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# Keeping Nato out of trouble

## Nato's non-policy on out-of-area issues during the Cold War

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## Preface

In 1996-97, the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS) received a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, allowing two persons to undertake a study of Nato's out-of-area problems from a historical perspective. IFS also received a joint grant from the Norwegian Research Council and the British Council. Cand. Polit. Torunn Laugen was engaged to study the post-Cold War period, and I was engaged to investigate the Cold War period. Laugen's study is published as *Defence Studies* no. 5/ 1999.

Given the scope of the topic, the study had to be strictly defined. A study based solely on secondary sources would be unsatisfactory, as several such studies are available already. On the other hand, a classic monograph - a survey of the topic based on virtually all primary sources available - would not have been feasible. Instead I decided to conduct a study based on a few, but hopefully key, representative and illustrative primary sources, supplemented by a selection of secondary sources. For the period up to the end of the 1960s, I could use Norwegian, British and American primary sources. For the 1970s and 1980s, only Norwegian sources were available.

I am thankful to the Director of IFS, Professor Rolf Tamnes, for his guidance, advice, comments and suggestions. Others who have read drafts and made useful comments are Professor Olav Riste, Professor Geir Lundestad, and Ambassador Bjørn Kristvik. A special thanks to Kari Dickson, who has put considerable effort into correcting and improving my English and writing style.

## Introduction

On the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1989-91, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato)'s declared enemies disappeared. The Cold War came to an end and Nato was forced to think about its raison d'être. One possible task for Nato that quickly appeared, was engagement in out-of-area issues. Many saw this not only as a new useful mission for Nato, but indeed as a rescue for an organization without a cause. The term «out-of-area or out of business» was frequently heard in Nato circles. From 1992 to 1995, in the shadow of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nato slowly but surely prepared itself for taking on out-of-area responsibilities. From 1995, Nato forces were dispatched to Bosnia with a United Nations mandate to implement and monitor the Dayton Peace Accord. This became Nato's first ground operation out-of-area. Four years later, and this time without a United Nations mandate, Nato instigated air-strikes against a sovereign state, Yugoslavia, in an attempt to break the impasse regarding the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in one of its provinces, Kosovo.

This was a dramatic change from the Cold War era. From 1949 to 1989, Nato was quite firmly committed to a non-policy regarding out-of-area issues. Out-of-area issues were no fewer, nor less serious, than in the post Cold War era, but throughout the Cold War Nato remained very faithful to its policy of non-involvement in such issues. The most fundamental reason was differences in interests regarding areas outside Europe, and consequently a lack of will and ability to agree on a common policy. The United States had global interests; some Nato members, including major ones such as France and the United Kingdom, had substantial colonial interests; and some Nato members only had marginal interests outside of Europe. Another important reason was differences in ideology regarding international politics and how this should be conducted. Many non-colonial powers were anti-colonial and many of the smaller Nato members resented the «power politics» conducted by the major Nato nations outside the Nato area. A third reason was differences in the

perception of threat, especially those coming from the Soviet Union and global communism. While everybody recognized the constant, albeit varying, Soviet threat to the North Atlantic area, there was no such consensus on the Soviet threat to other parts of the world or the forcefulness of global communism. At first, the United States focused on the Soviet threat to the North Atlantic area. But during the course of the Cold War, the United States became more and more concerned about the global communist threat. The colonial powers, on the other hand, at first portrayed the Soviet threat as greatest to the North Atlantic area, and global communism as most dangerous in regions where they had colonies. After the dismantling of the colonial empires, however, they tended to downplay the communist threat to areas outside the North Atlantic area. The smaller non-colonial powers tended all along to downplay the Soviet and communist threat in far away areas, and instead focused on the Soviet threat in their local neighborhoods.

In this situation, with no convergence on interests, ideology, or perceptions of threat, Nato as a collective organization realized that to force the various members to reach a common policy on issues of particular interest to only some members, would lead to resentment and mischief, and could possibly undermine Nato's prime objective, the defense of the North Atlantic area from Soviet aggression. All Nato members instead found themselves either pursuing or accepting a policy with the inherent logic that the task of defending the North Atlantic area was so important that nothing should be allowed to obstruct it. Staying out of trouble outside the Nato area would also increase the possibilities of avoiding problems in connection with the formidable task of defending the North Atlantic area. However, there was a price to be paid for this: internal trouble regarding out-of-area issues occurred frequently, as some members at various times found this non-policy unsatisfactory and inadequate, and ventured to challenge it.

The challenges fall into two main groups: first, in Nato's first two decades of existence, the colonial powers attempted to solicit Nato support for their actions and policy in their colonies. Second, from the

early 1960s, the United States wanted Nato to engage itself in containing communism in the Third World. Neither of these challenges succeeded. The colonial powers drummed up some support from individual Nato members, but not Nato as such. There were some exceptions, however, and in these cases, support was granted as it was believed to be for the sake of effectively defending the North Atlantic area. Similarly, until the early 1980s, Washington managed to receive some support from some Nato countries in some cases, but usually met solid opposition in its attempts to involve Nato in various Third World conflicts.

In discussions regarding out-of-area issues in Nato, the members fell into four main groups. First, the United States, which was a non-colonial power with an increasingly global outlook. Second, the colonial powers (the United Kingdom, France, Portugal and Belgium) which originally had a global/regional outlook, but which, after losing most of their colonial influence, in many ways became like the third group. (The United Kingdom and France, did, however, maintain a broad outlook even after losing most of their colonial possessions.) The third group was the non-colonial powers, which maintained a local outlook throughout the Cold War. This was either self-imposed as a result of World War II (Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany), or simply because they were small (Iceland, Norway, Denmark, and Canada). The fourth group (Greece and Turkey) was similar to the third in that they were non-colonial, less powerful and had a local outlook, but were different in that their local outlook extended to areas that were defined as out-of-area for Nato. The Netherlands is difficult to place, as it was a major colonial power until 1949 - and a minor one until 1963 - but was also an «Atlantic animal»[1] with a close affinity to the United States, and was «like-minded» with the Scandinavian powers in its Third World policy. Spain did not join Nato until 1982.

Having a non-policy on out-of-area issues did not, of course, shield Nato from having to deal with them. During the Cold War, Nato was affected by the many crises, incidents and developments that occurred outside Nato territory, and had to address these issues in some way. Nato,

therefore, considered a handful of devices, of which consultations became the most widely used.

These, however, were not sufficient for the larger Nato members, which despite acknowledging Nato's non-policy, - or because they acknowledged it from time to time, felt the need to engage in more substantial coordination regarding issues outside the Nato area. They therefore established an *ad hoc*, informal, bilateral cooperation, often of a low-scale military nature, on out-of-area issues. The groupings varied according to a «coalition of the willing» formula, whereby nations with particular interest in a specific case cooperated on that issue, but not necessarily on others. Coalitions between the United States and the United Kingdom were quite common, as were coalitions between groups of colonial powers, but others also occurred. This kind of cooperation was forced to take place outside Nato, due to what may be termed «coalitions of the unwilling» which prevailed within Nato. These also varied from case to case, but the nucleus often comprised the smaller non-colonial Atlantic nations, Denmark and Norway in particular.

It may seem strange that the only nations which nearly always seemed to succeed in having their policy on out-of-area issues passed by Nato, were these small nations. The explanation, however, is quite simple. Nato was not a supranational organization, but an international organization based on unanimity. Formally, this meant that each nation had a veto in Nato's supreme forum, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This formality, however, was not sufficient if all the major powers were in agreement about one particular issue. If that was the case, their combined weight usually put the smaller powers in place. But this was rarely the case. On the contrary, the major powers were only seldom in agreement on out-of-area issues. Thus, the smaller powers could generally rely on having one or more major power on their side, opposing Nato engagement.

Out-of-area issues, as noted, gave rise to substantial noise, quarrels and disagreement within Nato during the Cold War era. Solidarity within the alliance was tested again and again, and political and military efficiency suffered due to all these «crises». Still, it is fair to say that out-of-area

issues were never decisive for Nato cohesion, nor seriously damaging for Nato.[2] After a seemingly serious out-of-area crisis, for example after the Suez crisis in 1956, Nato closed ranks remarkably quickly. It is natural to attribute much of Nato's ability to remain focused on its paramount task, the containment of the Soviet threat in the Nato area, to Nato's unwillingness to attempt to stretch the Nato solidarity to cover secondary concerns, namely out-of-area issues.

In this study, the concept of «out-of-area issues» is used to denote issues relating to areas outside 1) Nato territory, as defined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty (originally the European territory of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, Iceland, Denmark and Norway, and from 1952, Greece and Turkey, and from 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany and from 1982, Spain; the North American territory of the United States and Canada; until 1962 France's Algerian departments; islands under the jurisdiction of any of the above-mentioned in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the above-mentioned, when in or over the above-mentioned territories, any other area in Europe in which occupying forces of any of the original parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force, the Mediterranean Sea, or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer),[3] and 2) Nato's declared enemy, the Soviet Union and its European satellites (members of the Warsaw Pact).

Moreover, this study only deals with out-of-area incidents that had a bearing on Nato, i.e. those which forced members to raise the issue of Nato involvement. The question of enlargement is also discussed.[4] The study will not, however, deal with the various out-of-area issues as such, individual Nato members' out-of-area policy, or bilateral cooperation between member states. Such topics are only included if they provide a context, understanding, and explanation of this study's major focus: how Nato as an organization dealt with out-of-area issues, and why it did so in the way it did.

In Chapter 1, after tracing the origins of the formal Nato area, and by

implication, what was considered to be out-of-area and why, I will look at the origins of the non-policy on out-of-area issues and the development of a number of devices created to deal with out-of-area issues. In Chapter 2, the first wave of challenges to the non-policy from the colonial powers will be discussed. Chapter 3 deals with the next serious challenge, posed by the United States from the early 1960s. In the concluding chapter, an attempt is made to gather the main threads and substantiate the general propositions made in this introduction.

# Chapter 1: Defining the Nato area and establishing a non-policy on out-of-area issues, 1948-1952

The topic of this chapter is the creation of Nato and its formative years. The underlying reasons for the geographical definition of Nato and why some areas became «out-of-area», are to be found in this period. Above all, Nato was created to defend the North Atlantic area from Soviet aggression. Areas which were not deemed to be of the utmost importance in this regard, were, with a few exceptions, not included. This focus on the North Atlantic area, in addition to diverging interests, ideology and perceptions of threat to areas outside the North Atlantic area, is the main reason why Nato, from the start, chose a non-policy towards areas outside the alliance. But as everyone realized that events and developments in areas outside Nato would invariably affect the alliance, Nato policy-makers had to establish how they would handle relations between Nato and areas outside the Treaty area. Thus, prior to signing the Treaty, and after much brainstorming, they drew up some basic principles and devices for handling Nato's relations with the outside world. Both the non-policy and these devices were soon to be brutally tested in the first major out-of area challenge for Nato, the Korean War. This war not only had great repercussions for Nato in general, but also influenced Nato's out-of-area thinking in the years that followed.

## The geographical definition of Nato, 1948-1949

The definition of the geographical scope of Nato was primarily determined by the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and was carried out in three stages. The first was to link the principal area under Soviet threat, Western

Europe, with the principal provider of its security, the only nation with the resources to withstand the Soviet Union, the United States. The second was the inclusion of the countries which were strategically necessary to conclude the first stage: Iceland, Denmark, Norway and Portugal. The third was to give special attention to political circumstances in France - resulting in the inclusion of Italy and Algeria - because that country was deemed crucial in the defense of the North Atlantic area. During this three-stage process a lot of sound and sensible arguments for the inclusion of other countries and areas were made, but they did not ultimately convince the decision-makers, primarily because the various candidates simply were not considered to be vital in the defense of the North Atlantic area. In addition, they would drain limited resources and stretch the proposed alliance to meaningless proportions, if they were included. All those involved realized that a «line must be drawn somewhere.»[5]

### Linking Western Europe with the United States

As mentioned, the fundamental reasoning behind the formation of Nato was the perceived threat from the Soviet Union. Uneasiness about the intentions and behavior of the great communist power had increased in the final stages of World War II, and peaked following the breakdown of the London Foreign Ministers' conference on Germany in December 1947, which for many was a litmus-test of the possibility to cooperate with Moscow. When the test failed, and the result was confirmed by the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact with Finland and the rumors of a similar pact with Norway in February 1948, it became top priority for leading Western European leaders to ensure the involvement of the United States, with its enormous resources, in countering this threat. First, they formed the Brussels Pact in March 1948, consisting of the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Its primary objective was, as noted by a prominent Nato historian, to entangle the United States in the defense of Western Europe.[6] Chronologically, as the initiative to form a Western alliance came from

Europe, the United States - and Canada, its junior partner - were the second group of countries to join the discussions on Western security in 1948-1949.

Despite the United States' geographic location far from potential rivals and enemies, a sense of vulnerability had traditionally led American officials «to regard preservation of a global balance of power as a vital interest». After World War II, policy-makers in Washington were forced to reconsider and adjust their strategies. As the Soviet Union emerged as a clear and direct threat from 1947-48 onward, Washington was more prepared than previously to deploy forces and establish bases overseas. Now, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the «entire area of Western Europe [...was] an area of strategic importance to the United States». Therefore the military establishment and key officials in the administration succeeded in reversing the skepticism of the Congress and secured a positive American reply to the European request for help.[7]

## Including the «link» countries

One of the first questions asked by the delegates from the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom who met at the Pentagon in March-April 1948 to take part in secret talks, was which nations should take part in a security arrangement for the North Atlantic area. At this point, the geographical scope was still quite fluid. Very broad concepts, based on culture and values, were brought to the table. The British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, who had initiated the talks, had ideas for a security pact encompassing the whole free European civilization.[8] However, such lofty ideas were soon abandoned. During the «Washington Exploratory Talks» in summer of 1948, the Brussels Pact members, which were all present, made it clear that they were interested in a limited alliance, rather than a broad one. They were first and foremost concerned about their own security and had no wish, as one historian puts it, to «share American largesse with outlying nations.»[9]

Following an initial tug-of-war in Washington, this restrictive view was

firmly rejected by the United States.[10] Under Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, was of the opinion that the «ultimate criterion» for any additional members, was whether inclusion enhanced American security, and, given the perceived Soviet threat to Western Europe, eased the burden of defending this area. In addition, the alliance had to be based on «reasonable geographic proximity and community of interest». Thus, as «Greenland and Iceland were more important than some nations in Western Europe to the security of the United States and Canada», and because the Americans thought it impossible to defend Western Europe without controlling such strategically important islands and a few key countries linking Europe with North America, such as Norway, Denmark (which governed Greenland) and Portugal (including the Azores), Washington insisted that these countries should be included. Given their primary goal of securing American involvement in the defense of Western Europe, the European delegates could not object to this.[11]

The possibility of being covered by an American security commitment was the main reason why the «link» countries chose to accept the invitation to become members of the North Atlantic Treaty. But they had reservations, and the alliance was adjusted to meet their special national security needs. Iceland, which had no military forces and was situated in a strategically significant area for the superpowers, was reluctant to enter into an alliance with the Western powers, for fear of being dragged into a superpower conflict and, in addition, was unwilling to yield national sovereignty. A precondition for Icelandic membership was that «there would be no military presence [in Iceland] in peacetime».[12] The Norwegian government was hesitant about breaking away from its policy of non-alignment, and had to win over considerable left-wing opposition to entering an alliance with the capitalist United States. In the spirit of Nordic cooperation, Norway and Denmark also made a futile attempt to create a Scandinavian alliance. In addition, both countries insisted that there should be no allied bases in these countries (except on Greenland) in peacetime, in order to satisfy critical domestic opinion and to avoid provoking the neighboring Soviet Union too much.[13] All in all, there was a strong

determination in the Nordic countries involved to limit the allied defense cooperation as much as possible. They agreed to measures that were deemed absolutely necessary to contain the Soviet Union, but would go no further. This kind of thinking was also to be crucial regarding out-of-area issues. Portugal had to square possible new Atlantic commitments with its defense pact with Spain, and found out that they were compatible. However, the exclusion of Spain, a close political ally, from the Atlantic alliance caused deep dissatisfaction.[14]

## The problem cases: Italy and Algeria

In many ways, the above-mentioned eleven Atlantic countries, together with the occupied West Germany, formed a «natural» strategic and geographic entity to counter a possible Soviet attack on the North Atlantic area. There were, however, many additional candidates for membership, and in order to evaluate inclusion systematically, certain criteria were set forth in the discussions. These were generally applicable, but were particularly pertinent in the case of Italy, which, despite not being an Atlantic state, was the most frequently mentioned possible member of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The first criterion was whether new members would be an economic or military burden or asset to the alliance. In the case of Italy, it was argued that its location as a non-Atlantic state, would made it difficult to defend, and that this could drain resources and divert them from strategically more important areas. Nor would the burden be sufficiently offset by Italy's assets, given the restrictive clauses imposed on the Italian military after World War II which considerably reduced the potential military contribution to the common cause.[15] A second criterion was whether the candidates were politically acceptable. After all, the North Atlantic Treaty was also intended to defend democratic free nations against the dictatorial rule of the communist Soviet Union. In the case of Italy, many felt uneasy about the historical legacy of World War I, the fascist regime of Benito Mussolini and its behavior during World War II.

Some feared that Italy would be an «ineffectual and undependable ally».[16] A third criterion which was particularly relevant to Italy was whether inclusion would strengthen the candidate's Western orientation. Though the military containment of the Soviet Union was the primary reason for the North Atlantic Treaty, another motivating factor was the wish to spark a cooperative mood in Western Europe, to boost a region struggling with economic problems and a lack of confidence, and to integrate the losers of World War II back into the fold, particularly West Germany and Italy.[17] In this context, the selection process was vital. Failure to include a nation that wanted to join could set in motion a process whereby that country developed a closer relationship with the enemy.

The inclusion of Italy in the Western security discussions was briefly considered prior to the Italian general election in April 1948, in order to weaken the communist party.[18] But after the election, in which the non-communist parties won an overwhelming majority, the fact that Italy was not an Atlantic power again rose to prominence. The Americans now «felt that the inclusion of Italy, unless it had theretofore become a member of the Brussels Pact, would be a mistake since it would destroy the geographic basis of the North Atlantic area.»[19] Canada and the Brussels Pact members agreed. Even the French, who later became Italy's primary supporters, questioned the desirability of including Italy in the proposed alliance, as at this stage, France's aim was to limit the alliance to the Brussels Pact members, the United States and Canada.[20]

Later, the question of Italy's political orientation again became the focus. The then American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, wrote in his memoirs: «from a political point of view an unattached Italy was a source of danger». He continued: «Italy might suffer from an isolation complex and, with its large Communist party, fall victim to seduction from the East.»[21] Italy should therefore not be left in the cold. But as Italy primarily was of strategic importance in terms of the defense of continental Europe, and not from an Atlantic point of view, the United States favored the inclusion of Italy in the Brussels Pact, or alternatively, membership in a future Mediterranean pact.[22] The Brussels Pact countries, not wanting to

impair the American security commitment, dragged their feet and came up with all sort of proposals, short of inviting Italy to join the Brussels Pact. The Dutch even proposed adding annexes to the Treaty, stating the alliance's relevance to certain external areas, which would then enhance Italy's security.[23]

But when France realized that the inclusion of the «link» countries would tilt the balance within the alliance to the North, and that Italian membership would enable them «to make a more forceful case for the inclusion of North Africa», Paris became the primary mover in the campaign for the inclusion of Italy.[24] At the start of 1949, no participants in the talks had any strong feelings about extending membership to Italy. However, in February 1949, France set the surprising ultimatum, that if Italy did not become a member, France would oppose Norway's membership. This provoked the other participants to the extent that it nearly proved counter-productive for France. The other delegates maintained that Norway was a totally different issue from Italy. Norway's case rested on geographical and strategic imperatives in the task of defending the North Atlantic area from Soviet aggression, whereas this was not the case with Italy. Despite the anger caused by France's behavior, Italy was the last country to become a signatory to the original Treaty when the American President, Harry S. Truman, on Acheson's insistence with reference to France's strong opinion, grudgingly accepted Italy's inclusion.[25]

Towards the end of the squabble regarding Italy, France also demanded that Algeria should be included in the alliance, as «Algeria was a part of France and in the same relation to France as Alaska and Florida to the United States». The American Under Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, was very much opposed to trying «to expand the area beyond the basic limits of the homelands.» The alliance had the North Atlantic area as its core area. To include North Africa would make it «impossible to draw a logical line anywhere» and would «open up a limitless field». In reply to a charge from the French Ambassador to Washington that the core area had «been greatly expanded by the inclusion of the northern territories of

Canada, Alaska and possibly Norway and Denmark», Lovett said that there was a marked difference between these areas and North Africa, which «had been considered and found to be not of cardinal importance.»[26] However, the United States accepted the inclusion of Algeria, primarily because France was important to the alliance and because it helped to solve the impasse regarding Italy and Norway.[27] It was emphasized, though, that Algeria was an exception. Washington feared that if other colonies were included, the United States would be sucked into colonial wars all over the world.[28]

With the exception of France, potential members possessing colonies quite easily accepted that the colonies would not be included in the alliance. After all, colonies were of secondary concern in relation to the hope that the United States would provide security against the Soviet Union. In addition, the colonial powers were not interested in the possibility of others meddling in their colonial affairs.

### The «remainder» category

During the deliberations leading up to the signing of the Treaty, there was a «remainder» category of nations, which for various reasons were briefly considered for membership. Four subgroups can be identified in this category.

The first subgroup included the three neutral states, Sweden, Ireland and Switzerland. The two former were considered as «link» countries. To include Sweden, however, was unrealistic, as participation in a security alliance was not compatible with Sweden's long-standing policy of neutrality. Ireland was effectively ruled out by insisting linking the question of the secession of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom with the question of participation in the security alliance. None of the delegates in the preparatory talks found this acceptable. Switzerland was never formally invited to join the alliance, as it was assumed that the answer would be no. However, had the Swiss wished to join, they would have been welcomed.[29]

The second subgroup comprised the occupied West Germany and Austria. As it would have been politically futile to suggest that they should be included, these countries were not under consideration for immediate membership, but it was agreed that they would possibly join at a later stage. In the meantime, their territories were to be covered by the Treaty, by way of reference in Article 6 to «occupying forces of any of the Parties».[30]

The third was the exposed borderline countries, Greece, Turkey and Iran. The concern that selecting countries to participate in a Western security arrangement would invariably leave someone out in the cold, combined with an alleged expansionist Soviet Union, was especially pertinent in the case of these countries.[31] They were under considerable communist pressure: Greece from within, and Turkey and Iran from the Soviet Union. But the desire to avoid affronting the Soviet Union too close to its territory, was sincere. This aspect of reassurance, combined with the fact that Greece, Turkey and Iran were relatively far removed from the core area of Nato, and that the United States had bilateral security arrangements with them, are the main reasons why these countries did not become full members in 1949.[32]

The fourth group comprised the long-shot, Brazil, which briefly was considered in the preliminary talks for Nato, but was too far away and too culturally different from the group of seven to really be seriously considered.[33] (The same applies to Egypt, which requested Nato membership in 1950.[34])

Even if the countries in this diverse «remainder» category did satisfy some of the criteria for inclusion, they did not satisfy all, and certainly not the crucial ones: that they were geographically and strategically important in the defense of the North Atlantic area. As a result, none of them was eligible for membership in the alliance.

All in all, there was a relatively restrictive attitude towards which countries should be included in the alliance. But this, however, did have a downside: how to provide for the security of the world's free countries which were not included in this paramount security alliance of the free world?

## Considering out-of-area devices, 1948-1949

The criteria for membership developed during the process leading up to Nato left many non-communist countries out-of-area. Their security problems in relation to a perceived threat from the Soviet-led communist bloc remained unresolved and had to be addressed. In was a common belief that every communist advance in the global struggle would dangerously affect the existing balance of powers and would have a negative long-term impact on Western security. Furthermore, all out-of-area conflicts, whether or not these stemmed from communism, could eventually involve the great powers, spill over into the Nato area and trigger a large-scale war. Moreover, some of the nations in the Western security talks had national interests outside the North Atlantic area, and wanted to use their Nato membership to protect them.

During the security talks, six devices were considered to help cope with the security needs of countries not included in the alliance: 1) limited membership in the alliance; 2) the establishment of a series of alliances across the globe (in which the North Atlantic Treaty would be first among equals); 3) an implicit understanding between Nato countries, the Soviet Union and the countries in need of protection, that Nato cared for the security of these countries; 4) explicit declarations that left no doubt that the North Atlantic Treaty indeed cared for the security of certain non-member countries; 5) consultations among Nato countries on out-of-area security questions on a case-by-case basis; 6) as a last resort: an expansion of the Nato area.

The purpose of the first device, limited membership, was to establish links with countries which did not want to become full members such as Sweden, did not geographically or strategically belong in the North Atlantic area such as Italy, or, for various reasons, would be useful associates for Nato. The negotiators basically envisaged two categories in addition to full membership: 1) associated members with limited commitments and responsibilities; 2) nations which, if threatened, would be consulted and possibly receive help from full members. In addition, the Dutch Foreign

Minister, Eelco van Kleffens, suggested that some countries should be associated to the alliance through amendments to the Treaty. All these proposals were quickly rejected, however, as it was felt that they would weaken the alliance and confuse the original purpose of defending the North Atlantic area from the Soviet Union.[35]

As regards the next possible device, the idea of a series of alliances stretching across the world was tabled at various times during the talks. The most ambitious suggestion was that the United States - which would be a member in all alliances - would specifically design its commitments according to local circumstances. Such grand designs, though, did not generate much support. First of all, American skepticism to commiting American resources anywhere, initially even in Western Europe, based on the perception that these resources were limited, did not allow for this kind of thinking. Second, such alliances would, to an unacceptable extent, undermine the United Nations and the idea of collective security. Provisions in the United Nations' Charter made allowances for regional security arrangements - such as Nato -, but if the United States was a member of all of them, then their regional character would undoubtedly be questioned. Third, and most importantly, it was argued that such alliances would probably not provide the necessary security. There was no point in, as one American official put it, «spreading the butter so thin that it would not feed anyone.»[36]

More limited alliance arrangements were investigated thoroughly. The most pressing concerns out-of-area were at Nato's Southeast frontier. The creation of alliances covering the Mediterranean and the Middle East would have many advantages. This would allow membership for those Western powers with interests in the region, and relinquish responsibility for those without. It would also make it possible for Washington to commit itself less than to the North Atlantic area, which was more important. And, perhaps the most tempting aspect of such alliances was that they would take care of the security needs of Greece, Turkey, Iran (and for a while, also Italy) without having to include these countries in Nato. But the American arguments against such ambitious alliance ideas

were applied here, too. Washington was of the view that it was already doing a lot for security in this region by providing assistance to Greece and Turkey, and was skeptical of greater commitment. In addition, it would be wrong to give more promises than one could keep. Thus, Mediterranean and Middle East alliances were not established in 1949. But some countries, especially the United Kingdom, which traditionally had the largest interests in the region, continued to push the idea into the 1950s.[37]

The third device which was considered to bring areas outside the alliance within its security scope, was to reach an implicit understanding with certain countries that even though they were not offered membership in Nato, they were included in the general picture and would be given due assistance in the event of an attack from the Soviet Union. Such an understanding would, by nature, be vague and non-committal. It would primarily rest on the premise that the countries in question - and the Soviet Union - understood that it would be in Nato's own interest to come to their aid in the event of Soviet aggression. The countries most often mentioned in this context were West Germany, Austria, and Spain. Geographically, historically and culturally, they belonged in the western camp, but due to their former or present fascist regimes, it was politically impossible to include them in the alliance itself. At the same time, it was taken for granted that these countries, at least West Germany and Spain, would become members at some future date, once their fascist legacy had faded. The great powers agreed that «no western security system would be complete unless Spain and Germany played their proper roles.» Their strategic importance was too great. An implicit understanding that Nato would provide for the security of these areas outside the alliance was therefore in reality only a temporary device.[38]

The fourth device designed to provide security for areas outside Nato was to issue explicit statements (or alternatively - «some sort of protocol» attached to the Treaty) to the effect that member states would take the necessary steps if certain countries were threatened by hostile powers. The use of an implicit understanding was considered suitable for countries such as West Germany, Spain and Austria, as the objective was to

circumvent the political sensitivity related to these countries within the nations of the future North Atlantic Treaty; but if the purpose was to send out a signal to certain countries, the Soviet Union in particular, that Nato had strategic concerns in areas not covered by the alliance, then explicit statements seemed better suited. The device was at one time proposed as a possible solution to the problem of Italy, but was rejected by the French. It was more applicable to the problems of Greece, Turkey, and Iran.[39]

These countries, Turkey in particular, were extremely disappointed that they were not being invited to join the alliance, especially after it became clear that Italy would join. The promises of the Western powers that they probably would become members of a Mediterranean or a Middle East alliance at some future date, did not mollify them. They continued their campaign for inclusion in the Atlantic alliance. The Americans and the British admitted «that the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact might have undesirable repercussions on certain nations which would not be included in its scope.» In order to rectify this and demonstrate support to Greece, Turkey and Iran immediately, an official statement seemed a good alternative. The British, who had major interests in the region, considered this «virtually as important as the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact itself.»[40]

This was in fact to become the device used to deal with these countries' security needs at the time when the North Atlantic Treaty was concluded. However, it was not Nato, but the United States, which unilaterally issued the statement. On 18 March 1949, the same day that the proposed North Atlantic Treaty was announced, the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, delivered this statement on radio:

*In the compact world of today, the security of the United States cannot be defined in terms of boundaries and frontiers. A serious threat to international peace and security anywhere in the world is of direct concern to this country. Therefore, it is our policy to help free peoples to maintain their integrity and independence, not only in Western Europe or the Americas, but wherever the aid we are able to provide can be*

*effective. Our actions in supporting the integrity and independence of Greece, Turkey and Iran are expressions of that determination. Our interest in the security of these countries has been made clear, and we shall continue to pursue that policy.*[41]

The fifth possible out-of-area device was consultations. The original idea was to give countries under communist threat the opportunity to consult with Nato or Nato members, «with the object of [the Nato powers] taking any measures which may be necessary.» It would be up to Nato or its individual members to decide on the scope and content of any eventual measure following such consultations, but it was still believed that the right to consult with Nato countries would give some reassurance to non-Nato, non-communist countries. At the same time, it was hoped that the existence of such a consultation mechanism would serve as a warning and reminder to the Soviet Union. The device was originally considered to be particularly relevant regarding Italy, North Africa and indeed any country and/or area belonging to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). In fact, the head of the Policy Planning Staff in the American Department of State, George Kennan, thought that the security of all non-Atlantic free countries should be covered by this device.[42]

In the course of the security talks, the idea of formalized consultations with countries outside Nato was replaced by the idea of consultations on out-of-area issues within Nato. All parties agreed that this kind of consultation clause would be appropriate, but opinions differed as to its form and content. The United Kingdom, with substantial interests outside the Nato area, wanted any consultation clause to be as committed as possible. The British wanted to obligate members to consult each other if any member country's national integrity - including its colonies - was threatened. Washington, especially the Pentagon, disliked such a mandatory element and the inclusion of the colonial possessions on the grounds that this would result in too many commitments and excessive Nato responsibility for areas outside the Treaty. The outcome - Article 4 in the Treaty- was a compromise, but would in the future serve as an

important device for dealing with out-of-area issues: «The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.»[43]

The sixth device was never really discussed, but was a logical possibility that could not be dismissed, namely to expand the alliance to include other areas. This was how many thought the security problems of West Germany, Spain and possibly Austria would be solved in the future. Although no other countries were under serious consideration for membership at the time the Treaty was concluded, there was a realization that in the future, situations may arise in which Nato would have to reconsider its geographical scope.

All these various devices, with the exception of limited membership, which was rejected, were very quickly and seriously tested, when North Korean forces attacked South Korea on 25 June 1950 and generated one of the most serious crises in the Cold War.

## The first major out-of-area challenge: The Korean War, 1950-1953

Few in the Western camp doubted that the Soviet Union had instigated the North Korean attack on South Korea. The attack was seen as the latest, albeit most flagrant, expression of an expansionist communist bloc aimed at taking a substantial lead over the free world in the Far East. The Soviet atomic explosion in 1949, Chairman Mao Zedong's victory in the Chinese civil war the same year, the subsequent alliance between China and the Soviet Union, communist threats against Indochina, Malaya and the Philippines - all pointed in the same direction. Moreover, most believed there was, at least in the longer term, a real danger that the Soviet Union could mount similar attacks on the North Atlantic area. We now know that these beliefs were, if not altogether wrong, inaccurate and greatly exaggerated. But the sentiments nevertheless explain the strong reaction in Western capitals to the attack. The West believed it had to counter the

onslaught in order to maintain its credibility within its own camp, with the Soviet Union and with the neutrals.[44]

As Nato's first serious out-of-area issue, the war can be viewed from several angles. As a local war, it was not of great significance. The Korean peninsula was far away and of little strategic importance to Western Europe and the United States. Nor did Korea possess natural resources worthy of Nato's attention. For Nato, the most significant aspect of the Korean War as a local war, was that it threatened a globally important center of industrial and military power: Japan.[45] But this was not sufficient to warrant any substantial consideration in Nato fora of the Korean War as a local conflict.

If the Korean War is viewed as an omen for what might conceivably also have happened in the Nato area, however, it is a wholly different matter. As such, the war represented a turning point for Nato. The communist bloc, and by implication the Soviet Union, had shown that it could aggressively use arms to achieve political and territorial objectives.[46] As it was believed that a similar act of Soviet aggression could take place in Europe, Nato had to take precautions. Nato members dramatically increased their military spending. The alliance itself established an integrated command structure and collective defense framework; it began the process of rearming and integrating the Federal Republic of Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty, and Greece and Turkey were invited to join the alliance. These events are viewed by many scholars as the most important aspects of the Korean War for Nato, and were indeed prime illustrations of how an out-of-area issue could affect Nato in the Cold War.[47]

The third angle from which to view the Korean War as an out-of-area issue for Nato, and the one to which most attention is devoted, is the Korean War as the first case where Nato and Nato members actually had to deal with an out-of-area conflict. Basically, the West interpreted the outbreak and initial development of the war in the same way. Western powers were able to respond collectively and militarily to a clear act of aggression. And as long as the American-led United Nations intervention

maintained a clear objective and good chances of succeeding, the West demonstrated unity and forcefulness. But as these criteria were eroded, so was Western unity. Diverging interests, different perceptions of threat, and, most of all, different conceptions of what constituted the best means to meet the communist challenge, surfaced among the allies. In the context of this study, the most serious consequence of these disagreements was that the Western powers allocated a very small role to Nato in the handling of the conflict, because they feared it would undermine Nato cohesion regarding the North Atlantic area. Despite the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles' statement that «if hostilities can be terminated in Far East, NATO will be the first beneficiary», and his assurances that «US [United States] efforts in Far East areas are aimed directly at increased strength and security for NATO», all the important aspects of the Korean War were tackled without Nato participation.[48] Issues related to Korea were dealt with at length in Nato, but they were almost exclusively focused on the defense build-up in the North Atlantic area, and not Korea as an out-of-area conflict.

### Strains on Western unity

The West quickly succeeded in getting the United Nations to authorize a multilateral American-led intervention force. In the first few weeks after the attack, Western unity was strong. Interests, perceptions of threat and practical response seemed to converge. But soon after, Western unity became strained. Whereas Washington was more inclined to rely on military strength and tough action, Western Europe - led by the British - was more inclined to make concessions and work in cooperation with neutral and Third World countries. The British «proposed compromises often resembled surrenders», the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, wrote in his memoirs. He also reacted sharply to the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin's suggestion in July 1950 to link a settlement along the 38th parallel (the border between North and South Korea established after World War II) with American withdrawal from the

Taiwan Strait and mainland China representation in the United Nations.[49]

The most important explanation for these differences on the Western side was diverging views and perceptions due to different interests. Whereas Washington refused to have anything to do with communist China, London had considerable economic interests there, in addition to interests in Hongkong, Malaya and Singapore. The United Kingdom was afraid that the conflict in Korea could jeopardize its interests and its empire. Washington did not pay much heed to British national interests in its formulation of the Korean War policy. On the contrary, American officials became quite upset when the British referred to regional and national interests, as opposed to common Western interests, in their arguments against American policy in Korea.[50] Only in rare instances did the British and allies' attitude have an impact on American policy, such as when the American Commander in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur's proposal to use large Nationalist Chinese forces in the war, was rejected.[51]

Other regional and national interests connected to, but with no direct bearing on, the war in Korea also influenced how the allies handled the war. The British, for instance, were interested in having a good relationship with the United States regarding Korea in order to secure Washington's support in the Middle East.[52] One of the main reasons why London, despite initial opposition, tried to accommodate Washington on the issue of economic sanctions against communist China in 1951, was that the British needed American support in their conflict with Iran. Other countries, such as Australia, the Philippines, Turkey and Greece, were eager to obtain an American security commitment, and contributed forces in Korea in order to achieve this objective. The latter two also hoped to be rewarded with Nato membership.[53]

For Nato's smaller nations, policy formulation regarding the conflict reflected a lack of interests in the Far East. They were more than pleased with the forceful American response to the attack, but primarily because, as the Norwegian Ambassador to Washington, William Morgenstierne, told Acheson in June 1950, «the small nations of Europe no longer doubted American determination to defend them under NATO».[54] In the same vein,

they were also of the opinion that any response to communist aggression in Asia had to be controlled. From their perspective, it was important that the commitments in the Far East did not interfere with the much more important economic and military build-up in the North Atlantic area, and, not the least, did not increase the possibilities of triggering a major war involving China or the Soviet Union.[55]

This concern was acknowledged by all the European allies, great and small. They were pleased that the United States took on the challenge posed by the communists in the Far East, but were afraid that in doing so, Washington would overreact and endanger the defense of the West.[56] An escalation and/or hostilities outside Korea, especially in the Middle East or the North Atlantic area, would in their view mean that the military response to the North Korean attack had been a terrible mistake. The United States, on the other hand, pursued its policy in the conviction that it was in the best interests of Europe. Washington acted tough as this was widely believed to be the best way of deterring the Soviet Union, also in Europe.

### Manifestations of disunity

Different interests, perceptions of threat, and application of means continued to haunt the allies throughout the war. In fact, they surfaced at almost every juncture in the course of the war. For example, the European contribution to the military effort in Korea was, to a large extent, motivated by the need to show the kind of solidarity which they expected the United States to demonstrate in a future crisis in Europe: military intervention. On the other hand, given the fear of an attack in Europe, Washington should not pay too much attention to Korea, either. That some allies were opposed to committing forces in Korea, should be interpreted in this light; they believed that these forces were more needed in the defense of the North Atlantic area. For instance, Norway argued that diverting excessive manpower to Korea could weaken the overall goal of defending the North Atlantic area and that priorities were being rearranged

without knowing the consequences. Most importantly, it could also undermine economic well-being in the North Atlantic area and thus Western military capabilities in the long run. The Pentagon basically agreed with this, but had to argue with the State Department and the White House, which, for propaganda purposes, wanted to assemble as broad a coalition as possible. As a result, non-American participation was limited to token contributions, leaving the Americans to take the brunt of the fighting.[57]

Similarly, the primary reason why the European allies in the end supported the controversial American decision to cross the 38th parallel in autumn of 1950, was because they feared that by not doing so, they would endanger American engagement in Western Europe. European support was conditional in that the advance should not trigger a Chinese or Soviet response, which in turn could lead to a globalization of the conflict. Any sign of this, and the advance should halt. When China indeed entered the war in November, the European allies blamed the Americans, and changed their overall soft opposition to a more forceful one.[58]

The Europeans received another blow when, at a press conference later the same month, President Truman hinted at the possible use of atomic weapons in Korea. The British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, rushed to Washington to discuss, in the words of a leading historian on the Korean War, «an Asia conflict that threatened to tear apart the Western alliance.» Attlee's criticism of the United States' attitude to Korea was, however, largely ignored. True, a deeper understanding that a wider conflict was not in the interests of the West had evolved in Washington, but Attlee's proposals - echoing those of Bevin five months earlier - to link the re-establishment of the 38th parallel with an American withdrawal from the Taiwan Strait and communist China's membership in the United Nations, were resolutely rejected by Acheson. Nor did Attlee succeed in getting the United States to agree that the United Kingdom should be informed in advance of any eventual use of atomic weapons.[59]

Allied criticism, from the British in particular, of American conduct in the war on the ground and American handling of the conflict in the United

Nations persisted throughout the first half of 1951. In January 1951, the British Minister of War, John Strachey, warned Bevin that a world war could start within two years if the United States got its way in the Korean War. Bevin thought this was an exaggeration, but tried as hard as possible to hold the United States back, but to no avail. The American proposal to brand China as aggressor in the United Nations followed a similar pattern. Acheson, irritated by allied feet-dragging, resorted to indirect threats by saying that a failure of the United Nations to recognize this aggression «would create a wave of isolationism in this country which would jeopardize all that we are trying to do with and for the Atlantic Pact countries.» This intimidation worked; despite changes in the wording, the main content of the resolution remained unchanged and was passed by all the Western powers. Later that spring, the British protested against American plans to attack Manchuria if the Chinese carried out substantial air attacks in Korea, but once again had to back down.[60]

The differences between the United States and its allies did not evaporate when the discussions on a ceasefire started in the summer of 1951. The allies found Washington too stubborn and too reliant on military, rather than diplomatic, solutions. Crises occurred within the alliance frequently. In 1952, Acheson was so angry about the British and Canadian support for an earlier version of the Indian United Nation proposal for the repatriation of prisoners of war that he allegedly threatened the British Foreign Minister, Selwyn Lloyd, to dissolve Nato. He subsequently calmed down, and a compromise was worked out. Another serious crisis occurred in May 1953, when many allies blamed the military stalemate in Korea and the diplomatic impasse on the belligerent American stance and deficient American leadership. The fear of a major showdown in Europe was widespread at this time. Harsh words flew high across the Atlantic and the so-called «May crisis» seriously strained the Nato alliance.[61]

Transatlantic differences not only stemmed from diverging interests, perceptions of threat and the application of means, but also from a general apprehension regarding the wisdom that the American leadership had shown in the handling of the war. Some European policy-makers regarded

the United States as arrogant, immature and ignorant of foreign policy. The preference for military solutions in relation to diplomatic ones, the erratic leadership of General MacArthur in the field, the bellicose Congress stance and general American opinion all contributed to this.[62]

### The emergence of a non-policy

What is most striking, in the context of this study, is how peripheral Nato was in all this allied squabbling about the Korean War. Allied deliberations were largely bilateral, informal, *ad hoc* and for the most part between the major powers. When there were multilateral discussions, these took place in the United Nations. If the allies needed a forum outside the United Nations, they were created on an *ad hoc* basis, such as the forum for meetings between the force contributors in the latter stages of the war, or the intimate relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the armistice negotiations from 1951 onward.[63]

It is difficult to ascertain why Nato ended up with a non-policy on such an important out-of-area issue as the Korean War. One reason was probably that the West, because of the Soviet absence in the United Nations Security Council, was able to utilize the United Nations to counter the attack, and did not need Nato for this purpose. Moreover, since no Nato member had direct interests in Korea, and those who had indirect interests, such as the United Kingdom, preferred to deal with the United States bilaterally, there was really no reason to involve Nato in the deliberations. Another contributing factor was that it soon became clear to the Western allies that they had diverging interests, different perceptions of threat, and different conceptions of what constituted the best means to meet the communist challenge in Korea and were not willing to play out these differences in Nato. The overriding objective of Nato - to cope with the Soviet threat against the North Atlantic area - required such strong solidarity and amicable relations between the allies that it was best for Nato to stay out of the quarrels about how to deal with the Korean War. The organization was simply viewed as too precious to jeopardize through

differences in interests, perceptions of threat and the applications of means in an area so far removed as Korea. Thus, it makes perfect sense that the world's most powerful alliance became a quiet eye in the international storm revolving around the Korean War.

## Probing solutions to out-of-area concerns on the Southeast frontier, 1950-1952

One fundamental consequence of the Korean War was a growing fear of Soviet intrusion elsewhere in the world. In addition to the Middle East, the Nato countries were particularly concerned about the area closest to its Southeast frontier: the Mediterranean area, Greece, Turkey, and even Iran. It was not a direct attack that caused most concern, but a possible gradual increase in communist interference and influence. A growing nationalist mood in the region, accompanied by a leaning towards neutralism, which was seen as an invitation to Soviet intrusion, added to this concern. Nato believed it had to do something, but the question was what?

Interpretation of the threat differed, along the same lines as those in connection with the Korean War. The United States deemed Nato's Southeast frontier to be within the perimeter of its global struggle with the Soviet Union. London wanted primarily to maintain its military, political and economic influence in the Middle East. The French, preoccupied with Indochina, were temporarily on the sidelines. The smaller Nato countries, which did not have direct interests in the Southeast frontier area, did not want to divert attention from the North Atlantic area. These diverse outlooks probably explain the lack of consensus on how Nato should deal with the region. Nato initially considered a pact solution, but ended up using the most decisive device to deal with out-of-area concerns - an expansion of the Nato area - despite the reluctance of the smaller Northern powers. Once the United States decided, in spring of 1951, that Greece and Turkey were essential to the security of the North Atlantic area, and managed to convince the United Kingdom and France of this their combined weight was too much for the smaller powers to oppose.

### A Mediterranean pact?

Proposals for a Mediterranean pact were first tabled at the Washington Exploratory talks in 1948, as a possible long-term solution to the problems related to Italy, Greece and Turkey. Italy ceased to be relevant to the scheme when the country became a Nato member. Greece and Turkey at first regarded a possible Mediterranean pact as insufficient and favored full membership in Nato, but when it became clear that the latter was out of the question, Turkey reverted to the idea in April 1950, probably as the best way of getting into the Western security structure. When Washington stated it was not keen on the idea, and the Korean War subsequently reactivated hopes of achieving the primary objective, both Turkey and Greece pushed for full membership in Nato. By that time, however, the smaller countries and France had started to become interested in a Mediterranean pact, probably as an alternative to full membership in Nato for Greece and Turkey. But the pact alternative made «no sense» to Acheson: if some Nato allies were to become involved in a conflict in the Mediterranean Pact area, the rest were obliged to follow suit, but without having a say in the initial involvement. The United States instead chose wholeheartedly to pursue the other option: an expansion of Nato to include Greece and Turkey.[64]

### Enlargement: Greece and Turkey

Greece, Turkey (and Iran, which was a cause of concern due to explicit Soviet threats against the country after World War II) had been excluded from the alliance in 1949 due to the priority of Western Europe, their distance from the Atlantic, the easing of communist pressures against them in the late forties, and a desire to avoid provoking the Soviet Union by meddling too close to its borders. But Greece, Turkey and to a lesser extent, Iran, constantly pressed for inclusion in the alliance, or if that was not feasible, for some form of security arrangement involving at least the United States, but preferably also other Western countries. But prior to the

Korean War, Washington was simply «not in a position to consider any security pacts with Greece, Turkey, Iran or other Near Eastern countries at the present time because we cannot tell whether our capabilities at this time are adequate to defend our vital interests in Europe.» Washington told the suitors to be patient until something could be worked out.[65]

Developments in Korea made Washington review its «wait and see» policy and re-evaluate an increased commitment, particularly with regard to Greece and Turkey. The hostilities in Korea had shown American officials that the communists were not hesitant to mount military attacks. More importantly, even before the Korean War, military strategists had recognized especially Turkey's vital strategic role for the North Atlantic area in an eventual war with the Soviet Union. If Greece and Turkey were to fall into enemy hands it would be a terrible blow for Nato and would undermine the security of the North Atlantic area. It was also of considerable value that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey would contribute 25 new divisions to Nato's common defense. Moreover, communist influence was allegedly on the rise again in the region, and it was possible that the Soviet Union could even exploit Greek and Turkish disillusionment at having been excluded from the alliance to lure the countries into a neutral, or even worse, submissive role in relation to Moscow. Congress and the Pentagon, however, were still hesitant about taking on more commitments.[66]

So, too, was Nato. A formal application for membership from Greece and Turkey was rejected at the Nato meeting in the autumn of 1950. Instead, Nato offered associated status to Greece and Turkey by means of their participation in a defense planning agency. It was vainly hoped that this would satisfy Greek and Turkish demands for security and at the same time avoid committing Nato and American forces to a new theater. Greece and Turkey continued to press for full membership.[67]

In February 1951, the United States State Department finally started seriously to consider the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in Nato. The Pentagon was still hesitant, but the reluctance to commit forces to regions other than Western Europe, occupied territories and Korea, waned slowly

but surely. In April-May, the military came around to the State Department's view, and the inclusion of Greece and Turkey became official American policy. Talks with the British and the French commenced.[68] By the time of the Nato meeting in Ottawa in September 1951, the Pentagon had become an ardent supporter of including Greece and Turkey in Nato. A JCS memo, agreed to by the Secretary of Defense, stated that:

> *it is of utmost importance to United States security interests that Turkey and Greece be admitted as full members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They [JCS] feel that no issue should be injected into the discussions at Ottawa which could result in jeopardizing or even postponing for any considerable period the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO.*[69]

The United States was, accordingly, by now fully prepared to assume greater responsibilities in the struggle against the Soviet Union. Washington's reason for wanting to include Greece and Turkey in Nato

> *is primarily military and is based on a conviction that this is the only satisfactory means of assuring that their military resources, especially those of Turkey, will be fully available to the West in event of war. The association of Greece and Turkey is to (a) secure the Southern flank of Europe, and (b) to lend substance to a Middle East Command [MEC - see below].*[70]

At the Nato meeting in Ottawa, Acheson took the lead in advocating the inclusion of Greece and Turkey. He was met, however, with what he described as «sulky resistance from our smaller associates». The biggest problem for the smaller Atlantic powers, especially Denmark and Norway, those most opposed to enlargement, but also the Netherlands, Portugal and Canada, was that they would have great difficulty explaining to home audiences that an attack on, for instance, Turkey should be regarded as an

attack on them. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, could not understand why the smaller nations should have to take responsibility for an area «which is outside their sphere of interest». Furthermore, small Northern countries like Norway feared that an extension of Nato could provoke the Soviet Union, diffuse Nato's resources, and undermine the culture, tradition, democratic nature and Atlantic character of the alliance. In addition, it would make it more difficult to expand Nato's mission into fields other than the purely military - something they desired - and would also shift the balance towards the South, and make an unwanted precedence for future enlargement. There was also some «soreness» which «led to some pretty straight speaking at the Council» regarding the way the big powers had handled the whole affair. The smaller countries believed they had been presented with a fait accompli. The French seconded this complaint, as they felt left out by the United States and the United Kingdom. Denmark and Norway maintained their opposition throughout the meeting, but Acheson's strong appeal on behalf of Greece and Turkey, and his reassurance regarding the many objections to enlargement, won over their opposition and secured the inclusion of the two Southern countries. Greece and Turkey were formally included in 1952.[71]

## Conclusion

The first and second stages of the formation of the defense cooperation were the linking of the Brussels Pact members and the United States/ Canada, and the inclusion of the «link» countries (Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Portugal). These states were explicitly related to the objective of defending the North Atlantic area from Soviet aggression. The third stage, the inclusion of Italy and Algeria was also, albeit in a more indirect way, due to the importance of defending the North Atlantic area. Given the importance of France and the fact that France placed considerable weight on including these areas, the other powers did not want to defy Paris. Because such high priority was given to the defense of the North Atlantic

area, Nato chose a relatively restrictive view of its membership from the start and preferred not to be engaged in areas outside the Treaty area. Concessions regarding Italy and Algeria, however, foreshadowed a perennial problem for Nato: how should Nato cope with national pressures regarding secondary concerns - issues that were neither directly related to the common defense of North Atlantic area nor to containing the Soviet Union?

Nato members realized that the line between primary and secondary concerns was a thin one. Conflicts outside the Nato area could involve Nato members, spill over into the Nato area and the outcome could tilt the balance of power between the East and West. The Korean War was a case in point. Moreover, for Nato members involved in such conflicts, the line between primary and secondary concerns quite often seemed meaningless: the problems had to be addressed, regardless of whether they were future problems involving the Soviet Union, or present issues involving enemies in far away areas. Thus, the alliance partners were forced to think about how to deal with this. The result was a handful of devices, which, with the exception of the concept of limited membership, all played some role in the decades to come. However, political consultations became the cornerstone of Nato's handling of out-of-area issues.

But these devices were only potential instruments. A policy for out-of-area issues was needed. And the preferred policy became that of not having one - a non-policy. This was not a meticulously considered policy, but one that manifested itself in the first couple of years of Nato's existence, and was especially influenced by how the Nato allies handled the Korean War. This war showed that Nato's member states had substantially diverging interests, perceptions of threat and views as to what were the best means to use in situations not directly related to the defense of the North Atlantic area. Consequently, a non-policy became the preferred solution instead of the potentially divisive process of attempting to hammer out a policy which cut across the varying national policies regarding areas far from the Nato area. Furthermore, the potential for succeeding in formulating a common Nato policy on out-of-area issues

was limited, as illustrated by Secretary of State, Dean Acheson's recollection of President Truman's remarks that «we would stay in Korea and fight. If we had the support from others, fine; if not, we would stay on anyway.»[72]

A favored alternative to a common Nato policy on out-of-area issues for nations with interests in the case in question, was to develop an *ad hoc*, informal, bilateral cooperation, often of a low-scale military nature. This formula was similar to what later has been called «coalition of the willing». It both suited Nato members not interested in becoming involved in a particular case and minimized the risk of Nato running into trouble regarding the primary task: the defense of the Nato area from Soviet aggression.

# Chapter 2: Challenges to Nato's non-policy on out-of-area issues, 1949-1974: The colonial powers

Nato's non-policy regarding out-of-area-issues, as it emerged in the organization's early years, was by no means without challenges. In Nato's first 25 years, these came first and foremost from the colonial powers which wanted Nato support for their colonial policies. These pressures, and increasing resistance from the non-colonial powers - the United States, and in particular the Scandinavian countries and Canada - constituted the bulk of Nato's out-of-area problems in the first two to three decades of its existence.

Nato's area was based on «location, rather that the legal status of a particular locality»; thus, it was the geographic area of Western Europe and the North Atlantic, not nation states, that constituted Nato. Hawaii, for example, was not included in the Treaty, despite being United States territory from 1959.[73] Most colonial possessions were not included in the alliance, either. All the colonial powers, except France with regard to Algeria, initially accepted this, not only as a result of strong American insistence, but also because they feared intrusion in «internal affairs». Soon, however, the colonial powers began to modify this acceptance. In face of great opposition from the colonies themselves and from the increasing number of new independent nations, the colonial powers wanted Nato to support their colonial policies.

Basically, they tried to obtain two kinds of support: 1) financial and military assistance and 2) moral backing. A broad range of arguments was put forward to solicit support. First, and most importantly, the colonial powers tried to define their colonial problems as common Nato problems. They highlighted the perceived global nature of the communist threat and

argued that their fight in the colonies was part of the great struggle against communism. The logic was simple: communism was intrusive in all parts of the world, thus, it should be fought in all parts of the world. Second, the colonial powers underlined that their efforts outside the Nato area put a serious strain on their economy and military capacity. Without allied aid, both their economic and military efforts in Europe would suffer. Thus, it was a classic case of the «tyranny of the weak». A third argument was simple, but powerful: the colonial powers expected their allies to show solidarity in times of trouble.[74]

The United States and the other non-colonial powers, most notably the Scandinavian countries and Canada, were basically skeptical to these requests for help. They declared themselves anti-colonial on moral grounds. They did not always accept the assertion that the colonial powers fought for a common cause. More often than not, they saw legitimate nationalistic claims where the colonial powers saw communist activity. They did realize that colonial struggles drained resources from the European scene, but believed that this could be resolved by granting the colonies independence, not by diverting even more resources to the colonies. As regards the requests for solidarity in times of trouble, the non-colonial powers argued that the colonial powers had got it up-side down. In many ways, it was the policies of the colonial powers that got Nato in trouble. They associated Nato with an outdated colonial policy, strained Nato's relations with non-aligned nations, undermined Nato's cohesion, and worse, threatened to jeopardize Nato's ability to do its job in the Nato area. It should be noted, however, that the United States tended to accept the colonial powers' arguments more easily than the smaller non-colonial countries. Washington was more ready, therefore, to bilaterally extend the support requested by the colonial powers. The clearest example of this was regarding Indochina from 1950 to spring 1954.

The requests for support were a kind of «damned if you do, damned if you don't» problem for the non-colonial powers, especially the United States. If the colonial powers were given material support, the total

allocation to Europe would diminish, and the resources would be diffused in an undesirable way. If, on the other hand, they were denied material help, the chances were that the colonial powers would prioritize their colonies over their European commitments. This is not to suggest that they regarded their colonies as more important than their homeland, but that the colonial problems were regarded as more pressing; while efforts in Europe were directed at a perceived future threat, efforts to maintain the colonies were directed at concrete problems demanding immediate action.[75] Similarly, as regards moral backing, if the colonial powers were given moral support, the non-colonial powers would be associated with the colonial powers, suffer «guilt by association»,[76] and lose legitimacy in the Third World. On the other hand, if they were not given moral support, it would lead to resentment among the colonial powers which could undermine the cohesion of the alliance.

So, how did Nato deal with this problem? I will look at Nato's handling of a series of issues: the French struggle in Indochina, mainly British problems in the Middle East, the big debates about the consultation device as a means of dealing with out-of-area problems in the Third World, and finally the Nato colonial powers' loss of empires and the consequences thereof.

## Nato, France, and Indochina, 1950-1954

Prior to 1949, the United States did not consider Southeast Asia to be of vital strategic importance. Washington had developed a strategic concept that gave priority to Europe, adjacent areas and Japan. For the remainder of Asia, Washington applied a «defensive perimeter» defense, i.e. maintaining island strongholds such as Okinawa and the Philippines.[77] As a general principle, Washington viewed Southeast Asia through anti-colonial glasses, as did Nato's smaller non-colonial powers. On the other hand, some European powers, such as the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands, had substantial colonial interests in the region, and viewed the region quite differently.

Even before the North Atlantic Treaty was concluded, the allies were at odds regarding colonial issues. Washington – pursuing an anti-colonial policy – imposed a weapons embargo on the Netherlands and threatened to deny military assistance if the Hague did not change its policy on its colony, Indonesia. Having made some futile attempts to receive support from other Western nations, the Dutch desperately attempted to link the North Atlantic Treaty to colonial issues a few days prior to the signing ceremony, by saying that they would not participate in the alliance unless the United States eased the pressure on Indonesia. The threat was not credible and, as the American Secretary of State Acheson noted, «the Dutch capitulated under pressure.» Indonesia was granted independence in 1949.[78]

Such heavy-handed anti-colonial policy was not pursued in relation to the much more important governments in London and Paris. The United Kingdom and France continued to maintain colonies in Southeast Asia, and at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty urged Washington to take greater interest in Southeast Asia. The British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, feared the «sausage-effect» – that the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty and possible future security arrangements in the Middle East would increase pressure on other places, notably Southeast Asia.[79] Paris seconded this view and insisted that maintaining Western colonies in the Southeast Asia region was vital for the West and the North Atlantic defense cooperation. An officer in the French General Staff told the Americans that should

*the Soviets be successful in establishing Stalinite governments from Korea to Iran, they will hold the entire Pacific coastline of Asia and the Indian Ocean, and their modern submarines will prevent America and Britain from maintaining their vital communications on the Seven Seas. In this event, nothing would be capable of withholding the Soviet General Staff from launching an all-out offensive against Europe and Africa. The abandonment of the American, British, French and Dutch positions in Asia would spell the certain doom of Europe.[...] Whatever*

*American feelings may be concerning colonialism in the Far East, both politically and morally, it is no longer permissible to undermine the influence of European nations still defending important footholds in Asia or the Pacific while they are being called upon to organize for the defence of «Western» Europe.*[80]

Washington became more receptive to such appeals after the «loss of China», the passing of the National Security Council 68 (NSC-68, which urged for a more active containment policy towards the Soviet Union), and most significantly, the outbreak of the Korean War. Washington was also aware that the region contained important natural resources, tin and rubber in particular, which were vital not only for the United States, but also for the reconstruction of Japan and Europe.[81] Thus, at a Nato meeting in the autumn of 1951, after Acheson had reminded his audience that practically all the current fighting in the world was in the Far East - Korea, Indochina, Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia – he emphasized that these hostilities had one thing in common:

*they were all Communist-directed and could be stopped at any time if Moscow so desired. Moreover, they were all causing a diversion of effort which would otherwise be used for N.A.T.O. purposes; there was thus a connection between N.A.T.O. and the Far East.*[82]

## France receives material aid from the United States

In general, France was pressing hard for allied support in all colonial struggles, but most notably in Indochina. A prominent Nato historian, Lawrence S. Kaplan, has even suggested that «France's investment in Nato was based heavily on the utility that the alliance would have in gaining U.S. material support for the French Union» and that «France saw the Nato connection as a means of maintaining its place in Indochina.»[83] France had been fighting the Indochinese nationalists since 1946 and was increasingly on the defensive. In February 1950, France formally asked

for American economic and military aid to uphold its efforts in Indochina. Paris received a positive reply in the spring of 1950, prior to the outbreak of the Korean War.[84] In the light of Washington's anti-colonial stance, this has to be explained, not least because the prevalent view in Washington at the time was to avoid commitment in far removed areas. In addition, the United States wanted to be on good terms with the various nationalist movements in Southeast Asia. Why, then, give support to the French struggle in Indochina?

The two most important motives were probably 1) to assist the French so that France could fulfill its economic and military commitments in Europe, and 2) to support France in a struggle that even Washington came to view more and more as a struggle against world-wide communism. A third motive connected to Cold War considerations was that Indochina, rich in natural resources, was important to the recovery of Japan, to maintaining the British presence in Malaya, and in general the Western supply of important raw materials. Fourth, there was also a certain degree of domestic pressure in the wake of the «who lost China?» debate from those wanting to devote more attention to Asia.[85] The outbreak of the Korean War greatly reinforced the American determination to assist its Western ally in Indochina. These Cold War considerations explain the American motives for granting material aid, but also why so many differences and misunderstandings occurred between Washington and Paris later on; whereas Washington was primarily motivated by the desire to fight world-wide communism, Paris primarily pursued colonial and national interests.[86]

The Indochina issue was – as was the Korean War – primarily dealt with bilaterally outside Nato, on both a political and military level. But the French were eager to discuss Indochina in Nato and explain their policy to their Western allies. First of all, they underlined that they were not waging a colonial war in Indochina. Paris had granted independence to the three Indochinese states in 1949 and the French union, established in 1946, was, according to the French, of the same nature as the Commonwealth. The French also argued repeatedly that their struggle in Indochina was

necessary in the struggle against world communism, which was a more gratifying argument to maintain after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Both wars, said the French, had to be fought by the free world: «liberty in Asia cannot fly on one wing alone [...] Indochina is not the only stake, South East Asia and even the whole of Asia, is at stake»; then, the argument followed, the road would lay open to Europe. The French also exploited the fact that their struggle in Indochina reduced France's ability to maintain its defense commitments in Europe. The French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, maintained that

> *France was still bearing a very heavy burden which, like British action in Egypt, was in the interest not of herself alone but of all the Western Powers. [...] France's Far Eastern commitments absorbed more than a third of her military budget and thus made it difficult for her to carry out the whole task she had undertaken for N.A.T.O. in Western Europe*

Another – but not so explicit – argument for fighting in Indochina was the need to preserve the supply of important raw materials for the West.[87]

The campaign for soliciting material support paid off. By 1954, the United States was funding approximately eighty per cent of France's war expenses in Indochina.[88] At Nato's Lisbon meeting in 1952, Nato accepted the transfer of French Nato-designated troops to Indochina. Some regarded this indirect Nato role as a step in fulfilling the French Prime Minister, Edgar Faure's «Grand Plan» – a Natofication of French policy in Indochina – and a step towards a coordinated western policy on world communism. Nato's indirect role in the Indochina war was also a victory for Nato's first Secretary General, the British Lord Ismay, who was a keen advocate of a more globalized Nato policy.[89] And it certainly seemed that Nato was heading in that direction when the so-called Indochina Resolution was passed in 1952.

**France gains moral support from Nato - the Indochina Resolution of 1952**

The Indochina Resolution of December 1952 was the first official Nato statement on an out-of-area issue and went to great lengths in its praise of the French effort in Indochina. The resolution stated that Nato

> *EXPRESSES its wholehearted admiration for the valiant and long continued struggle by the French forces and the armies of the Associated States against Communist aggression; and ACKNOWLEDGES that the resistance of the free nations in South-East Asia as in Korea is in fullest harmony with the aims and ideals of the Atlantic Community; AND THEREFORE AGREES that the campaign waged by the French Union forces in Indo-China deserves continuing support from the Nato governments.*[90]

In their campaign to have the resolution passed, the French restated the familiar arguments that the struggle in Indochina was of direct relevance to the security of Europe and the Middle East, and that the French effort was harmful to France's military and economic contribution in Europe. Sensing the skepticism of the smaller Nato countries, the French reassured that the resolution would not entail extra commitments for them.[91] France chose a different strategy with which to confront the larger Nato nations: to link the Indochina issue to European security efforts, to the European Defense Community (EDC) in particular, which especially the Americans were keen to establish. At a meeting with Americans and British delegates, the French Ambassador to Nato said that unless such a resolution were passed, it would be very difficult for the French to agree that the Council should adopt any resolution recommending the early ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty. [...] In fact the two resolutions were linked together in the minds of the French and their acceptance of a resolution on the E.D.C. was conditional on the passage of a resolution about Indo-China.[92]

For France, the passing of the resolution would have many benefits. It would «draw attention to the fact that certain countries had obligations outside the N.A.T.O. area which were bound to affect their contribution to N.A.T.O.» It would also «secure an affirmation of the connection between the defence of Indo-China and that of the N.A.T.O. area proper - i. e. presumably something similar to «the integration of Indo-China into the common strategy»».[93]

Skepticism among other Nato countries stemmed primarily from a reluctance to undermine Nato's established non-policy regarding out-of-area issues. The Americans would have preferred to keep out of the Indochina issue, but decided that

> *we need not, and should not, play the leading role in knocking down any such French suggestion. Indeed, we can rely on the Canadians and on the smaller European powers, which are intent on avoiding commitments outside the Nato area, effectively to block adoption (and probably even the introduction) of such a resolution in the NAC.*[94]

The assumption that the smaller nations would do the job proved to be wrong. Despite opposition, neither the United Kingdom nor – surprisingly enough – the smaller nations wanted to create trouble by refusing to toe the French line. They realized that this issue was so important for France that not giving in could have serious repercussions for the defense of the Nato area.[95]

The passing of the resolution represented a major departure from Nato's earlier policy of not addressing issues outside the Nato area, and was therefore met with considerable interest around the world. The influential observer, Walter Lippman, wrote approvingly in *The New York Times* that the passing of the resolution indicated that Nato was changing from a regional to a global pact.[96] *The Washington Post*, on the other hand, saw the resolution as a violation of the spirit of the North Atlantic Treaty because it went beyond Nato's traditional geographical scope.[97]

The association with the French war in Indochina caused Nato's

smaller Northern nations to suffer a serious headache on the domestic front. A heated public debate erupted in Denmark and Norway as to whether Nato should concern itself with areas outside the Treaty. Those on the far left generally disliked Nato and claimed that the alliance was now supporting a colonial war. Others supported Nato, but were concerned that peripheral wars would drain valuable resources from the defense of Europe, undermine the legitimacy of Nato in the Third World (and domestically), and increase Nato's commitments. The two governments were hard pressed on this issue. It is not surprising, then, that in subsequent years the Norwegian and Danish representatives in Nato referred to the furore in the two Scandinavian countries in the wake of the resolution whenever they wanted to avoid discussion of the Indochina issue in Nato. The Danish representative insisted that if the issues needed to be raised, it should be dealt with in secret. The domestic havoc caused by the Indochina Resolution was an eye-opener for the Scandinavian countries. As a result, they believed that Nato should not be involved in out-of-area issues in the future, if it could be avoided.[98]

### Limits of support – Dien Bien Phu 1954

Initially, France was successful in gaining allied and Nato support for its struggle in Indochina. But as the war dragged on, allied support waned. This was clearly illustrated in the crucial days in the spring of 1954, when French forces were surrounded by the enemy in the small town of Dien Bien Phu. France requested immediate American military assistance, but did not receive it. France lost the battle, and subsequently also the war in Indochina. At the international talks in Geneva later that year, the Vietnam part of Indochina was partitioned in two states, one of which became communist, and one of which became capitalist and dependent on the West. The principal reasons behind the American refusal to assist France in the last stages of the war, were primarily increasing differences in interests, aims, perceptions of threat and the application of force in Indochina.

The United States first and foremost viewed the conflict in terms of East-West relations. Washington did not want to alienate nationalist forces in the Third World and had therefore, from the time of initial involvement in 1950, urged the French to grant political concessions in Indochina. As the JCS saw it, «the military problems in Indochina are closely interrelated with the political problems of the area.» Thus, they wanted the French to «[e]liminate its policy of «colonialism»». This would also benefit France, the argument ran, as it would be easier to obtain local support for the fight against communism. The French, whose primary interest was in the preservation of their colonial empire, did not comply with these wishes.[99] Another source of tension was that, throughout the war, the Americans and the French had different opinions of how to best conduct the war. Washington believed France was applying the wrong strategy – that they were far too cautious – and that they made a grave mistake in not sufficiently engaging the local population in the fight against the communists. The French, on the other hand, complained loudly about American interference in their handling of the war. One historian has suggested that these increasingly bitter quarrels «may have been the decisive factor» behind Washington's refusal to support France at Dien Bien Phu.[100]

By 1954 it was clear to Washington that France's struggle in Indochina did not pay off sufficiently in the East-West balance to offset the enormous resources thrown into the war and the loss of Nato's legitimacy in the Third World. And the United States was not the only one to reconsider its support to France. In fact, London was crucial in the decision to refuse assistance at Dien Bien Phu. When the French asked for help, Eisenhower brought the matter to the Congress. Conditional support was granted if France made some major concessions in its colonial policy, and if the United Kingdom actively supported the Americans. The Americans had in mind some sort of «united action», in which the United States, the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth nations and several Asian nations in concert would assist France. But the British refused to help the French, and thus also doomed American support. London's «no» was

based on fears of a major war, Commonwealth considerations, the belief that outside support would not be sufficient, and unfavorable domestic opinion.[101]

## Nato, the United Kingdom, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1949-1956

Indochina was only for a short while regarded by the major Western powers as vital to the global defense against communism and thus also important to the defense of the North Atlantic area. The Middle East and the Mediterranean were a different matter. The region was adjacent to Europe, strategically important, and its enormous oil resources were deemed to be vital for the North Atlantic area in terms of both the economy and the military.

Traditionally, the United Kingdom had been the most powerful Western country in the region. The United Kingdom had colonies, protectorates, and substantial economic and military interests there. After World War II, however, the general deterioration of British global power had repercussions on London's policy in the region. The hand-over of responsibility for the security of Greece to Washington in 1947 further underpinned the United States' gradual assumption of Western responsibility in the region. Still, Washington wanted the United Kingdom to retain as much responsibility as possible. A policy paper from 1948 illustrates American thinking on the matter:

> *We have decided in this Government that the security of the Middle East is vital to our own security. We have also decided that it would not be desirable or advantageous for us to attempt to duplicate or to take over the strategic facilities now held by the British in that area. We have recognized that these facilities would be at our effective disposal anyway, in the event of war, and that to attempt to get them transferred, in the formal sense, from the British to ourselves would only raise a host of new and unnecessary problems, and would probably be generally*

*unsuccessful. This means that we must do what we can to support the maintenance of the British of their strategic position in that area.*[102]

But this also had a downside: it entailed leaving the security of a vital area to a declining power; it meant associating with a colonial power and supporting policies with which Washington did not always agree.[103] This dilemma was to haunt the United States in the years to come, and also to create difficulties for Nato, as the British sought to include Nato in their Middle East policy. The parallels to France and Indochina are clear. Furthermore, as the limits of allied support to the French in Indochina were reached in a climatic showdown over Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the limits of allied support to the United Kingdom in the Middle East were also demonstrated in another dramatic event - the Suez crisis in 1956.

## British attempts to link Nato, the Mediterranean and the Middle East

As mentioned, after the outbreak of the Korean War Western policy-makers feared Soviet intrusion via Nato's southeast border. Shortly after the outbreak of war in Korea, President Truman observed that if «we were to let Asia go, the Near East would collapse and no telling what would happen in Europe.» The West did not expect a direct Soviet assault, but rather a gradual increase in influence and less local resistance to communist pressure.[104]

This fear led to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in Nato in 1952, as these countries were closest to the Nato area and perceived as being under the greatest threat. Their inclusion, however, not only enhanced the security of the North Atlantic area, but could also be useful to Nato in dealing with out-of-area issues in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. This line of thinking did not appeal to most non-colonial powers in Nato, including the United States, and particularly not to the Scandinavian countries which were furthest from the region. They wanted to treat the Middle East and areas in the Mediterranean not included in Nato as

separate from Nato issues. The British, however, clearly stated their objective to link Nato with the Eastern area of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. They pushed particularly hard for a Turkish role in the defense of the Middle East and the Mediterranean. In fact, according to the British Foreign Minister, Herbert Morrison,

> *His Majesty's Government had been very reluctant to accept Turkish membership of N.A.T.O. and had only done so because of the importance they attached to establishing an allied command in the Middle East of which Turkey would form a part.*

In the years that followed, London put great efforts into trying to gain allied and Nato support for an enhanced Western role in the Mediterranean and the Middle East - with mixed success.[105]

The security of the Mediterranean was one of the first questions Nato had to address following the inclusion of Greece and Turkey. The Western part of the Mediterranean was part of the original Nato area from 1949, but had not been regarded as strategically important. When Nato started to fear Soviet infiltration in the Mediterranean, the Eastern part was also included with the admission of Greece and Turkey, and this assessment began to change. Nato realized that a coherent strategy and policy for *the whole* of the Mediterranean would be expedient. This, however, proved difficult to achieve in the face of the prestigious national rivalry and different interests between the United States, the United Kingdom and France regarding command structures in the Mediterranean. The tug-of-war regarding command structures caused problems for Nato for a long time. The British were concerned about the naval prestige in the Mediterranean, but equally, if not more importantly, they believed that their interests in the Middle East would be best served by a particular command structure. The French had direct strategic interests in the Mediterranean as well, and wanted the command structures to reflect this, but they were also concerned about their interests on the southern shores of the Mediterranean - in North Africa. The United States wanted to prevent the

discussion about command structures in the Mediterranean ending up as an out-of-area issue.[106]

In 1951, London suggested that the proposed British leader of the Mediterranean Command should also report to the head of the proposed Middle East Command (see below). This would not only secure a privileged position for the United Kingdom in the Mediterranean, but would also link Nato – and especially Turkey – to the defense of the Middle East. The Americans, sensing the British ploy to link Nato with the defense of the Middle East, were opposed to this and insisted that command structures in the Mediterranean be dealt with separately from the much more delicate question of Nato's role in the defense of the Middle East. In the end, they won. The long and heated struggle regarding the command structure in the Mediterranean culminated in a compromise in 1952. A Mediterranean Command was set up, but the intense national rivalry had left Nato with a strategically incoherent structure with an array of command lines and confused military responsibilities.[107]

Egypt was the most important country for the West in the Middle East. It was located at the center of the Arab world, was the most populous and resourceful state, and most importantly, it contained the Suez base, where the British had valuable assets such as troops, airfields, stocks of resources, harbors, etc. Furthermore, the principal waterway to the East was the Suez Canal. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Americans generally tried to perform the same delicate balancing act in the Middle East as they had in the Far East, by supporting a Western, predominantly British, presence and at the same time opposing imperialism and supporting nationalist movements. However, increasingly nationalist attitudes in Egypt and Iran combined with the growing American support of Israel made it harder to make friends in the region and also created opportunities for greater Soviet influence. The Americans found, as they had done regarding the French in Indochina, that they had to compromise their anti-colonial stand and assist an allied power out-of-area in order to contain the communist threat. But again, as in Indochina, the Americans would not go as far as to commit forces to the region. Instead, they

wanted to coordinate the British effort with bilateral American military aid to individual countries in the region.[108]

It was in this context that the British, in May 1951, attempted to use an out-of-area device to connect various alliances. They came up with the idea of a Middle East Command (MEC), which, in addition to securing British interests in the command structures in the Mediterranean, also would commit the United States and Nato, the latter especially via Turkey, to the defense of the Middle East and the Mediterranean. The British envisaged a British commander as head of a command with forces from the United Kingdom, the United States and possibly other Nato countries stationed in Egypt. A Middle East Defense board would include several Nato members, and the MEC would be linked to Nato through the Mediterranean command. Washington was initially hesitant, but gradually came around to the idea, on the condition that there should only be informal links with Nato, if any, and that the United States would not commit forces. London and Washington agreed on these terms and presented the idea to the other members in Nato.[109]

They were not enthusiastic. The Netherlands and Denmark worried that Turkey - as a member of both Nato and the MEC - would obtain a privileged position and enjoy the advantages of being a Nato member without taking on all the responsibilities. In addition, the scenario of being involved in a conflict in the MEC area through being Nato members, but without having any influence, was not attractive. At a Nato meeting in Ottawa in September 1951, Acheson reassured them that Turkey would share all Nato's responsibilities. The Americans and the British also argued - not very convincingly, though - that the MEC would in effect commit some Middle East countries to the defense of the Nato area without Nato having to include them as members and thereby expand the area of commitment. Besides, the MEC would secure the supply of oil from the Middle East, which was unquestionably essential to the security and economic well-being of the North Atlantic area. In the end, Nato gave its support to the proposed MEC, but to no avail, as Egypt, whose participation was essential, but who deplored the British presence in

Egypt, rejected the plan in October 1951.[110]

The Americans and the British tried for a while to push through a modified MEC. The new MEC would be based on the British-controlled Cyprus and separate from Nato. The most important new aspect was that Washington now contemplated committing forces. This new concept gradually came to be known as the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). MEDO could be set up without Egyptian participation, but Washington favored Egyptian participation. After the coup against King Faruk in the summer of 1952, Washington tried to cooperate with the new regime, headed by General Mohammed Naguib. The United States also considered granting military assistance, but this was rejected by President Truman in January 1953, due to internal (JCS) and external (the United Kingdom and Israel) resistance. As cooperation with Egypt proved to be difficult, the United States decided to scrap the plans of a defense organization centered around Egypt in the summer of 1953. The country lost even more of its strategic importance for Nato in 1954, when Cairo and London agreed that British forces should leave Suez within 20 months.[111]

But MEDO was not dead yet. The «series of alliances» idea became a key issue in the strategic thinking of the new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower also liked the idea. In terms of the Middle East, this manifested itself in a shift of focus from an «inner core» of defense centered around Egypt to an «outer ring « or a «Northern Tier» of defense, comprising Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. This had, according to Washington, several advantages. The Northern Tier was more important from the viewpoint of containing the Soviet Union. It would also represent a departure from relying on British influence in the region, which was stronger in the «inner core», and thus make it easier for the United States to distance itself from British imperialism. Moreover, the shift would also direct attention eastward to the Persian Gulf with all its oil resources. Besides, a Western-supported defense organization would help to keep the Northern Tier countries «Western oriented and politically stable.» The Turks were also very keen on setting up MEDO, and argued

that this would close the present gap in the defenses of the Western World. Washington, London and Ankara, therefore, conducted military discussions which ended in «general agreement [...] as to the military objectives, strategy, concept of operations, and other factors relating to the defense of the Middle East.»[112]

But MEDO did not come about. Instead the Baghdad Pact was established in 1955 with the United Kingdom, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq as members. The United States had surprisingly decided that it would not become a member, even though Washington had initiated the Pact and furnished most of the arms to its members. The reason for this was that Washington realized that the United States would not gain anything by being a member of an alliance which would alienate important countries in the region – Egypt and Israel. Furthermore, it decreased the possibility of peace between the two countries, a peace which the new American president was very keen to obtain. The British were extremely annoyed and felt betrayed. The British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, remarked that «[i]n recent years the United States has sometimes failed to put its weight behind its friends, in the hope of being popular with their foes». The Baghdad Pact did not become the strong bulwark against communism that the Western powers had hoped it would. The Pact was further weakened in 1959 when Iraq, following a left-wing coup in 1958, left the organization. The organization then changed its name to the Central Treaty Organization - CENTO.[113]

The West was partly to blame for the Baghdad Pact's weakness, as Nato refused to establish links with the Baghdad Pact, despite strong lobbying from the Pact, Turkey in particular. The United States, the United Kingdom and Italy had found the linkage idea interesting. Dulles said that linking security pacts together would combine something like 60 nations. However, he also realized that this would rival the United Nations, and that it was better to stick with separate regional groupings. But, it was still possible, Dulles said at the Nato summit in December 1957, to establish closer cooperation among the various pacts, particularly with regard to information. When Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and this became

CENTO in 1959, the earlier advocates of tighter relations with the organization joined ranks with the smaller nations, like Canada, Norway and Denmark, which were reluctant to involve Nato. What concerned these countries most was that American - and British - action in the Middle East could not only harm Nato's image, but even endanger Nato and the security of the North Atlantic area.[114]

A good example of this was the secret American operation to topple a pro-Nasser regime in Syria in August 1957. It failed, and the Syrian regime sought help from Cairo and Moscow. The United States responded by asking Turkey to mobilize along the Syrian border, and even considered dispatching troops to Syria. The Soviets, in turn, threatened Turkey. A possible Soviet move against Turkey would have triggered a Nato response and, viola, the incident would have escalated into a superpower conflict and highly dangerous affair. The crisis passed, however, after Syria and Egypt merged to become the United Arab Republic in 1958. What the smaller European members resented most about this incident, in addition to the danger in which they were placed, was that the Americans jeopardized Nato without informing, let alone consulting, their allies.[115]

## Trouble, but not really - the Suez Crisis

The failure of the MEC and MEDO, the weak Baghdad Pact and the withdrawal from the Suez base reflected a steady decline in British influence in the Middle East in the early 1950s. The British already had difficulties in Aden, Yemen, Lebanon and Cyprus when they faced their worst crisis in the region: the Suez crisis of 1956.[116] A brief outline of the crisis is as follows: Israel raided Egyptian troops in Gaza in February 1955. This led, or gave an excuse to, Egypt's new strong man, Gamal Abdul Nasser, to accept an offer of Soviet weapons (through Czechoslovakia) in September 1955. Panic ensued in Washington and London; as a result, the United States and the United Kingdom offered to finance Nasser's prestigious Aswan Dam project, but the offer was then somewhat clumsily withdrawn in July 1956. Shortly afterwards, Nasser

nationalized the Suez Canal Company, which was predominantly British. This was unacceptable to London, and the crisis unfolded.[117]

At the same time that the international community was engaged in hectic diplomatic activity to solve the crisis, the British, the French - who were convinced that the rebellion against France in Algeria was sponsored by Nasser - and the Israelis, in secrecy planned a military intervention from the end of July. The British Foreign Minister, Selwyn Lloyd, told the Americans that failure to take action would mean «the end of us, of Western Europe and Nato as decisive influences in world affairs». London regarded Nasser's behavior as dangerous to Western oil supplies and a threat to an important European sea route to Asia, and argued that the Soviet Union stood behind Nasser. Washington accepted all these arguments, but still would not resort to force. Force «would only facilitate Soviet infiltration of the region.» The Eisenhower administration therefore wanted to solve the crisis by peaceful means. The Americans were also anxious that the Suez crisis would harm the United Nations, Nato and relations with the Third World, especially the Muslim countries.[118]

Many other Nato members, particularly Germany, Italy and the Scandinavian countries, also distanced themselves from the British and French approach. But Nato, as such, did not do much. For a short while, the question was raised «whether attack on U.K. [United Kingdom] or French naval vessels in Mediterranean by Egyptians would come under terms of North Atlantic Treaty», but it was clear to both Washington and London that the North Atlantic Treaty was «not intended to cover this particular case». The extraordinary NAC meetings that were called because of the Suez affair, did not lead to anything, as the major powers did not want Nato to meddle in their affairs and the rest did not want Nato to become involved in the Suez affair. The American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, said of Suez that «[t]his is not an area where we are bound together by treaty.» He went on to say that

*[c]ertain areas we are by treaty bound to protect, such as the North Atlantic Treaty area, and there we stand together and I hope and believe*

*always will stand absolutely together. There are also other problems where our approach is not always identical. For example, there is in Asia and Africa the so-called problem of colonialism. Now there the United States plays a somewhat independent role.*[119]

Realizing that they lacked allied support, London and Paris decided to bypass their Nato allies altogether. Not only did they disregard the consultative mechanism in Nato which they, and all other Nato nations, had praised so highly at a Nato meeting only a few months previously, the British also imposed an information blackout on their most important ally, the United States, in early October. Disregarding Nato allies, however, did not stop the French using planes which were normally committed to Nato, in the military operation a few weeks later.[120]

When the United Kingdom and France used the Israeli attack on Sinai as a pretext to attack Egypt in late October, President Eisenhower was furious. What angered him most was the double-crossing, the secretiveness and the deceit by the British. Washington was more or less unprepared for the attack, despite warnings from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other sources. The administration had not paid much heed to these warnings because, as an Eisenhower's aide put it: «we relied on them as allies to inform us of what they were doing.» The Americans were so angry that shortly after the attack, they imposed a forceful combination of economic and diplomatic pressures, and were successful in getting the British and French to withdraw from Egypt in December.[121]

The United States was not alone among the Nato members in being upset and angry with the United Kingdom and France. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, who, along with two others, had been given the assignment to improve the consultative process in Nato in the spring of 1956, was so depressed that he at one point wanted to drop the whole project. Many were concerned about Nato's distorted image in the Third World and about the devaluation of the propaganda value that the Soviet invasion of Hungary - which took place at the same time as the Suez war – gave Nato and the West. But most serious were the bellicose

threats, including the use of atomic weapons, that the Soviet Union issued to London and Paris as a result of the Suez affair. These showed that, in effect, the United Kingdom and France jeopardized the whole alliance through this domestically motivated out-of-area affair.[122]

However, following the harsh words and strong sentiments, conciliatory voices were heard remarkably soon among Nato allies – also from the United States. The Soviet invasion of Hungary had something to do with this; the event aroused the feeling that the Suez affair only made it more imperative for Nato to keep together. Perhaps the Norwegian Foreign Minster, Halvard Lange, encapsulated the atmosphere best when he described the dispute with London and Paris as «dispute between friends, a family dispute». According to Lange, the lesson to be drawn from the Suez affair was that «the lack of coordination in members states' perception of nations outside the Treaty area had had serious consequences for cooperation.» The only way to deal with this, Lange continued, was to improve consultation: «Even though consultation may not always result in consensus, it will enable all members to take a stance based on a comprehensive knowledge of their allies' views and interests.» Suez created serious trouble for Western cooperation, but this could be tolerated as it was only an out-of-area issue, and thus did not have the power to distract Nato allies from close cooperation on the most important issue: the defense of the North Atlantic area from Soviet aggression.[123]

## Creating out-of-area policy through the Consultation process? 1949-1960

Since World War II, the Western allies had engaged in extensive talks and cooperation, both bilaterally and in various groupings. As Western leaders and their representatives participated in Nato meetings from 1949 onwards, they invariably became forums for discussion on a wide range of subjects. Emphasis was squarely placed on European security issues; the tour d'horizon at the start of Nato meetings was from the outset of an informative and noncommittal nature, as were the out-of-area discussions at the meetings of the permanent representatives. In the years to come,

however, Nato repeatedly pondered the question of whether the alliance should have more, improved and extended consultations.

In September 1952, the Americans took the initiative to investigate whether increased consultation would be of benefit to Nato. When the colonial powers quickly signaled that they would welcome the opportunity to solicit support for colonial and other out-of-area questions, they illustrated for the non-colonial powers the double-edged nature of consultation. This raised the question of the purpose of consultations. Should they only be an exchange of information, or serve as the basis for the formulation of a Nato global policy? Nato's Secretary General, Lord Ismay, favored the latter. In 1952 he wanted to discuss «the question of global planning within Nato». He was also keen on «establishing some machinery between Nato and other countries which would be expected to align themselves with Nato in time of emergency.» High on the agenda in the early 1950s, then, was both the question of improved consultation between Nato members, and between Nato and other nations. While the latter soon disappeared as a topic, the former was a recurrent theme in Nato throughout the Cold War.[124]

Many smaller, non-colonial Nato countries were generally positive to the prospect of improved consultation on all sorts of matters within Nato as they believed they would greatly benefit from the increased information, and in addition, would have the chance to influence the bigger powers on a wide range of issues. To this end, the Norwegians proposed the establishment of a political committee, but this was not passed at this point in time. On the other hand, the smaller nations were also apprehensive of assuming responsibility for areas outside Nato and being tied to the decisions of the bigger nations. This was demonstrated in 1953, when Lord Ismay participated in the tripartite meeting between the United States, the United Kingdom and France in Bermuda. The smaller nations immediately expressed concern that the big three were «ganging up» and that Lord Ismay's presence would commit Nato without all the Nato countries taking part in the discussions. When the issue was discussed in Nato, the British dryly reported that the Canadian representative «and his little friends are rather sore».[125]

### Addressing the Soviet challenge in the Third World – the Wise Men's Report

There was much talk about improving consultations over the next couple of years. The discussions were stimulated by two important trends in international politics in the mid-1950s. One was the apparent thaw between the East and West after the death of the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, in 1953, the peace conferences on Korea and Indochina in 1954, the peace treaty regarding Austria and the summit in Geneva in 1955. This thaw triggered questions as to whether Nato should attempt to enter new civilian ventures, and not solely concentrate on military defense. The second was that it seemed that the Soviets slowly but surely were beginning to mount an offensive in the Third World. The arms deliveries to Egypt through Czechoslovakia in 1955 and the many visits to Third World countries by the new Soviet leadership after the death of Stalin in 1953 were very alarming to many in the West. Already in December 1954, Dulles had warned Nato that the West should not be «lulled into a false sense of security» by the thaw in East-West relations:

> *Outside of the Soviet-Chinese Communist orbit, the Communists are everywhere stressing, pressing, subversion as an instrument of their policy. [...] It is particularly apparent in the so-called colonial and dependent areas. [...] We can see that policy being pursued particularly in Asia and in Africa.*[126]

Similar warnings were issued time and again by several speakers in Nato in the years that followed, but there was no take-off in the question of what Nato should do about it until Dulles suggested at a Nato meeting in May 1956 that perhaps improved consultations could be a suitable device. His proposal to investigate this in more detail was accepted by the other Nato members, but only «after considerable battle».[127]

Out-of-area concerns, then, were a central issue when the organization started the process of examining and re-assessing «the purposes and the

needs of the Organization in the light of certain changes in Soviet tactics and policies which have taken place since the death of Stalin», with special emphasis on non-military means and consultation. The committee of Foreign Ministers, Gaetano Martino of Italy, Lester B. Pearson of Canada and Halvard Lange of Norway (the «Three Wise Men»), appointed by Nato was in no doubt about the magnitude of the Soviet challenge in the Third World:

> *The Soviet Union is now apparently veering towards policies designed to ensnare these countries by economic means and by political subversion, and to fasten on them the same shackles of Communism from which certain members of the Soviet bloc are now striving to release themselves.*

The focus was placed on non-military matters as they regarded the challenge in the Third World to be subtle subversion, not armed attack. Emphasis was given to consultations as the consultation process was considered the most suitable for handling these kinds of out-of-area issues in Nato.

The report, presented to the Nato Council in December 1956, when Nato was trying to cope with the effects of the Suez crisis, emphasized that «Nato should not forget that the influence and interests of its members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty, and that common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by developments outside the Treaty area.» With clear reference to the Suez crisis, the report stated that it was important for Nato, which had experienced that some members were «putting narrow national considerations above the collective interest», that the Atlantic Community developed greater unity «by working constantly to achieve common policies by full and timely consultation on issues of common concern.» The report even suggested that «any changes in national strategy or policy which affect the coalition are made only after collective consideration.» How, then, could the consultation process be improved? The report stated

that «[c]onsultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. [...] It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed.» The report underlined that the major powers had the main responsibility to consult, but there were, of course, qualifications: 1) «ultimate responsibility for decision and action» still rested on national governments, 2) situations may occur which demanded action from a member «before consultation is possible with the others.» According to the report, the most important devices needed to achieve a better consultation process were: 1) annual political appraisals, 2) a mediator role for Nato if members disagreed (in particular greater power for the Secretary General), 3) parliamentary associations and the Parliamentary Conference, 4) improvements in Nato's organization and meetings.[128]

The Report was favorably received, but important conditions were quickly raised, even by the United States, which had initiated the report. Dulles underlined that Nato should not expect to reach agreement in all aspects of foreign policy. The United States had to take into consideration its world-wide commitments and collective security associations:

> *The United States has this kind of association with, I think, 44 countries, all of which call for consultation. [...] Obviously, it would not be practical to submit to prior consultations here matters which under our other treaties are perhaps more peculiarly, more directly, a concern of these other countries. [...] We cannot have a sort of hierarchy of associations in which we try to rate them in importance and have consultations accordingly.*[129]

Subsequently, Dulles went even further in pointing to the limitations of Nato's ability to deal with out-of-area issues: «There has been a feeling for some time that because the members were so affected by events which took place outside the treaty area that the jurisdiction so to

speak of the Council should be enlarged.» The United States was willing to go along with this to a certain degree, but was

> *not willing to take the position that our association in Nato is the most important association that we have, which has a kind of priority over everything else, so that all our policies all over the world have first to be brought to Nato and discussed, and agreed upon, and then carried out in the rest of the world.*[130]

The attitude of the United States illustrates that despite the rhetorical consensus on the need to improve the consultation process, it was hard to do it and to accept the consequences. This was clearly shown in the years to come.

### How to meet the Soviet challenge in the Third World?

At the time of the preparation of the Three Wise Men's report and in the following years, Nato considered three methods by which to maintain its unity and respond to the alleged new Soviet foreign policy in the Third World. First, investigating whether Nato's military strategy could be changed to fit the new Soviet challenge. Second – and connected to the first – establishing what united Nato members and what made Nato attractive for non-committed countries and, in line with that, developing Nato's non-military sides. Third, and most importantly, investigating whether the consultation process was suited to dealing with out-of-area challenges in the Third World.

One of the countries most eager to change Nato's military strategy in autumn of 1956 was the United Kingdom. The British believed that the new strategy should «stress the new Soviet tactics of proceeding by out-flanking and subversive moves outside the N.A.T.O. area.» Furthermore, it should emphasize the flexibility of the new Soviet threat, which was military, economic and psychological/ideological, and which could be directed at Nato, but was more likely to be directed at non-Nato areas.

However, this would still affect Nato: «the defence of the N.A.T.O area itself could be frustrated if N.A.T.O. countries failed to maintain sufficient strength to resist military threats outside the N.A.T.O. area». The British maintained that «the second priority [after deterring Soviet in Europe] was not World War III, but limited aggression either in N.A.T.O. or elsewhere.» The increased British focus on areas outside Nato bothered the Americans, who believed that the British were giving Nato defense a lower priority by highlighting defense commitments in other areas. The British countered that

> *we were compelled to give priority to hostilities in which we were actually engaged; the French had to do the same. Since nobody else would help us, the burden fell on the United Kingdom, but it had to be realised that the success or failure of our efforts was of vital interest to N.A.T.O. as a whole.*

The French seconded this: «It should be possible, given modern means of transport, to maintain the maximum defence effort in N.A.T.O., while at the same time being prepared to meet emergency calls elsewhere.» Despite some support, the overall reception to London's views was, according to the British, «rather discouraging.» Not receiving much support in Nato, however, did not discourage the British from giving a higher priority to areas East of Suez, as reflected in the British Defence White Paper from May 1957.[131]

In this debate, two countries not known to be active in out-of-area issues maintained strongly that Nato had to meet the Soviet challenge in the Third World. Germany was concerned about Africa, whereas Italy was eager to discuss an enlarged Nato role in the Middle East. At the end of the day, however, the various attempts to change Nato's new strategy to reflect out-of area concerns came to little. Nato agreed on the need to counter new Soviet tactics by looking more closely at areas outside Nato, but did not want to commit itself in any way. The new Nato strategic concept from May 1957, Military Committee (MC) 14/2, concluded that

Nato defense planning should take into consideration the efforts of some members to meet Soviet expansion outside the Nato area, but that the defense of the Nato area had to be the overriding task. For instance, if nations wanted to use Nato-designated forces for out-of-area purposes, it would have to be with due consideration to the primary task.[132]

Changing Nato's military strategy was only one way to meet the Soviet challenge in the Third World. Another alternative was to enhance those aspects that united Nato and possibly made Nato more attractive to Third World countries: democracy, economic progress and the quest for peace. One way to do this was to develop Nato's non-military tasks, perhaps even extend aid to the Third World. This idea had circulated in Nato for a while. At a Nato meeting in 1955, the French Foreign Minister, Antoine Pinay, proposed pooling economic resources for underdeveloped areas. This would associate Nato with aid to the Third World. At the next meeting, the Belgians circulated a document entitled *Plan to Create Nato Special Fund to Counter Soviet Economic Drive in Underdeveloped Countries*. The Wise Men's report and many proposals in subsequent years also dealt with this theme. Generally, reactions to all aid proposals were that the West and Nato had to counter Soviet moves and that aid was a good device. However, Nato should consider and analyze the Soviet threat, particularly the political and military aspects and its consequences, but should *not itself* grant aid. That could be done better by other agencies, most notably the United Nations or the OEEC. One reason why Nato was not encouraged to give aid was that Nato would be vulnerable to accusations that the organization had political, not altruistic motives for giving aid. The accusations would indeed have had merit: according to General Secretary Paul-Henri Spaak, Nato should not grant aid to Third World countries «regardless of their feelings toward West».[133]

Improving consultations was the third and most important method considered in the debate on how to counter the Soviet challenge in the Third World in the 1950s. And indeed, Nato did make a few adjustments to its consultation procedure in the wake of the Three Wise Men's report, but a wide range of ideas were dropped, either before or during

discussions in Nato. For example, President Eisenhower suggested departing from the rule of unanimity in the North Atlantic Council. His Foreign Minster, however, would not let go of the right to veto because of the «importance of maintaining good relations with members of other parts of the world» and because the United States should not be «bound by views of Europeans which were often based on inadequate knowledge of conditions elsewhere.»[134] Ideas that were tabled in Nato, but which were not endorsed or at least considerably modified, included the German proposal of expanding the Secretary General's powers, an Italian proposal for a fund to promote economic development in the Mediterranean and Middle East, Secretary General Spaak's proposal that Nato's regional expert groups should prepare proposals for common policies regarding out-of-area issues, and his idea that Nato should strive to have a «global policy».[135]

These proposals were largely dropped as the smaller non-colonial Nato powers were unwilling to involve Nato in out-of-area issues. They feared that such an involvement would undermine Nato solidarity and Nato's image in the Third World. They were especially wary of appeals for support from the colonial powers, or powers with considerable interests in far away areas, in the name of improved consultations. For example, the Netherlands wanted support for its policy in Indonesia and even hoped for a common Nato policy. In the same vein, the French requested a common Nato policy in their areas of interests, North Africa and the Middle East. Paris went as far as to suggest that Nato should expand its formal geographical scope. In response to such appeals, powers such as Canada, Norway and Denmark made it crystal clear that they would not commit to, and certainly not assume responsibility for, areas in which they had no interests and of which they had little knowledge.[136]

The result of all these efforts to improve the consultation process in Nato in the late 1950s, was a vague agreement based on the reluctant views of the smaller non-colonial countries and the United States: in traditional Nato matters, Nato's policies should continue to be common and binding; in out-of-area issues, Nato should not commit itself, and that

the volume of information should increase as should the regularity of the consultations. The establishment of the Committee of Political Advisors (later named the Political Committee) in 1957, the Regional Experts Groups set up in the following years and the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group for long-term studies and world problems (APAG) established in 1961, were tools to this end.[137] Another major reason why Nato chose to settle with a «lowest common denominator» policy on out-of-area consultations, was the French President Charles de Gaulle's wide-ranging proposals of «tripartitism», which were not favorably received by the other Nato countries.

## French overplay: demands for tripartitism

Following World War II, the French had persistently worked for closer coordination on global policies between the United States, the United Kingdom and France, for example by extending the military cooperation in the Standing Group (the Military Committee's Executive Body, composed of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France) and by developing political cooperation through improved consultations. Paris did not receive the desired response and continued to push this issue in the 1950s, most forcefully in a letter from de Gaulle to President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in September 1958. De Gaulle urged the three big powers to negotiate their policies on out-of-area issues, to reach a common understanding and then present the results to Nato as a sort of a fait accompli.[138]

De Gaulle's ideas were evaluated in a series of tripartite meetings in December 1958. «Nato no longer corresponds to the present day situation in the world», maintained the French Ambassador to Washington, Hervé Alphand, when he opened the discussions. He continued that in the current situation, when the threat was global, Nato had become «too narrow». It did not, for example, cover North Africa and the Middle East, «yet these areas have become the southern flank for the defense of Europe» and there was a problem of «Communist infiltration there.» Alphand compared

Nato defenses with the Maginot line. «It is admirable in its way but doesn't cover the whole front.» The various remedies that had been tried, for example «expanded political consultation» and «creation of new pacts», were not sufficient. «France does not oppose Nato consultation», Alphand assured them, Paris just «believes that it would be easier to get solutions if the three have an advance agreement.» The objective, Alphand said, «is to achieve, at least, some degree of advance tripartite agreement.» The French proposals would «secure world-wide co-ordination [...] on all matters of importance in the world.» Alphand promised that «NATO, of course, would be kept *informed* [my emphasis] of matters which relate to it.» He also said that France did not propose to extend Nato's military guarantees to other countries, because it is «not likely that the Scandinavians would agree to this.» Rather, Nato's military resources «should be re-organized to take into account other theaters of operation. As an example, thought has to be given to the co-ordination of African commands with European commands.» It was «ridiculous», Alphand contended, «that the Standing Group does not consider contiguous areas.» The American and British representatives were skeptical to all this. They argued that normal - albeit improved - consultations would serve the same purpose. The problem with the French ideas was, according to the British representative, that:

> *The Italians and Germans believe they are of comparable stature. The smaller countries will think the three are trying to impose decisions on them. As for the U.K., it has its special relationship with the Commonwealth to consider, and there is indeed the problem of most of the free world, committed or uncommitted.*

Faced with this skepticism, Alphand resorted to outright pressure: «if France can't get the tripartite consultation it seeks and Nato remains unchanged, then France has no interest in Nato in its present form. In short, France had to reserve its right to «denounce» Nato or seek a revision of the treaty.» Afterwards, however, Alphand backed down

slightly.[139] Several other Nato members did not like the French ideas at all. They argued that they would sideline Nato. Furthermore, as Nato's most important task was to defend the North Atlantic area, this would be far too heavy a price to pay for the sake of the creation of a triumvirate to deal with out-of-area issues. As the United States and the United Kingdom were also skeptical, even though they paid lip service to the French for another couple of years, the idea of tripartitism never took off. The tripartite meetings that took place over the next couple of years were more like the ordinary talks that had been conducted in the past, but they still aroused suspicion among the other Nato members. The majority of the North Atlantic Council was, for example, «extremely upset» about a tripartite meeting which took place in June 1960, at a time when France was proposing – albeit futilely – to use the Standing Group as the military realm of tripartitism. Aware of the opposition, France had began to implement some parts of its threats towards Nato, the most drastic measure being the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean fleet from Nato command in March 1959.[140]

The Congo crisis of 1960-61 presented de Gaulle with another opportunity to launch tripartitism. In a letter to the American president, he cited the Congo as an unfortunate case of Western disunity, and went on:

> *The fact that the Atlantic Alliance, such as it is, covers only the narrow sector of Western Europe, whereas continental Asia, South-East Asia, Asia minor, North Africa, Black Africa, Central America, South America are full of problems and of seething dangers and would eventually become the theater of war operations, appears to France unrealistic and incompatible with her world-wide responsibilities. [...] I feel that you, Mr. Macmillan and I have the possibility, which is at one and the same time definite and transitory, to organize a real political and strategic co-operation of our West in the presence of the multiple and dangerous threats which beset us.*

The attempt was in vain, however, as Eisenhower answered that he did not understand what France wanted. The tripartite proposals were too vague, he contended, and were not well received by the other Nato members -

and other friendly smaller nations, for that matter. Moreover, France's gardual withdrawal from the integrated military structure due to lack of support for tripartitism was deemed to be very unfortunate and in effect undermined solidarity among the Nato allies.[141]

## Nato and the dwindling empires

In the late 1940s and 1950s, Nato's colonial powers started to loose their colonial possessions, and the process accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s. It was a painful process for these nations, but also had repercussions for Nato. The colonial powers continued to solicit support from Nato and to attempt to extend Nato's geographical scope, in order to maintain their colonies, or at least ensure that dismantling their empires did not damage national interests too much. But in the final years of colonialism, with the Third World on the rise in international politics, the antipathy towards colonialism among the non-colonial powers in Nato was even greater than before. Thus, support was harder to obtain. The consequences for Nato were diverse: the lack of support for France's out-of-area problems generated bitterness and was one of the reasons why France left Nato's integrated military command structure in 1966; the United Kingdom managed to adjust to its lesser role, but Nato had to undergo major restructuring as the United Kingdom had lost important strategic possessions in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East; and finally, Nato's image and internal cohesion suffered due to Portugal's eagerness to hold on to its colonies long into the 1970s.

### France and North Africa

While the United States had supported France in Indochina, Washington did not support Paris with regard to Morocco and Tunisia, which were both struggling to achieve independence in the early 1950s. The French were bitter, especially as Paris had granted bases to the Americans in Morocco. Washington wanted to maintain French influence there, but

resented Paris' way of dealing with the situation. «The real difficulty with the French position was that France had no policy in North Africa except repression and hanging on», Acheson complained. Other Nato allies also had difficulties with the French policy in North Africa. Norway's representative to Nato feared that it threatened to make Nato look like a «colonial power-bloc».[142]

This did not deter France from making great efforts to link Nato with North Africa in the early 1950s. As Algeria was a part of the Nato area, the French believed they had a good case for also including Morocco and Tunisia. Besides, the Mahgreb contained both French and American bases, and thus was different from other African colonies. The French did not achieve much. One reason, in addition to the fear of guilt by association, was that the inclusion of North Africa would «tend to divert effort to countries which are not going to play a part in the main theaters of operations.» Besides, Nato did not see any reason for formally including Morocco and Tunisia. In the view of some British officials:

> *As arrangements for the facilities required by Nato in Tunisia and Morocco are already being made with the French under the procedure for military operating requirements as developed in NATO, we can see no military advantage to the inclusion of these territories in the Nato area.*[143]

The Americans agreed:

> *Attack on forces, vessels or aircraft [of] any Nato member in or over [the] Mediterranean off Tunisia would be covered by subparagraph (ii) Article 6. Practically speaking, it is not possible [to] conceive [a] Soviet attack which would not involve [the] latter possibility if Tunisian facilities were [the] object [of the] attack.*[144]

When the two countries gained independence in 1956, the idea of Moroccan membership in Nato surfaced again, but sank quickly, whereas

Nato negotiated an arrangement which allowed for the use of installations in Tunisia.[145]

By this time Algeria was far more important to France than other North African areas. Algerian armed resistance had started in 1954, inspired by the Vietnamese victory over French forces at Dien Bien Phu. In response, France transferred four divisions from Europe to Algeria, which was not a part of Nato's integrated military structure, but a French defense responsibility. Concerned Nato allies suggested that in the future, the transfer of Nato-designated forces to other areas should not occur without the North Atlantic Council's blessing.[146] In the following years, France tried occasionally with mixed success to gain Nato support for its war in Algeria. In many instances, Nato allies had to yield as they realized how hard France suffered militarily and economically because of its Algerian problems.[147]

However, there was typically a lack of support from the allies, including the United States. What worried the allies was not only a weakened Nato defense because of French preoccupation with Algeria, but also that Nato's image towards the uncommitted Third World would suffer. In autumn of 1957, the French marched out of a Nato Parliamentarians meeting in protest because the United States (together with the United Kingdom) decided to sell arms to Tunisia, which, according to France, supplied arms to the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in Algeria. Paris did not accept the American argument that if the United States did not supply Tunisia with arms, the Soviet Union would. In February 1958, France's Nato allies protested fiercely and a nasty row erupted between Washington and Paris when France bombed a Tunisian village in order to quell Tunisian support of the guerrillas in Algeria. The French demanded that if France did not get allied support in the Tunisian affair, Nato would suffer a very serious crisis («une crise d'une extreme gravité»). This threat did not scare the allies, however, and they distanced themselves even more from Paris, as the French continued their brutal fight against FLN in Algeria. In the United States, Senator John F. Kennedy made the colonial issue, Africa and opposition to France's policy

in Algeria an important part of his presidential campaign. Massive Nato protests also occurred in 1962, when de Gaulle simply invaded Tunisia after its leader, Habib Bourguiba, demanded that France should withdraw from its bases in the country. The same year, however, Algeria won its independence and the issue came to a natural conclusion.[148]

## Britain and the South-East Region

The United Kingdom also gradually lost its empire after World War II, but unlike France, allowed it to disintegrate with relatively little fuss. In Nato, France was very apprehensive about its declining status as a world power and bitter about the lack of support. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, quickly overcame the disappointment after Suez and managed to adjust to its new role in Nato. Following the decline in influence in the Middle East, the British then had to face a similar situation in the Mediterranean, an area which was even more important for Nato, as it involved many Nato powers. The Cyprus issue was a case in point.

In connection with Greek and Turkish membership in Nato, the Eastern part of the Mediterranean as well as the Western part was covered by the alliance. Thus, the whole Mediterranean became Nato territory. But not all land areas in the eastern Mediterranean, such as Cyprus, were covered. Only those belonging to Greece and Turkey were included. The United Kingdom had wanted Cyprus to join Nato as early as 1951, but decided not to press the issue, as France would probably then propose the inclusion of its North African possessions, and Belgium and Portugal would probably ask for the inclusion of their African possessions. This would not only be too much for the United Kingdom, but would certainly not be accepted by the rest of Nato either.[149]

In April 1955, the Greek Cypriot guerrillas started a war of liberation, with union with Greece as their stated objective. The Turkish minority resented this. They wanted partition and were supported by Turkey and Britain. Although the British never explicitly acknowledged it as they entered into negotiations, they realized that independence was inevitable

and that partition would serve their interests – not least regarding their bases – best. This conflict was awkward for Nato, as three of its members were involved. Turkey and Greece hardly spoke to each other, nor did London and Athens. In spring of 1955, for instance, a scheduled Nato meeting in Greece was canceled because London refused to go to Athens as long as intense anti-British campaigns were being conducted there. The meeting was instead, for «practical reasons», held in Paris. A more serious aspect of the conflict was that Nato had installations on the island. The bases were operated by the United Kingdom, but Nato financed an important link in its Early Warning System on Cyprus and relied on «suitable provisions made by the member country most directly concerned [the United Kingdom]».[150]

As the conflict dragged on, Nato, with the Secretary General at the forefront, entered into a new venture: conflict resolution within the alliance on an out-of-area issue. Initially, Nato was successful: the alliance played a significant role at the Zurich meeting in 1959 that paved the way for Cypriot independence in 1960. The United Kingdom retained two important bases on the island and Nato was satisfied with the outcome of the thorny conflict, not realizing that the conflict whould resurface only a few years later. The Secretary Generals, Ismay and Spaak, were believed to have done a good job, and this fueled Nato's mediating ambitions for the future.[151]

As soon as the conflict regarding Cyprus was temporarily settled, Malta became the source of trouble. Malta gained independence in 1964, and Nato, which not only had bases but also a headquarters (the Mediterranean Command) on the island, had to renegotiate its relationship with the new authorities in Malta. The Maltese government wanted to get as much security and money as possible for the bases. In December 1964, the first President of Malta, Dr. Borg Oliver, told the American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, that Malta wanted to become a member of Nato. He discretely threatened to throw out Nato staff if he did not receive a positive response. With the exception of a few countries, such as Turkey, Portugal and Belgium, Nato powers did not want Malta to become a

member. One reason was a general reluctance to admit more members into the alliance and raise the hopes of others wanting to join – such as Spain. Another reason was that Malta «would have interests and sympathies in common with the uncommitted countries of the south and eastern Mediterranean and her attitude is likely to be different from that of other members.» A third reason was that Malta was small and weak and would not contribute much in terms of military strength and would therefore be an economic burden. Lastly, Nato wanted to stay out of trouble regarding internal political problems in Malta.[152]

On the other hand, even though Malta was not very strategically important, and it was not essential to maintain Nato headquarters on the island, it would be disastrous for Nato if the Soviet Union gained influence on the island: «The objective which we were all seeking was to keep Malta aligned with the West», said a British representative to Nato. To achieve this, Nato reluctantly considered the possibility of guaranteeing Malta's integrity in return for continued facilities for Nato headquarters. But the British did not see any reason why Nato should broker such a deal with Malta; they could take care of the West's interests in Malta, as they did in Cyprus. The Scandinavian countries did not like discussing the issue in Nato at all; they considered it too sensitive in light of the domestic attitude towards Nato and out-of-area issues. The outcome of the talks with Malta was that the functions of Nato's Mediterranean Command on the island were transferred to Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples. But Nato maintained some base rights - through the United Kingdom – and, by maintaining and protecting the bases, the alliance would, in effect contribute to the economic well-being and security of the island. Malta was not entirely satisfied, but had to accept this solution.[153]

In the 1960s, turmoil and civil wars raged in the Persian Gulf and the United Kingdom had to let go of its possessions. For a while London tried to retain its influence; for example, British forces invaded the former British protectorate Kuwait in 1961, just after it became independent, to protect it from Iraqi claims. It was a peaceful operation and the troops withdrew a year later. But the British had used Nato-designated forces and

even hinted that they would use atomic weapons; this troubled Washington. These efforts to hold on to its possessions, however, were to no avail. In 1966, London announced that the United Kingdom would abandon its huge military base in its protectorate Aden. In 1968 it was decided that the United Kingdom would withdraw all its forces from «East of Suez» by 1971, thus reversing a fundamental aspect of its strategic thinking introduced in the Defence White Paper from May 1957, in which areas East of Suez were given priority. This created shock-waves among policy-makers in Washington, who tried in vain to make the British change their minds - as they had done in 1956-57, when they had *opposed* the British giving priority to areas East of Suez. There were reasons to believe that the Soviet Union was gaining increasing influence in the region, in particular through intervention in the Yemeni civil war. But as the British could not be persuaded, Washington tried to substitute British presence in the Persian Gulf by aiding, and relying more, on Israel and Iran.[154]

London also had to let go of its possessions in the Far East in the 1960s. In the process, however, in an attempt to preserve London's interests, British Nato troops serving in Germany were sent to the Far East. London was fully entitled to do this, and Nato was duly informed, but it nevertheless caused concern in Washington and other Nato capitals. London's problems in the Far East and the draining of Nato resources were parallel to what the Netherlands had experienced in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when Dutch interests in Indonesia and West New Guinea were jeopardized by Jakarta. The Dutch concentrated their campaign in Nato on coordinating Nato members' policy and in particular preventing Nato allies supplying arms to Indonesia. At first, the response was vague and uncommitted, but after the Dutch argued that they would have great problems in meeting their European commitments due to obligations in the Far East, the Nato members, excluding the United States, agreed not to deliver arms to Indonesia.[155] Although colonial problems were not formally Nato's problems, a weakened Nato defense in Europe was.

## Nato's smaller powers and Africa

It was not only the big Nato powers that had colonial problems which caused difficulties for the alliance; Belgium and Portugal's problems in Africa also caused trouble. In the early 1950s, Nato had not paid much attention to Africa. The situation in the Far and Middle East was seen as more important for Nato. At the end of the decade, however, Nato began to focus on Africa as it was believed that the Soviet Union was trying to gain influence on the continent. Several documents were circulated about the need and means to counter communist infiltration in Africa. The Federal Republic of Germany was, perhaps surprisingly, heavily involved in this process. In autumn of 1958, the Germans circulated a long report about the different forms of communist intrusion in Africa and possible Western means to counter this. Nato was aware that these discussions were sensitive, as sub-Saharan Africa was well beyond the Nato area, and it went to great lengths to keep these discussions secret. Especially the small, non-colonial powers felt uneasy. They maintained that is was crucial that Nato did not see African matters solely in an East-West context and risk gaining the reputation of acting as a block in African matters. This could alienate Third World countries, be exploited by the communists and thus be harmful to the alliance. On the other hand, Nato countries with interests in Africa, Portugal in particular, were eager to harmonize or at least coordinate Nato members' policies on Africa. Not much came out of these discussions in the late 1950s, except for an improved awareness and increased knowledge of African problems.[156]

The first major challenge to Nato on an African issue was in connection with the Congo crisis in 1960. Belgium, which had hastily left the Congo when the country became independent, intervened to protect Belgian nationals after the country erupted into violence and the province of Katanga seceded from the Congo. The Belgians did not receive the allied support they had expected, not even from the United States. Many Nato countries demanded that Belgium should withdraw from the Congo and let the United Nations take charge. For Nato, the overriding concern

was to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting the situation. Nato did not fear outright Soviet intervention, but rather communist infiltration. Nato members were aware of the link between colonial resentment, disorder and opportunities for communism. Moreover, if the Congo, a big country in the heart of Africa, were to become communist, it could spread to the rest of the continent. Nevertheless, they did not want to involve Nato in the matter. In 1961, Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Secretary General of Nato, left office disappointed at the lack of support in the Congo issue.[157]

But Belgium did get some sympathy. The other colonial powers in Nato saw the situation in the Congo as a precedent for what might happen to their remaining colonies, and regarded it as imperative to maintain law and order in Congo and not be too harsh on Belgium. Moreover, for some it did matter that the Belgians were «friends and allies». Excessive criticism could also undermine Nato solidarity. The Belgium bases in the Congo also mattered to Nato. They were used by Nato countries for training purposes. The British delegation to the United Nations, for instance, was instructed to avoid any mention of the bases in the resolution texts. It soon became unrealistic, though, to believe that the bases could be kept in Belgian hands and thereby remain useful to Nato.[158]

The other Nato country with African colonies, Portugal, had a long tradition of using Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, regarding consultations, to raise and solicit support for its colonial policy, not only for the African colonies, but also Goa, which was threatened by India. They also regularly maintained that it would be difficult to increase their defense expenditure in Europe as long as they had such heavy burdens in the colonies. On occasion, Lisbon also expressed its wish to expand the geographical scope of Nato to cover Africa, or at least parts of it. Portugal did muster some support, as expressed in the «Dulles-Cunha» communiqué of December 1955, which emphasized «[t]he interdependence of Africa and the western world», but for the most part the Nato majority did not support Portugal.[159]

In 1961-62 the guerrilla war in Portugal's African colonies intensified, especially in Angola. Portugal used Nato-designated equipment in its

response. In Washington, the newly elected President, John F. Kennedy, had made Africa and anti-colonialism a key element of his foreign policy, and in March 1961 voted for a United Nations resolution which criticized Portugal's colonial policies. The United States repeated the criticism at a Nato meeting and reduced its military aid and restricted commercial sales to Portugal. However, this American anti-colonial offensive under President Kennedy was not long-lived. Portugal launched a counter-attack in Nato, and argued that Washington was meddling in its affairs, and was supported by the other colonial powers in Nato on that principle. The major reason why Washington backed down, however, was fear of an unfavorable arrangement with Portugal regarding the very important bases on the Azores, which was to be renegotiated in 1962. Washington backed down in the United Nations and lifted its economic sanctions. In fact, Lisbon applied so much pressure on Washington, that the American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, wryly said that the Portuguese demands, if met, «would have the effect of making the United States the satellite of Portugal.»[160]

The smaller non-colonial powers in Nato did not have as many inhibitions and interests as the United States. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, they were increasingly vocal in their criticism of Portugal's handling of its colonies. A climax was reached in 1971 when the Norwegian Foreign Minister in very harsh words attacked the host's colonial policies at a Nato meeting in Lisbon. Naturally, Portugal found this outrageous, but also Nato's Secretary General, Manlio Brosio, Washington, Athens, Rome and London found this public criticism of an ally undesirable.[161] Three years later, following the peaceful overthrow of the government in Lisbon and the subsequent independence for Portugal's colonies, Nato's colonial problems were finally over.

## Conclusion

The attempts by the colonial powers to engage Nato in various colonial conflicts, created a no-win situation for Nato. No matter what the organization did, Nato could not avoid getting into trouble in some way or

another. On the whole, Nato chose not to yield to pressure, and paid the price: internal problems with resentful member states. But the benefits of this policy were considerable. First, Nato avoided involvement in trouble spots all over the world, which would have represented an even more serious drain on sparse resources than Nato already experienced as a result of individual members' engagements out-of-area, perhaps diluted the democratic and moral value of the alliance, and possibly escalated local conflicts into global issues involving the Nato area. Second, though connected to the first, Nato sidestepped a potentially even more serious division within its ranks than that stemming from resentful colonial powers, namely a division over the fundamental purpose of the alliance, which could have undermined the effectiveness of defending the North Atlantic area from Soviet aggression.

There were two exceptions to the policy of not yielding to pressure exerted by the colonial powers, both related to the imperative of defending the North Atlantic area from the Soviet Union. The first concession was given to individual Nato members to enhance their ability and will to cooperate in the defense of the North Atlantic area, and had been foreshadowed by the inclusion of Algeria in the Nato area. The same reasoning underpinned Nato's early moral support for France's struggle in Indochina, and the Nato agreement not to deliver arms to Indonesia during the conflict with the Netherlands, as well as the American retraction of its criticism of Portugal's colonial policies. Such departures from the non-policy, most notably regarding Indochina, did, however, have consequences for Nato's handling of out-of-area issues. The most important one, in the context of this study, was that the smaller non-colonial powers, especially the Scandinavian countries, experienced substantial domestic trouble in the wake of Nato's support for France's war in Indochina, which made them more determined to maintain Nato's non-policy on out-of-area issues in the future.

The second kind of departure from the restrictive geographical scope of Nato, arose because some areas adjacent to Nato territory were considered to be so vital to the defense of the North Atlantic area that Nato

had to seriously consider its security relations with them. As Greece and Turkey were included in the alliance, the Mediterranean area was deeply integrated in Nato defenses - both directly and through the United Kingdom - and Nato was prepared to accept an indirect link to the Middle East through the MEC.

As it was not possible for individual members to avoid out-of-area involvement, Nato's non-policy did not prevent Nato from being affected by out-of-area affairs. This was most prominent in the Middle East. Even the United States, which was generally opposed to Nato involvement in out-of-area issues, actually involved Nato in its ideas of linking regional alliances together, the invasion of Lebanon in 1958 (discussed in Chapter 3), and its actions against Syria in 1957. However, British actions involving Nato were more typical. The Suez crisis is a prominent example. This British (and French) out-of-area affair hurt Nato badly. But Nato's refusal to have anything to do with the Suez debacle ensured that Nato as an organization escaped much of the negative fallout resulting from the incident: it avoided being held directly responsible for an «imperialistic» war, and, more importantly, the crisis did not seriously damage cooperation in connection with the major task - the defense of the Nato area from Soviet aggression. Thus, the Suez crisis was in many ways an excellent demonstration of how involved Nato powers could become in out-of-area issues, and how this affected Nato, but still, how little Nato as an organization was involved.

# Chapter 3: Challenges to Nato's non-policy on out-of-area issues, 1962-1989: The United States

In Chapter 2 we saw that until the early 1960s, the colonial powers wanted Nato to engage in out-of-area issues, and the United States opposed it. In the 1960s, the former colonial powers changed their attitude and began to advocate limiting Nato's geographical scope and restricting Nato involvement in out-of-area issues. Now, however, the United States was in favor of Nato engagement in out-of-area issues. The discussions in Nato about Cuba following Fidel Castro's take-over was the first major instance of this «reversal of roles».[162]

What can explain this change of attitude by the great powers? For the colonial powers, the answer seems quite straightforward: with the disintegration of the major part of their empires, their interest in committing themselves, let alone Nato, in these areas faded. The American change of attitude, however, was not so directly linked to material interests. The United States did, of course, have substantial national interests outside the Nato area, but prior to the early 1960s Washington believed that to involve Nato would only dilute and create trouble for Nato's main mission, which was the defense of the North Atlantic area. When the Americans began to argue to the contrary by the early 1960s, it was not American interests that had changed, but rather the perception of the Soviet and the communist threat. From initially being a threat to Europe, the Soviet Union was now, according to the Americans, a greater threat to the Third World.[163]

In retrospect, it is easy to see that the American fear was exaggerated. Certainly the Soviet Union gradually sought to gain influence in the Third World following the death of Stalin. Anti-colonialism and the

decolonisation process created opportunities. The Middle East was the most important region for Moscow. The shipment of weapons to Nasser in 1955 was a turning point. In the Congo and Laos in 1960-61, the Soviet Union launched its first interventions in the Third World. Soviet engagement continued to increase throughout the 1960s, but it was not until the late 1970s that Soviet involvement in the Third World was to any reasonable degree comparable with the Western level. In the 1960s, Soviet involvement in the Third World was still marginal. Moreover, it was not very successful. But as this influence in the Third World had started from scratch in the 1950s, any increased interest and activity caused concern. Moreover, the Soviet leaders, especially Nikita S. Khrushchev, played actively on this Western fear with great success.[164]

Despite the evidence - the American concern over the new Soviet and communist threat was palpable. As this situation arose after the colonial powers had lost most of their interests in the Third World, fierce struggles ensued in Nato. To make matters worse for the United States, the smaller non-colonial powers were even more reluctant than previously to engage Nato in out-of-area issues. Thus, despite strong pressure from the United States, Nato continued to hold on to its non-policy. Focus remained on what was unquestionably in the common interest of all the members: the North Atlantic area. It was not until the 1980s that Nato departed slightly from the non-policy on out-of-area matters, and then as a direct result of the first massive Soviet onslaught on a nation not belonging to the Soviet sphere of interest after World War II, Afghanistan.

Before outlining the American challenge to Nato's non-policy on out-of-area issues from the early 1960s, we will look at some exceptions to the traditional American policy of not involving Nato in out-of-area affairs. We will then look in more detail at the case which was pivotal case to American thinking regarding Nato and out-of-area issues: Cuba after the revolution in 1958. The debacle regarding Cuba and the ensuing thaw in superpower relations after the missile crisis in autumn of 1962 led to a major reassessment of Nato's in out-of-area affairs. As in the mid-1950s, after a similar thaw, consultations were the favored device. In the late

1960s, American involvement in Vietnam and the question of Nato involvement were the main out-of-area issues, which were then replaced by the Middle East, Africa and South-West Asia, which in turn dominated Nato discussions in the 1970s and 1980s. Nato debates on out-of-area issues peaked in the early 1980s after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and for a while it seemed that Nato would depart from its non-policy. However, several conflicts in the 1980s - the war in the Falklands, the American bombing of Libya, and the war between Iraq and Iran - demonstrated the durability and strength of Nato's non-policy on out-of-areas issues. At the same time, these episodes also underscored the traditional preferred alternative among Nato members to having an official Nato policy on out-of-area issues: an ad-hoc, informal, bilateral cooperation, often of a low-scale military nature, in line with the «coalition of the willing» formula.

## Exceptions to the traditional American support of Nato's non-policy on out-of-area issues: the North Atlantic security dimension

As shown in earlier chapters, even before the 1960s Washington did not rule out that Nato should look beyond its area. But this was always closely tied to the North Atlantic security dimension. The military aid to the French war effort in Asia and American support of Nato's Indochina Resolution in 1952, were granted in response to strong French pressure and to ensure that France was able to maintain its European commitments. Likewise, the American acceptance of some kind of link between Nato and Middle East defense efforts in the early 1950s was due to strong British pressure and a realization of the Middle East's importance for Europe. Furthermore, the Americans proposed improved consultations in Nato, including out-of-area issues, in the mid and late 1950s, as Washington believed that Soviet intrusion in the Third World could undermine security in Europe. The clearest demonstration that American support of Nato engagement in out-of-area issues was related to European security

matters, was the American wish to link Nato to - or even include - adjacent countries important to the security of Europe, such as Greece and Turkey.

Below, we will look at two other cases in which Washington departed from its usual policy of not involving Nato in out-of-area issues: Yugoslavia for a short period in the early 1950s, and Spain for over three decades. Both were closely linked to the security of the North Atlantic area.

As Yugoslavia's leader, Josip Broz Tito, distanced himself more and more from the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, the United States saw a possibility of inserting a wedge in the communist bloc and drawing Yugoslavia closer to the West. The Americans decided to grant Tito military and economic assistance and urged its Nato allies to do the same. Furthermore, the establishment of an indirect link between Belgrade and Nato in 1953-54 by means of the Balkan Pact, of which Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey were members, was welcomed by both the United States and Nato. An overland connection between Italy and Greece through a friendly Yugoslavia was a very positive prospect for military planners. There was talk about technical and legal links between the two alliances, and even talk about possible Nato membership for Yugoslavia. The latter never reached the formal Nato agenda, however, as Belgrade never asked for membership. Moreover, the Balkan Pact turned out to be short-lived and the relationship between Nato and Yugoslavia withered away.[165]

Membership in Nato, however, was exactly what the United States wanted for Spain. Even before Nato's inception, Washington had called for Spanish membership in the future alliance. Military planners in Washington argued that facilities in Spain - primarily airports, harbors and overflight rights - would be of tremendous advantage in a strategy for Western Europe that relied heavily on reinforcement across the Atlantic. For the United States, the military imperatives outweighed the political problem that Spain's leader was a fascist dictator who had collaborated closely with Germany during World War II. Although the European Nato

members realized the military advantages of Spanish membership, they were not prepared to disregard ideology so easily. They were not willing to compromise the vision of a democratic Nato. Apart from the United States and Portugal, no one in Nato wanted Spain to join.[166]

Madrid realized that Spain did not have a high standing in Nato, but was also fully aware of Spain's strategic importance to Nato and consequently used this as leverage. In March 1949, Madrid insisted that «some arrangement should be made as soon as possible, outside the framework of the Treaty but in keeping with its spirit, to bring Spain into the general picture.» This was achieved in the shadow of the Korean War, when Spain in 1953 concluded a bilateral defense pact with the United States, which in effect included Spain in the collective Western defense against the Soviet Union. Many Nato members expressed misgivings, but in reality obtained the best of two worlds: the military advantages of a close Spanish-American defense cooperation, without the moral strain of having Spain as a Nato member.[167]

Over the next three decades, the question of Spanish membership was sporadically raised by Washington. At every juncture, an increasingly smaller number of allies blocked Madrid's entry. In 1955, when Spain was granted membership to the United Nations and the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of Nato, the United States and Portugal maintained that the time had come to include Spain in Nato. Only Greece, Turkey and Italy agreed. But the United Kingdom and France, which had fronted the broad opposition from 1949, modified their resistance, and in the years that followed, it was the smaller Northern countries of Nato, headed by Norway, which became the staunchest opponents of Spanish membership in Nato.[168]

In 1959, the majority of Nato members actually favored, or at least were not opposed to, Spanish membership in Nato. By this time, the Americans had also developed a political argument in addition to the military one: Nato membership for Spain would help to Europeanize Spain and would be a «stabilizing element in the Spanish political scene by developing a sense of community with the West.» But Norway and

Denmark could not be persuaded, not even after the major powers in Nato leaned on them to reconsider their position. The only thing that could facilitate Spanish membership in Nato, said the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, was the «establishment of a democratic regime in Spain».[169] The reason why the United States and the other Nato members allowed Norway to exercise its veto in this question was probably that, all in all, Nato interests were best served this way. This question was so important for Norway that to force Spain's entry in Nato would have caused considerable trouble and perhaps even jeopardized Norway's continued membership in Nato. That would have been too heavy a price to pay. Besides, American bilateral arrangements with Spain were, if not perfect for the defense of the Nato area, at least quite satisfactory.

As the road to Spanish membership was blocked for political reasons, American Nato military officials instead engaged in secret talks with Spanish officials. In 1959, for example, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Lauris Norstad, considered «the possibility of setting up some kind of relationship with Spain in the field of air defense» in which Spain's air defense «could be tied in with SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] planning either by contact directly through US forces in Spain or by liaison with Portugal.» During the 1960s and 1970s, however, the military contacts between Nato and Spain were informal and limited, and were not upgraded until the late 1970s. The exact nature of the military relationship between Spain and Nato, however, has not yet been revealed.[170]

As long as Spain's leader Francisco Franco lived, Norway and Denmark remained impossible to move on this question, even though they were under continuous American pressure, especially in the last years of Franco's rule. It was only two years after Franco's death in November 1975 that the Norwegian government finally declared that it no longer opposed Spanish membership in Nato. Spain finally became a member in 1982, ending four decades of American pressure to enhance the North Atlantic security through the inclusion of Spain in Nato.[171]

## The first major American calls on Nato: Cuba, improved consultations and Vietnam

In the 1960s, the American hesitancy on out-of-area issues was replaced by an active policy, which tried to engage Nato in out-of-area issues. The general reason was an increasing awareness in Washington in the latter half of the 1950s that the communist threat was growing in the Third World. A more immediate factor was the foreign policy of the democratic administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. They came to share the belief that communist advances in the Third World posed a more immediate threat than the Soviet threat to the North Atlantic area. Moreover, if the West did not deal with this threat, the threat to the North Atlantic area would become increasingly serious. At the heart of the policy was the old domino theory combined with an increased emphasis on credibility: if it was to be seen as a credible and viable alternative to communism, the West had to stand up to the Soviet Union and fight the communist threat anywhere in the world. A concrete expression of these beliefs was the new American national security concept in the 1960s, based on extended commitments and flexible response. The basis of the new concept was a belief in the principle of the balance of power. In the 1960s, the democratic administrations firmly believed that even minor changes in the periphery - the Third World - could tilt the balance, set off a chain reaction and, in the end, affect American national security. To prevent this, the United States and its allies had to increase and restructure their defense in order to be able to meet the enemy at every level of aggression.[172]

It was President Kennedy who paved the way for this kind of thinking. He had for a long time been interested in Third World matters, and devoted his time to such issues when in power. But perhaps developments in Cuba were even more pivotal to Kennedy's foreign policy. He regarded the new Castro regime in the American backyard as communist-directed, and asked for Nato support in fighting the regime even before the dramatic missile crisis in 1962 which nearly resulted in an armed conflict with the

Soviet Union. Following the missile crisis, the new American President, Lyndon B. Johnson, called for improved consultations in Nato, among other things in order to be better prepared to meet communist challenges in the Third World. This became even more important as the United States became increasingly involved in the conflict in Vietnam, a conflict which for many years overshadowed Washington's attention to Europe, which, in turn, concerned the European Nato allies deeply.

### Limited Nato policies on Cuba

After Fidel Castro's take-over in Cuba in 1958, Washington underlined the danger of allowing communism to gain a foothold on the American continent and began to lobby for Nato engagement in Latin-America. Thus, another region was added to Nato's out-of-area concerns. Washington's first step was to propose the establishment of a Latin American Expert Group in Nato in 1961. The other Nato members agreed to this, provided it was kept secret, in order to avoid allegations that Nato was meddling in Latin American affairs.[173]

Next, the Americans called for Nato allies to impose sanctions on Cuba. In February and May of 1962, the United States asked its allies in Nato to refrain from shipping weapons and other strategic materials to Cuba, to include Cuba on the list of nations targeted by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) system, to be cautious in giving credits, to limit their trade with, and not transship American goods to the island. The chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Walt Whitman Rostow, talked about a united Atlantic front against Cuba, including both the Organization of American States (OAS) and Nato, because Cuba was of concern to the whole of Western security. Most other Nato allies were reserved. They shared the American concern regarding Cuba and agreed to restrict arms deliveries, but not much beyond that; a collective Nato policy was out of the question. Cuba was not a threat to Nato, they maintained, not even to the United States. Thus, Cuba should not be the object of a collective Nato policy. Besides, such a

policy would probably generate negative responses. Including Cuba on the list of nations targeted by the COCOM system, for example, would probably play Cuba into the hands of the Soviets and be costly in terms of Europe's relations with the rest of Latin America. When the Americans then went on to propose that Cuba should not be formally included on the list, but instead that there should be a gentlemen's agreement to not send materials covered by COCOM to Cuba, this was not well received. Instead, a compromise was worked out during summer of 1962, based on a Danish proposal. Nato members would review arms sales in six months, assess whether export to Cuba was a problem, and then come together to discuss the matter again. A similar solution was found regarding credits. Moreover, Nato discussions on Cuba were to be kept secret, and it was stressed that Nato nations should not act collectively, but individually. This could not, of course, hide the fact that the discussions and solutions on how to deal with Cuba in these matters were in fact dealt with within Nato.[174]

In August-September 1962, when it became known that Cuba received substantial aid from the Soviet Union, Washington found greater understanding among its allies. The principal argument against the American proposals was that Cuba did not pose a threat to Nato nor to the United States. This changed as it now became clear to everyone that the Soviet Union was directly involved in the matter. In addition, the debate became more concrete for Nato when it became known that Nato powers were in fact aiding the Soviets in their support of Castro: according to American sources, during the first seven months of 1962, 141 ships from ten Nato countries had made 209 calls at Cuban ports while under charter to countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Preventing Western ships from going to Cuba now became a top priority for Washington. President Kennedy stated publicly that he would urge Nato allies to support him in this. Many Nato countries did indeed do this, but the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Greece, Denmark, France and Norway - the most important shipping countries - did not, claiming to defend the principle of free trade. The traditional skepticism to engage in out-of-area issues was also a

factor, especially for Norway and Denmark.[175]

The United States could not accept this. The Congress went on to pass acts that would forbid economic assistance to countries whose ships carried goods that were economically beneficial to Castro and military assistance to countries whose ships carried arms or strategic materials to Cuba. The administration also threatened to implement further sanctions on countries whose ships made port calls on Cuba. In addition, and probably equally important to the shipping countries, was the implicit threat of being cut off from the American shipping market in the event of non-compliance with the American wishes. Apart from the United Kingdom and France, which did not back down in the face of this considerable pressure, even after the missile crisis in October 1962, the rest of Nato's shipping countries gave in. Thus, Washington had in its first serious attempt succeeded in using Nato as an arena from which to pursue out-of-area policy, and in reality forced Nato to adopt a policy on Cuba, even though Nato technically, as an organization, did not do anything regarding Cuba.[176]

When the missile crisis came to a head in October, it overshadowed all other issues. Nato, however, did not play an active role in the crisis. The United States did not even consult Nato. (The United Kingdom was really the only country to be kept generally informed during the crisis.) Nato accepted this, as the crisis clearly was an event where the time factor inhibited normal consultation, a situation the Three Wise Men's report had taken into account. After the crisis, all Nato members praised the United States for its handling of the crisis. Only later did de Gaulle express the sentiment that the United States had endangered Europe in an out-of-area issue. It may have been possible that the Soviet Union, in the event of an American attack on Cuba or the vessels carrying the missiles, could have retaliated against Nato's Jupiter bases in Turkey.[177]

This leads on to an aspect of the crisis that seriously worried Nato, and Turkey in particular: the speculation as to whether a part of the deal that made Khrushchev recall the vessels on their way to Cuba was an American promise to remove Nato Jupiter missiles in Turkey. The United

States denied that there had been any deal. We now know that there was indeed a deal involving the Jupiter missiles. This was a small concession, however, as the missiles were outdated and would most likely have been scrapped in the near future anyway. The Americans decided to keep this part of the bargain secret, as they feared it would undermine Nato cohesion if it were known. Only a chosen few, among them President Kennedy's close friend, the British ambassador to Washington, Sir Ormsby-Gore, received prior indication that the United States was considering the inclusion of the Turkish Jupiter missiles in a deal with the Soviet Union.[178]

The events surrounding Cuba were the turning point regarding Washington's attitude to whether Nato should become involved in out-of-area issues. Washington was now convinced that the Soviet and communist threat outside Europe was great enough to warrant attention from the major Western actors. Washington's pressure on Nato, however, was only partly successful. Even though Nato's traditional non-policy was in practice altered slightly, it was formally maintained.

## Yet another call for improved consultations

The evidence of a thaw between the superpowers after the Cuban missile crisis led, as a similar thaw had done in the mid-1950s, to an internal debate in Nato about possible new tasks and new areas - beyond containment of the Soviet Union in Europe. Much of the new activity came in the form of various proposals for improving the consultative faculties, in much the same vein as in the mid- and late 1950s. Another similarity was that again it was the Americans who took the lead in calling for improved consultations. What was new in the mid-1960s, however, was that the Americans now especially wanted to include out-of-area issues in the consultative process, something they had been reluctant to do previously.

The debate in the mid-1950s had resulted in some concrete measures: the Wise Men's report, the Political Committee, the Regional Experts

Groups, and a few years later, the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG) for long-term studies and world problems. The geographical scope of Nato, however, was not extended. But this appeared to be what the Americans had in mind, when they launched additional proposals for improved consultations after the Cuba crisis. Some of the proposals were more mainstream, such as the idea of creating an «executive group within NATO available for quick consultation», or that the NAC should meet in Washington in emergencies, and that there should be four extra NAC meetings a year. A more controversial proposal was the so-called Rostow/ Bowie thesis of 1965 (after the American officials, Walt W. Rostow and Robert T. Bowie), which argued in favor of a coordinated Western global policy through Nato. The response to all these proposals, however, was largely negative.[179]

The British, along with Nato's Secretary General Dirk U. Stikker, were at this point in time perhaps closest to the American view. They wanted «as much harmonization of policy as possible within and outside the NATO area», and, given the present thaw, wanted to revitalize and gear Nato to other tasks because «the most immediate military threat to the security of the Western Powers is at present outside Europe.» The British were among other things considering whether Nato should conduct political «contingency planning» in out-of-area issues based on the Berlin model: «By the careful selection of contingencies for study we might by this means extend the practical interests of the Alliance beyond the NATO area.» In addition, they believed extended consultations were

> *a means of widening the horizon of the smaller NATO countries. It helped to instill in them a sense of collective responsibility for Western interests outside the area of the Alliance. The Scandinavians, for instance, who used to be reluctant to take part in such discussions for fear of involvement, now seemed much readier to do so, recognising that their interests were indirectly involved in the fortunes of their allies in other parts of the world.*[180]

The British did, however, have special issues which they wanted to keep for themselves, where they did not want Nato to become involved. Cyprus was a case in point. In a document that stressed «the need for harmonisation of Western policies outside the Atlantic area», it was also underlined that: «It would be best to say nothing about Cyprus in the general debate. We are doing what we can to ensure that discussion on Cyprus is avoided or at least kept to a minimum, preferably in a separate restricted session».[181]

It was, of course, still in the United Kingdom's interests that Nato became more concerned about out-of-area issues. The British still spent substantial amounts of money in the Far East and Middle East, and talked about the «burdens which we bore [...] on behalf of NATO», which were a «contribution to achieving the common aims of the Alliance.» The British recognized that Nato's first concern was the North Atlantic area, but as Nato shared the same essential interests and aims, it should seek to harmonize policies out-of-area, where there was an indirect, but growing, threat to Nato. The Congo, Indonesia, and Vietnam were problems not only for Belgium, the United Kingdom and the United States, but for the whole of Nato. The British were particularly concerned about cost-sharing:

> *Why should U.K. go on devoting 7% of GNP [gross national product] to defence while others devote only 4 % or 5 %? [...] U.K. cannot continue to accept situation. Only U.S. and U.K have world-wide defence commitments: should not be discriminated against because part of effort is outside Europe. Defence of free world indivisible: threats in Middle and Far East affect other members of alliance: military cost should not be borne by only two powers. Position made more acute by fact that overseas expenditure contributes to balance of payments problems. [...] Overseas commitments cannot simply be dropped. Other shoulders must take larger share. U.K. ready to discuss in alliance how this might be done.*

This emphasis on non-European theaters manifested itself in the British Defence reviews in 1957 and again in 1962. These toned down the defenses of Europe and instead emphasized the British presence in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, as the security of these areas was more vital than ever for the security of Europe.[182]

Still, the British differed from the Americans on several important points. The most common argument against the American proposals was, as a British policy paper from 1965 stated, «that the machinery as it stands is adequate and efficient.» The British would rather see consultation «grow like Topsy rather than be formalised». One reason was the realization that diverging interests among Nato members were the real obstacle:

> *Changes in machinery are unlikely to produce more effective co-ordination of policy. [...] The obstacle to co-operation of policy lies not in NATO machinery but in the divergent interests of members governments. This naturally applies particularly outside the NATO area*

Another reason was that the British did not want Third World countries to have the impression that «NATO countries are trying to run their affairs for them from Paris.» And finally, the British did not want a confrontation with France.[183]

In contrast to the British, most other allies, and especially France and the Scandinavian countries, were negative to the American proposals. They were not opposed to consultations as such, but did not want any coordination and did not want to include out-of-area issues. France favored bilateral consultations between the countries in question. One reason was that they believed the United States dominated Nato and thus would have too much influence on the outcome of these policies. The smaller countries simply did not want Nato nor themselves to be involved in out-of-area issues. This was seen to be even more important now that the conflict in Vietnam was escalating.[184]

Despite the negative attitude of many Nato members, something

concrete did emerge from the whole debate about possible new tasks and scope for Nato. One new feature was special Nato meetings on various topics. In 1965, for example, meetings were held on Africa/Congo, Vietnam and the Middle East. Another consultative device was an item on the North Atlantic Council's agenda called «political statements». A third device was institutionalized reports to the North Atlantic Council from the Chairman of the Political Committee on topics under discussion in the Committee. Finally, and perhaps the most important measure regarding out-of-area issues, was the increased number of expert groups that would deal with area-specific topics, which were to become institutionalized and permanent.[185]

In the eyes of some British officials, the meetings of the expert groups had two general objectives: 1) to enable Nato members to discuss out-of-area matters, 2) to produce reports on these matters. Another benefit of the meetings was that they offered the smaller powers, «the feeling of taking a full share in NATO consultations». Indeed, some British officials believed that «these meetings are something which we must put up with for the sake of the lesser brethren in the Alliance, even though they must at times be frustrating for our representatives at them.» Some «lesser brethren», however, like Norway, felt that the meetings provided useful information, and represented a possibility to influence the bigger nations, but they still did not want to use them for policy coordination purposes.[186] Despite these modest improvements in the consultative process, the Americans did not get the response they had hoped for when they had called for improved consultations, also on out-of-area issues. A British policy paper summed it up this way in 1965:

> *on problems which, though of great concern to most NATO countries, do not directly involve the Soviet threat to the Treaty area, consultation has mainly been limited to simple exchanges of views. [...] NATO as a political forum amounts mainly to a clearing house for political information. It also affords a permanent, fairly sympathetic audience for the presentation of already decided national policies and an*

*opportunity for allies to express their views on these policies frankly and secretly.*[187]

The problem with consultations on out-of-area issues was in reality the same that precluded a common policy on out-of-area issues in the first place: various interests, perception of threat and ideology. This made it virtually impossible to define which cases were suitable for consultation and, more importantly, what kind of consultations Nato should implement. Still, by giving the various Nato members a possibility to air concerns and to discuss out-of-area matters in Nato, unbinding consultations did in many cases function as a useful valve. Steam was let off and frustration was aired, without threatening to jeopardize Nato cohesion regarding the defense of the Nato area.

### Nato and American involvement in Vietnam

Already in 1962, Washington contacted its Nato allies about the possibility of forming a group for coordinating economic aid to Vietnam.[188] As the United States became more and more involved in 1964-65, American attempts to obtain support from its allies for American policies in Vietnam became more urgent. At meetings in both spring and autumn of 1965, the Americans urged their allies to give moral support and direct assistance. This could be military, economic and/or humanitarian, or at least some form of compensation in Europe to offset American burdens in Vietnam. The United States was especially eager to get support from the United Kingdom - both direct support in Vietnam and compensating measures elsewhere in the Third World, particularly in the Middle East. However, moral support was most important. Even a British bagpipe platoon would be of help - it was the visibility of the British flag in Vietnam that mattered the most for the Americans.[189]

The United Kingdom was, along with several other allies, negative to begin with, but became more supportive from 1965 onward. Denmark, Canada, Norway and France, however, were simply negative. The other nations expressed understanding, but only the Federal Republic of Germany and

Turkey were clearly supportive of the United States' policy in Vietnam. The reluctant allies shared the American concern about what was happening in Vietnam, but did not agree with the American interpretation and handling of the conflict. Especially troublesome for many smaller nations was the American readiness to resort to military means. With large domestic groups opposing the American involvement in Vietnam, fear of guilt by association was considerable, and Nato involvement was out of the question.[190]

In addition, many Nato members feared that American involvement in Vietnam would drain the American resources at Nato's expense. These fears were well founded. In 1965, the Secretary of the American Army admitted to the Congress that the American forces in Europe were temporarily weakened as a result of the war in Vietnam. In May 1967 Washington announced plans to withdraw 35000 soldiers, as well as several aircraft, from the Federal Republic of Germany. In November 1967 the Americans announced that they could no longer guarantee that they would send five divisions to Europe within sixty days if a conflict should break out in Europe. Between 1964 and 1972, the American forces in the Federal Republic of Germany were cut from 263000 to 210000, and other places in Europe from 119000 to 62000, and in «Europe afloat» from 54000 to 26000, in total a reduction from 436000 to 298000. In addition, large amounts of materiel were withdrawn from Europe. «We robbed our NATO forces blind from 1965 to 1972», said Robert Komer, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. One prominent scholar maintains that Washington's commitment in Vietnam «had grown to the point, by 1968, that the United States would have been hard-pressed to respond anywhere else in the world had a comparable crisis developed.»[191]

## American disillusionment with Nato's non-engagement in nearby areas, 1967-1979

The substantial American defense commitments in Vietnam and the question of Nato's priorities were part of the background for the great «burden sharing» debate that started in the mid-1960s. Another significant factor was that the United States was in relative economic decline

compared with Europe. Bearing in mind these two facts, the Americans believed that the Europeans lacked understanding for what in American eyes were common problems - both inside and outside Nato. The American frustration resulted in mild legislative measures and threats of harder ones to cut the American commitment to Europe. The most drastic measures were not carried out, but the Americans did cut world-wide commitments dramatically from the late 1960s. The Nixon doctrine from 1968 gave the most striking illustration of this:

> *America cannot - and will not - conceive* all *the plans, design* all *the programs, execute* all *the decisions and undertake* all *the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.*[192]

To compensate for the loss of direct influence, the Americans began to rely more on their allies around the world. They began to «Vietnamise» the conflict in South-East Asia; they counted more and more on three vital allies in the Middle East - Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia - and demanded that their European allies assumed more responsibility for their own defense. But things did not work out as Washington had hoped, neither in the Third World nor in Europe. The result of the American withdrawal from the Third World was not replacement by American allies, but rather increased opportunities for the Soviet Union. Consequently, Washington turned to Nato for help in countering Soviet infiltration in these areas. The Europeans, however, were not prepared to engage Nato in this task. In fact, they even dragged their feet regarding an increase in their defense commitments within the Nato area. This created resentment and disillusionment in Washington, and gave rise to serious disputes in Nato, especially regarding areas close to Nato: the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Africa.[193]

## American involvement in the Middle East

Following the Suez crisis, the United States had continued the process of taking over the United Kingdom's responsibility in the Middle East. The most potent illustration of this was the Eisenhower doctrine from 1957, which stated that the United States would employ military force to defend friendly regimes in the Middle East against communist aggression. And that was exactly what Washington did. In the late 1950s, the United States was heavily involved in helping anti-Communist regimes to stay in power in Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. The most direct involvement was the invasion of the Lebanon in summer of 1958. All these interventions, however, were carried out unilaterally or in cooperation with London. Washington clearly pointed out that Nato was not directly involved,[194] in full accordance with Washington's long-standing policy of not involving Nato in out-of-area issues.[195]

After the Lebanon affair, the United States changed its strategy in the Middle East and sought closer relations with the Arab countries, especially Egypt. But this came to an end with the Six Day War in 1967 between Israel and many Arab nations, in which the United States unequivocally sided with Israel. Washington immediately urged for a coordinated Nato policy on the Middle East, listing many reasons why this was necessary: the Middle East was adjacent to the Nato area, Nato had strategic interests in the region - oil and the Suez canal in particular -, and Nato would benefit from overflight- and base rights in the region. The other Nato members acknowledged these reasons. Secretary General Manlio Brosio wanted Nato to participate in active coordinating consultations regarding the crisis. The West German Foreign Minister, Willy Brandt, maintained that the crisis raised the question of whether Nato had the ability to react quickly to crises outside Nato, and urged Nato to make contingency plans for similar situations in the future. Many Nato nations were not certain, however, that supporting Israel was the right way to secure Western interests in the Middle East. France, for example, branded Israel as the aggressor and instead preferred to be on good terms with the Arabs. Nor

was the majority of Nato nations ready to coordinate Nato policy on the Middle East, or indeed involve Nato at all in the region.[196]

Six years later, in October 1973, the Middle East again erupted in war - disagreements about the «Yom Kippur» war became the most serious out-of-area clash in Nato since the Suez crisis. But the roles had changed: now it was the United States that wanted to support Israel and use force to stop Egypt (and the Soviet Union, which intervened heavily on the Arab side), whereas the United Kingdom and France - in addition to most of the other Nato nations - were reluctant to use force and help the Israelis. The Nato allies disagreed about almost everything, but the most serious disagreements were 1) whether to extend military support to Israel, 2) how to handle the Soviet Union, and 3) how to cope with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) oil embargo after the war.[197]

One of Washington's first priorities after the outbreak of the war was to supply Israel with arms and other goods. In order to do this swiftly, the Americans requested base rights from their Nato allies. At first, they used their bases in Germany, but Bonn stopped this as soon as it realized what the Americans were up to. Turkey, a crucial country for the United States in its handling of the war, denied American use of its bases, because they were «for the security and defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area and have been set up solely for defense cooperative purposes of Turkey.» The United Kingdom refused to permit the Americans to use their bases on Cyprus, and France even actively undermined the American war effort by sending oil tankers to Libya and Saudi Arabia during the crisis. Only Portugal gave explicit permission to the United States to use its bases, but only because the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, threatened to withdraw the American commitment to defend the country if the Portuguese did not yield. The Netherlands was the only Nato ally that actually supported Washington in this out-of-area issue. This Nato attitude, a furious Kissinger claimed, in fact made it easier for the Soviet Union to use Nato airspace than for the United States, as Soviet aircraft flew freely over Turkey and Greece to Egypt and Syria with supplies, without Ankara and Athens protesting.[198]

The second major source of conflict between the United States and their Nato allies was how to handle the Soviet Union. During the crisis, Moscow threatened to increase its intervention. This provoked Washington to implement a military alert involving nuclear forces, thereby transforming the crisis into a serious East-West affair. It troubled Nato allies greatly that they were not informed of the American moves. The main purpose of consultation in Nato was precisely to consult on out-of-area issues of this kind. The West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, demanded that Washington treated Europe as an equal partner and maintained that «partnership cannot mean subordination». The American explanation for its lack of consultation - fear of leaks - did not mollify the Europeans, on the contrary. The Americans for their part did not like what they considered to be a soft European response to Soviet behavior. Kissinger accused the allies of acting selfishly and only thinking of reaping the economic harvest of détente without contributing to Western security.[199]

The third source of conflict was how to handle the oil embargo by OPEC after the war. Both the United States and its European allies recognized the importance of Middle Eastern oil to Western security and economic well-being. But there were differing opinions as to which means should be applied in order to protect these interests. While the United States and the Netherlands wanted to play hardball with the oil-producing countries and consequently faced a total oil embargo, the other European Community countries went to great lengths to be on good terms with the Arabs and therefore faced only limited restrictions in oil supplies. The United Kingdom and France virtually escaped the sanctions because they concluded their own agreements with the Arab countries. In fact, France even initiated a so-called «Euro-Arab dialogue», which infuriated the Americans.[200]

Behind this lack of consensus regarding an indisputably important out-of-area issue for Nato were differing perceptions of threat, conflicting preferences regarding means, and interests. Kissinger strongly argued that vital common security interests for Nato were at stake and that the

conflict should first and foremost be viewed in an East-West perspective. The Europeans, however, were more sensitive to the local factors behind the Middle East tensions and did not see the Soviet Union lurking in the background at every juncture. As regards means, Washington wanted Nato to support the Israelis unequivocally, while the Europeans wanted a more nuanced response. They were also eager to maintain good working relations with the Arab countries. Different interests were at play here. First, Europe was far more dependent on Arab oil and had developed a far tighter web of economic and cultural contacts with the Arabs than the United States. Second, the European allies did not want to take a confrontational stance towards the Soviet Union, because they did not want to abort the fragile process of détente, which was so important to Europe, both in terms of security and economy. Third, the Europeans strongly objected to the American habit of defining common security on behalf of Nato. They could not see that it was they, and not the United States, who undermined Western solidarity. Later, Kissinger dryly commented that the Yom Kippur war «was not [...] one of the finer moments in allied relations.»[201]

## Intra-allied squabbles in the Mediterranean troubles Washington

The United States was increasingly concerned about Soviet intrusion in the Mediterranean from the end of the 1960s. The Americans believed that Moscow would take advantage of the declining French and British influence in the area, the rising Arab nationalism and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Washington expressed particular concern about the rapidly growing Soviet maritime build-up, not only in the Mediterranean, but on other oceans, too. These concerns were shared by many officers involved in Nato military planning, who quite often were frustrated by the strict geographic boundaries of Nato. The Soviet Union did not have a self-imposed line on the Tropic of Cancer or indeed anywhere else. Nato had, however, albeit within strict limits, conducted military planning for

maritime operations out-of-area for a long time. From the early 1950s, for example, Nato discussed various plans for the protection of Western civil shipping in the event of war. In connection with the Soviet maritime expansion in the Mediterranean from the late 1960s, Nato created a mobile fleet in the Mediterranean in 1967, and the following year a Maritime Air Force Mediterranean was established in Naples to coordinate surveillance of the area. In addition, the Sixth Fleet was given a higher priority in American strategy. Although the Scandinavian members did not entirely agree with the pessimistic American threat analysis, all members agreed on the measures. The United States was satisfied by this recognition of the Mediterranean's importance to Nato security.[202]

But the situation in the Mediterranean was, in Washington's view, still far from satisfactory. Intra-allied problems threatened to undermine Nato's position and even endanger Nato itself. Especially troublesome was the Cyprus issue, an issue the Soviets sought to exploit. Following the apparently peaceful solution of the Zurich arrangement in 1959, violence again erupted between the Turkish and Greek populations on the island in 1964. The Turkish Prime Minister, Ismet Inönü, threatened to invade Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriots from what he saw as Greek Cypriot aggression. President Lyndon B. Johnson reacted by sending a stern letter to the Turkish leader: Turkey could not count on Nato assistance in the event of a Soviet attack, in the light of the country's behavior regarding Cyprus. The American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, said in Nato that the United States simply would not accept an invasion of Cyprus by either of the allies. Fighting between Greece and Turkey was, Rusk emphasized, «literally unthinkable». Turkey, bordering the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Soviet Union, hosting important bases for Nato and the United States, and being a moderate Muslim country, played a key role in the region. Washington had no qualms about interfering in an intra-allied problem which was technically an out-of-area issue for Nato. Both the United States and the United Kingdom wanted to avoid discussion of the Cyprus issue in Nato, so that an out-of-area affair would not distract, or possibly destroy, Nato. Therefore, both governments tried to mediate in

the conflict. For example, a peace-keeping force in which Nato played a major role was proposed, and indeed even a Nato peace-keeping force was suggested, but with little success. As in the late 1950s, prominent Nato officials also made efforts to reconcile the two allies, but with no more luck than the Americans or the British. As none of these efforts was successful, and as Washington was determined not to allow an intra-allied conflict over an out-of-area issue endanger Nato, the United States had to raise the issue in Nato. The logic of avoiding out-of-area issues in Nato in order to stay out of trouble, did not apply here, as this particular issue involved two allies and was not a conflict between allies and outsiders.[203]

The Cyprus conflict entailed a break from Turkey's traditional close relations with the United States. Ankara initiated its own variant of an *Ostpolitikk* towards the Soviet Union, and from the late 1960s restricted American overflight rights and the use of bases on Turkish soil. This was serious, not the least in the light of the Soviet naval build-up in the Mediterranean. The Yom Kippur War in 1973 did not exactly improve American-Turkish relations. The following year, the Cyprus crisis erupted again. In response to a coup in Nicosia staged by the Greek Junta, Turkey invaded the island, allegedly to protect the Turkish minority, despite warnings from the United States. Nato's Secretary General tried to mediate, but failed again, just as Nato had done in the 1960s. The United States declared a weapons embargo on Turkey, which retaliated by nationalizing all 25 American-Turkish bases. Nato bases, however, were kept open. The following year, the embargo was partially lifted, and in 1978 it was removed. Ankara responded by lifting some restrictions on the American use of Turkish bases, but demanded economic support. American-Greek relations did not fare much better over the Cyprus issue. Greece blamed the United States for not preventing the Turkish invasion and left Nato's military structure for six years in protest, threatening to leave Nato altogether.[204]

All in all, the skirmishes in the Mediterranean provided additional evidence for Washington that out-of-area conflicts between Nato allies, if such conflicts jeopardized Nato and its ability to protect the Nato area, had

to be addressed. This course of action was preferred to non-involvement as all means possible had to be explored in order to avoid providing opportunities for the Soviet Union to gain influence in the Mediterranean.

### American concerns over Africa

The last American calls for allied action in out-of-area issues which fell on deaf ears were in connection with communist advances in Africa. The first case to appear was in Angola. After the collapse of Portuguese rule in Angola in 1974, different factions were struggling for power. The United States supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), while the Soviet Union and Cuba supported the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In December 1975, influenced by the Watergate affair, the troubles in Vietnam, scandals in the CIA and anti-apartheid winds, Congress decided to stop aiding its factions, which left no obstacles in the way of an MPLA victory, backed by Soviet-aided Cuban forces. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger deplored the decision, but stood alone in his desire to continue fighting the communists in Angola. The Communists celebrated a major symbolic victory which enhanced the Soviet Union's reputation in the Third World.[205] Kissinger did not give up, however, and continued his crusade in Nato, saying that the credibility of the West was at stake. Some agreed, but the majority viewed these events in the light of the African aspirations for independence and freedom, rather than in an East-West context. Portugal, now under socialist rule, even permitted Cuban planes to use airfields on the Azores on their way to Angola. The majority agreed, however, that Nato should not play any role in the conflict.[206]

The new American president from 1977, Jimmy Carter, had a different outlook on African affairs from Kissinger. Carter was more cautious in interpreting developments in Africa in an East-West context, and more inclined to view them from a local perspective. This probably explains his attitude to the so-called Shaba I and II incidents in 1977 and 1978. In both

cases, forces operating from Angola attacked the Shaba province in Zaire and initially gained control. In both instances, however, France and Belgium intervened on the Zairian side and threw the attackers out. The United States was concerned, but did not interfere in the conflicts, other than providing some logistical support to repel the second invasion, and together with the United Kingdom, praised France for its efforts in Africa. France, on the other hand, was heavily involved, not only in these two incidents, but also in several others on the African continent: in Mauritania in 1977, and in Morocco, Chad, and the Central African Republic in 1978. Although the French sometimes operated with the support of some Nato allies (primarily Belgium, but also Portugal and sometimes the United States), France absolutely did not want the operations to be Nato affairs. In fact, alongside the Scandinavian countries, France was the leading proponent of maintaining the established non-policy on out-of-area issues in the 1970s. Again, the cooperation between some Nato powers on out-of-area issues shows that the preferred alternative to concerted Nato action or policy was an ad-hoc, informal, bilateral cooperation, often of a low-scale military nature, based on the «coalition of the willing» formula.[207]

President Carter was more inclined to adopt an East-West perspective on the situation in the Horn of Africa than elsewhere in Africa, as he believed that the Soviet Union, again in collaboration with the Cubans, was gaining considerable influence in an important part of the continent - at the approaches to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf with all its oil resources - by supporting Ethiopia in its conflict with Somalia over the Ogaden province in the years 1977-78. But like Kissinger, Carter did not have the domestic or allied support to do anything about it, apart from giving half-hearted support to Somalia in the early stages of the conflict. Some Nato countries, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, which had a tradition of being a verbal advocate of strong Western responses to what Bonn regarded as Soviet attempts to establish spheres of influence in Africa, aired their concern, but were not ready to take action. The United Kingdom and France also supplied Somalia with defensive arms, but there

was a solid majority in Nato that did not want to engage the organization in the various struggles in the Horn of Africa. The Danish and Norwegian traditional view of not engaging Nato in out-of-area issues prevailed, now supplemented by the argument that the events in Africa should primarily be judged in an African perspective, and not only in an East-West context.[208]

## Hesitant and limited Nato out-of-area engagement, 1979-1989

The process of Soviet infiltration in the Third World started in the 1950s, progressed slowly in the 1960s, and accelerated in the 1970s. This convinced Washington that the West was losing ground to the Soviet Union in the Third World. Washington had repeatedly given warnings of this in Nato, but had not succeeded in provoking Nato to do anything collectively out-of-area. It was not until the early 1980s that Washington finally got a positive, albeit reluctant, response. The reason for this was the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979.

Following the invasion, the Americans launched a major campaign in Nato in an attempt to get the Europeans to share their perception of threat regarding the situation in South West Asia and to apply the necessary means to contain the Soviet Union. Even the staunchest opponents of a collective Nato out-of-area policy, the Scandinavian countries, admitted that the situation had changed after the Soviet Union's first invasion of a country outside its sphere of influence since World War II. But this did not mean that they, or the other Nato allies, were ready to engage Nato out-of-area or expand Nato's geographical scope. What they were prepared to do, after prolonged discussions, was to improve consultations on such matters, to air Nato's concerns in the communiqués, and to compensate within the Nato area for actions taken on national basis by individual Nato members - primarily the United States - to address the new situation. So, even though the link between out-of-area issues and a specific Nato policy became more clear-cut than ever before in Nato's history, it was still far from what the Americans had hoped for when they started the campaign.[209]

One reason for the hesitant European response was that they still did not share the American perception of the Soviet threat after the invasion of Afghanistan. Another reason was that the Europeans were more careful to avoid harming the process of détente than the United States. They were close neighbors with the Soviet Union, and potentially big trading partners with the Eastern European countries, and thus had a lot more to lose if détente collapsed. There was probably also an element of free-riding in the European response: it was more beneficial to let the Americans bear the brunt of the defense efforts and hide behind the American deterrent, than to spend money oneself, with the additional risk of losing even more if détente collapsed.

The modified approach to out-of-area issues was tested and developed in several incidents later in the decade, particularly in the Falklands War, the Libya incidents and the war between Iraq and Iran. The Nato members' response to these events demonstrated that the traditional formal non-policy on out-of-area issues remained largely intact, but was supplemented with some compensating measures and a greater realization that Nato was more directly affected by out-of-area issues than previously assumed. What was more striking, however, was that these events proved that the traditional ad-hoc, informal, bilateral cooperation of a low-scale military nature between Nato members with interests in a particular out-of-area issues was indeed a viable alternative for Nato.

### Afghanistan and changes in Nato's non-policy

The revolution in Iran in 1978, the ensuing hostage crisis, and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, in particular, represented a watershed in American foreign policy. These events dramatically changed the context and content of American efforts to get allies to do more in containing the Soviet Union outside Nato. In National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski's eyes, the Soviets were «emboldened by our lack of response over Ethiopia» and other places in the Third World during the 1970s. Thus, to regain credibility and to stop the Soviet momentum, the United

States and the West had to stand up and respond harshly and effectively. President Carter agreed. Immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan, Washington launched a series of economic and other sanctions against Moscow. The United States also increased its presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, increased the supply of arms to friendly countries in the region (Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia), and sought to gain access to naval and air bases in Oman, Kenya, Somalia and other places. It also increased its defense budgets and activated the plans for a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). The idea of such a force was born in a response to the crisis in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78. The RDF was to be deployed in Third World contingencies and was intended to make the United States less dependent on volatile local allies. It was therefore a major departure from Nixon's policy which relied heavily on local allies around the world. In 1981, RDF totaled some 200,000 troops with support functions. It was drawn from existing forces, especially those earmarked for Nato. This meant that Nato was invariably drawn into the events in the greater Middle East and the Persian Gulf at the end of the 1970s, something Washington zealously underlined in talks with its European allies.[210]

In early January 1980, President Carter maintained that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was «the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War.» Later that month, he declared, in what subsequently became to be known as the «Carter doctrine», that «[a]n attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.»[211]

The invasion also upset Nato, which entered into a long and, as it turned out, difficult, process to establish an appropriate response. It was obvious to everyone that the new situation had to be addressed in Nato's communiqués; in other words, the device of «explicit statements» had to be activated. But how this should be done was not obvious. One parallel was the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Nato had then

issued a warning to Moscow in its communiqué: «Clearly any Soviet intervention directly or indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean would create an international crisis with grave consequences.» The communiqué in 1968 had received much attention, especially as it was so vague and thus stimulated speculations as to which countries it referred to. The Israelis, for instance, thought or hoped they was included, and were therefore satisfied. The Yugoslav government mouthpiece *Barb* regarded the communiqué as a sort of a de facto guarantee for Yugoslavia's sovereignty and independence. American media speculated whether Nato had extended the geographical scope of its commitments. This was categorically denied by Nato officials. And indeed, no such thing was intended. Nato members had Yugoslavia, Romania, Austria and Albania in mind when they formulated the communiqué. But Nato was very satisfied that the Soviet Union was unsure as to which countries Nato had implied. Employed correctly, «explicit statements» could be an effective device.[212]

In 1980 Nato was prepared to go further and adopt a clear and official stance in an out-of-area issue. The first Nato communiqué after the invasion referred to South West Asia as being of «crucial importance» to Nato and that the invasion required increased solidarity among members. Those countries «in a position to do so», especially the United States, should do what they could to ensure peace and stability in the region. Other countries agreed «to do their utmost to meet additional burdens for NATO security which could result from the increased United States responsibilities in South West Asia.» It was particular important to strengthen Nato's South-East Flank. Thus, it appears that a division of labor was established: the United States would have the major responsibility for protecting Nato's interests in South West Asia, while the other members should compensate the reduced American capabilities in the Nato area.[213] The explicit recognition that events out-of-area did have a direct bearing on Nato, and that Nato members should employ various measures to protect Nato, was a major step forwards from previous communiqués and was repeated in the next couple of years. Perhaps the

strongest modification of the traditional non-policy was presented in the Defense Planning Committee's (DPC's) May 1981 communiqué, which stated that «common objectives [...] may require members of the Alliance to facilitate out-of-area deployments in support of the vital interests of all.»[214]

One major reason why the United States pushed so hard for stern language in the Nato communiqués was that the Carter administration, and from 1981 the Reagan administration, needed to placate the Congress and secure Congressional support for the RDF. The NAC communiqués, however, did not go as far as the DPC communiqués, as defense ministers were not so afraid to challenge the non-policy as the foreign ministers. Another reason was that France did not participate in the NAC. France, which had joined and in many ways taken the lead from the Scandinavian countries in opposing the American stance in out-of-area issues, noted the difference and protested against the DPC communiqués. Other members, especially Norway, also tried very hard to prevent the texts from the DPC from going too far. While Norway recognized that out-of-area events had «implications» for Nato, and that Nato should therefore engage in consultations, and individual members should compensate within Nato or even facilitate support to active Nato nations on an individual basis, they emphasized that policies regarding areas outside Nato were «a matter for national decision».[215]

But communiqués were not sufficient. The invasion of Afghanistan was perceived as a blatant display of aggression. In addition, the Soviet Union was now moving dangerously close to the vital Persian Gulf with all its oil resources. It was agreed that Nato had to prepare for new contingencies - also out-of-area - and build up arms in general.[216] Thus, in March 1980, Nato decided to accelerate the agreed defense expenditure increases, and thus send a signal to the Soviet Union that actions out-of-area were important to Nato and would not go unnoticed. A couple of months later, Nato's defense ministers rejected an American suggestion to create a Nato strike force to deal with out-of-area crises, but agreed to implement a series of measures- «Afghanistan, phase 1» - aimed at

strengthening Nato within the Nato area. In December 1980, after strong American pressure, Nato went even further and agreed to «Afghanistan, phase 2», in which Nato collectively would compensate for possible American, Nato earmarked, forces that may be used in a conflict in the South West Asia.[217]

The exact nature of the measures was fiercely debated over the next few years. In sum, the American proposals were: 1) Nato presence in the Middle East/South West Asia in peacetime (naval and air deployments, exercises with partners in the region, councilors and training programs), 2) Nato economic and military aid to local partners, 3) overflight- and base rights from Nato partners, 4) strategic capacity for mobility in case the United States had to operate in two places at the same time, in addition to fulfilling its obligations for the defense of Europe, 5) Nato military participation (on a bilateral basis outside Nato), 6) compensation from non-engaged Nato powers in the form of increased defense efforts within the alliance. The others members found this to be excessive. They were prepared to give some support, but only nationally, not through Nato or by Nato. It was very important to many members, that the United States was not given some sort of carte blanche support in out-of-area issues. At the same time, however, those countries which were most reluctant to engage themselves or Nato out-of-area, were glad that the United States in reality took on as much responsibility out-of-area on behalf of Nato as they did. But a formal Nato policy on out-of-area issues was out of the question.[218] In 1982, Nato decided to undertake a study of the exact compensating measure required from each ally, called South West Asia Implementation Study (SWAIS). The SWAIS was engulfed by disagreements between the United States and most of the European countries in 1983, but in the following year, based on SWAIS, Nato decided to set 2-year force goals for each ally in order to compensate for the potential use of American forces in South West Asia. The goals were not binding but, the allies were still forced to consider in detail what consequences American operations out-of-area would have for Nato and for each individual country. Underlying this compromise was the fear that possible American

engagement out-of-area would seriously harm the defense of the Nato area if it was not balanced by compensating measures. Moreover, the Europeans had to show at least some understanding for the United States' priorities, in order not to undermine Washington's will to commit military forces to Europe. In addition, a wide range of individual compensatory arrangements were established. For example, nine Nato members agreed to increase their contribution of long-range civilian cargo and passenger airplanes in the event that the United States was engaged in an crisis outside Nato; several Nato members, including the Federal Republic of Germany, agreed to increase their defense in the Nato area and give the United States overflight and base rights in connection with possible operations in South West Asia; the French and British strengthened their own rapid reaction forces for deployment outside Nato and maintained their forces in the Indian Ocean; many Nato members, including countries that had not engaged in out-of-area issues after World War II (Italy), participated in multilateral peace-keeping missions in Lebanon (Multilateral Force - MNF and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon - UNIFIL) and in Sinai (Multilateral Force and Observers - MFO); some nations, like the Federal Republic of Germany, agreed to extend economic support to Greece, Turkey, Portugal and even Pakistan, in order to strengthen the defense at Nato's South-East border. All these measures illustrated a new readiness to take the out-of-area challenge seriously and to take concrete steps to meet the challenge, short of a collective Nato policy.[219]

Still, this did not satisfy the Americans, and a new round of the burden-sharing debate began. Members of Congress said that the American contribution to the defense of Europe could be reduced if the Europeans were not prepared to assume greater responsibility in the defense of Western interests in South West Asia or to compensate sufficiently for this within the Nato area. Europe could not «have it both ways».[220]

The disagreement stemmed from fundamental differences, especially regarding perceptions of threat and the application of means. In general, the European allies (with the exception of the United Kingdom, which was

closer to the American view than the other European allies) were not happy that the United States constantly tried to get Nato engaged in out-of-area operations. In addition, they felt that the United States was far too concerned with military solutions at the cost of diplomatic ones. They also felt that the Americans too readily and mistakenly saw local and regional conflicts in an East-West perspective and placed excessive emphasis on the domino effect and credibility, and thus contributed towards polarizing such conflicts. They were much more concerned than the Americans that the arms control dialogue with the Soviet Union and détente in general should not be jeopardized. Their economic interests in pursuing the process of détente were greater than Washington's and they were reluctant to join Washington in their sanctions against Moscow. In fact, some West European countries increased their trade with the Soviet Union and in effect «picked up the slack in American trade». West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, said in 1980 that «We will not permit ten years of détente and defence policy to be destroyed.» The overriding fear, however, was that the United States would drag Europe into a conflict it had nothing to do with, and possibly trigger a war in Europe.[221]

The reluctance among politicians to involve Nato in out-of-area issues was sometimes frustrating for Nato's military planners. Especially the increased Soviet maritime build-up during the 1970s caused concern. Some measures had indeed been implemented. In 1972, for example, the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) was given authorization to plan how to protect commercial shipping in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. Still, many officers continued to worry. In May 1979, the Norwegian Chairman of the Nato Military Committee from 1977-1980, General Herman F. Zeiner Gundersen, noted that, since open lines of communication were vital, the fact that Nato countries did not control the situation south of the Tropic of Cancer was a weakness. His concern was probably not diminished by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. One of Nato's top ranking military officials, Admiral Günther Luther, wondered whether Nato should consider using naval forces also outside the geographic Nato area. He assumed that this would be welcomed by

cooperating countries. It is not yet possible to tell the extent to which military officials gained support for these views from political leaders, as the material is not available.[222]

### The alternative to an out-of-area policy in the 1980s

Even though the results of the American attempts to get Nato more involved in out-of-area issues in the early 1980s did not match American ambitions, developments later in the decade showed that there had been some change in Nato's non-policy on out-of-area issues. More striking, however, is the continuation of the traditional alternative to Nato's non-policy on out-of-area issues: the ad-hoc, informal, bilateral cooperation, often of a low-scale military nature, between individual Nato powers. This type of cooperation was quite visible and seemed to work well in the 1980s. One example of this was the Falklands War between the United Kingdom and Argentina in 1982; another case was allied cooperation in the Persian Gulf during the Iraqi-Iranian war. But this kind of cooperation required some common understanding of the potential threat of the out-of-area issue in question. In cases where perceptions of threat, interests or ideology clashed, however, cooperation was not easy. Libya is a case in point.

The Reagan administration was in general positive towards Argentina. It regarded the country as a good ally against the Soviet Union and especially suited to containing the Soviets in the South Atlantic. The amicable relationship between the United States and Argentina was probably one reason why Argentine generals did not think that Washington would interfere if they invaded the Falklands, which they did in April 1982. Immediately, and without consulting their Nato allies, the British dispatched a task force to protect their compatriots. At first, the United States did not interfere, and declared itself neutral. This angered London, which expected that Washington would support an ally which was confronted with outright aggression from another country. The British were appeased, however, by the substantial unofficial American support.

In reality, the British got almost everything they wanted, such as sidewinder rockets, airplane fuel, airport mats, mortar shells, and intelligence information. The Americans even filled in the holes in Nato defense of the North Atlantic area as a result of the British action in the South Atlantic. What the British did not receive, however, was official support and combat troops. The main reason for this was worries in Pentagon that the United Kingdom would actually lose the war. If the British were to lose the war, it would be a terrible blow also to those who supported them, included Nato. Another fear was that British war efforts would drain too much from Nato's defense in Europe. Approximately 70 per cent of the British Navy was active in the war against Argentina. There was also a danger that the Soviet Union would use the opportunity to gain influence in the South Atlantic. The Americans remained formally neutral until the Argentine generals turned down a peace proposal from the American Secretary of State in late April 1982. Washington then started to support London officially. Washington's fears that the United Kingdom would not win the war were soon proved to be unwarranted. When the British task force finally reached the Falklands at the end of May, the war was quickly over: Argentina surrendered in the middle of June.[223]

Most of the other Nato allies supported the United Kingdom with reference to a United Nations Resolution that demanded that Argentina withdraw from the Falklands. Belgium and France even helped the British by providing fighter-training for British airmen. Only Spain, the newcomer to Nato, with its traditional links to Latin America, did not support London. The British several times expressed their gratitude in Nato for the individual support given by Nato allies.[224]

Washington had for a long time been concerned about Soviet intentions and capabilities in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. From the late 1960s and through the 1970s and 1980s, there had been a massive Soviet naval build-up in the Indian Ocean, and Moscow acquired access to naval facilities in Aden, Somalia, and Mauritius. The United States tried to counter this with a substantial increase in its military presence in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region. Moreover, President Carter issued his

famous doctrine revealing the seriousness with which the United States viewed Soviet intrusion and instability in this vital region.[225]

Consequently, the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s caused deep concern in Washington. It also became clear that Western interests were directly affected by the conflict. After several shooting episodes against Kuwaiti oil-tankers, and against Western commercial and military vessels in 1986-87, the United States decided to take action by escorting Western ships and to reflag Kuwaiti ships with American flags. Washington made a futile attempt to get Nato involved in this; several allies were willing to make a contribution, but only as long as it was on a national basis. The Netherlands, however, managed to achieve some coordination under the Western European Union (WEU) umbrella. Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and even Italy agreed to cooperate in a protection scheme in the Persian Gulf. The Federal Republic of Germany also participated indirectly by assuming greater responsibility for the Western part of the Mediterranean (Nato area). Norway, which was not a WEU member, also volunteered to compensate for allied contributions in the Persian Gulf by increasing its presence in the English Channel. By the autumn of 1987, individual Nato members had together assembled the largest concentration of Nato naval units (approximately 80 ships) since the Korean War. Nato, though not formally involved, was thus in reality conducting an out-of-area operation. In a way, this was confirmed early in 1988, when six Nato countries with forces in the region established an informal joint command for minesweeping. Moreover, at a meeting in spring of 1988, five Nato countries decided to improve the cooperation in the Persian Gulf in order to avoid overlapping. Albeit informally, even France participated. As long as Nato was not formally involved, France was quite willing to cooperate on military matters. It was stated that each country should only protect its own forces in the Persian Gulf, but the United States on one occasion protected a Danish supertanker (Denmark did not have military forces in the region) and it was unlikely that other naval units in the war zone would have just sat idle if an allied ship had been attacked. This kind of ad-hoc, bilateral and mostly informal military

cooperation was regarded as a quite plausible way to operate, given the political reluctance to cooperate formally under the auspices of Nato.[226]

In the Persian Gulf, allied interests and perception of threat seemed to converge. Consequently, an informal cooperation was possible. In other instances, diverging interests and perception of threat made cooperation impossible. Several American clashes with Libya confirm this. In 1981, Libya made claims on the Gulf of Sidra, outside the shores of Libya. The United States could not accept this and took action against Colonel Muhammar al-Qaddafi. Libya retaliated by firing missiles against the Italian island of Lampedusa (ironically since Italy had denied United States overflight rights and access to Italian bases for its attacks against Libya). The missiles did not hit the island, but since this was a near attack on Nato territory as a consequence of unilateral American military action against the recommendation of other Nato members, it created havoc in Nato. Washington and Rome also clashed over the so-called Achille Lauro affair in 1983, in which terrorists hijacked an Italian cruise-liner. This time the Italians protested against the American use of Italian bases for action in a non-Nato issue. And finally, in 1986, the United States again attacked Libya, this time after a series of terrorist attacks Washington believed were staged by Libya's leader, Qaddafi. American airplanes based in the United Kingdom and on vessels in the Mediterranean bombed Libyan cities, killing several Libyans. Again Nato allies, most notably France, disapproved of the attack.[227]

## Conclusion

In the early 1960s the United States changed its mind and decided that it was necessary to engage Nato in out-of-area issues, primarily due to a changing perception of threat. The United States had been aware of the Soviet and communist threat in the Third World earlier, but was convinced that it was becoming more serious and, if unchecked, could eventually threaten the Nato area. Prior to the 1960s, the United States had only departed from its non-policy on out-of-area issues when Washington felt it

was necessary for the defense of the Nato area. The initial support for France in Indochina, the sympathy with British attempts to position the West in the Middle East, the advocation of Spain's inclusion in Nato, and the eagerness to link Yugoslavia with Nato, are all examples of this.

The new communist threat from the early 1960s, highlighted by Soviet involvement in Cuba, communist advances in Asia, Africa and not the least in the Middle East, was thought to be of a different nature than previously, and in certain ways more serious than the threat to Europe. In reality, it could then be argued that the Americans did not «reverse» their policy, but only adapted it to what they saw as a new threat.

But why, then, call on the Nato allies in this situation? Why not let the Europeans take care of their own defense and take on the new threat alone? After all, the Americans had assumed considerable responsibilities of behalf of the West before. Now, however, Washington believed that this was no longer possible. The hard economic facts were that the United States became less economically powerful, in relative terms, vis-à-vis its European partners in the 1960s. Thus, many policy-makers in Washington began to advocate that the United States should encourage its Nato partners to assume more responsibilities outside the Nato area. The lack of success can be explained by many factors. An important one was that the new Nato strategy, flexible response, demanded increased defense efforts from all Nato allies within Europe, and left little room for additional expenditure. The result of these American demands, therefore, was not a common Nato policy, but rather endless «burden-sharing» debates from the end of the 1960s, through the 1970s and into the 1980s.

However, economy was not the principal reason why the allies responded negatively to the American calls for engagement out-of-area. The differences in interests and perceptions of threat were more decisive. And as none of the parties were willing to press the issue for the sake of maintaining cohesion regarding Nato's main mission, Nato did not change its non-policy. The two important exceptions to this -

Cuba in the early 1960s and Afghanistan in the early 1980s - are largely explained by the direct Soviet involvement in these conflicts. As long as events in Cuba were seen as Western hemisphere business, Washington's allies were not willing to compromise Nato's non-policy. It was only after it became evident that the Soviets were directly involved that Washington's allies were willing to implement certain measures which in reality compromised Nato's non-policy. Again, with regard to Afghanistan, when it was evident that the Soviets were responsible for this out-of-area crisis, the Nato allies felt that Nato had to take a stance. Thus, it seems that the only out-of-area issues to be recognized by all allies as a Nato concern, were those with a clear-cut connection to Nato's primary task, to defend the Nato area from Soviet aggression. And even in such instances, Nato was cautious in its involvement.

This restrictive attitude as to what constituted a threat to Nato did create considerable resentment in Washington and bitter struggles in Nato. However, by largely maintaining its non-policy, Nato avoided getting involved in controversies in the Third World, dispersing even more resources than Nato already did as a result of American engagements out-of-area, and undermining cohesion regarding the main area of concern - the North Atlantic area.

Besides, the alternative to a common Nato policy, the ad-hoc, bilateral, and mostly informal military cooperation between those with interests in a specific issue outside of Nato, seemed to work quite well. The Falklands War and the war between Iran and Iraq were examples that preempted the «coalition of the willing» formula that became so fashionable after the Cold War. The rationale behind the idea was almost as old as Nato itself. American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, laid out the fundamental principles of this idea already in the early 1950s, when he reassured the smaller Nato allies that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey would not mean additional responsibilities for them; only those with major interests in the newly extended area and other areas outside Nato should contribute to its

defense. What the other members could do, however, was to contribute to the common cause by taking on increased responsibility within the Nato area, which is exactly what they did as a result of the big out-of-area debates in the 1980s.[228]

# Conclusions

A prominent Nato expert has stated that «NATO has meticulously avoided adopting a formal out-of-area strategy.»[229] This study confirms that statement. We have seen that, by and large, during the Cold War Nato decided to have a restrictive geographical scope, by limiting the number of members, by focusing on immediate threats to the Nato area, and by having a non-policy regarding out-of-area issues. But this attitude was not evident from the beginning, and there were to be some exceptions later on.

In Nato's first years, exceptions to the generally restrictive view of Nato's geographical scope were the admission of Italy and Algeria, the inclusion of Greece and Turkey, Nato's involvement in the Indochina issue and its support of various British initiatives in the Middle East. All these cases, however, were closely related to the European security dimension, either because France's willingness and ability to contribute to Western defense was conditional on support for these issues, or because they were related to the defense of Nato's South-East border, in an out-of-area region of particular importance to Nato, as it was adjacent to Nato, very volatile, and contained vital oil resources. But these exceptions, especially the Indochina issue, had substantial repercussions for Nato. By meddling in clearly out-of-area issues, Nato opened up a can of worms of diverging interests, perceptions of threat and ideology. Many Nato countries became increasingly critical of France's actions, and some experienced serious trouble in domestic arenas. The result was that Nato became more protective of its non-policy on out-of-area issues in the years that followed. The Suez crisis is a case in point. By not supporting the United Kingdom and France when they got into trouble in an out-of-area issue, Nato got itself into trouble, but probably gained more by avoiding involvement in this controversial affair and thereby not alienating anti-colonial members of the alliance. Involvement could have created more

trouble for Nato than that experienced by the organization, as it could have undermined cohesion regarding the defense of the North Atlantic area.

Exceptions to the non-policy that occurred in the later years varied but shared one common trait with the earlier exceptions: they were all closely related to the North Atlantic security dimension. One type of exception was when two allies fought over an out-of-area issue. In the case of Cyprus, Nato hoped that the two countries would find a peaceful solution themselves, but when this proved not to be the case, Nato felt obliged to try to solve the matter, for the sake of Nato cohesion regarding its main mission. A second type of exception, for example the Cuban and Afghanistan affairs, is also explained by concern for the Nato area. In both cases Nato departed from its non-policy because of clear acts of aggression by the Soviet Union. A third kind of exception was when a Nato member successfully used its assets to defend the North Atlantic area in order to obtain benefits in an out-of-area issue. This happened, for example, when the United States backed down in its criticism of Portugal's colonial policy, because Portugal threatened to deny the Americans the use of their bases on the Azores.

As this study has tried to demonstrate, the above-mentioned cases were all exceptions. The main policy was that of not having one. The fundamental reason for this was that beyond the consensus on trying to protect the Nato area from Soviet aggression, the various members' interests, perception of threat, and ideology differed too much to facilitate a common policy on other issues. What, then, were the interests, perceptions of threat, and ideology that prohibited a Nato policy on out-of-area issues throughout the Cold War?

The United States, as one of two superpowers, had *global interests* and perceived the threats accordingly. In principle, throughout the entire Cold War period, Washington wanted to contain the Soviet Union all over the world. Until the early 1960s, however, they were averse to using Nato in this global struggle, and instead insisted that the organization should focus on Europe. There were three main reasons for this. First, they regarded the Soviet threat towards Europe as far more serious than the Soviet threat

elsewhere. Accordingly, Western efforts and resources should be concentrated on Europe. Second, Nato resources - collectively and individually - were regarded to be so meager that it would be unwise to commit them outside Europe. Third, the Americans were declared anti-colonialists and sought to minimize «guilt by association» by refusing to take part in colonial struggles. They were, as they saw it, already too closely associated simply by being allied to the colonial powers. The balancing act between being brothers in arms in some aspects of foreign policy and enemies in others was not easy and led to bitter disputes between the United States and the colonial powers.

In the early 1960s, these three factors changed. Washington now believed that the Soviet threat had changed its focus from Europe to the Third World, that its European allies had recovered sufficiently after World War II to use more resources in the global fight against the Soviet Union, and that the colonial stain on the major European powers' foreign policy had faded with time. Consequently, they wanted Nato to be more involved in out-of-area issues.

Prior to the early 1960s, the colonial powers had *primarily regional* interests, though the United Kingdom did also have a global outlook. Beyond their homelands, they focused mainly on regions were they had colonies. Whether it was the case or not, they often portrayed their opponents in their colonial struggles as communists aided by the Soviets. Thus, they maintained that these regional threats were in effect global and closely connected to Nato's main mission. Consequently, Nato allies should support them in their out-of-area struggles. However, when their colonial interests diminished from the 1960s on, they primarily focused on their homelands, and consequently were negative when the Americans then advocated Nato involvement in out-of-area issues (with the exception of the United Kingdom, which generally was more inclined than the other former colonial powers to side with the United States).

Nato allies that were neither superpowers nor colonial powers primarily had *local interests* throughout the Cold War and consequently were most worried about the Soviet threat to them: the Scandinavian powers and

Canada were concerned about the Soviet threat to the Northern Flank and Northern sea lanes; the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Greece and Turkey were concerned about the Central and Southern Flanks. In addition, most of these countries were also ideologically averse to colonialism. Moreover, when the United States wanted to step up the war on communism and alleged Soviet adventurism all over the world from the early 1960s, many of these countries - which were now even joined by some of the former colonial powers - found this not only unwise, but also morally difficult to support. The Scandinavian powers in particular had problems, not least due to domestic opinion and their respective parliaments. They constantly faced a dilemma between defense imperatives on the one hand, and ideology on the other. In terms of security, they were dependent on the major powers taking on global responsibilities in defense of the West, but in terms of ideology, they did not like the power politics that this implied.

The differences in interests, perceptions of threat, and ideology are, however, insufficient in explaining Nato's non-policy on out-of-area issues. As all Nato's major powers at some point wanted a common Nato policy in different out-of-area issues, it would be reasonable to expect that they would have pushed harder to have their views accepted in Nato. But, with a few exceptions, they did not. Why? Primarily because this could have created trouble in relation to achieving Nato's main mission, defending the Nato area from Soviet aggression. Instead, the Western countries chose to deal with out-of-area issues outside Nato on an ad-hoc, informal, bilateral, and quite often low-scale military basis, according to a «coalition of the willing» formula.

All this was to be very different after the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact dissolved and Nato's declared enemies thereby disappeared. Now, Nato had to think about its raison d'être, and out-of-area issues were suddenly at the center of Nato attention.

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## Abbreviations

AFSOUTH - Allied Forces Southern Europe
Amb. - Ambassador
APAG - Atlantic Policy Advisory Group for long-term studies and world problems
CENTO - Central Treaty Organization
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
DEFE - Defence
delNato - delegation to Nato
EDC/E.D.C. - European Defense Community
emb[capital] - embassy in [capital]
FD - Forsvarsdepartementet [the Norwegian Ministry of Defence]
FLN - Front de Libération Nationale [Algeria]
FM - Foreign Minister
FNLA - National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FO - Foreign Office
FRUS - Foreign Relations of the United States
GNP - Gross national product
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
MC - Military Committee
MEC - Middle East Command
MEDO - Middle East Defense Organization
Memo. - Memorandum
Memo. of con. - Memorandum of conversation
MFO - Multilateral Force and Observers [in Sinai]
MNF - Multilateral Force [in Lebanon]
MPLA - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NAC - North Atlantic Council
NARA - National Archives and Records Administration (the United States)
Nato/NATO/N.A.T.O. - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC - National Security Council
OAS - Organization of American States

OEEC - Organization for European Economic Cooperation
PRO - Public Record Office (the United Kingdom)
RDF - Rapid Deployment Force
RG - Record Group
SACEUR - Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT - Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
Sec. of Def. - Secretary of Defense/Defence
Sec. of State - Secretary of State
SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
State [only in footnotes] - Department of State
SWAIS - South West Asia Implementation Study
UD - Utenriksdepartementet [the Norwegian Foreign Office]
UK/U.K. - United Kingdom
UNIFIL - United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNITA - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
US/U.S. - United States
WEU - Western European Union

## Notes

[1]*PRO, FO 371/102350, memo. of con., FM and Dutch FM, 31 January 1952.*
[2]*On this point, see also Lundestad 1998, esp. pp. 256-57.*
[3]*Nato 1989, p. 377.*
[4]*Except the formal inclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, as the country in effect was part of Nato area already in 1949, by way of reference to «occupation forces of any of the Parties» in Article 6 of the Treaty. (Nato 1989, p. 377.)*
[5]*FRUS, 1948/3, p. 240.*
[6]*Kaplan 1984.*
[7]*Gaddis 1989, p. 263.*
[8]*FRUS, 1948/3, pp. 3-6, 59-61. Sherwood 1990, p. 8. Sverdrup 1996, p. 287.*
[9]*Kaplan 1994, p. 24.*
[10]*Parts of the Congress and the JCS were generally skeptical to issuing a security guarantee outside the Western Hemisphere because of limited American resources, fear of over-extension and a lingering suspicion that the militarily weak European nations were exploiting American resources. But during the summer of 1948, the «Atlanticists» in the State Department, among them John Hickerson and Theodore Achilles, prevailed (Kaplan 1985, pp. 107-116; Kaplan 1984, ch. 5).*
[11]*FRUS, 1948/3, pp. 164-65, 211, 215-16, 240-42 (all quotations). Kaplan 1985, pp. 115-16. Even though the most important reasons for including the «link» countries were of a strategic and geographical nature, they were not the only ones. In addition, the Truman administration hoped to avoid arguments from isolationist congressmen that the planned alliance was a purely European affair. It was therefore necessary to convince the Congress that an eventual considerable American commitment was in the national interest of the United States (Kaplan 1984, pp. 42, 78).*
[12]*Ingimundarson 1999, pp. 25-31 (quotation on p. 30).*
[13]*Sverdrup 1996, part III, ch. 5-6.*
[14]*PRO, FO 371/89992, embWashington to FO, 30 December 1949. Kaplan 1984, p. 109. Nogueira 1985, pp. 90-93.*
[15]*FRUS, 1948/3, pp. 164-65, 240-42.*
[16]*FRUS, 1949/4, p. 142.*
[17]*Kaplan 1984, pp. 1-13. Lafeber 1989, p. 462.*
[18]*FRUS, 1948/3, pp. 45-46. Kaplan 1984, pp. 61-62.*
[19]*FRUS, 1948/3, p. 107.*
*20 FRUS, 1948/3, pp. 164-65.*

[21]*Acheson 1969, p. 279.*
[22]*FRUS, 1948/3, pp. 203-04, 227-28; 1949/4, pp. 13-14, 28.*
[23]*FRUS, 1949/4, pp. 27-32.*
[24]*Sherwood 1990, p. 18.*
[25]*FRUS, 1949/4, pp. 27-32, 43-44, 53, 122-35, 141-45. Acheson 1969, p. 279.*
[26]*FRUS, 1948/3, pp. 324-27 (all quotations).*
[27]*FRUS, 1949/4, p. 131.*
[28]*FRUS, 1949/4, pp. 11-12.*
[29]*PRO, DEFE 7/743, Sir Laithwaite to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 15 May 1950; texts concerning Ireland's Position in relation to Nato, 31 May 1950. FRUS, 1949/4, p. 15; 1948/3, pp. 71, 179.*
[30]*FRUS, 1948/3, p. 205. Nato 1989, p. 377 (quotation).*
[31]*FRUS, 1948/3, p. 65. Kaplan 1985, p. 111.*
[32]*FRUS, 1948/3, p. 103; 1949/4, p. 62. Sherwood 1990, pp. 21-24.*
[33]*FRUS, 1948/3, pp. 204-05.*
[34]*Hahn 1991, p. 110.*
[35]*FRUS, 1948/3, pp. 226-27, 240-42, 332. Sherwood 1990, pp. 13-14. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 31-34.*
[36]*FRUS, 1948/3, pp. 66-67, 180-81 (quotation on p. 181); 1949/4, p. 119.*
[37]*FRUS, 1948/3, pp. 65, 87, 103, 108, 203-04.*
[38]*FRUS, 1948/3, pp. 163, 179, 202-03, 205 (quotation on p. 163); 1949/4, pp. 181-82. Kaplan 1984, pp. 51, 136.*
[39]*FRUS, 1948/3, pp. 65-67, 204, 329-31, 342 (quotation on p. 331); 1949/4, p. 9.*
[40]*FRUS, 1948/3, pp. 87, 332; 1949/4, pp. 62, 117-20, 175-76, 234-36 (quotations on p. 175). Acheson 1969, p. 279. Kaplan 1984, pp. 141-42. Sherwood 1990, pp. 21-23.*
[41]*FRUS, 1949/4, pp. 237, 244 (quotation on p. 244).*
[42]*FRUS 1948/3, pp. 44, 241-42, 284-88, 331-32 (quotation on p. 242); 1949/4, p. 9.*
[43]*Sherwood, 1990, pp. 14-16. Nato 1989, p. 376 (quotation).*
[44]*Stueck 1995, pp. 41-43. Gaddis 1982, pp. 109-17. Gaddis 1997, pp. 70-84. Acheson 1969, pp. 405-407.*
[45]*Shaller 1997, ch. 2.*
[46]*Acheson 1969, pp. 436, 443.*
[47]*Kaplan 1994, pp. 41-49.*
[48]*NARA, RG 59, 740.5, embParis to State, 24 April 1953.*
[49]*Acheson 1969, p. 416-418 (quotation on p. 416). Stueck 1995, pp. 50-51.*
[50]*Foot 1986, pp. 49-50. Stueck 1995, pp. 66-67.*
[51]*Stueck 1995, pp. 133-34.*

[52]Stueck 1995, p. 239. This became even more pronounced after Winston Chirchill became Prime Minister in 1951 (Acheson 1969, pp. 596, 599).
[53]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo. with attachment, August 14, 1950. Stueck 1995, pp. 172-73, 192.
[54]LaFeber 1989, p. 473 (quotation). Villaume 1995, pp. 630-31, 634.
[55]Eriksen/Pharo 1997, pp. 51-53. Villaume 1995, pp. 635-36.
[56]Kaplan 1984, pp. 150-51.
[57]Skogrand 1994, ch. 7. Stueck 1995, pp. 57-58, 73-74. The Pentagon also agreed as too many small contigents would compromise efficiency in the field (Stueck 1995, pp. 57-58).
[58] Acheson 1969, pp. 445, 451-68. Foot 1986, pp. 43-44. Leffler 1992, p. 399. Stueck 1995, pp. 63, 88-96, 111-19.
[59]Foot 1986, pp. 46-52. Leffler 1992, p. 399. Stueck 1995, pp. 131-38 (quotation on p. 135).
[60]Foot 1986, p. 53-57 (quotation on p. 53). Stueck 1995, pp. 148-57, 188-89.
[61]Stueck 1995, ch. 6-9, esp. pp. 298-303, 320-25 (quotation on p. 322).
[62]Stueck 1995, pp. 181-82, 184-85, 188.
[63]Stueck 1995, p. 239.
[64]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo. of con., Turkish Ambassador and Under Secretary of State, Webb, 27 April 1950; memo., 1 May, 1950; embOslo to State, 8 August 1950 and 3 September 1951. PRO, FO 371/96319, visit of FM to Nato meeting, 15-20 September 1951. UD, 33.2/5-7, minutes with attachment, Nato meeting, September 1951; memo. of con., FMs Lange and Acheson , 17 September 1951. FRUS, 1948/3, pp. 4, 87, 203-04; 1949/4, pp. 14, 125, 117-20. Acheson 1969, p. 570 (quotation). Villaume 1995, p. 665.
[65]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo., 1 May 1950 (quotation); memo. with attachment, 14 August 1950; embMoscow to State, 31 August 1950; Sec. of Def. to Sec. of State with attachment (JCS memo., 9 September 1950), 11 September 1950; Sec. of State to Sec. of Def., 31 August 1950. Leffler 1985, pp. 820-21.
[66]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo. with attachment, 14 August 1950. Kaplan 1994, p. 47. Leffler 1985, p. 821.
[67]Acheson 1969, p. 570. Kaplan 1984, p. 167. Leffler 1985, pp. 820-22.
[68]Hahn 1991, p. 112. Leffler 1985, pp. 823-24. Stueck 1995, p. 200.
[69]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, JCS to Sec. of Def., 14 September 1951; Sec. of Def. to Sec. of State with attachment, 18 September 1951.
[70]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, preparations for Nato meeting, 14 September 1951.
[71]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, embOslo to State, 3 September 1951; preparations for Nato meeting, 13 September 1951. PRO, FO 371/96312, delNato to FO, 26 July 1951; FO 371/96316, Liesching to Sir Strang, with copy of letter from Clutterbuck, 29

*September 1951 (quotations no. 3-4); FO 371/96319, visit of FM to Nato meeting, 15-20 September 1951. UD, 33.2/5-7, minutes with attachments, Nato meeting, September 1951 (quotation no. 2). Acheson 1969, pp. 569-70 (quotation no. 1 on p. 569). Eriksen/Pharo 1997, pp. 46-47. Villaume 1995, pp. 652-76.*

[72]*Acheson 1969, p. 484.*

[73]*NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memos (two), 15 April 1959 (quotation in memo. from Becker to Merchant).*

[74]*Regarding the third argument, alliance theorist Glenn H. Snyder notes that «formal alliance commitments usually have a political penumbra, or «halo», extending beyond the narrow contingency (e.g., attack by an enemy state) which activates the commitment to military assistance. Allies expect their partners to support them on a variety of issues short of war, including diplomatic crisis, even though there is nothing in the alliance treaty requiring it.» (Snyder 1997, p. 8).*

[75]*Kaplan 1990, p. 232.*

[76]*Stuart/Tow 1990, esp. pp. 3-20.*

[77]*Gaddis 1982, pp. 40-41, 57-60.*

[78] *Acheson 1969, p. 257 (quotation). McMahon 1989, pp. 349-51. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 67-68, 270-71.*

[79]*Sherwood 1990, p. 31.*

[80]*NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo., 10 January 1950.*

[81]*Immerman 1990.*

[82]*PRO, FO 371/102291, visit of FM to Paris and Rome, part II: NAC, 21-28 November 1951.*

[83]*Kaplan 1990, p. 230. See also Harrison 1981, ch. 1.*

[84]*NARA, RG 59, 611.51G, aide memoire, 28 April 1950.*

[85]*Immerman 1990. Kolko 1988, p. 33. Leffler 1992, pp. 380-83.*

[86]*Césari 1990, p. 53.*

[87]*NARA, RG 59, 740.5, French General de Lattre de Tassigny's Speech to the National Press Club in Washington, 20 September 1951 (quotation no. 1); memo. of con., French official Daridan and Bohlen, 7 February 1952. PRO, FO 371/96413, memo. of con., Eisenhower and Churchill, 18 December 1951; FO 371/102291, visit of FM to Paris and Rome, part II: NAC, 21-28 November 1951 (quotation no. 2); FO 371/102293, visit of FM to Nato meeting in Lisbon, Part I, 20-26 February 1952. UD, 33.2/5-8, minutes, Nato meeting, 24-28 November 1951, 11 December 1951. Sherwood 1990, p. 40.*

[88]*Lundestad 1999, p. 63.*

[89]*Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 196-97.*

[90]*Nato undated I, pp. 74-75.*

[91] UD, 33.2/5-10, minutes, Nato meeting, 15-18 December 1952.
[92] PRO, FO 371/107904, delNato to FO, 16 December 1952.
[93] PRO, FO 371/102358, memo. of con., Dixon and Alphand, 27 November 1952 (quotation no. 1); FO 371/102359, delNato to FO, 9 December 1952 (quotation no. 2).
[94] NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo., 11 December 1952 (quotation). Kaplan 1990, p. 234.
[95] NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo., 17 December 1952. Eriksen/Pharo 1997, pp. 181-82. Villaume 1995, pp. 687-92.
[96] New York Times, 18 December 1952.
[97] Washington Post, 23 December 1952.
[98] UD, 33.2/5-10, vol. 1 and 2, several newspaper articles on the Danish and Norwegian debate regarding the Indochina Resolution; 33.2/5-11, FO to delNato, 20 February 1953; delNato to FO, 26 February 1953; 33.2/5-13, delNato to FO, 24 March 1954. Eriksen/Pharo 1997, p. 182. Villaume 1995, pp. 692-99.
[99] NARA, RG59, 611.51G, JCS to the Sec. of Def, 28 November 1950 (quotations); memo. with annex, 26 September 1950; embRangoon to State with memo. (14 December), 15 December, 1950.
[100] Herring 1990 (quotation on p. 30). Herring/Immerman 1990, pp. 96-97.
[101] NARA, RG 59, 651.51G, State to embParis, 8 April 1954; memo. of con., Sec. of State and Bidault, 14 April 1954. Herring/Immerman 1990, pp. 86, 89, 94. Immerman 1990. Warner 1990, pp. 73-74.
[102] FRUS, 1948/1 (part 2), p. 512.
[103] Hahn 1991.
[104] Brands 1994, p. xii. Hahn 1991, p. 102. Leffler 1992, pp. 361-69 (quotation on p. 366).
[105] PRO, FO 371/96319, visit of FM to Nato meeting, 15-20 September 1951, document 6 (quotation). Sherwood 1990, pp. 61-62.
[106] Kaplan/Clawson 1985, pp. 5-9.
[107] NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo. with attachment, 6 February 1952. Hahn 1991, p. 112. Kaplan/Clawson 1985, pp. 5-9.
[108] Hahn 1991, ch. 5 and pp. 102-112.
[109] Acheson 1969, pp. 563-64. Hahn 1991, pp. 109-30.
[110] NARA, RG 59, 740.5, preparations for Nato meeting, 14 September 1951. PRO, FO 371/96319, visit of FM to Nato meeting, 15-20 September 1951; 371/96317, document provided by Rose on agenda for Rome meeting, 24 October 1951. Hahn 1991, pp. 122-30. Leffler 1992, p. 425. Villaume 1995, p. 664.
[111] Hahn 1991, ch. 7-8.

*[112]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo., 11 July 1955 (quotations). PRO, FO 371/107909, delNato to FO, 27 May 1953. Gaddis 1982, pp. 152-54. Hahn 1991, ch. 8. Stuart/ Tow 1990, p. 52.*
*[113]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo., 11 July 1955. UD, 33.2/5-23, minutes, Nato meeting, December 1956. Sherwood 1990, p. 65 (quotation). Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 52-53.*
*[114]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo. of con. Italian FM Pella and the Sec. of State, 6 December 1957; memo., 10 December 1957; memo. of con., Iranian and American officials, 11 December 1957; State to embassies in Lima, Buenos Aires and Mexico, 11 December 1957; embParis to State, 12 December 1956; embParis to State, 10 April 1959; embTeheran to State, 16 November 1959; State to embRome, 16 November 1959; 375, embParis to State, 23 January 1963; NATO 7, State to several, 14 March 1963. PRO, FO 371/146300, delNato to FO (annual review 1958), 24 February 1959. UD, 33.2/5-23, minutes, Nato meeting, December 1956; minutes, Nato meeting, February 1957; 33.2/5-24, memo., Nato meeting, 2-3 May 1957; 33.2/5-25 (II), memo., 2 December 1957; embAnakara to FO, 5 December 1957; embLondon to FO, 6 December 1957; 33.2/5-25 (IV), memo., January 1958; minutes, Nato meeting, January 1958. Stuart/Tow 1990, p. 141. Villaume 1995, pp. 727-29, 741.*
*[115]Lesch 1992. Little 1994, pp. 530-31. Villaume 1995, p. 727.*
*[116]Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 58-59.*
*[117]Little 1994, pp. 524-26.*
*[118]Hahn 1991, pp. 211-12 (quotation no. 2). Little 1994, pp. 524-26. Sherwood 1990, p. 69, 74 (quotation no. 1 on p. 69). Stuart/Tow 1990, p. 59.*
*[119]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, State to embParis, 31 October 1956 (quotations no. 1 and 2). Hahn 1991, p. 218. Sherwood 1990, pp. 72-77 (quotations no. 3 and 4 on p. 77). Stuart/Tow 1990, p. 60.*
*[120]Hahn 1991, pp. 226-27. Richardson 1996, p. 69.*
*[121]Hahn 1991, pp. 224, 227-30 (quotation on p. 229). Little 1994, pp. 525-26.*
*[122]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, embCopenhagen to State, 9 November 1956; embParis to State, 9 November 1956; embOttawa to State, 11 November 1956; embOslo to State, 11 December 1956. UD, 33.2/5-23, delNato to FO, 18 December 1956; minutes, Nato meeting, February 1957.*
*[123]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, embParis to State, 10 November 1956; embParis to State, 11 December 1956 (two documents); embOslo to State, 11 December 1956 (quotations); embParis to State, 12 December 1956 (three documents); embParis to State, 13 December 1956 (three documents). PRO, FO 371/131024, annual review of events concerning NATO for 1956, 23 January 1957. UD, 33.2/5-23, delNato to*

*FO, 18 December 1956; minutes, Nato meeting, February 1957.*
[124]*NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo., 9 December 1952; memo., 17 December 1952. PRO, FO 371/107905, briefs, Nato meeting, 23 April 1953.*
[125]*NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo., 9 December 1952. PRO, FO 371/107905, briefs, Nato meeting, 23 April 1953; FO 371/107911, delNato to FO, 20 November 1953 (quotations); delNato to FO, 25 November 1953. UD, 33.2/5-12, memo. of con., Danish and Norwegian FMs and Def. Mins, 5 December 1953; 33.2/5-13, Danish memo. of con., Danish and Norwegian FMs and Def. Mins., 13 April 1954; 33.2/5-21, Boyesen to Lange, 9 April 1956.*
[126]*NARA, RG 59, 740.5, State to embParis, 20 December 1954.*
[127]*NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo., 1 May 1956; embParis to State, 5 May 1956. UD, 33.2/5-20, delNato to FO, 17 December 1955; minutes, Nato meeting, February 1956; 33.2/5-21, delNato to FO, 7 April 1956. Villaume 1995, p. 756 (quotation).*
[128]*For this and the preceeding paragraph: NARA, RG 59, 740.5, Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Co-operation in NATO, 14 December 1956 (quotations on pp. 3, 5, 7, 9, 10).*
[129]*NARA, RG 59, 740.5, Dulles' Speech at Nato meeting, 12 December 1956.*
[130]*NARA, RG 59, 740.5, Dulles to Latin American Ambassadors, 21 December 1956 (quotation). PRO, FO 371/131028, Caccia to Hoyer Millar, 25 November 1957; Steel to Hoyar Millar, 10 December 1957.*
[131]*PRO, FO 371/124794, memo. (Nato meeting, 4-5 May 1956; DEFE 7/1617, FO to delNato, 12 October 1956; delNato to FO, 19 October 1956 (quotations). Berdal 1997, pp. 97-101.*
[132]*PRO, DEFE 7/1617, delNato to FO, 1 December 1956. UD, 33.2/5-21, memo., 4-5 May 1956; 33.2/5-25 (II), German proposal re. political consultation, 6 December 1957; delNato to FO, 7 December 1957; 33.2/5-25 (IV), minutes, Nato meeting, January 1958; 33.2/5-26, delNato to FO, 27 February 1958; 33.2/5-33 (I), preparations for FM's orientation to the Storting's Extended Foreign Policy Committee 8 December, 7 December 1960. Pedlow 1997, pp. 277-313.*
[133]*NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo., 15 December 1955; embParis to State, 27 April 1956; embParis to State, 5 May 1956 (three documents); embParis to State, 12 December 1956 (quotation); State to embBrussels, 9 December 1959. PRO, FO 371/124795, minutes, Nato meeting, 4-5 May 1956. UD, 33.2/5-20, delNato to FO, 17 December 1955; 33.2/5-21, minutes (draft), Nato meeting, May, 1956; 33.2/5-25 (II), memo., 2 December 1957; 33.2/5-25 (IV), minutes, Nato meeting, January 1958; 33.2/5-29, delNato to FO, 23 March 1959; 33.2/5-30 (II), memo., 7 December 1959; 33.2/5-33 (I), memo., 7 December 1960; delNato to FO, 16 December 1960. Villaume 1995, p. 758.*

[134]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo. of con., Eisenhower and Dulles, 11 December 1957.
[135]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, embRome to State, 16 December 1957. UD, 33.2/5-25 (II), delNato to FO, 6 December 1957; 33.2/5-25 (IV), minutes, Nato meeting, January 1958; 33.2/5-28, memo., undated (brief for FM, December 1958); 33.2/5-28, delNato to FO, 4 December 1958 (quotation).
[136]UD, 33.2/5-25 (IV), minutes, Nato meeting, January 1958; 33.2/5-28, memo., undated (brief for FM, December 1958); 33.2/5-28, delNato to FO, 4 December 1958; 33.2/5-25 (II); FM's orientation to the Storting's Extended Foreign Policy Committee, 7 December 1957.
[137]UD, 33.2/5-29, delNato to FO, 23 March 1959; 33.2/5-33 (I), memo., 7 December 1960. Nato 1989, pp. 191-94.
[138]Harrison 1981, pp. 16-20, 86-101.
[139]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo. of con., Alphand, Lord Hood and American officials, 4 and 10 December 1958.
[140]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, State to embRome, 2 December 1958; memo. of con., Italian Ambassador and American officials, 2 December 1958; memo. of con., Dutch and American officials, 5 December 1958; embParis to State, 6 December 1958; memo. of con., Norwegian Ambassador and American officials, 9 December 1958; memo. of con., Alphand and Sec. of State, 24 June 1960 (quotation); State to embParis, 24 June 1960. UD, 33.2/5-29, memo., 20 March 1959.
[141]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, embParis to State, 9 August 1960 (quotation); State to embParis, 3 September 1960; 611.51, embParis to State, 20 April 1961.
[142]PRO, FO 371/102301, delNato to FO, with copy of letter from Norwegian Representative to Nato to Secretary-General Ismay, 25 June 1952 (quotation no. 2). Acheson 1969, pp. 561, 638 (quotation no. 1 on p. 638).
[143]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, Tangier to State, 13 February 1952. PRO, FO 371/102515, various documents on possible inclusion of Tunisia and Morocco in Nato, 21 February 1952; Chief Of Staff document on possible inclusion of Tunisia and Morocco in Nato, 12 March 1952 (qoutation).
[144]NARA, RG 59, 740.5. State to embParis, 29 April 1953.
[145]NARA, RG 59, 640.71, memo., 18 April 1956. PRO, FO 371/173385, memo. of con. Lord Hood and Stikker, 28 January 1963.
[146]PRO, FO 371/118643, delNato to FO, 27 May and 1 June 1955. UD, 33.2/5-18, various newpaper articles, 10 October 1955. Kaplan 1994, p. 58.
[147]Stuart/Tow 1990, p. 208. Villaume 1995, pp. 701-09.
[148]PRO, FO 371/124858, delNato to FO, 2 and 23 March 1956. UD, 33.2/5-21, Boyesen to Lange, 9 April 1956; 33.2/5-27, delNato to FO, 19 April 1958 (quotation). Harrison 1981, pp. 40-45. Stuart/Tow 1990, p. 206-09, 217. Villaume

*1995, pp. 701-709.*

*[149]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, State to embAnkara, 17 February 1952. PRO, FO 371/ 96319, visit of FM to Nato meeting, 15-20 September 1951; FO 371/102515, various documents on possible inclusion of Tunisia and Morocco in Nato, 21 February 1952; FO 371/137827, FO to delNato with attachment (Hood to Ewbank, 16 November 1951), 22 July 1958.*

*[150]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, embParis to State, 26 December 1956. PRO, FO 371/ 173386, delNato to FO, 9 July 1963 (quotation no. 2). UD, 33.2/5-16, four documents on where Nato spring 1955 meeting should be held, February-March 1955 (quotation no. 1). Hitchens 1997, pp. 38, 44-48.*

*[151]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo., 6 April 1959. UD, 33.2/5-21, Boyesen to Lange, 9 April 1956; 33.2/5-69, memo., 4 December 1974. Kaplan 1994, p. 79.*

*[152]PRO, FO 371/173386, brief, date omitted (Stikker's visit 24-25 January 1963) (quotation); memo., 2 May 1963; FO 371/184384, memo., 30 December 1964; 371/ 184384, delNato to FO, 5 February 1965; FO 371/184385, minutes, restricted NAC session about Malta, 27 April 1965. UD, 33.2/5-41, delNato to FO, 16 December 1964.*

*[153]NARA, RG 59, NATO 6 MALTA, 6 April 1965. PRO, FO 371/173386, memo., 2 May 1963; minutes, meeting Colonial Secretary and FM, 12 June 1963; delNato to FO, 26 June 1963; delNato to FO, 9 July, 1963; Lemnitzer to Stikker, 9 August 1963; FO 371/178994, brief (no. 14), 11 May 1964; FO 371/184385, delNato to FO, 21 April 1965; FO to delNato, 23 April 1965; delNato to FO, 26 April 1965; minutes, restricted NAC session about Malta, 27 April 1965 (quotation); FO 371/ 184385, delNato to FO, 5 and 6 May 1965; FO 371/184379, brief (no. 5), 10 May 1965. UD, 33.2/5-53, memo., 2 April 1969.*

*[154]Berdal 1997, pp. 97-101. Brands 1994, pp. 125-26. Porter 1984, pp. 66, 73, 86-89. Joyce 1998, pp. 104-10. Sherwood 1990, p. 129. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 117-18, 131-33, 146-47.*

*[155]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo., 12 December 1957; memo., 1 April 1959; memo. of con., Dutch and American officials, 4 April 1959; 375, embParis to State, 11 January 1961 (two documents); State to embParis, 11 January 1961; embParis to State, 13 July 1962; State to embParis, 5 September 1962. PRO, FO 371/173378, briefs, 12 December 1963; FO 371/179021, FO to certain of her Majesty's representatives, 2 January 1964. UD, 33.2/5-25 (IV), minutes, Nato meeting, January 1958; 33.2/5-33 (I), delNato to FO, 16 December 1960. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 145-46.*

*[156]UD, 33.2/5-28, delNato to FO, 6 November 1958; FO to delNato, 11 November 1958; delNato to FO, 13 November 1958; delNato to FO, 21 November 1958;*

*delNato to FO, 28 November 1958; 33.2/5-30 (II), memo., 8 December 1959; 33.2/5-33 (I), memo., 7 December 1960; 33.2/5-34 (II), memo., 2 May 1961; 33.2/5-35, memo., 6 December 1961; 33.2/5-37, memo., 8 December 1962. PRO, FO 371/173378, brief (no. 7), 12 December 1963.*

*[157]James 1996, ch. 6. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 71-72, 274-75.*

*[158]James 1996, ch. 5 (quotation on p. 46).*

*[159]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, embLisbon to State, 30 November 1955 and 23 April 1959 (quotation); embParis to State, 14 December 1956. UD, 33.2/5-40, embLisbon to FO, 9 June 1964; 33.2/5-48, delNato to FO, 16 December 1966; 33.2/5-59 (I), delNato to FO, 5 May 1971.*

*[160]PRO, FO 371/173374, FM's conversations at Nato meeting, 11-15 December 1962 (quotation). NARA, RG 59, 740.5, embParis to State, 5 Mai 1961. Cobbs Hoffman 1998, pp. 90-91. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 70-71.*

*[161]NARA, RG 59, NATO 3 FR (PA), embParis to State, 15 December 1966. UD, 33.2/5-48, delNato to FO, 16 December 1966; 33.2/5-59 (I), delNato to FO, 5 May 1971; memo., 25 May 1971; delNato to FO, 25 May 1971; memo., 28 May 1971. Grøndahl 1996, pp. 66-69.*

*[162]Sherwood 1990, p. 126.*

*[163]The United States had, of course, not been blind earlier to communist threats outside Europe, as the intervention in Korea, involment in Indochina and concern about communist intrusion in Africa demonstrated, but the emphasis was solidly on Europe.*

*[164]Porter 1984, pp. 16-32.*

*[165]PRO, FO 371/113221, memo., 14 December 1954; FO 371/113223, delNato to FO, 29 July 1954 (two documents); Commonwealth Relations Office to several, 3 August 1954. Moen 1997, ch. 2. Leffler 1992, pp. 417-18. Paulowitch 1985, p. 170.*

*[166]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, Acting Assistant Secretary Thompson to the Sec. of State, with attachments, 21 April 1950. PRO, FO 371/89992, FO to Air Marshal Sir Elliot, 11 January 1950. Leffler 1992, p. 417.*

*[167]FRUS, 1949/4, pp. 254-55 (quotation). PRO, FO 371/96316, delOttawa to FO, 15 September 1951. UD, 33.2/5-7, report with attachments, Nato meeting, September 1951; memo. of con., FMs Lange and Acheson, 17 September 1951. Villaume 1995, pp. 677-78.*

*[168]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, memo., 27 April 1955; memo. of con., American and Norwegian officials, 20 May 1955; embLondon to State, 7 July 1955; legation Reykjavik to State, 8 July 1955; embHague to State, 18 July 1955; memo. of con., Portugese FM and American officials, 1 December 1955; memo. of con. French Ambassador and American officials, 19 April 1957; memo., 24 April 1957;*

*embOslo to State, 20 and 24 April 1957; Elbrick to Burgess, 6 December 1957. UD, 33.2/5-20, delNato to FO, 17 December 1955. Haraldstad 1995.*

[169]*NARA, RG 59, 740.5, State to embMadrid, 1 April 1959; memo. of con., Spanish and American officials, 3 and 7 April 1959; State instruction to various embassies, 23 April 1959 (quotation no. 1); embOslo to State, 11 May 1959 (quotation no. 2). UD, 33.2/5-29, memo., 20 March 1959.*

[170]*NARA, RG 59, 375, embParis to State with attatcment (memo. of con., Spanish Ambassador to Paris and General Norstad, 20 December 1960), 22 December 1961 (quotations). UD, 33.2/5-85 (II), memo., 27 April 1981; memo., undated (Ambassador Vibe's speech in Nato meeting, May 1981).*

[171]*UD, 33.2/5-63, delNato to FO, 8 June 1972; 33.2/5-68, Def. Min. to FO, 23 May 1975; 33.2/5-70, embWashington to FO, 24 April 1975; memo., 15 May 1975; memo., 21 May 1975; 33.2/5-72, memo., 12 May 1976; 33.2/5-77 (I), memo., 10 May 1978. Alba 1985. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 300-05.*

[172]*Gaddis 1982, pp. 201-13, 235.*

[173]*UD, 33.2/5-35, delNato to FO, 25 and 28 September 1961; 33.2/5-36, memo., 26 April 1962.*

[174]*NARA, RG 59, 375, memo. of con., Nato meeting, Canadian and American FMs, 3 May 1962; embParis to State, 11 May 1962; State to embParis, 11 May 1962; embParis to State, 24 and 30 May, 1 and 3 June 1962; State to embLondon, 3 June 1962; State to embParis, 30 August 1962. Synstnes 1996, ch. 2.*

[175]*NARA, RG 59, 375, embParis to State, 5, 14 and 19 September 1962. Synstnes 1996, ch. 3.*

[176]*UD, 33.2/5-40, FM's orientation to the Storting's Extended Foreign Policy Committee 21 May, 27 May 1964; minutes, Nato meeting, 10 June 1964. Synstnes 1996, ch. 4-6.*

[177]*NARA, RG 59, 375, embCopenhagen to State, 30 December 1962. UD, 33.2/5-37, delNato to FO, 14 December 1962; 33.2/5-38 (I), memo., May 1963; 33.2/5-40, memo., 5 May 1964; FM's orientation to the Storting's Extended Foreign Policy Committee 21 May, 27 May 1964. Fursenko/Naftali 1997, p. 202. Sherwood 1990, pp. 121-23.*

[178]*NARA, RG 59, 375, embParis to State, 27 October and 4 December 1962. Fursenko/Naftali 1997, pp. 235-37, 250, 278-89, 321.*

[179]*NARA, RG 59, 375, memo. of con., Dutch and American officials, 4 December 1962 (quotation); DEF 4 NATO, memo. of con., Nato's Secretary-General, Stikker, and American officials, 5 March 1963. PRO, FO 371/178992, FO to embWashington, 3 December 1964; FO 371/178997, delNato to FO, 2 December 1964; brief (no. 4) Nato meeting, 14 December 1964; FO 371/184394, embParis to*

*FO, 16 March 1965; extract, document by A. M. Palliser, 12 April, and comment by Barnes, 29 April 1965; FO to delNato, 1 July 1965. UD, 33.2/5-37, delNato to FO, 14 December 1962; 33.2/5-38 (I), embOttawa to FO, 24 May 1963; 33.2/5-40, FM's orientation to the Storting's Extended Foreign Policy Committee 21 May, 27 May 1964; 33.2/5-41, delNato to FO, 16 December 1964; memo., 22 January 1965; 33.2/5-42, embLondon to FO (2 documents), 12 May 1965.*
[180]*PRO, FO 371/173375, brief (concerning the Secretary-General's political apprisal), Nato meeting, 20 May 1963; FO 371/173376, embOttawa to FO, 23 May 1963; FO 371/178993, delNato to FO, 16 March 1964; FO 371/178994, embHague to FO, 12 May 1964; FO 371/178998, delNato to FO, 16 December 1964; FO 371/179012, delNato to FO, 22 January 1964; delNato to FO, 5 November 1964 (quotation no. 3 and 4); FO 371/184376, brief (no. 9), Nato meeting, 30 March 1965 (quotation no. 2); FO 371/184379, brief (no. 3), Nato meeting, 10 May 1965 (quotation no. 1); FO 371/184394, embParis to FO, 16 March 1965 (quotation no. 5).*
[181]*PRO, FO 371/184378, memo., 26 April 1965 (quotations); FO to delNato 28 april 1965.*
[182]*PRO, FO 371/173378, embParis to FO, 16 December 1963 (quotation no. 1); FO 371/184379, FM's speech (draft) at Nato meeting, 30 April 1965 (quotation no. 2). FO 371/184381, memo. (draft), 3 December 1965 (quotation no. 3); delNato to FO, 15 December 1965. UD, 33.2/5-44, memo. (draft), 11 January 1966. Berdal 1997, pp. 97-101. Sherwood 1990, pp. 114-15.*
[183]*PRO, FO 371/184378, FO to delNato, 5 April 1965 (quotation no. 2 and 4); FO 371/184394, extract, document. by A. M. Palliser, 12 April, and comment by Barnes, 29 April 1965; delNato to FO, 1 June 1965 (quotation no.1); FO to delNato, 1 July 1965 (quotation no. 3).*
[184]*PRO, FO 371/184376, embParis to FO, 13 March 1965; minute, 27 March 1965; brief no. 9, Nato meeting, 30 March 1965; FO 371/184378, delNato to FO, 9 April 1965; FO 371/184379, brief no. 3, Nato meeting, 10 May 1965; FO 371/ 184381, delNato to FO, continued report, 15 December 1965; FO 371/184394, embParis to FO, 16 March 1965.*
[185]*PRO, FO 371/179012, delNato to FO, 30 January 1964.*
[186]*PRO, FO 371/178994, brief (Nato Expert Working Group meetings), Nato meeting in May, 11 May 1964; FO to delNato, 25 May 1964 (quotation no. 1); delNato to FO, 5 June 1964 (quotation no.2). UD, 33.2/5-42, memo., 15 February 1965.*
[187]*PRO, FO 371/184394, delNato to FO, 1 June 1965.*
[188]*NARA, RG 59, 375, State to embParis, 1 June 1962.*

*[189]NARA, RG 59, NATO 3 FR (PA), State to several, 17 December 1965. PRO, FO 371/178994, embHague to FO, 12 May 1964. UD, 33.2/5-40, telephone report from the Hague, 14 May 1964; FM's orientation to the Storting's Extended Foreign Policy Committee 21 May, 27 May 1964; minutes, Nato meeting, 10 June 1964; 33.2/5-41, memo., 22 January 1965. Sherwood 1990, pp. 127-28. Stuart/Tow 1990, p. 76.*
*[190]NARA, RG 59, NATO 3 UK (LO), 11 May 1965; NATO 8-2, embParis to State, 29 March 1966. PRO, FO 371/184379, FM's speech (draft) at Nato meeting, 30 April 1965. UD, 33.2/5-40, telephone report from the Hague, 14 May 1964; FM's orientation to the Storting's Extended Foreign Policy Committee 21 May, 27 May 1964; 33.2/5-41, minutes, Nato meeting, 19 December 1964; 33.2/5-42, memo., 6 May 1965; embLondon to FO (2 documents), 12 May 1965; embLondon to FO, 13 May 1965; 33.2/5-44, delNato to FO, 15 December 1965; 33.2/5-48, delNato to FO, 16 December 1966; 33.2/5-50, memo., 6 December 1967. Sherwood 1990, pp. 127-30.*
*[191]PRO, FO 371/184381, delNato to FO, 22 December 1965. Gaddis 1982, p. 267 (quotation no. 2). Kaplan 1994, p. 110. Sherwood 1990, p. 124 (quotation no. 1). Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 77-78.*
*[192]Sherwood 1990, p. 126, 136 (quotation on p. 136). Stuart/Tow 1990, p. 76.*
*[193]Garthoff 1994, p. 285. Little, 1994, pp. 535-37. Sherwood 1990, pp. 135-37.*
*[194]All the same, Nato-designated forces and Nato infrastructure were used in the many squirmishes in the region. During the invasion of Lebanon, for example, the Americans used their Nato-designated forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and bases in Turkey, the Azores, and Italy, in addition to British bases on Cyprus. Many Nato members resented the fact that Nato's non-policy on out-of-area issues had been compromised, especially Germany, which as host nation to many of the allied troops and bases involved, was most directly affected by the Anglo-American actions in the Middle East. (Sherwood 1990, pp. 97-99. Stuart/Tow 1990, p. 128.)*
*[195]NARA, RG 59, 740.5, State to embParis, 5 May 1959. Brands 1994, pp. 69-77. Little 1994, pp. 529-33. Sherwood 1990, pp. 95-99. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 127-30.*
*[196]NARA, RG 59, NATO 8-2, State to embParis, 10 July and 21 September 1967. UD, 33.2/5-49, delNato to FO, 9 June 1967; embWashington to FO, 10 June 1967; Def. Min.s speech in Nato meeting, 15 June 1967; FO to various stations, 15 June 1967; memo./minutes, 16 June 1967; memo., 30 June 1967. Brands 1994, 78-80. Kolko 1988, pp. 223-24. Little 1994, pp. 533-36. Quandt 1982, p. 10. Spiegel 1982, p. 2.*
*[197]Sherwood 1990, p. 138.*
*[198]Garthoff 1994, pp. 450-51. Sherwood 1990, pp. 138-42 and endnote no. 25, p. 225 (quotation on p. 139). Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 81-82. Warner 1989, p. 496.*

[199]UD, 33.2/5-66, memo., 13 December 1973. Garrat 1982, p. 84 (quotation). Garhoff 1994, p. 427.

[200]Kupchan 1987, pp. 166-74. Sherwood 1990, pp. 142-44.

[201]Garthoff 1994, pp. 450-51. Kolko 1988, p. 230 (quotation). Sherwood 1990, pp. 138-44. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 80-82.

[202]UD, 33.2/5-50, memo., undated (Nato meeting 12-14 December 1967); memo., 23 December 1967; 33.2/5-51, memo., 20 June 1968; memo., undated (Nato meeting, 24-25 June 1968); 33.2/5-53, memo., 2 April 1969; 33.2/5-56 (I), memo., 27 May 1970; 33.2/5-57, 2 Def. Min. memos, 4 and 5 June 1970; 33.2/5-58 (I), delNato (Def. Min. document) to Def. Min. (copy to FO), 3 December 1970; 33.2/5-60, delNato (Def. Min. document) to Def. Min. (copy to FO), 1 June 1971. Jensen forthcomming. Kaplan 1994, p. 105.

[203]NARA, RG 59, NATO 3, embHague to State, 14 May 1964 (quotation); NATO 3 FR (PA), embParis to State, 16 and 17 December 1964. PRO, FO 371/184378, memo., 26 April 1965; FO to delNato 28 April 1965. UD, 33.2/5-40, memo. of con., Assistant Secretary Tyler and Norwegian Ambassador to Nato, Engen, 17 April 1964; FM's orientation to the Storting's Extended Foreign Policy Committee 21 May, 27 May 1964; telephone report, Nato meeting, 14 May 1964. Brands 1994, pp. 94-101. Hitshens 1997, pp. 5-6, 66-67. Kaplan 1994, p. 82. Kaplan/Clawson 1985, p. 13. Sonyel 1997, pp. 67-69, 77-82, 97-98. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 290-91.

[204]UD, 33.2/5-69, memo., 4 December 1974. Brands 1994, pp. 142-43. Hitschens 1997, pp. 121-22, 125, 131-34. Kuniholm 1985, pp. 217-35. Sonyel 1997, ch. 5. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 291-96.

[205]Garthoff 1994, ch. 15. Kolko 1988, pp. 242-47. Porter 1984, pp. 147, 150, 168-79.

[206]UD, 33.2/5-72, minutes, Nato meeting, 28 May 1976; memo., 4 June 1976. Stuart/Tow 1990, p. 310.

[207]UD, 33.2/5-77 (II), minutes (2 documents), Nato meeting, 22 and 23 June 1978. Garthoff 1994, pp. 687-95. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 228, 231-33, 276.

[208]UD, 33.2/5-76 (II), minutes, Nato meeting, 16 December 1977; embCopenhagen to FO, 21 December 1977. Garthoff 1994, pp. 695-719. Porter 1984, pp. 182-83, 213.

[209]UD, 33.2/5-83 (I), memo., 17 June 1980; 33.2/5-85 (I), memo., 24 April 1981; memo., 28 April 1981; delNato to FO, 3 March 1981; 33.2/5-86, delNato to Def. Min. (copy to FO), 16 May 1981; FD, 204.12, Defence Planning Committee 1976-85 (1980), Def. Min. til delNato, 3 March 1980.

[210]FD, 204.12, Defence Planning Committee 1976-85 (1979), delNato to Def. Min., 25 May 1979; minutes, DPC meeting, 27 May 1979. Garthoff 1994, ch. 26

*(quotation on p. 1055). Kolko 1988, p. 273. Kupchan 1987, pp. 118-19. Sherwood 1990, pp. 151-52.*

[211]*Brands 1994, p. 168. Gaddis 1982, pp. 345-46. Garthoff 1994, pp. 1055-65, 1082-87 (quotation no 1 on p. 1082, no. 2 on p. 1063). Kupchan 1987, pp. 129, 136.*

[212]*UD, 33.2/5-52, FO to delNato, 26. November 1968; embWashington to FO, 26 November 1968; delNato to FO, 28 November 1968; embWashington to FO, 3 December 1968; memo., 9 December 1968. Nato undated I, p. 214 (quotation).*

[213]*Nato undated II, pp. 130-35 (quotations on p. 131).*

[214]*Nato undated II, pp. 148-57. Nato undated III, pp. 25-34, 37-41, 47-55, 58-68 (quotation on p. 31).*

[215]*UD, 33.2/5-86, delNato to FO, 20 May 1981; delNato to FO, 27 May 1981; delNato to FO, 18 March 1982; Def. Min. to several, 26 June 1981; 33.2/5-88, memo., 10 Juni 1982; 33.2/5-89 (I), memo., 1 March 1982; 33.2/5-90 (I), delNato to Def. Min., 24 November 1982; 33.2/5-90 (II), delNato to Def. Min. (copy to FO), 3 December 1982; delNato to FO, 13 December 1982; 33.2/5-92 (II), delNato to FO, 13 June 1983; FO to several, 14 June 1983; memo., 15 June 1983. Kupchan 1987, p. 192. Nato undated III, p. 31 (quotations). Sherwood 1990, p. 154.*

[216]*UD, 33.2/5-83 (I), memo., 17 June 1980; 33.2/5-84, minutes, Nato meeting, 15 December 1980.*

[217]*Sherwood 1990, p. 152.*

[218]*UD, 33.2/5-86, delNato to FO and others, 6 May 1982; copy of Def. Min. Winberger's speech at DPC meeting in May, 12 May 1981; Def. Min. to several, 26 June 1981; 33.2/5-87 (I), memo., 3 December 1981; 33.2/5-88, memo., 10 May 1982; 33.2/5-92 (II), memo., 2 June 1983; 33.2/5-97 (I), memo., 4 December 1984. Kupchan 1987, p. 184. Sherwood 1990, pp. 156-57.*

[219]*FD, 204.12, Defence Planning Committee 1976-85 (1980), delNato to Def. Min., 8 May 1980. Kupchan 1987, pp. 186, 197. Sherwood 1990, pp. 158-60, 168, 170-77. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 92-93, 97-98, 241-43, 268-69, 279-82.*

[220]*Sherwood 1990, p. 160 (quotation). Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 93-96.*

[221]*UD, 33.2/5-85 (I), memo., 24 April 1981; 33.2/5-86, delNato to FO, 11 May 1981; 33.2/5-89 (III), delNato to FO, 18 June 1982; 33.2/5-93, minutes, DPC meeting, 1-2 June 1983; 33.2/5-97 (I), memo., 4 December 1984; 33.2/5-94 (II), minutes, Eurogroup dinner, 7 December 1983. Garthoff 1994, pp. 1087-91 (quotations on pp. 1088-89). Kupchan 1987, p. 181. Sherwood 1990, p. 160. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 88-89.*

[222]*UD, 33.2/5-69, memo., 4 December 1974; minutes, Nato meeting, 18 December 1974; 33.2/5-75 (I), memo., 15 April 1977. FD, 204.12, Defence Planning Committee 1976-85, 1979, delNato to Def. Min., 25 May 1979; minutes, DPC*

*meeting, 27 May 1979; 200.1, NATO Defence Planning, embBonn (FO document) to FO (copy to Def. Min.), 15 October 1981. Tamnes 1997, pp. 97-98.*
[223]*Richardson 1996, pp. 112-56. Sherwood 1990, pp. 161-64. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 155-59.*
[224]*UD, 33.2/5-86, delNato to FO, 7 May 1982; 33.2/5-89 (III), delNato to FO, 15 June 1982. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 155-59.*
[225]*Kupchan 1987, pp. 30-31, 55-56.*
[226]*Brands 1994, pp. 192-95. Sherwood 1990, pp. 167-70, 178-83. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 242-43.*
[227]*Brands 1994, pp. 180-82. Kupchan 1987, p. 187. Stuart/Tow 1990, pp. 284-85.*
[228]*Sherwood 1990, pp. 62-63.*
[229]*Kupchan 1987, p. 161.*

# Keeping Nato out of trouble

In its 50th anniversary year, Nato was heavily engaged in so-called out-of-area issues. The organization found itself with peace-keeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and involved in its first war, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This was indeed a dramatic change from the Cold War period, during which Nato also faced difficult out-of-area issues and experienced bitter internal struggles as a result, but refused to get involved. Indeed, Nato remained quite faithful to a non-policy on out-of-area issues. The present study investigates the out-of-area issues Nato had to face during the Cold War, primarily in connection with colonial disputes and American engagement in the Third World. It describes the preferred non-policy and argues that this stemmed from diverging interests, perceptions of threat and ideology among the Nato members. Given these differences, Nato members accepted a non-policy in order to avoid undermining Nato cohesion regarding Nato's primary concern: the defense of the North Atlantic area from Soviet aggression.

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

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