



03

HÅKAN EDSTRÖM (ed.)

Approaching Comprehensiveness

**Two grand strategic options
and some of their consequences**

OSLO FILES

ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY—03/2009

INSTITUTT FOR FORSVARSSTUDIER (IFS)

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
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Editor: Anna Therese Klingstedt



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SUMMARY

Experience from international operations has shown us that coordination between a variety of actors, as well as functional sectors, from the international community is essential to achieving key objectives necessary for lasting security. NATO allies have agreed that a comprehensive approach is required to meet the challenges in different operational environments.

The issues discussed in this study revolve around the interplay between individual member states and multilateral organisations. The focus of the study is the situation of the small states generally and of Norway in particular. The critical questions are what grand strategic options there are for Norway when committing military resources to multinational crisis management, and the consequences they might have on the Norwegian Armed Forces.

The variable “provide military resources” has been given two defined outcomes: the *holistic approach* and the *atomistic approach*. The critical difference is the national framework under which the national military units participate in international operations. With the former approach the military instrument of power is coordinated with the other instruments at the disposal of the providing state, be they diplomatic or economic. With the latter the comprehensiveness of combining the different instruments is orchestrated at the multinational level and the contribution of the small state will in this case be purely military.

The Norwegian context is explored from a number of academic perspectives: history, political science, military theory, law, ethics, information and gender.

Based on the experiences gained from previous international peace support operations, a conclusion can be drawn: there are different needs in different regions of the area of operation. The current operation in Afghanistan is no exception and therefore serves as an example in the ensuing discussion.



CONTENTS

FOREWORD	4
INTRODUCTION TO A STRATEGIC CHALLENGE <i>Håkan Edström and Charlotte E. Ingalls</i>	5
THE NOBLE ART OF CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY <i>Harald Høiback</i>	19
NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE USE OF MILITARY POWER <i>Håkan Edström</i>	41
BALANCING ENDS, WAYS AND MEANS <i>Palle Ydstebø</i>	59
THE ROLE OF LAW AND HOW TO MAINTAIN LEGAL COHERENCE <i>Sigrid Redse Johansen</i>	73
ETHICAL PREREQUISITES AND IMPLICATIONS <i>Nils Terje Lunde</i>	85
THE MEDIA ASPECT OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARY OPERATIONS <i>Dag Rist Aamoth</i>	99
A GENDER PERSPECTIVE IN A NORWEGIAN CONTRIBUTION? <i>Charlotte E. Ingalls</i>	111
OTHER ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC CHOICE <i>Håkan Edström</i>	127
BIBLIOGRAPHY	137
CONTRIBUTORS	149

FOREWORD

The primary role of the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College is to provide the Norwegian Armed Forces with relevant military education. Such education should strengthen our professional identity and core values while maintaining high academic standards.

In order to stay relevant we need to take part in the debates on issues that relate to our profession of arms, be it military theory, national and international politics, joint operations or peacetime management. We do this by encouraging debate in the classroom, at seminars and in writing.

I am proud to present this volume of papers on the *Comprehensive Approach*, a concept that NATO has defined as highly significant to future planning and conduct of operations. This project, initiated about a year ago, was tasked with delineating the different ways of approaching comprehensiveness and suggest implications for the Norwegian Armed Forces. In essence, the book revolves around two alternative approaches (holistic vs. atomistic), discussing what small states in particular should consider once they have decided to participate with military forces in a multinational operation that is based on the principles inherent to the comprehensive approach. The authors apply seven perspectives to the analysis: history, political science, military theory, legal, ethics, information (media) and gender. Each of them, I find, gives us a better grasp of the comprehensive approach – opportunities and pitfalls alike.

I commend *Approaching Comprehensiveness* to you. These issues are important.

Geir O. Kjøsnes
Brigadier
Commandant
Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College

INTRODUCTION TO A STRATEGIC CHALLENGE

Håkan Edström and Charlotte E. Ingalls

The aim of this study is to illuminate two current grand strategic options for Norway when it comes to providing military resources to multinational crisis management, and the consequences either might have for the Norwegian Armed Forces. We will therefore mainly be addressing in this volume Norway's contributions to NATO's comprehensive approach.

Conceptual framework and the use of military power

During the Cold War, Norway and other smaller NATO member states were heavily influenced by security doctrines originating from the USA. The Truman and Dulles doctrines, containment, massive retaliation, mutually assured destruction (MAD), flexible response and roll-back strategy are all examples of American conceptual developments. These concepts and doctrines have all been subject to extensive research and comment.¹

Smaller member states were, more or less, importers of security. The strategic setting left relatively little room for them to influence conceptual development. This condition may have bred a certain conceptual and transformational complacency in smaller member states in the sense that smaller states became conditioned to expect the major players to provide most of the capabilities required, as well as leadership and guidance in any transformational and conceptual development.

There were, however, conceptual developments going on in Norway during the Cold War era as well. The idea of total defence was developed in the post-World War II period. It rested on the perception that the defence of Norway should include both a military defence and a broad civilian preparedness. The underlying principle of the traditional concept was that the collective resources in society, if necessary, should be mobilised to defend the country, to deal with acute and severe security challenges during war or when war was imminent.²

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- 1 See for example J. L. Gaddis, *We Now Know – Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); C. S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of Superpower* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky 1988); N. Friedman, *Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War* (London: Chatham Publishing, 2000); and C. V. Crabb, *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982).
 - 2 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Støtte og samarbeid. Det moderniserte totalforsvarskonseptet* [Support and cooperation. The modernised Total Defence concept], Oslo, February 2007, p. 10.

The concept rested, in other words, on the idea of optimal exploitation of society's limited resources. It must be seen in light of the need to address concerns of a likely attack or invasion from the Soviet Union. However, with the changing security environment of the 1990s, these concerns subsided and attention turned towards addressing vulnerabilities of modern society.³ Furthermore, there was recognition in Norway of the increasingly complex and unpredictable nature of the security environment, characterised by new security challenges and greater focus on societal security.⁴

In this setting, one might have expected the idea of total defence to be abandoned or parked alongside the curb, as it hardly seemed relevant to the new security landscape. However, that was not the case. Instead, Norway modernised it, giving it added relevance to the new security context. In short, modernisation entailed that the inter-sector flow of support was no longer limited to high levels of existential threat, but could take place in both directions whatever the crisis level. In addition, support could be activated at a considerably lower crisis level than under the traditional total defence concept. The view was that the total resources that were available to deal with major crisis and war should also be available to deal with challenging crisis-like situations in peacetime.⁵

The example of total defence serves two purposes. First, it shows how some small states out of necessity had to think conceptually, holistically and trans-sectorally in order to deal with significant security challenges. Second, it shows how a small state succeeded in modernising and maintaining the relevance of a traditional defence concept in a new and more complex security environment. Even small states have conceptual awareness which could be of value to concept development in a broader setting.

When it comes to the global environment of the post-Cold War era, international operations have demonstrated to contributing states the need of coordination and cooperation. Coordinating the actions of various actors from the international community is considered essential to achieving key objectives necessary for lasting security. NATO allies have, for example, agreed that a

3 See for example Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police, *Et sårbart samfunn. Utfordringer for sikkerhets- og beredskapsarbeidet i samfunnet* [A vulnerable society. Challenges in civil protection and emergency planning], NOU 2000:24, Oslo, 2000.

4 See for example Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005–2008* [Continuing the modernisation of the Armed Forces 2005–2008], Report to the Storting, no. 42, 2003–2004, Oslo.

5 See, for example, Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police, *Samfunnssikkerhet og sivil-militært samarbeid* [Societal security and civil-military cooperation], Report to the Storting, no. 39 (2003–2004); and Stortinget, *Innstilling fra forsvarskomiteen om samfunnssikkerhet og sivil-militært samarbeid* [Report from the Defence Committee about societal security and civil-military cooperation], Report no. 49 (2004–2005).

comprehensive approach which involves all these actors is required to meet the challenges of different operational environments. At the same time, the UN has introduced the idea of the integrated mission, and the EU seems to be adopting a concept based on the principles of the comprehensive approach. All three concepts have been subject to recent research and comment.⁶

Obviously, the small states had conceptual awareness during the Cold War era. This awareness seems to have included considerations of military strategy. Different options emerged for the use of military resources under the terms of the national total defence concept, and the broader conceptual supremacy of the USA.⁷

At least two questions stand out: How do the new multilateral concepts such as *comprehensive approach* and *integrated missions* affect the grand strategic thinking of small states? Which alternative strategies for the use of the military instrument have small states developed? This project focuses on the latter question.

The aim of the study

The issues addressed in this study concern the interplay between individual member states and multilateral organisations. The focus is on the situation of the small states and the strategic options available to a small state when military resources for use under the framework of multinational crisis management outside the small states territory. To be more precise, we explore the consequences of the strategic choice for the contributing state, in this case Norway.

As this study in our opinion covers a certain amount of unknown terrain, we have chosen to formulate a relatively modest objective. Our ambition is to increase awareness of the implementation of multilateral concepts such as the comprehensive approach and integrated mission. It is *not* to explain associated processes in individual member states *vis-à-vis* NATO, the UN and/or the EU. Nor to explore any of the concepts of the multilateral organisations.

6 See, for example, C. de Coning, *The United Nations and the comprehensive approach*, DIIS Report (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2008), p. 14; E. Gross, *EU and the comprehensive approach*, DIIS Report (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2008), p. 13; and B. Smith-Windsor, *Hasten Slowly – NATO's Effects Based and Comprehensive Approach to Operations*, NATO Defence College Research Paper (Rome: NDC, 2008), p. 38.

7 See, for example, H. Edström, *Hur styrs Försvarsmakten? – Politisk och militär syn på försvarsdoktrin under 1990-talet* [How is Defence managed? Political and military perspectives on defence doctrines during the 1990s] (PhD diss., Umeå University, 2003).

The need for new knowledge

The void in knowledge which this study aims to partially fill is multifaceted, and there are some aspects which have not been taken fully into consideration in previous research. Although there is a relevant literature at hand,⁸ we believe our project can provide some new insights. Primarily, it means understanding how a small state *can* contribute militarily to international cooperation. By drawing on different perspectives we will discuss how a state *should* contribute, though without giving unambiguous recommendations.

There is another gap in our knowledge: how the ability of international organisations is affected by how the various member states choose to contribute to the collective effort. While this in itself is not a new question, this study focuses on one specific area, i.e. NATO and the member states of the alliance coupled with the implementation of the relatively recently adopted concept of the comprehensive approach. In this study, the comprehensive approach is viewed as applicable in international crisis and conflict management in general. At present, the implementation of an approximation of the concept is concentrated to a specific empirical case, that of Afghanistan. It comes with the risk therefore that an equation mark will be placed between comprehensive approach and ISAF strategy. For the individual member state, for example Norway, the PRT function could hence be interpreted as a specific and local adaptation of the general comprehensive approach rather than of the specific ISAF strategy. Our aim is to problematise the general comprehensive approach concept, thereby improving our knowledge of the use of grand strategic tools in general. However, this does not mean that we will shy away from using specific examples, from, for instance, Afghanistan.⁹

8 See, for example, B. Buzan, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987); S. Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War" in *The Use of Force – Military Power and International Politics*, eds. R. J. Art and K. N. Waltz, 5th ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999); C. S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); E. N. Luttwak, *Strategy – The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987); and B. R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).

9 See, for example, E. B. Eide, A. T. Kaspersen, R. Kent and K. von Hippel, *Report on Integrated Missions – Practical Perspectives and Recommendations* (Oslo: NUPI, 2005); T. M. Flatemo, *Norsk konseptutvikling i Provincial Reconstruction Team Meymahne* [Norwegian concept development in Provincial Reconstruction Team Meymahne] (Oslo: Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College, 2008); K. Friis and P. Jarmyr, eds., *Comprehensive Approach – Challenges and opportunities in complex crises management*, NUPI Report, no. 11 (Oslo: NUPI, 2008); and P. V. Jacobsen, *NATO's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations – A Work in Slow Progress*, DIIS report (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2008), p. 15.

Defining the international conceptual frames

According to the definition used in this project the comprehensive approach entails the multilateral coordination of the three governmental instruments of power, i.e. diplomatic (*D*), military (*M*) and economic (*E*), in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the international organisation.¹⁰

We shall be focusing solely on the military instrument. To be able fully to appreciate how small states can provide military resources to international organisations, we need a broader contextual background. The discussion will therefore touch upon the other instruments as well.

The variables – national strategic options

We aim in this project to critically explore two grand strategic options and their consequences for the Norwegian Armed Forces from various vantage points. But for the findings to facilitate overarching conclusions it is a necessity, not an option, to use the same set of variables under each perspective. For the purposes of this project the independent variable, the use of military power, has two defined outcomes: the *holism* and the *atomism*.



Figure 1.1: The dichotomy; The strategic choice between an atomistic or a holistic approach in providing military resources to multilateral crisis management abroad.

The outcomes are theoretically constructed and inspired by Danish and Canadian empirical examples. The critical difference between the contemporary Danish approach and the former Canadian approach seems to be the national framework under which the national military units participate in international

10 See UK Ministry of Defence, *The Comprehensive Approach*, Joint Discussion Note 4/05 (Shrivenham: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2006).




Figure 1.2: In contributing militarily to a multilateral comprehensive approach, one option is to provide military (M) resources separately from the other national instruments, i.e. diplomatic (D) and economic (E), which could also be provided. The other option is to send a nationally coordinated package of diplomatic, military and economic (D+M+E) resources. The question is how each of these options impacts on the armed forces.

operations.¹¹ Under the former the military instrument of power is coordinated with the other instruments at the disposal of the providing state, i.e. diplomatic and economic (M+D+E). In the further discussion this will be defined as the holistic approach. Under the latter approach the comprehensiveness of combin-

11 On Denmark, see for instance the Danish Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defence, “Samtænkning af civil og militær indsats i internationale operationer” [Coordinating civilian and military contributions to international operations] (Forsvarsministeriet [online 19 Mar 2009]); and K. Fischer and J. T. Christensen, “Improving civil-military cooperation the Danish way”, *NATO Review*, summer (2005). On Canada, see J. H. Vance, “Tactics Without Strategy or Why the Canadian Forces Do Not Campaign”, in *Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives Context and Concepts*, eds. A. English, D. Gosselin, H. Coombs and L. M. Hickey (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005); and W. G. Cummings, *Operational Design Doctrine: Hamstrung or Footloose in the Contemporary Operating Environment?* (Master’s thesis, Canadian Forces College, 2007).

ing the different instruments is orchestrated at the multinational level, and the contribution of the small state will in this case be uncoordinated at the national level. In the further discussion this will be defined as an atomistic approach. Since the aim of this project is to establish how a small state can use its military instrument, the focus will be on the military (*M*) contribution. This approach does not imply that the overall contribution needs to be solely military. Diplomatic and/or economic resources might be provided as well. But since the three governmental instruments under this approach are uncoordinated at the national level, and since the focus of this project is on how the military resources can be provided, the non-military instruments will not be further discussed.

We are well aware that the political reality is much more nuanced than the theoretical dichotomy illustrated in figure 1.1. However, the dichotomy is an analytical tool to facilitate our exploration of the grand strategic options at the national level.

The key question is *how* the two approaches to the use of military power impact on the Norwegian Armed Forces. We employ a set of different perspectives to explore a broad range of aspects relating to the underlying question.

Expressed in terms of causality, *how to provide* is the independent variable and *Armed Forces* the dependent. The outcomes on the independent variable are defined as holistic or atomistic. The specific outcomes on the dependent variable will be defined within the scope of each perspective.

The following section focuses on the problems surrounding the selection of relevant perspectives when exploring the Norwegian context. Although we aim to establish the impact of the two national strategic options, there will most likely be no clear answers as to which of them a small state should pursue. On the contrary, because we apply different analytical perspectives to the strategic choice, the outcomes will most likely be given in terms of pros and cons associated with each.

The selection of perspectives

We believe that we can gain a better understanding of the comprehensive approach if we use more than one scientific perspective to problematise its practical implementation. This of course raises other questions, such as which perspectives are best suited to increase our awareness/understanding.

Traditionally, it is fair to say that the historical, the political-scientific and the military-theoretical perspectives are established within strategic studies. A

quick glance at the areas of competence found within the security policy and strategic departments at various national defence universities would probably confirm this statement.

In addition, the conflicts that emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War have grown increasingly complex and are characterised by a broadening set of challenges requiring new approaches. In our view, the ability of the individual member states as well as international organisations to deal effectively with these new wars depends in part on their ability to take a wider view of the new challenges and of the possible ways of addressing them. This entails heightened focus on the role of the media in the conflicts of our time. To this we have added Norway's self-image as a major humanitarian power, and an ambition to include more normative perspectives.¹² Disciplines such as ethics, law and gender seem appropriate considering both the complexity of modern crisis management and the Norwegian context. It does not, however, mean that all of these perspectives would be the best suited from a general point of view, but as this project focuses on the specific Norwegian context we consider them appropriate to this particular study.

Furthermore, the British, Canadian and Danish cases have also helped us select perspectives.¹³ Based upon those lessons, we found it fruitful to explore the Norwegian context under

- a historical perspective in chapter two
- a political science perspective in chapter three
- a military-theoretical perspective in chapter four
- a legal perspective in chapter five
- an ethical perspective in chapter six
- an media perspective in chapter seven
- a gender perspective in chapter eight.

12 See, for example, H. Edström, N. T. Lunde and J. H. Matlary, eds., *Krigerkultur i en fredsnasjon* [Warrior culture in a peace-fearing nation] (Oslo: Abstrakt, 2009).

13 For the British experience, see for example the UK Delegation to NATO, "Comprehensive Approach Workshop, Brussels, 8 March 2007" [online 18 Mar 2009]. For Canada, see Department of National Defence, "Defence Policy White Paper", 1994 (National Defence and the Canadian Forces [online 19 Mar 2009]). For Denmark, see for example the keynote speech by Søren Gade, Danish Minister of Defence, at a NATO seminar on civil and military activities in international operations, Copenhagen, 20 June 2005, "Transforming NATO – A Political and Military Challenge" (NATO [online 19 Mar 2009]).

Methodological considerations

In this study we consider several aspects of validity. One is the use of the same concept and terminology by several authors. Since each contribution belongs to a different academic discipline, definitions are likely to vary from chapter to chapter. The lack of a definitive definition of comprehensive approach increases the difficulties. We are aware of the problem, but find the different perspective approach too rewarding to let it be a decisive objection. Having said that, the authors have strived to use the key concepts more or less consistently, i.e. comprehensive, atomistic and holistic approach. Also, there is no homogenous causality between the independent and dependent variables. Under the each of the perspectives the direction of causality goes from “the use of military power”, i.e. atomistic or holistic options, to “Norwegian Armed Forces”. In the further discussion, however, we also look at the effect of going in the opposite direction. Plausible alternative explanations for observed co-variation between the independent and dependent variables have not been excluded. Hence changes to the dependent variable, i.e. the Norwegian Armed Forces, may be attributed to the additional variables, and not just to variations in the atomistic or holistic approach. Given the aim of this study, however, we do not believe these aspects of validity to influence our efforts to illuminate the grand strategic options at the national level.

Nor should the points raised in this discussion about validity necessarily affect the reliability of the study. Reliability is about the likelihood of reaching the same, or at least similar, results upon a repetition of the research process. This applies even if the process is repeated by different researchers.

As we do not fully explore the impact of the chosen approaches on the Norwegian Armed Forces, we have not explicitly considered possible alternative outcomes. Nor do we detail how each perspective de facto operationalises the dependent variable because the very purpose of this project is to present different grand strategic options for small states in situations where the decision makers might not believe that there are alternatives at hand. How the dependent variable can and should be operationalised is consequently of secondary interest, at least within the scope of this study.

Finally, we have not asked the various authors to weigh the pros and cons of the two defined outcomes of the independent variable. The perspectives will therefore not produce clear and unambiguous answers. In lieu of this, the results from the studies under the different perspectives will be given on scale. As this scale does not have defined intervals between the two outcomes of the dichotomy, it would be overly ambitious to state that we have taken inter-subjectivity into full consideration. On the other hand, this could have been addressed by conducting a more detailed analysis and, for example, weighting the influence of the different aspects. The reason for not doing so must again be seen in connec-

tion with the purpose of the study, to illuminate the matter at hand and increase awareness of the possible options. This, in our opinion, can be done despite the identified shortcomings in respect of reliability.

The findings

When Norway deliberates whether to adopt a holistic or atomistic approach there are several aspects decision makers will have to take into account. This project takes only a few initial steps towards illuminating the two grand strategic options at hand. We are well aware that several other theoretical perspectives could have been used, some of which might have been even more fruitful when analysing the strategic choice. Nevertheless, we do claim some interesting findings.

Within each of the seven perspectives, we have found arguments for and against both options. Our main conclusion is that decision makers have to realise that even if they are unwilling to use a policy-oriented top-down approach to the problem, sooner or later they will face an experienced-based bottom-up approach that might force them to pursue suboptimal, or even unfavourable, solutions.

NORWAY AND THE ATOMISTIC APPROACH

Historically, the atomistic approach, adopted in good faith, seems to be the most recommendable for smaller nations such as Norway. There are two critical conditions, however: national interests should overlap as little as possible; and there should be an effective supranational body working to forge common policy into strategy.

The political science perspective also favours the atomistic approach. With its point of departure in the phenomenon of national interests, the perspective concludes that since the atomistic approach implies no need for a full spectrum of military capabilities, and since a more niche-oriented structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces might be a necessity if the national interests truly are the objectives of national security policy, this option seems most favourable. It also allows Norway to trade full-spectrum operational capabilities and quantity for highly available rapid reaction units combined with increased quality at the tactical level. With such a structure for its military forces, Norway might be able concurrently to provide armed resources for the protection of its regional interests in Northern Europe, and for the promotion of its interests in a global context, hereby gaining as much influence as possible in the UN, NATO and the EU at the strategic level.

The third perspective that favours the atomistic approach is the ethical. The conclusions cannot, however, be deduced from theory alone, but require a

correlation between theoretical and empirical findings; between norms in generality and specific context; and between the different levels ranging from political strategy, to military strategy and operations and tactics. Under the logic of the just war tradition and defence of impartiality and relativism, the atomistic approach, despite its disadvantages, might from an ethical perspective be preferred. The choice is, however, not made solely on the merits of the option itself, but because ethical problems are more difficult than under the other option.

NORWAY AND THE HOLISTIC APPROACH

From the perspective of military theory, the holistic approach would be the option of choice. There are at least two arguments in favour of this approach. First, it might be necessary to bring together the different means at the state's disposal in order to achieve an overall national strategic end. Second, it might need robust tactical military forces, together with other national resources on the battlefield, to influence the planning and the conduct of operations at the theatre level. (Note that there is a difference between the strategic influence, discussed in terms of political science, and the operational influence discussed under the military theory perspective).

The legal perspective also points to the advantages of the holistic approach: a nationally coordinated provision of forces is considered to work better at creating legal coherence. The legal perspective argues that this might be even more important when the operation requires substantial law enforcement support. Another important argument in favour of the holistic approach is the avoidance of critical national dissent on legal conceptions during, for example, detention and riot control operations, in addition to self-defence operations. A third argument relates to the establishment of critical standards for the rule of law. The procedures for division of power and the principles of command between civilian elements and the armed forces are hence considered to profit from being synchronised nationally under the holistic approach.

The third perspective to favour the holistic approach is media. The most important argument is that holism gives the commander an opportunity to address his media operations priorities and tell "the most compelling story". The holistic approach is also considered better suited to the coordinating of efforts using the three levers of power within a national context, making cooperation and coordination easier and resulting in a higher degree of comprehensiveness, at least within the context of the contributing state. Another aspect in favour of this option is its ability to impact on the coverage by the media, and hence the resulting public perception of the contribution, both nationally in Norway and locally in the theatre of operations.

The fourth and last theoretical perspective to prefer a holistic approach to the national contribution is gender. However, it should be noted that the conclusions are tentative, and remain uncertain as to which of the two options, atomism or holism, is currently best suited to ensure the adequate inclusion of gender considerations in a Norwegian contribution. Furthermore, for this perspective to be of value, it relies on an assumption that the overarching multinational comprehensive approach also favours a gendered approach. Gender awareness is known to diminish the risk of unintended negative consequences of an operation, so enhance efforts to improve missions and to ensure the success of the total operation. A holistic approach would probably in any case be both desirable and beneficial for all involved; the local population in the area of operations, NATO and Norway. Also note that Norway has been pursuing gender equality at home for many years, and has a declared policy of promoting gender equality globally. Norway should therefore be in an excellent position to contribute to the conceptual development of the Alliance with regard to gender issues.

THE NORWEGIAN DILEMMA

In quoting Winston Churchill, “the only thing worse than allies is not having allies”, the historical chapter points to the nucleus of the dilemma facing a small state such as Norway. The simplest way of avoiding disagreement between coalition partners might be not to talk about the problems at all. The “mutual agreement of avoidance” will, however, sooner or later have to face up to the realities of the battle ground. In the era of information technology, the media will probably make this sooner rather than later.

The art of ambiguity is, as we have seen, to find the right balance between domestic political agendas in Norway on the one hand, and the needs of the Norwegian military on the other. Deliberately pretending to commit something that you neither can nor will deliver ought not to be part of policy. It is the surest way to cause friction in coalition operations and, what is worse, could lead to the dissolution of the Clausewitzian trinity: the people, the government and the army with its commander.

Tentative conclusions

The crucial challenge facing Norwegian policy is how to develop the national grand strategic concept. This is related to the first of the two questions we asked earlier: How do the new multilateral concepts such as the comprehensive approach affect the grand strategic thinking of small states? The tentative steps taken so far by some of the ministries, we argue, are simply not enough. First, they do not appear to be integrated with a top-down approach, and fail therefore to provide the conceptual guidance needed at lower levels. Second, they are not

interdepartmental; each of them focuses solely on a particular grand strategic instrument. They fail therefore to provide instructions on how to coordinate the national effort. Another tentative conclusion related to the first question is that the vocabulary of an interest-oriented security policy seems to go hand in hand with the logic of realism. When policymakers start thinking and speaking in terms of *national interests*, the traditional logic of idealism will be undermined. The gap between the old and new logic and rhetoric might, in worst case, lead to a grand strategic vacuum.

This project has, however, focused on the second question: Which alternative strategies have small states developed for the use of the military instrument? Our findings offer no clear arguments as to which one of the two strategic options is preferable for a small state like Norway. As illustrated in figure 1.3 below, none of the seven perspectives offers a clear recommendation. There are *pros* and *cons* under every single perspective. The results, therefore, are not concentrated at a single point on the scale, but rather are scattered across a wider range. Despite these provisos, both the people and the armed forces expect their government to provide leadership from the top and based on policy. Decision making without full insight into the problem is not a new phenomenon. This study has, however, provided some insights into the dilemmas facing policy and decision makers.




Figure 1.3: The dilemma of the policy and decision makers: Different recommendations from adherents of different perspectives.

The absence of an explicit policy could itself, however, indicate a choice. Without direction stemming from a clear policy, experience gained from the area of operations might be the only guidance available to field commanders. This might be the intention of the decision makers, i.e. to adopt a bottom-up approach to the challenges. There might, however, be other explanations. The politicians might, for example, be shying away (neglecting is a too strong a word) from their obligations to provide the necessary guidance.

The aim of this project is to delineate two grand strategic options (i.e. holism and atomism) that are available for Norway in the provision of military resources to multinational crisis management, and the consequences either could have on the Norwegian Armed Forces. By employing a set of different perspectives, we explore a broad range of issues and arguments.

An atomistic approach, ridden with caveats, is presumably the order of the day. National military resources are contributed in order to create an image of the contributing state as an active Alliance partner, but without jeopardising the domestic political agenda unnecessarily. The other strategic option at hand for a contributing state, i.e. a holistic approach, would also seem to benefit the member state. The question is whether these advantages can outweigh the problems created by both of the approaches for the coalition as a whole.

In spite of this difficult situation for policy making, the decision makers have to decide whether to use a top-down policy based approach to the challenges or not. If they opt for an experience based bottom-up approach, they may have to face an even less favourable situation in the future, at least from their point of view.

On the other hand, if the overriding multilateral concept does not provide clear-cut definitions, and the general national grand strategic policy is not explicitly expressed, there might be no other option than to use a bottom-up approach. Consequently, the development of national strategies on the use of the military instrument might currently be conducted in quite different circumstances than during the Cold War era. To clarify the grand strategic options open to Norway and other small states when committing national military strategies is hence an important task.

Approaching comprehensiveness is not, as we will see, an easy operation.

THE NOBLE ART OF CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY

Harald Høiback

Introduction

The most quoted tenet in the Western world concerning war and peace, is probably Carl von Clausewitz's: "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means."¹ This was a late discovery by Clausewitz, and scholars still discuss how significant it really was for the final draft of *Vom Kriege*. Despite the fact that the slogan is rather worn out among strategists, it is remarkably often misunderstood.

John Keegan, for instance, claimed that "[w]ar is not the continuation of policy by other means. The world would be a simpler place to understand if this dictum of Clausewitz's were true."² However, the dictum was never intended to be true. What Clausewitz wanted to say was that war *ought* to be a continuation of policy, not that it always was. The aim of the war should be political in nature, and the waging of it should proceed along political lines.³ He knew perfectly well that many wars had been fought outside the bounds of policy.⁴ Clausewitz's point was that such behaviour was irresponsible and not in accordance with *raison d'état*.

In English, the word "politics" has connotations other than "policy".⁵ For instance, when George W. Bush opened his first speech after having finally been recognised as the next president of the United States, he said, "After a difficult election we must put politics behind us."⁶ The president elect's phrasing would sound strange if one were not aware of the difference between policy and politics.

Politics is usually connected to sectional interests and backbiting, while policy is a strategy for reaching common goals: "[P]olitics is a multilateral phe-

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- 1 C. von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and transl. by M. Howard and P. Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), book 1, chapter 1, p. 87.
 - 2 J. Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (London: Hutchinson, 1993), p. 3.
 - 3 "The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace." Clausewitz, *On War*, book 8, chapter 6b, p. 605.
 - 4 *Ibid.*, book 3, chapter 18, p. 222.
 - 5 The difference of meaning between *policy* and *politics* is more distinct in the English translations of *Vom Kriege* than in Clausewitz's own language.
 - 6 G. W. Bush, "Address in Austin accepting election as the 43rd President of the United States", Austin, 13 December 2000 (The American Presidency Project [online 30 Apr 2009]).

nomenon, whereas policy is the unilateral subcomponent thereof. My ally, myself, and my enemy are all bound up together in politics, but we each have our own policies.”⁷

If war ought to be the continuation of policy, and not politics, by other means, two questions arise: *whose* policy should war be a continuation of, and *how* can cerebral policy be transformed into physical military action? In other words: How is politics to be transformed into policy, and then into action? The questions are generic; they pop up regardless of who actually wages the war.

The question of whether a state should use a holistic approach in its co-operation with other states, i.e. whether it should unilaterally coordinate its military contribution with other of its governmental contributions, or go for the atomistic approach, where the orchestration of the different instruments is done at the multinational level, is evidently also a question of *whose* policy should be carried through, i.e. how and where the policy should be carved out, and *how* that policy should be made militarily executable.

This chapter presents a rather broad historical perspective on these questions with the aim of adding some counterweight to the often ephemeral headlines of current debate. First we will have a look at a procedure called “method of avoidance”. To air one’s sincere opinion is a rare luxury in coalition operations. Then we will look at some of the oldest stunts in the circus, namely double dealing and balancing of hats. This takes us to two minor cases, before we round off with a brief comment on the freebooting do-gooders. In other words, many of the evergreens of the scholarly treatment of the pros and cons of coalition warfare will not be treated here.

It is to be hoped that this panoramic outlook will add some depth to the more topical issues discussed in later chapters. In order to get the message across I have also peeled off some of the academic qualifications and caveats one would normally expect to find in such a text.

Whose policy?

Clausewitz’s concern was not the relationship between politicians and officers, but between policy and war. Clausewitz, qua officer, had himself explicitly defied the orders of the Prussian king when he thought he had a better policy for Prussia than the former and his ministers, and defected to Russia in 1812.⁸ Nor

7 C. Bassford, “Primacy of Policy and Trinity in Clausewitz’s Thought” in *Clausewitz in the Twenty-first Century*, H. Strachan and A. Herberg-Rothe (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 85.

8 P. Paret, *Clausewitz and the state, the man, his theories, and his times* (Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 218.

is there reason to think that Clausewitz would have found it strange that among his 112 contemporaries who signed the Norwegian constitution in May 1814, 33 were members of the armed forces. Just as little as the *Militär-Reorganisationskommission*, which he joined in 1808, restricted itself to military matters only.⁹ Hence, that war is the continuation of policy by other means implies much more than just granting the politicians the prerogative to rule generals. Policy is not simply about *who* says what, but about the consistency of measures taken.

The ability to reach consensus, to get from politics to policy, is an enduring challenge in all types of social relations, including the military. During the Great War for instance, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Robertson, tried to establish a single authoritative channel where “all opinions, from whatever source they might emanate should be tested and criticised in relation to other plans and proposals”.¹⁰ The General Staff should be the furnace in which competing politics were forged into coherent policy. The Imperial General Staff should be the only source of military advice to the government, and the *supreme staff authority* over forces in the field. Robertson’s system never worked according to plan. The politicians had insufficient confidence in their generals to leave priority setting to them, and the generals did not trust their own chief enough to let him do all the talking to the politicians. Hence, even purely unilaterally, the British forces were ridden by politics.

An important precondition for getting from politics to policy in any area of life is a mutual willingness to avoid pushing controversial questions too far. The philosopher John Rawls’s ideas about “Justice as Fairness” give us a broad view on this *method of avoidance*:

[W]e try, so far as we can, to avoid disputed philosophical, as well as disputed moral and religious, questions. We do this not because these questions are unimportant or regarded with indifference, but because we think them too important and recognise that there is no way to resolve them politically. The only alternative to a principle of toleration is the autocratic use of state power. Thus, justice as fairness deliberately stays on the surface, philosophically speaking. ... The hope is that, by this method of avoidance, as we might call it, existing differ-

9 Gerhard Förster describes the commission’s basic idea or *Grundgedanke*: “Ohne veränderte gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse keine wirksame militärische Reform” [No effective military reform without societal change] *Carl von Clausewitz, Lebensbild eines patriotischen Militärs und fortschrittlichen Militärtheoretikers* [The life of a patriotic soldier and progressive military theorist] (Berlin: Militärverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989), p. 18.

10 H. Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 145.

ences between contending political views can at least be moderated, even if not entirely removed, so that social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect can be maintained.¹¹

It is an inherent feature of coalitions that they cannot resolve their disputed questions by “autocratic use of state power”, unless they are alliances bordering on imperialism or a master-vassal relationship. That separates coalition warfare from unilateral warfare. As a rule then, coalitions are forced to reach consensus by toleration, or are doomed to founder. The “method of avoidance” is therefore a supreme military skill in coalition warfare, but one rarely appreciated. Indeed, one of the generals from the Great War learned the hard way how difficult coalition warfare actually was: “Since I have seen Alliances at work, I have lost something of my admiration for Napoleon.”¹²

In all organisations there is a pendulum swinging between doing politics and doing policy and, almost like a law of nature, external pressure will enhance cohesion while its absence will give a smaller scope for self-interest greater leverage. As long as Napoleon, *Der Kaiser* or Hitler posed a deadly threat, very odd coalitions found it in them to forge a common policy, but as soon as the guns of the enemy fell silent, the pendulum swung towards greater particularism and more politics. The prototype of all later alliances, the Grand Alliance of 1813–15, was deeply dependent on pressure from without to maintain cohesion within.¹³

The same logic governs the relationship between the services of a single nation as well. The US services worked best together, according to Winnefeld and Johnson, when there was a certain chance of losing, as for instance in the air war against Japan in World War II: “Never before and rarely since has there been the same degree of cooperation, coordination, and willingness to put service interests aside in prosecuting an air campaign.”¹⁴ But as soon as the danger of losing the turf war over budgets is greater than the immediate danger of losing the real

11 J. Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 14, no. 3 (1985): 230–1.

12 General Maurice Sarrail to Clemenceau in 1918, quoted in *Coalition Warfare: An Uneasy Accord*, K. Neilson and R. Prete (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1998), p. vii.

13 “The pressure exerted by the mere knowledge that Bonaparte was still at large, reinforced as it was by his sudden and dreadful appearances, was enough to hold the alliance together in moments of crisis and eventually to persuade it to consolidate its resources in such a way that victory became impossible.” G. A. Craig, *Problems of Coalition Warfare: the Military Alliance Against Napoleon, 1813–1814* (Colorado: United States Air Force Academy, 1965), p. 21. (Just for the record: It was Napoleon’s victory that became impossible.)

14 J. A. Winnefeld and D. J. Johnson, *Joint Air Operations, Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942–1991* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 34.

war, willingness to sacrifice own ends to the greater good rapidly disintegrates. Sometimes it is not even clear whether foreign enemies or sister services pose the greatest threat. John Lehman, for instance, warned against fraternising too cordially with countrymen in the wrong uniform: “The current defense ideology of ‘jointness’ hobbles our military effectiveness terribly, and in the event of a major war with the Soviet Union could well lead to defeat.”¹⁵

To sum up so far. If much is at stake and if overall consistency in measures is important, then the atomistic approach seems reasonable. The method of avoidance also works best when there are important questions at stake. If real danger looms one is often willing to overlook serious flaws in one’s partner, as Churchill for instance did, comparing Stalin and the devil: “If Hitler invaded Hell I would make at least a favourable reference to the devil in the House of Commons.” That is particularly the case for small partners in big coalitions.

If the stakes are lower, however, and if the outcome of the conflict is not vital to the state’s own survival, the holistic approach seems more realistic, i.e. the participating nations’ will to coordinate their military contributions with others of its governmental contributions is significantly greater.

Even in Clausewitz’s era states cooperated, but it was always with ulterior motives, and everybody knew it. The risk with the holistic approach is thus that it can rather imperceptibly degenerate into the continuation of politics by other means, in the sense that if all participating nations make up their policy before they leave home, the result will be politics in the coalition, not policy.

If there is virtually nothing at all at stake for the participating states, the atomistic approach seems to reappear again, but this time the contributions more often than not come loaded with caveats.

Ideally, a coalition commander would like to have no national strings attached to the contributed units, but in themselves caveats are not insurmountable obstacles for coalition commanders as long as they are honestly communicated. If a nation contributes a knife so to speak, with the caveat that it should only be used to cut, the commander has no reason to complain if he’s shown the red card for using it to hammer in nails. However, if he’s gets a red card, or rather an informal red card, a so-called “pink card”, when he uses it to cut, frustration is bound to erupt. In other words: predictable and declared caveats, restrictions and preconditions are much to be preferred to hidden and undeclared caveats that pop up apparently at random in the heat of operations. Hence, caveats can be given in both good and bad faith. Given in good faith the contributing

15 Secretary of the Navy John Lehman (1988) quoted in K. Allard, *Command, Control, and the Common Defense* (Washington: National Defense University, 1996), p. 305.

nation announces its caveats clearly to the commander. Given in bad faith, the contributing nation apparently comes with few caveats, but has many hidden up its sleeve.

Caveats given in bad faith can cause enormous friction if they come as an unwelcome surprise to the commander. Sometimes nations only donate some tightly controlled assets to serve as military “hangarounds” in order to be seen in the right places with the right people, without any real political intention of making a tangible difference in the theatre. Moreover, if you suspect the receptacle into which you deposit your contribution to be “beset by suspicion, antagonism and double-dealing”,¹⁶ then all you’re likely to put in it will probably be garbage, in the sense that the assets you provide cannot be used by the coalition commander in any militarily meaningful way. In other words, under an atomistic approach, with good faith and with few caveats, the national control of contributed military assets can sink to virtually zero per cent, as indeed was the case with certain Norwegian assets during World War II. An atomistic approach with many caveats, or a contribution given in bad faith, however, can mean that national control over the contributed assets can border on 100 per cent, as is arguably the case for German assets in Afghanistan.¹⁷

So far we have elaborated on the struggle of progressing from politics to policy, but regardless of whether the coalition’s deliberations actually end in politics or policy, words have eventually to be turned into actions if the considerations are to have any practical consequences at all.

From words to action

In all wars governments have, according to Richard Betts, their primary focus on political concerns, while the generals have theirs on the fighting. “To para-

16 W. Philpott, “Haig and Britain’s European Allies” in *Haig a Reappraisal*, Bond and Cave (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1999), p. 129.

17 This comparison is problematic for several reasons. First of all Norway had only a skeleton left of their government during the World War II, and their ability to concert was correspondingly small. Furthermore, the German intentions and conduct in Afghanistan are still a hotly debated issue. It would not, however, be amiss to conclude that “politically, Berlin finds itself in a mess over Afghanistan” and that in Germany the “consensus on a comprehensive approach does not extend beyond rhetoric”. T. Noetzel and B. Schreer, “Counter-what? Germany and Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan”, *RUSI Journal*, vol. 153, no. 1 (2008): 45. That said however, on “the ground” the picture of German troops as the odd man out is perhaps not that justified after all: “The existing literature on the differences between the British and the German way of conduct in Northern Afghanistan has been found to be somewhat stereotyped and exaggerated.” K. Larsdotter, “Exploring the utility of armed forces in peace operations: German and British approaches in northern Afghanistan”, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, vol. 19, no. 3 (2008): 366.

phrase Clausewitz, the *purpose* of war is to serve policy, but the *nature* of war is to serve itself.”¹⁸ Quite often, the political and the military concerns pull in different directions.

How then can military operations be the continuation of political purpose and not of war’s own nature? Here we will focus on two generic challenges in this realm which influence all types of coalitions and alliances. The first is related to the method of avoidance, as touched upon above. Instead of accepting the burden of an open confrontation, a participant nation can restrict its military contribution by other means, especially through the choking of supplies. Let us call it “control by double dealing”. The second challenge is connected to a conventional mechanism used to safeguard national interest in an alliance, so called “dual hatting”.

In principle, a coalition’s *Force Commander* can be given command over huge forces, though without any real chance of using them. His political masters may say “go ahead” from their aerie, but “no way” with their purse, caveats and rules of engagement. According to General Wesley Clark this double dealing is part of an ancient ritual:

This back-and-forth with the Secretary of Defense [is] part of one of the oldest political games in Washington, one that is routinely played by generals and their civilian politician bosses supporting the commander in wartime. The political leaders want to appear to defer to the military – “We’re giving the generals everything they’re asking for” – but privately, the political leaders often limit these requests. If the action works out, both the generals and the political leaders get the credit. If the action fails, bad generalship must be to blame – “We gave him everything he asked for, and it failed ...”¹⁹

The relationship between generals and the politicians can thus be less than congenial, even in a purely national context. A favourite in this regard is General McClelland’s rather unflattering portrayal of the Secretary of War during the American Civil War:

I think that he is the most unmitigated scoundrel I ever knew, heard or read of; I think that ... had he lived in the time of the Saviour, Judas Iscariot would have remained a respected member of the fraternity of the Apostles & that the mag-

18 R. K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 2 (2000): 37.

19 W. K. Clark, *A Time to Lead, or Duty, Honor and Country* (New York: Palgrave, 2007), p. 216.

nificent treachery & rascality of E.M. Stanton would have caused Judas to have raised his arms in holy horror & unaffected wonder.²⁰

In coalitions, double dealing is of course the order of the day. Hence it was no problem for the Norwegian government to claim that “Norway has transferred full operational control over KFOR to COMKFOR, which is of benefit to NATO. Many nations only grant restricted control, which restricts COMKFOR’s freedom of action and increases the need for personnel.”²¹ This sounds nice, but operational control does not include control of logistics. Hence, in order to judge a commander’s freedom of action you have to know how many resources he can actually pull. You have to know both the overt and covert caveats attached to the command authority. It may sound impressive to hear a father bragging about letting his teenage son borrow his new Mercedes as often as he likes, but not so impressive if the tank is always empty. To agree on an operation does not mean the money will follow. To rewrite an old military saying, “Any damned fool can agree on a plan, but it all depends on the willingness to let the logistics loose.” To encapsulate: On the surface it may look very altruistic to go for an atomistic approach, but if every contribution is equipped with fishhooks and roadblocks the real outcome will be meagre.

The second point of interest here is so-called “dual hatting”, where a commander sits in two different chains of command, one national and one multinational. An especially interesting debate about dual hatting erupted after the American disaster in Somalia in 1993.

According to the American constitution, “The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”.²² In May 1994 President Clinton elaborated upon its implications:

No President has ever relinquished command over U.S. forces. ... The sole source of legitimacy for U.S. commanders originates from the U.S. Constitution, federal law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice and flows from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field. The chain of command from the President to the lowest U.S. commander in the field remains inviolate.²³

20 Quoted in D. K. Goodwin, *Team of Rivals* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 447.

21 Norwegian Ministry of Defence: *Controllerrapport 4/00*, (Oslo: Regjeringen, 2000), p. 13.

22 US Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2.

23 U.S. Department of State, “Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Operations”, PDD25, *Presidential Decision Directive 25*, February 1994.

Hence, to be the commander in chief is not only a prerogative of the president, but a duty. It would thus be a violation of the constitution to relinquish command to anyone other than those in the American chain of command.

America's dominance in world politics makes it difficult to compare directly with other nations, but Clinton's arguments are valid for others as well. Obviously, if all participating nations in a coalition argue along his lines, it is hard to see how military command can be enjoyed in a coalition at all. So even Clinton had to accept that it sometimes could be very beneficial to cooperate.²⁴ Consequently, the president was willing to give a non-American commander limited command over American troops, but added a certain caveat: "The U.S. reserves the right to terminate participation at any time and to take whatever actions it deems necessary to protect U.S. forces if they are endangered."²⁵ This seems like a prudent precaution for a platoon of boy scouts, but in a military setting it sounds like a joke.

Danger is inseparable from war, and if the US threatens to pull out their endangered troops under foreign command, there will be few teeth left in the Force Commanders' command. This is especially so given the aversion to risk in modern military operations. Even in a purely national context the tension between *force protection* and *force projection* has caused serious concerns:

It is precisely the individual right to life itself that is causing so much anguish among high-ranking officers in the US Army [which] has allowed its soldiers to think that their mission is not to get hurt. Excessive force protection is eroding the warrior's honour.²⁶

The US is by no means the only nation to reserve the right to "take whatever actions it deems necessary", which makes working conditions rather awkward for a military commander. Nevertheless, Clinton assures us, "There is no intention to use these conditions to subvert the operational chain of command. Unity of command remains a vital concern."²⁷ What a relief.

Even the UN opts for an unambiguous chain of command in their operations and sees "red-carding", aka "the right to terminate participation", as a considerable problem, "It is essential that the chain of command in an operation

24 "It is sometimes prudent or advantageous to place U.S. forces under the *operational control* of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives." U.S. Department of State, PDD 25, art. V.

25 Ibid.

26 C. Coker, *Humane Warfare* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 108.

27 U.S. Department of State, PDD 25, art. V.

be understood and respected, and the onus is on national capitals to refrain from instructing their contingent commanders on operational matters.”²⁸ One of the UN’s attempted remedies in this regard was to define a new kind of authority: *operational authority*. Important members, such as for instance the US, and Norway for that matter, are not willing to transfer *operational command* to the UN, but the UN was not satisfied with mere *operational controls* Clinton was willing to grant. Hence, they invented a new term which means almost the same as *operational command*, but which is sufficiently vague to be accepted.

Nevertheless, it seems more reasonable to learn to live with the problem, than to give in to wishful thinking:

Unity of Command in a multinational force is virtually impossible. Neither the US nor any other power is likely to allow their forces to join a multinational peace operation and cut their ties to the national command structure and political agenda. The experience in Somalia, where national groups maintained dual chains of command and multiple agendas predominated, is mirrored by the independence of French behaviour in Rwanda and the need for separate command arrangements for Arab forces in the Desert Storm coalition. Most authors now call for a conscious effort to achieve “Unity of Purpose” in peace operations. Even this is a very real challenge and depends as much or more on diplomatic relationships as on military ones. Moreover, even the military relationships must be more consultative than directive-driven.²⁹

An organisation that encompasses all nations and all interests has to practice constructive ambiguity to the extreme. In order for the UN’s peace operations to be the continuation of policy by other means, or even aspire to that condition, the method of avoidance is mandatory. The members have to allow very diverse interests to be hidden beneath glossy formulations.

To sum up: The art of getting from intention to action can be very difficult in all areas of life, but it is particularly knotty in situations where agendas are poles apart and incalculable risks and later consequences are passed around like pieces of hot charcoal. With regards to the differences between atomistic and holistic approach, the consequences of varying national will to concert its own means can be illustrated by a model.

28 L. Brahimi, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, S/2000/809, United Nations, 21 August 2000, p. 267.

29 D. S. Alberts and R. E. Hayes, *Command Arrangements for Peace Operations* (Washington D.C.: NDU Press Book, 1995) (The Command and Control Research Program [online 30 Apr 2009]).




Figure 2.1: The balance between national orchestration and relative importance

If we compare military assets to small bricks of Lego, national willingness to provide bricks *without* an accompanying assembly plan will peak when there are vital interests at stake, or none at all. In the middle however, where the participating nations are rather eager to make a difference in the theatre, they rarely dispatch Lego bricks without an idea of how to use them.

As always, a model such as the one above has certain simplistic effects that hide important differences. For some states, as for instance Canada, a major war on own soil has never been a realistic scenario in modern times. Hence, since the Constitution Act of 1867, Canada has always been a contributor, never a host nation in a direct military way. For Norway on the other hand, avoiding a major war on its soil has been the *leitmotiv* of Norwegian security policy since 1905, granting some temporary deflections.

In the next section we will take a closer look at two coalition commanders who were caught in the crossfire between politics and policy, and who during the military execution of the political intentions tried to wear several hats simultaneously. The idea is to illustrate how the art of ambiguity and skill of balancing hats remain pertinent elements of coalition warfare, and something it would be futile to try to dream away, as already indicated.

The ballad of Ferdi and Wes

In the spring of 1918 the Alliance finally agreed to subordinate the forces on the Western Front under a single commander, the French general Ferdinand Foch.³⁰ The agreement has become a classic within coalition warfare:

General Foch is charged by the British, French, and American Governments with the co-ordination of the action of the Allied armies on the Western front. To this end all powers necessary to secure effective realisation are conferred upon him. The British, French, and American Governments for this purpose entrust to General Foch the strategic direction of military operations. The Commanders-in-Chief of the British, French, and American armies have full control of the tactical employment of their forces. Each Commander-in-Chief will have the right to appeal to his Government if, in his opinion, the safety of his army is compromised by any order received from General Foch.³¹

First of all, the national commanders were evidently allowed to keep their red cards. To grant the national commanders the “right to appeal to his Government if, in his opinion, the safety of his army is compromised” was obviously a severe impediment on Foch’s authority. Not surprisingly, troops are consistently in danger in war. Hence, it was up to the discretion of each component commander to keep his red card in his pocket, which turned out to be a hard thing to do. Consequently, Foch’s *modus operandi* had in reality to be based on persuasion, not on military command. As we will see below, he was not the last to face this dilemma.

The treaty was also deliberately vague and ambiguous. It was supposed to mean different things to different people. To a military mind, though, the value of constructive ambiguity can be extremely hard to grasp. When the new Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, complained that one “never knows where strategy exactly begins and ends”, Foch replied, “in France one knows it perfectly”.³²

30 This section is mainly based on H. Høiback, *Command and Control in Military Crisis, Devious Decisions* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

31 Co-ordination of Allied Operations on the Western Front. Agreement reached at Beauvais, 3 April 1918. Signed by Mr Lloyd George, Field-Marshal Sir D. Haig, General Sir H. Wilson, M. Clemenceau, General Foch, General Pétain, General Pershing, General Bliss. CAB 23 WC 382, (4 April, 1918). Smaller participating nations on the Western Front were also included in the deal, but had no independent voice in the making of it.

32 B. Liddell Hart, *Foch: Man Of Orleans* (London: Penguin, 1937), p. 307.

Another pertinent question popped up as well. What happened to Foch's French obligations when the Allies bestowed the strategic direction on him? Was Foch still a French general with Georges Clemenceau as his political head, or was he an international Generalissimo with no obligation to any particular nation, except the Allies as such? Inevitably perhaps, Foch immediately started to behave like Pinocchio, free at last from political strings. Sir Douglas Haig, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force, found Foch's posturing disgusting: "Foch is suffering from a swollen head, and thinks himself another Napoleon!"³³ The French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, however, did not let Foch find comfort in that illusion for long, and playing the role of Gеп-petto quickly reined him in again:

"Do you know", the Marshal said to me one day, "that I am not your subordinate?" "No, I don't" I replied with a laugh. "I don't even want to know who put that notion into your head. You know that I am your friend. I strongly advise you not to try to act on this idea, for it would never do."³⁴

But what about the stature of Clemenceau? Did his *de facto* power over the Generalissimo elevate him above the other civilian war leaders of the coalition? Could he for instance bully the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, as a consequence of his power over the Generalissimo? To at least some, including the British ambassador to Paris, it was in fact Clemenceau who suffered from a swollen head, and not his puppet. "What amuses me is Clemenceau's open contempt of our P.M. He evidently thinks he can do what he wants with him."³⁵

To sum up Foch's part of the ballad, even if Foch was solemnly placed on the pinnacle of the coalition's military hierarchy, his *de facto* power rested on his personal abilities to soothe and convince his fellow generals. A wilful and unbending man on horseback was not what the situation called for. He hoped his fellow allies had finally started to supply Lego bricks he could use to fight according to his own plan. What they did, however, was to provide their own assembly plan as well.

Those who think the allied powers' command problems during the Great War were childhood diseases which two generations of NATO membership have

33 R. Blake, ed., *The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914–1919* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1952), p. 337 (27 October 1918).

34 D. S. Newhall, *Clemenceau: A Life at War* (Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), p. 397.

35 Lord Derby to Foreign Secretary Balfour in April 1918. See Blake, *The Private Papers...*, p. 395.

since cured, would be surprised by the political tussling General Wesley Clark had to endure during the war over Kosovo in 1999.

Clark had originally been rather amused by the title he was given in 1997, *Supreme Allied Commander Europe*. What more could a general ask for than being supreme? Wasn't it "a bit over the top?"³⁶ Alas, as events turned out in the Balkans, he was not that supreme after all. Indeed, he had to serve not one, but two masters. As SACEUR he had to relate to the Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, who operated on behalf of the North Atlantic Council. Simultaneously, he had as Commander in Chief, US European Command to relate directly to Pentagon. In addition, some of NATO's senior members also found it extremely difficult to march in step and tried unilaterally to manhandle the general. When Brussels and Washington started pulling him in different directions he evidently felt it: "I was nearing the fork in the road, I sensed, where European and American views were totally divergent."³⁷ Clark was on the horns of a dilemma, but his mission was still to win the war.

As a result of divergent politics of NATO and the entangled command relationship, Clark even felt a *personal* responsibility to save the Kosovars:

As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, I was responsible personally to each of the NATO member nations for the overall accomplishment of the mission. There was no way for me to hand over this responsibility to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or even to the Secretary of Defence. As a U.S. commander, I would have to regard the hesitations of my superiors as implicit orders, but in NATO, I could not always accept them as such. Instead I was bound to continue pushing the strategy until instructed otherwise.³⁸

The politicians' control of Clark was further complicated by the fact that there was consensual disagreement about the aim of the operation and how it should be conducted. The disagreements cut across both national borders and departmental boundaries within nations. In addition came the perpetual inter-service rivalry:

There was much made in the press that this was "war by committee". And it is true that NATO agreement was required in many cases and sometimes was difficult to obtain. But there was also a purely American committee at work. ...

36 Clark, *A Time to Lead*, p. 199.

37 W. K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 352.

38 Ibid, p. 453.

For whatever reason, there appeared to be a far higher degree of “leadership by committee” than existing U.S. legislation requires. In practical terms, this seemed to constrain my ability to act every bit as much as any transatlantic difference ever did.³⁹

Indeed, one of Wesley Clark’s major challenges during the Kosovo operation was to sort out friends from foes *within* the US Administration. On one occasion, Secretary of Defence William S. Cohen told Clark, with a “voice like ice”, “I’ve told you before, you don’t give military advice to Holbrooke.”⁴⁰ Clark’s rather reasonable apology goes like this: “[A]s a regional commander-in-chief I couldn’t very well do my job without sometimes exchanging ideas with other members of the U.S. government travelling in my region.”⁴¹ A holistic approach would be difficult even in more congenial circumstances.

The national capital’s lack of direct control with the general was compensated heavily by a number of caveats connected to each nation’s troops:

NATO commanders’ orders were subject to hour-by-hour scrutiny and possible veto from nations. It was a practice that had apparently originated in U.N. operations, called “red-carding”, where nations just temporarily drew back their forces from certain actions or operations ordered by higher commands. In the operations in Bosnia, we had seen a few cases where nations’ forces simply refused to go along with orders, allegedly based on instructions from home, but usually fed by the subordinates on the scene expressing their concerns. ... In practice almost every nation had special team monitoring its forces, ready to cry foul at the least deviation from the expectations. It was a miracle we had made it as far as this, I thought, without a major blowup.⁴²

As indicated above, in order to maintain cohesion, it is a prerequisite for any alliance that the politicians use vague and fuzzy formulations. Sometimes, even one nation’s unilateral political intentions, if there are any, cannot be expressed in words, because clarity would draw too much attention to differences of opinion. Hence, the North Atlantic Council had to govern Clark by the least common denominator. Even Clark himself philosophised over the fact that as a consequence the plans *had* to be vague: “The operation was enormously complex in practice. Or perhaps the underlying issues that a comprehensive strategy would

39 Ibid, p. 451.

40 Ibid, p. 113.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., p. 399.

have exposed were too difficult.”⁴³ You could always wish for a common policy, but it can be out of reach.

To sum up Clark’s part of the ballad, the political ruling of Clark was tricky. By working for a number of member states Clark was responsible to no particular one. Since nobody could say what they actually meant, Clark enjoyed considerable room to roam, even if he would have liked even more. All the same, he was stuck between a rock and a hard place. He felt a personal responsibility for winning the war, but he had little say over the means he could use to do so. The coalition’s members controlled Clark by controlling the flow of resources rather than by taking issue with the mission itself. A tricky situation became even more intransigent by virtue of the members’ widely different agendas. Manoeuvre warfare, or other operational concepts demanding unambiguous orders, was impossible. Clear intentions are a rare commodity, and perhaps have always been in war. What Clark hoped was that the participating nations at least had an intention to “solve” the problems in the Balkans. Many of the members did not. Their main concern, apparently, was to hang around with the big guys.

To conclude about Ferdi and Wes: At first blush, a lot is apparently accomplished when a coalition finally appoints a supreme commander. Military discipline and zeal can finally kick in and get the mean military machine going straight. Alas, as both Foch and Clark could testify, military life is a bit more complicated. In Foch’s case the Allies virtually stared defeat in the eyes, and knew something radical had to be done to save the war. In Clark’s case, on the other hand, his mother country could in principle have done it all by themselves, but found themselves for several reasons reluctant leaders in front of a rather heterogeneous coalition with often mutually exclusive agendas. On the practical level, however, the difference between Foch and Clark, regarding atomistic and holistic approach, can be illustrated by a model (figure 2.2).

Clark thought he had allies who meant business; he did not. Foch thought he had allies who trusted him to solve the crisis; they did not. Clark hoped to orchestrate a holistic approach, but got only caveat-ridden contributions, often in bad faith. Foch hoped to get caveat-free contributions in good faith, but got a disharmonious concert.

The freebooting do-gooders

Above we have seen how tactical military assets can be compared to Lego bricks, which can be provided with or without a mandatory assembly plan. However,

there are other bricks around as well, and those are bricks with a will of their own.

Non-military and non-governmental actors on the battlefield are by no means new. The battlefield itself, and especially its rear areas, have since time immemorial been swamped by camp followers, buccaneers and looters. Clausewitz was particularly disgusted by the freebooting Cossacks, even if they fought on the same side. What Clausewitz did not know anything about, however, were altruistic people roaming around in the field in order to do good. The Florence Nightingales and Henry Dunants were unknown to Clausewitz's generation. Had he known of them he would presumably have disliked them just as intensely as he disliked the brutality of the Cossacks: "war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst."⁴⁴ To our generation however, the "do-gooders" are a great practical concern for all military commanders.




Figure 2.2: Foch, Clark and their different strategic environment

44 Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 75.

Integrated mission, comprehensive approach and effect-based approach to operations are all virtually synonymous catchphrases that seem like shorthand for “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means”. They are all ways to cope with the wide range of different actors, different political and material assets, and the widely different agendas present in an operational area.

A modern battlefield is characterised by the multitude of participants on *either* side of the conflict. If the US were to start a war against a South-American state to stop the flow of narcotics, the US State Department, US Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency and the Drug Enforcement Agency could all participate without any “unity of command” as such. Add to this the Red Cross, Médecins sans Frontières, and numerous private volunteer organisations, many without any other cohesion than a similar T-shirt, and unity of command would be a deceitful dream. In Robert R. Leonhard’s words, “To attempt to apply the aged principle of unity of command within this vast cast of characters is not only unrealistic, it is illegal.”⁴⁵ The challenge is exacerbated by the fact that international law is not tailor-made for this situation, to say the least, and that in morally high-pitched conflicts, as for instance the “War on Terrorism” where you allegedly are either *with* us or *against* us, no neutrality seems to exist.

Nevertheless, for many of the altruistic organisations there is a great virtue in not being party to a “continuation of policy by other means” at all. Principally, they have neither stakes in, nor any opinion of, the outcome of a given conflict. Their only stated goal is to ease the victims’ pain, here and now. Many of them are not answerable to anyone except their own conscience. Hence, humanitarianism cannot be the continuation of policy by other means. If it were, it wouldn’t be impartial, neutral and independent. Contrastingly, all governmental assets, from all departments and all public budget divisions, *ought* to be the continuation of policy by other means. Not a single penny should be spent without asking how this particular decision contributes to the realisation of our policy. This is particularly difficult, of course, when most of the biggest NGOs are heavily subsidised with state funds. However, if we still want to follow Clausewitz, and allowing for the disuse of the word “war”, Clausewitz’s dictum should for our generation be: Any governmental intervention should be the continuation of policy by other means.

In summation: Members of military forces are not the only crowds in areas of armed conflict. Humanitarians, and even not-so-humanitarians, often swamp the military theatre of operation. These are individuals who see no merit in

45 R. R. Leonhard, *The Principles of War for the Information Age* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1998), p. 202.

acting holistically unless commanded by their own conscience. Any military or governmental idea of reining these actors in, or subordinating them to military logic, is a dream, and not even a beautiful one. One could of course let civilian authorities lead the operation, but that would not necessarily reduce the main problem, i.e. freebooting do-gooders who refuse to be part of any plan or the continuation of policy by other means.

Tentative conclusions

Any military expert knows that multinationality causes great command and control challenges due to practical challenges such as different languages, technologies, laws and doctrines, and political challenges such as incommensurable strategic agendas. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig was quite frank during the Great War: “All would be so easy if I only had to deal with the Germans!” For most states in the world, however, multinationality is the only way. Few nations have the military assets to fight expeditionary wars unilaterally. Even those states that can act unilaterally often see multinationality as an important legitimating factor for international peace operations. Hence, multinationality is politically desirable, but militarily dubious.⁴⁶

Given that Winston Churchill was right and “the only thing worse than allies is not having allies”, coalition partners must find a way to coexist and cooperate despite huge disagreements. The way to do it is simply not to talk about them. If pushed to take a stand on every controversial issue, the alliance would founder. Hence, a “mutual agreement of avoidance” is the *sine qua non* of coalition warfare. That said, however, every coalition partner has to talk frankly about matters crucial to the conduct of the operation. A coalition commander has a right to know about all the red cards, so as not to be flabbergasted by “pink cards” flying erratically around his headquarters. This is the main difference between constructive ambiguity and devious ambiguity. Constructive ambiguity is used in order not to jeopardise the efficiency of the operation. Devious ambiguity, on the other hand, sacrifices the operation on behalf of other political considerations, of all sorts. Evidently, these two kinds of ambiguity rarely if ever come alone, but in an admixture. The *art* of ambiguity is to find the balance that makes life easier not only for the politicians and domestic political agendas, but also for those who are sent in harm’s way on behalf of the state, not to forget those the operation was instigated to assist. To pretend to deliver something you

46 B. Holmen and S. Ulriksen, *Norden i felt: På oppdrag for FN og NATO* [The Nordics in the field. On UN and NATO missions], NUPI rapport 257 (Oslo: NUPI, 2000), p. 22.

cannot or will not is perhaps part of politics, but ought not to be part of policy, and is the surest way to cause friction in coalition operations. Sometimes the art of ambiguity has to be replaced by the art of unambiguity. The passing of the buck has to stop, occasionally.

The aim of every military coalition is *unity of effort*, which is why it sticks together. Regarding the effectiveness of military forces, unity of command is just a means to an end, not the end in itself. To some this will look like semantic hair-splitting: their idea is presumably that unity of *command* will automatically lead to unity of *effort*, but that is not necessarily the case, as argued here. When a given state deliberates between a holistic and an atomistic approach the question should be whether either of them gives not unity of command, but unity of effort. Lacking a “fifth service”, or non-national military entrepreneurs, without any preferences at all to a mother service or nation, the challenge is to reap the fruit of military collaboration without subordination and “autocratic use of state power”. The first step in that direction is to exorcise the real “ghost of Napoleon” – the dream of “unity of command”. Not only deep rooted principles of command, but even venerable principles of war do not necessarily survive the encounter with the politicised reality. According to General Clark he was in fact “compelled to sacrifice [the] basic logic of warfare to maintain the political cohesion of the Alliance”.⁴⁷

To orchestrate a multi-participant battlefield, and not only the military part of it, discussion and persuasion are inescapable. The frustration of Clark and Foch is partly due to the dissonance between their image of proper generalship and reality. Foch expected to be a traditional Commander-in-Chief, but none of his foreign subordinates would play along. Even Clark’s futile attempt to pull rank on a foreign officer indicates how deep-rooted the image of the Great General is.⁴⁸

If the power of the best argument outweighs the power of a general’s screaming voice, the aptitude for argumentation and fluency in the method of avoidance are skills much more important to the military man than martial steadfastness.

So finally, where has this chapter taken us regarding the preferability of either a holistic approach or an atomistic approach? Nowhere, is the most hon-

47 General Clark quoted in D. Henriksen, *Nato’s Gamble, Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis 1998–1999* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), p. 198.

48 “Mike, I’m a four-star general, and I can tell you these things.” From General Clark’s dispute with Lieutenant-General Mike Jackson, British Army, over Pristina airfield in 1999. Clark, *Waging Modern War*, p. 394.

est answer, which is exactly where we were headed. We wanted simply to rehash the old complaint about coalition warfare always being difficult. Thereafter, we studied two particular approaches and found pros and cons in both, and that the specific context has to be given its due before one is ranked above the other. The conclusion of this chapter is merely to bring forth that such questions are inherently difficult due to generic challenges in military matters. There is nothing particularly new in this, and nor anything particularly sinister either. For smaller nations, such as Norway, the atomistic approach, in good faith, seems to be the most recommendable, given that there are enough common interests around, and there is a working supranational council to forge common policy into strategy. When this is not the case, however, the holistic approach is the most realistic to hope for, where national governments see their military contributions in relation to their other contributions. However, an atomistic approach, ridden with caveats and often in bad faith, is presumably the order of the day, where national assets are mainly contributed in order to make the contributing nation look nice, without jeopardising the domestic political agenda unnecessarily.⁴⁹

49 The author wants to thank Håkan Edström and Charlotte Ingalls for kicking this text in motion, and Magnus Petersson and Paal Sigurd Hilde for constructive obstructions, along with participants at the purgatory held at the Staff College on 2 October 2008.

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE USE OF MILITARY POWER

Håkan Edström

Background

Is the choice between different approaches to the use of military power in international operations really associated with the national interests as the Canadian discussion indicates? And if so, how do the outcomes of the choice correlate with the national interests?

To be able to answer these questions I will start with an exploration seeking how the national interests of some relevant actors are expressed, either directly by the states themselves or indirectly in the findings of other researchers. I will thereafter use the initial empirical conclusions and the various theories, especially those of Barry Buzan, to create a model to be used in the exploration of the Norwegian context. In the third step, by using the report of the Norwegian Defence Commission that was presented late 2007, I will try to outline the national interests of Norway. Finally I will discuss how a holistic approach and an atomistic approach to the use of military power respectively may impact on the Norwegian Armed Forces' ability to protect and promote the national interests of Norway.

The nature of national interests

The use of national interests as a starting point in the discussion surrounding security policy is commonly understood to be a great power privilege. Hence this exploration will focus on the perspectives of the only remaining super power but the perspectives of a multilateral organisation, the European Union, will also be included as a reference.

Colin S. Gray describes national interests as a filter through which the correlations of global events to the state concerned can be subjectively interpreted. The very purpose of the interests is, according to Gray, to indicate the significance of the events to the strategic decision-makers and thereby help them to prioritise the response. Gray suggests a hierarchy of interests with four distinct levels. He labels the top level *survival interests* and defines them as interests which the state is forced to defend in order to be able to survive. *Vital interests* are defined as interests worth fighting for, while *major interests* do not necessarily have to be defended by the use of force. The fourth and last category involves all other interests and are defined as interests that can hardly legitimise the use

of force. Unfortunately Gray's elaborations end at an abstract level and do not provide any clear empirical examples.¹

In July 2000, just over a year before the events of 11 September 2001, a commission on America's national interests presented its report.² The commission's leading author was Harvard University's Graham Allison. However, the main part of the commission consisted not of researchers but of prominent Republican politicians such as former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and senator and recent presidential candidate John McCain. The commission argued that only a foreign policy grounded in national interests can identify priorities for the engagements of the US in the world and seems to have been influenced by Gray since it presented a hierarchy of interests ranging from secondary through important and extremely important to vital interests.³

Five *vital interests* are identified and all of them are expressed in terms of effects ("are to ..."); prevent, deter and reduce the threat of WMD against the USA, ensure US allies' survival and their cooperation, prevent the emergence of hostile major powers and failed states on US borders, ensure the viability and stability of major global systems such as trade, financial markets and supply of energy, and establish productive relations with nations that could become strategic adversaries (i.e. China and Russia).⁴

Extremely important interests are described as conditions that, if compromised, would severely prejudice, but not strictly imperil, the ability of the US government. Eleven interests are identified in this category and also expressed in terms of desired effects such as prevent regional proliferation, promote the acceptance of international rules of law, maintain a lead in military-related and other strategic technologies, and suppress terrorism.⁵

Important interests are described as conditions that, if compromised, would have major negative consequences for the ability of the government. Ten important interests are identified and are expressed in terms of effects such as discourage massive human rights violations, maximise US GNP growth from international trade and investments, maintain an edge in the international distribution of information to ensure that America's values continue to have a posi-

1 C. S. Gray, *Explorations in Strategy* (Westport: Praeger, 1998), pp. 116, 191 and 200–206.

2 Commission on America's National Interests, *America's National Interests* (Cambridge MA.: Belfare Center for Science and International affairs, Harvard University, 2000).

3 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 5.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

tive influence on the cultures of foreign nations and boost the domestic output of key strategic industries and sectors.⁶

The *secondary interests*, finally, are also categorised as less important interests and defined as desirable conditions with little direct impact on the ability of the government. The total number of secondary interests are not fixed but are said to include effects such as enlarging democracy, preserving territorial integrity and enhancing exports of specific economic sectors.⁷

In 2002, a year after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the US National Defense University presented a report on the transformation of the American military. The report included a study that linked the national security interests to politico-military objectives and further to future military missions.⁸ In his study, Sam Tangredi created an illustrative hierarchy of interests based on analyses of public statements and their objectives, and of military missions relating to each of them.

At top of the hierarchy, Tangredi put the *survival interests*, that include three related but functionally different objectives; survival of the nation, territorial integrity or homeland security, and economic security. The military missions identified with the first objective include nuclear deterrence, while critical infrastructure protection and counterterrorism are examples of missions identified as relating to the second objective. Associated with economic security would, according to Tangredi, be military missions such as ensuring freedom of the sea, ensuring access to raw materials, and protection of sea lines of communication.⁹

The second category in Tangredi's model is labelled *vital or world order interests* and is defined as interests which are critical to the long term vitality of America but which do not necessarily pose an immediate threat to the population or material values in America. The three objectives in this category identified by Tangredi are defence of treaty allies, defence of democratic and pivot states, and finally the deterrence, or winning, of regional conflicts. These three objectives are related to similar military missions such as overseas and forward presence, power projection, conventional rapid response and expeditionary operations.¹⁰

6 Ibid., p. 7.

7 Ibid., p. 8.

8 S. J. Tangredi, "Assessing New Missions" in *Transforming America's Military*, ed. H. Binnendijk (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2002).

9 Ibid., pp. 16–18.

10 Ibid., pp. 18–24.

The third and last category is labelled *value interests* and is focused on the reduction of overt violence and the maintenance of peace. The category is divided into two objectives; preventing conflicts and performing more generalised peace operations.¹¹

In a report presented by the European Union's Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) the interests of the EU are divided into two categories; vital interests and value interests.¹² The three *vital interests* are, according to EUISS, integrity, economic survival, and the social and political security of the Union's member states. The two *value interests* of the EU are international peace and security, and universally accepted norms and values. Taking an approach similar to that of the American commission, EUISS expresses actions in terms of desired effects in connection with the interests; to protect and project the vital interests and to promote the value interests. As in Tangredi's approach, EUISS relates missions to each of the interests. Homeland defence and consequence management when it comes to integrity, protection of trade routes and the free flow of raw material where economic security is concerned, and combating organised crime and preventing any massive influx of refugees where social and political security are concerned. The value interests are linked to missions aiming to protect and enforce the international rule of law and fundamental norms and freedoms.¹³

To summarise, national interests seem to be closely related to the ability of the government, or more precisely to the cabinet's freedom of action. Hence not all interests have equal importance or are given similar priority; there is a hierarchy of at least two levels. The interests are often expressed in terms of effects such as boost, ensure, establish, maintain, maximise, promote, protect, prevent, reduce and suppress. The effects seem to be related to:

- The vulnerability and resilience of the state regardless of possible antagonists, including nature herself.
- The national dependency and capacity to meet the critical needs of the nation, material and immaterial.
- The threats and risks emanating from possible enemies, or from nature herself, and preventing them from being realised by deterrence or proactive actions.
- The values and norms relating to the national culture, mindset and rationality.

11 Ibid., pp. 24–26.

12 EUISS, *European Defence – A Proposal for a White Paper* (Paris: EUISS, May 2004).

13 Ibid., pp. 9–13.

The effects appear to have two different dimensions; the presence or absence of specific conditions or whether these conditions are desirable or not (see figures 3.1 and 3.2 for further discussion).

Creating a model

The starting point of my theoretical discussion is Hans Morgenthau and the political or classical realism. In the second of his six principles Morgenthau defined interests in terms of power.

The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.¹⁴

According to Hedley Bull the national interests of a state must be seen in relation to the objectives the state seeks to achieve. Bull mentions security, prosperity and common values.¹⁵ The theoretical discussion take these arguments into account and continues by using ideas from the structural realism developed by Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little at the beginning of the 1990s.¹⁶ In *The Logic of Anarchy* (LoA) they present a theory of the global system based on three levels of analysis: structural, interaction and unit.

The organisational principles and differentiation of units, familiar from Kenneth Waltz's neorealism,¹⁷ together with systematic patterns in the distribution of units' attributes, compose the structural level. The two former parts are labelled deep structure and can best be described as the anarchy in the world order without a supranational government and with states as principal actors fulfilling similar tasks. The third part concerns traditional attributes, i.e. military capability, economic capability, political cohesion and ideology.¹⁸

Joseph S. Nye distinguished between the two former attributes, which he terms hard power, and the two latter, which he terms soft power. Soft power is the ability of a political actor, such as a state, to influence the behaviour or interests of other political actors through cultural or ideological means. Soft power, in other words, is distinguished from hard power, such as *direct* coercive

14 H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations – The Struggle for Power and Peace*, ed. by K. W. Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 5.

15 H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 63–64.

16 B. Buzan, C. Jones and R. Little, *The Logic of Anarchy – Neorealism to Structural Realism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

17 K. N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979).

18 B. Buzan et al., *The Logic of Anarchy ...*, pp. 34–47.

measures like military action and economic sanctions, by allowing the effects of culture, values, norms, and ideas to impact *indirectly* on the cognitive and conceptual frameworks of other actors.¹⁹

The discussion surrounding the soft power effects of culture, values and norms is in many ways related to discussions about whether there exists a universal human civilisation, or whether the differences between different ethnic and/or religious groups indicate several civilisations and hence a different logic for the use of soft power. According to Samuel Huntington, there is no universal level:

The concept of a universal civilization is a distinctive product of Western civilization. ... Universalism is the ideology of the West for confrontations with non-Western cultures. ... The non-West sees as Western what the West sees as universal.²⁰

I do not fully agree with Huntington and would argue that the universal declaration of human rights could serve as a starting point for the definition.²¹ In one of the conventions on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Council of Europe declares:

The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties.²²

I argue that the universality lies in the fact that the global system consists of states and their relations, not only among themselves, but also to individuals, groups of individuals and NGOs. Hence, soft power is about influencing the patterns of these relations so that behaviour corresponds to the values and norms of the state exerting the soft power. I interpret this to be at the core of the clash of civilisations. To go one step further, the work of Ronald Inglehart and his World Values Surveys is apposite. Although Inglehart focuses on the values

19 J. S. Nye Jr, *The Paradox of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

20 S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 66.

21 United Nations, "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (UN [online 19 Mar 2009]).

22 Council of Europe, "Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" [online 19 Mar 2009], article 34 – Individual applications.

of individuals, his division of values into religious, legal, social, and political aspects is interesting.²³

Using the convention of the Council of Europe quoted above, the targets of both hard and soft power can be the states' relation to *individuals*, to *religious, social* (including economic), and *political* organisations and groups of individuals, and to *legal* authorities (the rule of law).

The second level of analysis in LoA, interaction, concerns the interaction capacity within the global system, or more precisely the absolute quality of technological and societal capabilities across the system to interact. Interaction is divided into different sectors: *economic, military, political*, and *societal* interactions.²⁴

In one of his earlier works, Buzan describes two baselines in the development of national security policy. One is inward looking, focused on the vulnerabilities of the state, the other outward looking, focused on threats against the state.²⁵ Buzan also includes a fifth sector, the environmental or *ecological*, and relates each of the sectors to security.

Military security concerns the ... offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states' perceptions of each other's intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.²⁶

As the quotation indicates, outward looking policy relates not only to threats directed *towards* the state, but to needs directed *from* the state. To distinguish

- 23 R. Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); and R. Inglehart "Globalization and Postmodern Values", *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 1, winter (2000): 215–228.
- 24 B. Buzan et al., *The Logic of Anarchy...*, pp. 34–47.
- 25 B. Buzan, *People, States & Fear*, 2nd ed. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 112–116.
- 26 *Ibid.*, pp. 19–20. See pp. 116–134 for a deeper discussion. Instead of *environmental security* the further discussion will use the term *ecological* as defined by Hedley Bull. See H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 283.

the directions of interaction we can use of the model set out above, where conditions are described in terms of the dichotomies desired/undesired and present/absent. Naturally, threats directed at the state are undesirable and the absence of a threat therefore implies security. The capacity to meet critical national needs, such as access to resources and political influence, are desirable conditions and their presence therefore implies safety.

	DESIRED	UNDESIED
PRESENCE	SAFE	INSECURE
ABSENCE	UNSAFE	SECURE

Figure 3.1: *The two dimensions of conditions related to interaction*

The third analytical level in LoA, the unit level, relates to attribute analysis, or more precisely the behaviour of the units explained in terms of their attributes. The individual units are examined through their domestic processes and components. The processes are analysed not only in relation to bureaucratic procedures, but also in terms of patterns in the action–reaction behaviour in the unit’s response to the behaviour of other units.²⁷

According to Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, the origins of the modern state are to be found in the peace accords of Westphalia. They argue that all the attributes necessary came into place in 1648:

The key elements of the modern nation-state were now all available: a people, a territory in which they lived, a government with the authority to rule over the people and territory.²⁸

Barry Buzan describes a state consisting of three different attributes. The first attribute, the physical base, is composed of the population and the territory of the state. The second consists of the institutions governing the physical base and the third the idea that gives the institutions legitimacy to govern. In the discussion surrounding the physical base Buzan introduces qualitative aspects of the territory such as natural resources and created values. Buzan actually seems to use five attributes; population, territory, infrastructure, institutions and ideas.²⁹

27 B. Buzan et al., *The Logic of Anarchy...*, p. 47–65.

28 B. Russett and H. Starr, *World Politics* (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1995), p. 53–56.

29 B. Buzan, *People, States & Fear...* pp. 64–66 and 90–91.

To summarise, for the purposes of creating a theoretical model, national interests are assumed to consist of four components. At the *structural level* the interests are about value, at the *interaction level* they are about threats in the global community directed at the state, but also the state's access to critical supplies from the global community. Finally, at the unit level, interests are about the vulnerability of the state in relation to each of its attributes.




Figure 3.2: The national interests and the logic of the components

Each of the four components can be further divided into five subcomponents as described in figure 3.3 below. The next step is to use this model in exploring the empirical case of Norway .

STATE	NEEDS	THREATS	VALUES
Idea	Ecological	Ecological	Individual
Infrastructure	Economic	Economic	Legal
Institutions	Military	Military	Political
Population	Political	Political	Religious
Territory	Social	Social	Social

Figure 3.3: The interests' components and their substance

The Norwegian context

I base my empirical study of Norway on a report from the Norwegian Defence Commission. The Commission was appointed in mid August 2006 with a mandate to analyse the ongoing transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces,

with a focus on the years 2009–12 but with a perspective reaching as far as 2020. The report was submitted at the end of October 2007.³⁰

INTERESTS RELATED TO THE STATE COMPONENT

While the Commission does touch on each of the subcomponents listed above, their discussion is hampered by a certain terminological inconsistency and a tendency to privilege the abstract over the concrete. The Commission also seems to mix categories somewhat, making it sometimes difficult to establish what exactly they are saying. Their discussion of territory seems more about abstract issues of territorial integrity and sovereignty, though they do discuss resources – oil and gas primarily – and infrastructure. Perhaps the Commission conceives of infrastructure as a shorter-term facet, and sovereignty as a more permanent feature. Institutions, they seem to suggest, are particularly likely to attract political pressure.³¹

INTERESTS RELATED TO THE SAFETY/NEEDS COMPONENT

The Commission spends little time on safety and other needs. It does, however, prioritise the social well being of the citizens while addressing their social needs. The Commission discusses economic security in relation to the energy sector, though this section seems more concerned with Norwegian energy exports than Norway's own energy needs. Political and social relations with the international community are of critical importance for the country, vital international organisations being the UN and NATO. To summarise, the Commission gives priority to political and social needs and safety.³²

INTERESTS RELATED TO THE SECURITY/THREAT COMPONENT

The Commission focuses on the political aspects of security and the discussion on the vulnerability of the institutions, mentioned above, should be seen in this light. Terrorism remains a highly potent threat, which relates to political and military security. Work should be done to reduce the threat of direct terrorist attacks and to addressing conditions favourable to the growth of terrorism, including recruitment to terrorist organisations. Another topic discussed by the Commission relates to the Barents Sea and Arctic regions. The discussion around

30 Norwegian Defence Commission, *Et styrket forsvar – Innstilling fra Forsvarspolitisk utvalg* [Strengthening the Armed Forces – report of the Norwegian Defence Commission], NOU 2007:15, 31 October 2007.

31 Norwegian Defence Commission, *Et styrket forsvar*, see for example pp. 5, 10, 13, 18–20, 22, 25, 28–29 and 48–49.

32 *Ibid.*, for example pp. 10 and 19–20.

the situation in the High North does not, however, focus on the military aspects, as it doubtless would have during the Cold War, but on the politics of managing marine resources. The Commission does assess the possibility of an armed threat against Norway but engages also with economic, social and ecological security, if not in a narrower Norwegian context.³³

INTERESTS RELATED TO THE VALUE COMPONENT

The Commission discusses several core societal values such as democracy and the rule of law, though the situation for human rights claims most of its attention.³⁴

INTERESTS RELATED TO A WIDER APPROACH

Apart from the discussions about individual interest components, the Commission also takes a wider view. With the national interests as a broad point of departure, the Commission concludes that Norwegian participation in international crises management not only helps solve the crisis in question but strengthens international organisations and, most importantly, enhances Norway's leverage in these organisations.³⁵ To summarise, the ability and credibility of the UN and NATO are core Norwegian national interests. The logic of the Commission's considerations seems to be that the preservation of the present international order and structures, including Norwegian influence in the relevant organisations, is the best way to protect and promote Norway's other national interests.³⁶

EMPIRICAL SUMMARY

Norway's key national interests are presented in the figure below.

STATE	NEEDS	THREATS	VALUES
Idea	Ecological	Ecological	Individual
Infrastructure	Economic	Economic	Legal
Institutions	Military	Military	Political
Population	Political	Political	Religious
Territory	Social	Social	Social

Figure 3.4: The prioritised interests of Norway

33 Ibid., for example pp. 5, 10–13, 15, 18–23, 29–30, 47–49 and 52.

34 Ibid., for example pp. 5, 10–11, 13, 17, 19, 22–23 and 48.

35 Ibid., for example pp. 24 and 51.

36 Ibid., see for example pp. 5, 10–11, 13–17, 21–24, 27, 29 and 48–50.

We can summarise the key interests as follows:

- **Reduce vulnerabilities**, primarily those relating to aspects of sovereignty, i.e. the idea, but also those relating to territory and the ability of the Norwegian institutions to resist threats.
- **Increase safety**, primarily regarding needs relating to Norway's political influence in the UN and NATO, but also regarding the social well being of the citizens.
- **Reduce insecurity**, primarily by strengthening the ability and credibility of the UN, when it comes to political security, and NATO, where military security is concerned.
- **Promote Norwegian values**, especially with respect for human rights, but also democracy and rule of law.

Military power and the national interests

The preservation of the existing international system seems to be Norway's prime national interest. More precisely, the existence of transatlantic links, institutionalised in NATO, combined with a capable UN system, appear to be prioritised by the Commission. At the heart of the discussion are the desired political structures together with recognition of Norway's need to influence them. Although the Commission claims to have taken a broad approach in its analysis, the discussion seems to have a normative point of departure. Hence the focus appears to be on ensuring conformity between universal values and Norway's national preferences by actively working to influence the former. What conclusions are then to be drawn for the contemporary use of the Norwegian Armed Forces?

Since the discussion is so centrally concerned with sovereignty, territory and particularly the resources offshore, Norway tends to come across as an ethnocentric state with strong normative preferences. The Commission is aware of the political vulnerability of Norway's ambitious policy on the continental shelf and its resources. The Commission even recognises the political problems emanating from some of the positions taken by NATO allies such as the UK, Iceland and Spain. This might have inspired the Commission cite the UN system, rather than NATO, as the best means of maintaining the present international political order. However, since political means alone are not enough to ensure Norway's sovereignty over its claims at sea, at least not where its disputes with Russia are concerned, NATO will continue to play a crucial role for Norway. In other words, as long as the present international order continues to give Norway the right to utilise its maritime resources, and as long as the UN system works, Norwegian institutions should be able to resist political pressures from abroad. As long as Russian democracy remains questionable, there is, however,

no guarantee that Russia will be play by the international rules. As long as there is a transatlantic link, however, and as long as the NATO system works, Norway's Armed Forces should be capable of withstanding military pressures from abroad. The Commission seems, however, to have concluded that Norway needs a back-up, or alternative plan, in case policies at the UN and/or NATO take a less favourable direction for Norway. The answer seems to be the EU, an organisation which, in contrast to either the UN or NATO, can provide a mixture of relevant political *and* military means.

As we have seen, the Commission concludes that Norwegian participation in international crisis management achieves more than resolving a specific conflict. Strengthening the capacity and credibility of international organisations is even more important. Considering the discussion above, Norwegian participation in UN or NATO-led operations appears to be vital for Norway's national interests. More correctly, the question is not about the UN or NATO, but how Norwegian Armed Forces can be used to help strengthen *both* organisations and hence Norway's national interests. Furthermore, the Norwegian Armed Forces should also be able to participate in EU-led operations, providing credibility for the back-up plan. A first question for Norway's political authorities to answer is therefore how best to allocate appropriate military resources to the UN and NATO, but also to the EU. Related questions concern how to gain political, not operational, influence by contributing different kinds of military units and whether these different units can be used to strengthen the international organisations involved. These considerations, however, involve a number of paradoxes:

- Norwegian does not necessarily wield the same measure of influence in all three organisations at the same time. Participation in a NATO-led operation with special forces could, for example, strengthen both NATO's and Norway's influence within the organisation but at the same time undermine the UN's and Norway's standing in the Third World. Norwegian participation in UN-led peacekeeping operations could also undermine NATO's standing with Norway's transatlantic allies.
- The normative focus on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law could, turn Norwegian public opinion against the deployment of certain military units, make it more problematic, if not impossible. The same goes for participation in specific kinds of operation or specific regions. Even if Norwegian military units could theoretically participate, the international organisation may view national caveats as an obstacle, creating the opposite outcome than desired or intended by Norwegian participation.
- Norway cannot rely solely on the military resources of NATO allies to protect of national interests in the Norwegian neighbourhood. On the contrary,

NATO would probably expect Norway to take the operational lead. The consequence of this is that Norway must have military capabilities suitable for conducting operations, primarily maritime, in adjacent areas. At the same time, the UN, NATO and/or the EU could ask for ground forces to be deployed in out-of-Europe operations.

There is also a risk that the Norway's normative argumentation within the UN system might harm national interests or the operational behaviour of Norway's major NATO allies, i.e. the US and the UK, for example when it comes to interpretations of international humanitarian law. This might strengthen Norway's position in the Third World but could also rebound on Norway's influence within NATO. As long as Norwegian interests in Northern Europe can be safeguarded, primarily by political means, from within the UN system one could argue, however, that Norway should give highest priority to participating in and strengthening the UN. Hence it would be natural for the political authorities to consider the role of the armed forces, as well as of the other tools of grand strategy. The means, as we have seen, need to be balanced with the national interests. And as the discussion above indicates, the political authorities could find themselves in a "catch 22" situation. No matter how they behave, Norway could lose influence in either UN or NATO. One way out of the dilemma might be to loosen up the strong normative positions and reduce the part played by tradition in Norwegian diplomacy. Another solution might be to balance UN/NATO dependency with closer relations to the EU. The Commission seems to be considering the second option, not least in the field of military cooperation. It is, however, not a question of *de facto* EU membership, but a partial *de jure*.

The critical question is the ability of the two approaches, holism and atomism, to promote Norway's national interests and influence within the UN and NATO, but also with the EU. Before I compare them, some important assumptions need to be made. First, Norway is assumed to have limited military resources, a large part of which still have to be assigned to Norway's own neighbourhood to protect its interests in Northern Europe. Since these interests are primarily maritime in nature, naval units will clearly have important domestic tasks to fulfil. Second, Norway is assumed to have some kind of role within the NATO chain of command that obliges Norway to provide a framework for operations in Northern Europe. This includes not only an operational staff but also a minimum number of Norwegian units, from each of the services, assigned to

duties in Norway. Together these assumptions indicate that Norway's ability to provide military units to international operations will continue to be modest.³⁷

Holistic approach

With a holistic approach most of the military resources Norway is able to provide for international operations is expected to be concentrated in a single mission. The Norwegian PRT in Afghanistan is such an example. In favour of this alternative is the option of gaining not only strategic influence but also influence at the operational level since the number of boots on the ground is likely to correlate with operational influence. Another argument in support of the holistic approach is the option for increased emphasis on inter-ministerial efficiency within the Norwegian government. One argument against holism is that there are no guarantees for either strategic or operational influence. National caveats may, for example, be counterproductive to strategic and operational level work. If, for example, SHAPE and ISAF are in desperate need of light infantry units in southern Afghanistan, unwillingness on the part of contributing nations to provide anything other than logistic units in the north, will lead to dissatisfaction within NATO no matter how many logisticians are provided.

There are, of course, no guarantees of inter-ministerial efficiency either. The deep-rooted mistrust between different departments, which are quite common in Western governments, not least between ministries of defence and foreign affairs, might in reality prove to be too great an obstacle to overcome. One other argument against this alternative is that the qualitative profile of the resources needed in the North European context will probably be quite different to those needed in international operations. Since quality costs money and since the holistic approach is likely to involve greater demands across a broader spectrum of capabilities than the atomistic approach, there is a risk that Norwegian policymakers will be trapped in an "either/or" situation. If there is a reluctance to choose between reducing vulnerabilities at home and reducing insecurity abroad, there is a risk that, in the long term, "either/or" may become "neither/nor".

37 According to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence there were 625 Norwegian soldiers deployed abroad 19 January 2008. About 80 % of these troops (495) were deployed in Afghanistan. The remaining personnel were military advisers, observers and staff officers deployed to other missions. See Norwegian Ministry of Defence, "Fakta om Forsvaret 2008" [Norway's Armed Forces – facts and figures] (Forsvarsnett [online 18 Mar 2009]).

Atomistic approach

With an atomistic approach, not only the military, but all the instruments of the grand strategy, can be deployed on a number of different missions all over the world. Concurrent participation in several separate international operations with either military or other grand strategy tools thus speaks in favour of this approach. The possibilities for gaining strategic influence in several international organisations are thus considered to be better than with a holistic approach. A consequence of this approach is that Norway would have more options and could take subordinate national interests into consideration. With an atomistic approach Norway has, in other words, the opportunity simultaneously to reduce vulnerabilities, increase safety, reduce insecurity and promote Norwegian values from a strict Norwegian perspective in several different contexts while at the same time strengthening and gaining influence in the UN, NATO and the EU. An argument against the atomistic approach is that Norway could be interpreted by her allies, and others, as speaking with a forked tongue. Since the different grand strategic tools do not necessarily have to be coordinated in a single mission, there is a risk that different ministries within the Norwegian government might employ different logics and rationales, so that the sum of the different outcomes might actually be negative. The use of, for example, *military* means to reduce vulnerabilities relating to aspects of sovereignty in one (NATO) context, the *economic* means to increase security in terms of the needs and social well being of the citizens in another (EU) context, and the *political* means to promote Norwegian values, democracy and the rule of law in a third (UN), would have to be orchestrated and commensurate with an overarching national grand strategic policy. In the holistic approach this policy can be formulated *ad hoc* as the case of the PRT in Afghanistan shows. In the atomistic approach, however, this policy has to be explicitly articulated in the decision making process. The ability and/or willingness of the cabinet in small states is not always at hand for this important task.

Tentative Conclusions

Since national interests are considered to be anything but static, freedom of action is very likely to be the key to success. Following this logic, the most important variable in the comparison between the holistic approach and the atomistic approach is probably to be found in the dynamics of global politics. With a holistic approach most of the military resources of a small state like Norway are expected to be concentrated in a single international operation. To be able to benefit from the synergies created in cooperation with other official Norwegian agencies, the military presence probably has to be guaranteed for several years. Hence the options for flexible response to different challenges against the

national interests of Norway will be at a minimum, due to temporal as well as spatial aspects. At the same time, a single mission commitment implies a focus on strengthening and gaining influence in only one, or two at most, of the three identified key organisations.

The atomistic approach, on the other hand, implies no need for a full spectrum of operational capabilities. A niche-oriented structure of the Norwegian Armed Forces might not even be an option but a necessity if the national interests truly are the objectives of Norwegian security policy. In contrast to the holistic approach, the atomistic approach allows Norway to trade full-spectrum quantity, sustainability and operational coherence for tactical rapid reaction capability. With a high readiness profile for its armed forces, Norway might be able to provide tactical military resources not only for the protection of its interests in Northern Europe, but the promotion of its interests far away as well. Not the least of this, Norway will be able to strengthen the UN, NATO and the EU concurrently, gaining as much influence at the strategic level as possible.

The overall tentative conclusion is that an interest-oriented security policy appears to go hand in hand with the logic of realism. Once the policymakers start to use national interests as a premise, the ad-hoc driven logic of idealism seems to be outdated. If so, a change of the conceptual framework and the mindset of the government might be needed.

BALANCING ENDS, WAYS AND MEANS

Palle Ydstebø

... a politician who sets a political goal for military operations must have an idea of what is feasible for strategy given the resources available and how politics may affect the situation for better or for worse.¹

Background – the role of military theory

The role of military theory is twofold. In relation to military thinking and military history, military theory is also normative. In order to be normative, military theory must be able to generalise. But in doing so it contradicts one of its main foundations – military history, which focuses on the individual case and explains the unique event in context.

Military theory must teach us what war is, and how to win.² This chapter will focus on the normative aspect of military theory; what must we do to win. And in order to win, what the consequences are likely to be for the forces of a chosen approach to conducting operations. The approaches discussed are the holistic and the atomistic. The consequences will be discussed with regard to developing the Norwegian Armed Forces, including operational art. These factors will be discussed in the context of how to use military forces in order to contribute to the achievement of the strategic objectives and ends (which means the successful conduct of tactical actions). In doing so, one must balance ends, ways and means.

Figure 4.1 visualises the need for balance; choosing ends within the available resources and methods, or, if one sees something coming up, to develop means and ways to meet an emerging threat or challenge.

During the Cold War, the expansion of Norway's Armed Forces to counter the Soviet threat is an example of developing means. The concept development leading to a "manoeuvre doctrine" in the 1990s is an example of developing ways. Cashing in on the peace dividend after the collapse of the Soviet Union was all about reducing the ends, not without major consequences for the means. The ways were also affected, however, when the ends and means were reduced,

1 A. A. Svechin, *Strategy* (Minneapolis: East View, 2004), p. 74.

2 J. Widén and J. Ångström, *Militärteorins grunder* [A primer in military theory] (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2004), pp. 1–13.




Figure 4.1: The Strategic triangle.

since the operational options narrowed drastically as the quality of quantity was dismantled. The classic strategic challenge is to balance these three factors and develop them to match the changing character of war: in peacetime to deter and prepare for conflict, and during armed conflict to apply the forces and adapt ends, ways and means as the war progresses.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss in light of military theory the consequences and opportunities for the Norwegian Armed Forces, of the holistic and atomistic approaches. More specifically, whether a holistic or atomistic approach for the Norwegian Armed Forces actually shapes Norwegian military strategy, i.e. the force development and the development of doctrine and operations concepts, including operational art and tactics. The character of contemporary operations will be discussed. Finally possible consequences for any likely Norwegian force contribution at the operational and tactical level of war will be discussed within the framework of these approaches.

FRAMEWORK AND TERMS

The Clausewitzian understanding of war as merely the continuation of policy by other means forms the theoretical framework for this chapter.³ It means that war, or the use of military force as such, is never for its own sake, but is

simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.

We deliberately use the phrase “with the addition of other means” because we

3 C. von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by M. Howard and P. Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1976), p. 87.

also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change into something entirely different.⁴

What Clausewitz is stating is nothing other than the central tenet of what in NATO is called the Comprehensive Approach.⁵ Military force should always be regarded as one of many political instruments, a peculiar one, but one with no independent role in itself. In that sense, the particular nature of military means makes them rather different from all of the other political means, a fact that ideally should be taken into account so that “the trends and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means.”⁶ This should of course inform the use of military force for purposes other than full-scale war, such as peace support and stabilisation operations. This chapter is concerned only with the armed forces, however, insofar as it is the business of the political echelons to ensure that the military means support the political intercourse and other means available. It includes using military and other means to promote collaboration in the area of operations.

A final element in the policy–strategy interdependence is that bad policy cannot be corrected by clever strategy, creative operational art or smart tactics, or by technological superiority. In order not to get entangled in this debate, this chapter will assume a degree of positive coherence between the political ambitions and military strategy and between the latter and other policy instruments. This will of course include balancing ends, ways and means. Without a positive connection between political ends, available resources and an approach that is consistent with both ends and means, any military approach is risky at best.

Peacetime military strategy should prepare the armed forces to support policy in need of military force. That means equipping, training and preparing the force for likely military missions that are consistent with Norwegian political culture and ambitions. The deployment of the force should adhere to the same framework as the policy it is supporting. Other aspects of policy to be considered include elements such as ethics and law. But the actual conduct of operations should also reflect the character of the current war or conflict. That might well include self-imposed constraints when it comes to weapons and tactical solutions, as well as subordinating lower echelon military logic to political priorities and demands.⁷

4 Ibid., p. 605.

5 NATO, “NATO after Riga – Prevailing in Afghanistan, Improving Capabilities, Enhancing Cooperation” [online 22 Mar 2009].

6 Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 87.

7 Ibid., see book 8, ch. 6, e.g. pp. 608–09.

This chapter is basically interested in the kind of peace support operation (PSO) currently running in Afghanistan, which excludes large scale conventional war. The reason for this is mainly that Afghanistan will remain, for the foreseeable future, the focus of NATO and thus of Norway. A limitation will also help make the factors to be discussed more manageable. The political framework is participation in a multinational campaign with a low political aims (stabilisation and support for reconstruction) and a consequently low threshold for being overrun by domestic political issues (lack of funding, lack of interest, elections, etc.). After presenting the two approaches mentioned above in light of military theory, the chapter discusses challenges relating to operational art and peacetime force planning.

Atomistic approach

The atomistic approach is about providing tactical forces for an alliance, coalition or lead-nation led campaign for shared strategic ends, as outlined by the Canadian Armed Forces.⁸ This has also been the standard Norwegian approach to operations on foreign soil since the late Middle Ages. When operating abroad, either as part of the Allied forces in World War II or peacekeeping in Southern Lebanon, Norwegian forces have always provided tactical assets to the larger force. The ability of Norway to control the use of these forces has varied, as has the necessity for doing so.

First of all there is the need for an acceptable strategy. Under the NATO framework, the command structure and consensus principle should ensure that all twenty-six countries are heard. Some may be less equal than others, but in principle none are left out. The forces committed should (supposedly) bring proportional influence to bear upon strategy and the conduct of operations. When it comes to ad-hoc coalitions (e.g. “of the willing”), contributing nations tend to be more at the mercy of the leader or his closest compatriots. Contributing nations might accept reduced strategic/operational influence as the price of being part of the team, seasoned with a hope for some future political benefit.

As a consequence, Norway will have to balance the need (desire) for strategic and operational influence with the forces provided. That means having the “right” forces to deploy at the right time. On 10 of September 2001, what was expected of a contributing nation had no comparison with expectations just a few days later. At the time, Norway was had a battalion-size battle group

8 J. H. Vance, “Tactics Without Strategy or Why the Canadian Forces do not Campaign”, in *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives*, eds. A. English, D. Gosselin, H. Coombs and L. M. Hickey (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), pp. 280–83.

in Kosovo, and was restructuring its army to meet such needs. Over the next few years Norway sent a wide variety of forces to Afghanistan, both for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Stabilisation and Assistance Force (ISAF). These forces were selected from a broad force structure before the latter's transformation to meet the needs of the future. The deployment of an armoured combat engineer squadron to Iraq, (a so-called "humanitarian engineer company"),⁹ in the summer of 2003 proved to be the limit in terms of both coalition and mission of what was politically acceptable in Norway.

The initial Norwegian contribution to Afghanistan comprised selected technical and tactical units for duty with OEF and ISAF, ranging from special operations forces (SOF) and sappers to civil-military cooperation units (CIMIC) and a surgical unit. Norway assumed the leadership of a multinational battalion-size battle group in Kabul late autumn 2003. This battle group was a typical example of a high profile contribution. When it was traded with the quick reaction force (QRF) in the German-led Regional Command North (RC N) in Mazar-e-Sharif, Norway continued its high profile tactical contribution to ISAF.

The principal challenge for a small nation is to tailor its forces to the demands of political acceptability and a force structure that is sustainable in the sense of being able to field relevant and robust forces; and it has to be affordable over time. But even a shared strategy does not necessarily affect the nation's contribution in the same way as domestic policy and politics, as seen in the failed attempt to provide engineer troops to the UN in Darfur or Haiti in 2007–08.

The atomistic approach needs above all a shared strategy. This might not be too difficult under an established alliance or the UN, but can be more challenging in ad-hoc coalitions. Then the forces being asked for need to be available, along with some degree of sustainability for those forces. Finally, the country needs to balance strategy and the need to retain some influence over the forces one can afford to contribute – or forces which it is politically possible or desirable to provide. And then, sooner or later, the domestic politics card will be played at home.

9 K. M. Bondevik, "Stortinget – møte den 19. november 2003 kl. 10" [Storting – meeting of 19 November 2003 at 10:00] (Stortinget [23 March 2009]); Kjell Dragnes, "Humanitære soldater" [Humanitarian troops], *Aftenposten*, 13 December 2005; and *Dagbladet*, "Humanitært eller militært?" [Humanitarian or military?] editorial, *Dagbladet*, 5 June 2005.

Holistic approach

The holistic approach requires Norwegian military forces to be applied in accordance with a holistic policy, i.e. “with the addition of other means”.¹⁰ The Norwegian government will engage across a broader front to achieve its political ends and ambitions, but within the framework of an international operation. Strictly speaking, it means that the Norwegian Armed Forces will be providing direct support for *the political intercourse* and *other available means* by interacting primarily with Norwegian civilian resources. The Norwegian military strategy will thusly be more directly linked to *Norwegian* policy and ambitions.

The consequences for the Norwegian Armed Forces of a holistic approach should be less complicated to manage, since the political-strategic level will manage the multinational dimension. Once deployed, civil–military interaction will largely be between Norwegians, all within a national culture of cooperation and interoperability. The forces deployed must cover all the military functions needed for the immediate tactical tasks, relying upon the multinational forces for operational and strategic resources. This will demand a much wider national force composition than with an atomistic approach, since national forces are expected to fulfil much more of the force requirements at the tactical and lower operational levels. Those forces must have a combined arms capability at tactical level in order to fulfil a wide range of tactical tasks. Norwegian strategic or operational resources can in this specific case also support the multinational operational and strategic echelon (e.g., NORSOF, ISTAR etc.).¹¹

When NATO expanded into northern Afghanistan, Norway took over the PRT MEY after the UK. The PRT MEY developed into a multinational and holistic approach unit, including police, development aid etc. During the time Norway had both the PRT MEY and the QRF, holism and atomism were both applied. In addition, NORSOF was redeployed to the Kabul area as an operational resource. When the QRF was handed over to the Bundeswehr in July 2008 and all Norwegian military forces, together with some of policy’s other means, were moved to PRT MEY, there was a clear focus on the holistic approach, with a multinational element including Iceland and Latvia. But as the public defence debate at the time indicated, the fatigue of the newly transformed Norwegian Armed Forces was already taking its toll.

Holism is well tuned to the idea of NATO’s comprehensive approach, and will allow a government to implement policy instruments on a broad basis in or-

10 In this example, Clausewitz logic is deliberately presented with a twist; the other means being everything but the military.

11 NORSOF (Norwegian SOF), ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, targeting, acquisition and reconnaissance).

der to pursue its political ends and ambitions. For the armed forces, the holistic approach demands a broad troop contribution and a larger force pool to be able to sustain its contribution for some time. It is a desirable approach for doing well, but perhaps too demanding for a lean (or skinny) force.

Operational consequences

This section will discuss the consequences of holism and atomism at the operational and tactical levels. In a Norwegian context the operational level includes both the ability to conduct Norwegian-led combined joint campaigns and operations, and to provide core headquarters (HQ), such as HQ KFOR-V, and competent staff officers in a combined joint HQ. At the tactical level it is all about the services' ability to field forces for operations within the framework of the two approaches, to deploy tactical HQ for national or multinational tactical components, and finally to provide competent service staff officers in the multinational HQ.

OPERATIONAL ART

Operational art is defined by NATO as “the employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, operations and battles.”¹² The Norwegian Joint Doctrine (NJD), defines operational art as “ a military commander’s use of the means at his disposal to achieve the desired effects and fulfil the overall objectives.”¹³ In short, operational art should make sure that military means are applied in such a way that they contribute to the strategic objectives, and thus the political ends or ambitions.

This might sound self-evident, but military history is not lacking in examples of the contrary. The causes are often complicated and at times complex, but one of the key problems that emerged as Western society became industrialised and bureaucratised, was to maintain the connection between policy and strategy, on the one hand, and the means to achieve the strategic objectives, on the other. Two main approaches appeared, one mainly bottom-up and one mainly top-down.

12 NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine, AJP-01(C)*, 21 March 2007, para. 0429, pp. 4–15.

13 Norwegian Defence Staff, *Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine* (Oslo, 2007) para. 0510, p. 105.

The bottom-up approach, exemplified by the Germans in the two world wars, is best expressed by Ludendorff when placing tactics above strategy.¹⁴ Superior tactics should create tactical victories and the strategic victory should be the culmination of all these. The most famed result of this approach is what is known as *Blitzkrieg*. The German tactical successes in the opening years of the Second World War filled the gap of a lack of Wehrmacht strategy, at least until early December 1941.¹⁵ *Blitzkrieg* has thus been one of the most influential historical cases when it comes to concepts and doctrinal development in the West since the mid 1970s.

The top-down approach is what is known today as operational art. It emerged in several places, but the theoretical underpinnings were developed and written in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and '30s. The physical outcomes, such as large scale armoured penetrations and envelopments might indicate a similarity with *Blitzkrieg*. But that is only the surface. The key difference between the German *Panzer Operations* and the combined joint operations of the Western Allies, or the large multi-front operations of the Red Army, is their strategic-tactical linkage. Or as some would say when it comes to *Blitzkrieg*, the lack of such.¹⁶

Since its adoption by NATO, operational art has become institutionalised as the Alliance's approach for applying military means to strategic ends. Despite being challenged (or complemented, depending on one's viewpoint) by emerging concepts, such as the effects-based approach to operations, operational art is still a key element of NATO doctrine, and of the NJD.

The PSO framework does not exclude operational art, despite operational art's origin in the twentieth century's world wars and the Cold War standoff. Operational art is still about applying forces to achieve strategic ends, whether those ends were NATO's defence against the Soviet Army, or providing security and stability in the Hindu Kush. It is still about the application of military force for strategic ends, where the direct linkage between these ends and the forces is

14 G. Isserson, "The Evolution of Operational Art", in *Evolution of Soviet Operational Art, 1927–91: Documentary Basis. – Vol. 1: Operational Art, 1927–64*, ed. H. E. Orenstein (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 49. Also Svechin is critical of the German lack of strategic use of tactical and operational successes e.g. Svechin, *Strategy*, pp. 69, 85. Both these reflects the Russian (Soviet) critique of the German focus on the military and not the political dimension of war. See also R. B. Asprey, *The German High Command at War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff conduct World War I* (New York: Quill, 1991), p. 367.

15 Conversation with LtCol dr Gerhard P. Groß, Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA), Potsdam 30 October 2007. See also K.-H. Frieser, *Blitzkrieglegende* (München: R. Oldenbourg, 2005), pp. 437–41.

16 *Ibid.*

less than obvious. And most importantly, it is about subjugating tactics to strategy and not allowing excellent lower level performance to put policy at risk by demanding a strategy that does not support the political ends and ambitions.¹⁷

Norway's stated ambition – to be able to conduct combined joint operations on Norwegian soil or territorial waters, including crisis management – will not be discussed here, as it is outside the multinational PSO framework. In a holistic approach Norway's National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) should in theory assume a greater responsibility for a Norwegian force contribution than it would under an atomistic approach. First of all because the military contribution is expected to be larger and more complicated since that alone is putting a larger strain on logistics. Since Norwegian forces will carry out more missions themselves and liaise directly with Norwegian civilian resources, the higher echelon coordination in Norway is expected to be greater. In that case, the NJHQ might take over some coordination authority from the strategic level, because of its staff capacity and organisational proximity to the Area of Operations. That might revitalise the operational level in managing the planning of civil – military cooperation in the theatre.

An inherent risk in the holistic approach is that the actual managing of the operations might drift from the multinational HQ over to the NJHQ. Not by design, but as some form of “command creep”; one tends to cut corners to get things done. The more national the effort in a limited (tactical) part of an Alliance operation, the greater the temptation to utilise national channels to control national assets. Another challenge is the degrading of the multi-nationality as such. A national tactical sub-optimisation that is counter to the operational optimisation in the theatre might occur. Then the bottom-up approach might return in new clothing, undermining a common strategy. Failing to subordinate national hobbyhorses to the overarching strategy and operational concepts of the Alliance can produce spectacular local success stories, but put the joint effort at risk.

With an atomistic approach, the NJHQ will run national issues as the national contingent commander (NCC), national logistics, and hopefully act as a buffer between the political/strategic level and the Norwegian tactical commander(s) in the AOO. Since the Alliance will ideally plan and conduct the operations, national authorities should, again ideally, limit their efforts to providing and sustaining their contributions. However, there will always be national limitations and caveats. National authorities will then administer these

17 J. B. Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory”, *Parameters*, vol. XXXVIII, no. 2 (2008): 25, 26–28.

limitations, which might include the so called “red card”, a direct refusal to participate in an operation or part of it. Other limitations can be geographical, as was the case with the German and Norwegian refusal to participate in the operations in southern Afghanistan.¹⁸ These limitations and caveats will, of course, also be valid with a holistic approach, but are much more valid when a nation provides tactical forces under an multinational HQ and the different nations have different levels of risk acceptance, troop posture etc. Germany did send 200 specially trained paratroopers to reinforce their PRT in Kunduz in February 2008.¹⁹ These troops were part of the German holistic PRT approach, and the paratroopers operated under German national command in the vicinity of the PRT in order to prevent and combat threats posed by insurgents.

The operational challenges are very much about managing the nation’s strategic choices when it comes to participation. Operational art, and the operational HQ, are tasked with managing the troops in the theatre in such a way that the nation’s strategic objectives are achieved. Both the holistic and atomistic approach pose challenges. Some are common, some unique, and others reflect higher echelon (motivated by politics) limitations. The operational level has its unique complexities to deal with, very different from the complexities of early twentieth-century operational art, but it is still about applying tactical means to achieve some sort of strategic ends.

FORCE STRUCTURE AND FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS

Since the autumn of 2003 Norway has deployed the core of a mechanised infantry battalion with a battalion headquarters and a CS/CSS company to Afghanistan. As a result of the reduced size of the army and the increased fatigue of deployed personnel, Norway was barely able to field a company-size task unit in 2008.²⁰ Norway is present in Afghanistan for its seventh year, and is expected to be there for some time yet. Norway has also acknowledged NATO’s strategy, which calls

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- 18 The most celebrated case in the media is the political limitation posed upon the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. E.g. Spiegel, “Nato-Partner wütend über deutsche Kampf-Hemmungen”, *Spiegel Online*, 16 November 2006 [online 23 Mar 2009]; M. Gebauer and S. Weiland, “USA und Briten überziehen Deutschland mit Kritik-Kampagne”, *Spiegel Online*, 17. November 2006 [online 23 Mar 2009], and Spiegel, “Berlin will Afghanistan-Einsatz flexibel regeln”, *Spiegel Online*, 18 November 2006 [online 23 Mar 2009].
- 19 Spiegel, “Germany Discovers a War in Afghanistan”, *Spiegel Online International*, 9 August 2008 [online 23 Mar 2009], Thomas Wiegold, “In Deckung und hoffen” *Online Focus*, 7 April 2008 [online 23 Mar 2009]; and Thomas Wiegold, “Verband dringt auf mehr Soldaten für Afghanistan“ *Online Focus*, 22 April 2008 [online 23 Mar 2009].
- 20 Verdens Gang, “Må kutte styrker i Afghanistan” [Forces facing cuts in Afghanistan], editorial, *VG*, 3 April 2008.

for a long term presence with substantial ground forces, assisting in providing security for development, and in training and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA). Such a long term commitment allows the contributing nations to prepare and develop forces suited for that task.

As Norway has accepted NATO's long term presence in Afghanistan, and has chosen to participate both for the future of Afghanistan and the future of NATO, Norwegian troop contributions and national force development should ideally reflect such a choice. The recent experience with the quick reaction force (QRF) – and the respect that force has gained – is a clear indication of the kind of forces needed and appreciated by NATO, and there should be very good a reason for such a success to be abandoned. Norway has a well-deserved record of delivering boots on the ground for PSO and stabilisation operations. This, combined with Norwegian troops' proven ability to fight and win engagements, should make such an option a likely choice. Furthermore, the valuable experience of having battalion and company commanders and an ample number of small unit leaders fielded in a national combined arms task group would alone be worth the effort.

Based on NATO's stated needs over the next decades in Afghanistan (a struggle NATO cannot afford to lose),²¹ it is a little odd that the current Defence Analysis does not jump to the rescue and reinforce the Army's capability to contribute with a much needed robust tactical unit. The present predictability for the forces for NATO's mission in Afghanistan in the years to come is just as predictable as the need for forces for the defence of Norway during the Cold War. Theatre-wide and operational contributions from all services could supplement a valid and visible footprint on the ground, based on demand and availability. Such a contribution would serve both Norway's need for Alliance coherence and also reinforce national capabilities with up to date and valid experience in an allied tactical and operational context.

With a holistic approach the services would in principle establish a broader national force in theatre, and also cooperate more closely with national civil resources. That will demand a wider variety of national tactical forces to be integrated in a joint force. But also a more focused political leadership to harmonise national assets with the Alliance and also to provide broad national civil-military planning and coordination of national assets. The military demands will be comparatively heavy in maintaining a force at the higher tactical or lower operational level, including national logistics led by the NJHQ. Compared to an

21 NATO, "The Istanbul Agenda", video interview with Jaap de Hoop Scheffer [online 22 Mar 2009].

atomistic approach, holism will put a greater strain on a larger part of the Norwegian Armed Forces, a strain that the current force structure probably would not be able to sustain. The experience gained with the predecessor of the NJHQ as core for KFOR V HQ in 2001 might give an indication of the demand for a national field HQ with support units in a holistic approach.

Both approaches will need a force structure large enough to train units and commanders at the lower tactical level (brigade, task group and air wing), both in order to field and maintain forces, and to provide highly competent service staff officers for tactical and operational level headquarters in national or multinational forces.

Tentative conclusions

As the aim of military theory is to give guidance on how to win in war, or secure strategic ends using military force. To succeed, those ends must be addressed in one way or another. If not, military forces will be reduced to a passive presence or worse, involved in bottom-up initiated actions that may score tactical successes but are just as likely to harm the (assumed) strategic ends.

The aspects and challenges in a theoretical perspective of the atomistic and holistic approaches to the application of military force serve to amplify what small nations are struggling with in the military field. Both approaches highlight specific small-state challenges in ensuring that the nation's contribution into a multinational campaign or operation really serves the nation's strategic ends. Those specific ends must be identified and expressed if there are any unique national strategic ends outside an alliance or coalition. As the Canadian examples illustrate, national strategic ends might simply be just being there alongside our most important ally.²² If being a force contributor is what matters, just having the "right" kind of forces might be enough. If the tactical contributions are also units capable of securing tactical Alliance objectives, the strategic gain might well be proportionally far greater than the unit's volume. The Norwegian QRF in the ISAF RC N might well serve as an example. The rest are information operations to make sure the world knows how supportive we are of the common cause of world peace. And, of course, hope that any goodwill provided by such contributions can be cashed in when Realpolitik rules.

If there are important national strategic ends worth pursuing, the holistic approach might be the approach of choice. Bringing together the nation's other political means alongside the military's might then be the likely choice to achieve an overall national strategic end. The demands on own forces are greater than

22 Vance, "Tactics Without Strategy ...", p. 281.

contributing isolated tactical units; holistic forces might include robust combined arms tactical forces combined with a certain degree of national ability to influence the planning and conduct of operations at the operational level. That will also call for a national command and control capability able to provide strategic and/or operational command and control, and to interact closely with any in-theatre JHQ. A holistic approach may also demand quantity as well as quality. Quantity is a feature currently lacking in the Norwegian Armed Forces and is not expected to reappear in the foreseeable future.

When we use the models of the holistic and atomistic approach as analytic models, we see that the Norwegian contribution to the operations in Afghanistan has moved from an atomistic approach at the tactical and operational level, over to a holistic approach, as seen in the reinforcement of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Meymaneh (PRT MEY) and the subsequent handover of the QRF to the Bundeswehr in the summer of 2008, leaving the time limited NORSOF as the remaining atomistic contribution.

Both approaches should need a national force structure capable of supporting the strategic military ends Norway chooses to pursue. For a small state, balancing ends, ways and means might be quite a challenge. Perhaps just the acceptance of the interdependency between ends, ways and means might be the first step in choosing an approach to one's own international involvements that will give strategy a chance.

THE ROLE OF LAW AND HOW TO MAINTAIN LEGAL COHERENCE

Sigrid Redse Johansen

Legal coherence – approaching the problem

The chapter discusses the use of military power by NATO nations. Is the outcome of the operation best served by an atomistic or a holistic approach to implementing the comprehensive approach? In my chapter I examine this question by looking at one legal consideration: the quest for legal coherence. I have named it “The role of law and how to maintain legal coherence”. The title presupposes that “legal coherence” is a good thing to have.

In addressing these legal considerations I ask a couple of fundamental questions, namely whether legal coherence is a good thing to have in a multinational military operation framework and, if it is a good thing to have, how to achieve it in the context of a comprehensive approach. Is legal coherence best achieved under a holistic or an atomistic approach?

What is legal coherence?

We have coherence when things fit together. In this case the applicable legal framework. One example is the definition of criminal acts. If I for example express a strong dissatisfaction with the Norwegian government and its dispositions over the continental shelf in the High North, the statement is governed by my constitutional right to freedom of expression. If I express the same dissatisfaction in a situation where Norway should happen to be at war with its neighbours – defending the northern areas – my statements might be punishable as treason.¹ The punishable element of my actions (my statements) is related to the state of war in the Norwegian territory. The two legal regulations, freedom of speech and criminal treason, are understood in relation to each other. We might simply say that my freedom of expression in times of peace is *coherent* with my restricted freedom of speech in certain areas, at war. This is a two-sided relationship: the constitutional freedom of speech on one side and the penal code criminalising treason on the other. And finally, enforcing the penal code is

1 Norwegian penal code of 1902, art. 86, and new penal code of 2005 (not yet into force), art. 119.

a matter for the Norwegian police. The use of military force is reserved for cases of external threat.²

In an international or comparative context it is not unusual for different countries to have different approaches to the question of applicable law, both regarding the substance of the law, for example whether a statement such as that referred to above is criminal or not, and regarding enforcement methods, whether it is the police or the armed forces who have the powers to prevent certain crimes. Different approaches in different countries is not a problem as long as their respective sets of norms work mainly autonomously from each other. The problem of coherence arises if the two systems of legal norms are to work together as one. The Norwegian understanding of freedom of speech may not be *legally coherent* under another state's conception of treason – if the two conceptions were to be merged within the same framework of norms. This may result in a more than two-sided relationship; there would be the relationship between freedom of speech and punishable treason in a national context and the same relationship in a multinational context. In the following I leave the definition of what legal coherence is alone, and ask whether legal coherence is to be considered a common good.

Legal coherence – a common good?

The answer to the question might have been implied by the premises of the abovementioned example. Incoherence between legal conceptions might create challenges. We can look at these challenges more closely to discuss the presumed desirability of legal coherence.

To have a well-functioning legal system a modern state must be governed by the *rule of law*. This means in the simplest terms that legislation, decisions and enforcement measures are guided by rules and not the arbitrary use of state power. Rule of law is often linked to fundamental human rights, for example the right to protection from arbitrary deprivation of life (referred to as *the right to life*), the right to liberty and security of person, the prohibition of slavery and the right to a fair trial, to mention some examples.³ Arbitrary execution of power hinders equal treatment of equal cases. This – equal treatment of equal cases – is a basic tenet in the creation of rule of law. Substantial lack of legal coherence is a challenge for this part of the creation of rule of law. Another aspect

2 Norwegian Constitution, art. 99, second paragraph.

3 See UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966 (ICCPR), art. 6, 8, 9 and 14. The equivalent rights are laid down in Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950 (ECHR), art. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.

of equal treatment of equal cases is the level of transparency and predictability. Each citizen must be able to foresee the likely consequences of their actions. Let us therefore stick to the initial presumption that legal coherence normally and in broad terms is a common good to achieve in a state governed by the rule of law. But what, then, about joint military operations abroad? Is legal coherence a common good there as well? A military operation does not primarily enforce law. Law enforcement is a civilian task. But military force will support civilian law enforcement as a part of a comprehensive approach.⁴ The understanding of permissible and non-permissible methods in these supporting functions may differ from one troop-contributing nation to another. One state may use riot control agents for crowd control purposes and another state may have attached national reservations (caveats) to the use of such *less lethal weapons* based on the presumption that these weapons are solely for use by ordinary police for civilian law enforcement purposes – or are not tolerable at all. Two other practical areas exposed to different conceptions of applicable law, and hence where legal coherence would be perceived as a common good, are firstly regarding the arrest of persons and the subsequent handling of detainees, and secondly the execution of self defence. This use of national caveats is a challenge for the legal coherence of the force as a whole, both when it comes to operational planning and where factual execution is concerned. It requires a shared situational awareness regarding the concept of law among troop-contributing nations in order to know who will be able to support whom in different kinds of operations. Here, too, let us therefore stick to the initial presumption that legal coherence is a common good, and move on to the core of this chapter, namely the implementation of the comprehensive approach and the choice between a holistic or an atomistic approach.

Legal coherence and the comprehensive approach

NATO plays – at least for the future of NATO itself – a vital role in the international presence in Afghanistan. A discussion of the implementation of a comprehensive approach will for all practical purposes be directed at Afghanistan. The UN Security Council (SC) has focused on *cohesion* in this regard, when stating in resolution (RES) 1776 (2007)

that sustainable progress on security, governance and development, as well as the cross-cutting issue of counter-narcotics is mutually reinforcing and welcoming the continuing efforts of the Afghan Government and the international com-

4 See also NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine, AJP-01(C)*, 21 March 2007, pp. 1–9 and 1–10.

munity to address these challenges in a coherent manner through the comprehensive framework provided by the Afghanistan Compact.

This trend has been followed up. The Security Council has further recently (June 2008) emphasised

the importance of a comprehensive approach to address the drug problem of Afghanistan, which, to be effective has to be integrated into the wider context of efforts carried out in the three areas of Security, Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights, and Economic and Social Development.⁵

There are two issues I want to take forward from these quotations: the “cross-cutting issue of counter-narcotics” and the “coherent manner through the comprehensive framework”. For the purpose of this chapter it is the military (supporting) role in the struggle to combat crime (drugs) in a coherent manner through a comprehensive framework, which is interesting. This also implies that in this chapter I do not discuss comprehensiveness when it comes to humanitarian aid and development projects. My tentative conclusions in this chapter may therefore have less value for these other civilian aspects of coordination.

Armed forces are primarily present to provide security; this is the essence of the mandate of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force).⁶ The comprehensiveness entails a balance between armed force and law enforcement in the struggle against, among others, the drug industry. It is no secret that drugs finance weapons and therefore sustain the armed resistance against the Government of Afghanistan and hence the international presence supporting the Government. Nevertheless, there is an ongoing discussion and a need for constant consideration of the extent and manner in which the armed forces should deal with counter-narcotics. Drug dealing is a crime and crime is dealt with using law enforcement methods, by the police. The coherent manner in which these challenges are to be addressed – as emphasised in SC RES 1776 above – includes the need for a *legally coherent approach*. A legally coherent approach would entail a consistent view on the legal limits for the use of military force against actions which are primarily considered to constitute crime (and not military operations) and on the legal framework for cooperation between the armed forces and the civilian police. Thus legal coherence would entail consistency in the policy reflecting law as in whether one nation makes its forces available for certain kinds

5 UN SC res. 1817, 11 June 2008.

6 See for example UN SC res. 1386 (2001), 1510 (2003) and 1707 (2006).

of operations in close contact with law enforcement, or for supporting the local police during search and arrest operations.

Moving now from this general introduction on legal coherence and comprehensive approach to the more specific topic of combating crime in a military context, I shall attempt to draw some conclusions on which of the two approaches, holism or atomism, is the more likely to facilitate legal coherence, illustrated by the fight against organised crime (particularly drugs).

Military repression of crimes?

The title of this section is rather biased. I do not necessarily mean there is such a trend, but I believe it raises a relevant question. And the question, or challenge, as I see it can be put as follows: the comprehensive challenge is to choose and synchronise the appropriate means in order to achieve the aim of the operation. Should it be negotiation, trial or destruction? I have tried to illustrate the challenge as follows:

“No enforcement”	Law enforcement	“Combined force”	Armed force
Diplomatic pressure and negotiation	Investigation, apprehension and trial	Law enforcement and armed force	Directly deadly force without trial
	Human rights law	Human rights law and Law of armed conflict	Law of armed conflict

Figure 5.1: Illustration of methods for applying force, where the degree and intensity of use of force increases from left to right.

The boxes illustrate different enforcement measures and applicable law, where the degree and intensity of use of force increases from left to right. At the same time the boxes illustrate the cooperation or synchronisation between civil powers and the armed forces. I will comment on each box separately (apart from the first two which I treat jointly) and try to focus on issues of concern for promoting legal coherence.

NO ENFORCEMENT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

Both “no enforcement” and “law enforcement” are civilian “regular” methods of dealing with crime. I have separated the left box from the other boxes since diplomatic pressure does not involve force in the sense that is relevant here.

The law enforcement methods (the second box from the left) are governed by typical rule of law guarantees, for example the right to personal liberty and security, the presumption of innocence, the right to fair trial and the right to

life. Rule of law guarantees and law enforcement procedures are designed with a situation of peace in view. The rules will normally still apply when peace is broken but the initial position, legally speaking, is one of peace.

The different rules are subject to national interpretation and some of them may be subject to national derogation when public emergency so requires.⁷ The right to life may not be derogated from, except “in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war”.⁸ This means that civilian enforcement measures are subject to a doctrine of “minimum use of force”.

Death may be inevitable, but it should be so as a result of force which is no more than absolutely necessary ... in defence of any person from unlawful violence ... in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained ... in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.⁹

These criteria illustrate the European standard. The same wording is not repeated in the UN convention (ICCPR article 6), though the principle of “minimum force” is recognised. The article in the European convention (ECHR article 2) refers to three different situations: self-defence, arrests and detentions, and riot control. Each of these different law enforcement situations may also, in certain circumstances, be handled by the army. When handled by the army the human rights standard for the protection of life applies. Troop-contributing nations differ in their conception of when their armed forces are authorised to take part in the two latter kinds of situation and what measures they are authorised to use. Regarding the first situation, that of self-defence, multinational rules of engagement (ROEs) grant every person their individual right to self defence. Without entering the debate regarding the definitions of the *international* norm for individual self-defence, one can note that the notion of self-defence may differ from nation to nation and that this again may result in imposed restrictions – either explicitly or implicitly – on the force. Norwegian criminal law, for example, defines self-defence as including the right to protect third persons and property. This may be conceived as *extended* self-defence by other nations. Norwegian criminal law further defines *necessity* as a ground for justification – and not only

7 ICCPR, art. 4. It is a controversial question whether a state can derogate from human rights obligations extraterritorially. I leave this discussion here.

8 ECHR art. 15, second paragraph. The same is not explicitly said in ICCPR, but lawful acts of war are not normally considered to breach the right to life in this context either.

9 ECHR article 2 (2).

an excuse – leaving the act not only free from criminal responsibility, but making it lawful, and hence not possible to respond to with an act of self-defence.

Moving now from these examples of law enforcement to the *fourth* box above, namely situations where armed force is being used.

ARMED FORCE

As stated in the box, the applicable set of rules is primarily the international humanitarian law (the law of armed conflict). The situations will (normally) occur in an armed conflict. One of the major differences from the law enforcement situations when it comes to applicable law is the threshold for the protection of life. As referred to in the above section, the right to life as a human rights guarantee allows deaths “resulting from lawful acts of war”. This implies that use of force is not limited to the “minimum use of force” standard as in situations of self defence, arrest, detention and riot control. It is permissible to use directed, deadly force where the aim of the force is to kill the opponent. Another difference is that the overall aim of the use of force is *solely* to kill or inflict physical harm. It is not being used to bring someone to trial for an alleged crime. International law places restrictions on the methods and means used in armed conflict and one of its primary goals is to minimise the human suffering to what is strictly necessary if military objectives are to be achieved. In this regard it is not considered strictly necessary to direct military operations at civilians; we uphold a *principle of distinction*.

So far we can distinguish fairly easily between the situations – peace or armed conflict – and the applicable law – primarily human rights standards or primarily humanitarian law standards. But there may be situations in which it may be argued that both sets of rules are applicable. Those are the cases I have labelled “combined force”, and placed in the box in the middle in figure 5.1.

“COMBINED FORCE”

The “combined force” situations are situations where both armed force and law enforcement measures may be argued to be applicable. There may be situations which have escalated beyond the control of the local police. There may be situations where the army is expected to provide for security in an area and encounters crowds of people, and there may be situations where the army is to control certain areas and administer road controls. There may, in other words, be situations where the initial situation does not correspond to either regular law enforcement or the “regular” use of armed force in an armed conflict situation. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) of the operations are aimed at regulating situations like this, and will serve as a guideline; but as emphasised above,

the different national conceptions may lead to different national reservations in cases like those mentioned.

There is one further question, and this applies more in the specific context of the comprehensive approach – in particular in Afghanistan – and that is whether the “box in the middle” is increasing, or put differently, whether it reflects the “normal standard”. When the challenges require a comprehensive approach in a coherent manner, where – as is the case in Afghanistan – drugs finance weapons, will the initial position require physically close coordination between law enforcement and use of military force, rather than the means described in the boxes on either side?

I can only presume that the answer is “yes”, so let us assume so. We may characterise such a situation as both a trend towards military repression of crimes and, at the same time, the other side of the coin – towards the increased “civilianisation” of the armed forces. What then is the consequence? One obvious consequence is the need for an even more coherent approach to the application of rules. We can identify a need to define the aim of the particular operation concerned. Is it a person wanted for negotiation, for trial or wanted dead? One must identify the desired effect, in synchronisation with political (diplomatic), humanitarian and economic means. Is this done best when the national troop contribution is provided under a holistic or an atomistic approach? I will address this issue on the basis of what has been presented so far.

Holistic versus atomistic approach

Under a holistic approach the military forces are deployed in national coordination with the civilian components. The atomistic approach has the military forces deployed in multinational coordination with the civilian components – not nationally. Today, Norway contributes in a manner that may be described as akin to the holistic approach, as in the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan. The PRTs are primarily nationally run in close cooperation with the Afghan authorities and international organisations. The structures of the PRTs differ in the different regions in Afghanistan. The Norwegian official web page enumerates their tasks: to support the elected central government in Kabul, the national Afghan army (ANA) and the national Afghan police (ANP), and to assist these in the development work in the provinces. The PRT is therefore an important institution in the work of disarming illegal armed groups, identifying elements of the narcotics trade and contributing to reducing the power of regional warlords. The civil element in the Norwegian-led PRT consists of po-

litical advisors, police and development advisors whose main task is to support democracy and the development of society within their respective fields.¹⁰

These tasks may be compared with the illustration in the foregoing section, where synchronisation issues must be identified according to the goal of the operation, whether it is negotiation, trial or destruction. Let us first state the obvious: Norwegian armed forces cooperate with Norwegian police, who in turn assist the local police. The Norwegian national framework for cooperation between army and police is already legally coherent to a degree which is practicable.¹¹ This may work as follows: the Norwegian police assist and advise local police regarding the use of force and separation of powers between the army and the police during a search operation for illegal weapons; the local police ask for security support from the Norwegian army during the search operation. The Norwegian armed forces will (it is to be hoped) follow the same principles as those already advised by the Norwegian police. This is a step in the right direction towards legal coherence – and towards operational effectiveness. What is gained by this? The local police will receive advice which is already coherent, and the local population will have a chance to see what procedures are being followed during law enforcement (search operations), which again is one of the basic rule of law guarantees.

Can this be done at the multinational level? In theory, yes, of course, and it would be the optimal situation, but there may be practical challenges regarding the different legal conceptions of law enforcement methods and assistance from the armed forces, as mentioned in the previous section. Whether the armed forces are trained for, and authorised to, assist in riot control situations using “less lethal” gas weapons for crowd control purposes or not, differs from nation to nation.

The advantage of coordinating the civil and military efforts at the multinational level rather than the national level is argued to be broader unity in the overall area of operations. One could say that NATO as an alliance should be able to demand that the application of force take place in a legally coherent manner in cooperation between civil actors in law enforcement assignments and armed forces either supporting the civil powers or conducting military operations themselves. On the other hand, NATO is (still) a military alliance and has

10 Norwegian National Joint Headquarters, “De norske styrkene i Afghanistan” [Norwegian forces in Afghanistan], 4 February 2008 (Forsvarsnett [online 18 Mar 2009]).

11 The Norwegian principle is laid down in the Constitution article 99, second paragraph, and *Instructions on assistance from the Armed Forces to the police*, 28 February, no. 220, 2003.

no authority to instruct its civil counterparts. Nor does it have full command over its own military forces. This implies that troop-contributing nations, maintaining full command, and transferring operational command, will always be able to deny requests for certain actions and the disposition of its own forces, even though the nation does not exercise instruction in operational matters. These mechanisms will always grant the contributing nation the possibility of controlling controversial conduct by its armed forces, including whether and how they take part in law enforcement assignments as illustrated above – in particular apprehension, detention and riot control issues.

In the PRT concept, which is regional and closely connected to peacetime functions of the host state, NATO forces find themselves in the core environment where civil coordination issues should be exercised coherently.

Let us assume that there are obvious advantages for the law enforcement functions from taking a holistic approach when the mission is to reconstruct or establish peacetime functions – as is the primary task of the PRTs. We may then ask how different regional holistic *approaches* will influence the reconstruction of a whole country. Again we may start with the obvious: creating little Norway, little Germany and little Italy in another country will hardly be perceived as a good way to achieve national unity, especially when the host state is already fragmented. So we do not want a holistic approach which leaves a national footprint so deep that the regional differences become flagrant. This is not legal coherence and it is cited as a challenge by Norway's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, in a speech to Parliament on 5 February 2009. Mr Støre argues for a closer Nordic coordination of the efforts in Afghanistan.¹² At the same time, legal coherence may not require total unity. In a state which is well functioning under the rule of law, some regional differences are acceptable. To put it another way: we accept legal pluralism, but not internal incoherence. But when we accept the pluralism we must also address the challenges. Synchronisation issues always need to be faced at a multinational level and it may be that one of the most crucial factors is shared legal awareness. National differences can hardly be avoided but they can be communicated and therefore taken into consideration during planning.

The reflections above may not be valid for a multinational operation where the focus is less on state reconstruction and directed more towards “traditional”

12 See Jonas Gahr Støre, “En samordnet plan for Norges bidrag til Afghanistan” [A coordinated plan for Norway's contributions to Afghanistan], 5 February 2009 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [online 18 Mar 2009]).

combat but, in any case, nor is the combat situation that which critically requires the implementation of a comprehensive approach.

Tentative conclusions

Certain conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing. Legal coherence, understood as an internally well-fitted legal framework, is assumed to be a common good and worth achieving when implementing a comprehensive approach in a multinational operation. Legal coherence is particularly demanding when the operation takes place in a situation marked by a primary need for law enforcement to contribute towards establishing the rule of law and respect for fundamental human rights. Law enforcement is not primarily a military task, but the need for military assistance while combating serious crime is apparent. Law enforcement is a function of state power and is primarily exercised in peacetime situations. The situations in which directed lethal force is authorised arise solely in an armed conflict situation. During peacetime and in the conduct of law enforcement, the principle of minimum use of force is applied. The coordination between civil elements and military forces when it comes to supporting law enforcement tasks is marked by national limitations, which again will pose a challenge to the achievement of legal coherence.

For the creation of legal coherence, nationally coordinated provision of forces in a holistic approach may work better than providing forces in an atomistic approach when the operation requires substantial law enforcement support. The critical national differences regarding legal concepts are expected to show up particularly during detention and riot control operations, as well as in self-defence issues. National synchronisation may *not* be advantageous for humanitarian aid and other development projects, which may benefit from, in the case of Afghanistan, closer UN coordination. This point of view has been taken from the Norwegian authorities and is not necessarily completely true of the creation of rule of law in support of law enforcement. In order to help meet a foreseeable need for the employment of force in support of law enforcement, thereby contributing to the establishment of rule of law standards and maximising operational effect, the procedures for separation of powers and principles of command between civil elements and the armed forces may benefit from being synchronised nationally.

ETHICAL PREREQUISITES AND IMPLICATIONS

Nils Terje Lunde

Introduction

In this chapter I discuss choice of strategy from an ethical perspective. Often one thinks of the ethical perspective as a matter of implications. But this is just one part of the ethical perspective. The more fundamental question is about the ethical prerequisites for a chosen political/military strategy. Discussion of ethical prerequisites will give a necessary framework for understanding the ethical implications. On the other hand it is important to stress the practical role of ethics and ethical reasoning. It has to do with concrete choices in politics, as well as in the field.

The relationship between theory and practice can also be seen as a relationship between strategy and tactics. The principal question is here is in what way and to what degree strategic choices impact on tactical decisions. This is a general question which is beyond the scope of this chapter, The main focus is strategy, not tactics. This means that the major analysis will be of *ad bellum* rather than *in bello*. The line of distinction between these two is, however, not a precise one. It indicates that some *in bello* aspects, namely *distinction* and *proportionality*, need to be discussed.

Applying an ethical perspective to choice of strategy is not self-evident. Some of the traditional models of choice analysis in political science regard the ethical perspective as irrelevant. Their theoretical framework is political realism in its various forms. If ethics is discussed at all, it may be understood largely as a question of rhetorical phrases, i.e. language used to legitimise hard political reality.¹

Paradoxically, this line of reasoning can also be used from an ethical position which in many ways is the opposite of political realism, namely pacifism. In the context of this chapter it is not possible to discuss the different meta-positions on the relationships between ethics and the use of military power. The question of the role of ethics compared to other factors is, however, of great importance and will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

1 M. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 2nd ed. (1st ed. 1977) (Basic Books, 1992), pp. 3–20.

Choice of strategy is defined as choice between two different approaches: holistic and atomistic. Fundamentally, of course, it necessary to ask whether the option is of significant ethical interest. If one is to discuss the ethical merits of holism and atomism, one *a priori* accepts the use of Norwegian or other countries' military forces in international operations. It has to be stated that the most fundamental ethical discussion about the modern use of military force is not about *approach* but *rationale*. In the context of this chapter it is important to mention this, even if it is not possible to discuss it more broadly. However, the question of *rationale* for military force is also relevant in a discussion of the different approaches. Is military power to be understood as an isolated instrument or as a more or less integrated instrument in the service of (Norwegian) security, interests and values?² The answer to this question may involve choosing between a holistic approach and an atomistic approach.

The need for legitimacy

Max Weber defined legitimacy as a necessary prerequisite for any exercise of power.³ He also said that the monopoly on violence is a prerequisite of the modern state.⁴ In this definition the question of legitimacy may be regarded as fundamental, and actualised in all use of military force. This is also a basis for the discussion of choice of strategy. It is also a paradigm for a discussion of relationships between ethics and other normative factors.

Since the end of the Cold War, the legitimacy of using military power has been an important topic in Norway. This is reflected in political statements and military doctrines as well as public debates. The reason for this resurgence in interest is the fundamentally changing security situation, with new conflicts and a new role for the use of Norwegian military power.

During the Cold War, the security conditions, from a Norwegian perspective, were relatively stable. The rationale for using the Norwegian military power was territorial defence against invaders. Since the Cold War, this has changed dramatically. General Werner Christie, one of the heroes of WWII, who rose later to the rank of commander in the Royal Norwegian Air Force during the Cold War, puts it this way:

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- 2 The triad "security, interests and values" is the term used in NOU 2007: 15 and again in Norwegian Ministry of Defence, "Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier" [A Defence for the protection of Norway's security, interests and values], Proposition to the Storting, no. 48 (2007-2008).
 - 3 M. Weber, *Makt og byråkrati* [Power and bureaucracy], ed. Egil Fivelsdal (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1995) p. 87.
 - 4 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

When the Norwegian Armed Forces were merely a national defence against invasion; the task was clear. It was not necessary to debate ethics when the invader stood on the threshold of our border. Now it is different. We are participating in international “peace operations”. We have become crusaders, fighting for ideas. ... Now is the time for a serious moral debate ... in order to prepare ourselves for the new challenges.⁵

What Werner Christie says in short is that the new rationale and role of Norwegian military power is in need of a new definition of legitimacy. The legitimacy of territorial defence is self-evident. It follows directly from Weber’s definition of the state. The principle of a nation’s right to self-defence is fundamental in international politics and law. The other side of the coin is prohibition against intervention in another state, i.e. another state’s internal affairs. The question, however, is what is meant by “internal affairs”. It is also a question of the responsibility of a single state, or a group of states, in relation to international organisations such as the UN and NATO.

The Norwegian debate on military legitimacy – and Kosovo

The questions about the definition of internal affairs and the role of states in relation to international organisations both featured prominently in the public debates in Norway during the Kosovo crisis of 1998–99. In a broader sense, they also actualised the question of legitimacy and the new use of military power.

The military campaign lasted from 24 March to 10 June 1999. It was part of what is known as the “Kosovo conflict”. The Norwegian contribution to “Allied Force”, which the NATO operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was called, comprised six F-16 combat aircraft and a total of 210 men deployed as part of NATO’s *Immediate Reaction Forces* (IRF).⁶ My reason for using this particular example is not to give an ethical evaluation of the operation itself, or pursue an ethical discussion of the conflict, but rather to examine the Norwegian debate and some of very important issues it raised regarding the legitimacy of military power.

Although the Norwegian contribution was a part of an already established IRF, it was hotly contested nonetheless. There was no public consensus about the contribution, and while that was primarily a political challenge, it was also a military one. The deployed troops had families and were very much part of

5 W. Christie, “Om etikk og moral” [About ethics and morality], *Heimevernsbladet*, no. 10, oktober (1998): 3. Author’s translation.

6 T. Kristoffersen, *Samarbeid og sikkerhet i Europa* [Cooperation and security in Europe] (Oslo: Folk og Forsvar, 2002), pp. 316–319.

their local communities. Norwegian military culture has traditionally enjoyed very strong ties with civil society. There has also been strong popular and political consensus about the use of military power. This follows from the traditional use of the armed forces in defence of Norwegian territory and for the country's survival. A war fought for these reasons will naturally gain more support from the public than a war for political interests. From one point of view one could say that the new use of Norwegian forces should not need broad public support. This follows from the transition from a war of existence to the use of military force as a political instrument. From another point of view, however, the matter is more complicated. In a modern democratic and open society, where the presence of the media on the battlefield ensures operational transparency, public opinion will inevitably play a fundamental role.

Another issue was whether the Norwegian contribution was fielded for political reasons, or stemmed from more humanitarian intentions. It was a question about the definition of "intention". Another definitional question was more formal: was this a war or not? The then Norwegian Prime Minister stated that it was not war, but a limited military operation.⁷ Others said the distinction was irrelevant: the important point was the reality.

One aspect of that reality was the absence of a formal UN Security Council endorsement of the operation. This actualised the complex relations between politics and international law, but also the role of moral perspective in relation to politics and international law, in short, the question of legitimacy. What, one asked, legitimises the use of military power in international operations?

The principle of legitimacy

The debates in Norway over the handling of the Kosovo crisis could also be seen as a public discourse on legitimacy. The same could be said in relation to the war on terror in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. Norwegian forces were committed to Afghanistan, but without a political consensus in Norway. When Norwegian participation in an invasion of Iraq became an issue, the political conclusion this time was that Norway did not wish to participate.

The new international situation created fresh dilemmas for the use of Norwegian forces abroad, demonstrating once again the need for a clearer definition of legitimacy. According to a Government white paper, Norwegian military

7 Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik to the newspaper *Aftenposten* 25 March 1999. Later, Bondevik admitted that he should rather have called it a war, K. M. Bondevik, "Tale til Forsvarets fellesoperative hovedkvarter, Jåttå" [Speech to National Joint Headquarters, Jåttå], Stavanger, 2 September 2003 (Regjeringen [online 23Mar 2009]).

power may only be used for legitimate purposes. Legitimacy is said there to have legal, ethical and political aspect. Political legitimacy is not necessarily the same as ethical or legal legitimacy – and vice versa. The conclusion is that Norwegian armed forces may only be used for legitimate ethical, political and legal reasons, though the Government also says that weak legal legitimacy may be offset by strong political and ethical legitimacy. The correlation is illustrated in the following model.⁸




Figure 6.1: Trinity of legitimacy

We often think of relations between ethics, law and politics as linear and deductive. In other words, we expect ethical norms can be translated into rules and regulations and provide a legal framework for policy making. Use of military force under this model is a function of politics, cf. the Clausewitzian view of war as the continuation of politics by other means.

In reality, things are more complicated. The law, and this includes international law, is not just a framework within which politics takes place. It itself is created by political decisions. Political realities inform the interpretation and im-

8 Originally developed in N. T. Lunde, “Krigens legitimitet” in *Militæretikk* [Military ethics], N. T. Lunde and B. Mæland (Trondheim: Tapir akademisk forlag, 2006), p. 77.

plementation of the law. From this two distinctions can be drawn, one between the more static nature of laws and the dynamic nature of politics and another between idea and reality. Ethics is, to a certain degree, about ideas, but ideas tempered by reality or, more correctly, perceptions of reality. Changing legal and political realities are likely to impact on how ethical norms are understood and interpreted.

Just war theory as a framework for analysis

In the Norwegian debate about Iraq in 2003, the theory of just war was actualised as a framework for an ethical analysis of the use of Norwegian military power. The then Prime Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, himself a theologian schooled in the classical theory of a just war, used just war criteria in the governmental discussion of whether Norway should take part in the invasion of Iraq or not.⁹ The just war as a normative framework for the ethical evaluation of military power is also cited in *Strategic concept for Norwegian Defence*, given by Ministry of Defence in 2004.¹⁰

In this chapter it is neither possible nor necessary to relate the full history and theory of just war. Just war is a broad normative tradition within our culture, though it is more of a tradition than complete theory. It has accrued over a period of 2,500 years, and forms part of the very roots of our cultural history and as such is closely linked to our historical, cultural, religious, social and political development.¹¹

Just war theory posits certain ethical criteria for waging war at all (*ad bellum*) and for how war is waged in the field (*in bello*). The two sets of criteria can be complemented by other sets related to the overall political picture (*ad pacem*), the international legal and political structure preventing war (*ante bellum*) and the normalisation of society after war (*post bellum*).¹² Against a choice-of-strategy background, the main focus of this chapter will be on *ad bellum*, though I shall also deal to a certain degree with *in bello*.

- 9 Bondevik, "Tale til Forsvarets fellesoperative hovedkvarter". See also N. T. Lunde, *Norm og situasjon: En drøfting av kirkelig krig/fred-debatt i Norge 1945–2003* [Norm and situation. A discussion of ecclesiastical war/peace debate in Norway 1945–2003] (PhD diss, Lutheran School of Theology, 2007), p. 293f.
- 10 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Styrke og relevans: Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret* [Force and relevance. Strategic concept for the Norwegian Defence] (Oslo: Regjeringen, 2004), p. 52.
- 11 J. T. Johnson, *Can Modern War be Just?* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 6f.
- 12 Lunde, *Norm og situasjon ...* pp. 227–233.

With regard to just war as a broad tradition there are no standard criteria, but one possible list could be that proposed by James Turner Johnson.¹³

Jus ad bellum (whether resort to force is justified)	Jus in bello (whether a particular form of force is justified)
Just cause	Proportionality (in the sense of proximate good over evil)
Right authority	Discrimination, or non-combatant protection
Right intent	
Proportionality (in the sense of total good and evil anticipated)	
Peace as an end	
Last resort	

Figure 6.2: *Just war criteria*

Even more elaborate lists could be made.¹⁴ I shall however use these criteria to frame my ethical analysis of the choice between a holistic and atomistic strategy. This is not to suggest that all of the criteria are relevant in this analysis, and in the following I will concentrate on those criteria which may be regarded as being most relevant in this context.

Just cause

The formal definition of the criterion of just cause is that use of military power needs a just cause in order to be legitimate. The material definition of the criterion may, however, vary. In its narrowest form, just cause is defined as self-defence against military attack by another state. On this interpretation, international operations are illegitimate in nature, and the distinction between atomism and holism is irrelevant.

This narrow interpretation is not, however, the main normative position. Even if self-defence is regarded as the main example of a just cause, a wider interpretation of “self-defence” and “military attack” can legitimately be made.

13 Johnson, *Can Modern War be Just?* ..., p. 18.

14 J. H. Yoder, *When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996), p. 154ff.

While Norway has traditionally favoured the narrow interpretation of just cause, in the post-Cold War period, the rationale for using military force as an instrument of territorial defence was replaced by the need to achieve security policy ends. This fresh outlook is evidenced in a 2008 Government white paper where the purpose of military action is defined in terms Norwegian security, values and interests.¹⁵ This trinity actualises the question of just cause. It is indeed open to different interpretations, and one may ask whether this, as a framework for just cause, is too broad. And are security, values and interest compatible factors or not?

The answers will clearly affect the choice of approach. If one defines just cause narrowly with the emphasis on theoretical and practical differences between factors relating to security, values and interests, the atomistic approach would appear to be the more straightforward and “tidier”. On the other hand, if just cause is defined broadly and dynamically, stressing the compatibility of security, values and interests, the holistic approach would seem more to the point and comprehensive.

Right authority

The criterion of right authority is, in its formal definition, about competence in the exercise of power, including authorisation of the use of military power, command and control over military forces. It is called *competence de guerre*. In its material definition it has traditionally been understood as a function of the magisterial power of the state. It follows directly from the principle of sovereignty, elaborated in a territorial monopoly of violence and the prohibition of intervention. On the other hand, this traditional interpretation is rather out of step with the legal and political developments in international relations. The role and function of the state become relative as a result of an international system of security, a legal framework modifying the rights of the individual state, and of course the political realism on which international relations are based.

The question of right authority will consequentially actualise the nature of relations between domestic and international levels. Where does responsibility lie for the use, function and broader political goals of military participation in international operations? On the one hand, an atomistic approach will give the state command and control over its military forces in international operations

15 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, “Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier” [A Defence for the protection of Norway’s security, interests and values], Proposition to the Storting, no. 48 (2007-2008).

but weaken its control over the broader political function of these forces in theatre. This will be decided outside the state.

Adopting the holistic approach would give the state authority over a more elaborate and complex spectrum of means. But it could weaken the necessary focus on the military forces as other means become more important and in turn weaken the proper authority over military forces. One could also ask whether it is legitimate, or even possible, for a magisterial power to exercise the necessary and proper authority over such a spectrum of means. With regard to the criterion of right authority, the integration of different means in a holistic way would imply using the same standards and criteria regarding command and control of military means over the other means within the chosen spectrum. This may be possible, but will of course lead to new dilemmas and challenges.

This indicates further how the issue of right authority is not limited to discussions about relations between the international and domestic authority. It is also about challenges at home. In its general form it is about establishing and developing authority in a modern democratic state. If one presupposes a certain degree of public support as being necessary for international operations, the question will be which of the approaches would likely result in most public support. This cannot be answered *a priori*. What one can say is that holism requires broader public support, and has a better chance of obtaining it than atomism. The latter is more limited in scope and will consequentially neither require, nor gain, the same positive interest from the public.

On the other hand, an atomistic approach could be more susceptible to criticism given the nature of the means and the fact that it would be the only Norwegian contribution in the theatre. Within the framework of a holistic approach, the various means deployed will attract both positive and negative reactions. The failure of one could weaken the legitimacy of the others, with possible negative fallout for the military forces. And were the military forces to fail, it could undermine the legitimacy of the humanitarian means.

Proportionality (*ad bellum*)

The formal definition of proportionality as an *ad bellum* criterion is that use of military power has to be proportional in the sense of the total good and evil anticipated.¹⁶ The thinking behind the idea of proportionality is that the use of military means is not without costs – even if the cause is just and the goal achievable. In other words, it requires a cost/benefit analysis. Such an analysis is, of course, both complex and difficult.

16 Johnson, *Can Modern War be Just? ...*, p. 18.

Firstly there is the difficulty of evaluating proportionality between goals and means – if goals and means can be compared. A further difficulty follows from the nature of the use of military means. It is not mathematics, but rather a complex interplay of forces. Then there is the difficulty of proportionality in the *ad bellum* sense being a predicted evaluation, not a concrete evaluation of a successful operation. Whether the goal in fact is achievable is, in this respect, more a question of faith than science. Notwithstanding these reservations concerning the possibility of a proper evaluation of proportionality, I will try to indicate some relevant differences between approaches in the light of this criterion.

Choosing an atomistic approach brings the classical problems of proportionality to the fore. The question will be whether the approach is proportionate to the desired goals. The conclusion depends, moreover, on how one defines the goals. It is in fact a variation of the wider discussion on whether of military force can solve problems. If the problems are military in nature, the proportionality requirement may theoretically be fulfilled. If the problems are primarily political, economic or social in character, one may question whether military power alone is the right answer.

This actualises the holistic approach. One may say that, compared with an atomistic approach, a holistic approach is by definition better designed to solve the many challenges of which the military factor is just one. On the other hand, it can be said that an atomistic approach does in no way mean that military force is the sole means deployed in theatre. It would be the only Norwegian contribution, but there would be a comprehensive approach internationally, which of course would include non-military means. The difference is about the Norwegian perspective, not the operation in itself.

This perspective, in turn, actualises the relationship between the domestic and international levels. At the domestic level, proportionality can be defined and evaluated differently than at the international level. This may reflect real differences in interpretation of the situation in theatre, but it may also be the result of different interests. Choice of the strategy may depend more on domestic and international interests, than an evaluation of proportionality in theatre.

Last resort

One of the most important criteria in this discussion is last resort. In ethical terms, military power traditionally has been understood as last resort, i.e. when all peaceful means have been exhausted. In the Clausewitzian definition of war as a continuation of politics by other means, the traditional focus has been on the term *other means*. In this context military means are definitionally different from other means. Military means are used in situations where peaceful means

have been tried without success. Last resort would therefore suggest an atomistic approach.

But we could also interpret the Clausewitzian definition by accentuating *continuation ... by*. Military power would then be regarded as an integrated instrument of policy. The criterion of last resort could also be interpreted in accordance with this. This follows from the original Latin definition of criterion as *ultima ratio*. Military force may be the most powerful means, but it is not necessarily the final means. It can also be integrated with other means. A holistic approach is, one could say, based on the more integrated and dynamic interpretation of this criterion.

Right intent and Peace as an end

The just war criteria listed above include *right intent* and *peace as an end*. They are listed as two separate criteria. However, the traditional material definition of right intent is peace. The right intent of the use of military power is to defend, re-establish or establish peace. Consequently these two criteria should be considered together. The combined criterion is, in the language of ethics, teleological. A teleological perspective may define the overall goal (telos) of the use of military power.

In this way it actualises questions regarding the relationship between means and goals, as already discussed in the context of proportionality. The question here is the overall goal, i.e. peace, is more likely to be achieved atomistically or holistically. Do the different approaches make much of a difference in this regard? If they are understood as alternative options, i.e. between a military operation in theatre or a combined military and civil operation, this would clearly be important. But this is not the question being considered here. Here the focus is rather on the Norwegian perspective and the Norwegian strategy.

This actualises the other possible definition of right intent, which is about motivation. This is also a teleological perspective, but not in the sense of overall goal. Here it is a more virtue-oriented perspective, concerning the motivation of the actors. Motivation can be an individual's (and in this respect a part of *in bello*) or a collective's. Under this interpretation the criterion is relevant.

Ethically and critically, we have to question the motives for adopting either of the two approaches. What is the reason for choosing one of them? Is it a result of an analysis of the challenges in the theatre or of national interests? The pursuit of the national interest is of course a legitimate aspiration, but it is still necessary to distinguish between national interests and challenges in the theatre.

Proportionality (*in bello*) and discrimination

The two *in bello* criteria, proportionality and discrimination, are here analysed together. Proportionality in the context of *in bello* means the concrete proportionality of military force in the theatre. In this sense it is an ethical translation of the military principle of *economy of forces* where the underlying logic of proportionality *ad bellum* is the same as *in bello*. I discussed the logic earlier in this chapter and will therefore not pursue the matter further.

I want instead to examine the other criterion *in bello*, namely *discrimination* or *distinction*. In its formal definition, it requires a distinction to be drawn between legal and illegal subjects and objects in war. Only military subjects and objects may lawfully be targeted by military means. The ethical point of this distinction, from a deontological perspective (duty ethics), is that attacks on persons or objects have to be legitimised in order to be ethically acceptable. From a utilitarian perspective the distinction is a way of minimising the negative consequences of warfare to what is militarily necessary. In this respect it is the ethical translation of the principle of *military necessity*.

From a general perspective of modern warfare, the criterion of discrimination is problematic. The classical challenge is total war, where society is seen as participating in the war effort. This, however, is not the challenge in international operations, defined here as limited operations. The criterion of discrimination faces other problems as well, as conventional warfare, i.e. war between states, gives way to violence perpetrated by intra-national paramilitary groups whose methods we regard as illegal and illegitimate. These are general trends which, in themselves, do not favour one of the approaches above the other.

There is however a significant difference between them as far as discrimination is concerned. Atomism, from a national perspective, makes it easier to satisfy the discrimination clause in practice. If the Norwegian contribution to the theatre consists of military forces alone, it would be easier to draw a line between military and non-military targets. The *rules of engagement* will be an operational realisation of this distinction. Under a holistic approach, however, the Norwegian contribution would consist of military and civil elements, each with a different status in international law. At the same time, they can be seen as integrated parts of a wider package, working towards a common goal. This integration or mixture of different elements could make it harder to distinguish theoretically and practically between military and civilian elements in the theatre which would probably weaken the position of the military and, more especially, the civilian element such as humanitarian organisations in the area. It could also make it harder to achieve the overall goals of the operation.

Tentative conclusions

Ethically, the choice of a holistic or atomistic strategy has to be seen within a broader framework. This including not only practical implications but fundamental factors. One of the most important factors in international operations is legitimacy. The legitimacy of international operations, and thus of choice of approach, is not given. Legitimacy may be seen as a correlation of three factors: ethics, politics and law.

Legitimacy may in turn be operationally realised in terms of ethical criteria. The criteria of the just war tradition could be a relevant language and starting point for this realisation. The criteria will not just serve as a general guide, but be of use in the concrete analysis and comparison of the two strategies. As the analysis has shown, most of the traditional criteria are also relevant to a discussion of this specific question.

Having said that, however, it is not possible to draw entirely clear and unambiguous conclusions and recommend one strategy clearly above the other. Across all of the criteria discussed, each strategy has its share of *pros and cons*. This is due partly to the several possible interpretations of the criteria themselves, and indeed of the strategies. A third point is that this analysis is a theoretical exercise; it has not drawn on practice or experience. In other words, it is a discussion *a priori*, not *a posteriori*, and in that sense, a limited perspective.

But the absence of clear and unambiguous directions from the just war criteria is not necessarily a fundamental problem. It follows from the underlying logic of the just war tradition itself that ethical conclusions cannot be deduced from theory alone, but require a correlation between theory and practice, between norm and situation and between strategy and tactic.

Notwithstanding this defence of impartiality and relativism, I would put forward a possible conclusion, or rather a hypothesis, for further discussion. Although holism is dynamic and comprehensive, it nevertheless courts relatively difficult ethical problems. In a choice between holism and atomism, the latter, despite its disadvantages, may be the preferable option.

THE MEDIA ASPECT OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARY OPERATIONS

Dag Rist Aamoth

The relevance of the media

“Write, act and tell the most compelling story.”¹ This will be the key to success in today’s military operations, at least according to retired general Sir Rupert Smith. In his book, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, he introduces a new paradigm of warfare that he calls “war amongst the people”.² Sir Rupert challenges the traditional Western approach to war and points out that the use of military force seldom leads to the achievement of the desired political end state. A more subtle approach is needed, a comprehensive approach, which encompasses more than brute military force alone. Information is one of the aspects that needs to be incorporated into the plan, as alluded to in the general’s statement.

The importance of information is apparent to today’s military commanders. After all, the introduction of the microchip and satellite technology to military operations led to what many analysts refer to as an information revolution in military affairs.³ This technological development has enabled Western forces to enjoy a degree of information superiority on the battlefield making them superior to any other conventional military adversary. A point well demonstrated by the US-led coalitions in the 1991 Gulf War as well as in the initial phase of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, technological superiority within the information field has not made it easier for the West to “tell the most compelling story”. Richard Holbrooke makes this point as he ponders al-Qaeda’s ability to utilise information: “How can a man in a cave outcommunicate the world’s leading communications society?”⁴ One part of the answer is that communication technology is available to the consumer worldwide. Internet and mobile phones are as readily available for members of al-Qaeda as for the US military.

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- 1 H. Høiback, “Den beste historien” [The most compelling story] (Forsvarsnett [online 19 Mar 2009]).
 - 2 R. Smith, *The Utility of Force* (England: Penguin Books Ltd., 2006).
 - 3 See for instance N. Davis, “An Information-Based Revolution in Military Affairs”, *Strategic Review*, vol. 24, no. 1 (1996): 43–53.
 - 4 US National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *9-11 Commission Report* (US Government [online 19 Mar 2009]).

This partly evens out the technology gap. Still, the most important reason is probably in the realm of storytelling. In Western military terms this is covered by information operations and public affairs or media operations. Information operations (Info Ops) are in NATO defined as

a military function to provide advice and coordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives.⁵

These types of operations are by definition directed against an enemy. They are also partly kinetic, and the information used might be in the form of psychological operations that aim to deceive and deter the enemy. The effect is often limited to a small group of personnel and will be short-lived in those cases where the information used does not reflect reality.

The somewhat clandestine nature of information operations makes it a priority for Western armed forces to separate them from media operations. The theory behind this is to try to safeguard the credibility of the armed forces by having an official staff as a “spokes apparatus” which is supposed to serve the media and the public with trustworthy information.⁶ The purpose of this article is not to discuss the problems of separating these disciplines; rather it is to discuss how the armed forces should approach Sir Rupert Smith’s challenge of telling the best story. As the purpose of the operation is to change a set of conditions permanently into a desired end state, the story needs to have a long-lasting effect. As such, it needs to leave a credible impression and stand up to the scrutiny of the press and the different audiences. The main focus will therefore be on media operations. Media operations are directed at both decision makers and populations, both at home, in theatre and internationally. All of these audiences might need to be “compelled” to achieve the military objective and the political end state. Further, the message demands coherence between the writing, acting and telling. This means that the information being given represents the reality to a high degree. This rules out information operations. The problem the commander is left with is how to approach the media to make sure his story reaches the target audiences in a credible and compelling way.

This chapter will review the problem of media–military relations. As the final outcome is to advise on how Norway should structure its contributions in

5 MC 422/3, 9 March 2007.

6 NATO Military Public Affairs Policy, (MC 0457/1), September 2007, p. 15.

coalition warfare, the discussion will ultimately be brought down to the national level. While the general discussions will not be limited to Norwegian experiences, the point of departure will in most cases be a Western one based on the assumption that Norway shares most of its challenges, within the field of media operations as elsewhere, with its neighbours. The structure is intended firstly to underpin the relevance of the media by looking at a theoretical model of how the media impact on military operations. Secondly, to investigate some recent media trends and discuss their likely impact on today's military operations. Thirdly, to discuss how the commander needs to approach the media today. The final discussion will then revolve around the findings and priorities of these three parts as it attempts to conclude whether the atomistic or holistic approach enables the commander to tell the most compelling story.

The underlying thesis which this article attempts to demonstrate is that media operations are gaining importance in today's conflicts; they are more complex and pose more challenges for the commander than was formerly the case. Concerning Norway's approach to contemporary military operations, it appears that national benefits of the holistic approach might come at the cost of coalition disadvantage.

A theoretical approach to the impact of the media

The introductory statement indicates Sir Rupert Smith's view of the relevance of the media. To discuss how media operations can contribute to achievement of the military objective and the political end state, it is necessary to assess the impact of the media on military operations and how this impact can be explained. The Crimean campaign, 1848–52, is generally recognised as the first war visited by the media and what we today refer to as war correspondents. The most influential contemporary correspondent was probably William Howard Russell, reporting for the London Times. His reports on the chaos and amateurish conduct of the campaign by British forces are said to have brought down the British Government.⁷ Today, it is generally referred to as the CNN effect a term which gained currency after the 1991 Gulf War and is obviously not limited to the impact of the Cable News Network alone. Ken Livingston defines it as "The impact of new global real-time media on diplomacy and foreign policy."⁸ The idea is that the media can change a state's foreign policy – or reveal the lack of a policy – by presenting stories in an emotive and sensational style. And if policy

7 P. Young and P. Jesser, *The Media and the Military* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 23.

8 B. Bahador, *The CNN Effect in action* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 4.

is changed as a result, the use of military force could be affected as well. The US involvement in Somalia in 1992 might be a typical example of media exposure effecting a change in foreign policy. Critics would argue that the link between critical media reports and government actions is too hard to document. The reports might even be a result of Government media policy leaking information to support an impending decision. In his case study on the CNN effect and NATO intervention in Kosovo, Barak Bahador acknowledges these difficulties. Still, after a thorough examination of media reporting, political actions and the attitude of key political decision makers he is able to build up a solid argument that the media played a significant role in the decision making process leading up to the war on Serbia. Bahador demonstrates how three Serbian massacres, carried out over the period 1 January 1998 to 11 March 1999, caused eight per cent of the total deaths and three per cent of the destruction of villages in Kosovo. This meagre foundation gave rise to 48 per cent of the media coverage, and was linked directly to 38 per cent of Government actions, among them being the NATO activation order.⁹

A more theoretical approach to the media's impact might consider some of Clausewitz's thoughts on the conduct of war. He describes war as a paradoxical Trinity of the forces of Reason, Emotion and Skill.¹⁰ Disregarding the relationship between these forces will lead to failure. The forces are exemplified or represented by the state as the reason, the people as the emotion and the army and the commander as the skill. Retired colonel Harry G. Summers applies the trinity to his analysis of the US failure in Vietnam. After assessing the Vietnam War through the tri-focal lens of the trinity, it seems clear that the war effort had to fail. First of all the rationale for US involvement in Indochina was unclear. There were more than twenty different rationales for US involvement in the area.¹¹ And the public were not appraised of the war effort because President Johnson wanted to focus on his ambitious national societal programmes. The negative political aims of avoiding open conflict with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China led to an untenable mission for the military forces allied to political micromanagement of the military campaign. On the battlefield the US military was tactically superior, but were unable to translate their successes into the desired political end state. They claimed political interference as the reason for their lack of success. The American people initially supported Johnson's policy in Vietnam, until at least the Tet offensive of 1968. At which point they

9 Ibid.

10 C. von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and transl. by M. Howard and P. Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1976).

11 H. G. Summers Jr, *On Strategy* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), p. 98.

realised that their government's claims to be winning the war did not hold true. Through massive demonstrations the people made their point of view apparent; Johnson did not stand for re-election and Nixon became president on a programme promising to get the US out of Vietnam. In 1975 South Vietnam fell to the armies of the communist North. In the aftermath the US has been plagued by the so-called Vietnam syndrome. It has shaped US society and US security policy for decades. The interesting point is the significant role played by the media in this process. The US military blamed the media for losing the Vietnam War for it by setting the minds of the American people against the troops serving in Vietnam. The reporting that took place in the wake of the Tet offensive was biased, and it portrayed the US forces and US policy with a negative slant. However, this was partly a result of a less than forthcoming approach to the media by the armed forces who used censorship and widespread restrictions on accessibility to control the media's output. The paradox is that the Tet offensive was another tactical triumph for the US military in that the offensive broke the back of the Viet Cong, allowing the South to gain some level of control over its territory. Nevertheless, the negative reporting must have had an effect on the US population and contributed to the decision to pull US forces out; but to blame the media entirely would be to overlook the most important fact, namely the gross lack of agreement on the war between the people, the president and the armed forces. In popular terms, the trinity was not in balance and the media simply pointed this out.

The Vietnam case demonstrates the obvious. The media derives its ability to influence opinion by publicising information on events throughout the trinity. This information will add to the foundation on which each actor bases its decisions. An ever present media would make it very hard for the state, or the military, to exert leverage by controlling the flow of information. Since information is power, the media are a powerful actor in society. As long as the media publicise timely and unbiased information, they will in most cases support the functioning of a democracy. Imagine the impact of a well functioning media during the First World War. Would the Europeans have accepted the war if they were better informed about its consequences? On the other hand, if the information is somehow manipulated, the media might hamper the democratic processes by creating a false foundation for decision making. In any case, the armed forces need to take the potential impact of media reporting into consideration. A well thought out media policy should help the commander to get his messages across, protect the operation and personnel, but at the same time satisfy the democratic need for transparency.

The media in today's wars

So has the impact of the media changed in contemporary military operations? Technological innovations from the steam press to the Internet lie behind the media's current ability to disseminate enormous amounts of information, virtually in real time, across a variety of channels. The media reach more people all of the time. So, does it mean that the impact on the actors in the trinity is greater? It probably does. The argument against would be that people tire of being overwhelmed by information from news channels, commercials and the Internet. There is a limit to the amount of information one person can digest. On the other hand, people adapt and expect to be kept abreast of the most important developments in the news. The demand for information has led to a 24-hour news industry, especially on the radio, TV and Internet. Demand also leads to competition between news agencies, which again fuels the constant battle to generate news more efficiently. Few media companies can today afford to have journalists specialise in military affairs alone. This, combined with sensationalist headlines and images, makes it difficult to get across more complex messages which demand insight and analysis. And as most Western media today are driven by profit, news stories must be designed to titillate the desires of the spectator to keep him interested enough to buy tomorrow's issue or watch the channel again later. Not quite the ideal one has of the media as the guardian of a transparent democratic society. Controversial framing and dramatisation in most cases sell better than subtle analysis.

The media business has created media conglomerates like News Corporation and Time Warner whose annual revenues exceed the size of most national economies.¹² They have the economic and information leverage to ensure continued financial success. The fact that these companies are multinational further complicates the picture as the so-called new wars, to a greater degree than traditional wars, are fought over interests, not out of necessity. This challenges the will and interest of national media to fall in behind national goals, and posting encouraging stories about the nation's troops in times of war. In the new wars, the media feel less constrained to support the national goal. During the initial phase of the Iraq War, US media were overwhelmingly supportive. In the UK, the media were split down the middle.¹³ This demonstrates what the commander can expect today, national and international media questioning the rationale of any military operation.

12 See for instance Hoovers, "Fortune 500 companies" [online 19 Mar 2009] and CIA, "The 2008 World Factbook" [online 19 Mar 2009] referring to statistics.

13 S. Tatham, *Losing Arab Hearts and Minds* (Hurst & Company, London, 2006), p. 97.

Just as the emergence of the media challenged the information monopoly enjoyed by the state, the information revolution has enabled bloggers, hackers and citizens with a camera cell phone to challenge the dominant position of the media. This is a challenge both for the editor as well as the commander. As events unfold the editor will receive vast amounts of information, but will struggle to verify the sources. Less critical publishers will beat the media to the draw. The commander for his part will find that every witness to the conduct of operations, even his own soldiers, has the capability to distribute information globally using simple means like Internet access and a pocket camera.

The conclusion is that more information will reach society from the battlefield of the new wars than was formerly the case. It will travel more quickly, reach more people and might be presented with a lesser degree of understanding of the context of the information. One factor to watch when assessing the impact of news reporting is the credibility of the media. People are well aware of certain media's tendency to dramatise news and the commercial incentive is easily recognisable as news items are sandwiched between commercials. But does this mean the impact of negative reporting on a military operation will be softened by the readers' scepticism with regard to the validity of the story? Will the CNN effect slowly disappear as the spectator grows more cynical about the information presented by the news media?

Media operations today

From the Western point of view, contemporary military operations will be typified by increased complexity. The complexity is mirrored by the multinational, multiagency approach to war combined with the attempt to cooperate with non-governmental organisations and private actors who are providing services within the military sphere. The fighting itself is also complex since the traditional concept of military victory is not sufficient to achieve the political end state. The superiority of Western military forces makes the protracted strategy the preferred choice for any likely enemy. Basically the enemy will use a combination of guerrilla and terrorist tactics. There is nothing new about this, counter insurgency wars have frequently been fought by former colonial powers like Great Britain and France as well as the superpowers, the US and Russia. What is new is perhaps the scale of the asymmetric attacks and the emergence of multinational, non-territorial terrorist networks like al-Qaeda which utilise the media and modern information technology to achieve their goals.

So how do the military handle the media side of these wars? Reviewing the military approach to media operations, two priorities have dominated the military-media relationship: operation security and public support.

The first of these relates to the inherent scepticism military commanders have always had about revealing information which might be used to advantage by the enemy. The history of operation security defines the adversarial relationship between the military and the media and is well formulated in the British Ministry of Defence's guidelines to the media during the Falklands War: "The essence of successful warfare is secrecy; the essence of successful journalism is publicity."¹⁴

The priority of operation security has been balanced somewhat by the need to inform in order to ensure public support. This has traditionally been a low hanging fruit since most media will rally behind national goals in times of war; the Vietnam War being an exception to this rule. Historically, the use of censorship and access control has further ensured that military forces are portrayed in a positive manner by the national press. Although a military priority, public support is the responsibility of the state, not the commander. The commander's responsibility is rather to make sure that he operates according to the political ramifications and goals, and that he provides information on the conduct of operations and the rationale for the military part in the endeavour. The result for the armed forces can then be measured both in credibility, funding, recruitment as well as the moral support and public backing which is so highly desired to bolster the will of the troops as they try to break the will of their opponent. Public support and a supportive media will be harder to get in today's wars, because they are wars of choice, not survival. Young and Jesser describe how the social contract between a citizen and the state does not demand the same degree of loyalty as previously due to this fact.¹⁵ The same goes for the media. The lower degree of support might make it more difficult to sustain the fighting power of the troops and the state's patience with the military option might be short lived. On the other hand, a war based on interests might neither interest the media nor the people if the political cost is low enough.

In today's wars a third priority becomes apparent. This is to achieve some level of acceptance by the local and regional population. Of course, this has been a prerequisite for the many peacekeeping operations under the UN flag since the Second World War. Nevertheless, it seems that it has somehow been forced into the background by the imperatives of the Cold War, at least when it comes to high intensity conflicts. Considering the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it is easy to spot that the US-led coalitions did little to achieve a dialogue with the Arab press. Steve Tatham, British military spokesperson during the war, describes how Arab

14 Tatham, *Losing Arab Hearts and Minds*, p. 7.

15 Young and Jesser, *The Media and the Military*, pp. 6-10.

journalists were denied access to press briefings, and denied interviews because some coalition officers did not approve of their coverage and how the lack of translators made it difficult to get messages across to the local and regional press.¹⁶ As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq today are fought according to counter insurgency (COIN) tactics, it makes sense to view media operations as part of this strategy. One needs to drive a wedge between the insurgents and the population. Economic aid, reconstruction and governance are, in addition to security, the basic lines of operation in a COIN strategy. However, if these acts are not supported by a culturally aware media policy demonstrating the good intentions of the coalition, they will be to no avail. Gaining local acceptance at the operational level should in theory be based on a foundation of acceptance gained at the strategic level through diplomacy and soft power. The challenge on the two battlefields mentioned above seems monumental, because the strategic influence prior to invasion was miniscule. Joseph Nye points out that as the Berlin wall came down, 95 per cent of the population in Eastern Europe had access to the Voice of America. The night before the start of operation Iraqi Freedom only *two* per cent of the Arab population had access to US-based radio broadcasts.¹⁷

Holistic versus atomistic approach

Given the challenges facing the commander to get his messages across, which approach would be the most beneficial, the holistic or the atomistic? The simplified description depicts them as extensions of the three traditional levers of power available for the state: the diplomatic, economic and military. The three levers will be represented in different geographical areas in any given theatre. The difference between the two approaches is that with the atomistic approach, the Norwegian Armed Forces deploy the desired military forces and allow the coalition to decide the area in which they will be most helpful.

The holistic approach limits all Norwegian levers of power, economic, diplomatic and military, to one geographic area where the three would make up a comprehensive national effort.

One way of assessing the two approaches would be to discuss how they would promote the three priorities of public support, local acceptance and operational security. *Public support* would first and foremost mean working with the national media. Still, in coalition operations public support is also a function of the support of all contributing states. This might include relations with international media, but as Norway is most likely to field one of the smaller

16 Tatham, *Losing Arab Hearts and Minds*.

17 J. S. Nye Jr, "The Decline of America's Soft Power", *Foreign Affairs*, May/June (2004).

contributions, the international impact will be a result of national support, and the commander should therefore prioritise the national media. National media are normally not permanently present in conflict areas, and embedding is not a policy frequently used by the Norwegian Armed Forces. Reporting is therefore based on sporadic visits and tends to focus on domestic politics related to the contribution with coverage of the operation itself usually reserved for extraordinary events. It is therefore difficult to get the everyday reality of the military contribution across. If the public only gets information on Norwegian forces when they are involved in violent clashes, or are accused of some type of misconduct, it is difficult for the public to get a comprehensive understanding of the mission. Access restrictions and lack of transparency concerning certain units like Special Forces adds to this problem. Under the atomistic approach, this would continue to be a problem. With a holistic approach the national press is likely to be more interested in the scenario if the Norwegian contribution in one geographic area is more diverse. This would make it easier to build relations with the media and promote a dialogue which would give the journalist more insight and understanding of the military operations. It would also be more apparent how the different levers of power resulted in a comprehensive approach. Telling the most compelling story to gain the support of the Norwegian public would probably be easier. This would also benefit the coalition. However, if every small state preferred the holistic approach it could be taken as a sign that the coalition had problems cooperating fully in theatre. The reluctance of Norway and other nations to move their forces from RC North in Afghanistan to the more hostile south and east has raised the question of burden sharing within NATO and weakens the resolve of the coalition. These sorts of disagreements are promptly picked up by the press and might be seen as an argument in favour of the atomistic approach.

Under a holistic approach coordination between the agencies marshalling the economic, political and security efforts would be easier if they all shared the same language, culture and nationality. It might make the situation less complex for the commander. However, the presence of other departments in theatre would probably make it harder to separate political and operational messages. The tendency towards the politicisation of operations places more constraints on the commander's media operations and might make it harder to get the military side of the story across.

Concerning *local acceptance*, there seems to be an advantage locally in using the holistic approach as one can argue that one nation controlling all three state powers will be perceived as more coordinated and comprehensive than a multinational force. The opposing argument is that this might lead to a perception of the coalition as uncoordinated since different nations follow different

policies in different geographical areas. To achieve some degree of local acceptance one needs insight into local culture, demographics, language and media habits. There are many examples of Western forces failing in fairly simple matters like translating statements, estimating illiteracy rates and so on. With a holistic approach, the combined national resources, such as the number of experts on local issues, would probably be better, so decreasing the chances of making insensitive mistakes. The level of insight and cultural understanding might also improve if one accepts that three contributions from the same nation would be better at sharing information and building an institutional knowledge base on local affairs. Furthermore, a holistic effort offers a better possibility of adhering to a national interpretation of the mission, which might in turn make the effort more comprehensible and easier to relate to for the local population.

Operations security demands a balance between secrecy in a few prioritised areas and transparency in the remaining. The obvious reason for transparency is founded in the principles governing democracy. Further, the commander should attempt to inform the media in a proactive manner. Any void in information from a military unit engaged in operations will be filled by reports based on rumour, hearsay and information from other sources, so making the media coverage unbalanced and often critical. The commander needs to be in a position where he gets his side of the story across to the media. The basic approach is to establish a media function or staff at every major level. Such a unit will be responsible for linking up with the strategic level, coordinating with other units and agencies and handling any media requests. This staff will be responsible for coordinating and releasing information in a timely manner. As the gap between events and information reaching the public today is just minutes where before it was hours and days, this is an enormous challenge. Coordination through the different chains of command takes time, and coordination across the three levers of power reflects the fact that it is still early days for the comprehensive approach. There have been several recent examples of the challenge of handling information regarding Norwegian forces placed under allied command. Both during operation Anaconda in 2002 and operations in conjunction with the Afghan election in 2007, information concerning Norwegian Special Forces was released by US and NATO sources. In the latter case, Norwegian military officials refused to confirm the information due to national media policy. These sorts of problems will very likely continue to be a challenge under both approaches, but the coordination between the three levers of power might be made easier with a holistic approach because the process of establishing routines for the rapid coordination of messages would be a national responsibility. This might provide the desired transparency while at the same time avoiding situations where sensitive information is released without proper coordination.

Tentative conclusions

At the national level the holistic approach would seem to be the better option to enable the commander to address his media operations priorities and thereby to tell “the most compelling story”. The approach gives the benefit of coordinating the efforts along the three levers of power within a national context, making cooperation and coordination easier and resulting in a higher degree of comprehensiveness. This will most likely also be reflected in the media coverage and resulting public perception of the contribution, nationally and locally. However, it seems that the benefits of the holistic approach would be balanced by the problems it might create for the coalition as a whole. There is little comfort in achieving comprehensiveness locally if it makes the theatre-wide approach seem uncoordinated. To address this problem, coalitions based on the NATO framework should strive to improve mechanisms for coordinating civilian and military contributions. In this way the benefits of structuring the contributions under a national umbrella would be less significant. Until then, discussions of burden sharing and national interests will be a major threat to the attempt to convince the world that the coalition’s story is a compelling one.

A GENDER PERSPECTIVE IN A NORWEGIAN CONTRIBUTION?

Charlotte E. Ingalls

Introduction

Gender mainstreaming, and more broadly diversity policies, may at first glance appear to unnecessarily complicate already complex and costly operations. As a result, frequently gender issues are treated as secondary in importance to the hard issues of politics and security. Gender mainstreaming is not, however, a “soft” issue, but is at the core of security.¹

The final point in the above quote may create the impression that a gender perspective is appreciated and implemented in security and military matters.² However, for most who have devoted time to the study of the use of military power, even in today’s context of complex conflicts, gender issues were probably far from the core of their studies, if included at all. Gender mainstreaming would entail that gender issues are adequately addressed as well as recognised as a resource in international efforts in conflict prevention and resolution.³ Consequently, military contributions to such efforts should include the capability to understand and apply a gender perspective. However, with few if any exceptions, the value of considering the connection between gender, security and the use of military power is rarely on the top of the agenda of the Norwegian Armed Forces. That may be about to change. Not only is this a result of the focused attention that this connection has been receiving for some time in the United Nations, and increasingly also from Norwegian policymakers, and more

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- 1 Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF), *CWINF Guidance for NATO Gender Mainstreaming* (2007), p. 7.
 - 2 According to the United Nations, “Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations” the term gender refers to the social differences and social relations between women and men. It therefore refers not to women or men, but to the relationship between them, and the way this is socially constructed. (UN [online 21 Mar 2009]).
 - 3 According to the United Nations *Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997*: “Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women and men an integral dimension of design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.” (UN [online 21 Mar 2009]).

recently in NATO. It is also due to advances in our knowledge of how gender awareness can constitute an important tool in better understanding the impact of operations.

One example of the latter is the recent study *Equal Peace* which addresses gender power relations as one example of a power relation within a state, and how this specific power relation is frequently and unintentionally affected by peace operations. The study develops the concept of *security equality* as one dimension of gender power relations, the former to be understood as the distribution of protection between men and women. The study raises the question of whether gender power relations deteriorate (become more unequal) or improve (become more equal) as an effect of operations, and argues “that expanding the inquiry of peace operations to incorporate their effects on gender power relations produces a more detailed understanding of peace operations and their contribution to peace”.⁴ This is an example of how the inclusion of a gender perspective can therefore lead to an improved and more nuanced understanding of the impact of a mission in an area of conflict, and thus contribute to reducing the likelihood of unintended negative consequences.

Recognition of the value of including a gender perspective is also on the increase within NATO, and the Alliance is currently working on how best to implement the gender perspective in a manner relevant to the conduct of NATO-led operations and missions:

In recognising the important and distinctive role that women can play in conflict resolution, NATO and its Partners seek to improve the effectiveness of NATO-led Operations and Missions to ensure overall mission success. The complexity of peace building efforts argues for an approach that addresses the specific needs of all groups in a conflict zone. Gender issues are an important component of such efforts, and a tailored approach will be needed in each situation to ensure that maximum effect can be drawn from incorporating gender perspectives into NATO’s approach. While initial efforts based on this paper to implement the resolution will focus on operational issues, further work should take a wider perspective in addressing the issues raised by UNSCR 1325.⁵

4 L. Olsson, *Equal Peace. United Nations Peace Operations and the Power-Relations between men and women in Timor-Leste* (PhD diss., Uppsala University, 2007), pp. 2–8.

5 NATO, NATO decision on 12 December 2007, document of 10 December 2007, Annex 1, *EAPC(C)D(2007)0022 Implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security*.

As a NATO member, it is reasonable to expect that Norway would want to be active also in contributing to the conceptual development of the Alliance. As illustrated by the above quote, this involvement can now include the integration of a gender perspective in the planning and conduct of operations, and subsequently in an even wider perspective.

The point of departure for this book is the concept of comprehensiveness as presented in the first chapter. An interesting question in this context is whether it is accurate to claim that there is a comprehensive approach if gender issues are not adequately addressed at the strategic level as well as in the planning and execution of activities and operations, but that question will not be pursued further here. This chapter sets out to shed light on the core question of which of the options, holistic vs. atomistic, can currently be considered as best suited to ensure the satisfactory inclusion of a gender perspective in a Norwegian contribution. The underlying assumption for this question is that the comprehensive approach aims to draw on the inclusion of a gender perspective as a tool in the efforts to resolve the issue at hand.

Approach to exploring the issue

Gender mainstreaming and processes aimed at integrating a gender perspective are complex processes. For the purpose of this chapter the action plan launched by the Norwegian Government in March 2006 for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security will serve as the starting point.⁶ The purpose of UNSCR 1325 is to integrate the gender perspective in all areas concerning peace, security and development. The Government's action plan contains a number of measures in a host of different areas, including development and security aspects. I shall not discuss the substance of the plan here, just say that it signals a strong commitment by the Norwegian Government to follow up on UNSCR 1325. The introductory policy statement of the action plan assures the reader that "Norway will pursue a policy that promotes gender equality at home and in a global context."⁷ The policy statement was signed by the respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Environment and International Development, Justice and the Police, Children and Equality, as well as Defence. This broad interest is in line with the relatively high level of attention devoted to gender and equality issues in Norwegian society in general. The action plan is a strong

6 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Norwegian Government's Action Plan on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security* (Oslo, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Publication nr. E-799 E, 2006).

7 Ibid., Policy declaration.

policy statement, and it is reasonable to expect its subject matter to be addressed in subsequent major sector-specific policy documents.

The core question will be approached by examining the relevant sectors' emphasis on gender mainstreaming in sector-specific policy documents in the time following the release of the Government's action plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

This will be carried out in three stages. First, the status of the implementation of a gender perspective in the military will be addressed. This will be done by examining a selection of documents from the Ministry of Defence (MoD), looking for indicators of the importance placed by the Ministry on ensuring that the military organisation will have the capability to understand the relevance of and utilise a gender perspective.

Second, the status of the implementation of a gender perspective in a wider context at the strategic level will be looked at. This will be carried out by examining a selection of documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), as the MFA is responsible for a wide range of policy areas including development cooperation, human rights, peace and reconciliation, security policy and trade policy. Consequently, the relative influence of the MFA is assumed to be greater under a holistic contribution than it would be under an atomistic contribution. Third, the findings will be discussed in light of the strategic choice.

Within the scope of this chapter, only a relatively small number of the documents emanating from the ministries with references to the gender perspective could be examined. Gender is mentioned by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence in several speeches. In this chapter, documents were selected for closer examination from those on which formal political decision making takes place at the national level. It is recognised that there is some weakness in the methodology of looking into the status of the implementation of gender mainstreaming. This, however, does not preclude our ability to fulfil the ambition of this chapter, to *shed light on* which of the options, holistic vs. atomistic, can currently be considered best suited to ensure the satisfactory inclusion of a gender perspective in a Norwegian contribution. Although the findings and preliminary conclusions of the chapter rest on a relatively narrow foundation, it is considered to be relevant and solid enough for the stated ambition, as the sources are authoritative documents informing political decision making at the strategic level in the respective sectors.

Prior to proceeding to the examination of the documents, some thoughts on the connection between the gender perspective and the atomistic vs. holistic strategic options will be presented.

If Norwegian military forces are to successfully participate in the implementation of a gender perspective under a multinational comprehensive frame-

work, be that an atomistic or a holistic contribution, the forces should have the required knowledge and understanding of the background, contents and relevance of such a perspective. If they do not, it would seem unreasonable to expect the military to effectively promote or ensure the inclusion of a gender perspective in the Norwegian contribution.

This applies in particular in case of an atomistic contribution, where the relative influence of the military is assumed to be larger than under the holistic option where there is a wider spectrum of actors to contend with who can affect the contribution. As a consequence, in case of a holistic contribution, the emphasis on the gender perspective by policymakers able to influence the diplomatic, developmental and economic elements is likely to have greater impact on the design and content of the contribution. So even in case of weak gender awareness in the military, strong gender awareness in other relevant sectors might favour a holistic option in the end. In such a case, this option could increase the pace of building gender awareness and thus achieve a more rapid gender mainstreaming in the military sector.

If gender awareness and mainstreaming are strong in the military, then an atomistic option would be very well suited to secure the inclusion of a gender perspective in the national contribution. This causal effect applies under a holistic contribution as well, but whether or not this latter option would promote the gender perspective depends on the degree to which gender issues are addressed in the other elements of the contribution. If military, diplomatic and economic elements all were to have a high level of gender awareness and mainstreaming, then the holistic option would do much to secure the inclusion of a gender perspective.

If the level of gender awareness is low in the diplomatic and economic elements, and seen in connection with the assumed higher relative influence of these elements in case of holistic contributions, the holistic option would not be indicated. This applies even in the event of a strong gender mainstreaming effort in the military, as the relative influence of the military under a holistic contribution is weaker than under an atomistic.

An attempt to illustrate these connections between degree of gender awareness and mainstreaming in M and $D+E$ respectively, and the impact it could have on the two strategic options ability to promote the gender perspective is presented in figure 8.1 on the next page.

Degree of gender awareness and mainstreaming	atomistic contribution (M)	holistic contribution (D+E+M)
Weak in M	Not well suited to secure inclusion of a gender perspective in the contribution	Uncertain, as M is not suited to support the inclusion of a gender perspective, but strong gender focus in D+E may point towards this option being suitable
Strong in M	Very well suited to secure the inclusion of gender perspective in the contribution	If also strong gender awareness in D+E, this option would be very well suited to secure the inclusion of a gender perspective
Weak in D+E	N/A as M is the relevant variable in case of an atomistic contribution	Not suited, even in case of strong M which is considered insufficient for this option to be suitable
Strong in D+E	N/A as M is the relevant variable in case of an atomistic contribution	Uncertain, but strong gender focus in D+E may point in direction of this option being well suited, even if weak gender awareness in M

Figure 8.1 Connection between gender awareness in M (military) and D (diplomatic)+E (economic) respectively, and the impact this may have on the suitability of the two contribution options in securing a gender perspective.

Note that the figure is meant only to serve as an illustration, and that no further elaboration of the connections will be carried out. My intention is simply to set out a frame of reference for the ensuing interpretation of the empirical data and for the tentative conclusions in the chapter.

A gender perspective in an atomistic contribution?

With reference to the previous section on the approach to exploring the issue, the following defence sector documents have been studied, selected from documents found on the websites of the MoD and the Norwegian Armed Forces:

- *Increased recruitment of women to the armed forces*, White Paper, no. 36⁸
- *The Norwegian Chief of Defence's defence study 2007. Final report*⁹

8 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Økt rekruttering av kvinner til Forsvaret* [Increased recruitment of women to the armed forces], White Paper, no. 36 (2006-2007) (Regjeringen [online 21 Mar 2009]).

9 Norwegian Armed Forces, *Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007: Sluttrapport* [The Norwegian Chief of Defence's defence study 2007. Final report] (Oslo: Norwegian Armed Forces, 2007).

- *Defending Norway's security, interests and values*, Proposition to the Storting, no. 48 (2007-2008)¹⁰
- *For the fiscal year 2009*, Proposition to the Storting, no. 1 (2008-2009).¹¹

They were selected because they were either readily available policy documents, or were input to such documents, providing steering and guidance on a wide range of matters at the strategic level of the military organisation. In searching for indicators of the status of the work of gender mainstreaming, emphasis will be placed on identifying clear guidance to integrate gender awareness into the operational planning process, ensuring availability of gender expertise for advising commanders on gender issues in operational planning and conduct of operations, and integrating gender expertise at all decision making levels.

Another option was to look for indicators of guidance to increase the number of women in the military. Although often presented as the primary focus in the implementation of a gender perspective in the armed forces, the approach does not address the inclusion of gender issues in the core activity of the military, which is often described as the conduct of operations.¹² Therefore, the inclusion of an appropriate gender perspective in the operational planning process is an important prerequisite for being able to say that gender mainstreaming has been achieved.

The presence of women in a military unit can be of high value in ensuring the ability of a unit to conduct operations in an appropriately gender sensitive manner in support of mission success. But to leave gender mainstreaming at that would be suboptimal, as there are strong indications that *awareness* is the key factor in successfully maintaining a gender perspective in an operation. "Awareness in implementation" Olsson advises,

should rather be understood as awareness of gender specificity. This factor is considered to be relevant a) on the international level where operation mandating and planning takes place (that is, at UN headquarters), b) in the operation leadership which makes decisions about the implementation when the operation

10 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier* [A defence for the protection of Norway's security, interests and values], Proposition to the Storting, no. 48 (2007-2008) (Regjeringen [online 21 Mar 2009]).

11 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *For budsjettåret 2009* [For the fiscal year 2009], Proposition to the Storting, no. 1 (2008-2009) (Regjeringen [online 21 Mar 2009]).

12 See, for example, Norwegian Defence Staff, *Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine* (Oslo, 2007), pp. 14 and 158.

has been deployed, and c) among the operation personnel implementing the operation mandate.¹³

Even though the context of this chapter and book is not a UN operation, Olsson's point that gender awareness must permeate the strategic, operational and tactical levels is considered relevant also for the context of this project, which is the comprehensive approach framework. Consequently, even if the military were to remain male dominated for the near future, which is most likely,¹⁴ this should not exclude gender *awareness* from permeating the organisation, which anyway should not wholly dependent upon the ratio of male to female personnel. Gender awareness can be seen as a contributing resource in analysis and in determining the most effective way of solving the complex tasks in a comprehensive approach framework, regardless of the gender composition of the mission personnel. Even though the presence of female personnel may be a prerequisite for being able to reap the full potential benefits from implementing a gender perspective in a mission, the absence of female personnel should not exclude the establishment of gender awareness among mission personnel.

However, when examining *Increased recruitment of women to the armed forces*, White Paper, no. 36, which addresses the need to increase the recruitment of women, it is clear that the military must do more to draw on the resources and competencies women can bring to the organisation. Although not primarily intended as a policy document for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, section 4.4 does highlight the link between the main burden of the report and the implementation of Resolution 1325. In section 4.6 "Why do the armed forces need more women?" the following statement is included:

UNSCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, among other things points out that war and conflict affect women and men in different ways. It is therefore important that the gender aspect is considered in connection with the planning and conduct of military operations.¹⁵

And in section six of the report, it is stated,

Norwegian forces participating in international operations shall, in accordance with the Government's Action Plan to implement *UNSCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security*, have received training and awareness about the

13 Olsson, *Equal Peace*, p. 179.

14 According to Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Økt rekruttering ...*, 93 per cent of the of total number of officers and contract personnel are men.

15 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Økt rekruttering ...*, p. 9. Author's translation.

gender aspect in international operations. The gender perspective shall be integrated in all exercise scenarios for international missions.¹⁶

It is interesting to note that the above quotes seem to describe a desired end state more than the current status. Nevertheless, these are clear defence-specific signals from the political level and indicate an appreciation of the importance of gender mainstreaming in the military organisation. They also build on the signals in the Government's Action Plan on the implementation of UNSCR 1325. It will therefore be interesting to see whether this appreciation, and the associated policy guidance, manifests itself in the subsequent long-term plan for the development of the Norwegian armed forces, *Defending Norway's security, interests and values*, Proposition to the Storting, no. 48 (2007-2008).

However, prior to doing so, the final rapport of *Defence Study 2007* compiled by the Chief of Defence will be the object of attention.¹⁷ As it was one of the inputs to the current long-term plan, the defence study was examined in order to determine the extent to which it supports gender mainstreaming by alluding to the value of a gender perspective. The Defence Study 07 mentions UNSCR 1325, or a gender perspective, in several contexts. One is in connection with joint Swedish–Norwegian operational Military Observation Teams (MOT 1325) and also the statement:¹⁸

A joint Norwegian–Swedish project on military teams in international operations will be started by year end 2008. The project focuses on operational teams with specialist expertise on gender perspectives. The teams will comprise both sexes. A Norwegian–Swedish group of experts on operational activities and training will also be established by year end 2010; the location has yet to be decided. The goal is to provide new and relevant expertise of use to participation in international operations and to ensure that Norway can meet its international commitments in accordance with UN resolution 1325.¹⁹

In section 5.4 of the study, “Recruiting personnel”, the value of a gender perspective is also acknowledged.

16 Ibid., p. 15. Author's translation

17 Norwegian Armed Forces, *Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007*.

18 Ibid, section 4.11 “Norsk-svensk samarbeid” [Norwegian-Swedish cooperation], p. 30.

19 Ibid, section 5.6.5 “Kvinner i internasjonale operasjoner” [Women in international operations], p. 38. Author's translation with the kind assistance of Ms Linda Adamcik.

The ambition is to significantly increase the number of women in the Armed Forces. The expertise women bring to the organization should to be utilised to a greater degree in operations. In certain situations, this expertise may provide effects beyond what is being achieved today, for instance in dialogue with civilians in the area of operations, situational awareness and security. This resource ought to be given more prominence, recruitment efforts must be increased, and more women must be motivated to opt for a career in the Armed Forces. The force generators must include the gender perspective in operational planning and manning.²⁰

I have not been able to ascertain whether the above forecasted MOT 1325 has been established, although it is my impression that it has not. The joint Swedish–Norwegian competence-building exercise in with regard to UNSCR 1325 is not yet operational, and some time remains before its expected implementation. However, the two quotes above seem promising by indicating an awareness within the military organisation of the value of a gender perspective to international operations and operational planning. Even so, the wording points to a desired but not yet achieved end state.

The next object of attention is the current long-term plan for the development of the Norwegian Armed Forces, *Defending Norway's security, interests and values*, Proposition to the Storting, no. 48 (2007-2008), which outlines the development of the Norwegian Armed Forces. In light of the action plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, the Government's commitment to promoting gender issues in a security and development context, White Paper, no. 36 (2006-2007) and the *Defence study 2007*, it would be reasonable to expect it to be reflected in the most recent long-term plan for the defence sector.

Most of the references to women in the proposal are primarily connected with recruitment, providing education opportunities, career development programmes or facilitating ways of combining family life with a military career.²¹

The main point of a gender perspective in this proposal is to be found in box 5.2 "Gender and operations abroad". The fact that this is actually addressed in the section entitled Operations, could be interpreted as an indicator of how much policymakers want to see gender taken into account in the core

20 Norwegian Armed Forces, *Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007*, section 5.4 "Rekruttering av personell", p. 34. Author's translation with the kind assistance of Ms Linda Adamcik.

21 Norwegian Armed Forces, *Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007: Sluttrapport*. See for example section 1.3, page 13; section 2.10, page 21; section 8.1.2, pages 112–113; section 8.3.4, page 117.

activities of the Norwegian Armed Forces. Even so, there is no reference to, or elaboration of, the contents of box 5.2 in the ensuing subsections of section 5.6. Nevertheless, the text of box 5.2 clearly indicates a desire to continue what was set out in policy statements concerning gender mainstreaming in a military context, from the policy signals in the Government's action plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, White Paper, no. 36 (2006-2007) as well as *The Norwegian Chief of Defence's defence study 2007. Final report*.²² This indicates coherence in that the policy proposals in the long-term proposition rest on recommendations set forth in previous policy documents as well as recommendations presented by the Chief of Defence.

On examining *For the fiscal year 2009*, Proposition to the Storting, no. 1 (2008-2009), one finds mention of implementation of UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming in part III of the document, in chapter six, section 6.5. An excerpt of the text states that "both the MoD and the Norwegian Armed Forces are working on incorporating the gender perspective in, among other areas, operational planning, mandates, training and education, as well as in the conduct and evaluation of operations."²³

In the same section there are also references to the previously mentioned MOT 1325 and a Nordic collaborative effort in this area. Again however, the wording presents a picture of the establishment of a gender perspective capability within the Norwegian military a work in progress. Altogether, it seems reasonable to draw the conclusion that the Norwegian Armed Forces are in the process of implementing a gender perspective in a number of important areas of the organisation. The indications of will to implement seem strong at the strategic policy level, and as illustrated by the mentioning of the Swedish-Norwegian MOT 1325, this may soon bring results at the tactical level. Curiously though, at the operational level the evidence of implementation is less pronounced. This is interesting as the complete implementation of a gender perspective in the military organisation should entail permeation of the perspective at all levels, that is to say, the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Based on these findings, the Norwegian Armed Forces are arguably *moving* towards achieving gender mainstreaming and gender awareness. The question is how long it will take to fully integrate a gender perspective, and to what extent the Norwegian military will succeed in this effort. Presently it seems safe to maintain that the Norwegian military would at present probably only to a limited degree be able to integrate a gender perspective into the military portion

22 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet ...*

23 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *For budsjettåret 2009*, p. 98. Author's translation.

of a contribution. With reference to figure 8.1, the findings indicate a rather low level of gender awareness and mainstreaming in *M* is, although it is in the process of being improved.

A gender perspective in a holistic contribution?

With reference to the previous section on the approach to exploring the issue, I examined the following documents for the purposes of this task, selected from the website of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA):

- “For the fiscal year 2008”, Proposition to the Storting, no. 1 (2007-2008)²⁴
- “On equal terms. Women’s rights and equality in the development aid policy”, White Paper, no. 11 (2007-2008)²⁵
- “For the fiscal year 2009”, Proposition to the Storting, no. 1 (2008-2009)²⁶
- “Report on the progress of the Government’s plan to carry out Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security”.²⁷

The first document, Proposition to the Storting no. 1 (2007-2008) *For the fiscal year 2008*, is the MFA budget proposal for 2008. It contains several references to UNSCR 1325 and the implementation of the action plan, all of which will not be quoted here. However, it is worth noting that the pursuit of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is mentioned in many different contexts, and therefore seems to permeate several areas of responsibility within the MFA.²⁸ It appears that the MFA places great emphasis on addressing gender issues across a wide spectrum, for example in human rights and development issues in general, which is then complemented by the more specific peace and security perspectives included under UNSCR 1325.

24 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *For budsjettåret 2008* [For the fiscal year 2008], Proposition to the Storting, no. 1 (2007-2008).

25 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *På like vilkår: Kvinners rettigheter og likestilling i utviklingspolitikken* [On equal terms. Women’s rights and equality in the development aid policy], White Paper, no. 11 (2007-2008) (Regjeringen [online 21 Mar 2009]).

26 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *For budsjettåret 2009* [For the fiscal year 2009], Proposition to the Storting, no. 1 (Regjeringen [online 14 May 2009]).

27 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Framdriftsrapport for Regjeringens handlingsplan for gjennomføring av FNs Sikkerhetsrådsresolusjon 1325 (2000) om kvinner, fred og sikkerhet* [Report on the progress of the Government’s plan to carry out Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security] (Regjeringen [online 21 Mar 2009]).

28 See for example Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *For budsjettåret 2008*, pp. 11, 27, 67, 99, 141 and 225.

The subject of *On equal terms. Women's rights and equality in the development aid policy*, White Paper, no. 11 (2007-2008) is women's rights and gender equality in Norway's international development policy. The report addresses the topic from several angles. Of particular interest here is the report's mention of how gender equality policies can be considered a trademark for Norwegian society, and how Norway can put this advantage to use in international forums.²⁹ It is also relevant that the MFA in this report views the process of promoting gender equality in a gender power relations perspective.³⁰

The next examined document is Proposition to the Storting no. 1 (2008-2009) *For the fiscal year 2009*, the MFA budget proposal for 2009, section 11 of which specifically addresses gender equality. It remarks on the process of implementing UNSCR 1325, and the following statement included: "The gender perspective is central in Norwegian efforts to promote peace and reconciliation globally."³¹ This serves to illustrate the emphasis MFA places on the *holistic* perspective in pursuing the gender perspective, and the wide scope of the efforts.³² That is not in itself surprising, as the MFA is responsible for pursuing policies across a very large and diverse portfolio.

The final item of particular interest is the progress report on the Government's Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security.³³ As lead responsibility for coordinating the implementation of the action plan rests with the MFA, they are also responsible for the progress report. It is comprehensive, 50 pages long, and contains both tentative findings and experiences, as well as recommendations and challenges. The report is a way of measuring the progress of the implementation process in the areas under the jurisdiction of the respective ministries, including the MoD. The evaluation is intended to be an annual report, but at present no progress report is available for 2008.

In the report it is stated that the implementation work is gaining momentum, but that the process of following up on the action points is not adequately systematic, and that it too often depends on the drive and initiative of individuals. From reading the report, it is clear that the national and international net-

29 See Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *På like vilkår*, section 1, *Innledning og sammendrag* [Introduction and summary], p. 6

30 Ibid., see for example p. 8.

31 Ibid., "Kjønnsperspektivet har en sentral plass i norsk arbeid for fred og forsoning globalt" [The gender perspective is central to Norwegian contribution to peace and reconciliation], section 11, *Likestilling* [Equality], p. 265. Author's translation.

32 Ibid., see for example pp. 36, 37, 117, 162, 172, 271 and 273.

33 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Framdriftsrapport for Regjeringens handlingsplan ...*

works, and the organisations which in some way are engaged in the implementation of UNSCR 1325, are substantial. Here the MFA is in a unique position to monitor the resources, both nationally and internationally, being used to further the implementation of a gender perspective, including implementation in operations based on a comprehensive or integrated approach.

The progress report point out that “There is a substantial need for guidance on how to operationalise the action plan via planning, conduct and evaluation of actions in a gender perspective.”³⁴ Further, the report highlights the need for actively integrating the implementation work in the ministries. The Ministry of Defence is mentioned several times in the report, but the following statement was of particular relevance to the perspective of this chapter:

In its work to implement the action plan, MoD focused on recruiting more women to MoD, the armed forces and international operations. It is therefore doubtless fitting that lead responsibility for the action plan’s implementation rests with the department in charge of personnel. But the action plans goes further than increasing the number of women. In order to promote a wider appreciation of a more holistic approach to the action plan, there is reportedly a need to strengthen cooperation with other MoD departments and sections – not least the department of security policy and the department of operational and preparedness planning. This applies in particular to questions related to international operations.³⁵

This indicates a less than adequate integration of the gender perspective in the various departments of the MoD, in contrast to the apparent level of appreciation within in the MFA.

Based on the findings from the examination of the MFA documents, the conclusion is that the MFA has a high level of awareness of gender issues. With reference to figure 9.1, the findings indicate the degree of gender awareness and mainstreaming in *D+E* is leaning towards strong.

Tentative conclusions

The goal of this chapter was to shed light on which of the two options, holistic *vs.* atomistic, may currently be considered best suited to ensure the inclusion of a gender perspective in a Norwegian contribution. The preferable status would be to have strong gender awareness and mainstreaming in the military as well as

34 Ibid., p. 15. Author’s translation.

35 Ibid., p. 23. Author’s translation.

in the diplomatic and economic sectors. This would secure the greatest possible freedom of action for Norway when considering which of the two contribution options, atomistic and holistic, to adopt, while at the same time desiring to pursue the stated political goal of promoting gender equality at home and in a global context. However, at present the Norwegian Government does not seem to find itself in such a position.

To summarise the findings, the ability of the Norwegian Armed Forces to promote a gender perspective in the military portion of a contribution is limited, whereas the diplomatic and economic sectors seem well prepared to undertake such an effort in their part of a contribution. With reference then to figure 8.1, the degree of gender awareness and mainstreaming in *M* is leaning towards low and the level of gender awareness and mainstreaming in *D+E* is leaning towards strong.

This suggests that an atomistic option, with a purely military element, would at present not be likely to secure the inclusion of a gender perspective in a Norwegian contribution. This may at first glance seem to indicate that the holistic option is also poorly suited, as the lack of gender awareness in the military element would weaken the likelihood of securing gender awareness in the Norwegian contribution. But that is not automatically the case. A holistic contribution, it is assumed, would give the MFA relatively more scope to influence the parameters and content of the contribution than would be the case if the contribution was atomistic, i.e. purely military.

According to the findings, the MFA appears to have a good overview of resources and actors engaged in the implementation of a gender perspective in operations abroad, and furthermore seems to have gender awareness in many of its departments and sections. With a holistic contribution the MFA could act as a driving force in working towards mainstreaming gender considerations within all elements, to some extent also in the military one.

The tentative conclusions, based on the findings of this study, show that at present the holistic option would be more likely to encourage gender awareness as an integral aspect of Norwegian operations abroad. Such a contribution could then serve as a way of improving capacity to effectively address a greater variety of security issues in the local population – both male and female – in the area of responsibility. It could help in avoiding unintended negative consequences of an operation. And finally, as recognised by NATO, addressing gender issues is part of the ongoing efforts to improve operations and missions to ensure overall mission success. Conceptual development, which requires gender awareness and gender mainstreaming, is an area in which Norway, with its strong tradition for promoting gender equality, should be able to make substantial contributions in the ongoing efforts in the Alliance.

OTHER ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC CHOICE

Håkan Edström

Suggestions for further work

The aim of this study is to examine and discuss the two grand strategic options available to Norway to provide military resources to multinational crisis management, and their likely consequences for the Norwegian Armed Forces. We have, in other words, wanted to shed light on the options available to small states as they consider how to exploit their military resources and to assess some of the potential consequences of such a strategic choice. Raising the level of ambition a little opens up a number of fruitful areas for further study.

A first step might focus on the discussions surrounding validity and reliability in the introductory chapter. With reference to validity, for example, additional independent, or perhaps intermediate variables and their interdependence, could be explored further. With reference to reliability, the outcomes of the dependent variable could, for example, be defined and constructed to allow its application more or less independently of the applied perspective. Even the outcome of the independent variable could be refined to improve the measurability of the sliding scale between the two dichotomies. Such an approach could in turn lead to the development of more than the two options so far considered. In reality, however, this exploration belongs in a study more focused on the generation of theory than the present one.

Another issue not addressed in the present study revolves around the options available to a small state regarding the use of its military resources beyond its territorial borders and in contexts other than low intensity multinational crisis management. Consideration of this issue could take as its point of departure the voids in knowledge associated with the general use of grand strategic tools.

In an Alliance perspective such a study could, for example, aim to shed light on the options available to a small state regarding the provision of military support to another Alliance member within the framework of high-intensity contributions under Article 5. In such a case the variation would be attached to the conflict spectrum while the options would remain at the grand strategic level. Another option is to envision a search for variety by continuing to focus on low intensity multi-national crisis management, while analysing options and consequences at the operational or tactical level, although this would entail addressing an altogether different void in knowledge.

However, another void in knowledge we have partially addressed, albeit superficially, in this study is about the possible consequences for the multilateral organisation, in this case NATO, of the particular strategic choice made by the contributing state. Such an analysis, carried out in connection with the development of new multinational concepts, would be possible and appears to have much to recommend it.

Yet another void in knowledge that we have touched upon, but not pursued, is the question of how small states can contribute to the conceptual development of multilateral organisations. Rather than solely concentrating on the comprehensive approach, as in this case, this study would explore various problem areas within conceptual development. It could also address conceptual challenges at different levels, within the conflict spectrum as well as from a hierarchical viewpoint.

As highlighted in the first chapter and in each of the above examples, it is important to be aware of the differences between, on the one hand, international crises and conflict management in general and, on the other, a specific empirical case such as the current international efforts in Afghanistan. We intended to reflect this when stating, in the first chapter, that our ambition was to contribute to increased understanding of the implementation of the comprehensive approach, and not to explain related processes.

It would of course be possible to approach the topic with even higher ambitions, or apply scientific perspectives other than those chosen in this study. However, as our choice of perspectives was coloured by the Norwegian context, further studies could look at one or more other small states and, in doing so, select perspectives appropriate to the particular state(s) chosen. In light of the politically declared ambition of increased military cooperation between Norway, Sweden and Finland, further research based on such an approach has a certain appeal. It is possible to envisage an expansion in several dimensions whereby the aspects of validity and reliability already addressed could serve as a foundation. One dimension suitable for expansion could thus be the *national context* where not only Norway, but also Sweden and Finland are considered.

Sweden and Finland are both EU members and NATO PfP countries, so the comprehensive approach is relevant to both national contexts. Still within the framework of trilateral cooperation, another possibility for expansion would be to address concept development in relevant arenas within the EU. Although not a member of the EU, Norway has, for example, made contributions under the framework of the EU Battle Group concept. An expansion as envisaged could therefore take into consideration several multilateral organisations as well as a number of different concepts.

In the following sections of this final chapter, three problems are discussed. As our intention is to shed further light on the problem we have addressed in this work, we will not be providing answers to these new problems. Instead we are arguing for the need of further research.

The first problem is related to the issue touched upon in the first chapter. Is there a conceptual supremacy of the great powers? How much space do actually small states have in developing the conceptual framework of international organisations?

The second problem is related to the need of clear defined political guidance. Is there a policy based top-down alternative? Are the existing national policies actually implemented? And what about an experience-based bottom-up alternative?

The final problem is related to the international organisations and their efforts in implementing multilateral concepts such as comprehensive approach. What are the consequences for NATO if the members of the organisation choose the holistic option when providing military resources? What if they choose the atomistic option?

Conceptual supremacy of great powers?

As early as March 2004, Denmark launched a national initiative aimed at getting all Danish actors, or at least those at governmental level, who were participating in international crisis management to work in a coordinated manner. The initiative, to be known as Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations (CPA), aimed at ensuring a concentrated Danish civilian effort in areas where Danish military forces were to be deployed. This programme offered, unfortunately, no clear guidance on achieving integration. The Danish CPA approach may, however, serve as an example of a small state developing concepts ahead of the great powers.¹ Recent research indicates that so was the case:

By the spring of 2006, five more nations – Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway and Slovakia – had joined the growing chorus

1 See Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, “Samtænkning af civil og militær indsats i internationale operationer” [Coordination of civilian and military contributions to international operations] (Forsvarsministeriet [online 19 Mar 2009]), the opening speech “*Transforming NATO – A Political and Military Challenge*” held by Søren Gade, Danish Minister of Defence, at the NATO seminar on civil and military activities in international operations, Copenhagen, 20 June 2005 (NATO [online 19 Mar 2009]); and K. Fischer and J. T. Christensen, “Improving civil-military cooperation the Danish way”, *NATO Review*, summer (2005).

of Allies pressing for a codified plan of action. The United States followed soon after, and events culminated in the first official articulation of the CA by the 26 member states at the Riga Summit in November.²

Considering the fact that the UK had introduced a national comprehensive approach policy only some months before the Riga Summit, at least some steps would seem to have been taken by the great powers to advance conceptual. Otherwise, small state initiatives are not likely to be taken seriously within by the international organisations. Britain explains the comprehensive approach as a necessary step to coordinate the three national instruments of power (defined as diplomatic, military and economic instruments) in order to speed the achievement of national strategic objectives. The UK sees the comprehensive approach as a conceptual framework enabling cross-departmental decision making. It includes, apart from the national instruments, independent developmental and humanitarian instruments and “a customised, agile and sensitive influence and information effort”.³

It would be interesting therefore to explore the opportunity of small states, such as Denmark and Norway, to actually play a part in concept development in international organisations. Is this a privilege for great powers? Is Denmark an exception to the rule of small state reluctance?

Within two years of the idea first being floated by the Danes, Ambassadors supported by the International Staff had made haste to set the plan in motion.⁴

Top-down or bottom-up?

Following the Riga Summit the UK organised an informal workshop with some of her allies (e.g. Canada, Denmark, Norway), to address issues arising in the implementation of a comprehensive approach. The workshop took place in Brussels 8 March 2007. One partner nation attended: Sweden. One of the proposals for further work arising from the workshop concerned the interdependence between the approaches at the national and international levels. Another

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- 2 B. Smith-Windsor, *Hasten slowly – NATO’s Effect Based and Comprehensive Approach to Operations*, NATO Defence College Research Paper, no 38 (Rome: NDC, 2008), p. 5.
 - 3 UK Ministry of Defence, *The Comprehensive Approach*, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, January (Shrivenham: The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, 2006).
 - 4 Smith-Windsor, *Hasten slowly...* p. 5.

proposal concerned the need for maximising synergies between the approaches at the national and multilateral levels.⁵

The UK had introduced a national policy in 2006 and Denmark, as we saw, in 2005. Another participant at the Brussels Workshop, Canada, had also recently introduced a new policy. The new vision indicated a significant shift in Canadian military strategy.⁶ Hence at least three of the participants (e.g. Canada, Denmark and the UK) seem to have conceptual points of departure on which to build further progress. This also indicates a top-down approach by which military actions are conducted on political guidance issued in terms of an officially declared policy.

A critical question is, however, whether small states actually practise a top-down perspective and make policy-based choices between different strategic options (or strategies). The empirical finding from Denmark indicates that so is the case but what other options, aside from the holistic CAP, did the Danish policymakers consider? Was there, for example, an atomistic alternative at hand? And is Denmark actually implementing CAP in southern Afghanistan or simply carrying on with military business as usual?⁷

And what about Norway? Is, for example, the absence of an explicit policy indicative of a choice in itself? Without a clear policy to light the way, field experiences might be the only guidance at hand for commanders in the area of operation. This might be the intention of the political leadership, i.e. to take a bottom-up approach to the problem, but it could also be that the politicians are shying away from providing the necessary guidance.

A Master's thesis presented at the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College in the spring of 2008, analyses the evolution of Norwegian participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.⁸ The

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- 5 UK Delegation to NATO, "Comprehensive Approach Workshop, Brussels, 8 March 2007" (UK delegation to NATO [online 18 Mar 2009]).
 - 6 See Canadian Department of National Defence, "Defence Policy White Paper", 1994 (National Defence and the Canadian Forces [online 19 Mar 2009]); and Canadian Department of National Defence, "Defence Policy Statement – A New Vision for the Canadian Forces", 2005 (National Defence and the Canadian Forces [online 19 Mar 2009]).
 - 7 Informal discussions between representatives of the defence colleges of Austria, the Baltic states, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden during a workshop on comprehensive approach at the Danish Defence Academy in Copenhagen in the end of October 2008 indicate that Danish military units are focusing more on military cooperation within the British-led military task force than with other Danish representatives, NGOs as well as governmental, in southern Afghanistan.
 - 8 T. M. Flatemo, *Norsk konseptutvikling i Provincial Reconstruction Team Meymahne* [Norwegian concept development in Provincial Reconstruction Team Meymahne] (Oslo: Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College, 2008).

study finds that although different Norwegian ministries participated in the efforts of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) there was no intentional coordination between them. The civilian advisers were, as an example, subordinated to the embassy in Kabul and Norwegian development aid was distributed to the Afghan central authorities, not the provincial. The Norwegian elections in 2005 ended the term in office of the centre-right cabinet led by Prime Minister Bondevik, replacing it with a centre-left cabinet led by Prime Minister Stoltenberg. This change of guard did not, however, lead to a new conceptual direction. The implicit atomistic approach was hence preserved. Experiences from the field led, however, to two dramatic changes in 2006. First, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for a written policy on the interdepartmental PRT concept. (Which indicates that no policy was at hand, at least not a written one.) Second, development aid for Afghanistan was disbursed to local rather than central authorities.

Our critical point is, however, that lessons learned in Afghanistan have so far not been translated into a *general* policy of how Norway intends to contribute to NATO's concept of comprehensive approach.

The Danish case indicates a top-down approach to the comprehensive approach without implementation of the explicitly articulated and existing general holistic policy. The Norwegian case, on the other hand, indicates bottom-up generated developments of the existing, but only implicitly formulated, policy of the specific case of Afghanistan. These findings underscore the importance of examining the pros and cons of the strategic options at hand, both general and specific, when it comes to small states and their choice of strategy. Further research is therefore highly recommended.

Consequences for NATO?

Based on the lessons of previous international peace support operations, different regions of an area of operations clearly have different needs. The current operation in Afghanistan is no exception and will therefore serve as an example in the ensuing discussion related to the use of the diplomatic (*D*), military (*M*) and economic (*E*) instruments.

In the southern parts of the country some Alliance members and partners are conducting counter insurgency operations in order to create security. Without security it is extremely difficult for the unarmed grand strategic tools, i.e. diplomatic and economic, to work. Hence the presence of military units is a precondition for success. The Danish experience indicates that a holistic top-down policy might be impossible in these circumstances.

In the area of the capital, Kabul, it can be argued that higher levels of security have been established, at least in comparison to the South. One of the




Figure 9.1: Different regions – Different needs. In general terms, the needs of the different governmental instruments of power, i.e. military (M), diplomatic (D), and economic (E), might differ from one region to another. This might impact on the choice of a holistic or atomistic approach.

main challenges in the capital area is to create national Afghan instruments of governance. Some Alliance members and partners are conducting stabilisation operations to preserve order. Military units are still a success criterion, but the main effort is presumably provided by diplomatic resources.

In the provinces of northern Afghanistan, the more secure environment increases the chances of making a lasting impression. Some Alliance members and partners are conducting humanitarian assistance operations in support of progress. Foreign military units are not necessarily a precondition. The Afghan national army and police might very well be in a position on their own to enable governmental organisations and NGOs to work. Even if the argumentation so far might be over simplistic, it can still serve as a point of departure for the further discussion.

An application of a holistic approach in, for example, northern Afghanistan might not necessarily be the most efficient way of using the different grand strategic tools, at least not if each of them is analysed separately. In a region where the main effort is supposed to be carried out by unarmed economic instruments, the armed forces have to accept a less prominent role. The inclusion of NGOs makes the picture even less favourable for the military. This does not, however, indicate that the military has no role to fulfil at all. Until the national Afghan army and police are capable of ensuring security and stability by themselves, and as long as other Norwegian grand strategic tools are at work, the Norwegian Armed Forces must continue to field a contribution. Convincing the military on the kind of operations they are supposed to conduct in order to serve the

overarching grand strategic objective is possibly the main challenge. Once that has been clarified, relevant units with proper equipment can be deployed. This indicates the importance of orchestrating the different grand strategic tools, not only between the different governmental departments in Oslo, but also within the area of operations. Needless to say, the guidance of an explicit policy is fundamental for success.

There is, however, little comfort in achieving comprehensiveness in some of the provinces if it makes the wider ISAF approach seem uncoordinated. To address this problem, NATO has to improve mechanisms for coordinating civilian and military input. The benefits of structuring the contributions holistically under a national umbrella would otherwise be less significant.

An application of the atomistic approach in northern Afghanistan is another option. The national difficulties in orchestrating different grand strategic tools, not to mention the involvement of NGOs, might be avoided if the task were left to the multinational commanders in the area of operations. A fundamental problem is, however, that NATO itself lacks not only the capability but also the authority to command and control non-military resources and units. It is most likely that the UN will have to take the leading role as long as the overarching objectives are multifunctional in their nature and the use of military force is limited to humanitarian assistance and/or disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.

When it is possible to conduct stabilisation and reconstruction operations more or less separately from the operations conducted by the non-military grand strategic instruments, it might very well be appropriate for NATO to lead. An application of an atomistic approach in, for example, the Kabul area, therefore seems to be a possible option.

In the southern parts of Afghanistan, where the intensity of the conflict is higher than in other parts of the country an atomistic approach might be preferable due to the high threat level and risks. Due to national considerations and caveats, however, the operational options of the military commanders might be extremely limited.

It is a paradox that even though the highest national interest of Norway is in strengthening and increasing its influence in NATO, when it really counts there seems to be no political will to send Norwegian armed forces (other than special forces) to areas where the military could make a difference. Since not only Norway, but other members as well, are reluctant to contribute to high intensity combat operations this is a key dilemma for NATO to solve. The challenge is to create a reliable concept, i.e. an atomistic approach in good faith, which enables all members to provide relevant forces.

Burden sharing through a concept based on an atomistic approach in good faith might be what NATO should concentrate its conceptual efforts on. By its own ambition, however, NATO might have created a “catch 22” situation. As a consequence of introducing the comprehensive approach, NATO is effectively assuming more functions than it actually has the capability and authority to command and control. The problem has at least two dimensions. The first is the multinational dimension that comes naturally with international organisations such as NATO. The second is the multifunctional dimension of comprehensiveness, including not only the military, but also diplomatic and economic instruments.




Figure 9.2: The holistic and atomistic approaches and NATO’s quest for comprehensiveness. The context consists of a multi-national dimension and a multi-functional dimension. The latter comprises the three governmental instruments of power, military (M), diplomatic (D), and economic (E).

If all member states had deployed their armed forces atomistically, NATO would have had to rely solely on the military instrument. It only takes one member state’s adoption of a holistic approach to change this situation. The problem is that in regions with high intensity conflict, i.e. where NATO might be the most relevant organisation to manage the crisis, a large number of member states, if not all, would probably prefer an atomistic approach. In regions where security and stability already are established, and NATO’s relevance not that obvious,

a large number of member states, if not all, would instead presumably prefer a holistic approach. To take the discussion one step further; if NATO's relevance is unchallenged only in regions with high intensity conflict, and if only a few of the organisation's members are prepared to contribute their armed forces to these regions, and if, finally, the contributions actually provided in these regions take an atomistic approach which is not in good faith, what then is the point of struggling to implement the concept of comprehensive approach? It seems clear that NATO has created an enormous conceptual challenge for itself.

Final remarks

Approaching comprehensiveness is not, as we have seen, an easy operation. Once the Norwegian policymakers have decided how Norway should proceed, the country will be able to take a more constructive role in, and provide a more significant contribution to, the ongoing development of the conceptual framework of the international organisations. Hand in hand with such a decision come the necessary premises guiding the development of the national grand strategic concept. Following the strategic traditions of the Cold War era, deciding whether to adopt an *atomistic* or *holistic* approach would then be the third and final step. In the new strategic settings this step might, however, have to be the first. That being so, the military instrument might have gained in importance in the new millennium.

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