A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping

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Preface

Since the revival of international peacekeeping in the late 1980s, a vigorous debate has taken place on both sides of the Atlantic about the possibilities that the post-Cold War environment offered in terms of developing the practices of «classic» peacekeeping into something more «muscular» and, by implication, more instrumental in settling disputes. To many observers, the traditional emphasis on non-threatening and impartial operations goverened by the principles of consent and minimum force seemed not only antiquated, but also largely irrelevant to the kinds of conflict characteristic of the post-Cold War period.

The failure of the second UN operation in Somalia (in which the requirement of consent was consciously abandoned) and the continuing difficulties encountered by peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia have also forced the armed forces of many countries to re-examine the doctrinal implications of operating in far more complex environments. Charles Dobbie's timely and important paper is the product of precisely such a reassessment.

At the heart of Dobbie's analysis is his discussion of the nature and management of consent in the field, and he identifies consent as the «fundamental criterion of the conceptual approach required ... in terms of both the political direction of peacekeeping and its management on the ground». As Dobbie is keen to emphasise, however, consent cannot simply be «equated to universal approval of every action taken by a peacekeeping mission». Instead, at the tactical level consent is a «commodity of which a peacekeeper may expect to possess certain portions, from certain people, for certain activities and for certain periods of time». To approach the problem of consent in this manner - i.e. not to think of it as an «absolute» quality which is either present in theatre or not - reflects a far more nuanced and accurate understanding of the nature of contemporary peacekeeping than that which is found in much of the abstract and sterile discus-

sions of moving «beyond peacekeeping» that have appeared with such regularity in editorial pages and scholarly journals in recent years. But more importantly, as Dobbie demonstrates in this paper, the actual experience of military forces and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the field all testify to the validity of his approach. Above all, they reinforce the principal recommendation that flows from Dobbie's analysis, namely, that the «main effort of any peacekeeping campaign should seek to address the perceptions and attitudes of the parties to the conflict and the local population».

Before the fateful shootout in Mogadishu on 3 October 1994, which left 18 American soldiers dead and precipitated President Clinton's decision to pull out of the country, Dobbie described what was:

> ... *likely to happen in theatre if a peacekeeping force crosses the impartiality divide from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. If perceived to be taking sides, the force loses its legitimacy and credibility as a trustworthy third party, thereby prejudicing its security. The force's resources will then become ever more devoted to its need to protect itself. It actually joins the conflict it was there to police and is likely to become embroiled in activities that are irrelevant to the overall campaign aim. Such a situation will almost certainly result in the loss of popular support, a loss of control and uncontrolled escalation upwards in the ambient level of violence which will heighten political tension and foreclose opportunities for resolving the conflict. To cross the impartiality divide is also to cross a rubicon. Once on the other side, there is very little chance of getting back and the only way out is likely to be by leaving the theatre.*

Whilst the focus throughout the paper is on the *tactical* level of operations, the discussion has obvious implications for decisions taken at the *operational* and *strategic* levels, as well as for the broader political direction of operations. Indeed, as Dobbie makes clear and as the Somalian experience highlights, tactical success resulting from the use of force may lead to

long-term strategic failure.

Based on a careful survey of the historical record of peacekeeping, as well as the post-operational reports of military units and NGOs, this paper represents a major contribution to the ongoing debate on the future of international peacekeeping.

Mats Berdal
London, October 1994

Introduction

"Then the bowsprit got mixed with the rudder sometimes."
Lewis Carroll
(The Hunting of the Snark)

The history of post Cold War peacekeeping has been mixed, to say the least. Success in Mozambique and Cambodia has been tempered by frustration and failure in Somalia, Angola and Rwanda and protracted suffering in Bosnia. Is the effective management of such seemingly intractable conflicts simply hampered by inefficiency, inadequate resources and lack of political will? Or might a more fundamental malaise inhibit success? Could the prime cause of unsuccessful treatment be a general lack of clear-headedness in direction and execution - a failure at all levels to think through the issues logically? Has the very complexity of today's conflicts obscured the existence of gigantic intellectual disconnects in the way they are addressed? Might the direction and management of post Cold War conflicts equate to the confused yachtsmanship of Lewis Carroll's imaginings?

This paper will examine the demands of peacekeeping today from the perspectives of pragmatism, the recent post operational reports of practitioners, peacekeeping history, and some observations of non-governmental organizations and académe. On the evidence adduced, it will suggest that the absence or presence of consent in theatre is the fundamental criterion of the conceptual approach required - in terms of both the political direction of peacekeeping and its management on the ground. It will argue that this criterion has received insufficient attention and has, on occasion, been ignored with catastrophic consequences. It will consider the rôle of consent as the critical determinant of the manner in which peacekeeping operations should be planned, directed and conducted at all levels, particu-

larly with regard to the use of force, and go on to describe a concept for peacekeeping in the contemporary security environment that seeks to take realistic account of the consent criterion. The paper will also compare concepts for peacekeeping based on alternative philosophical approaches and deduce that peacekeeping and peace enforcement are separate and mutually exclusive activities which cannot be mixed and which therefore require to be directed and handled in a consistent manner with due regard to appropriate principles. It will argue that the use of force is *facilitated* by consent and should not necessarily be equated to the non-consensual category of peace enforcement. The paper will conclude by suggesting that the main effort of any peacekeeping campaign should seek to address the perceptions and attitudes of the parties to the conflict and the local population.

Chapter one
The Significance of Consent

International peace support operations terminology, in the main, bears testimony to the central significance of consent. The British Army defines peacekeeping as: "operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict."[1] The peacekeeping category includes 'Wider Peacekeeping' - a term coined by the British Army to describe "...the wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile."[2] For permanent members of the UN Security Council, such operations have become more prominent post Cold War. By comparison, peace enforcement has been defined as: "operations carried out to restore peace between belligerent parties who do not all consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities."[3] Most definitions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement similarly draw out the presence and absence of consent as the principal distinguishing criterion. There are notable exceptions to this including the International Peace Academy's definition of peacekeeping - although their publication "Peacekeeper's Handbook" repeatedly emphasizes the importance of consent to peacekeeping operations. The NATO definition of peacekeeping also fails to include consent[4]. In the main, however, international definitions of peacekeeping acknowledge the critical significance of consent. It has been interesting to observe how the peacekeeping definition in 'An Agenda for Peace' which questioned the pre-requisite for consent has not been allowed to endure.[5] On returning from a visit to UNOSOM II last year, the UN Secretary General commented: "We cannot impose peace...." According to most terminology, therefore, peacekeeping (including Wider Peacekeeping) requires consent, whereas peace enforce-

ment dispenses with consent. Consent, as it were, *separates* peacekeeping (including Wider Peacekeeping) from peace enforcement:

The Nature of Consent

Given its crucial significance to Wider Peacekeeping, consent is likely to represent a critical determinant of the manner in which peacekeeping operations are planned, directed and executed. The nature of the consent divide therefore deserves close attention. Consent *within* an operation must supplement consent *for* an operation. Paradoxically, a weakness in one may be compensated by strength in the other - local consent may balance a lack of operational level[6] consent and vice versa. *Within* peacekeeping situations, consent will normally be intangible and vulnerable. Depending on the volatility of the general environment, it is unlikely ever to be more than partial. Consent is a commodity of which a peacekeeper may expect to possess certain portions, from certain people, for certain activities and for certain periods of time. It is evidently anything but an absolute. When viewed in close-up, the consent divide between peacekeeping and peace enforcement might be depicted as follows:

At the tactical (field operations) level consent will derive from local events and the many influences that shape prevailing popular opinion. It will be subject to frequent change and its boundary will therefore be mobile, unpredictable and poorly defined. At the operational (ie theatre) level, consent will devolve largely from formal agreements and its boundary will consequently be relatively clear-cut and stable. Trespassing on the tactical boundary of the consent divide does not necessarily equate to breaching the divide as a whole. The operational boundary may serve to contain fractures of its tactical counterpart. This has important ramifications for the use of force which will be discussed later in this paper. Equating consent, therefore, to universal approval of every action taken by a peacekeeping mission would be unreasonable. Nor may it be perceived simply as political permission. Consent equates more realistically to a general public attitude that tolerates a peacekeeping presence and represents quorom of cooperation. At its most limited it might amount to an absence of systematic and concerted armed action against the mission. If consent such as that is present in a theatre of operations, then Wider Peacekeeping is likely to be a reasonable option. If it is absent, Wider Peacekeeping tasks are unlikely to prove relevant to the root causes of the conflict. Without consent, peace enforcement will probably represent the only realistic means of effective outside intervention.

Chapter two
Operational tasks

Wider Peacekeeping most closely typifies contemporary peacekeeping tasks and will be the focus of this paper's examination. Theoretical assessment demands a degree of task classification to facilitate examination. The following categories of activity, covering the very broad gamut of Wider Peacekeeping tasks, are neither exhaustive, exclusive nor self-contained. The activities described will often occur simultaneously and overlap and no two peacekeeping situations are likely ever to be the same. However, for the purposes of discussion, the categories serve to provide a specified framework for consideration. Consideration of the nature of each category is a necessary preliminary to theoretical judgements.

Conflict Prevention

Conflict prevention is an activity that seeks to anticipate and forestall conflict. The maxim "prevention is better than cure" has always been true of classic peacekeeping operations. In that context, preventive measures have traditionally relied on and exploited the consent of all parties concerned, the existence of an established ceasefire and the presence of an effective political framework to complement peacekeeping activities. Preventive measures are also possible in Wider Peacekeeping operations, although in this instance they are likely to take place in conditions where, despite an overall consensual framework, belligerent parties may not be responsive to their own central controls and consequently uncooperative. Sporadic outbreaks of violence might be taking place, Wider Peacekeeping forces may face local armed opposition, and there may be no effective state government. The prevention of conflict in such operations may require large scale deployments backed up by a substantial reinforcement and

support capability. Four complementary Wider Peacekeeping activities contribute to the prevention of conflict or the resurgence of hostilities:

> *Early warning*
> *Surveillance*
> *Stabilizing measures*
> *Preventive deployment*

Each method can be applied at all levels of military activity, from those that are theatre-wide to local operations carried out within a military unit's area of operation.

Early Warning

Early warning is essentially a strategic or operational level activity and is the product of an effective information system. Operations conducted at the tactical level, however, may have an important contribution to make to early warning. By identifying the threat of an outbreak or escalation of violence early warning will buy time for a range of preventive diplomatic and military actions to be effected. Military commanders will normally focus their military information assets on any potential crisis situation within their areas of operation and set aside resources for this specific purpose. Surveillance activity (covered below) will contribute to the accomplishment of this task.

Surveillance

The presence of widespread and impartial surveillance in an area of operation will deter breaches of the peace by parties to a conflict. In the first place surveillance will remove the element of surprise from actions that the parties or their enemies might take, especially if it is known that the

information arising from the surveillance is shared with all concerned. The loss of surprise will greatly improve the opportunity for the Wider Peacekeeping force to anticipate offensive action by the parties to a conflict, thus degrading the effectiveness of aggression and making such action seem less worthwhile. Secondly, effective surveillance will disclose to the international community culpability that might arise from actions which belligerents may be tempted to take. In each case, the likelihood of aggression being rewarded is lessened, and the threat of anticipatory responses by Wider Peacekeeping forces, or indeed an opposing party, is heightened. Effective surveillance might therefore be regarded a key conflict prevention measure, encouraging peacekeepers to make full use of the entire range of techniques and equipment available including observation, monitoring and patrols, and attended and unattended electronic, optical and acoustic surveillance devices.

Stabilizing Measures

Stabilizing measures will contribute to the lowering of tension in an area and, applied to the parties to a conflict, may take several forms:

> *Mutual and balanced reductions in personnel and equipments.*
> *The establishment of demilitarized buffer zones.*
> *Zonal restrictions on the deployment of weapons and manpower.*
> *Advance reporting of military activities or exercises.*
> *Joint inspections of disputed areas.*
> *The exchange of liaison teams.*

Such stabilizing measures can be applied at all levels and may represent the first steps towards negotiations for a political settlement. Communications between the parties involved in the conflict are essential for stabilization. Shuttle diplomacy, an establishment of mutual trust between the Wider Peacekeeper and belligerents, the establishment and maintenance of local

government and law and order are important elements of stability. This will be particularly relevant in the early stages of an operation when only a fragile peace may exist between the parties. Effective peacekeepers will continually review the potential for implementing stabilizing measures at any level in their areas of operation.

Preventive Deployment

A preventive deployment in Wider Peacekeeping operations is likely to take place in an area of potential conflict either between states or within a state where tension is rising between factions. A ceasefire or peace plan may not have been agreed and the situation may be characterized by sporadic outbreaks of violence and the possibility of local armed opposition to the deployment.

A preventive deployment force relies on its strength and authority to deter violence and promote negotiation. Its primary rôle is thus the interpositional forestalling of armed aggression. A preventive deployment force is likely therefore to be armed for protective tasks that go beyond the demands of self-defence and should be enhanced by on-call reinforcements and support, perhaps in the form of indirect fire assets and air power. The security framework provided by preventive deployment will enable other Wider Peacekeeping functinns to be discharged including early warning, surveillance, stabilizing measures, the protection of humanitarian relief and diplomatic activity to resolve the underlying political problem. The composition of a preventive deployment force may therefore include civil administrative personnel including police and relief workers. Survivability could also prove a critical factor and it would be unusual for the force's personnel not to have armoured protection for its duties.

Credibility is properly regarded as the key to success in preventive deployment. An effective force will normally be strong enough, and plainly perceived to be so, to 'hold the ring' - if necessary until its reinforcements and support arrive. The reinforcement and support capacity will also be

clearly communicated to the parties involved to promote the force's overall credibility. Once deployed, the force would normally conduct patrolling and other military activities so that its visibility and credibility remain high.

A preventive deployment may be carried out at low level within the area of operations of a national contingent. At a higher, theatre-wide level, preventive deployment may be undertaken multinationally as a symbolic and actual commitment of the international community. At that level, the force may be enhanced by the presence of an offshore or regional coalition strike force. At any level, preventive deployment may have to cope with rapid escalations in violence, possibly even including a short-notice transition to peace enforcement activity. Preventive deployment tasks will therefore only be undertaken by professional troops who are prepared and equipped to cope with such transitions.

Humanitarian Relief

Humanitarian relief operations seek to meet the needs of residents, refugees or displaced persons. They are likely to involve such things as the protection of supply deliveries and relief workers, and the establishment, support and protection of safe havens. Humanitarian operations may also include administrative, coordination and logistical activities to support relief efforts.

Humanitarian aid, particularly in the relatively orderly conditions of negotiated ceasefires, was generally part and parcel of Cold War peacekeeping operations. This paper does not cover routine humanitarian activities such as economic assistance and intermediary duties. Instead it covers the deeper commitment that now exists post Cold War to giving humanitarian relief to those in drastic conditions, often in situations of chaos. Humanitarian relief operations are likely to become a focus for attention within the context of a Wider Peacekeeping scenario and may exert a profound influence on the overall course of events. In certain circumstances, peacekeepers may be tempted to use elements of humanitarian aid

as a tool to reward the compliance of belligerent factions.

In a situation of internal conflict there are certain provisions of international law that apply to the granting of humanitarian relief. For example, Article 3 of each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the Protection of War Victims lays down certain minimum humanitarian standards which are to be adopted in cases of 'armed conflict not of an international character' occurring in the territory of a party to the Conventions.

Humanitarian relief operations may be carried out in conjunction with other Wider Peacekeeping tasks or completely independently. In most humanitarian relief situations it is likely that a broad variety of international civil agencies will be involved including the UN, and government, non-government and private voluntary organizations. Examples of such agencies include the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) - any of which might constitute the overall coordinating authority. Humanitarian relief operations could therefore occur under different guidance, authority and conditions of other operations going on in the same area. They might be conducted locally or state-wide and be denied the cooperation of the local authorities. The Wider Peacekeeping force will properly be wary of lending direct support to non-accredited aid agencies which may be involved in illegal activities (such as the movement of weapons) and could thus, by association, prejudice the contingent's legitimacy.

Targets of Humanitarian Relief

The migration of displaced persons (those forced to leave their homes) and refugees (those forced to leave their countries) are a common feature of the international community. They are also likely to prove a complementary

characteristic of most Wider Peacekeeping situations. The departure or removal of such people from their native supporting environments is likely to put them in need of humanitarian relief. The numbers of those requiring help can range from small parties of individuals to entire ethnic groups. Humanitarian relief may also be required for resident communities which are at risk from the activities of warring parties, famine, drought or ecological disasters, the latter categories often brought about by conflict.

Phases of Humanitarian Relief Operations

Military Wider Peacekeeping forces are likely to become involved in two particular phases of humanitarian relief operations:

Emergency Phase. The aim of the emergency phase is to save lives. It will therefore entail the provision of vital services and the distribution of the basic requirements for survival, namely food, water, fuel, shelter and medical care. Emphasis will be on the assembly and rescue of victims and, if necessary, transporting them away from a life-threatening environment. Emergency medical care will be crucial component of this phase.

Administration Phase. When the targets of humanitarian relief are no longer in immediate danger, the emphasis of the operation will shift to continuing the administration of those rescued and setting in hand arrangements for their subsequent rehabilitation and the reconstruction of public services.

Principles of Humanitarian Relief Operations

Liaison and Coordination. Community leaders will always have much to offer in terms of influence, information and linguistic skills. Imaginative peacekeeping commanders will therefore always seek to liaise with and gain the support of community leaders to enlist their cooperation and improve the coordination of relief activity. To this end, local leaders may well be involved in the

planning and supervision of humanitarian activities. If feasible, they may be taken on reconnaissance trips and also included in such things as briefings, orders and advance parties.

Security. Whenever possible, peacekeeping commanders are likely to place priority on demobilizing and securing the area within which humanitarian operations are to be mounted. The benefit of humanitarian operations will be minimized if they are not conducted within an effective security framework. There will be little long-term utility, for example, in providing humanitarian relief to communities who are in imminent danger of extermination from warring factions. A secure environment also provides better protection for humanitarian convoys than isolated escorts.

Timeliness. Timeliness is critical factor to the success of humanitarian relief operations. Information, intelligence, reconnaissance, mobility, speed of reaction and effective planning and staff work are all aspects of activity that will contribute to humanitarian operations being mounted in a timely fashion.

Priorities. The planning and execution of effective humanitarian relief operations will always be characterized by a careful prioritization of the targets and their needs. This prioritization will be reflected in the composition, equipment and supplies of relief teams. The movement of relief personnel and supplies to the target area will also be prioritized to meet the most urgent needs first.

Unified Command. Whenever possible, the directors of Wider Peacekeeping operations will encourage the establishment of unified commands in which all appropriate agencies are represented. The commands should be supported by widespread liaison and reliable communications.

Military Tasks

Military tasks pertaining to humanitarian relief are likely to fall into the following categories:

Protection of delivery and relief workers (against conflicting parties to a conflict or criminal elements).

Establishment, support and protection of regional safe havens and protected areas.

Administrative tasks, including the coordination of relief agencies and distribution of supplies. Special forces are often particularly suited to this task.

Engineer support, including road construction and maintenance, bridging and infrastructure engineering.

Sustainment, including transportation, supply, maintenance and medical support.

Many of the above tasks will overlap with those in the military assistance categories.

Military Assistance

Military assistance covers all forms of mandated military assistance rendered by a Wider Peacekeeping force to a civil authority and refers to such things as supervising a transfer of power, reforming security forces and developing or supporting civil infrastructure facilities. The maintenance of law and order is foundational to such activity. In the absence of any effective government, military assistance may take the form of direct help given to civil communities. It covers a broad variety of possible tasks and may precede or follow a successfully conducted demobilization operation. In rendering military assistance, a Wider Peacekeeping force acts in support of the civil government according to the terms of a peace agreement or mandate. In Wider Peacekeeping operations, the principle of impartiality will still govern military actions. Force may be used, but not in a way that deliberately identifies particular factions as enemy. This means that the overall security situation must be relatively stable. Military assistance operations will therefore tend to occur in situations where the scale of violence and hostilities will have been reduced and military activities will have moved into a less dynamic phase allowing the reinstatement of a civil authority and the resumption of civil order. A broad consensual framework

for operations will therefore exist. The commitment of military forces to assist an embattled government conduct counter insurgency operations would fall into the category of peace enforcement and is thus outside the scope of this paper.

Law and Order

Military assistance operations will contribute to the overall aim of maintaining law and order - a responsibility that rests, in the first place, with the civil police. The maintenance of law and order constitutes the framework for all operational action and is essential to the successful establishment of civil authority. If law and order is failing, the aim of military assistance will be to restore the situation to the point where the police can once again effectively enforce the law. In this way, therefore, a Wider Peacekeeping force acts as the arm of the civil government and all its actions will require to be clearly seen as supporting government policy. This will be achieved by coordinating civil and military actions and incorporating local security forces into military operations whenever possible.

Principles and Techniques of Military Assistance

The military assistance category of Wider Peacekeeping operations comprises a great variety of complex and sensitive tasks. There are therefore some particular principles and techniques which apply specifically to the military assistance scenario and may reward observance. Those principles and techniques that apply more generally to Wider Peacekeeping as a whole are developed in a broader context later in the paper.

Popular Support. Military assistance operations will be impossible without a substantial degree of popular support. A principle purpose underlying every Wider Peacekeeping force activity will therefore be the acquisition and fostering of popular support. Effective civil affairs pro-

grammes ('hearts and minds' campaigns) will be key in this respect. The policy of the civil administration will be to establish such controls and protective measures as are necessary to gain public confidence and enhance society's support. Peacekeeping commanders will therefore wish to reinforce this aim at every opportunity and avoid using their troops in an unnecessarily provocative fashion or where they risk confrontation with the local population. Whenever possible the local populace will be encouraged to play an increasing rôle in their own protection. In addition to civil affairs programmes, peacekeepers will also consider the potential for planning lower level community projects jointly with the local authorities. Such projects will seek to meet a genuine need, involve the overt participation of Wider Peacekeeping contingent members and be directed at all sections of the community.

Minimum Force. In a military assistance situation, the involvement and likely proximity of the local population makes the principle of minimum force particularly important to observe. Responsible military commanders will never use more force than is necessary and reasonable to achieve their immediate aim. All members of a Wider Peacekeeping force will be made aware of the constraints which the law imposes on the use of force. Failure to observe the law will lead to a risk of prosecution, and possibly to civil proceedings for damages. Breaches of the law will also serve to alienate loyal and law-abiding members of the local population, and respect for the rule of law - the framework on which the entire military assistance campaign will be taking place - will be weakened if it appears that the law is being flouted by those whose task it is to uphold it.

Legality. A Wider Peacekeeping force will usually be under obligation to observe strictly the relevant provisions of the national laws of the country in which it is operating - laws which may differ substantially from those pertaining to the nations from which the contingent members are drawn. All military assistance operations are thus conducted, and are seen to be conducted, within the law of the country where they are taking place. Commanders will be held responsible for their actions and will therefore check the legality of planned operations with the appropriate authorities so

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that their soldiers are not exposed to the uncertainties of legal interpretation. This is properly a function of forward staff planning. However, if an unexpected change in circumstance has precluded such planning, the legal basis for military operations will merit early and urgent examination and may demand the passage of emergency legislation.

Coordination and Cooperation. The successful conduct of military assistance operations depends on the effective coordination of civil and military effort. This coordination applies particularly to military and public information, security, planning, public safety, and operational direction. Such coordination is best achieved through centralized planning meetings in which the Wider Peacekeeping force and civil administration are drawn together in order to formulate policy and implement it in a coordinated fashion at all levels. At the higher level, this coordination will be attained through the medium of a series of formally constituted committees. At lower levels centralized direction and control will be achieved through liaison, regular meetings and the use of joint operations rooms at each level of command. Centralized coordination will result in effective cooperation between the civil authority and the Wider Peacekeeping force. Such cooperation will be essential to emphasize the mutual confidence between them and to ensure that the conduct of operations is coherent and contributes directly to the achievement of government aims. Peacekeeping commanders will wish to demonstrate cooperation at the earliest opportunity by the joint operation of Wider Peacekeeping forces and local security forces. To facilitate centralized direction and control, the boundaries of police and Wider Peacekeeping forces should coincide.

Concentration of Force. The principle of minimum necessary force does not imply 'minimum necessary troops'. A large element of a Wider Peacekeeping force speedily deployed at a critical location will demonstrate 'clout' and credibility and may enable a commander to use less force than he might otherwise have done - or even, by encouraging a peaceful resolution, to avoid using any force at all. Balance is required, however, since a potentially peaceful situation may become hostile because of a provocative display of an over-large force.

Military Information. At each level, peacekeeping commanders will seek to establish a single, integrated military information organization. Ideally, the information and security elements of the civil administration and local security forces should be incorporated. The commander will task his military information organization with specific requirements to provide the timely information he needs.

Use of Local Security Forces. Local security forces in a military assistance situation are likely to be in need of support and encouragement. Whenever possible they should be afforded the opportunity of playing a useful and constructive part in operations. Indeed, the following local forces will have much to offer a Wider Peacekeeping force in terms of knowledge, expertise and resources:

Reserve Forces. Local reserve, part-time or paramilitary forces may be employed on duties where their local knowledge and links with the community can be used to the full without exposing them to unreasonable pressures which could compromise their security.

Home Guards and Wardens. Depending on the security situation it may be possible to establish locally recruited home guards or wardens to protect life and property in their own local areas. This would require them to be suitably armed and trained in order to perform static home guard duties, basic patrol tasks or act as wardens responsible for liaison with the people living in their sectors. They could prove extremely valuable in reporting information affecting local security to the authorities.

Coastguards, Frontier Service, Customs and Immigration. The expertise and resources of coastguards, the frontier service, customs and immigration may be harnessed by Wider Peacekeeping forces in military assistance operations to provide surveillance and information as well as control the passage of both supplies and people. The communications of such organizations are usually good and their deployment comprehensive. Their assistance will represent little change from their peacetime rôles. Within the bounds of propriety and security, peacekeeping forces will seek to liaise with and exploit such organizations to the full.

Whenever possible, local security forces should operate with or along-

side Wider Peacekeeping units. As areas are brought restored to order, local forces can assume control as part of the important transition process towards the civil authority regaining full responsibility.

Through an effective public information programme peacekeeping commanders will seek to foster and maintain a good public image for their forces wherever they are deployed. This will be particularly important in a military assistance operation. The local populace will be kept in touch with government aims and intentions by means of public information activities. Through this means, it may be possible for the Wider Peacekeeping forces to explain the need for some of the restrictions being imposed and publicize other items of information that may prove helpful to both the public and military authorities. Hostile propaganda may be countered and the local population kept fully informed of government aims and policies. Every military formation headquarters will normally have its own public information officer and staff with a press office open 24 hours a day. Press officers will usually be established in each peacekeeping military unit.

In military assistance operations, commanders will ensure that they and their soldiers have received comprehensive briefings covering the background to the conflict and all aspects of the civil authority's activities and intentions. All Wider Peacekeeping personnel will be made aware of the political aims of the government and of the measures devised to implement them. This will enable military commanders to plan operations which are in accord with the civil administration's intentions and it will ensure that all ranks understand the reasons behind what they are doing and will react to unexpected situations appropriately.

Military Operations

Military assistance tasks can be grouped in the following categories reflecting the purpose for which such tasks might be undertaken:

Supervision

Administration
Protection
Reaction
Control
Coordination

Each category of tasks is considered separately below:

Supervision

There are a number of important supervisory tasks that a Wider Peacekeeping force might be required to carry out in a military assistance rôle:

A transition of authority (possibly preceded by providing security for an election).

Reforming local security forces including the provision of training, logistic and administrative support.

The relocation and rehabilitation of refugees and other elements of a displaced population.

The location, clearance and disposal of unexploded ordnance including mines (many of which may be unmarked) and improvised explosive devices. This task may prove an important contribution to the civil affairs programme and could include such things as the training of local nationals in mine clearance.

Each of the above supervisory tasks will require specialist personnel and resources which will need to be tailored to the particular situation faced.

Administration

Civil Administration. When assistance to a civil authority is requested, it is likely that at least part of the government's administrative machinery will have broken down. The consequences of that administrative breakdown are

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likely eventually to affect the life of the entire community. When public services cease to function, rents and taxes fail to be collected, local authorities decline in effectiveness and subsequent disruptions can lead to rising unemployment and widespread dissatisfaction. In such circumstances a Wider Peacekeeping force may be invited to give additional assistance in the area of civil administration. This might range from liaison at one extreme to military government at the other.

Public Utilities. The supply of power, water, public transport, communications and health and hygiene services are an essential part of the fabric of life in a modern state and their disruption is consequently critical. A Wider Peacekeeping force may have much to offer in contributing to the maintenance of such essential services. Engineer resources will be particularly useful in lending practical assistance, offering advice or giving direction. Similarly, in remoter areas, special forces may be able to provide guidance and coordinate assistance to the civil administration. If committed to such a rôle, commanders will seek to retain as much of the civil labour force as possible, especially the skilled labour, although this may mean providing protection.

Protection

Protective tasks include the safeguarding of individuals, communities and installations. Protective measures will tend to use up manpower. Commanders will therefore be mindful of the need to balance protective requirements against the need for more active operational measures.

Individuals. Government officials, prominent citizens, members of the Wider Peacekeeping force or associated relief agencies and their families may be at risk in a military assistance scenario. The scale and extent of precautionary measures (such as the employment of close protection specialists) will be related to the threat, but contingency plans will be made for an increase in the threat. Commanders will make a thorough assessment of the problem and implement appropriate measures. Individuals may often

be at their most vulnerable whilst travelling. Movement, by any means including road (in individual vehicles or by convoy) and rail will be protected by a combination of:

> *precautionary measures* (including basic security safeguards)
> *tactical measures* (for example escorts and picquets)
> *contingency measures* (possibly including such things as airmobile reserve forces).

Protected Areas. The aim of establishing protected areas will be to create the conditions in a defined area within which a community will be able to respect and observe the law, and which will be protected from outside interference and attack. A protected area will be a region where, ultimately, the civil administration works and where the civil community is able to go about its business and live freely without fear. Having established such areas, the controlling authorities will aim to expand them in size and link them up. In Wider Peacekeeping operations, opposing factions may be inextricably mixed together within the area of operations, and establishing protected areas will therefore usually be complex undertakings and depend to a large degree on the cooperation and support of the resident population. The pursuit of civil affairs programmes and lower level community projects will therefore be critical to success in creating protected areas. The development and participation of the civil administration is necessary if a protected area is going to have any chance of long-term success. Generally speaking, the establishment and maintenance of protected areas is fraught with difficulty since they will often cause friction, threaten the perceived impartiality of the Wider Peacekeeping force and demand large amounts of manpower.

Installations. Responsibility for guarding all civil installations rests with the civil police. Military assistance may be required to supplement the police or take over from them if weapons or techniques are required which only the military can supply. Installations will be classified according to their status and local peacekeeping military commanders will view criti-

cally all requests to provide guards. Efficiency demands that the classification of installations and guard commitments be regularly reviewed.

Reaction

The ability of a military force to react is essential to remaining balanced and regaining control over events. In all military assistance operations effective commanders will have reserves and contingency plans to assist the civil authority if required in dealing with outbreaks of violence including terrorism and riotous assemblies. The commander will normally be guided by these authorities, but he will make his own judgement as to what form of military assistance is appropriate, and will remain accountable for his actions.

Control

In military assistance operations, peacekeepers may be called upon to enforce collective control measures. Prohibitions and restrictions are always distasteful to the general public and the imposition of extra controls is likely to be particularly unpopular. Consequently such measures will be carefully planned. The need for them will be made clear, and they should be fairly and equitably applied. As with all military assistance operations, control measures which affect the civil population will be conducted within the law and no restriction will be placed on the movement or general freedom of civilians unless there is legal power or authority to do so. The aims of applying controls will include:

> *Improving the ability of the local security forces to enforce the law,*
> *thus increasing public confidence in government.*
> *Deterring violent or criminal activity.*
> *Restricting the potential for riotous assemblies.*

Limiting the illegal traffic of war supplies or contraband.

Apprehending wanted persons.

Detecting patterns of activity and gaining information.

Control measures will be planned and directed on a joint police/military basis with full cooperation at every level. Ineffective controls will undermine public confidence in the security forces and effective measures should be applied firmly but with understanding. Whenever possible, explanations should be given to the public for actions taken. Controls will not be exercised for any longer than necessary. They may include road blocks, checkpoints, curfews, searches and patrols. Control measures are described in more detail later in the paper.

Coordination

If military assistance operations follow conflict that has been particularly prolonged, violent or widespread, there is likely to be a need for considerable support from relief agencies. A Wider Peacekeeping force may therefore be required to assist the civil authority in coordinating humanitarian relief efforts (covered in the previous section). Coordination tasks could include the investigation of war crimes and human rights abuses.

Timing Force Withdrawal

At a local level, peacekeeping commanders will continually review opportunities for returning responsibility to the civil authority. In general, the criterion for deciding whether to withdraw from a particular military assistance function will be whether or not that function can be protected and exercised by the civil authority without further assistance. Such decisions are sensitive and will require careful judgement. Too early a withdrawal may prove disastrous - but over-prolonged military commit-

ment may prove nearly as harmful. Accordingly, the withdrawal of Wider Peacekeeping commitments within a military assistance operation should be flexible, taking account of the need to respond rapidly to political developments. There may even be a need to recommit military forces. In general, responsible commanders will therefore consider withdrawal from particular military commitments in three possible ways:

Rapidly (if the prospect of success seems assured).
Gradually (in phases which can be slowed down or speeded up). Such phases may relate to functions or geographical regions.
Partially (by changing the rôle of the Wider Peacekeeping force from direct to indirect assistance).

Demobilization Operations

There can be no peace without security. The nature of Wider Peacekeeping operations, therefore, is such as to require at least a rudimentary security framework as a precursor to further activity. Without a modicum of security, the long-term success of any military activity is unlikely. Demobilization operations, representing in effect the implementation of negotiated settlements, are therefore a foundational military task in the Wider Peacekeeping context. In essence, demobilization operations describe the controlled withdrawal, demobilization and rehabilitation of belligerents - something that in the Wider Peacekeeping context would be carried out with the prior agreement of the parties concerned.

Demobilization constitutes those actions taken by a Wider Peacekeeping force to restore and maintain a reasonable level of peace and personal security within a state or region. If fighting on a major scale is in progress, peace enforcement operations may be required which are outside the scope of this paper. In the Wider Peacekeeping context demobilization operations will depend on resolving rather than terminating the conflict. This cannot be achieved without obtaining a substantial level of popular support.

Demobilization can take place at a theatre or local level and effective tactical commanders at all levels will continually review and exploit whatever opportunities they might have of carrying out such operations.

Characteristics

A Wider Peacekeeping force committed to demobilization operations is likely to encounter some or all of the following characteristics in the situation they find themselves:

An ill-defined and widespread area of operations wherein opposing factions may be inextricably mixed. Conflict may be inter or intra state.

Inter-communal violence and atrocity.

Several parties to the conflict, some of which may be hard to identify, undisciplined, lacking restraint and barely accountable to any central or recognized authority.

Sporadic local opposition to the Wider Peacekeeping force.

Widespread unmarked mines and residual ordnance restricting movement.

Stages

There are numerous military tasks that contribute to demobilization. They are considered below in the context of the five main stages to the demobilization process:

Securing agreement
Establishing and managing a ceasefire
Withdrawal and assembly of belligerents
Disarming of belligerents
Dispersal and rehabilitation of belligerents

These stages need not necessarily take place on a theatre-wide basis. They may be adapted and implemented successively in local areas of operation. Essentially, demobilization depends on establishing and sustaining a ceasefire. Subsequent stages depend on the ceasefire being maintained. Demobilization operations may offer opportunities for the Wider Peacekeeping force to delegate joint responsibilities to the belligerent parties. There is also likely to be scope for a considerable degree of cooperation and sharing of resources between the Wider Peacekeeping force and the parties to the conflict.

Stage 1 - Securing Agreement

Securing appropriate prior agreement to demobilization operations is a necessary precursor to the Wider Peacekeeping force's further action. Such agreement will also constitute an important factor in the force's legitimacy. Depending on the level at which the operations are mounted, agreement may stem from anything ranging from a UN Security Council Resolution to a regional peace plan to negotiations brokered between local factions. If possible, the agreement will be made with all parties concerned and should protect the freedom of movement of the Wider Peacekeeping force and include timetables for action. Constructive agreements will focus on establishing and maintaining a ceasefire. Ideally, the agreements will also offer rewards and penalties to motivate compliance by hostile factions.

Stage 2 - Establishing and Managing a Ceasefire

Scope. The supervision of ceasefires has traditionally been associated with classic peacekeeping and has normally depended on a clear and agreed geographical delineation between two opposing factions. However, cease-fires may also be established and supervised in the more difficult and indeterminate circumstances to be found in a Wider Peacekeeping environ-

ment. In such environments a literal ceasefire may prove impossible to achieve. In this situation, ceasefires should be understood as referring to the *cessation of hostile activity*.

Delineated Ceasefires. In geographical terms, a ceasefire may be delineated using the following elements:

Ceasefire Line. The Ceasefire Line marks the forward limit of the positions occupied by opposing factions. It is, by its nature, usually the subject of contention - particularly when it adjoins significant tactical features or locations of national importance.

Buffer Zone. The Buffer Zone is the neutral space (or no-man's land) between ceasefire lines. It may contain residents and farmland which the Wider Peacekeeping force should monitor and protect. Otherwise access to buffer zones will be strictly controlled and normally only be allowed to the supervising authorities. The national civil authority's police may be allowed to enter the zone under the terms of a special agreement. The air space above a Buffer Zone will also be deemed as demilitarized and denied to aircraft of the parties concerned.

Control Zones. Control Zones are mutually agreed areas either side of the Buffer Zone, the forward limits of which will be the Ceasefire Lines. In those areas are set equal upper limits for numbers of personnel, tanks, artillery (by calibre), anti-aircraft weapons and missiles permitted in each area. Every situation will be unique, but an example of Control Zone dimensions in terms of distance from a Ceasefire Line might be as follows:

> *No military personnel within 5 kilometres.*
> *No support weapons within 10 kilometres.*
> *No armour, artillery or missiles within 30 kilometres.*

The agreement and creation of Ceasefire Lines, Buffer Zones and Control Zones constitutes the framework on which ceasefires are established and supervised.

Delineation Factors. The criteria used to determine critical terrain in war are not necessarily applicable to Wider Peacekeeping operations. A

road, civic facility or centre of population in low ground may be more significant than fields of fire from high ground overlooking the area. Economic considerations will also be taken into account when determining a line so that, for example, a farmer is not denied access to water or a route to market for his animals.

Delineation Procedures. The following procedures will normally be used when delineating ceasefire lines, buffer zones and control zones:

If possible the agreement of all parties will be obtained using a common large scale map.

The line will be verified on the ground.

An accurate and detailed description of the lines using agreed grid references will be recorded.

The lines on the ground will be surveyed and marked using painted barrels, oil drums, stakes or wire. The markers will normally be secured in a way that makes them difficult to move.

Agreed entry points to the zones will be clearly marked on the ground and the map.

A record of the lines, signed by all sides, will normally be given to the parties concerned with the original retained by the Wider Peacekeeping force. Alterations should be signed and promulgated in the same way.

If practicable, use may be made of air photography.

Area Ceasefires. In many Wider Peacekeeping environments the opposing parties to a conflict may be inextricably mixed. In this situation a linear ceasfire line using a clear geographical delineation may not be possible. In the place of such ceasefires, areas might be agreed where ceasefires pertain. Area ceasefires of this nature will be difficult to enforce and will require close supervision.

Management of Ceasefires. The effective management of a ceasefire will require numerous observers and liaison teams with independent, reliable and round-the-clock communications to both the Wider Peacekeeping authorities as well as the different parties to the conflict. Good management measures will contain procedures for:

Investigation of alleged breaches of the ceasefire

Attribution of blame to transgressors

Retribution against offenders - ideally carried out by the parent factions of the guilty parties concerned.

Ideally, peacekeeping commanders will rehearse their management procedures and ensure that they remain in close contact with all the parties involved. A prompt, firm and fair reaction to breaches of ceasefire agreements will be the most effective. Delayed and inappropriate reactions will prejudice the ceasefire's credibility and risk a rapid overall degeneration of the general security environment. It may be possible for the Wider Peacekeeping force to mount joint patrols with representatives from each of the factions involved. Such action will serve as a useful confidence-building measure.

Stage 3 - Withdrawal and Assembly of Belligerents

Following a ceasefire, demobilization operations will require the coordinated disengagement and withdrawal of belligerents. This may be done by successively expanding or moving sectors of the buffer zone whilst keeping the Wider Peacekeeping force in between. The aim of this stage will be to move combatants away from the sustaining environment of their base areas and assemble them in secured locations where they can safely disarm. Opposing factions will normally be withdrawn simultaneously. This process is likely to require large numbers of troops and military peacekeeping contingents will need to consider redeployment and reinforcement as a preparatory measure. Because of shortage of manpower, the operation may have to be sequenced, one small (but mutually balanced) area at a time. If supervised at theatre level, combatant elements, once moved to assembly locations, may be regrouped into cantonment areas, where they will remain long enough to allow assembly and disarmament to be completed theatre-wide. Once the cantonment areas are activated, parties will need to be

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accounted for and controlled. They will also require sustainment, including medical care. It may be appropriate to locate cantonment areas adjacent to civil infrastructure facilities so that the groups may be offered gainful employment in reconstructing and developing those facilities. Withdrawal and assembly of belligerent parties will also require the release and exchange of hostages, prisoners of war and bodies. Relocation and cantonment may also be required for vulnerable elements of the civil population although this will normally occur subsequently to the withdrawal and assembly of belligerents required by demobilization operations.

Stage 4 - Disarming of Belligerents

Disarming belligerents is likely to prove the most difficult and dangerous stage of demobilization. If done prematurely, the whole theatre of operations may be destabilized. Psychologically, parties to a conflict will only be prepared to disarm if they are confident that the preceding stages of the demobilization process have been securely carried out and that the resultant change in the security situation can be sustained in the long term. If the Wider Peacekeeper disarms local forces, he will be obliged to guarantee the security of the local population. Such a task is likely to prove demanding and manpower-intensive. Successful disarming will depend too on the combatant's trust of the Wider Peacekeeping force - both in terms of their impartiality as well as their state or region-wide credibility. The latter will depend on the public perception of the Wider Peacekeeping force's military capability and will to carry through the demobilization process, maintain the peace and punish transgressors. A perceived partiality or lack of resolve on the part of the supervising authorities will undermine the entire demobilization process, perhaps fatally. It may prove necessary to phase disarmament in a mutually balanced fashion. Besides collecting weapons from combatants, disarming will include the collection of war supplies from stockpiles and caches and the closure or control of munitions factories. The Wider Peacekeeping force may also have to interdict supply

routes from neighbouring states. The custody and accurate accounting of weapons and war supplies will play a vital part in verifying the completion of the process. Industrial resources that could have a military application (for example petrol) may also need to be controlled.

Stage 5 - Dispersal and Rehabilitation of Belligerents

The final stage of demobilization operations is the dispersal and rehabilitation of belligerents. This stage is principally the responsibility of the civil authority and may therefore leads into the category of Military Assistance operations. It is at this stage that military and civil responsibilities will overlap and careful judgement will be required to time the transition from one authority to the other. It may be that the trust built up between the parties to the conflict and the Wider Peacekeeping force will argue for prolonging their involvement at this stage. At any rate, a transition of authority is only likely to be made when it is judged to be safe. This stage of demobilization may be carried out in conjunction with the reconstitution and reform of the civil authority's police and defence forces which could well include former belligerents who might be re-armed, regrouped and placed under new authority. The planning and supervision of such reform might become the responsibility of a specified element of the Wider Peacekeeping force.

Guarantee and Denial of Movement

The guarantee and denial of movement describes those operations that are mandated to guarantee or deny movement by air, land, or sea in particular areas and over certain routes. Such operations may be mounted to allow ships to pass through a threatened sea lane, or to enable aircraft to reach a besieged city or community. The denial of movement generally focuses on the establishment of no-fly zones over a specified region or community.

Operations to guarantee and deny movement usually involve the coordinated presence of warships and combat aircraft and may involve the synchronized employment of electronic emissions, as well as access to high-level military information assessments. Guarantee and denial measures may overlap with conflict prevention measures, including preventive deployment. The operations are generally sensitive, carrying as they do the risk of sudden escalation and the possible prejudicing of impartiality. Their management and subsequent development may hinge on the interpretation of Rules of Engagement. In Wider Peacekeeping operations, guarantee and denial of movement operations are therefore normally controlled at the operational or strategic level.

Comment

Analysis of Wider Peacekeeping tasks themselves and the range of environments in which the tasks might be undertaken generally point in one particular direction. The most common conclusion of such assessments indicates that the practical demands of Wider Peacekeeping tasks require a significant degree of local cooperation. Cooperation, of course, depends on the presence of a sufficiency of consent. Peacekeepers are most likely to succeed if they are able to convince the belligerent factions of a link between compliance and mutual advantage and when all concerned have something to gain from the peace process. Assessments of hypothetical Wider Peacekeeping scenarios indicate that peacekeepers cannot succeed in the face of entrenched, widespread opposition. Forcible pacification (even if possible with the limited resources normally allocated to a peacekeeping mission) cannot in practical terms represent an effective long term method for addressing Wider Peacekeeping tasks. Without the broad cooperation and consent of the majority of the local population and the leadership of the principal ruling authorities, be they parties to the dispute or government agencies, success is simply not a reasonable or realistic expectation. The risks entailed and force levels required of an approach

that dispensed with a broad consensual framework would render impractical most operations that might be mounted in a Wider Peacekeeping context. Substantial cooperation is necessary for any prospect of lasting success. Put simply, consent (in its broadest form) within the theatre of operations is a pre-requisite to success.

Chapter three
Empirical evidence

Regardless of theory, what counts is what works - and pragmatism is usually an appropriate basis for investigation. Of UNPROFOR, the UN Secretary General has said: "...the UN peacekeeping plan is not viable until various local authorities extend the necessary cooperation..."[7] The same theatre of operations is rich with first-hand post operational reports of practitioners at the tactical level which make the same point:

The British Forces policy of aid movement by consent kept the route open throughout..... Escalation was avoided. This led to all sides generally respecting British Force's impartiality.... The use of force to deliver aid would not have worked as blanket saturation of the country by UNPROFOR is not feasible.[8]

Freedom of movement cannot, under the present mandate, be established by force. Negotiation at all levels is essential. Whilst this may take time, it has been successful.[9]

Squadron concept of operations was always 'Operations by Consent'... Patience, knowledge and a clear aim were vital attributes to negotiating with local forces. Aggressive behaviour gained no ground and just escalated the situation.[10]

Liaison Officers were deployed...to begin the development of a framework of trust and confidence that was to prove fundamental to the success of the Group's mission... The concept of a framework of confidence and trust based on the establishing of relationships between the local military, political and civil personalities and the Battalion Group...remained the key to executing the mission.... It was these

personal relationships which underwrote the ability of the Group to be pro-active in its concept of operations... The resolving of or attempted mediation in local and national inter-ethnic disputes was a major part of the Battalion Group's efforts... The conduct of negotiation...required enormous restraint and patience...[11]

Avoidance of escalation, impartiality, negotiation, patience, trust, confidence, the developing of relationships, mediation, and restraint do not constitute a disparate collection of useful characteristics and principles. They each serve to develop cooperation by protecting and supporting consent. The requirement for consent is, as it were, the parent of the principles and techniques described in the foregoing practitioners' reports. The same message emerges from the post Cold War peacekeeping experience in Mozambique and Cambodia. Successive UN Security Council resolutions urged and encouraged the government of Mozambique and RENAMO to comply with the terms of a peace agreement and cooperate with ONUMOZ.[12] In November 1993 the UN Secretary General noted in a report that he had stressed to the leaders of the two parties that the UN could only facilitate the peace process. It could not promote peace without their cooperation. UNAMIC and UNTAC similarly depended on the cooperation of all parties in overseeing a ceasefire, disarming and demobilizing belligerents, monitoring human rights, overseeing the national administration, and assisting and monitoring the election process. Such tasks could only have been successfully concluded with the substantial consent of the population and interested parties. To preserve consent, the Secretary General's Special Representative in Cambodia resisted pressure for enforcement action against non-cooperative elements of the Khmer Rouge.

The Somalian peacekeeping experience provides a mixed record, but one from which striking lessons emerge. Following a deterioration of the security situation in Mogadishu, United States units sought to coerce cooperation - using force that was sometimes proactive and far from discriminating in its effect. Commonwealth and European armies, on the

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other hand, tended to adopt approaches which were not so confrontational relying less on the explicit use of force and more on fostering local support for the UN's long term peace objectives. This difference in approach had a crucial effect on the ways in which contingents interpreted UNOSOM mandates. The American commanders of UNOSOM, for example, interpreted their mandate as allowing them to disarm the Somali militias by force without exhausting peaceful remedies. The intensive application of firepower was often seen as an appropriate response to widespread opposition. US Major General William Garrison, commander of a task force of Delta Force commandos and Army Rangers in Mogadishu disclosed in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee that he had been refused access to an AC-130 aerial gunship, but said that he had plenty of fire support from helicopters to make up for its absence. "If we had put one more ounce of lead on South Mogadishu on the night of 3 and 4 October, I believe it would have sunk," he added.[13] This approach contrasts starkly with that of the Commonwealth and European armies in Somalia. The policy laid down for the Australian contingent there by Lieutenant Colonel Hurley, their Operations Officer, was recorded as follows:

> *Hurley made it clear to the officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers in the 1 Royal Australian Regiment Group that their business was to be, 'Firm, fair and friendly.' He would not tolerate acts of violence against Somali citizens and emphasised the importance of the Rules of Engagement which restricted the firing of weapons to situations where weapons had been raised against them. In effect, the initiative was given to armed Somalis. The Rules of Engagement tested the training, self discipline and character of every commander and soldier. At the same time Hurley emphasised the requirement to make a difference by showing that Australians were following a strict code of personal and professional conduct.[14]*

Frequent references occur in diaries and other sources of Hurley's efforts to keep the level of violence towards Somalis in check and exercised in

accordance with the Rules of Engagement. Notwithstanding their different sector situations, the practical worth of the Australian approach compared to the American one was amply demonstrated by events and speaks for itself. Baidoa was a success, Mogadishu was not. The restraint and conciliatory nature of the Belgian and French operations in Somalia also demonstrated the success of such a conceptual approach. In describing the consequences of lack of conciliatory action and the excessive use of force in Somalia, an OXFAM Briefing Paper reinforces this point and underscores the need for consent:

> *In Somalia, violence in Mogadishu in June 1993 meant that Oxfam international staff had to be temporarily evacuated. Between then and October, there was considerable loss of life, due in part to UN actions. To a significant degree, this stemmed from UNOSOM II placing too much stress on the immediate and uneven disarmament of only specific groups, and not enough on long-term political reconciliation. Indeed UNOSOM II's work for political reconstruction has been pursued without much sensitivity to local realities, and therefore without success... The excessive use of UN force in Somalia between June and October 1993 caused many civilian deaths and alienated large sections of the population.[15]*

Following a research visit to Somalia in May/June 1993, John Mackinlay succinctly summarized the attitudes at battalion level within UNOSOM towards the need for consent and local support:

> *There is unanimity at <u>battalion</u> level that without a substantial level of local support, UN efforts to restore security will be fruitless and more seriously, the day to day security of military bases and humanitarian relief personnel could not be guaranteed. For example as long as the Pakistan Brigade in South Mogadishu concentrated its urban security operations against individual criminals and small bandit gangs it enjoyed the support of the local people. However when UN policy, and*

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consequently battalion operations, began to act against the interests of the local war lord, he mobilised his resources against them and the Pakistanis' security of movement and the modus vivendi *of the district were seriously jeopardised. Without human intelligence sources and the dialogue resulting from effective community policing by locals, any battalion surrounded by a potentially hostile population becomes vulnerable and isolated regardless of its legal mandate to use force and the overall coercive powers held at force level. The need for local support has,* de facto *regardless of UN operational policy, encouraged the more alert battalion commanders in both forces visited to devote time and important assets to fostering good community relations in their immediate environment.[16]*

A study of present day peacekeeping thus reveals a theme that repeatedly highlights the central significance of consent, and the key importance of giving priority to those principles and techniques that protect, sustain and develop consent.

Cold War Collateral

The history of peacekeeping operations during the Cold War provides ample collateral evidence of the need for consent. Some academic literature has emphasized the novel nature of peace support operations post Cold War. And indeed much *is* new, not least the general scale, participation, complexity and hybrid nature of such commitments, involving as they do large numbers of government and non-governmental agencies. However, lest babies be thrown out with bathwater, care should be taken not to interpret these fresh aspects too radically. A study of previous peacekeeping operations shows that most Wider Peacekeeping tasks have already been done during the Cold War under the label of peacekeeping - an undramatic conclusion, but one that takes honest account of historical records. Wider Peacekeeping tasks were part and parcel of many Cold War

peacekeeping operations - not so much in the experience of the Permanent Five (sometimes necessarily excluded because of the Cold War) - but certainly in the UN's experience at large, as well as in the experience of other non-UN peacekeeping operations conducted by national and multinational bodies (for example the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, the Multi-National Force in Beirut and the Arab Defence Force in the Lebanon). 'The Blue Helmets'[17] and numerous similar publications bear testimony to this. Peace enforcement and operations mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter were no strangers to the Cold War - an era when there was surprising unanimity within the Security Council, albeit tempered by a difference of approach. Of course there are differences post Cold War. More often the environment in which these tasks are done today is volatile and prone to escalation in violence - often requiring the commitment of professional, well-trained, well-equipped armies prepared for rapid and unexpected transitions in the nature and intensity of activity. However, the *intrinsic* nature of Wider Peacekeeping tasks seems not to be unique and differs little from the fundamental nature of many Cold War operations. It appears, therefore, that Wider Peacekeeping today does not reflect so much a novel departure from the norm as a developing emphasis of features that have always been part of peacekeeping. Aspects of UNFICYP,[18] UNEF I and II[19] and UNDOF[20] could be described as conflict prevention. ONUC,[21] UNSF,[22] UNTEA[23] and MNF I and II[24] were concerned with military assistance, including the maintenance of law and order. Demobilization operations were conducted by UNTSO,[25] UNIPOM[26] and the CMF.[27] Operations guaranteeing and denying movement were undertaken by ONUC, UNFICYP and UNEF II. Humanitarian aid, although on a lesser scale than such operations today, was part and parcel of most Cold War peacekeeping. The similarities of Cold War peacekeeping to that of the post Cold War period seem thus more significant than their differences. Indeed the label 'Cold War' of the generation of peacekeeping operations conducted between 1948-1988 is misleading in that it degrades their apparent relevance. When examined closely, the *essential* characteristics of contemporary Wider Peacekeeping operations differ little from the

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characteristics of those of that went before.

Cold War history, then, has something to teach us concerning the conduct of peacekeeping operations today. And the results are interesting. Then as now, it appeared that popular support, building a framework of confidence, trust and cooperation and patiently conducting negotiations - all those activities were foundational to success. It seemed that seeking to promote and sustain consent was the most important activity in which peacekeeping missions could engage. Again and again the history of peacekeeping shows that consent was the only effective vehicle for carrying peacekeeping operations forward. Cold War history thus provides collateral for the conclusions reached by the theoretical assessments and pragmatism of contemporary practitioners' post operational reports.

Chapter four
Managing consent

Once the nature and requirement for consent has been identified as the crucial differential between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, a valid approach to peacekeeping requires that differential to be interpreted and applied doctrinally. If a force is introduced into a conflict situation with the consent of the different parties to the conflict, their operational conduct should seek to preserve that consensual divide. There are various ways that the consent barrier might be breached and case histories of multinational peacekeeping operations (in particular the Multinational Force in Beirut in 1983 and operations in Somalia in 1993) demonstrate the consequences (pictured below) of an inadvertent crossing of the consent boundary from peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

If perceived to be taking sides or using force in a crass, unfocused way that alienates support, the peacekeeping contingent would reduce its status to

that of one of the parties to the conflict, prejudicing its ability to control events and losing its legitimacy and credibility as a trustworthy third party, thereby setting at risk its own security. In effect, the force would join the conflict and becomes part of the problem it was there to resolve. The force's resources would then become ever more devoted to protecting itself. It would actually join the conflict it was there to police and be likely to become embroiled in activities that were irrelevant to the overall campaign aim. Such a situation would almost certainly result in a loss of popular support, an attendant loss of control and an unrestricted escalation upwards in the ambient level of violence, heightening political tension and foreclosing opportunities for resolving the conflict. To cross the consent divide is also to cross a Rubicon. Once on the other side, there would be very little chance of getting back and the only way out would probably be by leaving the theatre, as events in both Beirut and Somalia demonstrated. Critical principles, therefore, which will guard against crossing the consent barrier are depicted below:

The ability of the force to contribute to conflict resolution depends upon the exercise of the principles shown above which will protect its third party referee status. Such status is key to the force's self-protection. Consent is thus supported by the principles identified below:

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+---------------------------------------------------+
|  CONSENT                                          |
+---------------------------+-----------------------+
|  IMPARTIALITY             |  MINIMUM FORCE        |
+---------------------------+-----------------------+
|  LEGITIMACY               |  CREDIBILITY          |
+---------------------------+-----------------------+
|  MUTUAL RESPECT           |  TRANSPARENCY         |
+---------------------------+-----------------------+
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
Lessons learned reports have also highlighted the need for continual effort to transmit consent between the operational and tactical levels. For example, if the theatre commander has secured the agreement of a faction leader to a particular course of action, he should then do everything he can to have that agreement transmitted down to those faction members facing his tactical commanders in the field. Similarly, one of the most useful peace-keeping commodities that a tactical commander can pass on to his subordinates are the fruits of agreement reached with local faction leaders.

Consent will be further promoted if the parties to a conflict can be endowed with vested interests in successfully resolving their own dispute. If the belligerents can somehow be made shareholders of the peace process, then their motivation to cooperate will be greatly increased. At the tactical level, this possibility may be pursued by creating incentive-based opportunities for parties to the conflict to cooperate together in jointly carrying out certain Wider Peacekeeping tasks. Such action would be risky and difficult but, as another dimension of consent-promoting possibilities, deserves consideration.

Impartiality

Impartiality emerges as a fundamental determinant of the peacekeeper's rôle. Of the principles listed above, it has the widest and most significant application. An analogy serves to illustrate the importance of impartiality to Wider Peacekeeping at a more practical level. In a game of rugby one referee on the field is able to control the course of the game. He acts as supreme adjudicator between the opposing sides, determining when the game starts and finishes and supervising all activities in between. On the field the referee is outnumbered 30:1 and he stands no chance of exerting his will by force. A vital element of his ability to control the other players is the perceived legitimacy of his status as referee. A key ingredient of that legitimacy is his impartiality. If his status as a legitimate authority is lost, he immediately loses control. To protect himself in such an eventuality he would need up to 29 other referees to create a 1:1 ratio with the players. If he wished to *control* the conflict in that situation, he would need, say, a minimum ratio of 3:1. In other words he would require the assistance of 89 other referees. This analogy thus demonstrates the key importance of the Wider Peacekeeper's legitimate status as an impartial third party to the conflict. It also demonstrates the exponential rise in force levels that compromised impartiality and a transition to peace enforcement would require.

Impartial conduct by peacekeepers will derive from and, in turn, sustain consent. If consent is to be protected, sustained and developed, impartiality must characterize all peacekeeping activities at all levels, from the formulation of mandates to the conduct of individual soldiers in theatre. The loss, perceived or real, of impartiality may have very serious consequences. At best, loss of impartiality is likely to result in the displacement of any trust and confidence that a Wider Peacekeeping force might have with local factions, thus limiting the options open to the force in resolving the conflict. At worst, the loss of impartiality could trigger an uncontrolled escalation to a peace enforcement scenario leading to widespread and unrestrained violence, heavy civilian and military casualties and the failure of

the mission. In commenting on the situation in Somalia, Richard Connaughton wrote: "As a rule, states should stay clear of civil wars but, if they are drawn in, it is essential that they remain impartial. If they lean to one side or another, they risk spawning an armed alliance against themselves."[28] Cedric Thornberry, former Head of Civil Affairs in Zagreb, has commented: "Without impartiality, the primary virtue, a UN peacekeeping operation will self-destruct."[29] Wise peacekeepers will therefore aim to preserve and demonstrate impartiality whenever possible. Their dealings, whether operational, administrative or social will be conducted without favour to any particular party or any single point of view. Even such actions as offering lifts may be misinterpreted, innocently or deliberately, by onlookers. Perceived balances of favour will be sought in all activities. Threats to impartiality will thrive on ignorance and misunderstanding. Consequently, effective peacekeeping commanders will make repeated efforts at the earliest opportunity to explain clearly the rôle of their forces and to develop the best possible relations with all elements of the local communities. Regular contacts and conference opportunities will need to be maintained with all parties to the conflict. An active and imaginative public and community information campaign will prove an essential tool for such tasks.

The UNTAC experience bears out the significance of impartiality. The Preliminary Study of Lessons Learnt by the UNTAC Military Component submitted by the Force Commander to the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Cambodia on 31 August 1993 repeatedly highlighted the key importance of neutrality and impartiality:

> *It can be said that nations from the North, the South, the former East and the West were unified by their neutrality in pursuit of a common goal in Cambodia... The absolute neutrality of each of these participants was critical to internal mutual respect and ultimately, unity of purpose... A lesson learned by the UNTAC Military Component was that neutrality and unity were the strength of the Force. Impartiality in its actions would not have been perceived if any component member*

had wavered in this regard. Attempts to undermine this strength were made. The international community was resolute in its defence of these principles, thereby ensuring their sanctity. Success in Cambodia can be extrapolated to other areas of UN operations. The same universal commitment by soldiers and governments will be critical to success there also... the composition of the UNTAC Military Component ensured a balance which allowed a strongly neutral stance.[30]

Similarly, the post operation report on the UK's military participation in UNTAC stated: "Operating unarmed, the UNMOs' strongest asset was seen to be their neutrality in operating with the Factions. This factor was demonstrated by the low number of UNMO casualties..."[31]

Humanitarian requirements have frequently been the cause of post Cold War peacekeeping deployments. The perspectives of non-governmental relief organizations are therefore worth considering. In discussing the relationship of military and humanitarian organizations, Neill Wright of the UNHCR made the following comment on the ICRC:

The ICRC...have considerable experience of operating in war zones, and it is in such high risk situations that they depend most on being perceived as impartial and neutral to prevent the warring factions from targeting their staff.[32]

The Mohonk Criteria quote impartiality, neutrality and independence as constituting three of the five fundamental principles that should govern all humanitarian assistance.[33] They go on to state that peacekeeping personnel facilitating humanitarian assistance must remain neutral and non-political.[34] Save the Children describe the UN's neutrality as: "the most valuable asset in any humanitarian operation." Their Position Paper continues:

Many NGOs have experienced the fall-out from the perceived or deliberate lack of UN neutrality, and its consequences for UN credibil-

ity. In situations (like Somalia and Iraqi Kurdistan) when NGOs should have been looking to the UN humanitarian operation for a lead and a strategic operational framework, they have instead been forced to avoid association with compromised UN efforts. Only by distancing themselves from the UN have they been able to guarantee the credibility and continuation of their own operations.[35]

In developing recommendations, an OXFAM Briefing Paper goes on to say:

...military action in crises that threaten civilian populations should not be authorized unless... all non-violent methods have failed... It must be limited to specific aims, and impartially driven... There should also be strict and impartial criteria for the behaviour of military forces acting under the auspices of the UN.[36]

Like consent, impartiality will be far from exact or absolute. It will not be enough for a peacekeeping mission to operate impartially - it must be *seen* to operate impartially. Belligerent parties will always be likely to accuse peacekeepers of showing favour to their opponents and in practice the concept of impartiality will appear fragmentary. But none of this detracts from the importance of impartiality as a principal determinant of the shaping and conducting of peacekeeping operations. At all levels of direction and management, impartiality should be protected and developed. The point is not that impartiality can be perfected, but rather that peacekeepers should strive to preserve impartiality and never deliberately abandon it.

Minimum Force

A successful concept for peacekeeping post Cold War must examine closely the relationship of Wider Peacekeeping to the use of force. 'Mini-

mum Force' describes the body of principles governing the use of force. The way in which force is used will be a critical determinant of the course that a Wider Peacekeeping operation takes - the unrestricted use of force in a peacekeeping operation is likely to cross the consent divide more swiftly than anything else. The long term effects of force may prove substantially different from the short term ones - a tactical success resulting from the use of force may lead to a long term strategic failure. This is because the use of force in a Wider Peacekeeping environment is likely to have profound repercussions that go beyond the demands of the immediate tactical situation. Many aspects of the overall operation are likely to be affected. The use of force tends in the long term to attract a response in kind and its use may heighten tension, polarize opinion, foreclose negotiating opportunities, prejudice the perceived impartiality of the Wider Peacekeeping contingent, and escalate the overall level of violence. Its use may embroil a peacekeeping force in a harmful long-term conflict that is irrelevant to the campaign aim. Collateral damage may also set back any developing civil affairs programme and adversely affect the overall attitude of the indigenous population to the Wider Peacekeeping contingent. The use of force therefore carries disproportionate risk of which commanders at all levels must take careful account, and decisions concerning its application are likely to prove the most critical that a commander will take. The use of force is thus a complex topic with many facets. It represents a crucial aspect of Wider Peacekeeping operations and merits the closest attention of all military personnel. A conceptual understanding of the importance of consent and impartiality is foundational to the correct use of force.

The misuse of force, in other words, risks destabilizing peacekeeping operations and causing an uncontrolled and violent transition to peace enforcement. Judgements concerning the use of force are therefore likely to be the most critical that a peacekeeping practitioner will make. An effective concept must offer guidance as to what is permissible, where the boundaries lie, what alternative options to the use of force might exist and what principles should guide its application.

The identification of the critical consent divide allows the use of force

to be addressed in a way that takes full account of its wider connotations. The need to preserve consent does *not* foreclose the use of force by peacekeepers. Indeed, consent may serve to marginalize opposition and render it vulnerable to the use of force. If a strong consensual framework reduces the status of armed action against peacekeepers to that of maverick, unrepresentative opposition, then force may be employed against it without fear of fracturing the consent divide. In the words of Mats Berdal:

> *If the military threat posed by the non-cooperation of parties is limited to small-scale resistance, banditry and looting and the principal parties to the conflict remain committed to an agreement, a peacekeeping force may be empowered to confront it.*[37]

For this reason, the use of force - even though mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter - may represent a valid consensual *peacekeeping* technique. Consent can thus *facilitate*, not hinder the use of force.

The above diagram shows the use of force in three different ways. What distinguishes them is not scale or intensity. Rather it is their effect on

perceptions. The use of force annotated indicates force that is exerted with the general agreement of local popular opinion - perhaps against crime or banditry - indicates a use of force that breaches the tactical edge of the consent divide, causing local upset. In such circumstances, stability may be retained if the *operational* boundary to the consent divide is preserved intact - the consent of faction leaders at theatre level may serve to contain ructions at lower levels. The use of force in these situations, although dangerous, is therefore not necessarily fatal to the overall stability of the peacekeeping operation. The downing of the three Serb combat aircraft violating the Bosnian no-fly zone is an example of this use of force. There were no substantial come-backs because the action was recognized as reasonable by the faction leaders at the operational level. If, however, force is used in a way that breaches both the tactical *and* operational levels of consent - then destabilization and a transition to peace enforcement becomes a serious likelihood:

Field commanders should judge their applications of force carefully on a case-by-case basis according to their prevailing situations. The foregoing considerations should assist such judgements, however, and guide the formulation of military doctrine concerning the use of force.

The principle of impartiality will also offer guidance on whether and

how force might be employed. For example, force may be used impartially in large measure to protect a humanitarian convoy against whoever might choose to attack it. However, the bombing of a particular faction *because* it was that faction would clearly abandon impartiality since it would represent a pre-emptive and deliberate attack to the detriment of one party to the conflict and the advantage of the others. Such a use of force would cross the consent divide with all the likely consequences that have been described.

Wider Peacekeeping doctrine will need to explain, therefore, that the consequences of using force reach far beyond the immediate tactical situation. Many aspects require consideration besides Rules of Engagement. Doctrine should specify a philosophy towards the use of force that takes account of its long term effects. Military commanders will need to take many factors into account when reaching decisions concerning the use of force. The commander should always perform a mission analysis which transcends the short term requirements of the tactical situation and takes into account the long term campaign aims. To preserve the consensual framework so vital to success in Wider Peacekeeping operations, responsible commanders will seek to defuse situations, de-escalate rather than inflame tensions and lend preference to actions that in the long term move the situation downwards through the spectrum of violence. Effective Wider Peacekeeping operations will be characterized by a reluctance rather than predisposition to the use of force. The commander will need principles to guide his use of force and should be trained to consider all possible alternatives to the use of force before making a final decision. Generally speaking, in a Wider Peacekeeping operation, commanders should regard the use of force as a last resort. Alternatives to the use of force include the following:

Deterrence. The requirement to use force may be avoided through the skilful use of deterrent measures such as interposition or deployment in strength. The presence of sufficient numbers of forces at the scene of a potential incident will tend to diminish the confidence of a would-be aggressor and allow the commander on the spot a wider spectrum of options to counter an incident. An insufficient force level at the scene of a

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crisis is more likely to require resort to a harmful use of force. Good planning and rehearsals will characterise anticipatory deterrent measures.

Threats. An *implicit* (ie unspecified) threat is no different from deterrence. However, consideration may occasionally be given to the use of *explicit* threats. To be effective such threats must be credible, thus committing a commander to the possible use of force. A wise peacekeeping commander will therefore never make threats that he is unsure of being able to carry out. Threats should not go beyond the limit of actions that might destabilize a peacekeeping scenario by rupturing consent at the operational level. As such they should be a last resort before the use of force. If made, threats should be strictly impartial and have at least the implicit prior consent of belligerent leaders and interested parties.

Negotiation and Mediation. Negotiation and mediation may be used to reconcile differences among belligerents both to each other and the Wider Peacekeeping force. In many societies, self-esteem and group honour are of great importance and simple face-saving measures to preserve a party's dignity may serve to relax tension and defuse a crisis.

Control Measures. Control measures such as pre-planned or improvised roadblocks, cordons, curfews, access control and checkpoints may be employed to avoid the use of force. For example vehicles might be used to block thoroughfares or remove unauthorized persons from sensitive locations. Sniping may be constrained by limiting the movement of weapons or by denying access to vantage points. Similarly, the potential for riots may be mitigated by restricting the ability of crowds to assemble.

Rewards and Penalties. Force is not the only means of compulsion. Rewards and penalties can often be used to encourage cooperation. When military forces control the distribution of basic resources, such resources can be withheld or granted to direct and shape local behaviour and cooperation. However, such action will need to be carefully judged in order not to compromise the impartial image of the contingent in the eyes of the local population.

Protection. Effective protection, for example armoured personnel carriers, will reduce the opportunities open to would-be aggressors to

mount attacks on Wider Peacekeeping contingents and will deflate the confidence of belligerent parties. In the event of being attacked, effective protection will obviate the necessity of an early resort by peacekeeping forces to lethal responsive measures. In a crisis, effective protection will allow the considered application of a wider range of non-lethal options.

Warning. Parties to a conflict should be left in no doubt about the circumstances under which a Wider Peacekeeping contingent might be obliged to use force. If appropriate, warning procedures for each circumstance may need to be provided to the belligerents and they should be given specific warnings if their continuing activities are likely to incur a use of force.

Non-Lethal Use of Force. Force itself need not be lethal. When authorized, incapacitants and riot control agents, including the use of batons, may preclude the need to resort to more deadly measures. Military peacekeeping commanders will therefore need to develop and practice the capabilities for measured non-lethal responses to potential crises.

A timely response is usually essential in containing potential crises and limiting escalation. To be effective, therefore, alternatives to the use of force will normally be carried out on the spot and at the lowest level possible. Pre-planning, anticipatory briefing and rehearsal are essential preparatory measures.

Rules of Engagement (ROE) are directives that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which force may be used. ROE will reflect legal, political and diplomatic constraints and will have been developed at the highest level. In Wider Peacekeeping situations, ROE will always authorize the self-defence of those conducting operations. They may also offer extended powers to use force in defence of mandated activities, for example the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, ROE will seldom anticipate every situation and commanders and leaders at all levels will need to interpret them intelligently in the light of long-term campaign aims. ROE should never inhibit a commander's responsibility to take all necessary and appropriate action to protect his force. Peacekeeping commanders at all levels will need to know how to request changes to ROE and have

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access to an immediate means of doing so. The requirement to change the ROE may result from local tactical emergencies. Situations requiring an immediate change to ROE might include the intervention of combat forces from a hostile nation or attacks by sophisticated weapon systems including nuclear, biological, or chemical devices.

Guidelines. If force has to be used, it should be controlled by the following principles:

Impartiality. Impartiality is a crucial determinant of the methods by which force might be employed. As a guideline it should therefore be uppermost in the minds of military commanders. The abandonment of impartiality equates to the abandonment of the Wider Peacekeeping contingent's third party supervisory rôle. In using force in such a way, the contingent would be seen to be taking sides and joining the conflict. The damage to its perceived legitimacy would prejudice the contingent's security as well as its ability to supervise belligerent activities. Force will therefore always need to be used impartially and not applied in ways that might be seen as deliberately favouring or penalizing particular factions.

Minimum Necessary Force. Minimum necessary force has been defined in British peacekeeping doctrine as *the measured application of violence or coercion, sufficient only to achieve a specific end, demonstrably reasonable, proportionate and appropriate; and confined in effect to the specific and legitimate target intended.*[38] The principle asserts that only the appropriate amount of force proportional to the particular situation should be used. The degree of force used must be no greater than that reasonably necessary under the circumstances. Non-lethal force would normally be appropriate to control disturbances, uphold law and order, and to apprehend or detain criminals. Controlling force in this way will demand restraint, discipline and control. Unnecessary collateral damage should be avoided at all costs. Reprisals and the pre-emptive (ie first use) of force are inappropriate to Wider Peacekeeping operations.

Observe Legal Limits. ROE, international, domestic and host nation law establish authoritative limits on the ways and means in which force may be used. Those limits should not be transgressed.

Firmness. The use of force should be accompanied at every stage by a display of firmness and determination. If a Wider Peacekeeping unit is seen to lack confidence, it may be further challenged, resulting in an unnecessarily high level of response.

Warning. If possible, the use of force should be preceded by clear warnings.

Escape Route. Before using force, a peacekeeping unit will ensure that belligerents can disperse or withdraw safely from the incident. Lethal force should not be used against belligerents who are in a position from which they cannot escape.

Defensive Locations. In anticipation of the consequences of using force, defensive locations should be reconnoitred, prepared for occupation and protected. If appropriate, such locations should include shelters to protect troops from shell, mortar and rocket fire. Their occupation should be rehearsed.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy derives from the perception that the Wider Peacekeeping mission, as well as its *execution* of the mission, is just. The higher the degree of legitimacy ascribed to the Wider Peacekeeping force by the international community and the parties to the conflict, the greater is the likelihood of success. It is therefore essential that military forces act, and are seen to act within the domestic, national, international and military law, as well as within the UN Mandate and the Status Of Forces Agreement. Perceived failure to do so could strip the force of its legitimacy, authority and, ultimately, its operational effectiveness. Legitimacy will also encourage the wider participation of the international community and non-governmental organizations. Commanders must beware of doing anything that might prejudice the perceived legitimacy of their forces. Inappropriate conduct off duty or the slightest evidence of corrupt practices at any level will damage the overall legitimacy of the contingent. The highest standards

of conduct and integrity will need to be observed by all peacekeeping personnel. Military commanders should be prepared to take severe disciplinary action against those who violate such standards.

Credibility

Wider Peacekeeping operations demand the commitment of a credible force. Such credibility will depend on the force's perceived capability to carry out its mission. Only then will those concerned (including the belligerents) have confidence in the force's activities. Credibility is a key psychological element of success and, at the tactical level, will derive from three elements:

Resources
Execution
Concept of operations

Adequate resources must be effectively employed in pursuing a realistic concept of operations.

Credibility will be high on the peacekeeping commander's list of considerations and will devolve from demonstrations of a manifest capability backed up by a will to use it. Gross violations of the UN mandate by belligerents should be answered quickly and correctly. The first few hours of a ceasefire, for example, are the most important to enforce. All personnel of a Wider Peacekeeping force will be required to bolster their force's credibility by a consistent, disciplined, thorough and effective performance of their duties. At the tactical level, credibility will demand balanced forces that can escalate or de-escalate their activities as required.

Mutual Respect

The Wider Peacekeeping environment is likely to create friction between the recognized parties to a conflict and the Wider Peacekeeping force. Notwithstanding such friction, the force will always need to hold the respect of the belligerent factions. If that respect has been lost, action will require to be taken as a matter of priority to restore it. Such respect should be mutual and, whilst a Wider Peacekeeping force will enjoy certain immunities, its members should respect the host country's laws, language, religion, culture and social customs and show patience and respect for the problems and negotiating positions of the belligerents wherever possible. Gratuitous offence to local cultures are likely to prove seriously counter-productive and should be avoided at all costs. Mutual respect, if fostered, will contribute to the development of local trust and confidence so essential to the overall consensual framework of a Wider Peacekeeping operation.

This principle also applies to relationships within a multinational Wider Peacekeeping force where mutual respect will need to be cultivated between the various nationalities represented. The multinational nature of forces conducting Wider Peacekeeping operations allows no place for national prejudices and chauvinism. Lack of sensitivities in this area may create profound damage to long-term prospects of success.

Transparency

It is important that a Wider Peacekeeping force's actions should not be misinterpreted by the parties to the conflict or the local populace. Such misunderstandings may prove dangerous in times of tension. A force's activities will therefore need to be manifestly 'above-board' and not be vulnerable to accusations of pursuing an illicit hidden agenda. Consistent with the prevailing requirements for operational security, therefore,

the parties to a conflict in a Wider Peacekeeping environment should be made as fully aware as possible of the motive, mission and intentions of the UN force. A failure to communicate this will foster suspicion and may prevent the development of confidence and trust, thus prejudicing prospects for future conciliation and cooperation. Transparency is therefore a highly desirable characteristic of Wider Peacekeeping operations and should be promoted whenever possible. It will require active management.

Chapter five
Managing the operational environment

If the philosophical approach that recognizes the central and determining significance of consent is correct, it should provide a basis for development - development which will serve to guide the planning, direction and conduct of peacekeeping missions. The development of a consent-based philosophy gives rise to realistic strategic guidelines and a practical doctrine for Wider Peacekeeping. The most critical elements of this doctrine are the consent-promoting principles described in the previous chapter. These consensual principles are key and deserve the closest attention. However they also form a foundation for identifying principles which serve to guide the allocation of peacekeeping resources and the physical management of the operational environment. Controlling the broad variety of Wider Peacekeeping environments demands the application of those additional principles listed below:

> MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
> Coherence
> Coordination & Liaison
> Flexibility
> Security
> Consentration of force
> Freedom of movement

Unlike the consent principles, most of the management principles are, in military circles, standard principles of war which read across to the peacekeeping environment without too much difficulty. Some, like coordination, liaison and freedom of movement serve well in addressing the peculiar requirements of Wider Peacekeeping.

Coherence

The UN mandate will determine the overall aim of the Wider Peacekeeping force. At the tactical level this aim will need to be translated into clearly defined, coherent and achievable objectives towards which all military activity is directed so that unity of effort is achieved. These objectives will have to be fully understood and consistently pursued by all members of the Wider Peacekeeping force at every level. It is through the common pursuit of such objectives that coherence will be achieved. Provided the security of the force is not prejudiced, parties to the conflict should be fully appraised of these objectives and, if possible, be afforded opportunities of contributing to their achievement.

When formulating the objectives, tactical commanders will take full account of the limitations imposed by the Mandate, Status of Forces Agreement, Rules of Engagement and other factors. However, submission to such limitations should not be allowed to inhibit the fullest consideration and exploitation of whatever residual scope there might be for imaginative military operations which consistently pursue realistic objectives.

Coordination and Liaison

As well as being multinational, Wider Peacekeeping operations are likely to involve a wide range of organizations including civil powers, UN relief agencies and non-governmental organizations. Privately-sponsored individuals may also be taking part in activities such as humanitarian relief. Although within a military area of operations, it is unlikely that such agencies will be placed under military control and peacekeeping commanders will need to appreciate that even at the lowest tactical level their own actions may be but one element of a variety of diplomatic and humanitarian activities over which they have no direct control. The potential for inconsistency and clashes of interest is therefore high. The timely and effective coordination of these agencies is thus likely to prove essential to the

successful execution of the campaign plan at the tactical level. Commanders will therefore need to seek to establish coordination mechanisms that take account of and impart coherence to all elements of activity in their operational area. As well as military operations, the coordination mechanisms should embrace political, diplomatic, civil, administrative, legal and humanitarian agents including the press and other internationally-sponsored military and civil contingents in the area, civil police, administrative representatives, and ongoing negotiations with the parties to the conflict.

Coordination mechanisms should be supported by extensive liaison with all involved parties and communities upwards, downwards and sideways. The ability to deploy large numbers of liaison officers with their own transport and communications will prove invaluable to the commander, both for information and coordination purposes. The more complex the environment, the larger will be the number of liaison officers required and military commanders will usually want more liaison officers than they have. Liaison officer skills should match those of the organization with whom they are to liaise (eg engineer to engineer, military police to police and so on) since there will be an obvious common interest between the parties and a reasonably similar modus operandi. To facilitate liaison, commanders should seek to co-locate their command posts with leading UN agencies in the area. Reliable communications are vital to coordination and liaison and should be backed up by alternative systems. The demands of liaison may slow the planning and execution of operations but will prove a critical element of success. Liaison techniques are described later in this paper.

Flexibility

Wider Peacekeeping covers a wide range of tasks, each of which has the potential for rapid transit up and down the intensity spectrum. This characteristic renders flexibility a key attribute for those undertaking such operations. The Wider Peacekeeping force will need to be able to adapt and

move from one activity to another as required - at short notice and with the minimum of outside assistance. Wider Peacekeeping teams will therefore, whenever possible, need to be structured so as to be balanced and independent in terms of skills, capabilities, equipment, self-defence and logistics. Arrangements to facilitate the speedy availability of reserves should also be considered. Skilful anticipation by commanders may often serve to pre-empt crises. At any rate, commanders will need to rehearse contingency plans for transitions in intensity and possible requirements to extract their forces or conduct relief in place.

Security

In situations of murder and mayhem, the impartial and legitimate status of Wider Peacekeeping contingents may not afford them the protection they deserve, either as groups or individuals. Self-defence is an intrinsic right of UN-mandated activity and commanders will need to ensure that adequate arrangements exist at all times for the protection of their forces. Requirements for protection could also extend to civil agencies and non-governmental organizations. Whenever possible, Wider Peacekeeping commanders will seek to establish a viable security framework within which operations are mounted. In humanitarian operations for example, a secure route and protected destination is a better guarantee of safety than convoy escorts, although both will normally be required. Locally employed civilians will require to be carefully vetted before they are allowed access to military facilities. Their security status should be regularly reviewed.

Concentration of Force

A maximum presence of forces on the ground will often be desirable for Wider Peacekeeping operations, both for deterrence, credibility and information-gathering purposes and for domination, albeit discreetly, of the

general environment. The deployment plans and daily routine of a Wider Peacekeeping force will therefore need to take this factor into account. The need to maintain a visible and confident presence, however, should be balanced against the possibility of such deployments being perceived as gratuitously provocative gestures. The safety of troops and availability of reserves will also be pertinent considerations. Responsible peacekeeping commanders will develop the mobility required to concentrate their forces quickly at the scenes of potential incidents.

Freedom of Movement

A degree of freedom of movement is essential to Wider Peacekeeping contingents. A force which cannot move to and within its area of operation to conduct its tasks will fail to accomplish its mission. The force's privileges and rights relating to movement will be outlined in the Mandate and Status Of Forces Agreement. The fundamental facility of free movement will need to be protected and exploited by tactical commanders at every opportunity. Routes, for example, should be kept open even when not in use.

Chapter six
Operational techniques

Wider Peacekeeping tasks will normally be carried out at the tactical level using a combination of the techniques described below. Like the principles already described, the techniques fall into two categories - consensual and managerial:

CONSENT TECHNIQUES	MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
Negotiation and mediation	Military information
Liaison	Observation and monitoring
Civil affairs	Interposition
Community information	Supervision
Public information	Control measures
Community relations	Patrolling

The consensual techniques address attitudes and perceptions directly and are therefore of critical utility in preserving and developing consent in order to facilitate the ultimate resolution of the conflict. The managerial techniques afford physical control of the operational environment. In so doing they create the opportunities for the consensual techniques to be employed. It must be in the area of consent-promoting principles and techniques that the key to successful post Cold War peacekeeping lies.

Force structures required to employ these techniques will vary. In some instances unarmed or lightly armed personnel in small groups will suffice. In the case of techniques like interposition, larger groups of armed soldiers may be required with armoured protection, indirect fire assets and on-call reinforcements. Such groups may well be of multinational composition or made up by troops from a single nation.

The surest way of consolidating a consensual framework will be by engendering the active involvement of belligerent parties in the Wider

Peacekeeping process. If parties to a conflict can be delegated responsibilities which confer vested interests in the successful outcome of a Wider Peacekeeping operation - if they can, in effect, be made shareholders in the peace process, then their willingness to cooperate will be greatly increased. Whenever possible, therefore, parties to the conflict should be given opportunities to cooperate together in providing specific services that contribute to the resolution of the conflict - for example joint patrols, checkpoints and the protection of humanitarian aid. Such opportunities should be linked to incentives and reinforced with appropriate rewards and penalties. Delegating responsibilities in this way is not without risk. The selection of responsibilities will require careful judgement and their delegation will invariably require close supervision by elements of the Wider Peacekeeping force. The perceived impartiality of the Wider Peacekeeping contingent should not be set at risk. Nevertheless, peacekeeping commanders will need continually to review such means of applying operational techniques and reinforcing consent.

Consent techniques:

Negotiation And Mediation

Negotiation refers to direct dialogue between parties. If negotiating itself, the Wider Peacekeeping force will be playing an active rôle to gain particular ends whilst protecting its own interests. Such negotiations might take place to secure the safe passage of humanitarian relief supplies. *Mediation* describes the activities of a go-between connecting parties to a dispute. In this rôle the Wider Peacekeeper has no position of his own to guard or represent - he acts as the means whereby opposing parties communicate with each other and he encourages them to identify and reach mutually agreed solutions. *Conciliation* describes the reconciling effect wrought on opposing parties to a conflict by agreements resulting from successful negotiation and mediation.

The ultimate aim of negotiation and mediation is to reach agreements to which all parties have freely concurred. Such agreements will normally represent compromises between the aims of the participants. The key significance of promoting and sustaining consent in Wider Peacekeeping operations has already been emphasized. Article 33 of Chapter VI of the UN Charter emphasizes the importance of negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation as the priority means of settling disputes. Solutions that are imposed without the consent of the belligerents are, by their very nature, liable to become sources of future resentment and hostility which may inhibit control and become manifest in outbreaks of further violence and prolongation of the conflict. It is through the continued exchange and modification of ideas by negotiation and mediation that relationships between the factions and the Wider Peacekeeping force will be formed, enabling agreements to be reached and promoting the process of conciliation. Objective and effective negotiations created, controlled and fostered at every level by the Wider Peacekeeping force will develop a climate of mutual respect and cooperation. The techniques of negotiation and mediation therefore have enormous potential and are likely to prove the primary and most potent means of developing peaceful, agreeable and lasting solutions to conflict in all aspects of a Wider Peacekeeping operation. Negotiation and mediation thus constitute prime Wider Peacekeeping operational techniques.

Negotiation and mediation will be required at all stages of a Wider Peacekeeping operation and will need to be exercised at every level. Consequently all participants will be involved - from senior commanders meeting with faction leaders, to individual soldiers at isolated observation points who might find themselves arbitrating a dispute. Confrontations may be sudden and unexpected, and negotiation and mediation could be required immediately without preparation in situations where life and limb may be at stake.

Negotiating sessions are likely to be characterized at all levels by the representation of numerous interested parties. Some will be directly involved, others will have peripheral interests. The relationship between the

representatives will be complex and often competitive. All representatives are likely to play a rôle in the outcome of the negotiations. Participants may represent the broadest and most complicated range of interests, perceptions, bargaining tools and cultural approaches - each element of which will interact and possibly conflict with the others present. The interplay of personalities will contribute significantly to the course and outcome of the negotiations. The effective conduct of negotiation and mediation represents a complex undertaking. Its three stages: preparation, conduct and follow-up require extensive consideration, research and care. The characteristics and requirements of those stages are described below.

Preparation. If possible, before mediating or negotiating a clear aim will need to be defined and the Wider Peacekeeper should seek to determine what he wants out of the occasion. His identification of an aim will take into account many factors including the objectives and capabilities of the belligerents as well as a realistic appraisal of what is feasible. In practice a clear aim (other than to get competing factions to meet together) may only become identifiable during the meeting itself. Specific preparations will include researching the background and history of the issue to be discussed, taking into account all previous relevant reports. The negotiator or mediator should conduct a survey of those arguments that the belligerent parties may wish to deploy. Options, limitations, minimum requirements and areas of common interest and possible compromise will need to be identified. If negotiating, the Wider Peacekeeper should be clear on those points he must win or protect and those that may be used as bargaining chips. He should also make a thorough study of the participants who will attend the meeting including their cultural origin, personality, authority, influence, habits and attitudes. If hosting the meeting, specific arrangements should take account of the following:

Location. The site of the negotiations or mediation should be secure and neutral.

Languages. A correct mix and distribution of language skills will be a fundamental element of planning for negotiations. Commanders should be practised in the art of using an interpreter.

Administration. Administrative organization should include such things as arrival and departure arrangements, and the provision of parking, communications, meals and refreshments. Vehicles of the Wider Peace-keeping force may often be the only means of transporting delegates to and from meetings. This transport requirement may demand considerable time and effort. The meeting itself will require an agenda, a seating plan and note-takers, perhaps supplemented with interpreters and other specialist advisers on such subjects as weapons, unexploded ordnance, economics, culture and religion. Meetings may continue for considerable periods of time and commanders should expect to have to feed all those who attend. Administrative details are important and may make a considerable differ-ence to the attitudes of the participants.

Attendance. Attendance should be at an appropriate and equal rank level. Great offence may be caused if senior representatives from one faction are required to meet with junior representatives from another. To avoid unmanageable numbers attending, the size of each party should be specified and checked. What weapons can and cannot be brought into the meeting should also be announced in advance. Rules for bodyguards must be established and Wider Peacekeeping commanders should bring their own bodyguards with them.

In the case of mediation, parties to the conflict will confer with the go-between in separate locations. Negotiations, on the other hand, will be held openly in one location with all the participants present. As a first step to either process, participants should agree on the purpose of their meeting. If hosting the occasion, the Wider Peacekeeper should remember to offer the customary salutations and exchange of courtesies and to ensure that all parties are identified and have been introduced to each other. Refreshments should normally be proffered or received. Some introductory small talk is useful and polite on such occasions to make everybody feel at ease and assess the mood. The following principles should guide negotiation itself:

Preserve Options. The opposing sides should be encouraged to give their views first. This will enable the negotiator to re-assess the viability of his own position. If possible, he should avoid taking an immediate stand

and he should be wary of making promises or admissions unless the situation absolutely calls for it.

Restraint and Control. Belligerent parties are often likely to prove deliberately inflexible. They may distort information shamelessly and introduce red-herrings to distract attention from areas that might embarrass them. Nonetheless, visible frustration, impatience or anger at such antics may undermine the negotiator's position. Cheap 'point-scoring' (even if valid) may achieve short-term gain by embarrassing or discrediting another party. In the longer term, however, such gain will invariably be paid for many times over in terms of forfeited goodwill. Loss of face is likely to increase the belligerence of faction leaders. Simple face-saving measures by the controlling authority will probably act in the longer term interests of all parties. Whenever possible, therefore, respect should be shown for the negotiating positions of other parties. Speakers should not normally be interrupted. Incorrect information should be corrected, if necessary with appropriate evidence. Facts should take preference over opinions.

Argument. If necessary, the negotiator should remind participants of previous agreements, arrangements, accepted practices and their own pronouncements. However, this should be done tactfully and with scrupulous accuracy. It may be appropriate to remind participants that they cannot change the past but, if they wish, they have the power to change the future.

Compromise. Partial agreement or areas of consensus should be carefully explored for compromise solutions. Related common interests may offer answers to seemingly intractable differences.

Closing Summary. Negotiation and mediation should be finalized with a summary of what has been resolved. This summary must be agreed by all participants and, if possible, written down and signed by the principals. A time and place for further negotiation should also be agreed.
Effective follow-up is every bit as important as successful negotiation. Without a follow-up, achievements by negotiation or mediation will be meaningless. The outcome of the negotiations or mediation must be promulgated to all interested parties. Background files should be updated with all pertinent information, including personality profiles of the participants.

Agreements will need to be monitored, implemented or supervised as soon as possible. The immediate period following a negotiated agreement is likely to prove the most critical. To preserve the credibility of the negotiating process, what has been agreed should happen and any breach of agreement should be marked at the very least by immediate protests.

The individual qualities and personality of the Wider Peacekeeping negotiator or mediator play a most important rôle. If negotiating, beyond the immediate interests of the issue under discussion he will need to remain scrupulously impartial. If mediating, the trust he requires of each party to the conflict demand that he demonstrate absolute impartiality and discretion at all times. He should continually take care to avoid giving away information or confidences about third parties which may be of value to their opponents. He must be firm, fair and friendly - with a mastery of detail, tact, patience, a sense of proportion, resourcefulness and objectivity. On matters of principle he should be insistent without being belligerent. He should never lie or adopt an arrogant or patronizing manner. He should maintain the highest level of dress and deportment at all times.

Negotiation and mediation are critical techniques in Wider Peacekeeping operations. Their aim is conciliation. All opportunities for negotiation or mediation will need to be explored and fully exploited to encourage belligerents to arrive at mutually agreed solutions to their problems. The importance of negotiation and mediation skills should be emphasized by commanders at all levels and the skills should be practised to the full.

Liaison

Conflict thrives on rumour, uncertainty and prejudice. The timely passage of accurate information based on a trusting relationship is a key method of combating uncertainty and promoting stability in a conflict region. Liaison is therefore a vital tool of a Wider Peacekeeping force and key to the successful execution of operations. Failure to liaise risks misunderstanding, friction, opposition and escalation of the conflict.

The purpose of liaison is to ensure the timely passage of information, to notify intentions, lodge protests, coordinate activity, manage crises and settle disputes. A liaison system is therefore required to link the Wider Peacekeeping force, the communities, the civil authority (if it exists) and the parties to the conflict. It will need to be established at every possible level including formation, unit, sub-unit and sometimes below that. The specialist skills and background experience of liaison officers should, if possible, match those of the organization with which they are to liaise. The most effective form of liaison is that of an individual who is permanently detached from his parent organization to the group or faction with which the organization is liaising. Alternative methods of liaison include patrols, regular or occasional meetings and visits.

The liaison individual or team will require robust, reliable communications with an alternative back-up system. In situations of particular tenseness, consideration will need to be given to creating 'hot lines' linking force command posts with that of opposing factions in order to facilitate the handling of crises. Effective liaison will be be founded on friendly, working relationships. Team members should familiarize themselves with the names and responsibilities of the leaders they deal with. They will also need to assess attitudes and attempt to predict and anticipate the direction that events may take. Everything should be done to foster an atmosphere of trust. Daily meetings (if necessary 'off the record') will be required to develop relationships and keep open channels of communication.

Opportunities for liaison should be explored and exploited by peacekeepers as a priority at every level. It will normally be necessary for commanders to augment their establishments with additional officers, warrant officers and senior NCOs for liaison purposes. If liaison is interrupted for any reason, commanders should seek to re-establish it at the earliest opportunity.

Civil Affairs

It has been shown that, without a reasonable level of local support, Wider Peacekeeping operations are likely to prove largely fruitless in the long term. Unless the general backing of the local populace can be gained, the security of Wider Peacekeeping personnel and non-governmental organizations, as well as the safety of their bases and movement, is likely to be jeopardized. Any unit of a controlling authority surrounded by a potentially hostile population will become vulnerable and isolated regardless of whatever mandate it may have to use force. Indeed, the use of force is most unlikely to persuade uncooperative elements of a population to submit enduringly to the conditions of a peace agreement. In a Wider Peacekeeping environment, coercion is thus a limited and short-term means of engendering cooperation. Firepower is consequently not normally an effective tool for resolving conflicts - indeed, in the long term, violent coercion is likely to foster resentment, hostility and, ultimately, armed opposition.

By contrast, winning the hearts and minds of the local population by a sustained civil affairs programme can transform the security environment and permit the safe accomplishment of a wide range of tasks inherent to Wider Peacekeeping operations. Civil affairs campaigns thus establish the basis for a longer-term, more integrated process which relies less on the explicit use of force and more on fostering local support for the Wider Peacekeeping objectives. The accomplishment of a popular civil affairs campaign may therefore prove a critical element of success.

Civil affairs projects may embrace a wide range of activities within local communities including medical and veterinary care, the provision and distribution of water, waste disposal, electrical power, the removal of unexploded ordnance, the restoration of public services and the construction and development of schools and civil aid centres. Such projects will invariably entail the commitment of specialist resources including engineers, medical, veterinary, military police and special forces elements and are likely to require extensive logistic support. In undertaking projects, the

advice of government, non-governmental organizations and relief agencies should be sought and programmes should be coordinated locally. However, civil affairs projects will lose their effectiveness if conducted in isolation. Priorities will therefore need to be coordinated at formation level and integrated into the theatre-wide plan. All elements of the Wider Peacekeeping force should be seen to be supporting such programmes in a coherent and consistent way. Military commanders will need to allocate generous resources to civil affairs projects. The "hearts and minds" return will amply justify such investment. The prevailing attitudes of the local population towards the Wider Peacekeeping force is a matter of considerable importance and commanders will gain considerable benefit by anticipating and exploiting civil affairs opportunities to the full.

Community Information

The psychological dimension of Wider Peacekeeping operations is a prominent and critical element of campaign activity that deserves the closest attention. It is minds that have to be changed. Any means of influencing perceptions, particularly those of the parties to the conflict, will be of crucial importance. Community information therefore plays a vital rôle in Wider Peacekeeping. There is a clear distinction between community information and public information. The latter builds attitudes in a worldwide context and is governed by the agenda of the media. Community information targets selected audiences and is a direct tool of the commander. It is, in effect, psychological operations under a gentler and more acceptable name.

Community information aims to influence the emotions, perceptions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the behaviour of target audiences. It represents for the commander a non-lethal means of engendering compliance and cooperation within his area of operations. Specifically, community information seeks to promote popular support and discourage armed opposition. It attempts to portray an honest representation of the

competence, credibility, resolve, achievements and human face of the Wider Peacekeeping force whilst also emphasizing the responsibility of local nationals to resolve their own differences. It seeks to educate and enlighten. Community information may additionally undertake a coordinating function including the broadcast of warnings, future intentions of the controlling authorities and details of agreements reached between opposing factions. In all, community information has the potential to make significant contributions to the overall conflict resolution process. Its planning will need to start early and form part of the commander's overall plan.

The following general principles will most appropriately govern the application of a community information campaign:

Impartiality. The neutrality of the Wider Peacekeeping force will require to be stressed repeatedly. Nothing should be communicated that might prejudice the force's perceived impartiality. The 'enemy' is anarchy, atrocity and starvation.

Cultural Knowledge. A thorough understanding of local culture, including dialects, is vital. Active effort will need to be made to gain this understanding. The conduct of socio-cultural studies and opinion surveys will serve to identify prevailing attitudes and expose misconceptions and misunderstandings that can then be addressed through the community information campaign.

Coordination and Integration. As a psychological activity, community information projects will need to be coordinated and integrated with other activities that seek to determine and influence perceptions. These will include military information, civil affairs projects and public information. Other operational elements that might be required to support community information activities will include aviation and electronic warfare assets.

Truth. Unless the information promulgated is believed, community information will serve no purpose. Demonstrable truth must therefore be the stock-in-trade of community information material. Exposed lies or evident propaganda will impose profound damage to the long term credibility and viability of any community information programme.

Style. Community information material will need to be presented as

public service announcements and must avoid appearing patronizing, arrogant or blatantly manipulative.

Targets for community information activities are likely to include elements of the Wider Peacekeeping force itself, all sections of the populace, parties to the conflict, local civilian and military authorities, non governmental organizations, media, relief agencies, and private voluntary organizations. All potential means of undertaking community information activity will need to be carefully assessed. There may well be extensive local resources such as radio stations that could be used. Such resources should be preserved and not destroyed. As well as radio and television broadcasts, community information material might be disseminated by loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflet drops, information sheets and newspapers. The most effective means of all, however, may prove to be community relations open days (see below) and regular face-to-face information briefings with local leaders.

Effective community information will require sizeable resources including media, technical, linguistic, cultural and regional specialists. Such personnel will normally be grouped into production teams (to cover research and the production of radio, video and printing materials), dissemination teams (with mobile audio-visual and loudspeaker resources) and liaison teams to coordinate and link supporting agencies.

Public Information

Wider Peacekeeping operations, particularly at the outset, are likely to attract intense public scrutiny via the international media. Their reports, influencing as they do widespread psychological perceptions, will have a significant impact on the direction and course of operations. Media reports may restrict or promote a force's freedom of action. A timely introduction of press reporters to the scene of a crisis may serve to restrict belligerents' actions and forestall atrocity. If managed effectively, media attention can enhance a contingent's overall prospects of success by making appropriate

messages widely known. An informed and educated public is more likely to respond maturely to major crises within a Wider Peacekeeping operation. Any void in information is likely to be filled with the propaganda of opposing factions, fuelled by media speculation. An effective public information service is therefore an essential element of Wider Peacekeeping operations. Public information demands the personal attention of the military commander and should be treated as an operational activity. The public information organization will need to be integrated into the mainstream command, control and reporting systems of the Wider Peacekeeping force.

The community information principles described above apply to public information. The following are additional principles that should govern public information support:

Accreditation. Media representatives should normally be accredited in order to gain eligibility for public information support. The accreditation should require them to abide by a clear set of basic ground rules that protect the operational security of the Wider Peacekeeping force. If the rules are violated, consideration should be given to excluding offenders from access to further public information services.

Openness. Open and independent reporting should be the norm. In most situations, unrestricted access should be allowed to accredited media. Warnings of dangers specific to certain areas should be given but should not preclude media access. Threats to personal security are an occupational hazard of media representatives. They are ultimately responsible for the consequences of the risks they take.

Quality of Service. Public information support should be prompt, accurate, balanced and consistent.

Public information liaison upwards and downwards within the Wider Peacekeeping force will prove essential at all times. Given the potential for political repercussions, higher authority will need to be kept informed of all significant developments in media reporting. Several public information staff should be available at unit level for detachment to incidents at short notice.

Community Relations

Community relations refers to the deliberate fostering of social contact with the indigenous population. The purpose of community relations is to create favourable perceptions locally and encourage Cooperative responses to the Wider Peacekeeping force's activities. Community relations, by its actions, seeks to convey implicitly simple but positive messages such as: "Trust us", "We are here to help you" and "Peace is the only way ahead".

Community relations may be developed through formal occasions such as sports days, musical concerts, displays, recreational outings, and tea parties. Such occasions may be large or small. Community relations activities may also be conducted at a low level on a daily basis by small and specialized teams which are able to provide local interest and entertainment in various ways. To be effective, community relations occasions should avoid being blatantly manipulative - relaxed informality should normally set the tone. Nevertheless, such occasions will need to be carefully planned and executed, and undue security risks should be avoided. Community relations programmes could be counter-productive if conducted in a way that might prejudice the Wider Peacekeeping force's perceived impartiality. All elements of the local population should be included.

Management techniques:

Military Information

The parties to a conflict in a Wider Peacekeeping environment will be suspicious of all intelligence-related activities. They are likely to regard the gathering of intelligence itself as a hostile act. The standard function of intelligence in Wider Peacekeeping is therefore termed 'military information'. This terminology seeks to accommodate local sensitivities as well as those that may exist within a multinational Wider Peacekeeping force itself.

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Although the impartial context of Wider Peacekeeping is different from that of conventional military operations, the principles which guide military information techniques are similar to those that govern the operational intelligence function. The significance of military information in Wider Peacekeeping operations is no less than that of intelligence in conventional operations. Military information will drive the conduct of Wider Peacekeeping operations and is the direct responsibility of the commander. As an operational function, military information will represent a prime influence in directing and synchronizing operations themselves. Military information works through the continuous cyclical process of direction, collection, interpretation, evaluation, collation and dissemination. The information organization will require to be flexible and task organized and will probably need considerable augmentation to include specialists in a wide variety of fields.

The information requirements of the commander in Wider Peacekeeping are likely to be broader and more complex than those of normal combat operations. There will be no "enemy" - only conflicting factions. As well as requiring detailed assessments of the geopolitical situation including historical and cultural influences, the commander will also require continuously updated assessments of the attitudes and capabilities of all local forces, ethnic groupings and interested parties to the conflict - particularly those that are potentially hostile. This will include detailed profiles of leading personalities in their areas of responsibility. In addition, the information organization will need to monitor all events and aspects of the general security environment that are volatile and have the potential to escalate violence at short notice.

Much of the data required will be available from open source material including libraries, the media, multinational business corporations and commercial satellite services. Other sources of information will include assessments from higher formation as well as those from national and regional authorities. At the tactical level, a primary source of military information will be reports and routine debriefings of those elements of the force that are deployed as well as local nationals and non governmental

organizations.

A well-developed information system is vital to the effectiveness of Wider Peacekeeping operations. Military information will need to be directed by the commander to meet clearly defined requirements to satisfy operational needs. In addition, the military information organization will meet a vital early warning requirement in monitoring and reporting those aspects that may destabilize or escalate the overall security situation. The rôle of military information in planning Wider Peacekeeping operations is covered in more detail later in this paper.

Observation And Monitoring

Observation is a fundamental element of Wider Peacekeeping operations. Its purpose is to gather information, and monitor, verify and report adherence to agreements of any kind, thus deterring and providing evidence of breaches. Examples of observation tasks include the following:

Observing Buffer Zones and Ceasefire Lines.
Confirming the withdrawal of forces.
Monitoring conditions in a potential conflict area for signs of war preparation or increased tension.
Monitoring and reporting human rights abuses.
Inspecting industrial facilities to verify compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions.

At levels of reduced tension, observation may be carried out by unarmed personnel in small multinational teams, often including civilian representatives. At higher levels of tension, observers may be lightly armed and grouped in single-nationality military teams. Methods used by observers might include the manning of static observation posts and checkpoints as well as foot and vehicle patrols. Effective liaison with all parties involved is a critical element of most of these methods. The success of observation

activities depends largely on accurate, timely reporting using reliable communications. By their nature, observation and monitoring teams are normally limited in the scope of reactive action they can take themselves.

Interposition

As during the Cold War, the interposition of peacekeeping forces between opposing factions remains one of the basic military tasks in Wider Peacekeeping operations and applies particularly to the establishing and maintenance of ceasefires within the context of demobilization operations. In these circumstances it is usually pre-planned with the consent of belligerent parties and normally follows (but could precede) the withdrawal and assembly of opposing factions from a ceasefire line. The interposition might be phased with advance groups deployed to provide a screen between withdrawing factions. Such groups might take the form of standing patrols or armoured vehicles. Interposition in this situation should be accomplished as quickly as possible to forestall clashes which might lead to a breakdown of the ceasefire arrangements. Interpositioned forces may be required to protect the parties to a conflict from outside interference and attack, as well as taking action against the violators of ceasefires. ·

Interposition may also be used as a short-term emergency response to forestall or manage a local crisis. As with a pre-planned interposition, speed is a crucial factor in defusing such a situation. If the early stages of a crisis appear manageable, commanders may have the opportunity of promptly inserting leading elements of an interpositional force between the parties concerned, whilst concurrently conducting immediate negotiations with the antagonists at the point of physical confrontation. While negotiations continue to reduce tension and the danger of violence, the interpositional group can be reinforced until the latter is sufficiently strong to regain control of the situation. Care will need to be taken not to escalate crises by such action.

An interpositional force in demobilization operations will normally need

to be similar in composition to that required for a preventive deployment including armoured protection and possibly indirect fire assets. As in preventive deployment, an interpositional force will require the availability of reinforcements to bolster its credibility and provide support in emergencies. Opposing factions may attempt to attack or pass through interpositioned forces. The principles governing the use of force in self-defence therefore apply directly to an interpositioned group and will need to be fully understood and applied as necessary.

Interposition may prove a hazardous operation but its capacity to separate antagonists makes it a valuable and rewarding operational technique. Interposition may only sensibly be used, however, when the force concerned is operationally credible. The interpositional force will serve little purpose if its size is such that it can be easily pushed aside or neutralized by opposing factions.

Supervision

In Wider Peacekeeping operations supervision is an activity that would normally occur within the framework of interposition. Supervision assignments will cover all stages of demobilization operations including the withdrawal, disarming, relocation, disassembly and rehabilitation of military or paramilitary parties to a conflict. Supervisory tasks will include negotiating and planning, the process of withdrawal and disarmament, and promulgating the essential information in time to allow the parties to respond. Supervision also includes the investigation of complaints and alleged breaches of agreement. The nature of supervisory tasks is such that, whenever possible, local civil authorities should be used in preference to Wider Peacekeeping forces. It may also be possible to delegate certain supervised tasks jointly to the parties to a conflict. If linked to appropriate rewards and penalties, such action would encourage their joint cooperation. Delegating supervisory tasks in this way is risky and would require tight control. However, if feasible, it could contribute significantly towards the conciliation of the parties concerned.

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Control Measures

A fundamental means of exerting control in Wider Peacekeeping operations is the allocation to commanders of responsibility for geographical areas of operation. Accordingly, operational areas will be broken down into sectors allocated and sub-allocated to formations, units and sub-units. If possible sector boundaries will normally take account of political and civil authority borders, the location of ethnic groups and parties to the conflict, and significant geographical features. Within the framework of sectors, military operations will usually require control to be established either to monitor, limit or deny access to many areas including:

Key terrain (such as Ceasefire Lines, Buffer Zones and Control Zones)
Installations
Centres of population
Stocks of war supplies.

This may be achieved by the use of guards (for the custody and accounting of war supplies, for example) and checkpoints. Checkpoints may be permanent or temporary. Checkpoint requirements and the procedures and tactics they employ will depend on the provisions and authority of the mandate, the Status of Forces Agreement and the Wider Peacekeeping force Standing Operational Procedures. Guards and checkpoints may constitute a major interface between the peacekeeping contingent and local populace. It is therefore key that soldiers carrying out such duties should be scrupulous in their observation of good manners and local custom, particularly in dealing with women. Patience and courtesy will need to be applied to safeguard the sense of personal esteem and collective honour which dominates individual and group behaviour in many foreign communities.

The powers of the Wider Peacekeeping military force to search and arrest civilians will depend on the mandate and Status of Forces Agreement. In a Wider Peacekeeping situation, such powers are likely to be a necessary adjunct to controlling actions taken by the force. Control will

need to be exerted over the passage of war supplies. Preventative action may also be needed to combat the smuggling of contraband items such as drugs. In the early stages of a demobilization operation, peacekeeping troops may be empowered to confiscate items and arrest offenders. In a military assistance phase, civilians or faction members suspected of illegal activity will usually be handed over to the civil authorities. Checks on the personnel and vehicles of the Wider Peacekeeping force may also be appropriate to demonstrate that the force itself is observing the law and to deter or detect any criminal activity among its own members.

In a military assistance situation, a Wider Peacekeeping force may be committed to supporting the civil authority in controlling a public assembly. The armament, number of troops deployed and scale of reserves will depend on the situation. Reconnaissance, deployment of reserves, liaison with the civil authority and minimum force will be critical factors guiding the execution of such a control measure.

Patrolling

Patrolling is likely to prove a key activity in Wider Peacekeeping operations. If well-planned, vigorous and intelligent in execution, patrolling can contribute much to the tactical initiative sought by commanders. Patrolling has many applications:

Information gathering. Patrols may be organized to confirm or supplement information provided by static observation posts or other means. Reconnaissance of inaccessible or dangerous areas may be carried out at long range by specialist troops in armoured vehicles.

Security. Patrols can provide additional security when complementing guards or checkpoints. They may also be used as escorts to representatives of the Wider Peacekeeping force, relief agencies or aid convoys as well as the civil authority or threatened elements of the local populace.

Other Tasks. Patrolling can also be used to carry out aspects of most Wider Peacekeeping operational tasks including mobile checkpoints,

investigation, interposition, supervision, liaison, negotiation and 'flying the flag' to reassure and calm troubled areas, deter law-breakers and promote the credibility and prestige of the Wider Peacekeeping force.

Patrols may be conducted by day or night in all conditions of climate and terrain. They may be carried out on foot or by any alternative means that might be available including soft-skinned and armoured vehicles, fixed or rotary wing aircraft and sea vessels. The protection of the patrol in the prevailing situation will be a key factor in determining the means to be used.

Essentially, there are two approaches in planning patrols - overt and covert. The overt patrol will probably take place during daylight hours and the patrol will be easily recognizable by the distinctive uniform of its members and the insignia of its vehicles. On rare occasions, however, a covert patrol may sometimes prove more appropriate in a Wider Peace-keeping situation. Covert patrols will usually be mounted at night, perhaps to gain information or to establish a concealed presence to monitor a particular area or route. Such patrols may last for long periods of time and will probably be sensitive politically and hazardous. Covert patrols should only be mounted after very careful assessments have been made and with the permission of the military commander's higher authority. The size, armament, tactics, back-up and execution of patrols will be limited by the restrictions imposed by the mandate and Status of Forces Agreement. Patrols should not be conducted in a way that prejudices impartiality.

Overview

This final diagram provides a summary overview of the Wider Peacekeeping concept developed for the British Army:

CONSENT PRINCIPLES

CONSENT TECHNIQUES

MILITARY INFORMATION

PATROLLING

COORDINATION AND LIAISON

SUPERVISION

COHERENCE

NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

IMPARTIALITY   MINIMUM FORCE

LIAISON

LEGITIMACY   CONSENT   CREDIBILITY

MUTUAL RESPECT   TRANSPARENCY

PUBLIC INFORMATION

CIVIL AFFAIRS

SECURITY

COMMUNITY INFORMATION

FLEXIBILITY

CONTROL MEASURES

CONCENTRATION OF FORCE

INTERPOSITION

OBSERVATION AND MONITORING

MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES

MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES

Consent lies at its heart. Surrounding it are the consent-promoting principles and techniques. These seek to influence directly perceptions and attitudes. Despite their intangibility, it is here that the key to successful conflict resolution lies. The outer circles depict those principles and techniques that seek to manage the security environment. Such management principles and techniques derive their meaning only from what they enclose in the diagram. Without the conceptual heart of consent, the outer principles and techniques will represent little more than an empty shell. This doctrine has been derived principally from post operational reports and has the support of current practitioners in the field.

Chapter seven
Operational planning

Military action in Wider Peacekeeping operations cannot be viewed as an end in itself, but will rather complement diplomatic, economic and humanitarian endeavours which together pursue political objectives. The Wider Peacekeeper, therefore, does not plan for victory. Such a concept would be inappropriate and, in predicating itself on an unrealizable goal, would flaw the planning process. Planning Wider Peacekeeping operations will need therefore to recognize and take into account the subordination of operations to political and diplomatic activity - and the likely effect of such subordination on military objectives. Achieving the strategic end-state will be the principal criterion of plans.

This chapter will review planning methods for Wider Peacekeeping operations, including the estimate process, and identify the principal concerns that need to be addressed.

Planning Method

Planning for Wider Peacekeeping operations will normally involve the following:

> *Preliminary assessment*
> *Reconnaissance*
> *Liaison*
> *Estimate*

The planning stages described above are neither consecutive nor separate. Some of them are likely to take place concurrently and the overall process may repeat itself cyclically and in varying orders.

Preliminary Assessment. Nearly all planning activities will be preceded by a period of preliminary assessment which may, in the early stages, represent little more than contingency planning. The preliminary assessment is likely to take many different forms and will include all types of research drawing on the widest source of materials. Commanders should encourage the thorough research of all conceivable aspects of the general environment and situation that might impinge on possible operational activity.

Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance has no substitute and will always pay. The direct observation of conditions on the ground combined with face-to-face liaison with other agencies is critical to effective planning. Reconnaissance will therefore need to be undertaken as soon as possible and involve the maximum number of the commander's key personnel in order that their own areas of interest might be effectively covered.

Liaison. The broad nature of Wider Peacekeeping operations means that the planning of military and civil activities must be conducted in concert from the beginning. Military planners should therefore liaise at the earliest possible opportunity with all related military and civil agencies in order to ensure that their planned intentions are synchronised and in harmony with the wider aspects of operational activity. Such liaison should be a continuous process.

Estimate. The peacekeeping commander's estimate (or appreciation) represents the most important planning element. Its product is, in effect, the commander's overall assessment of his own sphere of responsibility - an assessment that will determine the nature and conduct of his operational activities and direct their execution. The estimate is a cyclical process involving the stages depicted in the following diagram:
The remainder of this chapter will cover each of the estimate's steps shown in the diagram.

A circular diagram showing a cycle of six boxes connected by arrows, flowing clockwise: MISSION ANALYSIS → FACTORS → TASKS → PRINCIPLES → TECHNIQUES → CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS → back to MISSION ANALYSIS.

Mission Analysis

Starting with an appropriate and clearly defined mission is key to the estimate process. Commanders should check carefully with their higher authority to ensure that the mission they have been given is adequately defined. Ideally, the mission given to the commander should cover what to achieve, where, when and why - but not how. The commander must then analyze the mission given him in the light of the wider context. This wider context will include the 'why' of his superior commander as well as the priorities reflected in his superior commander's concept of operations. It will also include assessment of the general background to the situation, including UN or coalition and government policy and the strategic and operational level end states. The commander will need to review and understand his specific rôle in the overall context of his superior's long term plan. The analysis of his mission should therefore ensure that all plans are consistent in the immediate and long term with the commander's future intentions and the overall strategic requirements. Such a plan should avoid encouraging any actions that are *inconsistent* with those requirements or that may foreclose longer term plans.

Factors

This element of the paper will not review *all* factors that need to be taken into account when planning. Factors such as time and space are self-evident in their application and need no further explanation. What follows, therefore, is not an exhaustive checklist, but rather a review of those factors peculiar to Wider Peacekeeping operations and which merit special consideration.

Parties to the Conflict. Planners will need to make an accurate and thorough assessment of the parties to the conflict within their operational areas. This assessment will probably need to embrace a wide range of military, paramilitary and civilian groups and will require careful analysis of their motives, organizations, strength, weapons, equipment, doctrine, leadership, training, discipline and general attitudes and stability. Such analysis should lead to an overall view of the parties' strengths, weaknesses and likely intentions and activities. The short and long term political and military objectives of each party, their liaisons and changeability, and their past record of honouring agreements and ceasefires will be critical elements of this assessment.

Operational Environment. The operational environment of Wider Peacekeeping will include tangible and intangible aspects. The former will encompass topography, including lines of communication, climate, the general living conditions, ethnic distribution, languages, religion and customs of the populace. The national infrastructure of the area and the potential influence of neighbouring regions will also need to be taken into account. Intangible elements of the operational environment will include the indigenous population's culture, psyche and attitude as well as public perceptions of the conflict, both locally and world-wide. The potential for sudden and unexpected escalations in violence and the level of conflict would also come into this category. The intangible elements are likely to exert a key influence on the Wider Peacekeeping force's activity and general deportment. An effective assessment of the operational environment will demand a close study of the general history of the region as well

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as the origins and nature of the conflict.

Allocation of Resources. The allocation of manpower, equipment and the level of sustainability will have significant bearing on the character of the campaign to be conducted. The availability of reserves and reinforcements to commanders will also be important factors in planning. Planners will need to take account of the availability of local resources and host nation support and make full use of these where it would not deprive the local population of essential supplies.

Restrictions and Obligations. There are many aspects of a Wider Peacekeeping scenario that are likely to impose serious restrictions on the conduct of operations. The mandate, Rules of Engagement, Status of Forces Agreement, as well as national and international laws and conventions will probably severely limit the scope and number of options available. These factors should be very carefully assessed and it is likely that commanders will require clarification from their higher authority on many of the aspects concerned. The provision of arms control agreements and stabilizing measures could also impose limitations on deployment, equipment and activity. Planners must be aware of the details of such agreements and their impact on operational activity.

Multiplicity of Participation. The commander will require to make a careful assessment of other Wider Peacekeeping agencies operating within his area of responsibility. As well as joint (ie tri-service) and combined (multinational) elements, such agencies might include governmental and non governmental organizations and private voluntary organizations. Planning will need to take full account of the identity, rôle, interests, intentions and methods of these agencies and the need for the Wider Peacekeeping force to harmonize activities as much as possible.

Tasks and Principles

Having analyzed his mission and taken full account of relevant factors, the peacekeeping commander's next step will be to identify and assess the

tasks that have to be carried out to achieve the mission given him. These tasks may be both specified and implied. The commander will need to abandon all preconceptions in this process and seek to adopt fresh perspectives on the requirements as they appear. It may be that tasks which might be taken for granted prove on reflection to be unnecessary, whilst tasks that appear at first sight to be of fringe benefit actually turn out to be essential. Included in the commander's assessment of tasks will be that of providing a contingency reserve to cope with unexpected developments including sudden escalations in violence. If appropriate, such a force should be of multinational composition in order to demonstrate the international resolve of the Wider Peacekeeping force, and its contingency tasks might include that of conflict prevention, reinforcement and protection. Having identified the necessary tasks, the commander should then prioritize them in terms of importance. He will also need to identify those tasks that may be carried out concurrently, and those that may only occur sequentially. In the case of the latter, he should determine the order in which the tasks need to be carried out.

Before deciding which techniques to employ in undertaking the identified tasks, the commander will need carefully to review the principles, specific to his situation, that should guide his choice of techniques. Again, preconceptions will have to be resisted and radical reflection may produce fresh and unusual perspectives which could lead planning down avenues that might not normally be explored. Principles are an essential link between tasks and techniques in Wider Peacekeeping.

Techniques

Having reached this stage, the planner is now ready to consider, choose and prioritize the techniques that the Wider Peacekeeping force will employ in carrying out the necessary tasks. Operational techniques have already been discussed and this section therefore highlights some of the planning considerations related to a number of the key techniques.

Command and Control

The complexity and sensitivity of Wider Peacekeeping make command and control particularly important. Exacerbated by media presence, the atmosphere of a Wider Peacekeeping operation is likely to be highly charged politically and strategic and operational level considerations will tend to bear down to the lowest level. There will therefore be a tendency for the operational and tactical levels of command to overlap as individual incidents assume a high profile in political terms via the news media. The tactical commander will suffer additional limitations if operating in a multinational environment. Each nation involved is likely to have separate national command arrangements with their contingents which will preclude direct disciplinary action (in the event of detected corruption, for example) and are likely to affect all aspects of operations - particularly if sudden and unexpected escalations of violence occur.

The critical importance of effective liaison to coordinate the divergent activities of the many agencies likely to be involved in Wider Peacekeeping operations has already been exphasized. Liaison requirements and arrangements therefore require to be assessed and planned at the very earliest opportunity. The establishment of a comprehensive liaison network will require the presence of capable liaison personnel at a wide range of locations, including the local offices of the pertinent civil agencies, as well as the headquarters of the parties to the conflict. Plans willl need to take into account the need for liaison teams to be independent logistically, particularly with regard to transport and communications. Arrangements may also have to include the provision of interpreters, perhaps through local hiring. Given their critical rôle, liaison augmentees will need particular qualities (especially of personality), qualifications and experience and will require careful selection, briefing and training.

Effective planning will need to consider all means available to coordinate effectively operational activities within a Wider Peacekeeping force. These means will include Standing Operational Procedures which commanders will receive from their superior authority and which will require

interpretation for use at lower levels. Standing Operational Procedures will describe the methods and formats of coordinating mechanisms (such as communications procedures as well as reports and returns). They will also serve to assist the commander in ensuring correctness and commonality in approach to such matters as Rules of Engagement, public information and general conduct. Coordination between civil and military agencies may be planned by through regular meetings at all appropriate levels, as well as normal liaison arrangements.

When developing communications plans, the use of civil means of communications, if reliable, will need to be considered. However, sole reliance and dependancy on host nation systems should be avoided. Mobility and reliability will be key characteristics of the communications required by many elements of the Wider Peacekeeping force, particularly observation and liaison teams. The size and terrain of the operational area may itself pose communications problems.

Consent Techniques

The majority of management techniques already described require little elaboration for the purposes of planning. Those techniques (listed below) which bear directly on the psychology and perceptions of the parties to a conflict have also been covered:

Negotiation and Mediation
Liaison
Civil Affairs
Community Information
Public Information
Community Relations

Wider Peacekeeping is concerned with conflict resolution, not termination, and the consent techniques that address the mind and perceptions of the

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public are therefore likely in the long term to contribute more directly to success than most of the management techniques. Planning will therefore need to take account of this and, within the establishment of a reasonable security framework, lend emphasis to consent operational techniques. Such psychological methods have the additional benefit of being non-lethal - again an aspect more consistent with the overall ethos of Wider Peacekeeping. The planning and execution of consent techniques will therefore require to be given command emphasis from the very beginning.

Consent techniques will tend to overlap in their effects on public perceptions and will therefore require continual and careful coordination to ensure that a coherent and consistent message is being produced. Commanders will need to plan to take a direct and close interest in this and ensure that the necessary liaison both within and between the appropriate agencies is being carried out. The style in which consent techniques are employed will be all-important and their planning and execution should therefore reflect the principles described earlier.

Military Information

Military information may often form the foundation of the commander's decisions. The planning, design and operation of military information systems has already been emphasized and should therefore be command-driven. Operational techniques will support military information systems in creating a widespread interface between members of the Wider Peacekeeping force and the people with whom they deal.

In planning his Wider Peacekeeping military information system, the commander will need to identify his information requirements and the task organization required to satisfy such requirements. The Wider Peacekeeping environment may create no obvious focus of attention and the information emphasis may often be on widespread low level activities derived from human agencies. In addition to general data concerning the operational environment (including terrain and weather), the tactical commander's

information requirements for Wider Peacekeeping operations are likely to seek answers to the following questions:

Conflict - What are the root causes of the conflict at the local level and how might they be alleviated?

Belligerent Parties - What are the belligerent parties' capabilities, future intentions, morale and discipline? What are the profiles of their leading personalities? What external influences bear on their actions?

Volatility - What is the potential for escalation in violence? Why, when and where is such escalation likely to occur?

Demography - What is the ethnic distribution and attitude of the local population? What part will they play in future operations and how might they best contribute to the conflict resolution process?

Having identified his information requirements, the commander will then be able to plan his collection, processing and dissemination activities. This procedure will enable him to estimate the appropriate military information assets he will need, including augmentation requirements. Depending on the level of command, a wide range of information specialists are likely to be needed, including area experts, linguists, analysts, interrogators and security personnel. This will need to be planned well in advance of deployment, and the personnel involved should be assembled together and practised beforehand.

In a multinational environment information may need to be shared with other nations. Appropriate security caveats and dissemination criteria will therefore require to be agreed beforehand with the commander's superior authority. Liaison and exchange appointments within a multinational force will be important to encourage a commonality of approach to military information and a sharing of the product.

Concept Of Operations

The final stage of operational planning is the concept of operations. In effect, this is the commander's plan which organizes and coordinates the

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application of those operational techniques that have been identified in the previous stage. The concept of operations is the *last* stage of the planning process and represents the logical culmination of the previous stages - the analysis of the mission followed by a detailed consideration of all factors, tasks, principles and techniques. As the *fruit* of the planning process, the concept of operations will reflect the balance and priorities of the commander's estimate. It will identify where the main effort of operations should lie. The concept of operations will determine the missions and coordinating instructions that the commander will give to his subordinates, and the task organization and service support he will allocate to enable his subordinates to execute those missions.

The concept of operations should cover the stages of listed below. Allowances will need to be made within each stage for transitions in the nature of operational environment and activity.

Preparation. The preparation stage covers all activities prior to departure, including warning, reconnaissance, planning, liaison, assembly, administration and training. Training for Wider Peacekeeping is covered in Chapter Seven.

Deployment. The deployment stage starts with the departure of the Wider Peacekeeping force from its home base and ends with its arrival in the theatre of operations.

Employment. The employment stage begins with the arrival of the force in theatre and covers their reception, their move to base camp, preparatory measures and the force's tactical deployment forward into the operational area of responsibility. Establishing the force's security and self-sufficiency will be prime planning considerations in the early stages. Preparatory measures in theatre will include acclimatization if necessary, with only a low level of activity taking place in the first few days. Preparation will include briefings, reconnaissance, liaison visits, training, and administration. If taking over from other troops, the force's tactical deployment forward may be conducted as a relief in place operation. Once the supporting operational infrastructure is established and working, Wider Peacekeeping operations will begin.

Redeployment. The redeployment stage starts with the cessation or handing over of operational tasks and, including the force's departure from theatre and the return to home base, embraces all post operational activity. The nature of redeployment may vary from emergency extraction to planned withdrawal or routine roulement. Redeployment will cover the transfer of all operational and administrative activities to relieving troops, international relief agencies or national authorities. All aspects of such transfer must be anticipated, fully coordinated before redeployment begins, and executed in a speedy and efficient manner. Redeployment plans should cover its conduct (including all coordinating instructions), priorities and administration. Time for redeployment may be limited and plans for this stage of operations must be flexible and capable of adaptation to different situations at short notice. Post operational activities will embrace all after-action activity, including post operational reports, the submission of lessons learned data and administration.

Whilst there will be a natural tendency for commanders to concentrate on the employment stage of operations, the remaining stages may be of key importance and care will need to be taken that they are not neglected.

In considering the employment of his various resources, the military commander's concept of operations will need to take account of particular factors that apply to each element:

Infantry. Infantry will normally represent the most significant component of the Wider Peacekeeping force. Infantry are suited to hold positions, provide presence and observation, man checkpoints and conduct patrols. Armoured personnel carriers will enhance their protection and employability for such tasks as interposition.

Armour. Tanks may not be appropriate or practicable in most Wider Peacekeeping operations. However, armoured reconnaissance units are particularly useful when the situation is confused and fluid or involves a large area. The firepower, mobility, protection and communications of armoured reconnaissance vehicles suits them for such tasks as liaison, control points, convoy security, quick reaction and proving routes.

Aviation. Helicopter aviation units may perform a range of essential

functions in Wider Peacekeeping including reconnaissance, surveillance, liaison, transport and medical evacuation.

Special Forces. The characteristics of special forces have many pertinent applications to Wider Peacekeeping scenarios. Their ability to be deployed discreetly at long range with secure communications renders special forces capable of short notice liaison, reconnaissance and assessment tasks. Special forces are also suited to civil affairs, community relations and community information activities as well as the raising, training and reform of indigenous irregular armed groups and host nation security forces.

Engineers. Engineer resources have many applications to the Wider Peacekeeping environment and it is likely that commanders will require more engineers than they have at their disposal. A principal engineer mission is likely to be the support of civil affairs programmes. This might include the supply or maintenance of civil infrastructure facilities such as the provision of shelters, waste disposal facilities and electrical power, and the procurement, storage and distribution of water. Engineers will also be able to supervise the location, removal and disposal of mines and other unexploded ordnance. Mobility is another important task for engineer resources, especially in such operations as the protection of the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. Peacekeeping commanders will need to inform themselves of the wide scope of contributions that their particular engineer assets can provide. Engineer representatives should be included in reconnaissance parties whenever possible.

Artillery. In Wider Peacekeeping operations, artillery assets may be used in a number of ways. In a preventive deployment, artillery may fill a deterrent rôle as well as providing a contingency capability in responding to unexpected and uncontrolled escalations of violence. In the guarantee and denial of movement (probably coordinated at the operational level of command), artillery - particularly air defence may be used to enforce a no-fly zone. However, the deployment and use of fire support assets may prove inappropriately provocative in most of the conflict resolution activities of Wider Peacekeeping operations and, generally speaking, artillery

has a diminishing rôle. That said, there may still be uses in Wider Peace-keeping for mortar and artillery illumination, as well as locating radars - the latter for documenting and apportioning blame for violation of ceasefire agreements.

Military Police. In Wider Peacekeeping military police detachments are able to perform security tasks and control measures, and to undertake general police duties. In the sensitive environment of military assistance tasks, military police can work in close cooperation with host nation civil police and assist in the maintenance of law and order. They may also be used to detect and curtail possible illegal activities (such as black marketeering) by any members of the Wider Peacekeeping force.

Having assessed the required tasks and the preferred techniques to accomplish them, the commander's next logical step will be to allocate his available resources to those tasks. This calculation should be done for each phase of the operation and will determine which activities may be done concurrently and which (owing to the requirement to concentrate re-sources) will need to be undertaken sequentially. This process will provide a general overview of what is operationally feasible and set prudent limits on the commander's aspirations. The commander's troops to task calcula-tion will thus determine the overall shape of his plan.

The Wider Peacekeeping commander will then group his resources and allocate missions to each grouping. This action is the culmination of the operational planning process. It should reflect the emphasis and priorities of the deductions derived from all preceding stages of the commander's estimate. In articulating missions for their own subordinates groupings, commanders should take full account of the widest ramifications of the mission given them - which in Wider Peacekeeping will embrace diverse diplomatic, economic and social factors. The principle of coherence will need to be applied and the missions devised should be such that survive short term developments and maximize the scope for exploiting the condi-tions of the mandate. Groupings will need to be organized according to tasks and tailored to the allocated missions. The characteristics of each grouping, including structure, equipment and training standards will require

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to be appropriate to the tasks it will undertake and should also allow for contingencies. Ideally, groups should be flexible, self-contained and able to meet their own security requirements. Groupings should specify and authorize augmentation requirements including that of liaison personnel and interpreters.

The volatility of most Wider Peacekeeping environments demands that special attention be given to the creation of reserves at each level of command. As well as demonstrating resolve, possible reserve tasks include preventive deployment, reinforcement, and the protected extraction of other elements of the force. Reserve forces will need to be uncommitted, mobile, at an appropriate readiness state, and of sufficient strength to represent a credible reaction force.

Combat Service Support (CSS)

The prime purpose of CSS is to support the Wider Peacekeeping force. Within theatre, CSS is the responsibility of commanders at every level and an integral element of operational activity. Wider Peacekeeping will pose unique and significant challenges to the CSS function. The operational environment may be characterized by long distances, difficult terrain, a hostile climate, and a dearth of basic facilities and host nation support. Meeting CSS demands will therefore be a complex and demanding process, requiring careful planning. Indeed, CSS considerations are likely to dictate major aspects of the Wider Peacekeeping force's modus operandi. CSS advisers should be involved at the start of the planning process and be included in reconnaissance. The early deployment of CSS assets is desirable whenever possible. Typically, Wider Peacekeeping units may be expected to deploy with personal weapons and ammunition, organic transport, communications, equipment support and medical assets, and sufficient stocks of all basic supplies to last at least 30-90 days.

As in his troops to task process, the commander will need to balance and match his CSS requirements against his resources. Having done so, he

will formulate his CSS directive, clearly stipulating his logistic priorities, both in terms of which types of support are the most critical and which customers have the highest priority. He will also have to take full and careful account of any CSS limitations which may impinge upon his future intentions and contingency plans. Invariably, CSS demands will constrain the scope of operations and may sometimes require the commander's overall planning process to be repeated and revised.

CSS functions include supply, repair, equipment support, medical, provost and welfare services. The CSS organization will need the capacity to adapt and adjust its efforts, and the merits of centralizing or decentralizing sustainment must be assessed according to the situation. If deployed over long distances, it may be appropriate for military sub units to have their own supporting CSS detachments. CSS operations that support other military forces or cross multinational boundaries will require extensive liaison. Wider Peacekeeping operations may demand the commitment of CSS resources to support civil affairs programmes for the benefit of the indigenous population. Such commitments might include medical support, health care, veterinary assistance and extensive construction projects. If engaged in the latter, engineers are likely to require frequent and large supplies of construction materials. Careful coordination between engineer and supply or contract units will be essential. Given the likely need to exploit local resources, the operation of contracting agencies will be of particular significance to CSS activity.

The Planning Cycle

Wider Peacekeeping is, by its nature, dynamic. The commander's estimate is not a once-for-all process initiated at the beginning of operations. It is a logical and continuous planning cycle that can be referred to and brought into play whenever needed. The operational environment and strategic directives may change. The general situation will certainly develop. Alterations may be sudden, marked and unexpected, or virtually impercep-

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tible in the short term. The Wider Peacekeeping commander will need to remain alert to all changes, however minor, continually reviewing and revising his estimate and all that devolves from it in the light of ongoing developments.

Chapter eight
Training

The Wider Peacekeeping environment is likely to be complex, dangerous and stressful, placing heavy demands on all individuals participating in field operations. The point of contact between the belligerent parties and the Wider Peacekeeping force will frequently be the young soldier or Non-Commissioned Officer. It is often at this level that crisis situations may be held in check and resolved. Alternatively, it is at this level that crises can escalate and get out of control, thus threatening to destabilize the immediate environment - an effect that may easily spread to other areas. It is therefore of critical importance that each member of a Wider Peacekeeping force is both psychologically prepared and militarily trained for his tasks and the environment in which they will be carried out. Training for such operations should be realistic and progressive and take full account of their special nature. Training is the direct responsibility of the field commander.

Training is not confined to preparing troops before deployment. It is a continuous ongoing process which constantly seeks to refresh and hone skills. Wider Peacekeeping tasks may often prove repetitive and tedious, thus eroding readiness and morale. A constructive ongoing cycle of in-theatre training will prevent boredom, raise morale, develop unit cohesion and maintain operational effectiveness. Training in theatre may also serve to maintain visibility and demonstrate resolve without being unnecessarily provocative.

Training derives from doctrine. Doctrine therefore provides the intellectual underpinning which imparts meaning to actions. Effective training thus requires a clear explanation of theory to precede the practice of its application. Education is therefore a critical element of training and theoretical classroom study will precede the practice of most Wider Peacekeeping skills. Soldiers who understand the long-term purpose of their activities are likely to perform their duties more effectively than those who do not.

Understanding allows individuals at the most junior level to exercise initiative and flexibility to the full in order to exploit opportunities. In complex and volatile environments, the understanding and attitude of each Wider Peacekeeper will therefore be critical to the effective performance of his duties. A comprehensive educative process is thus the most important element of training and foundational to preparing for Wider Peacekeeping tasks.

Rather than terminating conflict by force, the Wider Peacekeeper's task is to resolve conflict in the rôle of an impartial third party supervisor. This calls, above all, for an adjustment of the soldier's attitude and approach which will differ markedly from that he would normally adopt in carrying out conventional operations. The Wider Peacekeeper will normally be a guest of the host nation, a representative of the UN and a goodwill ambassador of his own nation. The demands of preserving a consensual framework for operations will require him to respect local culture, customs and behaviour. The principles of impartiality, minimum force, legitimacy, credibility, mutual respect and transparency - the peacekeeping 'ethos' - will govern his actions. The need for such an approach will need to be carefully explained and fully understood by all contingent members.

Notwithstanding their special nature, Wider Peacekeeping operations will require many of the qualities and training required for conventional operations. Professional competence, discipline, morale, leadership, initiative, flexibility and alertness will remain crucial elements of a contingent's operational effectiveness. Training for Wider Peacekeeping therefore requires a thorough grounding in basic military skills including such things as command, control and communications, navigation, weapon handling, tactical skills, physical training and administration.

The Training Plan

Every Wider Peacekeeping situation will be unique. It is the commander's responsibility to identify the specific training requirement of his own

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operational task. This will derive from his preliminary assessment, reconnaissance, liaison and estimate - the operational planning process described in the preceding chapter. Standing Operational Procedures of the superior formation and post operational tour reports of other units will assist the commander in identifying the training requirement. Reasonable scope will have to be allowed for the expected operational task to develop and change. When complete, the training requirement will need to specify what subjects need to be understood and practised by whom and in what order of priority. Training requirements and standards will influence the commander's operational planning throughout the contingent's tour of duty.

Several factors will influelce the development of the training requirement and its translation into a training plan. At this stage commanders will need to take careful account of the existing training standards of *all* individuals who will come under their command on deployment. They should also consider the resources that will be available for training, particularly time and facilities (including instructors and training aids) and existing courses. Innovative consideration will need to be given to such things as preparatory reconnaissance, liaison, attachments and detachments, exchanges, the formulation of training teams and other means of expanding and developing training resources. The commander's training plan will specify how the training requirement will be met. It must be flexible and take all pertinent factors into account. The training plan should specify the general allocation of available time and cover in-theatre activities as well as pre-deployment preparation.

Individual Training

Individual training is the basis of a contingent's collective effectiveness. Its foundation is the education that will impart an overall perspective and understanding of the Wider Peacekeeping task and that will precede any practical application of operational techniques. This section describes in outline those subjects which should be considered for inclusion in an

individual training programme. The individual training requirement is classified under three categories:

Conceptual Approach
Orientation
Special Skills

Conceptual Approach

Essential background to any Wider Peacekeeping training is a general understanding of the overall conceptual approach described earlier. This should emphasize the prime significance and nature of consent - and its doctrinal interpretation in terms of impartiality and minimum necessary force. The remaining principles and operational techniques described earlier should also be the subject of classroom instruction. All members of a contingent should also be aware of the UN's rôle, general organization, operation and Charter. In addition, individuals should have explained to them, illustrated with appropriate case studies, the pragmatic development of peacekeeping and the fundamental principles which guide its conduct. Relevant aspects of national and international law should also be covered, as well as appropriate provisions of the Geneva Convention.

The general effect of background training should be to highlight the qualities required of members of a Wider Peacekeeping contingent. In the field of operations the activities of each individual should be characterized by professional, disciplined conduct seasoned with practical commonsense, a flexible outlook, patience, restraint, tact, a good sense of humour, vigilance and an objective approach. The aggressive pursuit of "victory" and disparaging public comments about the belligerent parties or the contingents of other nations should be understood as entirely inappropriate.

Orientation

In addition to grasping the necessary conceptual approach, the Wider Peacekeeper will require comprehensive briefing relating to the particular operation he will undertake. Such orientation should include the geography and climate of the region, its economic and military situation in outline and the political background, origins and course of the dispute in question. Each soldier needs to be made aware of the political motivations, government structure, history, religion, customs, ethnic lifestyles and social structures of the indigenous population and the different factions in the dispute to which he will be a third party. Only when he has understood the causes of the dispute and the perspectives of those involved in it can he adjust his attitude and approach to the requirements of the situation and to the rôle that he will perform. Cultural factors may determine tiny but important details of the Wider Peacekeeper's conduct including expression, voice tone, touch and distance when dealing with the parties to the conflict and members of the local population. Prior to deployment, consideration should be given to procuring diplomatic representatives to brief on the progress of recent UN resolutions, what politicians are trying to achieve in theatre, the national line being taken, and on the reception of any recent peace initiatives.

Orientation briefings should also cover local security, health and hygiene hazards and recognition of the uniforms, rank insignia, equipment, weapons, vehicles and aircraft of the belligerent parties and indigenous security forces. All ranks should also be taught useful phrases of the local languages such as greetings, thanks, and sentry challenging procedures, including the word to halt. Ideally, all contingent members should be provided with a handbook setting out phonetically key words or phrases in the native languages of the area of operations.

The Wider Peacekeeping mandate, Status of Forces Agreement and other relevant protocols must be carefully reviewed and interpreted to explain how they affect the rights, privileges, duties and methods of operation of the contingent. Commanders and staff officers will require to

study these documents closely. All members of the Wider Peacekeeping force will need to have clearly explained to them the scope afforded and limits placed on their actions by the mandate, Status of Forces Agreement, protocols and laws under which they operate. This area of orientation will inevitably be complex and require frequent refresher training and practised application using hypothetical scenarios. This training will continue in theatre after deployment.

Whilst operational training will of course take precedence, administrative education and awareness is important to the effectiveness of a Wider Peacekeeping contingent. Administrative briefings will therefore need to be included within training packages. Subjects covered should include pay, allowances, conditions of service, inoculations, leave, rest and recreation, domestic arrangements for families, post, canteen and currency.

The general nature, rôle, organization and modus operandi of non-governmental and private voluntary organizations operating in the contingent's area should also be described in briefings. Individuals should be made aware of the relationship and status that members of such organizations have with regard to the Wider Peacekeeping force. If possible, relevant agencies should be asked to visit and brief units before those units deploy.

Special Skills

Special training will be required to supplement conventional military skills with those particular Wider Peacekeeping skills identified in the commander's training plan. Training should therefore include coverage of the following special skills:

Law of Armed Conflict. All members of the contingent will need to be made aware of the rules they must observe to comply with The Law of Armed Conflict. This training should be supplemented by briefings on any Arms Control agreements or negotiations relevant to the theatre concerned. Peacekeeping officers should familiarize themselves with the appropriate

elements of the Geneva Conventions, including such things as the status of refugees and displaced persons.

Use of Force. The principle of minimum force needs to be clearly and completely understood by all peacekeepers. The entire contingent should be thoroughly familiar with alternatives to the use of force and the principles that should govern its employment. They should understand the scope and limits imposed by Rules of Engagement and what action has to be taken after force has been used. This aspect of special training will need to be practised as frequently as possible, both formally and informally, using such methods as discussion of varying hypothetical scenarios, as well as general question and answer sessions.

Negotiation, Mediation and Liaison. All members of a Wider Peacekeeping force may find themselves in an emergency situation which will require them to negotiate, mediate or liaise with members of the belligerent factions or local population. This subject should will therefore need to be covered by all ranks although those specifically selected to fulfil such rôles as liaison officers will require considerable extra training. The use of interpreters will require practising.

Community and Public Information. Whilst community and public information activities are likely to be the province of specialists, all members of the contingent have a part to play in giving correct and appropriate impressions to the media and local community and will need to be briefed accordingly.

Military Information. All ranks will contribute to the collection of military information and should be taught and practise what to look out for and how to report it.

Civil Affairs. Civil affairs programmes will normally be the province of specialist personnel such as engineers and assault pioneers who may require extensive training in minefield clearance, EOD, building construction and the installation of services such as water, power and sanitation. It will be the peacekeeping commander's responsibility to ensure that all contingent members are briefed as to the importance of civil affairs programmes and their contribution to developing relationships with the

community and resolving conflicts.

Mine Awareness. Wider Peacekeepers will normally be deployed to the vicinity of former battlefields. They may, therefore, be exposed to old minefields and other types of dangerous battlefield debris. In addition, new mines may be laid by the belligerent parties. An assessment of the mine risk must therefore be made and training may have to be conducted emphasizing detection, recognition and reporting. Instructors may have to be trained to conduct minefield awareness training for local civilians.

Observation and Monitoring. Observation and monitoring will be a primary task for many members of the Wider Peacekeeping contingent. The training syllabus will need to include the siting, defence and construction of observation posts, daily routine, the maintenance of logs and use of standardized reporting formats, observation techniques for searching ground by day and night, and the operation of surveillance equipment.

Interposition and Control Measures. The tactics, requirements and procedures for interposition and control measures will depend on the provisions and authority of the mandate, Status of Forces Agreement and Force Standing Operational Procedures. Training will need to cover subjects like the siting and layout of checkpoints as well as detailed procedures to respond to such things as the discovery of contraband, refusal to produce identification or submit to searching, the brandishing of firearms and crashing through of barriers. Crowd control techniques may also be appropriate subjects for training.

Supervision. Training for supervisory actions will be conducted in the context of demobilization operations and include such things as the investigation of complaints, the procedures for which will be laid down in Force Standing Operational Procedures.

Patrolling. Training for patrol duties (including escorts) will need to cover all types of patrol, their purpose and conduct.

Standing Operational Procedures. All individuals will require to have a working knowledge of Force, contingent and unit Standing Operational Procedures. If available in time, they may be used to direct many aspects of pre-deployment training. Ideally each soldier should have a personal aide-

memoire which will contain the pertinent information required to perform his duty.

Health. Wider Peacekeeping operations will often be conducted in areas and climates where diseases are prevalent due to primitive sanitary conditions, lack of medical facilities, or the effects of the conflict. Individuals therefore need to be trained to maintain their health and to take preventive action in basic health care, hygiene and sanitation. If the climate of the operational theatre differs significantly from that of the home base, acclimatization will be an important element of preparation following deployment.

Medical Training. Basic medical training will need to be completed by all peacekeeping contingent members. Practical tests and repeated battle handling exercises will prove a useful means of validating theoretical medical training.

Recognition Training. Relevant recognition training will include repeated 'crack and thump' demonstrations to develop and practise the ability to recognize a broad variety of types and calibre of weapons.

High Frequency (HF) Communications. The nature of the terrain and distances involved in certain peacekeeping operations will often require widespread proficiency within military contingents in the use of HF communications.

Safety. The safety of troops will be of continuous concern to commanders. Training in safety precautions will normally cover the following areas:

Construction of Shelters. Each position will need to include a shelter to accommodate personnel in that area, including extra space for visitors.

Movement Security. Contingent members may be at special risk when travelling. Such things as vehicle security measures, avoidance of routine, route selection, defensive driving, counter hijack drills and anti-ambush drills will therefore need to be covered in training.

Road Safety. Traffic accidents are one of the largest causes of death on peacekeeping operations. Training should therefore emphasize safety on the road and cover host nation traffic regulations. All drivers will need to be competent in driving across country and on sheet ice. Negotiating

narrow tracks, roads and bridges will have to be practised. Drivers of armoured fighting vehicles will need to be confident of their ability to drive closed down for long periods and manoeuvre in confined spaces.

Weapon Handling. Soldiers will probably handle their personal weapons and live ammunition more often than in normal peacetime activities. Over-familiarity and fatigue may cause needless accidents and training will need to emphasize continually safe weapon handling drills. Basic training in the use of former Warsaw Pact small arms, particularly unloading and making safe will also probably prove relevant.

Helicopter Drills. If helicopters are to be used in theatre, pre-deployment training will need to include safety briefings and the practice of all drills, including emplaning, deplaning, crash and casualty evacuation.

Collective Training

The purpose of collective training is to validate individual training standards and practise the corporate performance of what has been learnt. Collective training affords broad scope for exploring issues, widening individuals' perspectives, increasing understanding and developing practical skills. It will also develop team cohesiveness and promote morale. The number of ways in which collective training may be conducted is limited only by the commander's imagination. It may be conducted at any level and with any grouping of individuals. Collective training methods will include the following:

Discussion Groups. Directed discussions of topics can range from formal seminars to informal question-and-answer sessions. The composition of groups may also range from gatherings of commanders or particular specialists to formed groupings of any variety. Visitors with particular experience or knowledge may be included.

Command Post Exercises. Command post exercises may be used to test and practise command, control and communications at all levels, addressing every phase of likely operations, including logistics and UN staff

procedures.

Gaming and Simulation. At its most sophisticated, gaming and simulation may be carried out using computer-based operational analysis. At more basic levels, useful training experience may be gained from playlets and rôle-playing exercises which seek to enact particular scenarios which require to be resolved.

Field Training Exercises. Field training exercises may be carried out at any level. They will particularly suit the exercise of skills required by large-scale activities such as preventive deployment and demobilization operations.

Soldiers will become discouraged if unfamiliar skills are exercised on a scale and intensity beyond their abilities. Although realism is desirable, collective training will need to be conducted in a progressive fashion that takes proper account of existing training standards. When conducting pre-deployment training, commanders will increase the benefit available to their troops by seeking to have the administrative support for that training delegated to other units.

Chapter nine
Might pigs fly? - Alternative concepts

In terms of conceptual approach, the implications of impartiality are more profound than they might seem at first glance. The requirement for impartiality confers a unique status on the peacekeeper. If he values his impartiality he is not at liberty to take sides in disputes or to initiate actions that will engender large-scale hostile reaction from the majority of the population amongst whom he works. Indeed, in a multi-faction conflict where he may be heavily outnumbered, his survival could depend on preserving his perceived impartiality. The rôle of third party may be an unfamiliar posture for soldiers. Basic military doctrine is traditionally predicated on the identification of an enemy. The influence of principles which guide the soldier's actions tend to reflect this context - in most armies they are termed "The Principles of War" or words to that effect. This means that such principles cannot be applied wholesale to the peacekeeping context - attractive though unified hierarchies of principles often are to doctrine specialists. Not only would such an application be irrelevant - by prejudicing impartiality it might also prove dangerously destabilizing. To the peace enforcer, however, standard military principles *do* apply - there is little or no conflict of interest. This is not to say that *all* standard military principles are irrelevant to peacekeeping. Some will remain key guides to conduct. Their overall ethos, however, will be inappropriate to a peacekeeping context.

The Implications of Impartiality

For this reason, peacekeeping and peace enforcement cannot be guided by a set of *common* principles. The peacekeeper to the peace enforcer is as referee to football player. The objectives of each are different. One is there

to win, the other to see fair play. One is a supervisor, the other a combatant. A legitimate conceptual approach, therefore, needs to recognize this radical difference. The comparison of peacekeeper to peace enforcer is not tomcat to tiger - there is no feline family link between the two. Pig to parrot is nearer the mark. It is true that a pig and a parrot are both warm-blooded, oxygen-breathing animals - just as a peacekeeper and peace enforcer may both be soldiers. But, like pigs and parrots, the differences between peacekeepers and peace enforcers outweigh their similarities. Peacekeepers and peace enforcers operate in different environments in different ways guided by different attitudes, motivations and intentions.

Strategic Direction

The debate which attends this area has not always been characterized by intellectual vigour. All too often it seems that little or no attempt is made to identify and interpret the fundamental difference in function between that of an impartial third party peacekeeping mission and that of a combatant-orientated peace enforcement undertaking. The difference in the two activities means that they cannot be mixed together - they are mutually incompatible. Whilst it would be convenient for peacekeepers to undertake large scale offensive actions when it suited them, the reality of the consent differential does not allow this. By so doing they would prejudice their legitimacy as peacekeepers and foreclose continuance of that rôle. Peace enforcement measures cannot therefore be sprinkled onto peacekeeping theatres of operations. A failure to grasp this intellectual nettle is reflected in all levels of planning, direction and management. There are many instances where peace enforcement-type UN Security Council Resolutions have been formulated and applied to peacekeeping situations - sometimes with disastrous results. Resolution 837 (passed on 6 June 1993) authorized UNOSOM II to take offensive action against those responsible for attacking UN forces. This resolution, following the deliberate ambush and murder of 25 Pakistani soldiers, extended significantly the traditional and

inviolable right of UN soldiers to employ all necessary force to defend themselves. Resolution 837 was used to legitimize two large-scale and deliberate offensive actions in which large numbers of UN soldiers and many hundreds of the local populace were killed. The use of the Resolution in this way did not advance the mission's cause. Instead it degraded the UN's control of the security environment and severely limited the continuance of the humanitarian mission in Mogadishu. Resolution 837 is an example, therefore, of strategic direction failing to appreciate the illogicality and danger of mixing and matching peace enforcement measures into what was, in effect, a Wider Peacekeeping situation. There are other examples of similarly-flawed strategic direction.

Military Doctrine

Nor is doctrine for the military elements of peacekeeping missions free from thinking of like kind. Doctrine frequently stables peacekeeping with inappropriate companions. Some armies represent peacekeeping on a spectrum of military activities depicting such things as counter insurgency, intervention and peace enforcement. In deciding when peacekeeping is appropriate, for example, US policy seeks to determine: "...an understanding of where the mission fits on the continuum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement."[39] Indeed, the perception of a spectrum linking peacekeeping and peace enforcement appears to dominate US thinking at all levels. Its effect is to classify Peacekeeping in an adversarial context with peace enforcement, linking it directly on a common scale separated only by degrees of intensity. Peacekeeping is depicted as a scaled down version of peace enforcement. The pig is, in effect, regarded as a small species of parrot. What makes peacekeeping different from peace enforcement, argue such doctrines, is the level of violence and intensity of activity.

Objection to this goes beyond pedantry. The intellectual confusion of such an approach can have serious practical consequences. It can lead to

peacekeeping being subject to a set of common principles that impose combatant adversary-orientated attitudes on the impartial third-party activities that constitute peacekeeping. Pigs are, as it were, being urged to fly. But the fundamental difference between the two creatures places them on separate scales. Pigs *can't* fly - just as parrots can't root for truffles. The spectrum approach is characterized by theories that identify some sort of middle ground between peacekeeping and peace enforcement - middle ground that is argued must now be occupied post Cold War. This middle ground is variously termed Chapter VI½ (a much misused term[40]), 'aggravated peacekeeping' or 'Level Two'. John Ruggie illustrates this approach when he argues for a military strategy in the "doctrinal void" between peacekeeping and peace enforcement that seeks to "deter, dissuade and deny". He concludes his proposal:

> *UN peacekeeping has already been pushed too far, and UN-sanctioned military enforcement will continue to be a rarity. The domain of a potentially enhanced UN military role occupies the space between those two.[41]*

Such 'middle ground' theory derives from the illusory logic of a common scale. Peacekeeping requires a referee, peace enforcement demands a player. The referee can be strict or easy-going, authoritative or ineffectual - but he will always be a referee. The player may be good, bad, orderly or disorderly - but he will always be a player. There is no middle ground that lies between player and referee - he can only be one or the other. If tries to be both at the same time his performance of one will prejudice the status of the other. So it is with the peacekeeper and peace enforcer. Logic, pragmatism, experience and history unite to refute such a dangerously destabilizing philosophical approach. The betraying characteristic of such middle-ground theories is the downgrading of consent from critical determinant to take-it-or-leave-it option.

Another example of this approach is the draft concept for 'Second Generation Multinational Operations' which propounds a theoretical

framework for post Cold War peacekeeping operations on the premise that new operational categories of task challenge the traditional thresholds of peacekeeping. The concept argues:

In second generation operations the initiative and support of the Security Council remains the primary driving imperative, but success relies less on the consent of locally opposed parties... As the consent of local parties in conflict becomes less available, the UN's impartiality will be defined by the terms of its mandate and not by the traditional acceptance of its restricted conduct and presence.[42]

Second Generation Multinational Operations contains much useful analysis on the classification of peacekeeping tasks. However, such middle-ground (in this case "Level Two") doctrines tend generally to lack emphasis on the consent factor and draw insufficient attention to those principles and techniques that might promote consent or develop public perceptions. Richard Connaughton argues a middle-ground theory using the spectrum approach. Again, the giveaway is his downgrading of consent: "Consent and impartiality are far too fragile to serve as a fulcrum around which a sensible doctrine can be built."[43]

Adam Roberts recognizes the shortcomings of 'middle-ground' theory when he describes the central difficulty in the expansion of UN peacekeeping tasks as the blurring of the lines between peacekeeping and coercive action. "This is intimately linked" he writes, "to a tendency to down-grade the requirement of consent of the parties as a pre-condition for setting up and maintaining a peacekeeping operation."[44] He goes on to recognize that this development takes peacekeeping into dangerous territory and warns against too bold an approach to the use of force - another characteristic of the middle-ground approach:

To rush into a generalized advocacy of the use of force, on a misguided assumption that the UN can succeed where so many states and empires have failed, is to invite disaster. The risks in the expansion of the concept

of peacekeeping which we are currently witnessing, and of proposals for increased willingness to use force, are obvious. Major military activities in the name of peacekeeping may get mired in controversy, and tainted by failure.[45]

Roberts later administers a healthy dose of realism to emerging theories by commenting:

In face of a baffling range of problems, and the undoubted need to restore the credibility of some battered UN peacekeeping operations, it is not surprising that many have come to advocate peacekeeping with muscles: including more reliance on major military forces and alliances. While events are indeed moving in this direction, the problems peacekeeping faces are more numerous and complex than such a formulation might suggest.[46]

Mats Berdal goes further, arguing that the basic distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement action must be upheld. He cites the forceful measures taken by US troops to disarm warring factions in Somalia, although within the mandate of UNOSOM II, as highlighting the particular risks of attempting to combine the coercive use of force with peacekeeping objectives.[47] Berdal believes that the downgrading of consent (as the symptom of middle-ground theory) was taken to its ultimate conclusion in Somalia[48].

Denying consent its status as fundamental criterion of what is possible, and its key rôle as determinant of operational activity spawns doctrine that fails to recognize where the sensible limits to peacekeeping activity lie. Peacekeepers are sent into situations with little or no guidance as to what criteria should guide and control their judgements and activities. The practical consequences of such doctrine and its parent philosophy were indeed amply demonstrated in Mogadishu last autumn. They were also illustrated ten years earlier in Beirut by elements of the Multi-National Force. If a tree is to be judged by its fruit, Mogadishu and Beirut condemn middle-ground theories.

Chapter ten
Some lessons

The Wider Peacekeeping conceptual approach described throws up seven useful general lessons that apply to the direction and conduct of post Cold War peacekeeping at all levels:

First, the presence or absence of a workable modicum of consent is the determining criterion between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

Second, peacekeeping and peace enforcement strategies require separate and mutually exclusive actions. Whilst there may be variations *within* each category, no spectrum *links* them and the identification of middle-ground will continue to lead to much confusion, and possibly bloodshed. Their techniques cannot and should not be mixed - a hard political choice has to be made between the strategies required. If peacekeeping is selected as the preferred option, then the UN, national governments and practitioners alike should act consistently with that choice - whether it be in the formulation of mandates or the daily conduct of operations on the ground. Thus far, the UN management of several peacekeeping operation has failed to make a choice and its management has accordingly been grossly inconsistent. A journalist has eloquently highlighted this problem in Bosnia:

> *... the international community... has refused to choose between the two*
> *courses of action open to it... It is impossible to follow both courses at*
> *the same time... The international military force in Yugoslavia is*
> *deployed and configured for the humanitarian mission. Its members*
> *consequently are vulnerable when the UN and NATO make their*
> *intermittent stabs at doing justice. When NATO air forces struck*
> *Serbian troops at Gorazde, the Serbs promptly arrested or sequestered*
> *UN soldiers and private relief workers... There has to be a decision...*
> *There are two possibilities. One is... that the Bosnian victims of aggres-*
> *sion must be armed.. and supported... In that case the humanitarian*

mission must end and its personnel be pulled out. The UN cannot support one side in this war and expect to be treated as a neutral by the other side.[49]

Thirdly, mandates for peacekeeping operations should follow peacekeeping principles - especially impartiality, minimum force and credibility. Certain mandates for UNPROFOR and UNOSOM have had a gravely destabilizing influence on their theatres of operations. The UN should never again betray the security or credibility of its peacekeepers by saddling them with mandates that are unmanageable or demonstrate partiality.

Fourth, a strong consensual peacekeeping framework at the operational level marginalizes opposition and facilitates the use of *minimum necessary force*. An analysis of the consent divide will furnish detailed guidance for judgements concerning the use of force.

Fifth, the use of force or a UN Charter Chapter VII mandate does not therefore necessarily equate to peace enforcement. The absence or presence of consent is the determining criterion. UNOSOM II, trumpeted as a peace enforcement operation because it was mandated under Chapter VII could arguably have remained a peacekeeping mission using its mandates only to combat banditry and restore popular confidence in law and order. Chapter VII no more equates to peace enforcement than Chapter VI equates to peacekeeping.

Sixth, in order to protect, sustain, promote and transmit consent, psychologically-orientated techniques, by addressing perceptions and attitudes, have the greatest potential in peacekeeping. It is in this area that the key to successful peacekeeping of the future lies. Influencing favourably the attitudes of factions and population alike should constitute the main effort of any peacekeeping campaign. As part of a wider political process, the development of peacekeeping strategy, concepts and doctrine should focus on this aspect.

Lastly, strategic direction and military doctrine deriving from spectrum-based 'middle ground' theories should be treated with caution! A common Wider Peacekeeping doctrine is required for UN troop-contributing nations.

Notes

[1] *Army Doctrine Publication 'Operations', dated 14 Dec 93.*

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *The latest unclassified version of 'NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations' dated 28 February 1994 defines peacekeeping as: "...the containment, moderation and/or termination of hostilities between or within States, through the medium of an impartial third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using military forces, and civilians to complement the political process of conflict resolution and to restore and maintain peace."*

[5] *An Agenda for Peace (published in June 1992) defined peacekeeping as: "the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned..." (italics added). The Secretary General's subsequent report to the 48th session of the General Assembly on 14 March 1994 revised the definition of peacekeeping, omitting 'hitherto'.*

[6] *Levels of direction and activity referred to in this article are described as follows: **Strategic** level refers to direction and activity emanating from outside the theatre of operations - most commonly from UN fora or the governments of troop-contributing nations. **Operational** level describes the senior level of command, control and representation in theatre. It is at the operational level that strategic direction is translated into campaign design. **Tactical** level covers all field operations. Campaign plans give rise to tactical activity.*

[7] *Statement on UNPROFOR made to UN Security Council by the Secretary General in 1993.*

[8] *UNPROFOR Commander British Forces Post Operational Report dated 13 November 1993.*

[9] *UNPROFOR Unit Commander's Post Operational Report dated February 1994.*

[10] *UNPROFOR Armoured Reconnaissance Squadron Commander's Post Operational Report dated March 1994.*

[11] *UNPROFOR Unit Commander's Post Operational Report dated August 1993.*

[12] *UNSCR 818 of 14 April 1993, 850 of 9 July 1993, and 882 of 5 November 1993.*

[13] *Washington Post of 13 May 1994, p.40.*

[14] *"Through Aussie Eyes" - Photographs of the Australian Defence Force in Somalia 1993. Gary Ramage and Bob Breen (Department of Defence:National Capital Printing, Canberra), p.110.*

[15] *Improving the UN's Response to Conflict-Related Emergencies - Oxfam Briefing Number 6, dated November 1993, p. 2-4.*

[16] *UNPROFOR-UNOSOM: An Assessment of Peace Support Operations' by John Mackinlay dated July 1993.*

[17] *The Blue Helmets - A Review of UN Peacekeeping - Second Edition, UN Publication 1990.*

[18] *United Nations Peacekeeping Force In Cyprus, deployed to Cyprus from 1964 to the present day.*

[19] *United Nations Emergency Force, deployed to Egypt and Sinai, 1956-1979.*

[20] *United Nations deployed to Golan Heights from 1974 to the present day.*

[21] *Operation Des Nations Unies Au Congo (UN Operation in the Congo) deployed to Congo, 1960-1964.*

[22] *United Nations Security Force, deployed to West Irian (formerly West New Guinea) 1962-1963.*

[23] *United Nations Temporary Executive Authority, deployed to West Irian (formerly New West Guinea) 1962-1963.*

[24] *Multi-National Force I and II, deployed to Beirut 1982-1984.*

[25] *United Nations Treaty Supervision Organization, deployed to Palestine from 1948 to the present day.*

[26] *United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission, deployed to India and Pakistan, 1965-1966.*

[27] *Commonwealth Monitoring Force, deployed to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, 1979-1980.*

[28] *Interests, Conscience and Somalia by Richard Connaughton, dated December 1992.*

[29] *The Lessons of Yugoslavia, paper presented to Centre for Defence Stuides seminar, King's College, London, 7 December 1993.*

[30] *Preliminary Study of Lessons Learnt by the UNTAC Military Component - UN Report submitted on 31 August 1993.*

[31] *Operation Lecturer - Post-Operation Report on the UK's Military Participation in UNAMIC and UNTAC 1991-1993.*

[32] *Lecture to the North Atlantic Assembly Rose Roth Seminar - 22 February 1994.*

[33] *The Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies -*

produced by the Task Force on Ethical and Legal Issues in Humanitarian Assistance, convened by the Program on Humanitarian Assistance World Conference on Religion and Peace - February 1994, p. 3.

[34] Ibid. p. 10.

[35] The UN and Humanitarian Assistance - Save the Children Position Paper - April 1994, p. 4.

[36] Improving the UN's Response to Conflict-Related Emergencies - Oxfam Briefing Number 6, dated November 1993, p. 2-4.

[37] Ibid. p. 11.

[38] Army Field Manual 'Wider Peacekeeping' (Fourth Draft)

[39] Non-Paper: US Views on Improving UN Peace Operations, dated 6 May 1994, p. 3.

[40] The term 'Chapter VI½' was first coined by Dag Hammarskjöld in 1961 to illustrate the fact that neither Chapters VI nor VII of the UN Charter (or, indeed, any other part of the Charter) covered the activity of peacekeeping.

[41] Wandering in the Void - Charting the UN's New Strategic Role by John Gerard Ruggie - Foreign Affairs, November/December 1993, p. 31.

[42] A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993 by John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra - The Thomas J Watson Jr Institute for International Studies, Brown University - March 1993, p.5.

[43] Time to Clear the Doctrine Dilemma by Richard Connaughton - Jane's Defence Weekly dated 9 April 1994, p. 20.

[44] The Crisis in Peacekeeping by Adam Roberts - Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Forsvarsstudier 2/1994, p. 17. See also article in this edition of 'Survival'.

[45] Ibid. p 27.

[46] Ibid. p. 38.

[47] Whither UN Peacekeeping? - Adelphi Paper 281 dated October 1993 by Mats R Berdal, p.76.

[48] Beyond Peacekeeping? - Reflection on the Evolution of International Peacekeeping After the Cold War', by Dr Mats Berdal - a paper for the Japan Institute for International Affairs, Tokyo, 2-3 June 1994, p. 6. Dr Berdal expresses extreme scepticism for middle-ground theories in this article.

[49] You Can't Have It Both Ways in Bosnia, by William Pfaff - International Herald Tribune dated 5 May 1994, p. 6.