Man the Braces!

Naval Operational Leadership and Leadership Training

The Art of the Moment for the Benefit of the Community

Leadership training philosophy of the
Royal Norwegian Naval Academy

Bergen 2009

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Chief's introduction

Our departing position

Situated on the wall at the main entrance of the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy is a memorial plaque carrying the names of altogether 47 former cadets at the Naval Academy. All were killed in action. These names are impregnated in bronze as a token of the gratitude, but also as a reminder of the sacrifice that the officer's profession might demand from the individual.

Above the memorial plaque there is also a crest. A wreath surrounds the Norwegian flag with the brief, engraved inscription: For King, Country and the Honour of the Flag. These two symbols, the memorial plaque of our fallen colleagues and the motto of the Norwegian Naval Forces, underline the uniqueness of the officer's profession. The officer carries the sole responsibility when it comes to defending society with military force, thus implicating the large personal sacrifice, death as the last resort. This requires officers with a certain sentiment of duty to the Norwegian society as well as officers with the ability to operate and lead in complex combat environments. Extensive requirements for selection and education go along with such a complicated task. These are tasks that deviate markedly from requirements to be found in civil education institutions.

This document describes the Naval Academy's thoughts regarding operational leadership and leadership training. With this we would like to clarify the basis for how we train and develop officers at the Academy. In order to be able to answer these questions, we first need to describe what we train and develop, and why we focus the way we do.

The rationale for the Naval Academy's leadership training philosophy is manifold. First, this represents a comprehensive presentation of the thinking and practice in leadership training that exists at the Naval Academy at the present, primarily as a basis in order to introduce the Navy Academy's

leadership philosophy to our own employees and interested, external parties. Second, it is my intention that this leadership synthesis will contribute to an extended exchange between operational departments and the Naval Academy regarding shared experiences, criticism, and expanded joint exercises. The synthesis has been prepared in the Leadership environment at the Naval Academy by Commander senior grade Roar Espevik and Commander Olav Kjellevold Olsen who have shared the joint editor responsibility.

Operational leadership - some reflections

Experience shows that military operations represent a large pressure on the individual officer in the shape of uncertainty, fear of death as well as homesickness, boredom and situations where you may take or sacrifice life as a last resort. For the individual this implies a potential for moral and physical dissolution as well as wrongdoings and deceit. Thus the operational context will require a lot of the individual officer's strength of character, hereby understood as will and ability to act well and wisely, also under pressure and in situations characterised by a wide range of choices for how to act.

Military history is awash with examples where firm and strong-willed officers and combat groups have been out-manoeuvred and defeated when met with the complexities and uncertainties of war. Military performance requires more than strength of will and individual character.

The will to collaboration during large degrees of uncertainty therefore represents a decisive collective operational capacity. Here leadership represents the glue that binds units and individuals together, adding joint power, direction and wise actions.

As a point of departure this synthesis states that operational leadership is a complicated and demanding task dependent on mature and competent leaders. It requires vessels and units to be "permeated" by leadership as well as units where leadership constitutes more than what is carried out by the formal leader.

The definition of leadership in the synthesis will read as a "simultaneous, goal- formulating, language- creating and problem-solving interplay between relevant others" (on a par with Erik Johnsen, 1995). This means, amongst others, that leadership has to focus on developing mature teams. Ideally leader dependence will be reduced when he or she is confronted with complex situations.

These are situations where the leader will neither be able to have total overview, nor will he be omni present. These are also situations where the leader might be jeopardized at the

same time as quick (re)-action is tantamount to good effect and performance.

Theory construction- sources and coherence

The synthesis argues for a multi profession perspective on how to build good operational leadership. Leadership theory employed in military contexts has often been developed in a civilian environment such as industry or business life. Such "civilization" might endanger good leadership in that civilian norms might be uncritically transferred to the operational context. The synthesis thus employs a military perspective on leadership philosophy. Yet several of the approaches we use stem from civilian sources for "adjusted" applications related to the operational context.

It is to be noted that all (leadership) theory simplifies reality. Theory construction will always try to find the balance between wanting to describe reality as nuanced as possible on the one hand and the need for simplification to get the broader picture on the other. Leadership theory should suggest how diverse capacities act on each other. Beyond identifying relevant variables that are significant for effective leadership, the synthesis should therefore suggest cause and effect correlations. An example of this could be transformational management that stimulates the development of cohesion, which again stimulates situation awareness. These cause and effect correlations are simplifications, and we sometimes tend to think that correlations work the other way round ("everything is connected to everything"). The synthesis suggests, nevertheless, cause and effect correlations by supporting the view of regarding operational leadership as an interplay between several factors as well as distinguishing "the target image" for military leadership training.

Leadership training

Certain qualities that are needed in the role as operational leader will be biologically determined, and as such the selection process rather challenges the possibility for leadership training. However, important capacities related to leadership might be developed on individual as well as on group levels. Operational leadership can be improved, first and foremost, through realistic and good experience, and through improvement of behavioural patterns. Good leadership is created through repetition, and through gradual, increasing challenges.

A learning environment that provides room for "trial and error" will here be of importance. This implies that courage is needed to test new behaviour. Courage to challenge one's own limits should be encouraged and stimulated. Wrong actions ought not to be sanctioned in a way that would hinder

the individual's capacity and will to continually challenge his or her performance. Leadership training also has to do with developing a language that is adjusted to difficult situations, creating insight or reflection into individual cognitive and emotional patterns. Counselling and systematic reflection play a key role in developing emotional and cognitive maturity.

Structure
Chapter one starts with a description of military operational leadership within the limited context from the point of view that leadership is situational. Chapter two continues with a short rendition of correlations in the synthesis based on identifying the involved variables in an attempt to describe mutual interaction. These pages will provide the reader with a sufficient introduction to the leadership philosophy at the Naval Academy.

The next part of the document (chapters three through nine) represents a more comprehensive presentation of the variables identified in chapter two. Closing off, chapter ten presents the core pedagogical thinking at the Naval Academy. In other words: how we think the capacities identified in the synthesis ought to be stimulated and trained.

Enjoy your reading!

Bergen 15 January 2009

Thomas T. Wedervang
Captain
Chief Royal Norwegian Naval Academy

Chapter 1
Operational leadership

1.1. Operational "In Extremis" leadership

Military operational leadership, understood as in extremis leadership, is a goal-oriented interplay tied to the use of power and arms in contexts characterised by partially large degrees of pressure, its intention being to secure our status quo and our values

This pressure may have various shapes. One example might be when there is danger or loss of own or subordinates' lives. The pressure can also be related to the killing or injuring of adversaries, or in worst case, wrong actions where civilians are killed. The pressure can also materialise as very narrow time margins. Often important decisions are made without possibility for reflection and analysis, almost as instinctive reactions to situational changes. This requires a high degree of attention and interaction.

An operational context is often characterised by a high degree of complexity. This implies that the situation is non predictable in itself with an outcome that is also as difficult to predict. In an operational context this often implies that we are faced with a decisive situation where access to information is limited. This could for example be a situation where loss (or salvage) of human lives is at stake. In other words, operational in extremis leadership implies situations characterised by a short time spans, scarce information and serious consequences. It implies that operational decisions and actions are often short-lived, but have long duration due to their consequentiality. Again, this represents a large mental load on individuals as well as for the collective combat group.

The type of stress and complexity described here will often require an operational leadership that deviates from peace oriented, management leadership.

Management leadership assumes that environments are predictable and possible to structure and control, e.g. through rules and procedures. In operational leadership these possibilities are often limited, here illustrated through two basic and demanding operational leadership challenges. The first is to motivate the crew to enter and stay in an operation over time even though the operation implies mortal danger with the moral legitimacy of the operation being criticized from various quarters. The second implies the handling of unforeseen and dangerous incidents in

an effective and morally justifiable way, running the risk of serious erroneous actions. Leaders are required who will lead "from front" with good personal examples. Leaders are also required who possess the ability to build leadership processes within their force in such a way that leader dependency is reduced for the sake of the collective capacity.

1.2 Operational leadership in naval context

Leadership and leadership behaviour are situational. This implies that leadership variants and leadership behaviours have to be adjusted to the environments and tasks that are faced in a given situation. Naval leadership has many similarities with other military operational leadership. Some common denominators are time pressure, complexity, demands on attention, consequences etc.

Certain contextual arenas, however, will distinguish naval leadership from other leadership types. Naval warfare is very complex in the sense that it can encompass warfare in three dimensions. Air, -surface, - and submarine threats may all knock in simultaneously, often combined with for example power projections against land. When

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Bartone (2006) identifies six sources for stress and pressure in modern military operations:

1. **Isolation:** operations in foreign environments, far from family, bad home communication
2. **Uncertainty (ambiguity):** Unclear tasks and missions, unclear ROE (Role of Engagement) and role distribution, unclear behavioural norms.
3. **Powerlessness:** Restrictions implying that help and protection of locals is impossible, likewise impossible to help family at home, detailed government
4. **Boredom - alienation**: Lack of variation, routine, lack of understanding of the necessity of the operation (legitimacy), few possibilities for recreation
5. **Danger:** Real danger for serious injury or death (from "blue on blue", illness)
6. **Work load:** High number and duration of deployment, long intense days in preparation, execution and post phase

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possible interior needs such as fire fighting and/or shipwrecking occur, naval warfare represents an extremely non-transparent and chaotic situation.

This supports the importance of developing leadership on board that is group related. In the absence of the leader, several of the crewmembers should be able to execute leadership functions. The same applies when the situation calls for immediate (re)-action. This supports the relevance of developing mission-based leadership (MBL) on board navy vessels.

From a technological point of view, a navy war vessel is most advanced. Waging war at sea combines a number of advanced, technological capacities in the production of operational efficiency. There is a high level of interdependence within the diverse areas of professional proficiencies in the production of operational effect. Possible flaws in particular details will soon have serious consequences for the entire vessel. This technological complexity implies that the leader only to a certain degree will be able to control or monitor the singular professional area in a complicated battle situation.

This dependency will first require high mutual trust between the players who will reduce the need for time consuming control and detailed management. It further requires a high level of maturity related to interaction and team develop-ment. Here the leader's and the group's ability to develop mutual commitment and cohesion will be decisive factors.

Naval warfare often implies fighting targets that are beyond visual reach. Missiles, torpedoes etc. are fired towards invisible enemies. Such warfare, called "faceless warfare" will make specific demands on moral sensitivity and the ability to reflect. Extensive research has shown that people turn more brutish and less considerate when they do not need to face the consequences of their known actions.

An infantryman who kills at close range will most likely be affected in another way than an operator who fires missiles on board a naval vessel, albeit also conscientiously. The latter requires leadership characterised by extremely well developed moral conscience in order that immoral and non-proportional power abuse does not take place.

When asked what was particularly challenging in naval warfare, an experienced Spanish submarine commanding officer answered the following: "The loneliness of the commander." His reasons were that a vessel (surface vessels included) often operates without physical contact and exchange with other units over time. This way it is rather seldom that the CO will receive support from superiors or other CO colleagues in the mission. This again requires leaders who have the ability to endure loneliness. Thus

leaders are demanded who will be able to connect the Leader to his or her crew in a way that contributes to the leader also being taken care of. A naval vessel is characterised by limited space. It is narrow with less room for private life. It does not provide for the individual to "chill out" by jogging around the block or similar. This situation makes particular high demands on social competence in crew and leadership. To create a "happy ship" is a decisive element to preserve the individuals by means of empathy and respect.

Navy missions are often exposed to continuous threats in the shape of demanding weather and wave conditions. Weather conditions shift rapidly. If the elements are mastered properly, this represents an operational advantage. They do, however, also represent perils such as personal injuries and downright ship wrecking. The naval context will, in other words, represent a continual stress situation by bad weather, regardless of operational threats that are likely to appear at any rate.

1.3 Operational "three phase leadership" leadership

Operational leadership encompasses more than the execution of perilous operations. From our perspective, operational leadership can be aligned across three phases: (1) Preparation, (2) Execution, (3) Post phase. These three phases are included in the responsibility of the operational leader, encompassing partly diverse leadership challenges. Preparation deals with coordinating combat groups, relationship building, developing collective skills, optimism, sense of duty and motivation related to the mission. Realism and pedagogy are here a special challenge. It is also important to challenge the individual in the combat group with guidance, possibly to include family relations in a way that enables a good send

Figure 1: Three- phase leadership – various challenges

Preparation

- Realistic education and training

- Established Pre-conditions

- Intensity and realism

Execution

- Leadership of crisis

- Critical moments

- Attention

- Mastery and meaning

Post-phase

- Take care of people - for further employment - and ethical demands

- Learning through experience

- Responsibility

off. Execution deals with maintaining focus and ability to act effectively in the given moments. This encompasses wisdom to act in such a way that the superior objectives of the mission are realized. Specific demands are made on attention, agility, mastering and the keeping up of motivation and purpose of duty.

Post phase deals with the caretaking of mental and physical health of the personnel as well as with protecting and strengthening the cohesion in the combat groups as a means to getting ready for the next mission. This implies adjustment and counselling related to a good "hook up" between the individuals in the combat group and their next of kin who have experienced ordinary Norwegian daily life during the deployment.

This "tail-phase" also addresses experience maintenance and systematization as means of the continual improvement of operational capability. Leadership training aims at raising awareness within officers towards a comprehensive leadership responsibility, enabling them to tackle it with proficiency.

1.4 Authentic leadership – and the operational context of the "dressing down effect"

The operational context puts the leader and his or her crew in a pressure zone. Experience shows that this pressure might reveal or provoke typical patterns of reaction among the individual for the benefit of "our true selves." This dressing down effect requires authentic leadership. An authentic leader is real and holistic. The non-authentic leader will be regarded as a sort of remake or copy, apparently functioning as an original, but when scrutinized closely, he will appear as a hoax of sorts. This way leadership has turned into a type of play with a large discrepancy between the leader cum person and the role that is being performed.

When encountering a leadership situation, an authentic leader is a person who when executing leadership remains true to him or her self and his or her own values. This implies that personal strength is used in a safe and convincing way without any false pretence. An authentic officer thus possesses a broad behavioural register comes along as natural, not assumed. Hence it is possible to exercise role flexibility without seeming assumed.

The non authentic is often characterised by a conflict between what you strive to be or be perceived as, and the person you display in all distinctiveness. Authenticity comprises self consciousness and a deep understanding of yourself and your surroundings. An authentic officer has a character and an understanding of self that harmonize with the requirements that are associated with the leader role. For a leader this implies that he or she possesses a solid core with reliable and

effective patterns of action as well as porosity and humbleness regarding the needs and perspective of others. Included in this is also adjustability to new situations, the ability to learn and room for others. This authenticity contrasts leaders who try to play leader roles that only to a minor extent reflect the true nature of the leader. Such lack of authenticity will emerge as artificial – without generating trust. In the worst case, this may lead to lack of trust, demoralization, and dissolution of the battle group. To stimulate the individual officer's personal and authentic leadership style will therefore constitute an important task in military leadership training.

1.5. Operational leadership – art of the moment

Operational leadership may be regarded as a type momentary art. When the American leadership researcher Gerry Klein studied experienced operational officers and fire fighters, he found that in stressed situations, good decisions were made unconsciously without particular hind thought or explicit analysis of various alternative actions. When operational decisions and behaviour meet, Klein concluded that pressure and complexity often happen intuitively, based on pattern recognition.

This type of momentary art is illustrated in the model below. Such intuitive ability to decide requires experience, team work and ability to recognise what is known or unknown in the moment: not too early (the degree of uncertainty being too large) nor too late (too few alternatives for action being left).

The model registers the lapse towards successful momentary action as an alert actions preparation where the leader will continually watch and monitor the situation. This actions preparation is a type future oriented pre-wisdom which

Figure 2: Two areas of competence – on the division between theoretical and practical competence In accordance with operational decision making and leadership

also draws on experience, pattern recognition and team work. Hindsight implies the understanding of what actually took in the given moment, in the past, in slow reflection, for coherence. This represents a type language creation that translates momentary experience into learning. In other words, a well functioning operational leadership is characterised by its competence in effective decision-making, based on pattern recognition, which requires practical training. A well functioning operational leadership is also recognized as competence to activate the entire battle group when it comes to watching the situation in question, the latter to ensure good situational understanding. Such competence feeds off good relations and trust within the group. Eventually good leadership will be recognized as the ability to reflect on one's own choices and actions in common, the purpose of which is to be able to contribute to learning and improving action preparedness for future situations.

1.6. Four "action substances" in operational leadership

An important question for the understanding of leadership and leadership development has to do with what it is that works when the leader is successful. There are four important basic "action substances": (1) Behaviour (2) Language (3) Emotions (4) Thought. Research as well as general experience clearly shows that the leader's behaviour is of great importance when it comes to crewmembers' effort and interplay. The leader's (1) behaviour creates motivation, has a guiding effect and contributes to culture creation. It is also our experience that behaviour contributes considerably more on the crew than does language ("action speaks louder than words"). An example: research shows that leaders who run greater personal risks on behalf of the community will earn more respect and trust among the crew, being identified as positive role models. Leadership characterised by deviation between expressed ideals and what is observed as the leader's behaviour will not be long lived. Positive leader behaviour training makes for an important part of operational officers' training.

Operational leadership is also to be found through (2) language and language creation. Language creates reality. The leader defines understanding and focus through language. A leader who does not have concepts for people, vessel systems, the mission in question etc will soon render into a situation with non-addressed and difficult challenges. This might be due to the fact that the leader is unable to name the challenges, hence does not realize the actual conditions or else, is not able to convey problems and challenges. Common focus, motivation and meaning are created through language. Language can reveal and conceal. Language has an undressing

and effect that does not present any danger. The adage "right words in the right hour" gains its relevance here. An example of important language is the language of ethics. The leader wants to fill an important role linked to creating motivation and sense to international operations. The ability to legitimise the mission by means of ethical arguments is important here. If the leader who displays weak language skills does not have the ability to reflect, he will easily end up in a situation where the crew loses the understanding of the intention of the mission.

The leader also influences through (3) emotions. Emotions create touch and movement. Movement can again be seen as motivation of sorts. Simply put, it is possible to claim that negative emotions create negative movement, and positive emotions create positive movement. Research also shows that emotions are contagious. Negative emotions spread rapidly on a vessel on a par with how positive emotions contribute to enthusiasm and flow. An emotionally mature leader will recognize how emotions influence people and groups, he will recognize his own and others' emotions, understanding the significance of these emotions.

Leadership also implies complicated assessments which need cognitive complexity and mature thoughts, e.g. in the shape of situational analyses, or in the shape of the planning that takes care of diverse various interested parties and various needs. Research shows that effective leaders are good at stimulating their crews to alternative critical thinking. The leaders' ability to reflect and to think clearly contributes to building a personal database as well as trust. In this context it is important that the leader is capable of reflecting upon his/her own and others' thinking, in order to be able to criticize and possibly change direction. Added up, these four action substances will represent important focal areas for military leader training.

Figure 3: Four general focal points for operational leader training.

Emotions

Patterns of thought

Language

Action

Chapter 2
The Naval Academy's leadership model - an overview

A relevant and practical leadership theory has to build on a clear understanding of the reality and the situation within which leadership will be executed. The leadership model of the Naval Academy uses as its part of departure the fact that the world is complex and chaotic. Complexity implies that reality is difficult to predict and to understand. The unexpected is often what to expect. Chaos implies that the unexpected carries along a threat of destruction and dissolution, which creates fear and anxiety. The goal of operational leadership is therefore to create and sustain a collective ability to utilise continual non-predictive changes in the environment through fast and wise adjustments. This ability to adjust is often called agility.

Operational doctrines encompass guidelines for warfare encountering complexity and chaos. The Norwegian Armed Forces Operational Doctrine regards manoeuvre warfare, combined with effect philosophy and a network based defence (NbF) as the most effective approach to military operations. Good operational leadership will thus have to promote manoeuvrability and effect within the framework of the NbF. In the synthesis at hand we regard the operational doctrine and the op-

erational context as directional factors for further development of leadership theory. We also define fast and wise adjustments as leadership objectives: The question to be asked will then be the following: What is required in order that a battle group obtains such an adjustable ability?

Our initial answer has to do with motivated people: motivation to function in a combat environment where the objectives are to protect civilians, forcefully if necessary. Henrik Ibsen proclaims that no man can be helped if he doesn't what to do what he is capable of. Good qualities and skills will lose their relevance if the competence is not followed by will, motivation and responsibility. In our context this implies duty and motivation to offer military protection of Norway and Norwegian interests.
Professional identity and professionalism are therefore basic in all military leadership training.

A professional identity implies a clear understanding of the societal duty resting on the officer's shoulders vis-à-vis military leadership. Professional identity touches us as human beings. It is characterised of a conscious and deeply felt personal responsibility so

that country and its order might be protected. In other words, it should mean something for the particular officer's definition of self that s/he contributes to the protection of society. This way the officer will distinguish himself from a hired soldier or a civilian worker.

Are will and sense of duty enough, then, to obtain good operational leadership? We assess motivation and sense of duty to be necessary, but they do not necessarily suffice as qualifications for operational leadership. Many highly motivated people who possess a genuine interest in the military protection of society will lack personal qualifications for the mastery of such a demanding task. The individual's character traits will here be decisive. Character traits are durable denominators of the individual human being; a kind of non-situational "element." The Royal Norwegian Naval Academy identifies seven characteristics for a military leader, identified as "the seven small ones": (1) Courage, (2) Justice, (3) Steadiness, (4) Wisdom, (5) Care, (6) Humour, and (7) Robustness. If leadership and officers are characterised by these traits, they possess good suppositions for the execution of operational military leadership.

As pointed out earlier, however, individual character traits do not suffice in order to lead well. Operational leadership is a skill that must be educated and trained. In addition to the individual strength of character and talent, good leadership will demand the acquisition of a series of skills, adapted to operational requirements. We also envision leadership as a collective process. Good operational leadership is more that a product of the leader's singular behaviour. The next question is therefore: What characterises good operational leadership?

In accordance with the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine, the answer is mission-based leadership (MBL). This is a type leadership that makes room for, and requires decentralised decision making and actions on a par with the leader's intentions, in cases where the situation requires this. This approach is contrasted by order-based leadership where the subordinates' duty to follow suit is dependent of how "up-dated" and sensible it is in the given situation. It is, nevertheless, important to understand that orders have large relevance also within MBL.

There is, however, no valid excuse for lacking judgment or wisdom because the leader was not present to issue new orders when the situation changed. The individual is obligated to make assessments on a par with the leader's intention. This requires good leaders who can clarify their intentions, developing their crew's ability to act independently. This again

Complexity and chaos

Operational doctrine (requirements)

AGILITY

Quick
OODA loops

(quick re-orient.)

- Situation
awareness

Character

**- Authentic
leadership**

**- Collective
building blocks**

- Cohesion
- Trust
- Duty
- Moral
- Organisation
- Common mental
model
- Automating
skills

- Courage
- Justice
- Temperance
- Wisdom
- Care
- Humour
- Robustness

**Officer
identity**

OBL

GR-
led

TL-
TRK

Figure 4: The Naval Academy`s leadership model

requires strong discipline within the personnel who are encouraged to act and think the way the leader would have thought and acted if the situation would have demanded this (not as the individual him or herself would have preferred). MBL constitutes, however, a relatively generally formulated leadership language. The next question is thus: What type of leadership contributes to a successful practise of the MBL principles?

Our answer suggests a combination of transformation and transaction leadership where the leader moves the battle group towards a mandatory group leadership. A battle group marked by group leadership will adapt to changes in the environments by changing objectives, work methods, role assignments and at the same time contribute to maintaining relations and cohesion.

This group leadership, where ideally everybody in the combat group contributes to leadership, is operationalised through what Erik Johnsen calls "leadership of the leadership process" and group dynamics theory (SPGR). This theory will say something about what behaviour and which roles the individuals and the group must occupy in order to survive in a complex and chaotic environment.

We have now made concrete what we regard as effective leadership behaviour on individual and group levels. The question remains if we have identified sufficient capacities in order to explain good operational leadership and operational effect. Our answer is that something is missing.

A challenge when developing leadership theory is to identify the mechanisms stimulated by good leadership that generates production of good results. Which capacities are stimulated through operative leadership and through which are these activated? Here we have identified seven capacities, also known as "the seven big ones," which are all stimulated by good leadership (and vice versa: stimulate good leadership), contributing to operational action:

(1) Cohesion is the glue that keeps a combat group together under pressure. (2) Trust is a relation, which makes fast decentralized actions and specialization possible. (3) Duty contributes to making the crews stay through their missions, meeting their own doubt and anxiety. (4) Morale retains meaning and may contribute to a reduction of the conflict (5) Organization creates framework and opens up for decentralized and swift actions (6).

Common mental models contribute to a common understanding of reality, coordinating attention and action. (7) Automated skills are necessary skills when officers encounter stress and exhaustion.

With good leadership processes, what will the "seven big" collective capacities contribute to? Why are these important in order to create agility and operational effect? To begin with, we suggest that they contribute to get attention, stimulating action alertness, the latter also coined as situation awareness.

Situation awareness implies an up-dated and realistic opinion of both forces as the kind of weaknesses, possibilities and limitations one is faced with, momentary as well as when they belong to the future. Weak situation awareness might activate wrong actions or lack of action, which again might have fatal consequences for the outcome of the fighting. You need to have the capability to establish and keep an up-dated situational picture as well as the capability to act vis-à-vis the "window of opportunity" in order to develop interplay where the entire crews ideally are actively on the alert. This applies to situations under pressure as well.

This requires that the seven collective capacities that activate the entire organization, that is, related to active interpretation of the situation, will be wisely (and often quickly) transferred into new knowledge and action. Here we suggest that for example lack of automated skills could "steal" mental focus that could have been used for concentrated monitoring of the situation. We can also imagine that a demoralised crew with low cohesion, low sense of duty and with a low level of leader trust will be distracted when it comes to contributing to an up-dated situation awareness.

Our final question thus remains: How can situation awareness translate into wise actions? We contend that it has to do with motivation and the ability to manoeuvre in an effective way. Here again the "seven big ones" will contribute to co-ordinated and quick action, through motivation and sense of responsibility combined with professional skills.

Chapter 3
Operational leadership frameworks

A theory and synthetic approach of operational leadership have to stem from the reality that surrounds this leadership. In this chapter we shall define two contextual relations that pave way for shaping leadership theory and its objectives. These are (1) complexity and (2) operational doctrines.

3.1 Complexity and chaos

"Let us learn our lessons. Never, never, never believe that any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on that voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.

Antiquated war offices, weak incompetent or arrogant commanders, untrustworthy allies, hostile neutrals, malignant fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscalculations – all take their seats at the council board on the morrow of declaration of war. Always remember, however sure you are that you can easily win, that there would not be a war if the other man did not think he also had a chance."
(Churchill in Herwig 1998:74-75).

Complexity can be interpreted in two ways; first as where the problem is indeed complex which implies that it can be dissolved into its variable components and mastered from there. Organization and drill are good answers to this challenge. Complexity, however, can also mean that something is undecided. This implies that it is impossible to predict that linear logics (proportionality, additionality, replication, causality) will only to smaller degrees be able to help us. The future of humanity is always a mixture of something known and something unknown. In military conflicts, however, the amount of the unknown is often much more substantial. Not only because there are at least two adversaries that attempt to conquer the other, but also because none of these will be able to create the outcome of the conflict in his picture since there is a vast number of variables that can play along.

Nobody knows the outcome of a war, and often the outcome is ever so different from what the warmongering partners envisioned at the outbreak of the war (hardly anybody in WW1 had as their objective that three empires would be dissolved, nor did anybody

write as their WW2 objectives that the world be parted in two, with people living on the brink of extinction 50 years onwards). In modern wars this complexity grows: they are often asymmetric, seldom between states, and there is rarely a sharp division is between combatants and non-combatants. There is rarely a sharp division between friend and foe, and often there is a blurred line between war and peace. There are few answers to this complexity. Technology does not help much. We can only to a small degree organize ourselves out of the problem. Military leadership therefore has to do with being able to live with chaos, being able to operate effectively in chaotic circumstances, and handling chaos better than the adversary.

Complexity has also got a positive side. It is through the unexpected and unpredictable that creativity, innovation and progress take place. Chaos and complexity do not only open for destruction; it also implies possibilities. Organizations and leaders that are able to adjust are in demand; i.e. people who are able to read situations, observing mismatches between their own expectation of progress, and who will develop, adjusting their actions accordingly.

The border marks the location where the leader and the organization face a new situation. One is situated at the borderline of the known area, an area where experience and knowledge, rules and procedures do not quite suffice. Between the familiar and the new situation emanates a type no-man's-land. Since the situation is not already familiar, it is not possible to know the right thing to do. One is situated in a

Figure 5: Brunstad's liminality model – transgressive operational leadership

Normality and structure		Liminality and anti-structure
Tradition History Stability / Order The familiar Security Rules Structure Control	L I M I N A L E S O N E	Chaos Complexity Disorder The unpredictable The unstable The unsafe The unknown The nameless The foreign The angst ridden The vulnerable

situation of choice where road signs are blank. Nevertheless, one needs to make decisions. This is leadership's true location, a place characterized by lack of overview, with complexity, chaos and at times uncertainty. In this operational area the leader is tested, and the future of the organization is momentary jeopardized.

3.2 The operational doctrine

"The keen sword of initiative has no place in the armory of those who hold the "Doctrine of no doctrine" (Knox: 53)

A doctrine describes guiding principles for the approach we apply when solving our missions. "Guiding" implies that the officer has to use his/her professional judgment when applying his/her professional judgment when making use of the principles of the doctrine; i.e. a doctrine is not a recipe to be followed from A to Z, but will tell us where to focus.

A doctrine may have several objectives. Our joint operational doctrine (FFOD) is focused on internal cultural development (FFOD p7) i.e. on what norms to be in effect for our joint interaction. The FFOD describes our culture to be characterised by effect, network and manoeuvre thinking.

"Effect thinking has to do with neither finding the right attention towards the result, nor the individual input nor seeing

his /her mission in a larger context. Network thinking has to do with organizing all the resources in the best possible fashion to obtain the best situation awareness and systems integration.

Manoeuvre thinking implies mastering the psychological dimension of warfare by understanding warfare as a fight between wills, characterised by uncertainty, chaos and friction."

The logics of manoeuvre thinking imply that the adversary's will has to be broken down by our application of surprise and expectation. The objective is to employ the complexity of military missions to our own benefit. The fact that things do not happen when they are expected to, are in and of itself confusing. One does not comprehend what happens in the here and now which makes for disorientation, something that again will have a negative effect on motivation during stress and perils.

That being said, it is important to remember rule number one in all competition: one must assume that the adversary is at least as cunning and motivated as yourself. We must therefore assume that the adversary will try to confuse us. This requires that we keep our own situation awareness up-dated vis-à-vis what happens in our environment. It boils down to being able to stay informed in an environment that tends to be ambivalent,

complex, and in rapid change, all the while when the natural tendency seems to be one of disorientation.

The logics of network centric thinking calls for utilising the advantages offered by ICT in order to increase flexibility, and thereby increased efficiency (pt 0453). The objective is to retrieve and share information (p 0450) to increase situational awareness among decision makers in the organization. Network centric thinking also implies focus on the ability to rapidly being able to assemble forces on an ad hoc basis (pt 0310). It is also necessary to distinguish between technical and social networks since the possibilities offered by technology also have repercussions on social relations in the organizations, i.e. how we are to function within the framework of a network. Contrary to a classical hierarchy where orders and co-ordination will have to be issued from up above, in a network where it is expected that each and all will have to understand how he/she can contribute to the needed collaboration and management. Network collaboration implies that not only are we supposed to strive for the solution of our own problems, but we shall also support others so that they reach theirs. All the time it has to do with being continually informed, up-dated and accessable.

The essence of the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine is that The Armed Forces is a flexible organization. We are equipped for the solution of missions characterised by friction, uncertainty, chaos, danger and stress. In some situations we are capable of operating unpredictably at high speed (the manoeuvre method), in other situations we are predictable, generating trust (stabilisation method), often in the same operation. The further question is therefore: What are required from an operational leadership that acts effectively in a complexity and that is adjusted to our operational doctrine? Our initial answer: A leadership that acts pro creatively, qualifying people for reorganization and situation adjustment.

Chapter 4
Adaptability (agility) as operational leadership objective

"Agility means the ability to rapidly change one's orientation in response to what is happening in the external world" (John Boyd)

"The essence of agility (…) to any form of competition is to keep one's orientation well matched to the real world during times of ambiguity, confusion, and rapid change, when the natural tendency is to become disoriented". (Chet Richards)

Within leadership research it is regarded as difficult to measure good leadership. The discussion often has to do with what can be measured; that which good leadership has resulted in. Some focus on co-worker satisfaction, other focus on leader behaviour in itself, other yet again put emphasis on for example economic revenues.

Within our leadership theory our leadership objective is the ability to adapt in a way that the combat group is able to adapt to the conflict environment in a favorable way, hence the notion adaptability or agility.

The key to master complex situations where an enemy seeks to beat you is to be mentally prepared in advance. You will then faster be able to see that situa-

tions change, that planned actions may function or not, or that mental simulations of expected development may materialise or not. Agility has to do with abilities to transform and abilities to adapt. This might occasionally lead to you acting before the enemy, creating his reality image; occasionally you will let the enemy act first, accepting him to go wrong. Mentally you will still be in advance.

Leadership in complex surroundings will demand capacities that can relate to situations in continual transition. It requires adaptability skills where one will continually learn from ever shifting situations. One is humble in the encounters with the unknown without letting go of one's own core, one's own memory. One enters the game coined by John Boyd as interaction and isolation (SG 36-39), where interaction with the environment adds agility whereas isolation from the environment leads to loss of information and loss of one's own morale.

The opposite of such adjustment might lead to the loss of one's own identity, its dissolution or entering into an amoebic state. The good leader will appear in his or her ability to balance

on a continuum where the extreme points are isolation and loss of identity. When the Naval Academy contends that agility is the key to success as a leader, it is because, in our opinion, future conflicts will be continually more complex, rapidly changing character. The key also implies rapid change to be able to deal with adversaries using new and unforeseen events. Doing it mentally quicker than your adversary – employing agility – is decisive in order to succeed. Ways to acts that promote collective transitory abilities will therefore be a superior objective of operational leadership. This implies first and foremost a combat organization constituted by individuals with motivation and certain character traits where will and sense of responsibility are first corner stones towards a professional identity.

Chapter 5
Professionalism - officer identity

"Hired troops are useless and dangerous. The man, who bases his state on hired weapons, will never find tranquillity and safety. These are namely always at strife, full of ambitions, without discipline and faith; popular among friends, coward among enemies, they do not fear God, and are faithless towards people. With these people defeat is as certain as every battle they undertake…the only thing that keeps them in battles are the lousy wages they receive with which they are not motivated to face death for you. They would love to be your soldiers when you are not on the war path, but when war arrives, they will either hide or desert."
Machiavelli

With "identity" we understand our own thinking about "who I am" – how I deep down understand myself. The idea is that thought is tied to how I perceive and understand the world, including my own profession.

Professional identity will constitute my personal conscience, and the perception of who I am as an officer. This will answer questions like: Why am I an officer? What does my job entail? What is my area of responsibility? As a point of departure we contend that the professional identity has a decisive bearing on

the motivation for the profession, hence also on the ability and the willingness to fill the officer role.

The core of the military profession deals with executing the missions it receives from the state. The military profession and the organization are part of the state apparatus of violence which issues authority to execute violent acts on behalf of the state (privately, personally, because the allied asked for it etc.) The right and duty to exercise violence requires a lot when it comes to loyalty, discipline, commitment, ethics and morale. Since the fighting military profession will encounter thinking adversaries with lethal intentions, courage, strength of will, and vigour under extreme suffering will be an essential part of the military profession.

The enormous physical and mental loads connected to killing and losing your own soldiers require a legitimization beyond the instrumental. It can only be legitimized if the large purpose is right and good. It is therefore necessary that the military profession is connected to a larger purpose rooted in the values supported by the employer (i.e. the State). The members of the military profession will thus have these values

internalized and located in language. This implies that a professional officer will experience the mission as meaningful and as an important part of his own self-image and professional identity.

The professional identity will again contribute to responsible actions and professional behaviour. This can either happen in such a way those actions that conflict with the individual's professional identity will activate negative emotions like shame and guilt, or else be actions that confirm positive professional identity that will activate positive emotions and a strengthened self-image.

> "Other matters in the state are directed to the profit of individuals, where as the business of soldiering is directed to the protection of the entire common good. The essential distinction between those occupations that are professions and those that are not is that the former, but not the latter, serve the common good."
> Thomas Aquinas

The military profession is also collective in its nature. The profession receives its missions and executes them as a collective unit. Individualists that single-handedly ask what society can do for me rather than what they can do for society will therefore occupy a problematic location within a military, violent apparatus.

The American military sociologist Charles Moskos has proposed an assumption that officer identity has started to look like what we find in regular occupations where wage work has more prominence than service. As seen from the table below, officers tend to focus more on a permanent job, regular work hours, material rewards than service for the country.

Also among Norwegian officers we find a large group of officers that would fit better in an occupational role than in a professional role. This is not unnatural since a large part of the work in the military organization does not deviate from work in a civilian enterprise. It is harmful, however, if this view of professional identity will set the tone in the Norwegian Armed Forces. Subsequently, developing a professional with institutional elements will be an important objective for the leadership training at the Naval Academy.

The military profession is also threatened by what is called a deprofessionalization. Implied is the fact that the officers' task range is extended to such a degree that their professional role vanishes. Officers are supposed to be warriors, administrators, teachers, technicians, aid-workers, aid catastrophe workers, police officers, humanitarian aid workers etc. This is a development that cannot be reversed, but officers' ability to hold on to their basic professional identity is largely challenged.

Variable	Institutional	Occupational
Legitimacy	Normative values	Market economy
Societal member evaluation	Respect based on service notion	Prestige based on wage level
Role obligation	Vague, generalist	Specific, specialist
Reference group Armed forces	"Vertical" within Armed forces	"Horisontal" with prefessions outside
Recruitment appeal	Character traits, life style/orientation	Wages during education, technical capabilities
Conduct assessment	Holistic and qualitative	Segmented and quantitative
Salary basis	Rank and seniority, with rank as governing principle	Technical skills and labour market pressure with rank as governing principle
Types rewards	A lot of non materialistic, respect generating rewards	Salary and bonuses

Table 1: Institutional work identity contrasted to work relations (Based on Moskos/ Wood 1995:16)

In his investigation "Norsk Monitor" Ottar Hellevik has continually measured value development in the Norwegian society from 1985 till today. The tendency shows a general shift in values from traditional values like security, frugality and respect for the law towards modern values like openness to "the new times", women`s emancipation, technology, risk taking, diversity tolerance and critical approach to authorities. Hellevik also acknowledges a shift from idealism as inner focus, spiritual and creative values, care, environment and health towards more materialism with emphasis on the exterior - materialist and social issues alike. Hellevik also portrays difference between generations. Young people (15-29 years of age) are more modern and materialistic in contrast to older people (+55 years of age) with a more traditionalist and idealistic orientation. These changes and value might effect military leadership and military identity. Development towards more risk taking and openness towards "the unfamiliar" probably supports accept of foreign operations while contempt of rule might curb the readiness to follow the chief`s orders and intentions. The shift toward more materialism and ego focus might represent a challenge when it comes to developing commitments vis-a-vis society as well as cohesion within the organization.

Chapter 6
"The Seven Small Ones" – characteristics for operational leadership"

Operational leadership represents complexity and pressure. It makes demands on interaction and cohesion. It also makes large demands on individual capacities – understood as character and strength of character. In the following we are going to present seven traits of character (possibly called virtues), also called the "The Seven Small Ones" which we view as instrumental when it comes to individual characteristics for officers who are going to operate well in a complex, operational contexts.

Our character says something about what characterises us as human beings. It mirrors the individual and unique sides of our personality. Our character is reflected through the values, ideals and role models with which we try to identity ourselves. This is the inner side of character. To this there is a corresponding outer side. Character expresses itself in the way we perform our responsibility towards others, as a moral obligation, as our abilities to persevere the lesser evils in life, as well as realizing our goals. Our character is therefore closely linked to our identity. We are identified through our character and our exterior patterns of actions. Known and unknown traits of our character will continually coexist.. Both

parts have in common that they seek to influence our actions and priorities. Thus our character will influence the way we execute leadership.

In addition to having an inner and an outer side, the character will also be static and dynamic, the static implying a relative solid core in our action and reaction patterns. In addition to this stabilizing point of gravity, there are also more dynamic elements. This shifting aspect is due to the fact that we all the time have to relate to the shifting element of the environment.

Requirements and challenges in the topical situation make adjustments of habits and action patters necessary, frankly in order to be able to tackle the shifting circumstances in which we are situated. Without the flexibility in this field, a person could have been said to have a problematic character, well, in certain situations a lacking ability to pay attention to one's environment could be seen as an expression for a flaw in character that might lead to rigid leadership.

Simultaneously, however, if there's no stability, no static aspect of our character, we would be capricious, unpredictable

and free-floating individuals, without the means to build lasting relations and the lasting trust with others. Character must be rooted and flexible at the same time. The characters, which an operational leader should strive for, can be summed up as seven character traits – also called virtues.

6.1 Wisdom – phronesis

The most important of all virtues is wisdom, in Greek phronesis. The distinctive character of wisdom implies that it is situation oriented and tied to man's intellectual capability. That does not mean that it is a theoretical proportion in itself. Wisdom challenges thought, but its goal is to understand the concrete and the practical. Therefore wisdom is also called practical wisdom. Here Aristotle emphasises wisdom as kairos, or timing, where the right means are used at the right time, in the right number and intensity to reach the goals. In operational leadership wisdom is the art of the moment, not at least due to high risk (potential damage extent and probability) and lack of information, which characterises the situation.

Good leaders may use wisdom to check if the situation is known, and thus let routines and habits have the right of way, or, if the situation is new, they can demand other solutions. Such an ability to read the situation will be decisive for its solution. If one only looks for the old in a new situation, one will attempt to solve it according to old habits, routines

and rules. Everything is done correctly, but everything turns out wrong. To look for the new in the new, for subsequently to be able solve it in new ways: This is the nature and strength of wisdom.

6.2 Justice

Justice is a fundamental moral capacity. It is difficult, yet possible, to imagine a moral action, which at the same time is also unjust. Justice has to do with a distribution of rights and duties, benefits and burdens that are fair, where everyone gets his/her share or what he/she is entitled to. Justice unites a community while injustice carries in itself a potential for dissolution. An experience of injustice often creates strong negative emotions; in the worst case dissolution of good will and community. Research shows that a leader's ability to balance diverse players' duties and rights in a way that is regarded as just will be decisive for the creative and keeping of mutual cooperation between strangers. This is not the least relevant in a network centric defence where many players are linked together. The experience of justice is just as important in a battle group as between units in a mission – and as the last resort, between conflicting parties.

We operate with various types of justice. We distinguish between justice of procedure, which focuses on a just decision process, justice of distribution which focuses on just allocation of goods and duties, and justice of interac-

tion which focuses on just recognition of effort, attention, and care taking of the individual. Eventually, justice of information will provide good information about the bases for decisions, plans etc. Shut off from information, the individual will soon experience a type isolation and seclusion; a feeling of not being worthy of any explanations. For all these types of justice there is an understanding that everybody owes something to the other. This implies that regardless of what type we are talking about, we are committed to each other. No one can reach beyond this obligation. If one were to do that, one would act unjustly, thus letting the others down.

The perspective of guilt turns more visible if we study it by ways of the English word duty, in the expression to do one's duty. Duty is derived from the Latin debitus/debitum which means guilty/trespasses. To begin with, I am not creditor, but debitor. In a community where all owe each other something, and everybody is willing to pay their debts, everybody will receive what is rightfully his. Justice is a kind of eco(nomy)-system that is always unbalanced, over which we are constantly summoned to watch . If we are not awake, we will stumble, in the act of unbalancing, and things might break. To obtain balance in these books will then be tied to everybody being alert whilst being doing his/her duty: without duty, no right.

Several studies show that officers' presuppositions for making just decisions, particularly in complex and pressured situations, will vary to a large extent. An international publicized study undertaken at the Naval Academy also shows that ability to principled justifiable thinking is an important component in transformational leadership.

6.3 Courage – fortitude

Antiquity connected courage with the officer and to good performance of violent power. To protect society rests with the officer – and the courage of the battle group. Courage is in other words a condition for survival. If the nature of wisdom is to find the best means of realizing a higher good, then courage is the fearless contribution that you need when conquering the obstacles that threaten the realization of this goal.

 A moral without courage would not be a moral. Courage will aid you in doing the right thing. Moral is not first and foremost theory: it is action. The Latin word for courage is fortitude, and is closely connected to the adjective fortis. Fortis is used to denote a character trait. It corresponds to the Norwegian adjectives kraftig, dyktig, energisk, modig, uforferdet, staut, djerv and tapper. There are semantic remnants in our own synonym for castle, namely a fort (like we also know it from English). A fort is built of strong walls, situated on a ridge. This way it is able to protect what is inside. Fortitude is the notion of mental

strength that can indeed withstand attacks that will endure danger and tolerate pain.

To be found in courage is a certain confidence that life resists placement in a formula. The haphazard and unpredictable are some of life's characteristics. What we believed was dead certain, was maybe not so certain after all. What we didn't believe in, won terrain. What we gave everything for, let us down in the last instance. As its point of departure courage emanates from what the Greeks called tyche: contingencies, chance, and the unpredictable. The world is not quite safe, but then again, it will never be. In this lies a surrender to something that is larger than one self. From a theological perspective, it is natural to find hope and faith in God's providence and care, underlining the significance of courage.

It is difficult to lead a courageous life without at least a belief that the good will prevail. Joined with this hope lies a persistent and resilient faith in believing that good is stronger than evil, and that good will prevail in the long run.

In antiquity courage is the road from cowardice on the one hand and overweening pride (hubris) and foolhardiness on the other. Aristotle describes these ditches the following way: Who flees from everything and for everything will not be able to endure anything, will turn cowardice whilst whomever nothing fears will lash out at everything but will only gain overweening pride. Again, it is the ideal of the middle way that represents the classical ideal.

Attached to this idea, however, is to walk along just roads that do not follow crooked paths in order to trick others. Many show boldness in the pursuit of individual gains, but this is not the true road of courage. Only the one who is just can be courageous in the true sense of the word. Like cowardice courage is contagious; something that is spread. In this lies a particular leader responsibility. The courage of the leader will nourish the unit's courage and vigour.

6.4 Temperance
Temperance is about being able to insert a delay between impulse and action. To keep back a bit, wait off, in order to stem impulses characterised by self-focus and possible rage and destructive emotions. This way temperance serves as a buffer against reduced ability to assess. Whereas wisdom will relate to the surroundings, temperance is more of an inner character trait. The focus is not on the situation, but on the person. Critical and corrective assessment of individual motives and action preferences will open up during this postponement.

Temperance is in itself not a realization of the good life, but a precondition for it. Discipline, moderation, or the art of tempering oneself, will open a

room into the good. In temperance impulsivity might be stemmed which again may have a damaging effect related to superior goals. Rage from the local population in a Peace Support Operation serves as an example of this.

In these introvert looks lures indeed a new type of self-centeredness. The danger of getting so comfortable around one's own inner peace might result in a limitation of self and of being caught once again. It is therefore not without reason that this virtue has emanated as self-virtuousness' standard-bearer: I have full control and can make do without the other. Moderation can thus not unexpectedly give raise to relational and destructive conceit including contempt of others who do not to the same extent master their own idiosyncrasies and inclinations: I have succeeded at restraining myself; you have not.

In Latin the virtue was translated with temperantia, which again goes with tempus, i.e. time. Temperantia has to do with being able to await further instruction, letting things get adjusted, letting the singular item find the place where it belongs. Without time to restrain, acting wisely is difficult. It goes without saying that wisdom and temperance are intimately connected. In temperance the leader will also allow space for the other. By refraining from individual points of view, space is admitted the other. This weighing of clarity and dominance on the one hand, and of transparency and humbleness on the other, is an important balancing act in operational leadership.

6.5 Care
While justice asks questions of what is a reasonable distribution of rights and duties, and what the individual is entitled to, care will ask what the individual needs. Focus here is on the individual's emotions and needs. Here justice is tempered with mercy. The caring leader will ease the burden of the individual, at times regardless if it is deserved or not. Care conditions empathy in the other's emotions, and will contribute to help the other on his or her premises. Care blends in with justice. While justice contributes to keeping an organization gathered at a balance between rights and duties, care will provide for the up keeping of close relations.

While justice may seem "cold," care is "warm." Balancing between justice and care is important, particularly for leaders at higher levels, in other words balancing between closeness and distance. A leader with some degree of care, but with a minor capacity for justice, will be endangered when practicing soft leadership, which again contributes to dissolve cohesion when inequalities are experienced. A leader with a well developed sense of justice, but with less care, might run the risk of creating a cold and impersonal climate where case will override person.

6.6 Humour

The French philosopher Andre Comte-Sponville contends that "whomever lacks humour, also lacks humour, humbleness. He also lacks clarity, lightness and he is too much preoccupied by himself. He is too imposed by himself, he is either too strict or too aggressive, and therefore lacks nearly always mildness, charity and compassion. There is something suspicious and alarming about too much seriousness." Positive emotions are aroused in humour, particularly when we are faced with the difficult and threatening.

A leader without humour is a sad leader. Leadership characterised by humour will be able to initiate positive drive and optimism on the expense of sadness and misery. Positive emotions also opens up a human being, makes it responsive to new experience and other people while negative emotions will close and capsule the other person within him or her self. Learning and development will thus feed on positive emotions that again will feed on humour.

Experience from concentration and detention camps has shown that humour, often as sardonic humour, is able to explain mastery and survival. This is underlined in humour's paradoxical truth: the situation is hopeless, but not serious. We also know that humour is contagious; lifts us up, uniting us. Humour is not the opposite of seriousness, but rather a precondition for the other. This might explain research that alleges that humour is often tied to inspirational and good leaders, while lack of humour is often tied to destructive leaders.

A person who always jokes, however, is not humorous, but rather cowardice. Irony is not humour, but rather a weapon that is nearly almost pointed at our fellow human beings. Irony is the evil, sarcastic damaging laughter; a hurtful mockery able to kill. Irony will scorn, accuse and judge. Irony is narrow-mindedness that views everything in black and white. Humour, on the other hand, will laugh at itself or of the others like itself, always including itself in that which brings about laughter.

According to Kierkegaard irony is self-assertion while humour is self-annihilation. Humour is neither seriousness (where everything makes sense) nor indifference (where nothing makes sense), but something in between. The more important areas of our lives humour is directed at, the better and more profound the humour.

Humour helps us see our surroundings and ourselves in a less threatening and grave perspective, often by objects being reinterpreted from one walk of life to another.
An often-quoted example from Freud refers to an American undertaker advertisement: "Why die today when you can be buried for 10 dollars!"

6.7 Robustness

Faced with war and conflict as well as stressful and demanding workdays, the individual is challenged to function well in action as well as in reasoning. Both will and abilities are prone to succumb when faced with war and troubles, in spite of various types of mental and physical refuge: away from oneself, away from difficult situations. This ability to master and adjust to situations where one is confronted with resistance and negative experiences is called robustness. Without this trait of character, all the other character traits are easily irrelevant in an operational context.

Robustness can be compared with elasticity in metal. Some iron is hard, and breaks easily while other types of iron are softer and can be bent without breaking. Research and experience have taught us that this ability will vary among individuals. Some resist more. The robust officer counteracts negative experiences, adjusting to the new demands imposed by the new situation. Robust people are optimistic and energetic, often curious and open to new experiences. Robust people are often good at developing positive emotions, often by employing humour and positive thinking. They are characterised by hope, faith and optimism related to the future, even in demanding situations.

Through maintaining positive emotions (like joy, satisfaction, interest) the individual's ability to think and act from a broad range is widened, as opposed to when negative emotions (anger, hatred, irritation and apathy) will reduce the individual's think-action area (the latter because negative emotions often lead to quick decisions that close any wider orientation). Faced with stress the robust leader will be able to define positive sense when encountering rather meaningless experiences.

A basic attitude (also defined as a personality trait) is hardiness that can explain parts of a person's robustness. Hardiness contains three main elements: 1) Challenge, 2) Control, and 3) Commitment

1) Challenge has to do with a belief that change in itself is exciting, and can lead to personal growth. We identify an appetite for life when breaches of conventions give possibilities, and where negative experiences are perceived as possibilities for learning. Normally the negative is turned into something positive.
2) Control implies the belief that it is possible to influence incidents that occur. Powerlessness is replaced by an experience of control, both by the surroundings and by oneself. This is not about being control freak, but rather when feelings and thoughts are tied to the attitude of "I can do this" of "I can influence."
3) Ultimately, commitment contains an ability to involve oneself, privately

Figur 6: "The seven small ones" – character traits to strive for

as well as professionally. This involves attention, focus and presence. Instead of being distanced or alienated, a person will be responsible, he or she is curious, and displays joy when assuming responsibility. This type of commitment will go hand in hand with the capability for self-motivation and endurance.

6.8. The significance of virtues and character – a summary

Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between the seven character traits. Even if they are all connected through an inner dynamics of sorts, there are certain traits that have a stronger relation to each other than anyone else.. It is natural that robustness forms a foundation at the basis of the model. Robustness adds a durability that creates space in order that other traits can function in a pressured operational context. At the top, at the opposite end of robustness, we find wisdom. Wisdom encompasses a situational adjustment and proper action marked by good timing. In wisdom the remaining character traits are delivered to the field of practice. This way the remaining virtues become useful helpers on their way to develop wisdom.

Care and justice both address the care taking of others. They are, however, placed on the opposite side of the model, as a warm and a cold part, respectively. These are supported by humour and temperance. Humour is placed closest to care, as a "risk-free," inclusive, and containing quality whereas temperance is placed next to justice as a cooling quality that will aid the decision maker to a sensible balancing act before action is carried out. Courage represents the very engine in the strength of character, and will therefore occupy a central

position. It puts things in motion, transforms thoughts and intentions into practice. Thus courage is situated right below wisdom, both as energy and support, but also to illustrate that wisdom ought to inform courage in order that courage does not venture into overweening pride.

Virtues' primary purpose is not as much occupied with man per se, but with his of her capability and power to force him or her to look away from him or herself. Through this re-focusing man can forget about himself for a second. This is what German philosopher Martin Heidegger refers to when he employs the German notion "Gelassenheit" . In this moment of self-forgetfulness individual interest is let torn off, and thereby also the destructive power imbedded in the fear of losing oneself, and what one personally clings on to. In this view, when will and emotions are directed towards the environments, man is about to open up to the situation and to him or herself. In this openness the basis for one's own humanity will be found.

Borders will be closed if he or she too one-sidedly focuses on him or herself, thus verging on losing oneself. By forgetting oneself, one will, paradoxically, find oneself: by continually thinking of oneself, one will lose oneself. In a military perspective the opposite is the goal, hence virtues and strength of character have a decisive factor.

Chapter 7
The leader and the leadership process

In the Norwegian armed forces mission based leadership (MBL) has been identified as the most suitable leadership philosophy. This emphasizes decentralization and requires vigour when we are faced with emerging opportunities in order to turn battles into our favour. However, MBL is a overriding philosophy, which requires to be made further concrete in order to be implemented.

In other words, we lack language about the type leadership behavior and the type leadership that are needed in order to practically carry out MBL. Royal Norwegian Naval Academy operates by using three different leadership theories that we regard as mutually interlinked and interactive.

As a point of departure we emphasise inspirational transformational leadership as a condition for developing adjustable and effective battle groups. Underlined here is the leader's responsibility to develop community commitment, procreation of opinions, creative thinking, care, independence and vigour. In addition we value transaction leadership for preparation and follow-up of expectations and demands. However, operational leadership is too complicated that this will be regarded as solely a leader's commitment. A battle group where the leader has a decisive impact is vulnerable and static. This is the reason why we follow Erik Johnson who emphasizes that leadership is leadership of a group process where the entire crew will ideally actively contribute to the leadership process. This way continuity is secured in the leadership process, even if the leader gets killed or when the situation turns out to be too complex for one person to comprehend and control everything simultaneously. This also requires a mature group with a high degree of role flexibility where leadership implies more than what the leader does. It also secures leadership in situations where direct orders are absent. A considerable leadership challenge is here to develop a mature group that is permeated by leadership. The leader turns into "the first mover" carrying the main responsibility for initiating and maintaining development. The question is, however, what happens in a mature group with a collective leadership process?

The Naval Academy implements group leadership within the SPGR (Systematize Person Group Relation) theory, which regards group performance

as a type behavior. Role descriptions are connected to group dynamics. This theory identifies which behavior and role registers that are needed to perform well. At its most sophisticated level it operates with 24 behavioral levels, which more or less promote interaction and group achievement. In the following chapter we are going to describe mission- based leadership. This will be broken down in transformation and transaction leadership as the "creational process" for effective group leadership.

7.1. Mission-based leadership

"Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do, and they will surprise you with their ingenuity." (General George S.Patton)

Mission-based leadership (MBL) has been shaped to function effectively during most circumstances. MBL departs from the fact that in most cases it will be of most worth to have a decentralised organization to obtain the flexibility that is required to master uncertainty in missions. MBL gives possibility to take advantage of initiative, flexibility and speed to encounter shifting environment in a co-ordinated way. The leadership philosophy opens up for taking advantage of the creativity in the entire organization, not just the leaders'. The objective is that the person with the best situation overview (situation awareness) will act independently according to the leader's intention. MBL implies that subordinates will be assigned to a mission, which they have to find out

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"Certain to win"
Blitzkrieg is often mentioned as the grand example of organizational effectiveness. The mastery of the chaos of war constituted the strength of the German military organization which thus was able to utilize this when encountering the enemy. The organization possessed a high degree of adaptability, thus operating with utmost decentralization. In stead of detailed governing, mission where given and the executor could by and large select his method of choice. In order to be able to operate effectively and decentralized, strong cohesion,

reciprocate trust ("Einheit") and professional skills ("Fingerspitzengefül") were preconditioned. It was necessary with a common outlook on what was to be attained in order to be able to issue a mission without supervising the line and action. Trust, cohesion and professional expertise were thus of less value if they did not constructively contribute to solving the mission. The organization also needs to know what they are going to attain by solving the mission ("schwerpunkt"). Only then will the mission aquire direction, force and meaning. (Richards 2004.)

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how to solve him or herself, i.e. within the framework of a superior leader's intension or intent. The intent will give the subordinate the sense of the mission, adding the Leader's thoughts of what there is to obtain. The intent will be assigned explicitly to a mission, and stays permanent. The mission constitutes the concrete objectives to be reached by the subordinates. How the mission is executed is left to the subordinate's tactical faculties. The governing principle in MBL is the mission. The intent is the glue that makes the entire organization act co-ordinately. When the intention is understood, discussed and internalized within each individual, it will create a common understanding of the intension.

The standards of independence, to show initiative, and as the last resort to be able to act contrary to mission execution, do not imply that principles of subordination are removed, but the subordination is connected to the leader's intention, and not necessarily to the concrete wording in the executive plan. Any such deviation must be transmitted to the leader in question as soon as possible. If any adjustments are to be adjusted, the subordinate will have to be able to argue for his actions by referring to the intension of his mission. MBL does not exclude use of detailed orders and control with subordinates. Situations may occur, where control with the situation from the highest command is necessary,

and our conduct will in these cases be characterised by predictability. But extensive use of detailed rule will over time be regarded as an undermining of trust relations within the organization, and thus destructive for the will to take responsibility and act on one's own initiative. Holf (p 76 in Military Leadership) maintains the following: *"If I use too much superior control and negative sanctions, I will create fear and unrest. It will be easier to try to avoid error than opting for good results."*

Even if MBL describes what has to be present when facing uncertainty and complexity, there is not enough said of how to make this happen. In this respect it gets very important to attain clarity into what type behavior and manners that will promote trust, independence, flexibility and initiative. Our first approach is the transformational leader and Bass (1985)'s full range model for leadership behavior.

7.2 Transformational leadership, the full range model and "the first mover"

7.2.1 Transformational leadership
The substantial element in transformational leadership implies that the leader or the leader and his/her collaborators together, turn focus away from narrow self interest to collective commitment where each individual contributes to the realization of the missions and visions of the organization. Transforma-

tional leadership deals with developing the crew to becoming participants in the leadership process on board or in the department. The leader's behavior will be decisive in creating such a development. The leader will in turn be the "first mover" in the development from a leader managed "autocracy" to a process founded on a collective leadership process. To make this happen, the leader ought to focus on four areas. He or she has to be a good role model (idealised influence), must be able to motivate others, managing to stimulate the thinking of others (intellectual stimulation), and will need to be considered, when accommodating each individual's needs and faculties (individual consideration).

1. Idealised influence
A leader must be willing to take risks, on his and others' behalf. He or she must act in such a way that there is correspondence between life and learning. Through his/her actions, the leader must display the high moral standards, which govern his life. Such a leader will be perceived as a good role model and be object for admiration, respect, instilling respect.

2. Inspirational motivation.
A leader must formulate missions and visions where co-workers are involved to the highest possible extent, and she or he must be closely engaged in the follow-up. This generates co-workers with ownership and relations

to a visionary and attractive future workplace. A leader is expected to communicate with conviction and commitment. He must be clear on the expectations that he nourishes for his co-worker. This creates security regarding what is expected as it simultaneously increases motivation and commitment. Such a leader will give his/her co-workers duties that verge on what the individual is capable of, yet with this challenge their understanding and experience of sense will increase

3. Intellectual stimulation
By inviting their co-workers to question established truths, reformulating problems, finding new approaches, the leader will be able to spurn new thinking, increasing individuals' capabilities. This must not be destroyed by public criticism even if the co-workers' opinions might deviate from the leaders'.

4. Individual concerns considerations
The leader will pay attention to the individual co-worker's needs for mastery and progress by also performing as councillor. He or she will authorise the subordinates, delegating tasks that are part of developing his/her co-workers. These tasks are simultaneously followed up in order to assess if the co-workers need further support or instructions. This happens without co-workers experiencing any surveillance. This way the co-worker will be

successively developed into a higher potential in a supportive climate. "Management by walking around" is practised for the sake of visibility and to be able to reach out to the individual on a personal level.

A transformation leader inspires to commitment, motivating others to do more than they had originally planned, often even more than what they thought was possible. In spite of the fact that this represents the ideal, the leader will encounter situations that require a relationship of exchange or transaction in order to accomplish the task. This is the case when a particular exterior pressure makes everybody yield extra or when nobody sees any reason or meaning with what is to be done, and there is no time to explain or let anybody else into the situation (transformation).

7.2.2. Transactional leadership.

Traditional leadership theories all build on a common, fundamental view on leadership where leadership is a type of social transaction or a change of values between leader and co-workers. Such a relationship of exchange between leader and subordinate that results in satisfactory mutual interests is called transactional leadership. Transactional leadership carries out this by means of "sticks and carrots." Executing transactional leadership implies that the subordinates agree to, accept or comply with the leader. This is traded with recognition, rewards or resources, and is done to avoid punishment or other disciplinary consequences. In sum, it is possible to say that while the transformational leader emphasises "what you can do for your country", the focus of the transactional leader will be "what your country can do for you". Transactional leadership is in other words driven by exterior motivation either through conditional rewards or through active "leadership by exception."

1. Conditional reward

This constructive type of transaction deals with administrating rewards conditioned by certain actions. The leader will assign/create consensus regarding missions, will promise one type reward, and will distribute this in exchange for satisfying performance by the individual.

2. Leadership by exception – active

This corrective type transaction is a reclining leadership where you only exceptionally interfere where minor deviations from standards (blunders and errors) are discovered. Correction or various types of disciplinary means are used when the desired results from the subordinate are not obtained. This leadership is divided between active and passive, dependent on the active scrutiny for errors or if irregularities or the corrective work is merely carried out when actual problems have occurred. Research shows that active

control behavior might be necessary in for example situations characterised by large risks and pressure.

7.2.3. Passive avoidant leadership

This is dysfunctional leadership where the leader to a large extent avoids showing leadership even if the need for leadership is large. This leader behavior represents a bad role model, and a lack of knowing how to take responsibility that does not correlate with the requirements that are demanded from operational leadership. This approach consists of two types of behavior.

1. Leadership by exception-passive
Here the leader intervenes and corrects behavior if faults or shortages have occurred. This is leadership behavior that combines focusing on flaws and shortages with a basic passivity. Only the types of mistakes that have reached the leader's attention will activate a type corrective behavior.

2. Laissez-faire leadership
Laissez-faire means absence of leadership, also called non-leadership. Contrary to transaction leadership, here is no transaction between leader and co-worker.

The leader avoids staking out course, necessary decisions are postponed; action is held off till the last minute or neglected altogether etc. Leadership responsibility is ignored, often through a concentration of last minute cases, and authority remains unapplied.

Figur 7: The full range model for leadership (ill exerpted from Kaufmann & Kaufmann, 2003 p 356)

7.2.4 The full range leadership model

The full range leadership model illustrates that a wide range of behavior may be characterized as leadership, from transformation leadership on one end to avoidant leadership on the other. According to the model a leader will more or less employ seven types of leader behavior, which again are more or less suitable for developing team leadership and good operational leadership.

The model is normative, based on three dimensions. The horizontal dimension is read from active to passive. According to the model, transformational leadership is the type behavior that will most radically different from "the laissez-faire" model. The vertical dimension stretching from effective to ineffective will show which leadership behavior that is generally regarded as the most effective. Meta analyses that include studies with more than 4000 respondents show transformational leadership to be effective and "laissez-faire" leadership to be least effective.

The third dimension (depth) shows how often the singular leadership behavior types ought to be employed. From the figure we can read that the most effective leader rarely uses non-leadership; he gradually uses transactional leadership, but most often she or he will use the four components of transformational leadership. Such individual leadership behavior will

develop a crew that will change from being solely lead to being active and positive contributors in the leadership process itself. This has largely to do with the dynamics from large leader dependency to leadership that involves a common process. This is often described as team or group leadership.

> Through a 360° evaluation by mean of the assessment tool "Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire" (MLQ) the singular cadet may have transformation, transaction and laissez-faire behavior revealed, and areas of improvement may be identified for those who wish to develop leader qualities. Several published studies show that Naval Academy cadets constantly develop transformation leadership during their studies.

7.3 Leadership in the group: team leadership

Successful execution of mission-based leadership will be the result when subordinates in all ranks have performed disciplined initiatives based on the leader's intent to solve a given mission. This decentralisation, or empowerment, will give the leader a certain responsibility to develop leadership as a collective process. This implies that "relevant others" (i.e. co-workers who with an eye for requirements of the situation, will take responsibility, putting it into action on a par with

the leader's intention) contribute to "playing him good" through continual monitoring and possible adjustments to ensure that the unit's actions are adjusted to the given mission. Everybody may contribute in the process, given that they wish to "play on the winning team" with the capabilities to occupy various (leader) roles that are adjusted to the requirements of the mission.

Any group who would like to work as a team (i.e. three or more people with a common goal, and who are able to interact in order to reach this goal) have to fine-tune their expectations and power structure in order that various people's contributions in the leadership process will be accepted. In other words, it is decisive that group posits 1) a range in action competence that entails that the group is able to fill several roles tied to the leadership missions, 2) individuals who wish to perform and contribute regardless of formal rank, and 3) people with capacities to read changes in the given mission, and who are able to activate new effective actions due to this.

The description of leadership as a team process, where everybody is responsible for good leadership, breaks with preconceived theories held by some. The idea that everybody shares responsibility may be regarded as an undermining of the leader's responsibility as leader. This is not a correct understanding. The leader will always have a superior responsibility that leadership processes are constructed and function for the leadership development as well as for the group itself.

However, experience shows that units which obtain a collective leadership process have larger capacities for mastering shifting and complex missions: they contribute to setting good goals, they select effective methods, they employ a purposeful language, they contribute to motivation and meaning, and eventually, they establish and uphold requirements for behavior. This applies especially over long stretches of time where sleep is scarce, and where the level of stress is high. Moreover, ever more advanced technology and an increased professionalism make it impossible for leaders to be experts in every area. Subordinates today are to a much larger extent than earlier experts in their own professional areas. Slightly exaggerating, one could claim that military leadership today is so complicated and so important that it cannot be executed by the leader alone.

Consequentially, we bring along the following questions: How well equipped are we at bringing out the individual member's brainpower and vigour? How will we best co-ordinate our resources, making our endeavours powerful when confronted with external demands? In other words,

what characterises the dynamics of a good operational team? Ultimately: how can we be aware of the dynamics and the leadership process in our own group?

7.4 SPGR - a description of the mature battle group

SPGR (Systemizing Person Group Relations) is a tool for the understanding, analysis and classification of group behavior. The SPGR is important for the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy since it provides information about relations between individuals at behavior levels in groups. As long as leadership is defined as a goal-defining, problem-solving and language creating interplay with relevant others,

the Naval Academy is going to need SPGR. The theoretical foundation of the SPGR model is based on Bates' work on social systems (1950), on Bion's work on the emotionality in groups (1953), Parson's groups functions (1953) and Mills' work on group's development (1984). The SPGR model itself has been further developed by SYMLOG (Bales 1979), implemented by Olav Skårdal and Endre Sjøvold at the Norwegian University for Science and Technology (1984). Research testifies that human group behavior can be defined and categorized in a limited number of dimensions, common themes and functions. These functions or dimensions are called basic group functions and are shown in figure 8.

Figur 8: Basic group functions

The model's logics are to be understood along the following lines: Any group that works with a specific task needs to share goals and plans to ensure progression and productivity. Themes and behaviours that deal with structure, rules, authority, procedure, progress, and "this is the way things are done here" will have the common denominator CONTROL (blue). Over time, however, any group will need to preserve and maintain the social bonds in the group; this applies in particular to battle groups under continual pressure and stress.

Activities that are directed towards the interpersonal are called CARE functions (green), encompassing behaviours like care, relationship building, acceptance, listening and empathy. So far this may remind of the old adage: "Solve the mission, take care of your men." Complexity implies shifting situations and terrain. Unpredictable occurrences and changes demand that the group ask questions about how things are done, and if the present solutions are valid. This presupposes ability to positive criticism.

When we experience criticism, conflict, influence, resistance and struggle for power, it is the function OPPOSITION (red) that rules. Such behavior can be de-energising and counter-productive, but are occasionally necessary for the reorientation of the group, which has to find new and better solutions. The group will, nonetheless, have to agree on getting something done. Somebody will need to sit down and actually do the job. This requires both cohesion and a type dependency between the members. Adjustment, loyalty, acceptance, obedience, and follow-up of decisions are typical for DEPENDENCY's (grey) functions.

Fig 9: Immature withdrawl vs mature synergi

In a new team most will stick to the behavior that they have previously perceived as well functioning. A typical structured person will show more blue behavior, while others might laugh and joke around as in green behavior. Every person contributes with the behavior at which they perceive they are best functioning. We contend that this type of team is characterised by a low level of maturity called WITHDRAWAL (dark grey). Productivity is never very much larger than the sum of the individual contributions. At the other end, it is possible to imagine a mature group because the climate and interaction patterns in mature teams are such that anybody in the group can be caring, dependent, controlling or in opposition according to the circumstances. This is the opposite of withdrawal,

and is called SYNERGY (yellow). In mature teams on is not afraid of honest exchanges of opinion where nothing is left unsaid or tested. This group has a large capacity to activate necessary behavior to adapt to the situation, both in terms of external adjustment (by utilising changes in the environment to their own benefit) and regarding internal integration (by maintaining cohesion and interplay in the battle group). An objective for operational leadership is to move the battle group from a non-mature withdrawn position towards a mature and adjustable synergetic stance. Figure 10 shows how people who are part of a group may be depicted in the SPGR room. In other words, by filling in a behavior assessment of yourself and the others in the group you can obtain a graphic

Figur 10: The SPGR room.

depiction of behavior in the group, e.g. before and after a demanding exercise. Persons in the group are noted as same coloured circles of various sizes that denote influence in the group. The circle's distance from the centre to the edge will reflect the frequency with which this behavior appears. The group will thus receive a good picture of its behavioral patters with relative placements for the individual members of the group. This information may now be used for further growth and development both for the group and for the individual members.

The group may for example assess how individuals with small circles may be able to contribute more. It can also tell the person who always cares to display a more task-oriented behavior. All the time the intention is to create closely linked teams with clearly defined mission foci that can perform under varied conditions. We employ other and more detailed reports on both group and individual levels, yet all use the six described group functions as their point of departure. We shall further proceed by studying one of these: the flexibility profile.

7.4.1 An example of application of SPGR analysis – within a Norwegian norm

Below we can see an example of how to apply the SPGR on the individual level. The figure is a print-out of behavior which the individual team members experience that the person in question

displays in the every day class room situation. This may present a point of departure for an action plan where he or she may collect certain behavioral areas that one wishes to improve. The person is then allowed to function as leader for the same group that gave the first profile (figure 12), but now in a complex exercise. After the group has carried out the mission, a new SPGR report is generated and the person who was previously leader will now receive a profile as shown in figure 13. In this case it is now possible to observe how his performance is reflected in the profile. The area of behavior has been widened and several vectors have been strengthened on a par with what was needed in the given situation (see e.g. TASK ORIENTATION, CLARITY, and EMPATHY).

The essential element is that the other group members, by knowing the action plan in question, are able to support the person who practises a new behavioral trait by counselling and giving feedback as they go along. Being more than an individual exercise, leadership training this way turns into a dynamic interplay between all group members.

Figur 12: Classroom behavior

TASK ORIENTED
Diligent, industrious, formal and disciplined, "correct", uses established procedures when performing tasks

ENGAGEMENT
Inspiring, trustworthy, friendly, engages others in goal directed and egalitarian cooperation

CLARITY
Strict humourless pedant, demands obedience at ant prize, rules and restrictions are to be followed.

SELF ASSERTION
Unfriendly, dismissive, isolated, self-centered, indifferent, "full of him/her self".

OPENNESS
Forthcoming, sincere, pleasant, informal, humane, no status seeker

REVOLT
Wilful, unstable, cynical, reckless, routine dropper, both self asserting and self denying

EMPATHY
Change maker, warm at heart, helpful, worryless, happy, encouraging, harmonious, secure, personal

CREATIVITY
Spontaneous, non-traditional, creative, direct, unconsentrated, intuitive, emotional

Figur 13: Behaviour in operational leader role

TASK ORIENTED
Sensible, professional, committed, just in control, impersonal, routine oriented

ENGAGEMENT
Inspiring, trustworthy, friendly, engages others in goal directed and egalitarian cooperation

CLARITY
Demanding, humorless, controlling, is always "right", follows rules and procedures.

SELF ASSERTION
Dismissive, stubborn, egotistic, distanced, unfriendly, aggressive, insensitive

OPENNESS
Forthcoming, sincere, pleasant, informal, humane, no status seeker

REVOLT
Wilful, unstable, cynical, reckless, routine dropper, both self asserting and self denying

EMPATHY
Confident, helpful, contact seeking, open, conflict shy, benevolent

CREATIVITY
Multi angled, happy, imaginative, spontaneous, immediate, inspiring, non-conventional

Chapter 8
"The Seven Big Ones" as collective building blocks for operational effectiveness

We often think that good leadership behaviour creates good results, in other words, that there exists a direct link between leadership and results. However, extensive research in the leadership field has during the last decades focused on so called median variables (such as mediators and moderators). These are variables that are influenced by leadership behaviour, and which again influence group performance and result.

For example, there is a lot of research that shows that good leadership influences the level of trust in a group, which again influences performance under pressure. This way leadership will influence the results indirectly. In the following chapter we are going to identify and describe seven median variables that we contend are both influenced by leader behaviour (and the other way round: will influence leader behaviour) and, as we see it, will function as contributors to operational performance. These variables are presented as seven collective capacities, "the seven big ones."

8.1 Cohesion
Military leadership never takes place in a vacuum. Military leadership happens together with others. The group is in focus, not the individual performance. In military contexts the individual is always subjugated the group and the group is always subjugated a larger community. This collectivism emanates from the notion cohesion. Cohesion is what joins the activity with every single member of the group, the group's leader and the larger organization. Cohesion is the group members' care for each other simultaneously while the group is being goal focused. Cohesion is the members' unlimited trust in each other while they are threatened, together with the willingness to hold diverse opinions, to be able to discuss loudly, challenging each other when needed.

Through well-developed cohesion the group will persevere the horrors of war; without cohesion the group will disintegrate when faced with the reality of war. A crew or a military unit that is impregnated with high cohesion will be able to pull off a stronger battle force, will sustain the battle longer, will focus on the group's missions, will be creative when encountering war's challenges and will be able to preserve the mental and physical health of its members. A task force without cohesion will experi-

ence high dissertation rates as well as violent conflicts between officers and soldiers. They will often have substance abuse problems, and extremely high PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) numbers. It is therefore important to have military leadership that under-stands the significance of cohesion and how it can be built.

8.2 Trust

A pillar within cohesion is trust. This is also the pillar for military leadership on which mission based leadership will be

The importance of cohesion came in focus in the aftermath of World War 2. The large study of American World War 2 soldiers (Stouffer et al. "The American Soldier" 1947) found that what made soldiers fight were not secondary concepts like country, flag, democracy etc., but the close experience of being part of a combat group where nobody wanted to let each other down. Shils and Janowitz ("cohesion and disintegration in the German army" 1947) apply the same to the German soldiers; their unique ability to keep fighting effectively after they had realized they had lost was only to a minor degree connected to secondary concepts, but was tied to comradship where nobody would deceive each other. Dessertations and surrender never took place before the group had been blown apart and members scattered.

Cohesion was once again brought to our attention after the American defeat in Vietnam. It was alleged that the Americans lost because their armies were dissolved. Dessertation, mutiny, "fragging" (blue on blue) and drug abuse (more than half of the soldiers admitted to having used drugs the last 14 days, 32 % had used heroin) showed an army without the capacity to fight where the glue that had held the organization together was gone (Gabriel and Savage, "Cohesion and disintegration in the American Army "(1976) and "Crisis in Command" (1978)). On the other hand, studies of the adversaries Vietcong and North Vietnam showed that when encountering the most modern and awe inspiring army in the world, they realized that they could only win by superior leadership and cohesion. This led to the construction of the most cohesive army to ever enter a war. (William Daryll Hendersen "Why the Vietcong thought" (1979) and "Cohesion - the human element in Combat (1985)). One might argue, pointedly, that no army that lacks cohesion will win a war, and that cohesion might compensate for inferiority in most material preconditions.

based. (MBL, see further description). Trust is the key to decentralization, the key to unplanned interaction, the key for taking advantage of competence, the key for initiative and vigour. Trust must exist on different levels- it has to be personal between those who interact personally, rooted in a common dedication to each and the missions to be solved. The necessary willingness to assume responsibility is also included here. Trust is the contract that keeps officers, soldiers and society together; that the people trust the officers' moral integrity and military competence, creates the basis for professional autonomy, the right to exercise judgment when encountering a complex reality.

Without trust the military organization would be a battlefield invaded by lawyers, bureaucrats, journalists, rules, and controllers all struck by paralysis when faced with the unknown. Trust is therefore something that needs to be present if the Norwegian Armed Forces are going to succeed in operating decentralised, in a reality of continual change. An important and necessary part of the officers' education is therefore about the importance of trust, it is built and may also easily also get lost.

8.3 Duty and obligation
Obligations grow from a sense of belonging and dependency. Without community, a sense of needing each other, there will be no duties. While the nuclear individual manages well by asserting her or his rights if anybody feel obligated towards them, a community will disintegrate if its members act as nuclear individuals. The duty is therefore fundamental for the leadership view in the Armed Forces, mission-based leadership (MBL)

MBL emphasises initiative – which is nothing but experienced obligation to act. MBL emphasizes responsibility; this is nothing but an experience of obligation to solve the mission, for the community. MBL emphasises trust, which is nothing but believing that everybody else experiences the same obligation as oneself.

When soldiers are willing to kill and willing to die, it can only be motivated through the obligation that they feel. Without the experience that community, is worth fighting for, the obligation will of course be perceived as very vague. A fundamental task in all military leadership development is therefore to strengthen the experience of community (cohesion) on a small scale as well as strengthening the feeling of belonging to the larger community (the Armed Forces), anchoring this in the largest community (the nation).

Contrary to obligations are rights. What my community owes me, I am entitled to. If, however, the organization (where

people assert their rights) is more pre-occupied with rights than obligations, it will probably never be able to exit a conflict as the winning party.

8.4. Morale/moral

Operational morale is important and difficult. Morals deal with realizing the good. The good is here defined as what is just, and/or caring. The moral subject (which is supposed to "be good") is ideally a combination of intentions, the action in itself, and consequences. This is a strict requirement. The effect of our actions, however, will always be an important focus in missions, given the large potential for destruction that exists in the execution of military power. In operational morale we will therefore always put specific demands to the officer regarding the consequences that go along with decisions and actions.

Operations where the battle group's actions have large and probable (potentially destructive) consequences for others (and such clear moral standards do exist) represent moral intensity. Research shows that crew and subordinate in such situations are particularly attentive to the way the Leader tackles moral challenges.

Moral border failures will here influence heavily on the leader's integrity, influence and effectiveness and for the development of unit morale. Experience shows that moral failures from

e.g. the leader will very soon generate very negative emotions, loss of sense and apathy, which again can lead to disintegration of the battle group. This contributes to a drastic restraint of the ability to reconstruct situation awareness and vigour. On the other hand will just and caring leadership contribute to cohesion, motivation and the commitment of others.

Moral actions under pressure therefore constitute decisive leadership competence. The good operational leader emerges as a moral role model, particularly in situations where morale is demanding. This way, by inspiring in the faculty of the example, the leader will influence and develop the moral standard of the unit. Showing courage and justice by choosing individual risk to help and support others that are dependent of our support is an example of this. This includes the possibility to retract, or to do short cuts, which would reduce our own risk (on behalf of others). Research shows that leaders who are willing to engage in personal risk and strain are regarded as inspirational and effective.

We view a moral action from two perspectives; the momentary action, and the learning from hindsight and the creation of meaning (ethics development). The moral action can be regarded as a result of four processes that are all necessary, but not sufficient as conditions for morale. These four

competences constitute a superior objective for the Naval Academy's education and training in operational morale. Failure in one of the processes may lead to moral failure.

1. Moral sensitivity: The ability to perceive moral challenges in the operational leadership situation.

This is a condition for activating the moral thinking and assessment, and is demanding in an operational context that encompasses a large number of tactical, technical, political and leadership-oriented elements.

2. Moral assessment: The ability to be able to generate and assess various action alternatives, and to be able to find the best alternative, possibly as an intuitive process. Research shows that there are big differences between officers' ability to mature moral assessment.

3. Moral motivation: The ability to motivate for the moral choice, even if other alternatives might encompass personal and self-interested gains: e.g. failure to tell on immoral practise in order to be black listed regarding further career.

4. Moral implementation: To act morally is often demanding and will often "cost" individual risk and unpleasantness. This may result in internal resistance. A moral leader must thus have the ca-pacities to inspire and instigate moral choices. He/she must have abilities to carry out these choices even when met with resistance. Sometimes one also needs the guts to destruct a possible opposition.

To retain morals in military missions is decisive for maintaining the unit's fighting morale and their experience of meaning. Moral is also important when it comes to taking care of mental health, including also battle capacities. Also in psychological missions morale plays a key role; immoral practise on "ground level" will often have very negative effects – on a strategic level as well. An operational leader, and a battle group, there need to pay particular attention to moral turn off mechanisms, which often contribute to (subconsciously) conceal immoral.

8.5. Organization
An organization is a planned coop-eration of people who intend to reach certain goals. In other words, it is a group of people who when facing a task will require a collective contribu-tion; the task is too big for them to be solved individually. To allocate tasks is the simple part; the challenging part is to co-ordinate the individual contribu-tions.

Structure is what creates bonds between the different tasks of the organization, between the objectives one works toward, and between the

people in the organization. Structure will decide who talk together, what is talked about, and how one approaches and solves the various tasks. There are numerous ways of organizing, but some approaches are better adjusted to certain types of tasks. In a predictable world we can imagine that both the allocation of tasks and how one chooses to co-ordinate the contribution could have been done relatively permanently.

These types of organizations are called bureaucracies, and are reckoned to be effective in predictable environments. This does not imply that leadership is redundant; organizations fall apart all the time, and it will be a leadership challenge to keep up motivation and focus. In an unpredictable world it will be difficult to create a permanent structure for the execution of missions. Then we speak of organic organizational structures, which imply what we know as task organization: elements that are organized in relation to the mission to be solved.

Network will be the extreme point in an organic design. This again implies that we have to co-ordinate our efforts to open up for local solutions, what we call mission-based leadership. Crises, conflicts and war represent the greatest leadership challenges for the Norwegian Armed Forces. In this area an organic design for command and control would function best. If many

participate, the capacities for observation and orientation will be largely strengthened. The organization will then need to have more flux where informal structures operate jointly together. As a condition to implement MBL and manoeuvre capacities, it will be necessary to create a flexible, yet solid organizational structure.

8.6 Automated skills
Military operations are about imposing our will on our adversaries by means of weapons and violent force. Basic skills within basic functions (Command and Control, joint contribution, intelligence, mobility, protection and logistics) are therefore decisive to solve missions and survive. This applies on the individual basis as well as in the battle group. These skills are only relevant when they function in pressured situations over time.

This requires automated skills – ready at your fingertips when your body tells them to. A condition for executing automated skill is to possess professional competence. Experience shows that various types physical and psychological deprivations are the norm in the armed forces. In parts of or throughout entire operations one might encounter conditions like sleep deprivation or physical and mental exhaustion. Such deprivations particularly affect areas that require a lot of attention. They are also to be found in areas that require new learning, new generating

of assessments of new action alternatives. Psychological conditions like for example humour and optimism may have a similarly negative affect. In other words, a large spectrum of human functions is heavily reduced under such circumstances. We know, however, that drilled automated actions have an unusual durability when encountering physical and psychological deprivations.

Behavioural patterns that will last also through exhaustion can be developed through drill and hyper learning. These are situations that are crucial for survival. This way attention power is liberated in a way that strengthens situational awareness. A substantial operational leadership challenge is hence the development of relevant drill exercises

It is equally important to develop a culture that values and emphasizes skill training, drill and hyper learning. Through drill and hyper learning a capital is created which proportionally augments with the wear and tear of the battle group. Drill and automated skills can be regarded as good habits, reaching beyond technical proficiencies. It also reaches into the social interplay, incorporating actions of care and the prevention of physical and mental injuries.

A particular leadership challenge will in this respect be to motivate for drill when faced with boredom. Another one is to stimulate for drill on the one hand, and manage to release creative problem solving on the other. A unit that is solely based on drill and procedures without having any particular ability to improvise will endanger itself in its predictability, and would easily be put out of action.

8.7. Common mental models for successful co-ordination and situation awareness in teams

Teams must have a high degree of maturity in their interaction in order to meet a complex and dynamic exterior world. Officers must hence be able to create trust and govern interplay between people. This is, however, not sufficient for performance in a dynamic, insecure and complex environment. As a whole, the team must have a high degree of situation awareness. In our opinion, two factors are important when we aim for high performance proficiency: the ability to learn and the ability to co-ordinate quickly.

To obtain a close to real situational awareness with quick adaptation ability, it is required to have teams that posit and are able to create good mental models of the system and the environment. Rouse and Morris define a psychological model as a mechanism which people use to make descriptions of a system's (as e.g. the OPS room on Nansen) purpose and shape, explanations of the systems' functions and

Figure 14: (The purpose of common mental models)

observed state as well as to predict future system states. Cognitive psychology has emphasized that mental models and their description of how people interact and cope with the world, is significant. It is claimed that these psychological models enable people to draw conclusions, predict actions, understand phenomena, choose alternative actions, and control system performance and to experience happenings in a number of ways (Johnson-Laird, 1983). This is illustrated in figure 14 .

Teams that are supposed to perform must therefore be able to explain and learn about the exterior world through and of each other. The best teams will be the teams that are able to bring the out the "differentness" in members' perspectives (perception and cognitive abilities) when creating mental models. Otherwise the team will be prone to one person's orientation and thinking. This will also increase the possibility to understand and discover when something is out of sync (Boyd's "mis-matcher"). In other words, important changes have taken place. (level 1: situation awareness).

Judith Orasanu found that flight crews who used quiet periods to think and discuss possible scenarios ("What do we do if"-thoughts) performed way better during high intensity periods. Canon-Bowers and Salas explain this with a mechanism they have coined "common mental models." They contend that good teams develop common mental models that enable them to predict each other's behaviour and needs.

This makes them capable of supporting and correcting each other, coordinating efforts towards a common goal. Team with well-developed common mental models are implicitly able to co-ordinate their activities. They do not need to talk to each other that much because they understand the tasks, the equipment, the situations, the responsibility, and they also have a common outlook on team members'

preferences, knowing what the others in the team will like to do. The implicit co-ordination may seem prerequisite for a team to be able to handle large workloads, time squeeze, and a non-transparent dynamic environment. An internationally published study from the Naval Academy that involved Norwegian submarine crews has shown that crews with the best developed common mental models performed better (hit more targets). They communicated less (implicitly), and were less physiologically active (lower heart rate). Officers must therefore be able to create teams that continually develop their common mental models in order to gain the best possible situation awareness as well as co-ordinated efforts in high-intensity periods.

Chapter 9
Situation awareness

In the synthesis model we define situation awareness as a decisive capacity for wise action and adaptability in operational contexts. Without a proper understanding of the situation, we tend to act too late. We choose the wrong strategies or stay passive when windows of opportunity open up. We have also defined "the seven big ones" as important preconditions for good situational awareness over time. What exactly is situation awareness?

According to Endsley, we define situation awareness as:

"the perception of the elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future."

For officers and the battle group situation awareness constitutes an understanding, upon which they base their decisions. In this case, we refer to knowledge at a given time, and which has been built over time. Relating to when and where this knowledge is to be employed, situation awareness thus relates to both past and present. In dynamic decision making situation awareness can be divided into three levels. At the first level the actor precipices his or her environment based on

relevant information. The next level is directed towards integration of diverse information from the first level. This will thus give the actor a holistic comprehension of the environment, and he will also be able to compare with the objectives in question. The third and the highest level of situation awareness build on the two other levels including the ability to predict occurrences that might happen in the near future. A high degree of situation awareness will add chances that adequate decisions are made. Chances are that performances will be optimal.

Research shows that lack of situation awareness is one of the most important causes for human errors and accidents. This happens in cases where wrong information has been evaluated and errors have occurred when critical facts or lack of information have been recognized and have occurred between the actors. All the factors could also have been combined. Low situation awareness may influence the ability to predict future events and in addition provoke a reduced execution. Situation awareness may be regarded as art of the moment; it is what we manage to catch in the here and now. A natural reaction if one does not manage to mentally adjust

is to be paralysed. A clear target image is an important part of relevant situation awareness. A reflected awareness of the mission and a superior intention for the operation are substantial "filter" and "navigational points" in a continual orientation and up-dated situation awareness.

It is difficult to arrive at adequate situation awareness, and many erroneous sources will influence our perception. We have, for example, a tendency to trust information, which will match our pre-conception, and to be sceptical to information that does not comply with this. Complexity implies that we have to count on experiencing situations where new information will break with our pre-conception. New information might be decisive when we aim at situation awareness with the closest possible reality match. Consequently, inviting and validating new and also critical information are important capabilities for officers and battle groups. If we possess a quali-

tatively better capability at situation awareness than does our adversary, we shall be able to transfer this surplus as friction, causing our adversary to experience absurdity which again will turn him paralysed.

Internationally published research from the Naval Academy has shown that crews' ability to establish and maintain relevant situation awareness will vary, at times quite substantially. Meanwhile, research shows that it is possible to train capability. This again implies that operation leadership is a capability that can be trained i.e. if we understand operational leadership as a capacity that contributes to out-manoeuvring our adversary on physical, psychological and moral arenas. As described earlier, this conditions individual capacities within each single crewmember. It also conditions mature interaction and collective capacities that will go along with situation awareness and vigour. But how can this be trained? How can these capacities be developed?

Chapter 10
Leader trainingdevelopment –
how to develop "the good officer"?

We have now looked at mission based leadership philosophy, and the conditions that must be present in order to operate well and wisely in demanding operational situations. In other words, we have described the prerequisites for good actions. One question, however, still remains unanswered: How do we create officers that are situational aware, wise, robust, caring and initiating and who possess a solid ethical fundament? In other words: How do we run operational leadership training?

10.1 How do you learn to become an officer?

For officers to develop in the right direction, we regard the quality of the reality and the culture they are surrounded by as most important and in many ways conditional. This is the framework for leadership training. The most important leadership development initiative that the school can put into effect is thus the promotion of a culture that preserves the mission based leadership and the values of the community; if officers for example,e.g. do not experience an extended use of decentralization and intention based leadership, chances are that it is going to be very difficult for them to develop situational awareness, initiative, in-

dependence and flexibility. A culture without cohesion and trusts but with a lot of detailed leadership will additionally worsen the picture. Correspondingly, it is difficult to develop officer identity and moral consciousness if the culture is characterised by individualism and the pursuance of individual goals.

In spite of the focus of operational leadership in a context characterised by complexity, chaos and violence, here are clearly leadership elements that can also be effectively utilized in more normal peacetime operations. A culture that is characterised by for example e.g. reciprocal trust, strong cohesion, decentralization, and collective responsibility for objectives to be reached, will be more effective, a more motivating workplace, and will be more creative than an organization characterised by hyper control and micro management.

This is in and of it self not enough reason to administer this type of leadership in "peacetime." There is one other condition that justifies that this is not something one embarks on when "leaving" and/or moving into the spectrum of conflict. Culture does

not change "over night," and it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for a peacetime organization to handle the transition to crisis situations if this way of thinking has not characterised daily life over a large period of time. When we, in addition, are going to run systematic leadership training, we need to come to grips with two fundamental questions: what is a human being? How does a human being learn?

10.2 Views on humanity and learning

We base the following assumptions on a positive understanding and respect of man. In this we imply that man is to be understood as a complex integrity of body, reason and emotions where each single individual is unique. Man is capable of acting good and evil. In extreme situations we react differently: some will display their better sides whereas others will reveal their evil ones. Man wishes to work and experiences his or he/her contribution as meaningful and important in a larger context.

Through seeking and assuming responsibility, man will develop his/her better sides as well as his or her imagination and creative power. When man discovers that it can have influence on his situation, he is motivated to assume more responsibility. Positive expectations from the surroundings will stimulate the positive sides whereas the negative will result in the opposite.

Man learns by construing his knowledge in the interaction with the surroundings. The acquisition of knowledge will therefore happen in the interaction between what you want to gain, the knowledge you already possess, the problems you live through, the experiences you make as well as the conclusions you make, based on all this. Man thus plays an active and decisive role when it comes to developing, organizing and implementing knowledge. Prior experience, interest and commitment are in a continual interplay when a new understanding of reality is developed. For leadership training this has important conse-

Figur 15: Bridge of trust

quences. As our point of departure we have to take into consideration where the counselled is situated; his or her experiences vs. his or her approaches to reality. We have to try to implement the new into a known and familiar context, else this might give little sense; a fragmented experience with less relevance. In the best of cases this will constitute short-lived knowledge. The trainer's first task will therefore be to aid the counselled in creating images of future stances (goals), which will add coherence and meaning as well as direction, relevance, interest and commitment.

10.3. Learning as imbalance and trust

The driving force in the officers' leadership training is the tension that erupts between the existing and the new experience and knowledge. It is therefore possible to claim that learning is leaving the safe with its large degree of stability, and entering into the uncertainty, a world of which you have no knowledge. The counselled will therefore for a short period of time be in transit "without foothold." To master this uncertainty is learning in itself. Such mastery is important and necessary because it touches on the core of this approach. The counselled is not supposed to believe that he or she has the correct answer, but will rather "gain foothold" with an inner safety, in which the he or she understands what happens in the exterior dynamic world,

quicker and more correct than the adversary. The social context where the officers are supposed to learn to master this, is of great importance when he or she jumps into the insecure, trying to construe a new reality. This is illustrated in figure 15 as the bridge if confidence. In a learning environment where some of the experiences to be undertaken are both frightening and unpleasant, it is the trust between all involved that manages to get the counselled "over the bridge" from the safe to the insecure. This is essential because it is in the insecure that learning and development take place. This is how one "learns to learn." Accordingly, it is difficult to envision a movement towards increased independence, initiative and vigour without the afore-mentioned setting the standard for the approach.

10.4 Social interactionplay – an intensifier

When people meet as learners in a learning process, social interactionplay takes place. This creates possibilities for a larger understanding and development. We perceive and assess situations in different ways. If we therefore underway and afterwards try to forge a common outlook, this will increase our own and others' learning of what is really going on in the environment. In other words, the counselled will see new tensions between what he or she knew and what others have construed reality to be like.

Good skills and processes that address this in a team context will be decisive in order that officers arrive at the best decisions and actions in difficult situations. This is, in addition, very important for how to learn about the individual's possibility to contribute to learning, both to one's own and others' learning. This is not central only to leadership training, but to leadership theory in general. Thus the notion "learningship" may be attached to leadership. Understanding oneself in interactionplay with others is something to which everybody needs to develop a relationship. Here nobody can turn master, only better. The types of situations that await an officer are rarely characterised by solitude. Missions are to be solved in interaction with others,

and performance and results are often directly linked to how well one masters this interaction. The social interaction, that one is part of, has significance for how one thinks and action when alone. This at influences the thoughts and, emotions, and creating a language for the inner conversation, and will subsequently be able to give perspectives (voices) when one is faced with situations alone.

10.5. Experience-based learning

With the aforementioned as backdrop, one can might statesay that learning happens as a transformation of concrete experience into an increased/altered understanding of reality. Construction takes place in an active processing of impressions and reflections. The core

Figure 16: Experience based learning

Figure 17: An example of experience based learning at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy.

of the reflection makes it possible for the counselled to draw his/her own conclusions of the experiences that he or she has made. He or she can then face new situations with these conclusions.

Concrete experiences are the core of what is to be learned. It adds structure, coherence and a subjective approach to the concept. In order to learn effectively, it is required that the officer:

• is totally involved in the new experiences, is open without preconceived opinions

•   reflects upon and regards his/her own experiences from several perspective (Reflective perspective))

• develops notions that integrate observations into logical theories (Abstract conceptual formation)

•   is able to employ these theories at a later stage when decisions are to be made and problems are to be solved (New experiences)

In order to develop leaders withwho have a high degree of transitory capabilities, the counselled must be met with a learning environment with large enough action space. In this action space the officers must

Figur 18: Conditions for experience-based learning.

learn to act independently; they must interpret targets, identify what one needs to learn, they must develop as human beings, develop new strategies for problem solving, must succeed (master), take initiatives and be creative, must develop knowledge, fail, reflect, make their own experiences etc. All this contributes to developing an understanding of what leadership development is, in addition to being an improved ability to lead. Trainers must be able to help officers develop relevant images of what has been attempted to obtain; the goals for the development. If these are not present, it is going to be difficult to experience relevant learning needs, in addition to developing a need to face them.

Additionally, the leader developer must contribute to making the counselled see the difference between today's situation and a desired one. Subsequently, the counselled must have the opportunity to havedo their experiences in ever-new situations.

The mantra has got to be a learning environment where everybody is allowed to try and fail. Trainers have to focus on the officers' reasons for the choices that are being made rather than on preliminary ready-made answers. The experience of a back up key answer will reduce creativity and action room. The goal is to create an officer who continually reflects on his or her own practise with the intention to create

future realities (i.e. good actions). If we manage to create reflective practitioners through our leadership activities, we have succeeded. For the trainers at the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy it is important to give officers a model of what they are supposed to strive for. This should be done to stimulate an experience and an understanding of relevant learning needs. Hence we need to create pre-conditions in order to develop relevant models of what they need to acquire. In addition, we need to make officers experience the distance between what they already know and what is to be acquired.

Without this, it is going to be difficult to define one's own learning needs. Subsequently we must give officers possibility to make their own experiences in ever new situations. This dynamics is illustrated in figure 18.

The Royal Norwegian Naval Academy must be able to challenge the officer and make him or her realize the difference between where he or she is and where he or she is going. Our challenges have to be of such a nature and content that the officers will experience this as an imbalance that he or she will strive to redress through new knowledge and development.

We must be able to assess the progress that each individual displays and express and decide accordingly. The officer must receive the support and

trust that is necessary in order to dare venturing into new experiences.

In this lies also help for observation, reflection and thoughts regarding the conclusions of experiences. The officer must possess capability and willingness to learn to meet experiences that gives possibility for mastery while simultaneously being varied enough to ensure new learning. If the entire learning environment at the Naval Academy (including systems of rewards, academic professional loads etc) supports this, and everybody pulls in the same direction, we have a possibility to develop officers to become leaders.

10.6 Realism – a necessity
As shown, the "social coherence" plays an important role. The same applies to "physical coherence." With physical coherence we understand the physical environment where the training takes place (e.g. in the machine room or in the OPS room). The Physical coherence therefore needs to be as realistic as possible. This is where the acquired knowledge is supposed to be applied. Research shows that if one has practised a situation, and happens to encounter an equivalent situation in the future, the possibilities for remembering and implementing the knowledge is far greater if the training has been perceived as realistic. Realism and coherence are therefore essential and will increase the profit of learning.

10.7 . "Freeplay" as exercise concept

"Teach students to make quick decisions though a coherent logical thought process, while under pressure (William Lind).

Military exercises are often conducted according to a detailed scenario. Moments are recorded according to a set of activities and time schemes. What happens is governed by a game staff where the assessments of the individual players and their actions have minor influence on game procedure. In spite of the fact that this may train certain levels of merit and technique, this approach will often lead to predictability of context as well as preconceived solutions thought out by the game staff. To bring out players' creativity, initiative and assessment will thus be difficult. Focus is often on cracking the code, finding the solutions conjured up by the game staff (i.e. the school's solution) rather than out-manoeuvring an adversary. For the Naval Academy this represents a large challenge because experience shows that officers rather look for the school's key than acting creatively, testing whatever situation they are faced with (cf. the Liebergbekk commission)

In order that Naval Academy officers develop mastering and know-how for dealing with non-predictability and pressure (war= chaos and complexity), the Academy faces a big challenge.

Imbedded in our understanding of war is the notion that crisis and war represent an interpersonal activity. This implies that you fight or compete against another will (brain). In other words, you do not know what he or she thinks or feels. Training at facing another's dynamic wills is therefore important. In your own predictability lies the potential for becoming out manoeuvred. To train in an environment that is predictable will easily create officers with reduced capabilities for creativity and situational adjustment. One way of creating a realistic training is thus to conduct or control the exercise in the purpose of opening a realistic fight between diverse wills in a dynamic process. The idea is that the exercise will to the largest possible degree be governed by players' choices and actions. Now the game staff will function more as scenario mediators, defining frame-work, rand recording actions that are rather consequences of players' choices than preconceived solutions.

Our approach to exercises in operational leadership is therefore, by and large, the notion of "free play." The thinking and initiative of the officers constitute the focal points. They will face numerous players (wills) who they will try to confuse, surprise and out-manoeuvre. In this encounter where surroundings are characterised by uncertainty and rapid changes, the officers will face the largest possible

number of situations where decisions (without preconceived answers) are to be made under pressure, such that their ability to resonate, assess and make initiatives are challenged and trained. At this point only, they can begin to understand what they will encounter in a real situation, being able to start practising the handling of such situations. It is of vital importance that officers are never criticized for having made the wrong decisions, but they are always accounted for on the basis of responsibility in case decisions are not made in time (action inertia), or if they are not able to give logical and comprehensive reasons for their choices. In contexts where the Academy manages to instill this in shorter sequences or through lengthy exercises, the officers will be able to raise their consciousness on how they think, feel and act in pressured situations. This will constitute a further base for training and development. In our opinion this is a far better point of departure for counselling and theory construction (understanding) than by relating only to what they think, feel and do.

This approach represents a great challenge for the Naval Academy's staff. Often we find ourselves situated between individual needs for control and security on the one hand, and the necessity of letting the game develop freely to create an arena for realistic training on the other.

10.8 "Suspense of disbelief" as operational learning competence

Military operations often involve the use of arms and a realistic danger off the loss of lives. This possibility is near approximately impossible to fully recreate in peacetime based leadership training. All military peacetime training will, in other words, be characterised by a type of unrealism.

In order to meet this challenge it is of course possible to develop exercises that are as realistic as possible, possibly on arenas that will generate experiences of fear, and which offer realistic complexity (as in e.g. "free play" exercises). Another approach to increase realism during exercise is to stimulate the officers' ability to cognitively repress the fact that their experiences are situated within a safe peace-oriented exercise. This ability can be called "dispense of disbelief."

The notion "suspense of disbelief" origins from film theory and is directed towards the phenomenon when the film audience is being seduced by a film (if it is a good one). As you sit down, you stop reflecting on the fact that what you see is fiction. The set you watch is in reality surrounded by cameramen, light technicians and staff. But when you buy the ticket, you decide to let yourself be carried away. You park the part of your brain that says that you now watch fiction (unless you decide to enter the film critic's role). Next your

experience in the theatre takes on the quality as if you were there. Your pulses rises radically in dramatic scene, you are moved to tears when key persons die etc. In other words, the movie touches you as if it were real. The same capacities ought to be stimulated as a part of making exercises more realistic, and hence increasing the learning. The officers ought to be challenged when it comes to empathy.

Attempts to be up to the tricks of the movie staff as well as attempting to place oneself in the role as the observing outsider, who is about to assess realism and relevance, ought to be discouraged. One should rather stimulate the individual to go for the full package. Try to stop evaluation thoughts and mental flight away from the setting in order to experience the exercise in the best possible realistic manner. This way stress reactions and complexities will strongly increase, and you will most like profit from the exercise in a similar way.

10.9 Theory and practice – the problem of transfer

The decisive about learning is that "the acquiesced things come out of the head (and hands) at the right time and in the right situation"; i.e. like a type of wisdom. The officers have to acquiesce what that is transferable to situations they will meet in their future service. In order that such a transfer is successful, the officer must have acquiesced the necessary knowledge.

Exam results, however, are not necessary the best indicator of such knowledge. Transfer of knowledge between various situations will primarily happen when these situations share many similarities (this we call close transfer). A large challenge regarding when it comes to transfer of knowledge is the situations where the learning situation and the practical implementation share few similarities. In order that this type of transfer (also called distance transfer) is understood, the learning material must be understood. Understanding has to do with being able to explain and argue why and how models and concepts are used related to practical tasks and problems. The ability to learn by heart is not the same as to have understanding. The Navy Academy's Intent is to accommodate learning situations which will provoke, promote and support the officer's understanding of leadership and social interplay, and which makes it possible to transfer experiences made at the Naval Academy onto an operational setting.

10.10 The learning environment – the importance of interacting arenas.

Most pedagogues in the Armed Forces agree that good learning requires reciprocal interchange action between experience and theoretical reflection. From the Officer Candidates' School we know this as a well-established fact. It is, however, more difficult to make this happen in practical life. It requires in-

teractionplay between three learning environment arenas: 1) education (theory) 2) counselling (synthesis) and 3) exercises (experience). Education and theory will here serve to interpret experience, and providing a knowledge basis for the practical training. Exercises are supposed to produce realistic and challenging experiences. Counselling will help the young officers to match experience and theory in such a way that meaning and coherence are bridged; in other words, a builder of a bridge builder role.

Two aspects have to be present in the relationship between these arenas if the learning environment can be understood as stimulating for leadership development. First, the extension and the weighting ought to be relative relatively even similar. Second, there must be a continual exchange between arenas in order that synergy is produced. Figure 20 illustrates an imbalanced learning environments characterised by large differences in the weighting of the three arenas. The stippled lines indicate that the learning environment is characterised by a small interaction play tied to common processes and goals. Here the learning documentation will by and large be tied to education in theory on a par with civilian colleges and universities. Exam results are the only decisive criteria for

proficiency. Exercises and counselling are in these learning environments only marginal in size. Theoretical studies characterise the study week (fig 19). This pretty much harmonizes with the new focus on civilian system of weighting that we have observed in military education lately. Its drawback, however, takes places when the theory is cut off from the field of experience. The end result turns out to be" archive knowledge" that might explain why we lost a vessel, but which is less worth in the situation when the vessel founders shipwrecks. In other words, this all results in the education of theoreticians, not reflective practitioners.

We also observe that theory and learning only to a small degree will interchange and interplay in exercises and counselling as in the situation illustrated in figure 20 (contrary to figure 19). Less exchange between exercise and counselling may also lead to that important experience being worked through in debriefing and conversations of errors of action. Through relevant questions, especially as memory for the officer who has forgotten or repressed various experiences, the counsellor will be able to stimulate to healthy shame that contributes to development, and to feelings of mastery – and reflection that will create better officers.

Fig 19: Balanced acquisition environment - high exchange

Fig 20 : Non balanced acquisition environment - low exchange

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Grunnlagsdokumenter til bruk innen militært lederskap:
        Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine
        Forsvarets verdigrunnlag
        SAP 1 (D) Tjenestereglement for Sjøforsvaret
        HFL 400-1. Håndbok i ledelse i Luftforsvaret.

I St.prp. nr. 139—1948 om ekstraordinære beredskapstiltak m. v. 1. januar 1949—30. juni 1950 er det under avsnitt III gjort rede for en del grunnsetninger som skal gjelde både for planleggingen og gjennomføringen av vårt forsvar. I Innst. S. nr. 283—1948 fra Komitéen for særlig utenrikspolitiske saker og beredskapssaker, side 648, har Komitéen erklært seg enig i disse grunnsetningene.

Departementet har funnet at grunnsetningene bør utformes i mer konkrete direktiver til militære befalingsmenn og militære sjefer, og at disse direktiver bør fastsettes ved Kongelig resolusjon.

Direktivene skal slå igjennom overfor alle eldre bestemmelser som kommer i strid med direktivene. Etter hvert som gjennomarbeidingen og vurderingen av eldre bestemmelser skrider fram, vil direktivene bli innarbeidet, og uoverensstemmelser vil ikke forekomme.

Departementet har på et tidligere tidspunkt bestemt at grunnsetningene skal innarbeides i den militære undervisning på alle trinn.

Utkastet til direktiver har vært behandlet i de militære staber og har også vært gjenstand for inngående drøftinger i Den sentrale sjefsnemnd.

Forsvarsdepartementet tilråder:

Det fastsettes direktiver for militære befalingsmenn og militære sjefer ved væpnet angrep på Norge i samsvar med vedlagte utkast.

Kgl. res. 10. juni 1949:

Direktiver for militære befalingsmenn og militære sjefer

ved væpnet angrep på Norge

I. DEFINISJONER

1) Med militær befalingsmann forstås i dette direktiv enhver befalingsmann med grad fra sersjant, kvartermester e. likn. og oppover uten omsyn til om han er fastlønt, vernepliktig, ulønt eller utskrevet.

2) Med militær sjef forstås i dette direktiv:
   a) Sjef for forsvarsgren, kommandosjef i distriktene (D K-, S K- og L K-sjef), sjef for selvstendig administrert avdeling i alle forsvarsgrener, derunder sjef for fly- og flåtestasjon.
   b) Militær befalingsmann som ved mobilisering er disponert som sjef for enhet ned til kompani, fort, fartøy, skvadron eller tilsvarende enhet.

3) Med væpnet angrep forstås i dette direktiv enhver uhjemlet inntrenging over norsk land-, sjø- og luftterritorium av væpnede styrker fra fremmed makt, når de åpenbart har fiendtlige hensikter eller når de bruker makt mot norske styrker som vil stanse dem.

4) Med kommandodistrikt forstås i dette direktiv distrikt for vedkommende Distriktskommando (DK), Sjøforsvarskommando (SK) og Luftkommando (LK).

5) Med femtekolonister forstås i dette direktiv nordmenn eller utlendinger som innenfor landets grenser arbeider for fremmed makt med ulovlig etterretningsvirksomhet, planlegging og gjennomføring av sabotasje, attentater e. likn.

II. DIREKTIVER SOM GJELDER FOR ALLE MILITÆRE BEFALINGSMENN

6) Mobilisering ved væpnet angrep i kommandodistriktet. Militær befalingsmann som får kjennskap til at et væpnet angrep finner sted innenfor det kommandodistrikt der han skal møte ved mobilisering, skal uten videre gjøre sitt ytterste for å nå fram til sitt mobiliseringssted på kortest mulig tid.

7) Væpnet angrep som utløser full og øyeblikkelig mobilisering. Et væpnet angrep skal gjelde som ordre til full og øyeblikkelig mobilisering over hele landet, dersom Kongen (Regjeringen) blir satt ut av spillet av fienden. Ordrer som utstedes i Regjeringens navn, om å avbryte mobiliseringen, skal betraktes som falske. Ved full og øyeblikkelig mobilisering gjelder bestemmelsen i punkt 6 for alle befalingsmenn.

8) Grunnsetninger for forsvarskampen. Ved planlegging og gjennomføring av forsvar mot væpnet angrep skal militære befalingsmenn følge disse grunnsetninger:
   a) De skal uten videre gjøre motstand mot et væpnet angrep med alle midler som står til rådighet og sette all kraft inn på forsvaret i løpet av kortest mulig tid.
   b) De skal gjøre motstand selv om de blir stående alene og selv om situasjonen ser vanskelig eller håpløs ut og uten omsyn til om fienden truer med eller gjør alvor av represalier om det gjøres motstand (f. eks. bombe byer e. likn.).
   c) De skal fortsette forsvarskampen uavhengig av de paroler som blir utstedt i Kongens (Regjeringens) eller annen overordnet myndighets navn, dersom disse er tatt til fange eller satt ut av funksjon på annen måte.

d) De skal, dersom det er uomgjengelig nødvendig å gi opp vedkommende distrikt eller landsdel til fienden, gjøre hva de kan for å komme med i forsvarskampen sammen med sin avdeling på andre frontavsnitt i Norge eller utenfor Norge.

e) De skal, dersom Norge blir helt eller delvis besatt av en fiende før de har nådd fram til sin avdeling, søke til kjempende norske myndigheter i eller utenfor landets grenser, så sant de er feltdyktige.

f) De skal ikke avgi æresord til fienden om de blir tatt til fange.

III. SÆRLIGE DIREKTIVER TIL MILITÆRE SJEFER

9) Mobilisering ved væpnet angrep i kommandodistriktet. Militær sjef, nevnt i punkt 2 a), som får kjennskap til at et væpnet angrep har funnet sted i kommandodistriktet, plikter — uten omsyn til andre bestemmelser i mobiliseringsregler og mobiliseringsplaner — å mobilisere på hurtigste måte som forholdene overhodet tillater det, alle enheter som hører under hans administrasjon, til øyeblikkelig frammøte. Dersom det er mulig å innhente forholdsordre fra nærmeste sjef uten å forsinke mobiliseringen, skal det gjøres. Melding om at mobiliseringsordre er utgått skal under alle omstendigheter sendes uten opphold til nærmeste sjef.

10) Mobilisering ved væpnet angrep i kommandodistriktet. Militær sjef, nevnt under punkt 2 b), plikter så langt hans muligheter rekker å medvirke til at den mobilisering som er nevnt under punkt 9), blir gjennomført så raskt og så effektivt som mulig.

11) Væpnet angrep som utløser full og øyeblikkelig mobilisering. Ved væpnet angrep som skal utløse full og øyeblikkelig mobilisering, se II. punkt 7, plikter alle militære sjefer å mobilisere de avdelinger og enheter som er underlagt dem etter bestemmelsene i punkt 9.

12) Grunnsetninger for forsvarskampen. Militære sjefer skal ha et særlig ansvar når det gjelder å etterleve de grunnsetninger som er nevnt i II. punkt 8.

13) Femtekolonister.
   a) De militære sjefer skal regne med at femtekolonister vil komme til å bli satt inn før eller samtidig med væpnet angrep.
   b) De militære sjefer er i fred og krig ansvarlige for sikringen av militært område mot femtekolonister innenfor rammen av sine hjelpemidler.
   c) De militære sjefer plikter med de midler de rår over, å sikre mobiliseringen og de væpnede styrker mot femtekolonister.
   d) De militære sjefer skal i fred og krig samarbeide med politiet og andre sivile myndigheter om de sikringsoppgaver som er nevnt under a—c etter de bestemmelser som til enhver tid er gitt.

IV. FORSKJELLIGE BESTEMMELSER

14) Direktivenes gjennomslagskraft. Disse direktiver gjelder foran alle eldre bestemmelser som måtte være i strid med dem.