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**National separatisms and the
disintegration of Yugoslavia**

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Note on the author

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Introduction

The Yugoslav war of succession (1991-1995) was a civil war and an international war, stimulated by various outside interventions. Its proximate cause was the disintegration of the SFRY. The principal question about its termination was what pattern of ethnic and political relations would arise in place of this federation. Whether that question has been adequately answered by the Dayton and Paris Agreements remains to be seen.

Through lack of ability or will on the part of numerous parties, and the exercise of organised force and related means for political ends, some three million people who were living in former Yugoslavia when the crisis first assumed proportions threatening to peace and stability, in 1990, became displaced persons or refugees in or outside their country of origin. At least two hundred and fifty thousand soldiers and militia were killed, though other estimates suggest that including civilians as many as a million may have died, many of them killed outright or tortured then murdered in gross and bestial ways in their own homes, or in execution grounds not far away from where they lived. Despite all pretences to the contrary, and all honest efforts to prevent it, 'ethnic cleansing' has prevailed. (Woodward 1995a:350-53)

Serbia remains ascendant in Vojvodina, Kosovo, and northern and eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, where ethnic minorities and/or their rights have been suppressed, and continues to control part of eastern Slavonija. With Montenegro, Serbia in 1993 formed the FRY, which is now gaining international recognition as the successor state of the SFRY. The FRY remains an ethnically heterogeneous society, but it must face critical internal tensions over relations between the dominant Serb-Montenegrin majority and the large Albanian minority, which in the province of Kosovo constitutes a potentially secessionist majority of formidable proportions. (Table 3)

Croatia has expelled most of its once-large Serb minority population, and shows no appetite for re-admitting them as the Dayton Accords and the more recent agreement on recognition between Croatia and the FRY both provide. Those who

remain have had their separate national status removed, and their civil rights substantially curtailed, except in the part of eastern Slavonija still controlled by Serbs. The history of the Serbs in Croatia is one of bitter tragedy, added to the massacres perpetrated against them during the Second World War. Numbering between 650,000 and 1,200,000 before the recent war, depending whether one counts those living in emigration with Yugoslav citizenship and presumptive rights to live in Croatia through place of birth or family connections, they have experienced systematic and forcible expulsion. Legislated changes of Croatian citizenship laws have made many of them stateless persons, refugees, and victims of crimes against the laws of war. Yet it has been said that their fate was not ethnic cleansing. (Galbraith 1995)

The sovereignty of the Bosnian government and the integrity of its territorial boundaries, always theoretical, are now widely acknowledged to be figments of the western liberal mind. The Dayton Accords rely upon the 'strategic consent' given by president Milosevic of Serbia to the deployment of IFOR by NATO, and expressly recognise the Bosnian-Serb entity RS alongside 'Bosnia and Herzegovina' (no longer 'The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina'). Yet the Slav-Muslims in Bosnia, over two million people at the beginning of the crisis, have established their own Bosnian state for the first time, and many regard it as the nucleus of a Bosnia that will one day attain sovereignty over the entire country. Unless one presumes a staggeringly rapid reconciliation among peoples and leaders who were so recently savagely fighting, it is impossible to see how this goal could be attained without further warfare. Nonetheless, all evidence to the contrary, supporters of 'Bosnia' remained unconvinced that it never possessed the credentials or resources to sustain the independence so casually granted by the international community. (Macdonald 1994; Malcolm 1996)

The Bosnian-Croat Federation, controlling fifty-one per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is held together by enmity against the Bosnian Serbs, and by American and German backing. As intense antagonism between Croats and Slav-Muslims over the city of Mostar in western Herzegovina illus-

trates, this 'federation' is a fictitious sham, invented for higher strategic purposes; within it, therefore, a struggle continues between Croats and 'Bosniaks' for predominance within various regions of the country, with the Croats aiming, like the Serbs of the RS, to an eventual union or at least a constitutional integration with Croatia, while the 'Bosniaks' struggle against the Croats - who effectively control about a quarter of Bosnia, fly the Croatian flag and transact business in the national currency of Croatia, the Kuna - so as to preserve their precarious independent political existence. (Woodward 1995a:338-9)

These political outcomes must be regarded as provisional and unstable because they are mutually contradictory. To some extent such contradictions can be regarded as fruitful ambiguity. But if the men and women who began and ran this war continue to exercise predominant influence then fighting is likely to break out again, once the various sides have recovered from present losses and gained new strength, and if support for robust peace enforcement wanes. For example, many Croat extreme nationalists want to absorb most of Bosnia, attaining again the limits of the wartime First Independent State. Many Serbs want the FRY to become an ethnically pure state. The Bosniaks are largely, and rightly, outraged that the promises made by their American sponsors have amounted to so little after so much sacrifice. With the Albanians (and Turks) of Kosovo-Metohia as allies in a common cause they might seek to destabilise the surrounding, much weakened, structures of Serbdom - and could even turn against their Croat partners. Hence making the peace work is not simply a matter of pursuing war crimes through the Hague Tribunal. The Serbs themselves, if their 'strategic consent' in Bosnia is threatened, could undermine the entire Dayton framework. (Neville-Jones 1996:47-53)

For the time being, however, the most obvious consequence of the war has been a grand-strategic compromise between Croatia and Serbia, reflected in the August 1996 agreement on mutual recognition between Croatia and the FRY. (Belgrade 1996:3-6) This leaves the former in control of all its own territories and much of Hercegovina and

western Bosnia, though the issues of eastern Slavonija, the status of Brcko and the Posavino corridor, and control over the Prevlaka peninsula close to Dubrovnik, remain to be settled by negotiation. Serbia controls most of eastern Hercegovina and eastern and north-eastern Bosnia, and tacitly claims a 'strategic purview' over part of eastern Slavonia. The constitutional ties to the FRY, permitted to the RS under the Dayton arrangements, are now most unlikely to be challenged, whatever efforts the US puts into Bosnian 'unification'. The Slav-Muslim 'Bosniaks' have thus been left the symbols but not the substance of power in Bosnia, graphically illustrated by the open conspiracy through which some 300,000 'additional' votes were suddenly found by the OSCE in the September 1996 election 'contest' in order to make Alija Izetbegovic first president of the new inter-ethnic presidency. In actuality what remains of Bosnia for the Bosniaks is a land-locked mini-state based on Sarajevo, plus whatever guns and money the Americans leave behind when their period of 'peace-enforcement' expires.

Efforts to rebuild the countries shattered by this war and its attendant economic sanctions will continue to demand the close involvement of the UN, EU, and other institutionalised forms of the international community for an indefinite number of years to come. That is an intentional but risky political consequence of the way the war was limited in crucial respects by outside interventions. At the same time would-be peacemakers constantly find themselves returning to a model of loose federal and close inter-communal arrangements among closely kindred south Slavs. If years of patient understanding and many billions of money succeed in maintaining this peace then the rebuilt region will resemble what was Yugoslavia, but without its territorial-ethnic heterogeneity. If that does not happen war may again ravage the region, fought for unconditional rather than limited aims. (Neville-Jones 1996:53-62) Hence the meaning and consequences of the war will continue to be debated for many years. In an earlier paper I outlined the international and domestic course of the war; but here the main focus is the period before violence erupted. (Macdonald 1996)

Historical and other features of the SFRY

The SFRY was established in 1945. It succeeded the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, torn apart by invasion and civil war in 1941. It remains debatable how many died in that struggle, and who was responsible for killing whom. But during the Second World War in Europe parallels for the sometimes intensive but always extensive killing in wartime Yugoslavia can be found only in Poland, through the Holocaust, and in some of the battles of the German-Soviet War. Josip Broz Tito and his communist partisans emerged triumphant in this charnel house, supported by Churchill and Roosevelt as well as by Stalin.

The self-image of the SFRY stood for the transcendence of civil war and nationalism through socialist federalism and eventual communism. But despite copying Stalin's constitution and other methods, Tito broke with the Soviet Union in 1948. From that time the SFRY received strategic assistance from the western powers, including notably the US. In the more relaxed era of superpower detente the SFRY joined western economic institutions, and Yugoslavs spread abroad to many western countries in search of employment. Their remittances, and the fact that Yugoslavia provided a bargain holiday destination for millions of tourists, provided a veneer of modernity and prosperity in what remained, none the less, a society based on a comparatively small and not very advanced industrial sector, with a large and inefficient agricultural sector. Yugoslavia's industrial sector was heavily focused on military defence against a perceived Soviet threat, on internal trade, and on a few resource-extractive and other industries capable of earning hard currency. Through time a marked and growing divergence appeared between the level of development of different regions within Yugoslavia. (Woodward 1995b:351-60; Table 15)

Under general constitutional provisions since Tito's death, each of the six constituent republics and two autonomous provinces - Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (including Kosovo and Vojvodina), and Slovenia - nominated one representative to serve on

the collective presidency. The chairman of this body was nominated by the LCY. The president served for one year before handing over to his successor. By convention each of the eight federally represented units took the presidency of the federation in turn. The federal prime minister acted as chairman of the executive 'cabinet' of the federation, and as Commander-in-Chief (ie. as the authorising civilian authority) of the federal armed forces. The JNA, whose ethos and explicit constitutional duty included defence of the federation and of Yugoslavism, was represented independently in SFRY federal councils as, in effect, federal defence minister, the post being held by a senior nominee of the High Command. Each of the republics had its own militia forces, the TD, well equipped and trained, which were to act as peoples' defence forces supplementary to, but also capable of acting autonomously from, the JNA. (Crnobrnja 1994:73-8; Tables 4-7)

Through time and constitutional change, economic and political power devolved to the republics and autonomous provinces within the SFRY. These controlled the public sector enterprises on their territories; had their own republican banks; and legislated for their populations subject to federal powers. Successive attempts were made to renovate republic-based economic and political divergences through Yugoslavism, an ideological language indulged in by the LCY. This suppressed direct discussion of nationalism, but used a 'national key' formula for representations which subserved its purposes and provided the operational code for the intra-republican and inter-republican politics of the federation. In theory, therefore, the party ran the state in the name of all the people, and nations, nationalities and republics were subsidiary and dependent structures which would progressively give way to the developing structures of Yugoslavism in a socialist society. In actuality a chronically inefficient federal and republican political-economic structure, deeply embedded at every level of society, was driven by the internal politics of a Soviet-type *nomenklatura*.

Before and even more so following the death of Tito in 1980, political power redounded to elites within the political units that, however different in

size of population or economic growth, were recognised, as co-equals at the federal level. In these and other bodies the 'national key' was used to ensure that unbalanced representation by any nation or nationality was avoided. Such arrangements therefore tacitly acknowledged the continuing relevance of nationalism as a political force. They accepted the actuality of a continuous struggle for power over economic resources between the republics, autonomous regions, and the federation. Indeed when advisory councils within enterprises, local government communes, and sub-regional levels are taken into account, all of which were empowered through the theory of socialist workers' self-management, it can be seen that the SFRY operated as a multi-national economic semi-democracy pretending to be a one-party state. Thus it contained by incorporation the issues of nationalism in the contemporary world:

Based on an ideology that proved utopian and on a power structure that was both undemocratic and bound to be inefficient and to deteriorate, the communist solution of the national question in Yugoslavia was destined to be transient. (Djilas 1991:187)

The party brought nominal unity to this diversity. But democratic centralism was an insufficient principle to keep order within an oligarchy of quarrelsome senior figures, many of whom by the mid-1980s were old men who had gained their places because of wartime service, and therefore moderated their disagreements in the spirit of Clausewitz rather than that of Lenin. Aspiring younger men in a hurry thought such moderation a bad thing. And a temperamental society remained full of different localisms and provincialisms, yet was also habituated to expectations of rising prosperity, induced both by contact with the west, and by Yugoslavia's own, unique, welfare economy.

During the cold war, and before the world economy went into its repeated recessions in the 1970s and 1980s, subsidies to the JNA and state budget coming from the US, and soft loans from international lending institutions, together with

remittances from Yugoslavs abroad (many of whom intended to return and therefore invested heavily in the private sector of the domestic economy) allowed this complex socio-economic structure to sustain itself. But when economic recessions and hyper-inflation added themselves to its inherent market inefficiency, the Yugoslav experiment faced a series of increasingly urgent questions. To these during the 1980s, as reform became more and more imperative, there was no sustained, coherent response.

This exhaustion of ideas was seized upon by the ambitious contenders for power within the LCY. The habitual response of the federal authorities, which had been to operate 'subsidiarity' as a compensation for their bankrupt vision of integration, was at last overtly challenged. As economic disagreements mounted, attempts were made to strengthen federal powers. This served to sharpen rather than resolve inter-republican disagreements, both over resource allocations and the best 'reform model' for the economy and constitution. Within society, inflation and unemployment refreshed ethnic tensions. Extreme nationalism was revived as a popular cause in different Yugoslav republics, but especially in Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia. Whether it would have led to widespread civil war had federal economic reforms succeeded is therefore a crucial issue.

The mounting internal dilemmas of the SFRY were compounded by the influence of various groups which had gone into exile after the Second World War, and remained unreconciled to the idea of Yugoslavia, or to communism, or both. These groups fiercely sustained their own ethnic, national or religious ideals. Based in prosperous western countries including the US, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Germany, Britain and elsewhere, the openness of Yugoslavia, and family and other ties to Yugoslavs in economic emigration or living within the SFRY, meant that the social structure of Yugoslavia's republics was penetrated by largely invisible influences possessing the money and other resources to seriously contend for power if the federal structures of the SFRY broke down.

Another destabilising influence came from further north in central Europe. Other national-

states were leaving the orbit of Soviet power; throwing off their communist governments; reshaping their historical identities. An early example of this 'socialist transnationalism' had been the quickly-suppressed Croatian uprising of 1970-71, which took much of its inspiration from the Prague spring of 1968 in Czechoslovakia. By the mid-1980s the comprehensive failure of the Soviet-type society was pervading political thought even in Serbia, which remained most closely wedded to the survival of the SFRY. This removed the last great impediment to open nationalist agitation everywhere, and posed an almost insoluble dilemma to Serbian, Croatian and other senior officers of the JNA.

Background hyper-inflation, rising unemployment, failed growth; these features of Yugoslavia in the international economy during the 1980s brought different consequences to different sectors of the economy, regions of the territory, and groups in society. Social conflict based on previously established ethnic-religious categories and historical justifications, flourished. Different variants of the relationship between economic recession, political atrophy, and the rise of ethnic tensions can be defined. The basic recipe is, however, familiar from the history of totalitarianism in Europe. Take one ethnically heterogeneous society. Apply hyper-inflation. Watch carefully while economic competitiveness induces social dislocation, and inter-communal stereotypes bubble up to the surface. Add several knobs of fanatical leadership, and some bunches of guns and money freshly brought in from outside. Leave to cook while new ideological movements coalesce, until the entire mixture boils over into inter-communal killing, ethnic cleansing, and international war. This basic dish can be modified to use all sorts of different national ingredients.

In January 1990 an Extraordinary Congress of the LCY, called to try to resolve the deadlock of ideas and institutions in the SFRY through the party, collapsed. The Slovenian delegation walked out. Then the Croats, bullied to form a platform against the Slovenes, walked out, too. Serbia had revoked the autonomous constitutional positions of Vojvodina and Kosovo in 1989 (though this was

not finalised until a legislative referendum on a new constitution in July 1990); but had not withdrawn their representation from the federal presidency, which greatly alarmed other republics. (Crnobrnja 1994:105-6) But the public collapse of the LCY was only the culmination of many years' inward deterioration. (Goati 1995:14-27) Indeed action quickly shifted to the holding of multi-party elections in various republics. In the name of democracy this brought into power nationalist regimes determined to oppose to the hilt Serbian socialism and centralism. Despite the continuing economic reform programme of the federal authorities, and their attempts to encourage federation-wide elections, an unbridged dichotomy thereafter grew between the ethnic, constitutional and economic preferences of most citizens for the continued existence of Yugoslavia; and the politics of the proto-national republics. A Slovenian referendum in December 1990 first brought 'outright independence' onto the public political agenda, if no solutions were found to the federal economic and constitutional crises within six months. The Krajina Serbs, threatened by the destruction of their equal rights as citizens of Croatia, simultaneously moved to establish their own autonomy or independence by forming a 'Serbian National Council' which declared 'autonomy within Croatia for areas of Serbian majority population'. The breakup of the SFRY had begun, and with that the national crisis entered a new stage as 'the battle of the republics'.

But what *then* made national separatisms sufficiently potent to cause the disintegration of a sovereign state? In retrospect this outcome seems so predictable as to have been inevitable. 'Nationalist' explanations tend to suggest this. Yet it was unexpected, too. Like the French revolution it took most people by surprise when the SFRY disintegrated altogether. This was what gave most of the leaders who preached nationalist separatisms their opportunities to act. It will be fascinating to know in due course how prepared, or otherwise, they were. Also like the French revolution, the descent into violence and ideological hatred came quite slowly. It seems to have come as a result of the absence of an overarching state, rather than as a

direct consequence of the collapse of the pre-existing state. This cautions against any easy acceptance of the great and growing literature on why one nation or another could no longer live as part of Yugoslavia.

Was the breakup of the SFRY primarily caused by nationalism?

My contention is that the breakup of the SFRY was not *primarily* caused by nationalism, for two reasons. Firstly, other forces existed which had more easily observable political consequences and/or more clear cut causal effects on the economic and social structure of the SFRY. Secondly, national separatisms were not new in Yugoslavia; indeed Yugoslavia was a union of separatists at different levels and forms of power and maturity in their national identities.

Except during the Second World War, tendencies for these identities to form their own states had been contained well short of destabilising the Yugoslav state. It is possible to contend, as do nationalist-minded historians of different stripes, that Yugoslavia was 'impossible' (Hall 1994) or 'improbable' (Pavlovic 1981), and that its breakdown represented the 'inexorable' dissolution of the artificial union of 1918 (Magas 1993), or the 'flawed legacy' of Tito's socialist experiment. (Beloff 1985) This, however, raises more difficult questions than it answers. Why does 'inexorability' take over seventy years to arrive? Why were national separatisms in Croatia or in Serbia so quiescent for so much of the intervening period? What about national identities which were vigorous by 1988 but had barely existed in 1918, like that of the Slav-muslims in Bosnia? (Malcolm 1996) Or which, like the Albanians and Macedonians in Yugoslavia, had been unionist rather than separatist for much of the time? Is it reasonable to explain the previous unsuccessfulness of national separatisms by reference to Yugoslav or Titoist or communist *repression*, when by international comparisons, including numbers of the criteria employed to monitor minority rights, the political ethos of the SFRY was suppressive but not unfree, rather than repressive? What about the facts which

demonstrate that even in its last phase, when nobody was anymore wanting to be a 'Yugoslav', large proportions of the individuals being subsumed under the new ethnic-national identities did not actively want their rights and duties as citizens of a federation to be redefined in such a fashion? (Table 10) And, even more tellingly, what about the millions who even in the face of civil war refused to be evicted from the *terroirs* in which they lived, even if these were inconveniently and dangerously located in propinquity to those of other *ethnie*? (Cohen 1993:172-76)

In the face of such questions, and recognising that we have not yet begun to tackle the hard issues involving nationalism, I submit that a better explanation of the breakup of SFRY is to be found in the association between economic forces, federal structures, and republican political attitudes.

Primarily, therefore, what differentiated the national crisis of 1989-91 from all preceding problems confronting the Yugoslav state was the compound effect of fiscal inefficiency (including hyper-inflation) and structural unemployment. The influence of these factors cannot be properly understood without reference to international conditions. Susan Woodward characterises the oddly normal behaviour of all the republican and federal leaders through most of this period in terms of 'politics as usual in unusual times'. (Woodward 1995b:346) These leaders conducted themselves as if the well-established procedures of Yugoslavism would somehow suffice to manage the difficulties which accumulated from hyper-inflation, structural unemployment, the end of the cold war, and the absence of fresh assistance from the western governments and lending institutions that were creditors of the SFRY. Indeed none of these difficulties was new in itself; what proved fatally unpredictable was their combination and interacting consequences.

This misleading pervasiveness of normalcy can be exemplified as follows. In federal and inter-republican bodies the language of political business remained that of economic and constitutional reform. Only in February 1991 did Slovenia - rescinding its own previous declaration that six months would be allowed for resolving constitu-

tional issues - declare that federal legislation would no longer have effect within the republic. The federal executive, grouped around Prime Minister Ante Markovic, mainly comprising federalist Croats, retained credibility with republican leaderships until it became clear, at about this time, that it had failed to negotiate any significant new economic assistance from international institutions. It now had no further resources to deal with the domestic fiscal crisis, which many every republic and the federation bankrupt, except Slovenia and Croatia which were receiving credits directly from Austria, Germany and the US, but refusing to permit these to enter the nationwide system of inter-bank lending. At the same time the federation had failed to attract significant popular political support for its own, new, political movement, the 'Alliance of Reform Forces', in the Serbian elections of December 1990. Although the CIA considered widespread civil violence in Croatia to be imminent from around this time, western governments offered no political mediation or fresh economic assistance until the middle of 1991. Even then it was contingent on conditions unacceptable to various parties.

Following the Slovenian *ultra vires* act of national separation, covert bargaining among republican leaders assumed the form of an overt inter-republican crisis about how and on what terms the SFRY might be either disintegrated, or kept in being as a nominal union of six republics. The Yugoslav crisis now entered a new stage (1991-92), during which the proto-national-states, still in constitutional terms parts of the SFRY, might preserve some overarching political structure only by new techniques and a new language of crisis management. The Sybil and substance of this new crisis was a secret meeting between presidents Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia at Karadjordjevo in March 1991, during which they discussed the disintegration of the SFRY but failed to agree about either keeping it together or, more crucially, managing its demise without war. Hence recognition of the depths and implications of the new crisis was a development decidedly late in the day. Even so, none of the republican leaders seriously advocated

a plebescite of the people of Yugoslavia. Such behaviour suggests that the leadership elites of the SFRY, even following the first democratically contested elections, thought in time-worn oligarchic terms, using a system of thought and accompanying rules that had not evolved in time to meet new challenges.

The adjustments required were increasingly formidable. (Woodward 1995b:351-52,359) The SFRY had sacrificed market-economic efficiency in favour of its own type of 'welfare' economy. The country was becoming more urbanised: the population living in rural conditions fell from nearly 70per cent in the 1970s to some 20per cent in the late 1980s. Becoming also more integrated with the western international economy, it was exposed to the problem of hidden structural underemployment. From 1979 when emergency credits were necessary to stave off technical bankruptcy, loans from the IMF and other lenders became more and more conditional upon drastic reforms. A chronic deficit in the balance of payments on external account was covered partly but not entirely by the remittances of Yugoslavs working abroad. Emigration was an important mechanism in lessening domestic unemployment. A high estimate of the number of Yugoslavs living abroad made by the federal foreign ministry in 1990 was 'about 3 million'. In conditions of economic recession and growing unemployment in western Europe, and of mounting national separatisms within the SFRY, these remittances tended to dry up, or anyway to evade the usual channels by which they entered the domestic economy. At the same time the military faced the requirements of a rapidly changing strategic environment. The 1980s was a decade of fierce if unnecessary strategic competition between the superpowers, with sophisticated new weapons and technologies presenting complex defence problems to a country formally non-aligned with either bloc, and committed to defending itself against both.

Once the economic recession and debt crisis of the world economy in the early 1980s added itself to these problems, Yugoslavia experienced hyperinflation, beginning in 1985, which was not driven out of the system until 1990 (and which returned

when civil war broke out in 1991-92). Traditional export markets in the Soviet bloc were becoming more difficult, as the loans which these countries had accumulated, without managing to improve their productivity, severely limited their import potentials, and in general growth slowed to a halt. To the west, on the other hand, the economic recession of the early 1980s meant increased competitiveness, which Yugoslavia's export trade was poorly adapted to, though the north-western regions and Vojvodina did better than others. Hence like the eastern European countries which were about to suffer the collapse of their communist regimes, Yugoslavia possessed an economy which was to all intents and purposes archaic; but unlike those countries, the SFRY did not experience a political revolution, and did not receive the special consideration of western governments and banks in a post-revolutionary process of 'transformation'. On top of all of this the collapse of the WTO, and hence of any pretence of an external threat, led to the immediate withdrawal of considerable US bilateral assistance, and hence to further pressures in the inter-republic struggle for resources for cuts in defence expenditures allocated to the JNA. (Woodward 1995b:363)

A vitally important concomitant of this situation was that, 'by the (later) 1980s unemployment was threatening industrial workers and especially the children of the urban middle class. Unemployment now faced the chief beneficiaries of socialism - industrial workers and budget-financed administrators and professionals.' (Woodward 1995b:348) In the SFRY nearly 60 per cent of all non-agricultural workers worked in 'the public sector'. And by 1987 the public sector - most specifically the federal-run banking system - was broke. (Woodward 1995b:352)

The general effect of economic forces on real net personal incomes in Yugoslavia is shown in Table 17. From a base of 100 in 1955, the mean average *per capita* income rose to 320 in 1978. Thereafter it declined to a 1984-5 low of around 240, rose again to around 260 in 1987, and fell back below 200 in the crisis years 1988-90. Judged in time-period relativities, the income of the average worker in the SFRY was more than 20 per

cent less in 1987 than ten years earlier. By 1990 it was plunging back towards the level of the 1960s. As if this was not a severe enough jolt to rising expectations - though Yugoslavs in work abroad and some groups in the country were doing so much better than others - much worse was to come, and to come suddenly. In 1991 hyperinflation made its reappearance. All of the republics directly touched by war experienced this; but a new world record was achieved by conditions in Serbia during 1993-94, where monthly inflation at one point in time touched 313 million per cent., passing the levels previously reached in Weimar Germany and immediate postwar Hungary. (Silber & Little 1996:383)

Even within the SFRY, the combined effects of rising prices, (accelerated by devaluations of the Dinar), eroding real incomes, and growing unemployment, seems to have had a crippling effect on social tolerance, and to have induced rapid increases in social distancing both from other ethnic groups within the same social space, and from other groups in other republics which were being depicted in increasingly overt terms of inter-republican conflict as 'enemies'. Caught in the middle and attracting the image of impotence and failure, support for the federation quickly evaporated. (Hall 1994:69-89) The socio-economic and political consequences of this national (federal) crisis, which struck well before any decisive polarisation of inter-republican or inter-ethnic conflicts, included the following:

1. Loss of capacity on the part of all political and economic structures, at every level, to enforce policy goals.

2. Declining legitimacy of social rules transmitted and upheld via employment. This affected not only security of employment but also the elaborate inter-ethnic balances upheld by Yugoslavism in such sensitive regions as central and eastern Bosnia, the mixed Serb and Croat regions of Croatia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. In order-upholding structures such as the police this soon produced an underlying source of social conflict which, as ethnic tensions grew, would make police forces in many parts of the SFRY creatures of national separatisms, and throw a correspondingly

greater burden of order-maintenance onto the regular Army, which was not well adapted to that role.

3. Stasis in federal institutions and mounting conflicts between the central state and ALL of the republics.

4. From a non-political or 'social' point of view, the absence of fresh and workable policy initiatives appeared inexcusable.

5. The virtual collapse of the 'internal' economies of the weakest republics (Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia). The governments of these republics now needed constitutional reforms which would 'favourably' alter the federal-republican balance of powers by strengthening the federation's economic instruments.

6. A specific and deepening difference between the federation and the economically weakest republics on one side, and on the other Slovenia (joined gradually by Croatia) whose 'internal' economy experienced a qualitative shift forward due to the espousal of market-efficient economic reforms, especially after the collapse of the Soviet-type states in central (eastern) Europe. Slovenia specifically refused to allow fresh credits and investments from Austrian, German and other investors to turn into a 'guided' country-wide flow of capital, labour and foreign exchange.

The main hypothesis to be derived from this analysis is that far from beginning in a 'nationalist' conflict over the future of the SFRY, its breakup begins with a national economic crisis, in terms of which the main issue was not that there was no consensus among political leaders, but rather that consensus was the only mechanism available for resolving hard choices about new problems.

Specifically, *all* the political elites in the SFRY drew the same basic conclusion from the impact of the external economic and strategic environments, namely that Yugoslavia would need to change rapidly in a 'western' direction. (Woodward 1995b:346-361) Yet serious economic and political difficulties began to cumulate in two issue-areas. Firstly the strengthening of federal authority, which was implied by responses to the economic crisis, and advocated persistently both by Yugoslavia's creditors and by the federalists in

its national elites, was resisted for differing reasons by all of the republics which had gained power at the expense of the centre over a long period.

Secondly, defining a new inter-republican balance of influence in a restructured federation or confederation, wherein the economic growth paths of the strongest 'northern' areas (Slovenia, Zagoria, Slavonija, Vojvodina, the Dalmatian coastal strip) would be less threatened by the 'drag' exerted by the 'southern' regions beset by structural unemployment and out-of-date industries (central Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the hinterland of Montenegro), became hopelessly entrapped with the requirements of democratisation, and with the rhetoric of 'free-marketeers' (Croatia and Slovenia) versus 'unreformed socialists' (Serbia and Montenegro).

In 1989-90 outside interference in this contentious process became serious: the US Congress offered credits directly to 'free-market' republics. Austrian and German banks and industrial interests invested directly in Slovenia's and Croatia's financial sectors. The US Congress moved to amend the Direct Aid to Democracies Act by dissociating the human rights' problems of minorities in Slovenia and Croatia from those of the Albanians in Kosovo. (Woodward 1995a:160-61) This shifted the post-cold war balance of economic forces within the SFRY decidedly in favour of the reform model favoured by Slovenia against Serbia. Added encouragement was lent to republican attitudes and interests against the centralising logic of the federal government and external (international) creditors. In these terms, with respect to the second stage of the national crisis, there is substance in Woodward's contention that:

The process of breakup was begun by politicians in wealthier regions located nearer to western markets, with close communications and cultural links to western and central Europe, and with less dependence on the internal economy and greater integration into foreign trade, investment and capital flows. These were also areas with influential western patrons who promised support. (Woodward 1995a:349)

Why did federalism prove ultimately unavailing?

Once again this question has received easy answers from those who contend that the breakup of Yugoslavia was fore-ordained. It is pointed out that the republics, or at least some of them, existed as proto-national-states, each with its own boundaries, governments, security and territorial defence structures, economic infrastructures and republican elites and masses. Alternatively, the inherently mixed ethnic pattern of most territories within the federation, and the 'contested' nature of the boundaries established between the republics under Tito, it is said, comprised a time-bomb waiting to go off; or anyway a long-lasting corrosive which would sooner or later wear down the structure of the 'national' state. It seems to me that a much less obvious answer is required if we are to understand properly what broke Yugoslavia apart in the manner that it did.

To begin with, the anti-inflationary economic reform programme embarked on by the government of prime minister Ante Markovic, which had been installed in early 1989, worked. The Dinar was 'tied' to the Deutschmark. Private savings were made freely convertible. Wage increases were strictly controlled. New banking and foreign trade liberalisation programmes were announced. State-controlled assets were to be privatised. Government expenditures were to be systematically reduced. The most obvious result of these steps was a fall in the inflation rate from 60 per cent per month at the end of 1989, to virtually zero in mid-1990. (Cohen 1993:66-73; Crnobrnja 1994:148)

But while these measures brought it considerable popularity, the federal government lacked an independent political basis on which to contend with the republics. Following the first democratic elections in the Yugoslav republics in 1990, the parliament of the federation, which in normal conditions would be 'normally the supreme expression of a democracy' was reduced instead to a charivari. Its upper (elected) chamber would remain the province of unrepresentative communist nominees of the now defunct LCY until such time

as federal elections were held. But meanwhile its lower chamber, consisting of representatives of parties elected in republican elections, altered its composition whenever a new election was held in one or another of the republics. This confused the issue of legislative authority, and obstructed what efforts were made to form trans-republican political coalitions. But the republican governments locked in conflict about the reform of the constitution and the terms of economic stabilisation could not come to an agreement about holding early federal elections. Serbia sponsored the argument that an early election should be held across Yugoslavia, based on universal adult suffrage. This would probably have resulted in a 'Serb bloc' or coalition, though given the subsequent course of intra-Serbian dissension it would be quite wrong to believe that would necessarily have led to the triumph of Serb chauvinism. Slovenia and Croatia, advertised internationally as champions of freedom of expression, opposed the idea of an elected federal parliament, proposing that, after agreement on the modalities of constitutional reform, there should be a single chamber federal assembly consisting of appointed (unelected) representatives. (Cohen 1993:59-61, 102-7; Crnobrnja 1994:112-14, 146-48)

Out of mounting frustration, but also on the back of the initial success of his counter-inflation programme, Markovic chose to form a *federal* political party. However, as elections had already been held in some republics, and these republics refused to hold fresh elections to accommodate his proposals, this new entity could function only in republics where elections were yet to be held. It did reasonably well in Bosnia-Herzegovina (about 14 per cent support) but badly in Serbia (under 2 per cent); and that killed not only the form of the party but also the remaining political credibility of the prime minister, who had opened himself to charges of exceeding his appropriate powers. (Cohen 1993:146-7)

But it was not democracy or its frustration *per se* that de-legitimised the federation. Rather, it failed to accumulate enough power to counter the separate paths each of the republics had begun to pursue in response to the economic crisis and the

need for constitutional reform. Given the nature of that crisis there was only one avenue by which the federation could have accumulated the necessary power to maintain a more than temporary re-imposition of authority over the banking, monetary and tax systems operating within the republics: sufficient economic assistance from the west. As with Gorbachev's vain efforts to save the USSR a year later, in 1990 the Yugoslav federalists pleaded and begged for the fresh money that, following the initial success of Markovic's anti-inflation strategy, might have consolidated stability on a national basis. (Crnobrnja 1994:149-50)

It must remain a matter of speculation how far such macro-economic consolidation would have modified the constitutional conflict among the republics. But as in mid-1990 none of the republics had as yet proposed the demise of the federation we are entitled to hypothesise that macro-economic consolidation through federation-driven continuing reform might have kept in being a loose confederation of Yugoslav national-republics. That in turn might have obviated civil war. In the absence of such consolidation, the national economic system collapsed into the hands of the anyway conflicting republics:

In autumn 1990 the republics [...] openly and blatantly abandoned the agreed-upon course of reform. Government expenditures rose in all republics, the process of privatisation was stopped, cancelled or delayed, with social property being nationalised equally vigorously in the socialist Serbia and the western-oriented and proto-capitalist Slovenia and Croatia. Incomes, which were also supposed to be controlled, grew exponentially, thus wrecking the second of the three anchors that held the anti-inflationary boat. Foreign reserves were depleted rapidly, forcing the government to carry out two consecutive devaluations, abolishing thereby the third and last anchor (price stability). The reform program was all but finished. (Crnobrnja 1994:154, emphasis in original)

In concentrating attention on the national crisis and

what was *different* about the demands it placed on the political and social structure of the SFRY, we must ignore the significance of long-run and predisposing factors. Of these the most important surely was that Yugoslavism and the Yugoslav national identity were always closely correlated with Yugoslav socialism, which was never endorsed in freely-contested (multi-party) elections by the majority of any nation or nationality before the Serbian elections of December 1990. Although they had achieved strong support amounting to 35-40 per cent of the voters in parliamentary elections in Croatia and Slovenia (Margaret Thatcher in her enormous election victories in Britain in 1983 and 1987 won 40-42 per cent of votes cast), it was made to seem that the peoples of Slovenia and Croatia had decisively rejected continuing rule by their unreformed republican communist organisations. But actually they had *not* rejected reform-communists. Nor had they by any means afforded blanket endorsement to extreme nationalist programmes.

The central difficulty was that by now federal structures were so weak that an alternative identity to the dominant political party within republics was hard to define, and this difficulty also confronted opposition parties. Indeed a Yugoslav identity tended to be an avocation, something additional to a basic religious, national, ethnic or local identity. This is not to say that the small minority of those who thought of themselves as primarily Yugoslavs were isolated by other nationalisms, or failed to gain the assent of others who preferred more traditional affiliations. But it is to say that just as Yugoslavia was in effect an oligarchy masquerading as a democracy, so it was also a political movement and a specific ideology that claimed to constitute a nationality of all nationalities. When that claim became manifestly absurd, as it seemed to have done by 1991, all remaining support for federalism as 'Yugoslavism' went with it. (Table 9)

The failure of this ideology can be mapped graphically by looking at youth participation in the LCY, and at youth attitudes towards membership of the party. This shows that from an active base of around 30 per cent and possibly rising in the late 1970s, with little variation between different regions

and republics, participation fell to below 16 per cent in the first half of 1989, and had eroded far further in Slovenia and Croatia. Correspondingly, whereas large minorities of youth in these republics preferred not to join the LCY in the mid-1970s, the average of those preferring not to do so across the SFRY was under 10 per cent; but by 1989 the average across the country was over 50 per cent and in the two northern republics had risen to over 90 per cent and 75 per cent respectively. (Cohen 1993:48; Tables 12a-b)

As we have seen, at the core of Yugoslavia's 'federalism in society' was a welfare-economic system distributing benefits through employment and in turn co-opting large sections of the urban and rural proletariat, and the middle class members of the administrative, professional and business elites. The disintegration of this social contract and its accompanying 'operational code' for employment rules and ethnic quotas in the disciplined and public services, and in state-run sectors of the professions and commerce, was bound to weaken support for the federation. Indeed it did so by posing dilemmas of choice for those broadly adhering to the idea of Yugoslavia, between their political outlook and their economic livelihood; and between the notion of a central, overarching state, and the competing claims to self-sufficiency and sovereignty of the proto-national-states which dominated increasingly the political agenda of inter-republican affairs.

In micro-economic terms, those of the family or individual, the federation's economic strategy was threatening to increase unemployment and prices, decrease wages, and introduce other market-efficient reforms that jeopardised traditional economic security and welfare, and was unable to guarantee that the sacrifices entailed were leading to a more stable future, then why not choose a different but apparently easily available alternative identity that promised to obviate these forms of insecurity, or at least to make the necessary accompanying sacrifices *mean something more* than adherence to a contested country? At that micro-political level the kind of question which those economic choices would result in concerned whether voting for a federation that has failed

economically but that it was desired should be kept in being in terms of multi-ethnic life, would amount to a vote for the status quo when what clearly was demanded was a vote for change.

Survey data covering the period 1971-1985 indicates there was a fivefold increase in those identifying themselves as Yugoslavs. This trend was continuing, 'concentrated among younger and more educated citizens and those residing in urban localities and certain geographic regions [...] multinational areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina and Croatia [...]'. The inference to be drawn from this evidence, taken together with earlier statistics on the rapid decline of party affiliation in the later 1980s, is that:

Such Yugoslavism indicated a reservoir of support for the country's cohesion at approximately the same time that ethnic tensions and economic problems throughout Yugoslavia were becoming more serious. [...] Exactly where these divergent, but not necessarily contradictory, dimensions of the Yugoslav political landscape would eventually lead depended in large part on the country's divided post-Tito ruling elite. (Cohen 1993:49)

This point in the argument is slightly complex but basically straightforward and open to further testing. It is that tax revolts and other measures of protest by individuals, enterprises and republican legislatures against the federation during the period 1989-91 decisively lost support for its political and constitutional reform, and confirmed the futility of its economic reform programme after that had failed. But in economic terms it had initially been winning, and had it continued to do so it is reasonable to think that it would have received public endorsement. Hence it is mistaken to contend that these revolts were primarily driven by nationalist separatist motives or objectives.

The paradox of Serbian nationalism illustrates the point: the Serbian government broke federal constitutional provisions on the use of federal funds during 1990 in order to pay public service employees of the state, including the federation, even while Serbia was insisting in the inter-republi-

can struggle with Slovenia that the most appropriate reform model for the federal constitution and political structure of the SFRY was a 'centralising' one. At the same time, neither Slovenia prior to the election of a coalition government in early 1990, nor Croatia, still ruled by its communist party, were advocating the demise of the federation, as distinct from its reform into a loose confederation affording economic sovereignty to its constituent republics.

The evidence suggests that, following the elections of 1990, republics, enterprises, legislatures and citizens, moved to break federal rules because the federation was failing to perform according to its declared objectives, not because they wanted the federation to fail by breaking its constitutional provisions. But now a fundamentally important structural difference appeared in the situation of different republics. Having external support for their ongoing economic needs and evolving separatist aims, Slovenia and Croatia could afford to wait - as Clausewitz would have put it - on the strategic defensive but with the offensive aim in view. Serbia and the poorer republics, desperate for resources with which to continue to meet their heavy welfare liabilities, needed increasingly to force the issues of the future of the nation and its federation so as to sustain their own intra-republican requirements. In general terms, the 'culminating point' for holding the nation together through a federation which was operating an authoritative reform strategy *vis a vis* the republics occurred, without action being taken, in the fall of 1990.

All other comparisons and similarities aside, this decisively distinguishes the Yugoslav experience of resurgent nationalism from the 'typical' east European model. Hence it is in this specific socio-economic context that the identity-preferences of the elites and masses during the ensuing period 1991-92, the collapse into civil war, ought to be interpreted.

Why did the League of Communists of Yugoslavia lose its legitimacy?

It follows from the foregoing that I do not con-

sider the LCY was particularly important to the course of subsequent events, or the role of national separatisms. But as we shall see in due course, the issue is important for explaining why the JNA failed to uphold the cause of the federation.

There are those who contend that the LCY never possessed legitimacy because it monopolised power by violence or coercion. Others, like Milovan Djilas, one of Tito's closest wartime colleagues, denounced the party's intellectual and material corruptedness: the 'new class' governed in the name of socialism, but did not believe its own teleology. Abroad, and sometimes at home, revolt against this godless mythology led anti-communist Croats, Serbs and others into acts of rebellion. Numerous assassinations and other acts of outrage were perpetrated against Yugoslav state officials, or symbols and assets of the state, by quite highly organised groups opposing the regime and awaiting their days of vengeance. But, acknowledging that, it seems to me that, as a sociological concept, legitimacy tells us a great deal about the disintegration of the SFRY.

The party ran Yugoslavia much less by selective repression than by incorporation, including persistent educational and cultural self-advertisement. Its extensive *nomenklatura* reached down into all of the 520 or so local government structures (communes). As economic and cultural decision-making shifted from the central government to republics and enterprises, these party-dominated elites became effectively tri-identical, owing something to place of work, republic, and federation. Thus the party assumed many forms. While the SFRY held together they could be reconciled. Once it began to break up, they could not.

The building of Yugoslav national identity, at the stage of incorporation into elites postulated a belief in communism. The strength of this as a factor in party membership, or office thereafter, varied from commune to commune, within regions, in different enterprises or professions, and indeed from time to time and circumstance. For example it is frequently noted that after the 'Croatian spring' in 1971, party leaders and new members were selected with particular care for their ideological conformism. But everywhere, selecting to join the party meant a

choice of principles that many refused, or were later to recant.

At the same time the party-republic-federation-national identity linkage was inherently 'soft'. In Yugoslavia communism was imposed from *within*, unlike the other states in eastern Europe; and it had to function to manage and if possible transcend ethnic-national differences more complex and embittered by war than anywhere else in Europe. Moreover, as the prevailing ideology disbelieved in nationalism as an enduring difficulty, still less as an autonomous loyalty structure in a socialist society, the party's task was to build an inclusive state-society rather than acting as a vanguard party or preserving the purity of pre-existing doctrine. Hence the party as a structure demanding affective loyalty, and imposing a stringent identity, came well behind two or three others: a pre-existing 'ethnic' identity; an active belief in a socialist society; and a commitment to building an integrative federation through Yugoslavism.

There were three main avenues for an individual, whether or not incorporated into elites, to find a role in public service: the bureaucracy; the armed forces; or state-run commerce and industry, including foreign trade. There is much evidence to suggest that through time the third of these avenues became the most sought after. The bureaucracy was too close to politics, and too closely scrutinised. The armed forces demanded greater ideological commitment, particularly for promotion. Trade, industry and foreign relations were in a sense less crucial to party orthodoxy, and more demanding of talents that the country needed. So even though party membership was a pre-condition of access or advancement, in a commercial or 'abroad' career in the west it demanded little in practice that a man or woman of flexible outlook could not accept.

Given the scope of public enterprise and employment in the SFRY, a career in one of the professions involving, quite possibly, work and residence abroad, fostered talents that were, in turn, relied upon later at the higher levels of party leadership in the republics or by the federation. Unlike the Soviet Union or most of the east European states, therefore, Yugoslavia's greater interde-

pendence with the western world combined with the 'soft' ideological goals of the party's domestic programmes to produce aspiring leaders in the 1970s, and more particularly the 1980s, who saw little contradiction between their commitments to Yugoslavism and to other 'national' identities, or between those to socialism and to western economic and social values.

The role of the party in undermining the legitimacy of the party in the SFRY is unique among the histories of the downfall of communist states. In several republics, most notably Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia, inter-republican party quarrels were overt, relying on the influence of media 'information' wars, even before the series of elections during 1990 which brought non-communist parties onto the political scene for the first time. Simultaneously, communist or reform-communist leaders were bidding to reshape their identities by appealing to national traditions, sentiments and interests. The paradox is that the overt inner contradiction, which made the LCY as an institution peripheral rather than central to the growing struggle of personalities in the politics of the disintegrating SFRY, and which at the same time encouraged these recent former-comrades to brawl with each other publicly as they done privately, ought also to have made the reform of the state Yugoslavia less difficult than that of other eastern European states. That the opposite would prove to be the case must therefore take our enquiry beyond the role of the party as such, into the role of leading figures from the LCY.

In Serbia Slobodan Milosevic established an uncontested position by upholding Serbian rights and suppressing those of the autonomous regions. Later, for a period, he needed the support of the more extreme nationalist Radical Party, primarily in order to defeat the democratic opposition and the challenge from Milan Panic as federal prime minister during 1992. But from his position as president of the Serbian LCY, Milosevic was to dominate the politics of Serbia-Montenegro. There can be little doubt that despite the strength of opposition to him in Serbia, the Serbs' sense of being a beleaguered nation has made his position virtually unassailable by democratic methods, and that in due course he will succeed in gaining public

support to become president for life of the FRY. Serbia and Montenegro meanwhile have been transformed from proto-national-states within the SFRY to a single sovereign state sub-divided into two autonomous regions, based on the interests of a predominating nation; though the FRY remains a multi-ethnic society.

The Slovenian case shows strong similarities, for all the differences that actually divided it from the Serbian case. The two republics vied with each other for the ascendant role in reshaping the SFRY. Despite its demographic weakness, Slovenia was much stronger economically than any other republic. It was also more mono-ethnic. Based on these strengths Milan Kucan, president of the Slovenian LCY, successfully appealed to a unified national sentiment to remain in power as president of the republic and gain for his reform communist party the largest single bloc of seats in free parliamentary elections held in 1990. But the opposition bloc entered a power-sharing executive and took control of numerous powerful ministries. As in Serbia, where the opposition never gain executive control, non-communist political forces proved to be more radical in their nationalism than those whom they had displaced, or with whom they now shared power. It is arguable that under Kucan's overall leadership, it was the Christian Democrats and other strongly national separatist forces which pulled Slovenia onto a course of outright independence from the SFRY. This has not benefitted the economy or society to the extent promised by the uncompromising nationalists. And it most certainly contributed to the violent civil war in Croatia that ensued from the disintegration of the SFRY.

Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, having once belonged to the LCY, abjured his former loyalties and, as leader of the highly nationalistic HDZ, successfully opposed the Croatian LCY in free elections in 1990 and drove it into opposition. That he succeeded so markedly owed much to the support of emigre Croatian organisations, and to the intense propaganda which control over the only nationwide television transmitting station in Zagreb afforded. But just as the Croatian LCY had been more 'orthodox' than others prior to the breakup of the LCY, so it took a less radical nationalist

stance in the democratic elections, and this may have cost it the opportunity to remain in a power-sharing government. The consequences of that *not* having occurred were, arguably, profound.

In Macedonia and Montenegro the former-communist president of the Macedonian LCY, Kiro Gligorov, and the communist president of the Montenegrin LCY, Momir Bulatovic, stayed in power with widespread national support despite the existence of strong ethnic cleavages in both societies. In the Macedonian case the logic within society appears to have been that 'if we don't hang together, we shall hang separately': Macedonia's national identity remains disputable, and hence also potentially threatening, to Greece and Albania, and of some vital interest to Serbia and perhaps also Bulgaria. Hence despite the growing unpopularity of socialism-without-Yugoslavia, president and people found themselves sharing a situation; and Gligorov's power, experience and pragmatism were sufficient for him to stay in power with a significant US military presence securing the territorial limits of the fragile new 'national' state. In the Montenegrin case it was Serbia rather than the US that provided the indispensable guarantees to secure the national society against the irruptive tendencies of social conflict over competing national identities, and this factor has brought Montenegro into a probably irreversible integration with Serbia in the FRY.

Only in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the former autonomous region of Vojvodina (where popular opinion and leadership policies remained strongly pro-federation until late in the day) could it be said that the LCY was in a weak position from the outset. Even in these cases there were figures from the communist past - Goran Hadzic, Radovan Karadzic, Fikret Abdic - who continued to command widespread support within their ethnic communities.

The loss of the federation's capacity to enforce its policy goals was, in part, a function of the breakdown of LCY discipline. This was not the main cause of its failure. And while the influence of events elsewhere in eastern Europe may have encouraged republican leaders in different parts of Yugoslavia to change their long-term strategies,

their conflicting interests were clearly pre-established. What appears most directly to have caused the loss of legitimacy was the breakdown of democratic centralism, which by then was strictly a function of inter-personal conflicts between republican leaders. This loss of self-legitimation appears to have led immediately and overwhelmingly to the discrediting of the party in the eyes of much of its membership.

In parallel, the federation had to implement its policies through the deliberative councils which were a ubiquitous part of Yugoslav socialism. These councils traditionally took a strong cue from local party cadres. But once the LCY split, and there were corresponding splits at all levels, within as well as between republics, the party's capacity for influence in the deliberative councils collapsed, leaving them open to many new influences. This was tantamount to the failure of social legitimacy.

Probably the breakdown of the orderly functioning of the deliberative councils was more damaging to the aims of federal economic strategy than the collapse of the federal LCY. The former were irreplaceable, not least because the habits of mind of millions of workers, developed over many years, could not simply be scrapped. During a transitional period from authoritarian to democratic federalism these councils might have continued to work effectively, independent of the party. Certainly they were more representative of society in the SFRY than the party had been. Hence the collapse of the party did not necessarily mean the end of an effective economic reform strategy, because that depended far less on party authority than on whether or not there would be political agreement among the leaderships of the republics.

At a micro-economic and micro-political level the collapse of party self-legitimacy and its causal relationship to social legitimacy help to explain why the LCY became anathematised in society so quickly. There are, perhaps, two main components to this explanation. Firstly, many of the most talented members of elites were ahead of the game. Their example and influence were considerable even if time-lagged for less talented or ambitious party members. Secondly, the erosion of party internal discipline meant the breakdown of the

(theoretical) fairness by which jobs and resources had previously been accessed. But as the party remained a repository of technical knowledge and habitual influence, even as its legitimacy was dissipating, this transformed it into 'a gatekeeper' for favouritism and advancement in such areas as higher education and employment in the bureaucracy. Hence by continuing to exercise micro-economic and micro-political influence when its macro-political and macro-economic authority had gone the party destroyed any social legitimacy that might have remained to it. (Woodward 1995b:353)

What this crude sociological model suggests is that the failure of the LCY to command effective authority was partly due to the failure of the federation to solve specific, and very deep-rooted, economic and political problems. At the end of the day this explains the defection of society from the party and, more importantly, from the Yugoslav model of welfare socialism. The party had been a structure for incorporating elites and masses, whether directly by party membership or indirectly through the deliberative councils, and specifically for transcending nationalism through elite and mass participation in the operation of socio-economic welfare. Once consensus formation failed, this posed a fundamental choice, between drastically revising social structures, necessitating democratisation, and therefore redistributing power in unpredictable ways; and the abnegation of the federal structures of the SFRY through the politically motivated enhancement of pre-existing national identities.

The latter course was followed. It tended strongly to conserve power in the hands of existing elites, whose most talented, ambitious and forceful members had anyway shifted their allegiances away from federal structures to those of the proto-national-republics. But it would also open the door to the more extreme nationalistic aspirations of individuals and groups now operating freely inside Yugoslavia but outside the LCY; or returning from abroad with radical ideas of 'past revivals' or 'future renaissances', and with plenty of money to try to put these into practice. This Pandora's box was opened partly by the pressures making for free democratic elections, following the example of

the rest of eastern Europe; but even more so by the personalised politics of republican and sub-republican leaders, who in so many cases had shared a comradesly past in the now-defunct LCY.

The political revolutions which accompanied the failure of the SFRY to uphold its powers and competences, and which therefore dissolved the legitimacy of the party in society, produced a mounting confrontation between and within republics, dominated through the period of supposed democratic transformation in 1990 by mounting rhetorical nationalisms, out of which the prevailing elites who anyway wielded power in Yugoslavia emerged still in place, in some cases now sharing power with, or manipulating, extreme nationalists from abroad or from within Yugoslavia's most ethnically mixed or backward regions. As one acute observer has put it, the national crisis which had been largely economic in causation became an political struggle for power and territory in which these elites 'consciously preferred a revolutionary subordination of *demos* to *ethnos*'. (Janjic 1995)

As a careful analysis of elite political conflicts in the SFRY concludes:

[...] the outbreak of civil war in the "second Yugoslavia" did not result from the a priori verdict of history, but from the actions of the republican elites which were deciding which one of the following courses [...] events would take: democratic integration of the country, peaceful separation of the republics [...] or the war option. The first two scenarios required the conflicting political elites to achieve at least minimum agreement. Since this agreement was never reached, the conflict among the elites grew into a civil war. (Goati 1995:29)

Why did the JNA fail to control the growth of civil violence?

This is not a question that can be fully dealt with here. But it is too important to ignore entirely. The essence of an answer has been hinted at earlier: the JNA was so intimately identified with the federation and the party that if these collapsed the

question, 'To whom does the JNA belong?' would automatically arise.

An army in search of a country is liable to be very dangerous to others, or very dangerous to itself. In either instance, it lacks clear political guidance, which is indispensable to the measured use of force. Lacking the judgement to know where, when and how far to act, the JNA acted incoherently. The outcomes of its actions were everywhere subjected to wider political forces, none of which it was able to control. In many instances, particularly in Croatia during 1991, it was middle-level commanders who acted most decisively. But as the crisis of the SFRY turned into the confrontation of the republics, mixed with Serb-Croat confrontation in the republic of Croatia, the main feature of JNA activity was its pusillanimous and inconsistent responses to the appearance of organised violence. This betokened its inner inaction and indecision, until it was taken over and subjected to Serbia's will. In turn, that inaction was the manifestation of its internal disintegration.

Within the SFRY the JNA was an incorporated part of the federal-party-welfare economy. Its political direction came from the prime minister and federal executive council. Its party-state representation made the defence minister its chief spokesman. Its welfare-economic role included a monopoly of expertise on strategic-technical knowledge, and the budgetary implications thereof. The 'ethnic key' was a vital part of its top management, the General Staff. The party had its own institutional structure within the military, and the ethos of Yugoslavism was treated seriously by all ranks in its professional cadres. It was a very large and expensive instrument, supposedly controlling the vast arsenals of weapons and defence production which were features of Yugoslavia's strategic position between West and East in the cold war. It also had responsibility for securing the country in the face of internal rebellion, and was therefore distinctly separated from, though it could also act to control in war, the TD forces belonging to each republic.

Stasis in the federal (rotating) presidency meant that the defence minister had no clear interlocutor. The prime minister's executive was overwhelmed

during, and by, the economic crisis. The national budgetary crisis, and termination of US bilateral assistance induced a funding crisis, while simultaneously the revolutions in eastern Europe and the collapse of the USSR challenged its *raison d'être*.

Controlling the streets, separating ethnic communities when violence first began threatening in 1990 and early 1991, suppressing illegal acts by increasingly politicised militias and police, and securing the arsenals of weapons inside Yugoslavia, were well within its capabilities, and were on the whole well executed, for at least a year after the demise of the LCY. There was, however, strong US and German pressure exercised by Ambassador Warren Zimmerman in January 1991, against disarming the extra-constitutional militias of Croatia and Slovenia. (Cohen 1993:189-90) And in March 1991 student protests in Belgrade led to a crisis in which, it would seem, president Milosevic sought to use the JNA; but, because his motives were doubted, the federal presidency was deadlocked, and neither the specifics of the situation nor the precedent it might set could command a clear consensus within the High Command, the military declined the proposition that they act. (Cohen 1993:201-5) In Bosnia-Herzegovina the JNA contributed nobly to the minimisation of inter-ethnic violence well into 1992.

Thus the effective collapse of the federation in 1991 was like the setting off of an internal time-bomb within the JNA itself, because the issues of national separatisms could not now be avoided among brother officers and men; and because the constitutional frame of reference within which the JNA could justifying acting to itself was breaking down. Hence the military-technical problems of acting on time - for instance to stop the arguably illegal Slovenian and Croatian UDIs - compounded and were compounded by intense internal turmoil and debate in every garrison across Yugoslavia.

These debates turned into paradox. The nature of that paradox was that only when it became clear beyond doubt that the federation no longer possessed a core identity capable of giving legal political direction to the armed forces would it be rational and legal to act in its absence. At that point in time it would be too late to act without backing

one or more of the proto-national-republics against others; but as the ethos of the JNA could not warrant extra-constitutional military action in defence of the federation, it would clearly be unconstitutional to back one republic against another.

The precise nature of this paradox was shown when JNA intervention took place following the Slovenian UDI at the end of June 1991. For some weeks previously the Serb president of the federation, whose time in office had expired, blocked the succession of the vice-president, Stipe Mesic, a nationalist Croat who had told the Croatian legislature that his job was to end the SFRY. This was the kind of constitutional vacuum that the JNA was charged with obviating; but could not do so in the absence of a clear constitutional mandate for using force.

Who were the warring parties and what did they achieve?

With the disintegration of the SFRY so many warring parties emerged in what was ceasing to be Yugoslavia that the world might be forgiven for seeking to find only two; one 'good' and the other 'bad'. The international community, and particularly the countries of the EC, followed by the US, chose to support 'good' Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to calumnise 'bad' Serbia-Montenegro and the 'bad' Bosnian Serbs. So in analysing the warring parties it is first necessary to say something about why this choice was made in this way.

Essentially, during the course of 1991, the western powers moved from the view that Yugoslavia should be kept together to the view that it should be encouraged to disintegrate, and to do so on the basis of the proto-national-republics being recognised as sovereign states with due provision for the civil and human rights of all ethnic minorities.

The trouble with this view was that it made civil war in Croatia and Bosnia a certainty, unless there was swift international military intervention to impose the outcome in the name of the UN. But no country was willing to go to such lengths. Indeed

there could not have been a lawful case for doing so, as the SFRY remained the recognised sovereign state entity at the UN; and Serbia and Montenegro, which had rejected secession and the constitutionally dubious methods by which Slovenia and Croatia had acted, claimed to represent the continuing federation. Given that these two republics made up almost half of the population of the SFRY, and that large minorities of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia opposed the secession of the republics in which they lived, there was great dubiety about the legality and the morality of the policy chosen by the Europeans, and followed initially by the US.

To the detached observer the logic seemed to be this. As the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 delegitimises non-negotiated changes in the frontiers of states, the use of force is ruled out. As it has been decided to extend recognition to republics of the SFRY requesting verification of their constitutional provisions (including those for minorities), the Serbs and Serbia, being unwilling to accept this groundwork for the legal dissolution of Yugoslavia, are denied national self-determination. Even though they were the founding nation of Yugoslavia, they are everywhere to be depicted as the agents causing the civil wars which are liable to ensue from the implementation of this approach.

The *actions* of the international community, led by the Europeans, were even more artificial and contrived. Even while offering to grant 'national' self-determination and sovereign statehood to republics which barely or only recently constituted 'nations' in any accepted meaning of that word, most importantly Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EC bypassed its own criteria for recognition. These criteria included the creation of viable constitutions and entrenched provisions for protecting the rights of minorities. In Croatia, where the Serbian minority was unwilling to accept Croatian citizenship (and where indeed the Orthodox Serbs could not meet the definition of a Croat promulgated by the Croatian parliament), recognition was extended and announced despite the existence of a civil war and a heavily contested plan to deploy a UN peacekeeping presence.

The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina was even more blatantly incendiary. Having recognised

Slovenia and Croatia, and declared that Macedonia met its criteria for recognition (despite being a desperately poor and heavily contested territorial entity), the Europeans and the US decided to extend recognition to Bosnia on the basis of a referendum which had been boycotted by the Serbs, and which clearly infringed existing constitutional conventions of the republic requiring a consensus among all three constitutive ethnic peoples. As one authority on the subject has written:

The constitution of BiH specifically required consensus on all matters dealing with the strategic issues of state sovereignty, independence, and inter-ethnic relations. (Crnobrnja 1994:174)

Under the constitution of the SFRY Serbs and Croats had their identities as parts of larger nations. Slav-muslims had their identity as a nationality (ie. a recognised people, but not possessing a 'home republic' within the SFRY). That not unimportant aspect of constitutional legality was ignored, despite the clear intention of both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats to join with their mother nations in the event of Yugoslavia ceasing to be a common state. Yet the international community also ignored the preference for keeping the SFRY in being as a looser confederation, which had been supported during negotiations between the republics in 1991 by the Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegovic, on behalf of the trinational presidency comprising Serbs, Croats and Slav-muslims.

Having fitted up an answer required to appear consistent with their own flawed logic and irresponsibly rushed timetable, namely a vote by 60 per cent of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in favour of independence, the EC and US, unable to agree a joint course of action, by their disagreement virtually guaranteed that civil war would break out in Bosnia. Washington commanded president Izetbegovic to withdraw his consent and signature from a peace plan negotiated by Jose Cuteliero, appointed as its mediator by the EC to succeed Lord Carrington, who had resigned in disgust and dismay over the previous conduct of

major European governments. This orphaned EC plan had been accepted by all three Bosnian groups. It would have reconstituted Bosnia on the basis of three territorially distinct parts, each governed by one of the ethnic groups. Its rejection in Washington, as with proposals later put forward by Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg, made sure that the war in Bosnia would be protracted as well as vicious. (Glitman 1996:69-70)

That such a civil war would break out, and that it would pit all three groups against each other, was clear despite the apparently convincing majority in favour of independence. The referendum on independence had been boycotted by the Serbs (around one-third of the population). The Croats (around twenty per cent) voted for independence against their widely stated preference (union with Croatia) only as a temporary expedient, because Croatia intended to refuse any substantial measures of autonomy to its own Serbs, who might have been able to use the Bosnian model negotiated by Cuteliero to strengthen their own case. Indeed the hypocrisy of the western powers went much further: for almost a year after the beginning of the civil war, international attention focused on the campaigns of ethnic cleansing conducted by the Serbs in Bosnia, ignoring the deadly campaigns being conducted by Croats and Slav-muslims against each other in central Bosnia and western Hercegovina, and by the Croats and Serbs in Croatia.

This war, as most wars do, suspended moral categories in time, reserving them to be reinvented in the aftermath. In this sense it is the victors who write history. But what if there are no victors? Or, still worse, what if the side which is presumptively chosen as 'good' fails to triumph, and the side that has been deemed 'bad' actually thrives? For more than three years the international community refused to intervene decisively to underpin the outcomes it had sought to propound. And when in 1995 it did at last intervene, it was to decisively entrench a set of morally indefensible outcomes.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.
Before and during the Yugoslav War of Succession the great powers quarrelled among themselves, picked sides, defined competing as well as com-

mon interests, and persistently intervened - as did numerous other powers - covertly to shape the course of the civil war (which therefore became an international war), while paying lip-service to the concepts of law, justice, and unity under the UN.

So who in this drama of escalating national separatisms were the chief actors; what did they stand for; and what did they achieve at the end of the day?

In Serbia Slobodan Milosevic had employed nationalist sentiment to push aside more senior figures who relied more on Yugoslavism as a formula for approaching the management of growing inter-republican and intra-republican conflicts. He was influenced by his rising popularity among nationalist Serbs, who in the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and in the Serbian areas of Croatia and later Bosnia. These Serbs feared that the breakup of Yugoslavia, or of Serbia itself, might imminently jeopardize them. Milosevic was also greatly influenced by the 'Memorandum on the position of Serbia within Yugoslavia', published by a group of intellectuals connected to the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. This group included both long-standing members of the LCY, and former dissidents such as the notable poet and writer Dobrica Cosic, later to become first president of the FRY, who had been indicted for subversion of the state during the Tito era.

The 'Memorandum' has been represented as a 'programme for the creation of Greater Serbia'. It contended that *if* Yugoslavia broke up - which the group of authors did not advocate - *then* Serbia should pursue the same aim of national self-determination within a single state that other nations and nationalities were bound to aspire to. Explicitly, therefore, the argument was that the internal boundaries of the Yugoslav republics, which had been designed to produce an internal balance among the three largest ethnic groups in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, namely Serbs, Croats and Slav-muslims, would need to be renegotiated. The authors of the document also foresaw, as a more immediately pressing set of issues, that the constitution and political structure of the SFRY would need to be altered in the face

of mounting economic disparities between the more and less rapidly growing regions, and in view of rising ethnic tensions between Croats and Serbs in the economically deprived Serb-populated regions of the republic of Croatia. (Crnobrnja 1994:97-100)

This was a highly ethnocentric approach, which explicitly returned to the concept of historic Serbian national identity. But in itself it was neither a programme nor a preference: the ethos of the Academy remained, until after the SFRY was no more, the last bastion of Yugoslavism and socialism in former-Yugoslavia. What it did advocate, however, was a tough-minded stance over economic resources, the restructuring of the federation, and the position of the Serbian nation within the SFRY. In essence it envisaged a strengthening of the federation through a strengthening of Serbdom.

This was unacceptable to others, initially the non-Serb populations of Vojvodina and Kosovo, whose autonomous status as quasi-republics within Serbia and in the presidency of the SFRY had made them independent fiefdoms. The logic by which Milosevic and his supporters proceeded was that what the Serbian legislature had granted, it could also revoke. In the case of Vojvodina, whose leadership was largely Serbian anyway, mass rallies indicted the provincial leadership for corruption, inducing its resignation and replacement by one that was completely amenable to Belgrade. In Kosovo, where an increasingly ambitious movement for union with Albania existed, strikes led to the granting of emergency powers by the federal government to the JNA. In those circumstances the Kosovo Assembly was pressurised by Serbia to vote to end its autonomous status. While the other republics might have looked uncomfortably on as this was implemented in early 1989, they did not object on constitutional grounds, and indeed cited the Serbian precedent in subsequent intra-republican and inter-republican dealings. It was a useful one, given the power political proclivities of the elites now pursuing increasingly divergent courses. But the other republican leaderships were alarmed that, having extinguished the unusually extensive autonomies of these two provinces, the Serbian leadership did not sacrifice their separate and equal

representation in the presidency of the SFRY, but, rather, contended that this would have to await constitutional reform of the state.

Vojvodina was not heavily suppressed, but parties agitating for an east-European style political revolution in Serbia were closed down, and Hungarian and other minority language freedoms in education and other areas of social life were rescinded.

In Kosovo the situation was, and remains, very different. Essentially the army ran the province. There was no short-term alternative: Serb-Albanian relations had become as embittered as Protestant-Catholic relations in Northern Ireland at the culminating point of Protestant ascendancy in the early 1970s. One common feature of these two situations was the prospective demographic triumph of one community over the other despite, and partly because of, impoverishment which induced it to breed in idleness. But if once not so long ago Catholic urban areas of Northern Ireland still contained many slums unrebuilt from the last war, Pristina and the concentrated populaces of Kosovo in the 1990s are much closer to the third world - Cairo, perhaps - where nothing in the overloaded, worn-out, physical infrastructure works successfully twice in succession, and people therefore adapt to complete unreliability by becoming completely unreliable. Pristina, like Cairo, is better than the unproviding hinterland. Both, as Northern Ireland once was, are tinder-boxes where the Army does what it can to preserve a degree of order in public places like railway stations. But with young women available for young soldiers for little more than letting the family onto an anyway impossibly crowded train without tickets, how can that order be reliable, or respected?

Kosovo's secessionist movement is strong underground. While it has achieved little, and lacks the same political support afforded to Slovenia and Croatia by western powers, its passive role during the unfolding Yugoslav War of Succession forced the Serbian leadership to choose between all-out support for the Serbian Krajina in Croatia, and this cradle of Serbian national identity. If these conditions are not to constitute another civil war, then Kosovo demands a programme of economic and

social development that is beyond the resources of war-weakened Serbia, and that can be designed and implemented, therefore, only with the cooperation of the great powers and international organisations such as the OSCE.

Where the Serbian case excited far greater opposition during Yugoslavia's breakdown was over strengthening the central powers of the federation in economic affairs, and extending power over Serbs outside Serbia. But with Serbs comprising at least 15 per cent of the population of the Croatian republic (probably more if one counts those in temporary emigration abroad), and at least 33 per cent of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and with Montenegro reinvoking its basic kindred identity to Serbdom, there was a substantial case to be made for national self-determination outside but not inside Yugoslavia. This has led a number of those looking at the issues to conclude that the Serbian leadership decided to destroy the SFRY, but the available evidence and the considerations brought to bear in this paper suggest the opposite.

Despite the rise of Serbian and other nationalisms inside Yugoslavia, the issue of national separatisms did not arise until after the collapse of the federation's economic reform strategy, and the more or less simultaneous collapse of attempts to negotiate a continuing confederation acceptable to Serbia. From that point in time, in March 1991, Serbia's policies in the 'battle of the republics' became gradually more forceful.

Slovenia and Croatia at the same time became much more recalcitrant about the economic and constitutional conditions under which they would accept *any* reformed Yugoslav constitution. Until DEMOS, with its right-wing nationalist parties entered the government in 1990, the Slovenian model had aimed at economic rather than political sovereignty *within* a refashioned confederation, essentially insisting on 'republicanising' the LCY; greatly diminishing the subsidising of the slower-growing republics; cutting the costs of the JNA; and limiting the competences of the federal authorities in economic and legal affairs. Thereafter, with the national-separatist Christian Democrats holding the post of prime minister, Slovenia set a new

course for itself that was far more obdurate and prone to extra-constitutional risk-taking. During the second half of 1990 this included refusing various rulings of the federal constitutional court; promulgating 'sovereign' laws (while declaring that being part of a reformed Yugoslavia was intended); and ignoring well-documented evidence produced by the JNA that Slovenian militias were receiving arms from abroad, and preparing to fight against federal forces. (Cohen 1993:202)

This in turn faced Croatia's republican-nationalists with a complex dilemma; associating with the more radical nationalists in Slovenia (as national-separatist Croats returning from abroad, like Defence Minister Gojko Susak urged); or temporising with Serbia and the Serbs in Croatia. Opinion survey evidence indicates that Franjo Tudjman as president of the republic became more popular the harder his line towards Serbia in the battle of the republics, and the more intransigent he was towards the Krajina Serbs, who exercised effective control over much of the country and were blockading trade and tourist traffic. But this opinion survey evidence must be treated with great caution, because the Croatian media were no longer free and the regime in Zagreb (as in Belgrade) was mounting an intense war of words and images. But when after ten exhausting, stalemated, meetings of the federal presidency with the presidents of the republics in the period January-March 1991 resulted in Slovenia declaring that it would no longer bargain for even the continuation of a 'minimal and voluntary confederation of sovereign states', a position at least partially coordinated with Zagreb, the hand of Croatian policy was tipped: Croatia declared that the republic would 'not stay one day longer than Slovene' in the SFRY. (Cohen 1993:198)

Tudjman was the author of several works on Croatian history, including a massive tract, 'Wastelands of Historical Truth', which depicted the Jews as a 'holocaust people' (that is to say, they brought their fate under the Third Reich and in earlier chapters of violent anti-semitism upon themselves), and explained away, by minimisation, the extensive massacres of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies under the wartime Croatian puppet regime of Ante Pavelic.

Indeed the HDZ explicitly proclaimed the legitimacy of Pavelic's First Independent State of Croatia. Streets, schools, squares, parks and monuments began to be renamed, and the uniforms and other symbols of the *Ustashe* state reappeared.

But all of this served to further deepen Croatia's dilemma within Yugoslavia. For it alienated the Serbs, many of whom had suffered under that religiously deformed, regime. The prospect that they might have settled for autonomy, which is what they had been demanding under their leader Jovan Raskovic and his SDS, in parallel with Croatia's demands for independence within a loose Yugoslav confederation, now all but disappeared. It should be clear why: 'The Serbs of Croatia had been part of Croatia's national identity, a legacy Tudjman wanted to destroy.' (Silber & Little 1996:381)

Already in the summer of 1990, he had begun issuing minatory threats. The new citizenship and nationality legislation being proposed by the Croatian parliament clearly threatened the existing religious as well as national identity of the Serbs, let alone their current ideas about political and economic autonomy. Inter-ethnic tensions rose dangerously with the appearance of mutually antipathetic militias, and attempts by the regime in Zagreb to disarm the predominantly Serb-nationalist police in Knin, the main inland town of the overwhelmingly Serb populated region of northern Dalmatia.

History - written by victorious Croatia - will record that these people, the Orthodox Serbs of the Krajinas, were irreconcilable, irrational, and that their leaders were madmen. (Glenny 1992:10-11) Subsequently, with the help of Belgrade, they set up their own flimsy mini-republic, the RSK, which defied logic and reason for four years and then collapsed. In the summer of 1995 the remaining 350,000 Serbs who had endured great hardships to stay on their lands, fled before a Croatian military offensive.

It is worth recollecting that a great majority of the almost one million Serbs who left Croatia between 1991 and 1995 had no more fondness for Milosevic's communist Serbia than for fascist Croatia, and that virtually all the rural population,

by far the greater part of the total Serbian minority, however Orthodox and suspicious of their Croat neighbours, were far more deeply attached to their land than to any political regime. That is why they had remained settled in the republic of Croatia after the Second War. Of course many others were socialists, and had fought with the partisans of Tito. When re-elected as president of the RSK in 1993 (the elections were annulled by Belgrade, and partly re-run), Milan Babic announced 'the end of communism in the Krajina'. Belgrade's representatives were made decidedly unwelcome. Great numbers of Croats had also fought the Nazis. These important factors had brought Croats and Serbs into close postwar propinquity in the cities of Croatia; in many of the larger towns of Dalmatia where in any case, under Italian wartime administration, the inter-religious civil war had been less extreme; and even in parts of the countryside. Rather, the unleashing of ethnic hatred that transformed the national crisis of the SFRY into a bloodbath began in the republic of Croatia after the election of the HDZ in 1990. With Croatia's UDI in June 1991, civil war became unavoidable. Eventually in December 1991 the fighting was brought to a cease-fire, brokered by the UN representative Cyrus Vance and Lord Carrington, who resigned following the premature recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by the EC.

It is not clear that extreme national separatisms *had* to prevail in the case of the Croatian republic. In the first place the victory of the HDZ in elections in 1990 was less clear cut in terms of popular *votes* than of the *number of seats* it won through the electoral arrangements adopted. (Table 14) Secondly, at some future time the history of negotiations conducted during the recent war between the Serbs of Bosnia and the Krajina with the Zagreb regime and the Croats of Hercegovina and central Bosnia, chiefly under the auspices of Radovan Karadzic and Milan Babic, may eventually become clear. But these figures are routinely depicted as psychologically unstable 'Serbian extreme nationalists'. And there was always a controlling Belgrade presence in the RSK despite the absence of a regime-party equivalent to that in Serbia or Bosnia. Lastly, despite 'inter-state'

conflict, there was a clear choice open to the Croatian nationalists, between reconstructing Croatia as a multi-ethnic society, and pursuing a national separatist state. As one author has observed about the general process of the consolidation of power in the republics after the outbreak of civil war:

Elected leaders in the new states and potential states placed priority on consolidating their own power and that of their political party by taking control of state assets such as the mass media, the military and the police. The [...] threatening war or uncompleted projects of national sovereignty provided the pretext for extraordinary executive power and [...] emergency rule. (Woodward 1995a:353)

The key to all of this was the overriding claims of military security. Yet when the warring former-republics and their international interlocutors decided that it was time to trade, the conveniently aggressive proto-republics that had supposedly caused such insuperable difficulties disappeared or were severely reduced, and with that went all pretence to find autonomy provisions for minorities, consistent with European practice and UN charters. That principle has been restated by the Dayton agreement, and by the 1996 Zagreb-Belgrade agreement on mutual recognition. But hardly anyone believes that large numbers of refugees will return to their former homes. In Croatia a reaction against the dictatorial and extreme methods of the HDZ has made itself apparent in local elections, where in 1995, shortly after the triumphant crushing of the RSK, the regime lost control over government of the capital, Zagreb. (Silber & Little 1996:382)

The Serbs' aim of achieving national self-determination if Yugoslavia broke up has been frustrated. But Milosevic has managed to preserve the territorial integrity of Serbia; to draw closer to Montenegro; to gain control over half of Bosnia; and to win acknowledgement of the FRY as the successor state to the SFRY. At the same time the economy of Serbia has been severely weakened, and the Serbian Krajinas and the Serb areas of

Sarajevo and its surrounding region have been forsaken: 'The collapse of the economy destroyed the wealth base of Yugoslavia's once strong and highly developed professional middle class, and at the same time gave rise to a powerful new elite [...]' (Silber & Little 1996:383)

In Bosnia Alija Izetbegovic had published again in 1990 a tract he first wrote in prison, the 'Islamic Declaration'. This contended that the Slav-muslim people of Bosnia, having attained recognition of their identity as a nationality within Yugoslavia during the 1970s, must continue to struggle for the establishment of their own islamic institutions. Izetbegovic, unlike the leaders of many other warring parties, had never been a communist, and loathed Tito's godless society. But that did not mean that he rejected outright a future for the Slav-muslim people of Bosnia within Yugoslavia. Indeed it was the non-communists within the SFRY who took most heart from the collapse of communism elsewhere, offering something between passive acceptance of the prevailing state and a dangerous search for independence. In this, for a time, he made common cause with Kiro Gligorov of Macedonia, and might have had more support from Montenegro had the issue of the Albanian and Turkish minorities in the Sanjak/Metohia not pushed the position of that republic into firm alignment with Serbia. (Crnobrnja 1994:147-8,217)

Izetbegovic made clear that even as an absolute majority of the population of Bosnia, the Slav-muslims would not be able to islamicise its state and society; for that to happen would require maybe 70 per cent or 80 per cent predominance. Moreover it seems that before the Yugoslav national crisis began to encourage national separatisms he was not in any sense an 'islamic fundamentalist'. While believing in the long-term building of an islamic society across Bosnia, and in the mutual incompatibility of islamic and western institutions, he was not committed to a theocratic model of the islamic state, but to something more like modern Turkey or Egypt. But because so much of his written thought is general, abstract and allusive, it is difficult to be precise about what course he would have pursued in more auspicious circumstances.

In any case the overriding need for the Slav-muslims to find allies who would help them to fight the Serbs and Croats dashed his hopes for a peaceful long-term transformation in Bosnia, and turned his own position into one of presiding symbolically more than authoritatively over the affairs of his government. That government contained a number of powerful younger figures such as Haris Siladzic and Ejup Ganic, who knew the US or had been educated in American institutions abroad. Aside from the capacity this afforded to lobby the American government and Congress on an inside track, it is certain that Izetbegovic's imprisonment and the strength of his movement had attracted the attention of agencies of the US government, including the CIA, in what was, after all, a country within which during the cold war a political crisis might have induced a superpower confrontation. This may help explain why the Slav-muslim cause proved so popular in the American media.

It is also important that, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Bush administration's policy on 'Bosnia' had the Gulf War of 1990-91 and the continuing problem of Iraq much in mind. Consequently it was much more disposed to help, as well as to constrain, its Turkish NATO ally, which took a strongly interventionist view of the threat of civil war in the republic. And in general the Pentagon and NSC increasingly viewed the national crisis and unfolding ethnic confrontation in former-Yugoslavia in terms of eastern Mediterranean and Middle East interests, rather than in the European perspective which predominated in western Europe.

Much more difficult to explain is why Izetbegovic and his movement allied themselves with the Croats against the Serbs before civil war spread to Bosnia. After coming to power in Zagreb, president Tudjman had made numerous references to dividing Bosnia in order that the separatist Croatian regions could join with Croatia. But Izetbegovic also knew, and was repeatedly reminded by Radovan Karadzic and other Serb leaders in the Bosnian Assembly and presidency, that civil war would be the consequence of the pursuit of independence without the assent of the

Serbs; whereas the Croat position favoured secession from the SFRY. Moreover, the Serbs demanded that if the SFRY broke up they should exercise self-determination and union with Serbia. In any circumstances short of that they wanted guarantees of their status as a minority in a republic in which they had once been a majority. Izetbegovic and the Serbian president of the Bosnian Assembly, Momcilo Krajsnic continued a private dialogue about these possible outcomes virtually to the last moment in mid-April 1992, when serious fighting was about to commence across the barricades which had sprang up during the previous month between the Muslim and Serb suburbs of Sarajevo, and when snipers and militiamen were about to completely take over the streets. The two men talked over Karadzic's offer of a compromise to halt the impending tragedy; the division of the city between the two communities. (Silber & Little 1996:225)

It seems likely that on the level of intra-republican politics the availability of a working alliance with the Croats, and the minatory rhetoric of the Serbs, combined to keep Izetbegovic and the SDA in alignment with the tactics of the Croats, however uncomfortably. A deal with Karadzic at that time would have disrupted the alliance. Thus we can see that Izetbegovic and his people feared Serbian domination, and knew that a Slav-muslim society would only be achievable if Serbdom in Bosnia continued to weaken demographically. But that was not an immediate prospect, except through war or, possibly, the coercive use of state power. So did he think that course might have worked?

The most plausible explanation of Izetbegovic's actions during this period is that at least from the rejection of the Cuteliero plan onwards, and probably much beforehand, he acted at the behest of the American government, which had promised effective assistance following independence. That assistance took the form of UN Security Council resolutions ordering the JNA out of Bosnia, and imposing economic sanctions on the FRY.

By that time the killing was well underway in the countryside of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unlike Croatia the year before this had not been significant

before independence. But the withdrawing JNA left behind huge stockpiles of armaments. In any case Bosnia was covered with arms dumps, part of Yugoslavia's national defence provisions. (Woodward 1995a:27) These arms were intended for use by the TD forces, and so many of the locations of the stockpiles were known to local commanders. Bosnian Serb officers and men were allowed by the acting-presidency of the SFRY (the FRY was constituted on 27 April 1992) to remuster to their home republic, where they joined the Serb units of the former Bosnian TD. These Serb units had been ordered by the president of the republic, Izetbegovic, to report with their weapons to Slav-muslim and Croat controlled central organising points around Sarajevo, where undoubtedly they would have been disarmed and quite possibly interned. (Silber & Little 1996:225) This order they disobeyed, on the grounds that the conventions providing the authority for the collective presidency governing Bosnia-Herzegovina had been broken.

Hence the warring parties in Bosnia faced each other over constitutional as well as territorial and ethnic issues, and, like Hobbes' state of nature, each was vulnerable to the other and both were too insecure not to seek immediate military advantage. Equally, therefore, the movement of the JNA out of Bosnia-Herzegovina ordered by the great powers acting in the name of the UN removed the only force which would have been capable of policing the country in its entirety. Despite allegations to the contrary, and strong evidence of a mounting pro-Serb bias in its actions and direction, the JNA had been doing this. (Silber & Little 1996:224) Preventing the militias from unleashing terrible vengeful killing on each others' communities, as had occurred in Croatia in 1991, now became impossible. (Tables 6-7) Contributing to the ensuing mayhem were at least 15,000 Croatian regular forces and equipment, sent into Bosnia by the State Defence Council of Croatia. These forces were not ordered out of Bosnia by the UN.

Recognition by the international community and resolutions by the UN therefore provided the incentive, if not the motive or justification, for a concerted military effort by Croats and Serbs alike

to destroy Bosnia as a feasible unitary state; the political motive and legal grounding, but not the military means or moral justification, for the Slav-muslim SDA and its militias to fight for the control over a unitary state; and an answer to the JNA's search for a country, since the interventionary operations of the great powers now placed Serbia in thrall to war, demanding a High Command structure with which to fight it. Under the Slav-muslim-Croat tactical alliance, Croat and Slav-muslim militias hardly ceased fighting each other, even in early 1994 when the US and Germany put together the 'confederation' of the two entities. Croatia's eventual success in regaining the territory of the RSK removed its strategic need for the Slav-muslim alliance, and brought to the fore once again the Croatian separatist agenda for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The US and Germany have proved, however, that they can be compelling and insistent patrons. Croatia today is uncomfortably constrained by powerful allies whose interests are unlikely to be served by a renewed Serbo-Croat division of Bosnia. Realistically, only the continuing presence of IFOR obviates such a development.

The discussion can now be summarised:

1. Two models of national separatism *within* the SFRY developed during the late-1980s, in Serbia and in Slovenia.
2. The Serbian model was driven by various specifically Serb motivations, but its two most obvious external dynamics were the state of the economy in Serbia and the growing democratic rights and national separatist movements in Vojvodina and Kosovo.
3. The Slovenian model was also intrinsically economic rather than political at first, concerned with reducing its resource and revenue outflows to the rest of the SFRY, but it also had a political dimension in that it encouraged the loosening of centralisation by the federal state and LCY.
4. Following the collapse of communist regimes elsewhere in eastern Europe, but more importantly driven by the failure of federal economic reforms, models of separatism *from* the SFRY developed. These were driven by the appearance of a plethora of new and sometimes extremist parties contesting multi-party democratic elections. But the east

European revolutions were in themselves insignificant in impact; their consequences lay in opening the inter-republican politics of the SFRY to *western* influences that proved extremely potent.

5. Democratic elections also pushed existing parties and movements into more intransigent positions. As importantly, they diverted attention away from the crucial significance of the collapse of federal structures, and mounting dissensions within the deliberative councils.

6. Clearly this further energised the inter-personal policies of elite members and factions who were most of all concerned to keep power in the inter-republican battles over the future of Yugoslavia.

7. The clear emergence of national separatisms was encouraged by democratisation of the political process. The dramatic proliferation of political parties at republic and sub-republic levels smothered the last chances for pan-Yugoslav political organisations to function. Electoral methods intended to produce strong governments did so. But these governments were nationalistic and at best partially representative of their peoples.

8. Democratisation also presented a unique set of opportunities to emigre groups for whom nationalism was more important than democracy, and the destruction of Yugoslavia more important than the avoidance of civil war.

9. The challenge which this situation increasingly posed to the Serbs living in three of the six republics, and to Montenegro, was whether to accept state-sovereignty on the basis of existing inter-republican boundaries, or to strive for national self-determination within a single state.

10. The challenge to Croatia was in some respects similar to that posed to Serbia, given Croatia's historic links with Bosnia. But the election of the HDZ polarised Serbo-Croat relations within the republic of Croatia, encouraging national separatism by the indigenous Serbs.

11. Given the rise of confrontation between Serbia and Croatia, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (and other republics) remained remarkably stable. But in this case a Slav-muslim national separatism was stimulated by multi-party elections and by the growing demands of the

Bosnian Serbs for inter-Serbian unification.

12. At this crucial juncture the Slav-muslim SDA calculated on external intervention by the international community, led by the US, to sustain the figmentary sovereignty of the 'state' of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13. The Serbs were alienated by the actions of the international community against the collapsing SFRY and succeeding FRY, and by the abrogation of constitutional conventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

14. Croatian national separatism in Bosnia, and with respect to the breakaway RSK, was more covert and tactically subtle, but had little in common with the Slav-muslim cause.

15. Political conflicts beginning in economic and constitutional issues turned, with the effective breakdown of the SFRY through the Slovenian UDI in June 1991, into issues of cohabitation, borders, legal succession, and security. No obvious answers existed, and international mediation ought therefore to have commenced with the *de facto dominance of the republics*, a clean sheet of paper, and what the EC mediator, Lord Carrington, called "an invitation to Yugoslavia *a la carte*".

16. The logic of following the 'Slovenian model' of UDI, (quickly recognising a country with no significant national minorities) without allowing for adjustments of borders, questions of legal and economic succession, or the constitutional entrenchment of minority rights in every other republic (where there were significant minorities and no provisions for these beyond the abandoned federal constitution of the SFRY) turned each insecure minority into a candidate for national separatism and every presumptive majority into a potential minority in at least part of its recognised sovereign territory.

17. With the disintegration and re-nationalisation of the JNA by Serbia, and the refusal on the part of the international community to send a peacekeeping force to Bosnia-Herzegovina in advance of recognition, the disintegration of the SFRY and the absence of any overarching structure of security created conditions of such insecurity that a virtual international war was bound to break out, and to interact with the pre-existing civil war within Croatia, thus encouraging all factions to regard war as both a likely

outcome and hence as a rational instrument for the further pursuit of national separatist aims.

A compromise solution to the disintegration of the SFRY?

It is worth now briefly summarising the evidence accumulated in the various Tables attached to this paper, some of which have already been referred to. Firstly, there is the striking strength of localism and provincialism, balancing a strong attachment to the Yugoslav federation in most republics. This suggests that a powerful cleavage of loyalties arose in the context of social conflict. (Table 11) When this is read alongside the overwhelming popular wish to see the constitution of the SFRY be respected, one is entitled to hypothesise that the growing likelihood of war was not supported by popular opinion. (Table 10)

Even in Croatia and Serbia, multi-ethnic societies remained widely supported. (Tables 3, 13, 14) The preferred models for majorities of the populations of these states is shown by something beyond the statistics: the facts that, firstly, recruitment into armies was resisted widely, and, secondly, that most local communities *stayed put* where they lived, despite changing state structures, even in highly mixed areas, until they were, in so many cases, burnt, beaten and dragooned out of their homes, or died where they had lived.

The greatest tragedy of the Yugoslav War of Succession was that interacting consequences of economic collapse, democratisation, and the abandonment of the overarching state structure of the SFRY, opened the way to a war of succession in which established elites and new political actors employed the rhetoric and images of national separatisms to gain, keep or extend their power and prestige. Given the near-universal contempt in which the defunct SFRY is now held, it is difficult to argue with conviction that the civil war was entirely avoidable. But if the national separatisms which turned the disintegration of the SFRY into war were informed by conscious political logic, and if the steps beyond into civil and international strife were *not* obviously popular, then the case remains to be made that the war in its actual

course was unavoidable.

The groups which showed the strongest temper for war were religious, rural peoples who could not of their own resources or thought have swung former-Yugoslavia into such a maelstrom of bloodletting. They had to be assisted to unleash their hatreds. And they were the most vulnerable and insecure groups to be affected directly by the collapse of the SFRY. This is not to look past the point about *majorities* also feeling threatened in part of their sovereign expectations. But such issues could have been dealt with through negotiated autonomy provisions, as Carrington and Vance sought to do; and as David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg were condemned to continue doing in the impossible conditions of later bloodletting.

The denial of the prospect of self-determination for *all* nations sustained the war in its viciousness, because the international community, in offering to extend recognition to republican governments that were not democratically representative of the whole people over whom they were being invited to rule, and that had not entrenched adequate rights for the protection of ethnic and religious minorities, revived ancient animosities. (Varady 1995) At the same time, the essential feature of the crisis as it unfolded through the consolidation of state power was that leaders were prepared to resort to war as policy.

Through the course of this war, therefore, national minorities have become second-class citizens everywhere. There is a partial exception to this in the FRY, which may now be the most ethnically diverse entity in former-Yugoslavia. Even so, the situations in Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohia are far from normal. In Croatia itself the rights of returning peoples to re-enter their properties and reassert their civil and political rights have been cancelled by Croatian legislation. Despite the language of the Dayton Accords and the Serbo-Croat agreement of August 1996, probably the best that can be hoped for is that some people will in due course feel safe enough to return to lands to which they feel a deep attachment; and that compensation will be afforded to the rest. In Sarajevo, where there were six or seven predomi-

nantly Slav-muslim districts and three that were Serb, but where all had a significant multi-ethnic and multi-cultural mix, the Serbs have mostly gone, and are filtering away from the outlying areas too, leaving behind an impoverished, broken, wounded Slav-muslim ghetto in what was once one of Europe's most cosmopolitan societies.

The end of consociationalism has not been balanced by any improvement in the growth of political democracy. The regimes of these new states and sub-state entities rule by suppressing adversaries. Both Tudjman in Croatia and Milosevic in Serbia have sought to reverse the outcome of local government elections unfavourable to their regimes. Neither of the two regimes in Bosnia exercises power democratically or with respect for minorities: international agencies report the continuing, systematic, destruction of properties belonging to those who fled the war but might have been tempted by the ostensible fairness of the peace accords to return. These regimes employ uglier means of suppressing freedoms than the SFRY was indicted for by its enemies. Numbers of the *emigres* whose influence has been so deadly now act as advisors or business people, incorporated into the new oligarchic power elites. At the same time, popular opinion in these new states has accepted authoritarian rule and endorsed ethnic cleansing. This is perhaps not surprising since the sickening toll of murder, and the physical demands of reconstruction, have dulled the appetite for democracy for the time being.

An overall conclusion?

Events in former-Yugoslavia do little to sustain the notion that self-determination and nationhood are natural or objective outcomes of a popular will, or of pre-established racial ethnicity. Rather, as Max Weber wrote:

[...] all those groups who hold the power to steer common conduct within a polity will strongly instill themselves with [...] ideal fervour of power prestige [...] Insofar as there is a common object [...] behind the obviously ambiguous term 'nation', it is apparently

located in the field of politics [...] A nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own. (Hutchinson & Smith 1994:20)

Yugoslavia did not experience a political revolution led from the streets against a centralised communist state, as happened elsewhere in eastern Europe. Only in Croatia was there a significant change of regime, though in Bosnia-Herzegovina the disintegration of inter-communal political management led to the division of the country. Even so, these significant popular choices confirmed the power of existing elites and leaders. The collapse of a weak federal structure and party was brought about by external as well as, and more than, domestic economic conditions. The logic of democratisation was challenged and dominated, rather than being complemented, by the logic of nationalism. Sentiments of community, myths of origin, and dreams of a better future, all played their potent roles. But they did so under the driving of leaders who manipulated nationalism for their own ends, who possessed their own agendas, and who took some or even much of their direction from powers beyond Yugoslavia. It therefore remains an open question, particularly as so many of those dreams have turned to bitter ashes, whether the national separatisms that arose through the disintegration of the SFRY would 'normally' have produced communities of sentiment 'adequately manifesting themselves' in ethnically-cleansed societies. As Sir Michael Howard once wrote about the outbreak of the First World War, 'if the masses howled for war, it was because they had been taught to howl'.

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Glossary of terms

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency of the US
DEMOS	Democratic Opposition Bloc (Slovenia)
EU/EC	European Union/European Community
FRY	The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro)
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Alliance
HVO	Croatian Defence Council
IFOR	Peace Implementation Force
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JNA	Yugoslav National Army
LCY	League of Yugoslav Communists
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSC	National Security Council of the US
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RS	Republica Srpska
RSK	Republica Srpska Krájlina
SDA	Movement of Democratic Action (Bosnia-Hercegovina)
SDB	Security Service of Serbia
SDS	Serbian Democratic Party (RSK and RS)
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SPS	Socialist Party of Serbia
TD	Territorial Defence Forces (republics of the SFRY)
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence (Slovenia & Croatia)
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organisation

Table 1: Nations, nationalities and ethnic groups in Yugoslavia (1981 census) (SFRY)

		%
<hr/>		
Population of SFRY	22.427.585	100
<hr/>		
<i>Nations of Yugoslavia:</i>		
Croats	4.428.043	19.7
Macedonians	1.341.598	6.0
Montenegrins	579.043	2.6
Muslims	1.999.890	8.9
Serbs	8.140.507	36.3
Slovenes	1.763.571	7.8
<hr/>		
<i>Nationalities of Yugoslavia:</i>		
Albanians	1.730.878	7.7
Bulgarians	36.189	0.2
Czechs	19.624	0.1
Hungarians	426.867	1.9
Italians	15.132	0.1
Romanians	54.955	0.2
Ruthenians	23.286	0.1
Slovaks	80.334	0.4
Turks	101.291	0.5
Ukrainians	12.813	0.1
<hr/>		
<i>Ethnic groups:</i>		
Gypsies	168.197	0.7
Vlachs	32.071	0.1
Yugoslavs	1.219.024	5.4
Ohters	254.272	1,1

Table 2: Yugoslav diversity

	I Population 1981 census in 000s	II Farmers	III GDP pr capita (in per cent of average)	IV Major religions	V Major languages
Bosnia-					
Herzegovina	4.124	683	69	Orth. Cathl. Musl.	Serbo-Croat
Croatia	4.601	668	125	Catholic	Serbo-Croat
Macedonia	1.909	392	65	Orthodox, Muslim	Macedonian
Montenegro	584	76	77	Orthodox	Serbo-Croat
Slovenia	1.892	173	197	Catholic	Slovenian
SR Serbia:					
- Serbia proper	5.695	1.514	99	Orthodox	Serbo-Croat
- Kosovo	1.585	380	28	Muslim Orthodox	Alb., Serbo-Croat
- Vojvodina	2.035	391	121	Orthodox, Catholic	Serbo-Croat, Hung.
Yugoslavia	22.425	4.277			

Table 3: Data on the national (ethnic) composition of the population (FRY)

	Serbia	Montenegro	Total FRY
1 Serbs	6.428.420	57.176	6.485.596
2 Montenegrins	140.024	380.484	520.508
3 Albanians	1.686.661	40.880	1.727.541
4 Hungarians	345.376	---	345.376
5 Yugoslavs	317.739	25.854	343.593
6 Muslims	237.358	89.932	327.290
7 Gypsies	137.265	---	137.265
8 Croats	109.214	6.249	115.463
9 Slovaks	67.234	---	67.234
10 Macedonians	47.577	860	48.437
11 Romanians	42.386	---	42.386
12 Bulgarians	25.214	---	25.214
13 Ruthenians	18.339	---	18.339
14 Vlachs	17.557	---	17.557
15 Turks	11.501	---	11.501
16 Slovenes	8.340	407	8.747
17 Regional affil.	4.881	---	4.881
18 Others	44.866	13.425	58.291
19 Undetermined	16.661	---	16.661
20 Unknown	61.278	---	61.278

Table 4: National composition of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA)

Nationality	Total population (%)	JNA officers (%)	Estimated number of JNA officers
Montenegrins	2,5	6,2	4873
Croats	22,1	12,6	9903
Macedonians	5,8	6,3	4952
Muslims	8,4	2,4	1886
Slovenes	8,2	2,8	2201
Serbs	39,7	60,0	47160
Albanians	6,4	0,6	472
Hungarians	2,3	0,7	550
Yugoslavs (1981)	1,3	0,7	5266
Others	3,3	1,6	1258

Table 5: Public attitudes towards financing the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) in mid-1990

How much money should the JNA get?	Tot.	Mont.	Croat.	Maced.	Slov.	Serbia.	Kosovo	Vojvod.	Bosnia Herzeg.
Less than now	36,0	10,0	54,0	28,0	78,0	18,0	65,0	21,0	24,0
About the same	39,0	56,0	33,0	47,0	10,0	51,0	18,0	52,0	41,0
More than now	16,0	24,0	6,0	16,0	3,0	23,0	9,0	20,0	24,0
Don't know	9,0	10,0	8,0	9,0	9,0	9,0	9,0	7,0	11,0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 6: Territorial armies (estimate)

Sovereign state	Population	% in SFRY	Army	Total operational
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4.365.639	18,6	372.000	120.000
Montenegro	616.327	2,7	52.000	17.000
Croatia	4.763.941	20,31	406.000	135.000
Macedonia	2.033.964	8,7	174.000	60.000
Slovenia	1.974.839	8,4	168.000	60.000
Serbia	9.721.177	41,4	823.000	270.000

Estimate of the size of potential protectors of republican sovereignty were made according to available data on reserve JNA units and territorial defence conscripts. The figures should be taken with a grain of salt, since the numerical potential of certain «armies» was derived on the basis of the population census rather than national affiliation.

Table 7: Strength of the armed forces on former Yugoslavia territory

	soldiers	tanks	artillery	aircraft	helicopters
Bosnian Muslims	110.000	40	400	-	-
Bosnian Croats	50.000	75	200	-	-
Croats	110.000	170	900	20 (including helicopters)	
Bosnian Serbs	80.000	330	800	40	30
Krajina Serbs	50.000	240	500	12	6
FRY	125.000	600	1500	200	100

Table 8: Principal political leaders in Yugoslavia (January-May 1991)

Republic	President	Age	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Alija Izetbegovic	76	Moslem fundamentalist/anti-communist
Croatia	Franjo Tudjman	69	Croatian nationalist/communist
Slovenia	Milan Kucan	50	Slovene regional nationalist/reform communist
Macedonia	Kiro Gligorov	77	Macedonian regional nationalist/reform communist
Serbia	Slobodan Milosevic	49	Serbian nationalist/communist
Montenegro	Momir Bulatovic	35	Serbo-Montenegrin nationalist/communist
Fed. prime minister	Ante Markovic	68	Yugoslav/reform communist
Fed. president	Borislav Jovic ¹	63	Serbian nationalist/communist
Fed. vice-president	Stipe Mesic ²	57	Croatian nationalist/communist

¹ Resigns post on March 15, 1991, over presidency's failure to adopt emergency measures against Croatia and Slovenia. Resumes post on March 20.

² Scheduled to become president of collective state presidency on May 15, 1991, but blocked by Serbia and its allies. Assumes post of president on June 30, after compromise negotiated by European Community.

Table 9: Number of Yugoslav citizens to identify themselves as «Yugoslav» in the 1981 and 1991 censuses

	1981		1991		Change 1981-1991
Bosnia-Herzegovina	326.280	7,9%	239.845	5,5%	-26,5%
Slovenia	26.263	1,4%	12.237	0,6%	-53,4%
Croatia	379.058	8,2%	104.728	2,2%	-72,3%
Macedonia	15.673	0,7%	-- ¹	--	--
Montenegro	31.243	5,3%	25.854	4,0%	-17,3%
Serbia proper ²	272.195	4,8%	145.810	2,5%	-16,4%
Vojvodina ³	164.880	8,2%	168.859	8,4%	2,4%
Kosovo	2.676	0,2%	3.070	0,2%	14,7% ⁴

¹ The first results of the censuses in Macedonia did not report data on «Yugoslavs».

² Without the provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo.

³ 53% of all the «Yugoslavs» in the republic of Serbia are in the province of Vojvodina, and persons declaring that identity made up 10% or more of the population in eight of Vojvodina's municipalities.

⁴ Information for Kosovo is incomplete because almost all Albanians (about 90% of the province) boycotted the census. The growth rate of Yugoslavs in the province reflects a small increase in their absolute number, most likely among inhabitants of Serbian and Montenegrin background.

Figure 10: Federal versus republican constitutions: Per cent of sample agreeing that the federal constitution must be paramount, 1990




Table 11: The personal attachment of citizens in Yugoslavia to different levels of territorial organization, May-June 1990 (in per cent)¹

Ethnic group	Level of territorial affiliation		
	Local	Republican/provincial	Yugoslavia
Slovenes	51	66	26
Croats	45	51	48
Macedonians	31	52	68
Moslems	43	50	84
Yugoslavs	25	32	71
Montenegrins	37	47	80
Serbs	36	51	71
Albanians	48	47	49
Hungarians	60	62	79
Others	37	43	58
Total sample	39	52	62

¹ Per cent of respondents in each ethnic group who felt a particular level of affiliation was "quite important" for them personally. Based on interviews with 4230 randomly sampled adults throughout the country.

Table 12a: Percentage of young people preferring not joining the League of Communists

Region	1974	1986	1989
Slovenia	32	88	92
Croatia	13	70	75
Vojvodina	4	54	50
Serbia ¹	6	40	42
Macedonia	7	40	42
Bosnia-Herzegovina	5	36	40
Kosovo	4	35	33
Montenegro	8	18	34
Total Yugoslavia	9	50	51

¹ Not including the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina.

Table 12b: Participation of young people in membership of the League of Communists (in per cent)

Region	1976	1980	1984	1988	1989
Slovenia	27,7	26,0	16,6	8,3	7,6
Croatia	24,7	26,2	18,7	7,1	¹
Vojvodina	31,2	28,9	20,7	14,0	13,2
Serbia ²	32,5	33,3	24,8	16,3	15,8
Macedonia	20,9	25,3	20,2	12,1	10,3
Bosnia-Herz.	36,0	41,2	33,6	20,2	17,8
Kosovo	35,3	40,7	37,8	35,7	34,0
Montenegro	30,2	25,0	28,6	22,5	22,8
Total League of Communists	30,8	33,1	25,3	16,1	15,8

¹ Unavailable.

² Not including the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina.

Table 13: Political parties in Yugoslavia, December 1990, by dominant goal orientation (in per cent)

Predominant Goal Orientation of Party Program ¹	Slovenia	Bosnia-				Macedonia	All Republics
		Croatia	Herzegovina	Serbia	Montenegro		
Communist and socialist	12,7	11,9	18,6	10,5	40,0	16,0	16,3
Liberal-democratic	22,1	16,6	23,2	21,0	20,0	8,0	19,2
Labour/farmer/business	8,5	7,1	13,9	10,5	4,1	16,0	10,0
Ethn. pol./rel./regional	14,8	40,4	23,2	33,3	24,0	36,0	28,4
Special interest ²	31,9	14,2	6,9	10,5	4,0	8,9	15,0
Yugoslav state unity	2,1	2,3	13,9	1,7	4,0	4,0	4,6
Other	8,5	7,1	--	12,2	4,0	--	6,2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of parties	(47)	(42)	(43)	(57)	(25)	(25)	(239)

¹ The breakdown is intended to illustrate general tendencies of Yugoslavia's emergent pluralist party system, based upon the predominant beliefs or organizing principles of parties and disregarding significant overlap in orientations and differences among the parties with respect to size and influence.

² Parties organized to advance specific interests (e.g. the environment, peace, women, pensioners, unemployed, consumers, human rights culture).

Table 14: The Croatian elections of 1990: Voting and distribution of seats for the Sociopolitical Chamber of the Sabor

	First Round		Second Round		Seats won	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
The Croatian Democratic Alliance (HDZ)	1,200,691	41,8	708,007	42,2	54	67,5
The League of Communists (SKH-SDP) and smaller parties of the left	994,060	34,5	627,345	37,3	19	23,7
Serbian Democratic Party	46,418	1,6	34,682	2,0	1	1,2
Centrist Coalition and others	633,892	22,0	308,378	18,3	6	7,5
Total	2,875,061	100,0	1,678,412	100,0	80	100,0
Voter turnout (in %)	84,5		74,5			

Figure 15: Social product per capita by region, 1947 and 1974





Table 16: Yugoslavia's Economic Growth, 1956-1984: Selected indicators

Indicators ¹	Average Annual Growth Rate (%)			
	1956-64	1965-72	1973-79	1980-84
Gross domestic product (GDP)	8,8	6,0	6,1	0,4
GDP per capita	7,7	5,0	5,1	-0,3
GPD in industry	12,2	6,6	7,5	2,1
GPD in agriculture	3,6	2,0	2,2	2,9
Labour productivity in the public sector	4,8	4,3	2,7	-2,0
Real personal incomes	6,3	6,1	2,7	-2,0

¹ 1972 Prices.

Figure 17: Real net personal income per capita Yugoslavia, 1952-1988



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**National separatisms and the
disintegration of Yugoslavia**

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