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**Great Power Guarantees or Small
State Cooperation?**

**Atlanticism and European Regionalism in
Norwegian Foreign Policy, 1940-1945**

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Introduction

Until the Second World War, Norway was a country with limited foreign policy traditions and experience. Foreign policy and international affairs played a subordinate role in public debates, and there was little professional or academic expertise in the field. The aims of the country's diplomatic activity seemed simple: to maintain a distance to potential issues and areas of conflict. Norway intended to be everybody's friend and nobody's foe. Neutralist inclinations grew stronger and gradually became dominant as tension increased in Europe in the latter 1930s. During this period Norway's involvement in the League of Nations increasingly focused on efforts to restrict the compulsory character of the Covenant's Article 16, i.e. the right and duty of member states to participate in sanctions against an aggressor. Norway declared its intention to follow a policy of formal neutrality in the case of war involving the European great powers.

Behind the policy of non-involvement in great power conflict was the conviction that Great Britain would, in its own interest, come to Norway's rescue in case of attack from Germany or the Soviet Union, the only conceivable aggressors. Thus Norway based its security on an "implicit guarantee" by, primarily, Great Britain, but Norway's official stance as a non-aligned country precluded public declarations to this effect.¹

In the eyes of most influential Norwegians, the German attack on Norway on 9 April 1940 and Britain's inability to provide effective military assistance had once and for all compromised the basic tenets of prewar Norwegian foreign and security policies. The need to demonstrate Norway's active commitment to the allied war effort and the necessity of starting planning for the future made the Norwegians in London rethink the basic premises of Norway's security and its foreign relations. The need to cultivate relations with all the major allies, including the Soviet Union from 22 June 1941, forced the Norwegian government to define Norway's place in the relationship between

the three great powers which were likely to play leading roles in Europe after the war.

The policy formulation which started soon after the Norwegian government's arrival in London in mid-June 1940 included discussions of the basic premises of Norway's foreign and security policies.² From June 1940 to May 1945 the policy of the government-in-exile went through three main stages. Halvdan Koht, the prewar foreign minister who continued in office until he was replaced by Trygve Lie in November 1940,³ struggled in vain to salvage what was left of prewar neutralism.

Although it is difficult to reconstruct a complete picture of his thinking, he apparently thought that Norway should take part in the war against Germany without involving itself in a clear-cut and formalised alliance with Great Britain. Trygve Lie, on the other hand, from the onset of his tenure as minister of foreign affairs saw as his primary task the strengthening of Norway's ties to Great Britain and the consolidation of its position within the alliance. Partly in order to demonstrate and underline Norway's break with its neutralist past, he introduced his "Atlantic policy", a scheme for Atlantic cooperation to be continued and developed further when hostilities ended.

With the rise of the Soviet Union as a major partner in the alliance and a power which must be included in all planning for the postwar world, the "Atlantic policy" gradually receded in Norwegian foreign policy declarations. The "Atlantic policy" had been conceived when the Soviet Union played a subordinate role in Norwegian foreign policy considerations. The new balance of forces within the alliance, however, forced the Norwegian government to retreat from the one-sided western political and military orientation inherent in the "Atlantic policy". The Norwegians began to think in terms of Norway as a "bridge" between the Soviet Union and the two dominant western powers, the United States and the United Kingdom. While making less mention of the need for political and military cooperation with the "Atlantic powers" (Lie had even suggested that the United States might wish to establish military bases in Norway after the war), Norwegian policy turned gradually

towards supporting schemes of global great power cooperation. "Bridge-building" succeeded "Atlantic policy" as the declared Norwegian foreign policy doctrine.

Aspects of the government's international orientation, most markedly the declaration of the "Atlantic policy", was criticised and opposed by groups of Norwegians abroad and from allied governments. Various counterproposals were introduced. Isolated *neutrality* as represented by Halvdan Koht was hardly present in discussions after the summer of 1940. It may be argued, however, that elements of the idea survived and surfaced with the rise of "bridge-building" and global rather than Atlantic commitments as the foundations of Norwegian foreign policy. *Nordic cooperation*, as opposed to Atlantic, i.e. great power cooperation, continued to appeal to groups of Norwegians abroad and also to parts of the Home Front leadership in Norway. Schemes of Nordic cooperation were often linked to broader schemes of *European cooperation* as propagated by Polish premier Wladyslaw Sikorski and Norwegians in Stockholm.

This article discusses the schemes of European and Nordic regional cooperation together with the *Atlantic policy* and the *bridge-building ideology* as they appeared in Norwegian foreign policy discussions during the Second World War. Why did the policy-making bodies in London consistently reject all ideas of regional solutions in Europe, propagating either schemes of cooperation with the western great powers or "non-allignment" in the form of Norway as a "bridge" between the East and the West?

Prewar Norwegian attitudes to Nordic and European regional cooperation

After the First World War Norway opted for membership in the newly created League of Nations. The decision was far from undisputed in Norway; not only the Labour Party argued that Norway should continue the policy of neutrality which had served its purpose during the First World War. Neutrality or non-allignment, it was

argued, was incompatible with participation in the League of Nations. The conflict between *international solidarity* and commitments, expressed through Norway's active participation in Geneva, and strong *neutralist sentiments*, remained a characteristic feature of Norwegian foreign policy in the interwar period.⁴ Whereas Norwegians placed great hopes on the new world organisation during the relatively tranquil 1920s, enthusiasm waned in inverse ratio to the growth of tension and conflict in Europe. In the latter half of the 1930s Norway and the other Scandinavian states took the lead in attempting to weaken the strength of the Covenant's Article 16. Norway and the Nordic states also took steps to prepare the ground for formal neutrality in case of war. The British "implicit guarantee" nevertheless remained the cornerstone of its security policies.

In the interwar period the Scandinavian countries (from the mid-1930s including Finland) developed a system of frequent and regular consultations on the highest political level. Cooperation in economic and cultural matters brought significant results, but there was also a high degree of coordination of their activity in Geneva and of their foreign policy in general. In the military field, however, collaboration was limited to a few areas of peacetime preparation, and the results were meagre.⁵ Attempts at staff consultations and cooperation in the production and procurement of weapons and munitions had few results. In Norway the idea of some sort of Nordic or Scandinavian military union or common security arrangement found support only in military, and some conservative, quarters. Among the leading politicians of all the major political parties such ideas were rejected out of hand.⁶ Taking into account their rejection of Nordic cooperation, it is hardly surprising that Norwegians were even more negative towards any involvement on the European continent. Polish and Baltic attempts, perceived or real, to develop contacts with Scandinavian countries met with no response in Norway.

The prevailing Norwegian attitudes towards the notion of Nordic and European regional cooperation were influenced and reinforced by what they perceived to be Soviet preferences. The Norwe-

gians felt that the Soviet Union disapproved of all kinds of regional arrangements in the immediate vicinity of their borders.⁷ Halvdan Koht, minister of foreign affairs from March 1935, consciously played down the significance of his Baltic and Polish contacts in order not to antagonise Moscow. This argument reappeared in the wartime discussions.

Summer 1940: reorientation of Norwegian foreign policy attitudes

When the Norwegian government established itself in London in June 1940, the attention and criticism focused on Halvdan Koht, minister of foreign affairs, who was strongly identified with the prewar foreign policy and its ultimate failure. Mounting opposition against Koht's conduct of the government's foreign affairs led to his replacement by Trygve Lie in November the same year.

It would be wrong to present Koht as simply being in favour of a continuation of the prewar policy of neutrality; an obviously non-existent alternative at a time of war and emigration. Discussions in the summer of 1940 focused on Norway's role in the alliance and the character and scope of relations with the United Kingdom as the main belligerent power.

The Soviet Union played an important role in Koht's thinking at this point. If the war ended without the allies achieving a clear-cut victory the result could be some sort of compromise peace. In this situation the Soviets would be in a position to exert decisive influence when the shape and order of postwar Europe should be decided. It would then obviously be in Norway's interest to be able to draw on a reserve of Soviet goodwill and, if possible, on a Soviet commitment to restore some sort of Norwegian statehood.⁸ Fundamentally Koht's view was based on the assumption that the Soviets would be favourably inclined towards a Norwegian foreign policy which set limits to the wartime cooperation with Great Britain. The government-in-exile should therefore stress its independent stance, although Koht never argued in favour of a complete disentanglement from the

allied cause. In this connection it is noteworthy that Koht, some weeks after his arrival in London, took the opportunity to assure Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to London, that the Norwegians had not asked for allied help after the German attack. Ivan Maisky, according to Koht, attached due importance to his communication.⁹

The attitude of the foreign minister may be further characterised by a remark he reportedly made during another interview with the Soviet ambassador. According to Maisky, Koht spoke of Norway as "still remaining 'neutral' though at war with Germany".¹⁰ Some of the members of the Norwegian cabinet were of the opinion that Koht wanted Norway to be "a belligerent neutral". The minister of justice, Terje Wold, returned on various occasions to a discussion of Koht's views on foreign policy in his diary. According to Wold, Koht held the view that "our position in relation to Russia will be better [...] *the less we have to do with England*".¹¹

Koht's opponents rejected his policy of stressing Norway's independence vis-à-vis the British in order to preserve and cultivate the Soviet connection. A memorandum signed in mid-July by a group of five intellectuals of the inner circle surrounding the government gives a clear picture of their thinking.¹² "The five" pointed out that all attempts at effective wartime cooperation between Norway and its allies would be seriously hampered if Norway prepared for the worst alternative by building up its relations with a great power which was supporting the allies' adversary in the war. Norway must avoid being suspected of cultivating friendship with "the foe of its ally". This argument went to the core of Koht's foreign policy doctrine, and "the five" were probably hinting at the foreign minister's conversation with Ivan Maisky a few days earlier. Secondly, "the five" argued that the Soviet Union, *because* it did not want to see Norway completely dominated by Great Britain, must view favourably all attempts to make Norway an active participant in the war. A policy of active cooperation with the allied powers in the struggle for the allied cause was Norway's only chance of asserting the country's position as a sovereign power, thereby avoiding "complete dependence on

England in case of a German defeat". Summing up: the principal concern of "the five" was the necessity of developing a more active and whole-hearted cooperation with the British.

Trygve Lie and the introduction of the "Atlantic Policy"

Trygve Lie's instalment in office as minister of foreign affairs in November 1940 signalled a radical departure from the "Koht doctrine" in Norwegian foreign policy. The new foreign policy philosophy, presented as "the Atlantic Ocean policy", or simply the "Atlantic policy", represented a fundamental departure from the traditional Norwegian policy of maintaining a distance to great power politics. Some isolated voices, for instance the Norwegian envoy to Moscow, Einar Maseng, continued to argue in favour of a more "independent" foreign policy line. For the time being, however, the representatives of the old line of neutrality had lost their influence.

Lie developed the idea of Atlantic cooperation in a series of speeches and articles commencing in the autumn of 1940. The general idea of continuing cooperation between the allies after the war might seem a logical outcome of the new solidarity and realisation of common interests among the great and small comrades-in-arms. It is equally obvious that the introduction of the "Atlantic policy" was partly motivated by the acutely felt need to enhance Norway's standing as a fully committed member of the alliance. Of greater interest is the operational content Lie gave his ideas even at this early stage of their elaboration. He wanted to offer Great Britain and the USA military bases in Norway even in times of peace. Lie aired this idea for the first time in the autumn of 1940 when he was still minister of supplies and returned to it on several occasions in the following years. This shows that the new foreign minister and his advisers had a frame of reference that differed radically from the dominant prewar doctrine.¹³

The first to introduce Lie to the idea of Atlantic military-political cooperation was Dr Arnold Røstad, a specialist in international law and an

adviser to the Norwegian government in matters of foreign policy.¹⁴ Røstad was concerned with creating a set of "security combines" which together would be strong enough to eliminate the possibility of renewed aggression on the part of Germany or Japan.¹⁵ Røstad made no hints about having to safeguard against Soviet expansion as well. The area of responsibility of each of the "combines", together with its system of military bases, was to constitute "a strategically complete field of defensive operations".¹⁶ In Røstad's opinion, the countries bordering on the North Atlantic constituted such a regional entity, and he consequently argued in favour of the creation of a "North Atlantic Security Combine".¹⁷ Neither a purely European nor a Nordic system would be strong enough to give Norway the sufficient degree of security against aggression from an expansionist great power. Within the framework of each of the regional organisations should be created "a permanent military machinery, sufficiently manned and alertly watched", which was to dispose of "massed air and sea forces".¹⁸

The "Atlantic policy" was not unequivocally welcomed among the allies or influential Norwegians at home and abroad. British and American reactions were cautious and uncommitted. They did not reject the idea, but were unwilling to enter into discussions of its practical implementation. The Home Front leaders in Norway were highly sceptical about the idea of giving priority to cooperation with the great powers rather than with Sweden and the other Nordic neighbours. They also stressed the importance of the coming world organisation, and emphasised the necessity of including the Soviet Union in any future security arrangement in the region.¹⁹ Yet another challenge to the foreign policy orientation of the Norwegian government was introduced by the Polish government-in-exile of General Wladyslaw Sikorski.

Wladyslaw Sikorski and the idea of a Central European Confederation

Early in the war the new Polish government revived the idea of a Central European confederation, made up of Poland, Czechoslovakia and

possibly other countries "with which the vital interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia are linked up".²⁰ Continuing prewar Polish foreign minister Józef Beck's political thinking, Sikorski's idea was to create "a politically solid bloc of Slav states extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Adriatic".²¹ The Polish-Czechoslovak confederation was envisaged as the core of a Central European system of cooperation between states. Discussions between Eduard Beneš and Sikorski began in October 1939, and on 11 November 1940 the two governments declared that Poland and Czechoslovakia after the war would enter as independent and sovereign States into a closer political and economic association, which would become the basis of a new order in Central Europe, and a guarantee of its stability.²²

Although negotiations between the Poles and the Czechoslovaks continued until 1942, the plans for a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation ultimately failed. This failure was due to the two countries' divergent attitudes towards the Soviet Union, their conflicting ideas about the nature of the proposed confederation, and a virtual Soviet veto on the plan. A declaration of 23 January 1942, outlining the basic principles of the confederation, did not receive Beneš' signature, and turned out to be the climax of the Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations. Relations between the two governments became increasingly strained.

The Norwegians were alarmed at the idea of a "central zone" in Europe, although Norway was hardly designated as a participant in the system. What was it then that motivated the Norwegian to resist Sikorski's scheme for the solution of the security problem of eastern continental Europe, a scheme which only indirectly touched Norwegian interests?

When the Norwegians in London discussed Sikorski's ideas in beginning of 1942, they did not rule out their future realisation in some form or other.²³ Neither did they doubt their basic anti-Soviet leaning. They were therefore convinced - and rightly so - that the Soviets would oppose schemes of small state cooperation in the eastern part of Europe. In the short term, therefore, the Norwegians felt that a discussion of the Polish scheme would expose the alliance to additional

strain.²⁴ In a longer perspective, the scheme threatened to add an element of friction between the Atlantic great powers and the Soviet Union in postwar Europe. Thus, the Norwegians based their opposition to Sikorski's ideas of a unified Central Europe on a fundamentally correct evaluation of the ultimate Polish motives for launching the project: the Poles were concerned with creating security for the Central European countries against both the Soviet Union and Germany. At the same time the Norwegians were unable or unwilling to take into account specific Central European security concerns, and evaluated the plan primarily within the context of future East-West great power relations. The Poles thought of small state cooperation as a means to counter possible future Soviet and German demands. The Norwegian government, on the other hand, consistently rejected participation in schemes of cooperation which the Soviets might perceive as being directed against themselves.

The Atlantic policy was conceived as a system based on the participation of Great Britain and the United States, within which smaller states would inevitably act as junior partners. The Norwegian government felt that the Polish ideas about small and medium state cooperation pointed in the opposite direction, by emphasising small state cooperation and independence from the great powers in matters of security. Their reasoning was never made explicit, but it appears that the Norwegian government perceived Sikorski's schemes as competing with their own Atlantic proposals. They were anxious lest the Polish ideas should receive support in British and American circles and thereby weaken their own favoured scheme for Atlantic cooperation. After the war Lie argued rather unconvincingly that the Poles feared that the Norwegian "Atlantic" initiatives would impair Poland's position in the alliance, which was why the Poles launched their own initiatives.²⁵

Military-strategic factors pulled in the same direction. Norway's position as an Atlantic power, its sparse population and its lack of an industrial base for large-scale production of military equipment and weapons, made the country fundamentally dependent upon the Atlantic powers, Great Britain and the USA, for its security. Thus the

pursuit of credible guarantees of support from the western great powers remained the core of Lie's Atlantic policy, and plans for the future organisation of central Europe were naturally peripheral to the primary interests of the Norwegian government.

The Norwegian hostility to schemes of exclusive cooperation between smaller states, and the concomitant awareness of possible Soviet misgivings, were revealed when General Sikorski in January 1942 proposed drafting a declaration of the exiled governments, outlining their position with regard to the postwar order in Europe. The ostensible primary purpose of the declaration was to reach agreement on a joint policy towards postwar Germany.²⁶

Lie was far from enthusiastic. He pointed out to General Sikorski that Norway's interests were "mostly directed towards the West", and that any scheme for postwar cooperation had to be discussed with the great powers - Great Britain, USA, the Soviet Union and - China.²⁷ In conversations with the British and the Americans he pointed out that Norway favoured cooperation with Great Britain and the United States, while the Polish plans seemed to be inspired by an ideology of small power cooperation.²⁸

Lie's most direct concern, however, was the reaction of the Russians. When Józef Retinger, who was one of Sikorski's closest advisers, returned to the proposal a week after Sikorski first presented the idea, Lie was still of the opinion that the whole project was rather nebulous and lacking in constructive purpose. He told Retinger that the Norwegian government would not participate in an action that could "incite Russian suspicions".²⁹ Lest the affair should trouble Norway's reasonably good relations with the Soviet government, Lie told Alexandr Y. Bogomolov, Soviet minister to the governments-in-exile in London, that he had been approached by the Poles, but that the Norwegian government was sceptical about the idea.³⁰

Nothing came of the planned small state declaration. Trygve Lie, who never suffered from excessive modesty, accorded to himself a major role in blocking the idea. In a letter to the Norwegian minister to Moscow, Rolf Andvord, Lie

emphasised that he had taken an "initiative" and done "what [he] could" to obstruct Sikorski's proposal, thereby preventing the formation of "an anti-Russian coalition of small occupied states".³¹

The Nordic alternative

Norway would not have been directly affected by the Polish plans for Central European cooperation, and the aborted declaration of the occupied states in Europe remained a minor episode in the history of the alliance. Trygve Lie certainly exaggerated his own role in preventing the realisation of Sikorski's plan. Nevertheless, the Russians were pleased with the Norwegian attitude. In April 1943 Bogomolov told a member of the Norwegian cabinet that the Soviet government was aware that Norway wanted cordial relations with the Soviet Union:

*He [i.e. Bogomolov] added that the Soviet government had noticed with satisfaction that the Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian governments had distanced themselves from the Polish intrigues, which were directed against the Soviet Union.*³²

Lie's emotional engagement and Bogomolov's praise notwithstanding, Norway played a peripheral role in Sikorski's plans for European cooperation. The Nordic alternative, which became the object of heated Swedish-Norwegian discussions in the spring and early summer of 1942, presented a more conceivable alternative in terms of Norway's postwar foreign policy and security orientation. The Norwegians in Stockholm, centred around Labour party leader Martin Tranmæl, voiced the most clearly expressed opposition to the Atlantic orientation of the London government. Signs of diverging views also emanated from the leadership of the Home Front in Norway, and there were significant differences of opinion within the government itself.³³

Beginning in the winter of 1942 there was a discussion about the nature of future Nordic cooperation in the Swedish, Norwegian (London), and to some degree British press. The argument

culminated in a harsh attack on the Swedish point of view in the official Norwegian newspaper *Norsk Tidend* on 15 July.³⁴ The Norwegians were extremely upset when Sir Stafford Cripps came out in support of the idea of a future Scandinavian "federation" in an interview in the Swedish weekly *Vecko-Journalen*,³⁵ and were also alarmed by the appearance in Sweden of a booklet titled *Nordens Förenta Stater (The United States of the North)*.³⁶ The preparation and discussions in the government in April and May 1942 of the policy document "Hovedlinjer i norsk utenrikspolitikk" ("The principal features of Norway's foreign policy") were partly motivated by the need to present the Norwegian point of view in face of the propagation of a "Nordic" solution.³⁷

The strained relationship between the two governments during the two years following the German attack on Norway complicated any talk of postwar Norwegian-Swedish cooperation. In Norwegian circles in London there was a widespread feeling of bitterness towards the Swedish government, resulting from what the Norwegians regarded as excessive Swedish accommodation to German demands. Of equal importance was the need to demonstrate Norway's uncompromising stand as a member of the fighting alliance - considerations of alliance commitments and solidarity were always present in the foreign policy thinking of the Norwegian government during the war. After Lie took over as foreign minister in November 1940, he introduced the "Atlantic policy" partly to dissociate his own foreign policy from the neutrality oriented approach of his predecessor Halvdan Koht. Lie felt that an open discussion during the war of a future partnership between Norway and the neutral Sweden would cause the western powers to question the sincerity of Norway's Atlantic commitment. Finland's participation in the war against the Soviet Union - and Finland was traditionally closer to Sweden than to Norway - also contributed to the erosion of the traditional feeling of Nordic unity and solidarity, and made easier the transition to an Atlantic, or great power, orientation.

Nonetheless, the Norwegian government's attitude to future Nordic cooperation reflected a

fundamental reorientation of Norwegian foreign policy. The experiences of war and occupation tended to place security concerns uppermost in government planning for Norway's place in the postwar world. Any schemes of Nordic cooperation, according to the propagators of the Atlantic policy, would not suffice to give Norway an acceptable level of security. Arne Ordning, an influential advisor to Lie in London, argued that basing Norway's security policy on schemes of Nordic cooperation would mean the continuation of the prewar policy of non-alignment. No group of smaller states would be able to keep out of a future conflict between the great powers, if only one of the belligerent parties found reason to draw their territories into the conflict. There could be no real security for small states except in cooperation with one or more of the great powers. The question was not whether Norway should engage in cooperation with other powers, but with whom to cooperate, and whether to undertake joint preparations for war in times of peace.³⁸

There was general agreement about the need to seek security for Norway in cooperation with other countries. Lie favoured military cooperation with, principally, Great Britain and the USA. Sweden's and Denmark's adherence to an Atlantic system would be welcomed, without being essential. Tranmæl and the group in Stockholm, on the other hand, viewed a Scandinavian bloc as the northern link in a set of European regional systems. They too rejected participation in a neutral Nordic bloc as an option for Norway after the war, if neutrality implied the rejection of any form of security arrangement with groups of states outside Scandinavia and Finland. As opposed to the Norwegians in London, they viewed future Norwegian and Nordic foreign policies primarily in the context of an extensive system of European cooperation, within which the smaller powers would together seek security in regional arrangements. The Stockholm group accordingly rejected exclusive reliance on the Atlantic great powers for support and security.

The Swedish arguments in favour of a neutral Nordic bloc were rejected out of hand in London. Such a solution, for one thing, seemed to guarantee

Sweden a dominant position - and the Norwegians were extremely apprehensive about possible Swedish motives and objectives.³⁹ But the London Norwegians' opposition to the Swedish point of view was also of a more fundamental nature: the option of a Nordic bloc independent of great power support directly contradicted the security arrangement that the government preferred.

Arne Ording also suspected the Swedes of preferring some sort of Soviet-German balance of power in the Baltic area,⁴⁰ while the Norwegians based their policy planning on a definitive allied victory, which would leave the Soviet Union as the only remaining great power in that region. During the war the Norwegian government could not engage in discussions about a future Nordic system which could be expected to assume a "neutral" position between the Soviet Union and Germany.

For all these reasons, the Norwegian government was extremely sensitive whenever they felt that the question of Nordic cooperation gained some degree of consideration or acceptance in the alliance. Lie therefore protested to the British when Sir Stafford Cripps in the interview in *Vecko-Journalen* expressed support for the idea of a future "Scandinavian federation", powerful enough to allow the Scandinavian countries to remain independent of great power support.⁴¹

"The principal features of Norway's foreign policy" discussed the nature of the future relations between the Scandinavian states only in general terms, but rejected out of hand the idea of a Nordic "bloc" conducting foreign and military affairs jointly. The emphasis in the document was on Atlantic cooperation and participation in a new global security organisation.

The group in Stockholm, on the other hand, held that "the western orientation should not be at the expense of the Nordic cooperation".⁴² They felt that Norway must avoid the position of a powerless junior partner in an alliance of great powers. Anders Frihagen, a member of the cabinet who openly supported the Nordic orientation, expressed this point of view in a letter to prime minister Johan Nygaardsvold: "A strongly [...] united North will be a real power factor. In isolation we will be

completely dependent on one of the great powers."⁴³ Martin Tranmæl made the same case in letters to Lie and Nygaardsvold.⁴⁴ The group in Stockholm did not object to the idea of continued security cooperation with the western powers after the war, but were of the opinion that only a united North would be in a position to play an independent role in a security arrangement with great power participation.

Tranmæl and the group in Stockholm did not elaborate in any detail their vision of future Scandinavian or Nordic cooperation, but their thinking pointed in the direction of cooperation in security and economic affairs, which could gradually develop into "a possible Nordic union of states".⁴⁵ The nature of this hypothetical Nordic union was left open. The concept at this stage hardly constituted more than a policy statement couched in very general terms. It shows, however, that the Norwegians in Stockholm envisioned far-reaching Nordic or Scandinavian military, economic and political cooperation in the future. In a letter to Trygve Lie in August 1942, Tranmæl reiterated that a Nordic defence union, and cooperation in economic and foreign affairs, could be the first steps towards a political union.⁴⁶

The Norwegians in Stockholm were aware that Nordic cooperation would be complicated by a number of factors: fear of Swedish domination; the uncertain future status of Finland; Denmark's strategic dependence on the dominant power in continental Western Europe. All these factors made the idea seem risky. A vision of a united North *as an element in a postwar European system of federations or confederations* motivated Tranmæl and the Stockholm group to pursue the idea despite these obvious difficulties. Nordic cooperation was "one step" towards a "rational" European order of regional units, which might ultimately be transformed into some sort of "United States of Europe".⁴⁷ Nordic cooperation, according to "Diskusjonsgrunnlag om våre fredsmål", a document of June 1942 which expressed the views of the Stockholm group, could exist and develop only "in a broader European and international context". Although the Norwegians in Stockholm supported the idea of a global security organisation, they

maintained that the world organisation must be supplemented by regional groupings of countries. They envisaged "very far-reaching" forms of cooperation within the "federations or unions", and the future world organisation should be based on regional agreements.⁴⁸

Tranmæl argued that foundations of a federal organisation of Europe must be laid during the war.⁴⁹ "Diskusjonsgrunnlag" praised the idea of a Central European confederation of Poland and Czechoslovakia with the possible participation of Roumania and Hungary. The document further envisaged a "federation" of the Balkans, and a system of close cooperation between the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom. Germany, France and Italy were expected to assume their traditional role of regional great powers.

The Norwegian government in London, on the other hand, was of the opinion that Norwegian participation in a European system of small state cooperation might complicate the country's relations with the Soviet Union, and quoted Soviet opposition as one reason to reject the idea. Although the Norwegians in London were concerned about possible Soviet territorial or other demands on Norway in the future, considerations of alliance solidarity made them play down these concerns, and government papers and discussions of Norway's future foreign policy and security orientation barely touched the topic.⁵⁰ The Norwegians in Stockholm were more outspoken in their fear of an expansionist or imperialist Soviet foreign policy after the war. Tranmæl pointed out the need of creating a "balance of power" on the European continent, rejecting the idea of placing Germany under occupation and stripping the country of its armed forces after an allied victory. Tranmæl perceived clearly the need to create a counterpoise to the Soviet Union on the European continent:

*[...] what is the alternative to a real Germany? Should the Soviet Union be allowed to become the supremely dominant great power on the European continent? Don't they understand in London the dangers inherent in this massing of power around Stalin's imperialist bolshevism?*⁵¹

Tranmæl was pessimistic about Norway's chances of remaining on good terms with the Soviet Union after the war. Soviet foreign policy would reflect "harsh realities", and he expected Germany to present less of a problem than the Soviet Union.⁵² Anders Frihagen argued that defence against a possible future Soviet attack from the east demanded cooperation with Sweden and Finland, while Lie's system of Atlantic cooperation primarily aimed at defending Norway's coast line. Frihagen also accorded importance to Finland as a "barrier against Russia".⁵³

The Soviet Union in Norwegian wartime foreign policy planning

The "Atlantic policy" was conceived and originally propagated when the anti-Hitler coalition was still dominated by Great Britain, heavily supported by the United States. The growing stature of the Soviet Union in the alliance after its entry into the war soon began to challenge some of the basic assumptions behind the Atlantic policy.

The Norwegians did not envisage that their scheme for Atlantic cooperation should include the Soviet Union. In fact, in the early war years Norwegian foreign policy thinking seemed largely to ignore the existence and potential of the Soviet Union. In the final years of the war, however, planning for the future could no longer disregard the Soviet Union.

The dilemma was highlighted in the autumn of 1942 when the Soviets signalled that they might demand a role in a future North Atlantic security system. Lie was far from delighted. "If only", he told Laurence Collier, British ambassador to the Norwegian government, "your authorities had not taken such a long time to consider my original proposals, we might have avoided this danger".⁵⁴

Although the "Atlantic policy" was primarily designed to safeguard against a renewed threat from Germany, after June 1941 Lie and his advisers made it clear on occasions that some sort of Atlantic regional cooperation could be needed to safeguard against Soviet territorial claims as well. Traditional Norwegian "russophobia", fear of

Soviet designs on Spitsbergen, rumours that the Soviets wanted a "free port" in Northern Norway, and the possible Soviet role in the liberation of Norway all served to increase Norwegian fear and apprehension. In November 1941 Lie alluded to a possible future Soviet threat during a conversation with the Dutch and Belgian ministers of foreign affairs. He indicated Norway's primarily western orientation, and added that

*Germany is not necessarily the only possible source of threat to Europe. Even though the Soviet Union has declared that it has no territorial demands [on Norway], Russia's policy towards Finland in the last years points in a western direction, and it has been written that Russia would like to have a port on the Atlantic.*⁵⁵

If this was part of the motivation behind Lie's Atlantic policy, it could hardly have been the intentions of the Norwegian government to include the Soviet Union in the system. He had been thinking of Russia, Lie told Eden at about the same time,

*but he did not want Russia in the North Atlantic; though he also thought Russia would want to be there. Part of his purpose in proposing an Anglo-Norwegian and, if possible, American defensive plan for the North Atlantic was to be all prepared were Russia to present any demands.*⁵⁶

Arne Ording argued along similar lines, pointing to the exposed position of Northern Norway in particular if the Soviets should instigate an aggressive Soviet foreign policy leading to "a new period of arms race and formation of alliances". Ording concluded that only Great Britain and the USA were in a position to provide security for Norwegian independence. "No other form of absolute security exists, at least not in the foreseeable future."⁵⁷ An official committee planning Norway's postwar defence concluded in March 1942 that as the Soviets *might* resume an aggressive policy after the war, Norway's defence would consequently have to be planned with an eye to this alternative as well.⁵⁸

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aware of the possibility of Soviet objections to Norway's participation in a western-dominated defence system in the Atlantic. Arne Ording, commenting in June 1942 upon a Dutch proposal of similar content, indicated Norway's special position vis-B-vis the Soviet Union. After the war and as the result of Soviet-Finnish peace treaty, Norway and the Soviet Union would in all probability become direct neighbours. Ording did not exclude the possibility that the Soviets might approve of Norwegian participation in a defence system together with Great Britain and the USA. "This is, however", Ording continued, "the most sensitive question arising as a result of the proposed agreement".

The British Foreign Office was acutely aware that the Soviet Union was likely to put obstacles in the way of the realisation of Lie's plans for a North Atlantic defence system. The Russians were expected to raise objections to discussions of the plan between Norway and the western powers unless the Soviets participated. Eden emphasised the need to avoid elements of friction in the relations between the great powers.⁵⁹ Consequently, the Soviet Union must be invited to participate in the discussions, though Eden feared that its contribution would be "entirely destructive":

*It is probable that their [i.e. The Soviet Union's] line would be that it is also a Russian interest to participate in the defence of the Atlantic, and that for this purpose Russia must have an ice-free base in Northern Norway.*⁶⁰

A speech by the South African Field Marshall Jan Christiaan Smuts in November 1943 provoked a discussion about certain aspects of Norwegian foreign policy. It throws light on the implications of Lie's Atlantic policy. Smuts argued in favour of organising close cooperation between Great Britain and the other West European countries, in order to counterbalance the power of the Soviet Union and the United States by shaping a "trinity" of forces.⁶¹ An editorial in *Norsk Tidend* objected to this part of Smuts' speech. Smuts, the paper held, was obviously influenced by the ideology of "balance of

power and spheres of interest". *Norsk Tidend* had to admit, however, that Smuts' scheme bore some resemblance to the Norwegian Atlantic policy. But it was argued that the resemblance was a superficial one, because the Norwegian schemes had always envisaged American participation, and the planned defence system in the North Atlantic was, according to *Norsk Tidend*, to be organised "in intimate cooperation with the Soviet Union".⁶² This last part of the argument, as we have seen, was hardly part of the rationale behind the "Atlantic policy".

The article in the official Norwegian newspaper was precipitated by a conversation on the matter between Lie and Collier. The Norwegian minister of foreign affairs deplored the public presentation of the idea of grouping smaller West European states around Great Britain. According to Lie, such plans were bound to incite Soviet suspicions.

Lie went on to say that there were now more signs [...] that the Russians would be likely to take a suspicious and unhealthy interest in Norwegian foreign policy, if it showed signs of linking up with that of this country and that of America. [...]

He did not himself actually fear Russian territorial designs on any part of Norway; but he did fear that the Soviet Government might try, for reasons of their own, to prevent the Norwegian Government from conducting their foreign affairs in the way in which he would like to see them conducted, and that was the main reason why he regretted the publication of Smuts' speech.⁶³

Lie's statement provoked an exchange of opinions within the British Foreign Office. One official held the view that the statement was contradictory to Lie's own cherished idea: the Atlantic Ocean policy, which would involve Norway in close collaboration with Great Britain and the United States: "If Mr. Lie is afraid of Norway taking this course, then why does he proclaim [...] in favour of it?" It was held that the rising power of the Soviet Union had obviously forced Lie to change

his mind. The only commentator who felt that Lie's statement did not signify a change of his views was G.M. Gathorne-Hardy. He maintained that from the very introduction of the idea the Soviet Union had been ascribed a role in the North Atlantic cooperation. In his opinion the Norwegians were particularly opposed to the idea of creating a third bloc to counterbalance the power of the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the Foreign Office, Lie's rejection of Smuts' ideas was seen as yet another sign of a growing Norwegian fear that the Russians had their own designs for Northern Norway. This anxiety might dispose the Norwegian government towards downgrading its advocacy of the Atlantic policy, which would in fact imply some sort of alliance between Norway and Great Britain and the United States.⁶⁴

At approximately the same time, Lie, in a conversation with Collier, left the impression that the idea of an Atlantic security system was not abandoned at all. After the signing of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and postwar cooperation on 12 December 1943, Lie feared that the Soviet government might demand a similar agreement with Norway. He continued his argument:

He would not like such a request to come from the Russians before agreement had been reached with the British and the Americans on the question of Atlantic security, and he thought we might not like it either.⁶⁵

The British, however, were bent on avoiding any discussion of Lie's Atlantic projects. The Norwegian minister of foreign affairs was accordingly to be told to shelve the idea of Atlantic defence for the moment.⁶⁶

At this point, the Atlantic policy was no longer an expression of the official foreign policy doctrine of the Norwegian government. The Norwegians continued, however, to argue in favour of an Atlantic regional arrangement within the framework of the future worldwide security organisation. As late as April 1944, *Norsk Tidend*, obviously expressing the government's official view,

argued that Norway wanted to participate in a defence system together with the Atlantic powers, although "with the consent of the Soviet Union". *Norsk Tidend* knew perfectly well that the idea of regional arrangements was not unequivocally endorsed:

*In some quarters there has been fear that a system of regional cooperation thus envisaged might give rise to spheres of influence and alliances. But this will depend completely on the degree of cooperation between the great powers. If this succeeds, the great powers will have no need for spheres of influence, and regional security agreements will not have the character of alliances, but will serve as a supplement to the obligations within the framework of the international organisation.*⁶⁷

Until the end of the war and the conference in San Francisco in the spring of 1945, official proclamations of Norwegian foreign policy views were increasingly adamant in their support of the ideas underlying the new world organisation. The emphasis on an Atlantic regional agreement was correspondingly downgraded. Towards the end of the war it was admitted that such an agreement might constitute an element of tension between the great powers. Nonetheless, the Norwegians continued to assert the interest of the small states in regional systems with great power participation, within the framework of the incipient "United Nations Organisation".⁶⁸ The main currents of Norwegian foreign policy during the period from Dumbarton Oaks to the Conference in San Francisco were marked, however, by the Norwegian government's willingness to support every attempt to solidify and further develop the cooperation between the great powers.⁶⁹

The declaration towards the end of the war of "bridge-building" as the Norwegian foreign policy doctrine did not mean that the Atlantic orientation was abandoned altogether. Trygve Lie himself apparently never became a fully convinced bridge builder. In October 1944 he told ambassador Lebedev that the Norwegian government had deliberately chosen to avoid propagating the idea of

Atlantic cooperation after the Soviets had voiced their opposition to the idea if the Soviet Union were not invited to take part in the system.⁷⁰ But the Norwegian attitude "as to the necessity and advantage of a regional agreement between the Atlantic countries, now called Western Europe, has surely not changed".⁷¹ Although Norwegian foreign policy remained highly ambiguous when the Atlantic policy gradually receded, the declaration of a policy of "bridge-building" meant the rejection of both an alliance with the Atlantic great powers and European regional cooperation as official Norwegian foreign and security policy options. What remained of the ideas and the reality underlying the Atlantic policy, and why did the Norwegian government consistently reject the notion of regional Nordic or European cooperation?

Conclusion: great power guarantees or small power cooperation?

Although the idea of an Atlantic alliance which was inherent in Lie's Atlantic policy towards the end of the war was suspended in favour of "bridge-building" as the declared Norwegian foreign policy doctrine, this did not mean that the basic assumptions about the need for some kind of American and British commitments to Norway's security were abandoned altogether. Towards the end of the war and in the early postwar years, the implementation of the original plans for Atlantic cooperation was not seen as indispensable. On the one hand functional ties, especially in military matters, could be further developed independently of political declarations or agreements. On the other hand the Norwegians were convinced that the western powers viewed Norway as belonging to their sphere of interest. Thus they expected the Western great powers to take an interest in the defence of Norwegian independence in their own interests.

Thus the policy of bridge-building bears some obvious similarities to the neutralist sentiments of the 1930s and the traditional reliance on Britain's alleged "implicit guarantee". On the declaratory level, however, Norwegian foreign policy after the

Second World War was more ambitious than the policies of the 1930s. Prior to the war, Norwegian foreign policy initiatives, the country's active role in the League of Nations notwithstanding, reflected Norway's desire to keep the world of "great power politics" at a distance. Concomitant with the increasing international tension in the 1930s, moreover, Norway's policy in the League became increasingly dominated by efforts to limit the organisation's effective instruments of power. Norwegian policy in the United Nations was different. The Norwegians took an active part in the process leading up to its creation and later in the organisation itself, and in some crucial issues the Norwegian point of view departed from that of most of the other smaller powers.⁷² But the real differences between Norwegian foreign policy before and after the war should be sought somewhere else. In both periods involvement in the world organisation was only part, and not necessarily the most important part, of the overall Norwegian foreign policy strategy.

In the course of the war the Norwegian government established close political and military ties with the two western great powers. The declaration of a policy of bridge-building towards the end of the war did not bring an end to these contacts. The "Atlantic policy" made operational would have meant the "implicit guarantee" of the prewar years was made explicit. The Norwegians stopped short of this, but political cooperation and strong "functional ties" in the military field with Britain and the United States created an environment radically different from the semi-neutrality of the 1930s. The "implicit guarantee" of the 1930s lacked backing in the form of peacetime preparations for military assistance in times of war. After the Second World War, the step from "bridge-building" and non-aligned status to fully fledged participation in the North Atlantic alliance was facilitated by the continuation of extensive cooperation and contacts, political as well as military, between Norway and the western powers.

In this lay the attraction as well as the limitations of the Norwegian version of "bridge-building". It was not designed to provide security for Norway, i.e. to safeguard against the threat or use

of force by one of the remaining great powers. In case of a threat to Norway's security or integrity, the assumption of the "implicit guarantee" was still valid, and ideas of an "Atlantic policy" could easily be revived.

The Norwegian government's opposition during the war to schemes of European regional cooperation reflected Norwegian foreign policy traditions. During the war, however, the Norwegian attitude clarified and some of the assumptions underlying Norwegian policies were made explicit. The Norwegians did not oppose regional arrangements as such, but they rejected the idea of purely European or even continental solutions. For them the most important thing was to secure the participation of the major Atlantic power. Before the war this role was assigned to Great Britain; towards the end of the war and afterwards to the United States.

In the discussions about Nordic cooperation, the Norwegians feared that a partnership with the economically and militarily stronger Sweden would create an unequal alliance with Norway in the role of a junior partner. It may seem paradoxical that the Norwegians seemed to be more apprehensive about being dominated by Sweden than about the obvious inequality inherent in schemes involving the major great powers.

Strategic considerations, as discussed in this article, provide part of the answer to this apparent paradox. The Nordic countries, it was argued, could not muster the strength to present a credible deterrence or the ability to repel an aggressor. Further elements of the answer may be sought in the nature of the security arrangement the Norwegians wanted. Nordic cooperation would have meant a system of mutual obligations and commitments of principally equal partners. The Norwegians felt, however, that the equality would be symbolic rather than real, and that Sweden would want to capitalise on the system to secure for itself a dominant position in the region. They feared, moreover, that Norway could be drawn into possible conflicts in the Baltic region.

At the core of the Atlantic orientation, on the other hand, was the search for great power *security guarantees*, i.e. a formalisation of the prewar assumptions about the interest of

the Atlantic great powers in upholding Norway's sovereignty and integrity. This did not necessarily entail the kind of *mutual* obligations, commitments and involvement which would be preconditions for a Nordic arrangement. Norway did not want to engage itself in the affairs of other small or medium-sized powers, nor did it want its neighbours to interfere in the political routine of day-to-day affairs. And although Norway's relative influence in a great power alliance would be strictly limited,

most probably more so than if it opted for cooperation with smaller countries, this limited input would still be multiplied by the strength of the alliance and produce enhanced security for the country. The relatively greater influence in cooperation with the other Nordic countries would not, it was thought, pay off the same way. The Norwegians preferred the position of a junior partner in an influential organisation rather than that of one among equals in an inferior system.

NOTES

1. John Sanness, who first used the expression in this connection, defined the "implicit guarantee" as "the assumption, that one or more of the great powers will not allow the territory and sovereignty of a non-aligned state to be violated by another power". Cf. J. Sanness, "Norsk alliansefri politikk?" in the series *Atlantehavskomiteéns skriftserie*, nr. 44 (Oslo 1978).
2. For discussions of various aspects of Norwegian foreign affairs during the Second World War, see Olav Riste, *"London-regjeringa". Norge i krigsalliansen 1940-1945*, 2 volumes (Oslo 1973-1979); and Nils Morten Udgaard, *Great Power Politics and Norwegian Foreign Policy. A Study of Norway's Foreign Relations November 1940 - February 1948* (Oslo 1973).
3. Formally the change took place a few months later.
4. Pending the publication of the third volume of *Norsk Utenrikspolitikks historie* (The History of Norwegian Foreign Policy), the most comprehensive discussion of Norwegian foreign and security policies between the World Wars is still Nils Ørvik, *Sikkerhetspolitikken 1920-1939*, 2 volumes (Oslo 1960-61).
5. Finnish-Swedish relations were different but are outside the scope of this article.
6. Cf. Tom Kristiansen & Sven G. Holtmark, "En nordisk illusjon? Norge og militært samarbeid i Nord, 1918-1940", in the series *Forsvarsstudier* nr. 6/1991 (Oslo 1991).
7. In this they were only partly right. The Soviet attitude towards Nordic military cooperation changed from rejection towards cautious encouragement in the late 1930s. Cf. Sven G. Holtmark, "Enemy springboard or benevolent buffer? Soviet attitudes to Nordic cooperation, 1920-1955", in the series *Forsvarsstudier*, nr. 6/1992 (Oslo 1992). Cf. also the relevant documents in *Norge og Sovjetunionen 1917-1955. En utenrikspolitisk dokumentasjon* (Oslo 1995).
8. This is basically Arne Ording's explanation of Koht's policy in a report for the Parliamentary Commission of Investigation. Ording, to be sure, was in a position to know, though his remarks may have been influenced by his position as one of the leading critics of Koht's policy. UB, Ms4^o, 3061:1, Arne Ording's report, March 11, 1947. Cf. Riste's work referred to above, and Sven G. Holtmark, *Mellom "russerfrykt" og "brobygging". Sovjetunionen i norsk utenrikspolitikk, 1940-1945*, unpublished thesis for the degree Cand.philol., University of Oslo, 1988.
9. Halvdan Koht, *For fred og friedom i krigstid* (Oslo 1957), p. 281 *et passim*.
10. Public Record Office, London (hereafter: PRO), FO 371/29432, N 213/213/30, Dormer's minute, October 26, 1940.
11. The diaries of Terje Wold are in the possession of his son, Einar Wold, who kindly placed them at my disposal for the work on a previous study on a related topic. The quoted entry is from October 26, 1940.
12. Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo (hereafter: MFA), 34.1/19, j.nr. 978/40, PM 10 July, 1940.
13. "The Atlantic Ocean policy" is discussed extensively in the first volume of Olav Riste's two-volume work referred to above. A presentation in the English language of the subject is given in Olav Riste, "The Genesis of North Atlantic Defence Cooperation: Norway's 'Atlantic Policy' 1940-1945", in *Forsvarsstudier. Årbok for Forsvarshistorisk Forskningscenter 1981* (Oslo 1982).
14. The historian Jacob S. Worm-Müller, in his preface to Arnold Ræstad's posthumously published book *Europe and the Atlantic world* (Oslo 1958), attributed the idea to Ræstad. So did Wilhelm Keilhau, another member of the "brain trust" surrounding Lie in London. Cf. UK-1945, box 33, file 2, Keilhau's report.
15. The following presentation of Ræstad's views is based on *Europe and the Atlantic world*.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
18. Universitetsbiblioteket i Oslo (Oslo University Library, hereafter: UB), Ms4^o, Arnold Ræstad, "The World Crisis as seen by a Norwegian", speech held in the Canadian Club in Montreal on December 15, 1941.
19. The Home Front leaders set out their views as a response to the Norwegian government's major foreign policy document "The principal features of Norway's foreign policy", approved by the government in May 1942. The letter from the Home Front is printed in *Regjeringen og hjemmefronten*

- under krigen (Oslo 1948), no. 21, Legation in Stockholm to the MFA, 18 July, 1942.
20. *The Great Powers and the Polish Question 1939-1945*, edited by Antony Polonsky (London 1976), document no. 31, p. 98.
21. From declaration issued in Angers on December 20, 1939, as quoted in Piotr Wandycz, *Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation* (Bloomington 1956), p. 34.
22. Antony Polonsky (ed.), *op.cit.*, document no. 13, p. 77.
23. Cf. Arne Ording's remarks in *Norges krig* (Oslo 1948), vol. II, p. 228. Arne Ording, a historian, was a one of Lie's principal advisers, and he was instrumental in formulating the Atlantic policy.
24. Cf. Arne Ording's remarks in *Norges krig*, *op.cit.*, p. 229.
25. Trygve Lie, *Hjemover* (Oslo 1958), p. 55.
26. MFA, 25.1/2, j.nr. 2698/42, R.B. Skylstad's minute of February 8, 1942.
27. *Ibid.*
28. National Archives, Washington, D.C., 740.00119 EW 1939/1047, the Ambassador's Polish Series despatch No. 119 of February 20, 1942, pp. 31-32.
29. MFA, 25.1/2, j.nr. 3623/42, Lie's minute of February 21, 1942.
30. MFA, 25.1/2, j.nr. 4488/42, Lie's minute of March 5, 1942.
31. MFA, Lie's archive, box 1, file 11.20/57, Trygve Lie to Rolf Andvord, June 30, 1942.
32. MFA, j.nr. 09070/43, Paul Hartmann's minute of April 12, 1943. Soviet satisfaction with the Norwegian attitude was also signalled to Rolf Andvord in Moscow.
33. For a discussion of the views of Norwegian Labour party leaders in London and Stockholm about Norway's future foreign policy, see Kersti Blidberg, *Splittråd gemenskap - kontakter och samarbete inom nordisk socialdemokratisk arbetarrörelse 1931-1945* (Stockholm 1984), pp. 176-217.
34. Schanche Jonassen, "Vår kamp og Nordens fremtid", printed in *Norges forhold til Sverige under krigen* (Oslo 1950), vol. III, p. 163-166.
35. No. 27, July 1942.
36. Written by Karl Petander, Wilhelm Kleen and Anders Örne.
37. This is according to Arne Ording. The general background of the document was growing opposition to the Atlantic policy within the alliance, as exemplified by the Polish schemes of continental cooperation, and within the Norwegian exile community itself. The final version of "The principal features" was approved by the cabinet on 8 May 1942. The discussions about Nordic cooperation were also reflected in a series of dispatches to the Foreign Office from the British legacies to Norway and Sweden. See for example FO 371/33062, N 1756/262/42, Laurence Collier's minute of 31 March 1942; and FO 371/32808, N 3004/2954/63 Laurence Collier's minute of 6 June 1942.
38. For a representative argument, see Arne Ording's article "Sverige og Norden", in *Norsk Tidend*, 22 July 1942.
39. See for example Lie's letter to Finn Moe of June 30, 1942, in the MFA, Lie's archive, box 2, file 11.20/20.
40. *Norges krig* II, p. 228.
41. MFA, 25.1/2, j.nr. 14584/42, Lie's minute July 14, 1942; and his minutes of July 22 and 27 in the same file.
42. The statement is from a document called "Diskusjonsgrunnlag om våre fredsmål", dated 3 June 1942, which expressed the point of view of the group around Martin Tranmæl. A copy of the document is in Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv in Oslo (Archives of the Norwegian Labour Movement, Oslo), Frihagen's archive, box 5, file Rapportør 1942.
43. Anders Frihagen to Johan Nygaardsvold, 2 April, 1942, in Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv in Oslo, Frihagen's arkiv, box 3, file *Nygaardsvold - Frihagen*.
44. See for example Tranmæl's letter to Lie of March 3, 1942, in MFA, Lie's archive, box 3, file 11.20/8.
45. "Diskusjonsgrunnlag", *op.cit.*
46. Tranmæl's letter to Lie of August 14, 1942, as referred to in Blidberg, *op. cit.*, p. 194.
47. This is according to "Diskusjonsgrunnlag". The concept of the "United States of Europe" appeared repeatedly in Norwegian foreign policy discussions. In a letter to Lie, Tranmæl envisaged Europe organised in regional groupings, which in turn would

combine into "something like the United States of Europe". Cf. Lie's archives, box 3, file 11.20/8, Tranmæl's letter to Lie of 12 February 1942. Hardly more than a convenient slogan without definite substance, the idea nevertheless illustrates the strong European element in the foreign policy orientation of the Stockholm group. "The principal features of Norway's foreign policy", on the other hand, explicitly rejected the idea of the "United States of Europe". The concept did not reappear as an element in foreign policy discussions in Norway after the war.

48. "Diskusjonsgrunnlag", op.cit.

49. Op.cit., Tranmæl's letter to Lie of February 12, 1942.

50. For a discussion of the place of the Soviet Union in Norwegian foreign policy planning, see Sven G. Holtmark, *Mellom "russerfrykt" og "brobygging"*, op.cit., pp. 134-148.

51. MFA, Lie's archive, box 3, file 11.20/8, Tranmæl to Lie, January 16, 1942.

52. Ibid. As regards Norwegian attitudes towards the Soviet Union, my interpretation is slightly at variance with the view presented by Kersti Blidberg in her discussion of "Diskusjonsgrunnlag" and the position of the Tranmæl group. The Norwegian Labour leaders in Stockholm, according to Blidberg, were more optimistic than the London group about the future role of the Soviet Union in international politics. Cf. Blidberg, *Splittrad gemenskap*, pp. 193-94.

53. See Frihagen's comments to the draft of "The principal features of Norway's foreign policy", in Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv in Oslo, Frihagen's archive, box 5; and his letter to Trygve Lie of 9 January 1942, in box 3.

54. FO 371/32808, N 5097/978/G, Collier's letter to Eden, October 5, 1942.

55. MFA, 25.1/2, j.nr. 20068/41, Lie's minute, November 28, 1941.

56. FO 371/29422, N 7205/87/30, Eden's letter to Collier, December 2, 1941.

57. *Festskrift til Arne Ordning* (Oslo 1958), p. 121-123, letter from London, 8 December 1941.

58. RA, FO arkiv H, XX-1-B-XIV, Redegjørelse far FD's utvalg III, as cited in Olav Riste, "*London-regjeringa*" II, p. 348.

59. MFA, 25.1/2, j.nr. 20405/41, Lie's minute, December 2, 1941.

60. FO 371/29422, N 6510/87/30, Sir Orme Sargent's minute, November 14, 1941.

61. The speech is printed in L.W. Holborn, *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations* (Boston 1948), vol. II, pp. 712-719.

62. *Norsk Tidend*, 11 December 1943.

63. FO 371/36889, N 7401/421/30, Collier's letter to Coote, December 10, 1943.

64. FO 371/36889, N 7401/421/30, various minutes, December 1943 and January 1944.

65. FO 371/36868, N 7700/219/63, Collier's letter to Warner, December 17, 1943.

66. Ibid., Warner's letter to Collier, January 2, 1944.

67. *Norsk Tidend*, 15 April 1944.

68. See *Norsk Tidend*, 14 October 1944, editorial "Sikkerhetsorganisasjoner"; and ibid., 6 January 1945, editorial "Veien mot demokrati og internasjonalt samarbeid"; and *Norseman*, No 2/1945, Arne Ordning's article "From Geneva to San Francisco".

69. Olav Riste, "*London-regjeringa*" II, p. 344.

70. The Soviet position was set out in their response to "The principal features of Norwegian foreign policy", delivered to Lie on 24 September 1942. MFA, 34.1/2.

71. MFA, 25.1/2, j.nr. 22241/44, Lie's minute, October 20, 1944.

72. Most significantly in the question of the right of veto in the Security Council, when Norway supported the view of the great powers.

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