concentrating resources in one field that might increase their relevance to partners will easily mean forfeiting others. In a nutshell, this is the problem small countries like Norway face when asked to specialise in a specified set of skills or equipment that might not be needed for territorial defence.

A member of an alliance expects to draw upon the joint pools of strength in the pursuit of its own security interest. Yet, as has been pointed out here, relying too closely on your partners carries a risk as well. They might choose to opt out from measures that are of considerable importance to you. As pointed out in chapter 3, Norway's reservations against certain aspects of Alliance policies during the Cold War illustrate this. Norway's predicament was not limited to its policy of "screening", but also included the problems experienced by a small country cooperating with a larger ally. Here, Norwegian conditions over command and control issues

ran contrary to American desires. Solutions satisfying to both parties were found. Deployment in times of crisis or war would, however, most likely have been carried out according to US concepts and requirements. Another issue concerns the loss of relevance. Throughout the Cold War, Norway had a strategic position giving it a stronger voice within NATO than its size should indicate. In the 1990s, the relevance of Norway's assets declined. This triggered a process of exploring new forms of cooperation with allies and neighbours.

The end of the Cold War meant that the divide between Denmark and Norway as NATO members and Sweden and Finland as non-aligned lost much of its distinctive character. Although notable successes have been made in the field of peacekeeping, and a few in the field of joint procurement, it would however be wrong to claim that the Nordic countries are driven towards each other on security issues.

The chapter on burden-sharing starts out highlighting how touchy this issue has been for NATO. One of the reasons has been the lack of a commonly agreed standard for how national contributions should be measured. The agreement reached at the Prague Summit in 2002, whereby the members committed themselves to develop specific capacities, is designed to avoid this problem. If successful, it could limit the endless discussions over national inputs and burden-sharing.

During the Cold War, the US had few efficient tools that could be applied to pressure the Europeans to spend more. Threatening to reduce the US military presence was not regarded as credible simply because European security problems were US problems as well. Not so in the post-cold war climate. At the beginning of the 1990s, the relevance of NATO was questioned. Much focus was at that time given to the impact the possibility of membership had on democracy and stability for Eastern Europe. The military aspects of enlargement figured less prominently.

This changed radically with the new focus given to international terrorism. Terrorism meant that new military capabilities had to be developed, and this was a possibility for Europeans to prove their relevance. At the Prague Summit in 2002, a commitment was made by all the members to concentrate on what had been designated as the most relevant capacities required if NATO was to meet the new threats effectively. This was an opportunity to the small countries to concentrate on a few select niches.

But the commitments made at the Prague Summit are challenged by the emerging security role of the EU. The challenge is expressed in two ways: the EU's future military role which is set to go beyond the current emphasis on peacekeeping; and growing cooperation between armaments producers within Europe. The developments in this field have been characterised by mergers and acquisitions leading to increasingly larger units. Moreover, the armaments producers have formed lobbies influencing EU decision-making. This has left small countries in a squeeze. As far as can be ascertained, little is done to alleviate their situation.

In lieu of a conclusion ending with a customary optimistic keynote, it might be enlightening to ponder on the relationship between a country's size and its influence within an alliance. Throughout this study, scant reference has been made to the research literature available in this field. It might be appropriate to do that now, and at the same time compare some of my findings with conclusions drawn by others.

Size and influence

There is no unanimous definition of what a small state is.²⁴⁷
The easiest may be to state it in the number of inhabitants.

²⁴⁷ Heinz Gärtner and Allen G. Sens, "Small States and the Security Structures of Europe: The Search for Security After the Cold War", in Ingo Peters (ed.), *New Security Challenges: The Adaptation of International Institutions. Reforming the UN, NATO, EU and OSCE since 1989*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996; W. Bauwens, A. Clesse and Olav F. Knudsen

But since our focus has been on power, such an approach yields little. Instead, one might state that a small state is one with considerably less power than at least one of its neighbours.²⁴⁸ A third definition, by no means excluding the former, includes perception: the smaller is fully aware of its inability to uphold its own security, a fact recognised by the other states.²⁴⁹

The Finnish security expert Karoliina Honkanen has claimed that in the post-cold war climate, even this definition remains problematic. A country measured as small according to all the indicators suggested here, may still have resources that enable it to play a powerful role. Norway's vast energy and fishery resources mean that in certain forums, the country is a large power. The reason being that in these settings, Norwegian assets are relevant.

Alliances like NATO and the EU have institutionalised safeguards to protect the rights of the smaller members. Formally, influence over decisions within NATO is divided equally by granting each member one vote, the USA does not differ from Luxemburg. But this equality cannot hide the very obvious fact that the USA has played a leading role all along simply because this country was the sole guarantor of the others freedom during the Cold War. On key issues, the USA either alone or in coalition with other large countries has framed the decisions as well as the outcome. The question then is, what scope of influence is there for smaller countries in such an alliance? Many experts agree that the answer has

(eds.), *Small States and the Security Changes in the New Europe*, London: Brassey, 1996; Ryan C. Hendrickson, "NATO's Northern Allies: Contributions in the Post-Cold War Era", *European Security*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1999.

²⁴⁸ See Olav F. Knudsen, *Sharing Borders with a Great Power: An Examination of Small State Predicaments*. Oslo: NUPI Report 159, 1992.

²⁴⁹ Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Power*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, pp. 21, 29.

been a surprisingly large scope.²⁵⁰ A recent example is Denmark, since the end of the Cold War, Denmark has pursued a very active role in the Baltic region not least thanks to its status as a NATO member. Sweden made some efforts to increase its standing in the region, but Denmark's added bonus of being a NATO member quickly outshone Sweden's attempt to promote non-alignment as a viable option.

The proclaimed equality of all NATO's members is circumscribed by the undisputed leadership role of the USA; and by the emergence of informal groupings of the bigger members. From the perspective of the smaller partners, it is especially the latter constellation that has been perceived as a limitation to their influence. During the early years, the importance of France, Britain and the USA was expressed in the membership of the Military Committee's executive organ called the Standing Group. Once Germany joined, the membership was expanded and the four were labelled "the Quad". The Standing Group played a decisive role at an early stage. Yet, the key decisions on military strategy, e.g. Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response, all originated in Washington. French dissatisfaction over the US role, prompted an attempt by president de Gaulle in 1958 to set up a directorate within the Alliance consisting of the USA, Britain and France. This directorate was to be responsible for military planning and its execution. The smaller allies disapproved vehemently. Paul-Henri Spaak, then Secretary General, claimed this would mean that the smaller members would leave NATO and instead opt for neutrality.²⁵¹ President

²⁵⁰ See Tamnes, *The United States in the High North*, Oslo: Tanum-Norli, 1991. For a comparative analysis; Ruyan C. Hendrickson, "NATO's Northern Allies; Contributions to the Post-Cold War Era", *European Security*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1991; and Karoliina Honkanen, *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making*.

²⁵¹ Robert S. Jordan and Michael W. Bloome, *Political leadership in Nato: a study in multinational diplomacy*, Boulder : Westview Press, 1979, pp. 71–72.

Eisenhower rejected the French proposal not least because of the impact it would have on the smaller members. In this study, the apprehensions voiced against the Franco-German concept of a vanguard, and the plans drawn up by the large countries' armaments lobbies should be included as recent cases where the small fear they are being left out of important forums.

Despite Norwegian worries over lack of influence, like other smaller members of NATO Norway has been able to exert influence over NATO policies in areas of particular relevance to Norway; by developing strong links with countries with similar security interests and concerns, NATO has functioned as a force multiplier for the smaller countries.²⁵² According to one security scholar, this means that NATO should not be seen as the US instrument for promoting American interests, but just as much as a means for a small state to promote its own views and strategies.²⁵³

There have been cases when the smaller members have preferred to enter reservations, fearing how it would affect their international standing and domestic audience had they taken part. The Danish policy of footnote reservations against NATO plans pursued in the 1980s partly belongs here, as does the Norwegian reservations against certain forms of Allied presence in Norway. Nonetheless, in general the culture of persuasion and compromises, including regular consultations, consensus-building and the norms of equality, have all made it possible for the small allies to exert influence.²⁵⁴

²⁵² See Guillaume Parmentier, "Redressing NATO's Imbalances", *Survival*, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 96–112.

²⁵³ See David B. Haglund, "Allied Force or Forced Allies? The Allies' Perspective", in Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley (eds.), *Alliance Politics, Kosovo and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies?*, New York: Palgrave, 2000.

²⁵⁴ One of the most thorough analysis remains Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy*, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995.

The ability to do so depends on the extent to which the parties share the same view on security. Although multinational units are presented as the new and stronger bond reinforcing Alliance cohesion, the motives for participation differ according to which side of the Atlantic you are on. The arguments presented above in favour of multinationality applies, but with differing emphases in the US and in Europe. The Europeans are keen to participate to gain influence over decision-making. For the US side, the motives are different. They need the European allies in order to achieve greater legitimacy, but also to share the economic and human costs involved. Although the US is militarily far stronger than the Europeans they have had to rely on the European for overflight rights, bases, supply harbours, as well as other forms of logistical support for the operations against the Taleban in Afghanistan.

Relevance

If the other members perceive the assets a country contributes to an alliance as relevant; it will gain influence in return. Influence is different from power. The latter is usually defined in terms of military might and/or economic strength that can be applied to enforce a change, whereas influence is the ability to have an effect on the behaviour of others.

Small countries can pursue a number of strategies to achieve this. Here, only two rather general directions will be sketched. One is to become a member of an international alliance. Although this means access to decision-making, it can also mean decreased autonomy. Once you have joined, you cannot shy away, if so you will be regarded as a free rider and soon find that your advice or opinions carry little weight. But countries that value influence higher than autonomy will be eager to promote the cohesion of the alliance.²⁵⁵ These states

²⁵⁵ See Honkanen, *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making*, pp. 16–17.

will, as a rule, attempt to gain influence and advance its own security interests by advocating the common values of the international organisation. Indeed, the Norwegian support for NATO, and the “common values that tie the USA and Europe together” so often repeated in official statements, fully fits this line.

The other strategy is for a country to exploit the common commitments of an alliance for its own purposes. A country pursuing this strategy will be reluctant to support a common position without concessions. Norway tried this strategy when it offered troops to the EU’s planned military force in the wake of the 1999 Helsinki Summit in return for command influence.²⁵⁶ NATO’s history abounds with examples of this kind. But the degree of success depends on at least two factors, one is that the country must be regarded as sufficiently relevant to make the other countries willing to accept a concessionary solution, the other being a strong need for consensus. At such times, small states can extract concessions more easily than when the need for cohesion is less.

* * *

In a US study of the countries that are the most likely partners for the USA in case of multinational operations, countries unable to send at least one battalion were omitted; considering that a state is unlikely to send over 25 per cent of its ground troops, only states with a standing army above 5000 soldiers in peace time were included in the analysis.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁶ The Norwegian condition was rejected in no uncertain terms by the Finnish hosts.

²⁵⁷ Szayna et al., *Improving Army Planning for Future Multinational Operations*, pp. 46–47. To pre-empt any curiosity from Norwegian readers, Norway is not ranked among the first tier of likely coalition partners for the US in any future multinational operations. This group is small, consisting only of Great Britain, France and Germany. But Norway is not even

Moreover, only countries with a technological level sufficiently advanced to enable cooperation with US forces were on the list. The main indicator to delineate this group is spending pr. soldier. Only those countries where this level reached 50 per cent of the US level were listed as potential allies in a multinational operation. But this is an indicator fraught with pitfalls; above all the fact that it reveals nothing about how the money allotted to defence is being spent. The current debate on the costliness of maintaining large conscript armies in all the European countries where this is still the norm, is a case in point.

Since the debate on burden-sharing started, committees have been established to work out schemes to overcome burden-sharing problems; once agreed the schemes often failed to be implemented. The problem today is that there is no longer one transatlantic gap created by the discrepancy in military technology, but there is also a political fissure to boot. Any attempts to overcome the former will be dependent on the efforts undertaken to overcome the latter. The stakes are high. Especially so for the smaller countries. This is not only because the US has traditionally been their security guarantee, but because US leadership has meant that the influence of the small has increased relative to that of their larger European neighbours.²⁵⁸

In this study, the economic and political driving forces behind multinationality have been outlined. Alone, they might give the reader the impression that multinationality will enable the participant to continue much in the same way as before,

included in the second tier of countries consisting of Canada, Australia, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Spain. The report notes that although Norwegian participation in multinational operations has been high, the size of the ground troops is too low to expect sizeable contributions. Szayna et. al., *Improving Army Planning for Future Multinational Operations*, p. 53.

²⁵⁸ This has been an implicit part of the Dutch strategy of sing the US as a counterbalance to resist domination by a big regional power, especially France, see Alfred van Staden, "Small State Strategies in Alliances: The Case of the Netherlands", *Cooperation and Conflict*, no. 1, 1995, p. 32.

but now splitting the costs more efficiently. That would be wrong. Instead, multinationality is about developing the capacities needed to retain NATO as a viable military alliance. If not, we might be faced with what was once referred to as the Dorian Grey Syndrome: “the danger is that NATO will be dead before anyone notices, and we will only discover the corpse the moment we want it to rise and respond”.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁹ Stephen Walt, “The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are approaching a Parting of the Way”, *The National Interest*, Winter 1998–99, p. 11.