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Master Thesis

**Explaining Norway's Engagement in
Serbian Defense Reform, 2006–2010**

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This thesis is dedicated to my mother Ljiljana who passed away this year. This is for you mom, thank you for everything!

Oslo, May 23, 2011

Saša Nešić

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this thesis are the author's alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Serbian Ministry of Defense or any other part of the Serbian government, the Norwegian Defense University College or any other organization.

Abstract

Shortly after the breakdown of the Eastern Block and Yugoslavia in early 1990s, it became obvious to the international community that security sector actors and the armed forces in particular, play an important role in the development and democratization of transition-states. Defense reform concept emerged, and many Western states participated to assist transition-states. After the democratic changes in Serbia in 2000, Norway was among the first to recognize that external actors should have a significant role in Serbian defense reform.

This thesis is about defense reform as a component in the broader Security Sector Reform (SSR) concept. It has a donor-state focus and deals with possible explanations for donor-states' engagement in defense reform processes. It explores the rationale behind Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform, interpreted in the light of the IR theories of neorealism and neoliberalism. The research was directed to answer the following question: How can Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform be explained?

Thesis examines defense reform through one case study – Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform. It concludes that Norway's engagement first at all can be explained through the lenses of neoliberalism, as it contributes to the expansion of Zone of liberal peace. However, there are also some effects that can justify that engagement from a neorealist standpoint.

Summary

Shortly after the breakdown of the Eastern Block and Yugoslavia in early 1990s, it became obvious to the international development community that security sector actors and the armed forces in particular, play an important role in development and democratization of transition-states. The main questions were how to keep those actors under civilian, democratic control, and how to build capable and professional armed forces in states lacking the capacity, knowledge and/or resources, needed for such comprehensive reforms. Assistance from developed countries was required, and defense reform concept emerged. Many developed states took part in it to assist transition-states in their development.

After democratic changes in Serbia in 2000, reform of the defense sector emerged as a top priority for the new Serbian administration. The Serbian Armed Forces was burdened by heritage of the events in the region, had a surplus of personnel and weaponry, and was not ready to meet modern challenges and threats. Norway was among the first to recognize that the young Serbian democracy did not have sufficient ability to conduct reforms, and that external actors should have a significant role in Serbian defense reform.

However, donor-states have not been engaged in defense reform processes purely for altruistic reasons. States are organizations, and like any organization they have goals and interests, thus they expect some gains as a result of their actions.

This thesis is about the defense reform concept as component of the broader Security Sector Reform (SSR) concept. It has a donor-state focus and deals with possible explanations for developed states' engagement in defense reform processes. Thesis examines defense reform through one case study – Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform. The research was directed to answer the following question: *How can Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform be explained?*

Defense reform is a military and political interaction between the donor and the recipient states, and as such it can be studied by International Relations (IR) Theory. Therefore this thesis applies IR theory to the defense reform concept. It explains Norway's engagement in Serbia based on interests within the IR theories of neorealism and neoliberalism.

This thesis is an intentional explanation of the problem where Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform is explained by referring to its intended effects and expected gains. The research is performed as a qualitative study where the facts are gathered from written sources, such as official institutional documents and official statements extracted from public documents; but also from interviews with officials that have been involved in various

defense reform activities. To answer the research question, three analyses are conducted: first focuses on the concept of defense reform and try to explain donor-states' activities and areas of engagement. The second analysis is theoretical and focuses on International Relations (IR) theory, striving to theoretically explain donor states' engagement in defense reform in the light of neorealism and neoliberalism. Thirdly, the empirical analysis focuses on the Norwegian rationale for engagement in defense reforms, and in particular on Norway's engagement in Serbia between 2006 and 2010.

The main findings in this thesis have been:

There is no empirical evidence which indicates that the Norwegian government took neorealist aspects into consideration when the decision on engagement in Serbian defense reform was made. The Norwegian government did not expect gains predicted by the neo-realistic theoretical explanation. Therefore, the conclusion has to be that Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform cannot be explained by neorealism. Nevertheless, there are some effects that can justify that engagement from the neorealist standpoint.

Neoliberalism provides us with an appropriate explanation for the rationale behind Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform, as this engagement contributes to: (i) development of democracy and extension of the Zone of liberal peace; (ii) increasing the number of contacts between Norway and Serbia which makes cooperation more possible and desirable; (iii) protection of personal freedom; and (iv) strengthening international institutions, especially the UN.

List of Abbreviations

DCAF	– Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDR	– Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRG	– Serbia – NATO Defense Reform Group
FD	– Forsvarsdepartementet (Norwegian Ministry of Defense)
IR	– International Relations
IO	– International Organization
MFA	– Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MINURCAT	– United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MOD	– Ministry of Defense
NGO	– Non-governmental organization
NORDCAPS	– Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support
ODA	– Official Development Aid
OECD	– Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD DAC	– OECD Development Assistance Committee
PRISMA	– Programme for Resettlement in Serbian Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces
SSR	– Security Sector Reform
UD	– Utenriksdepartementet (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
UN	– United Nations

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Norway is among the largest donors to the [Serbian] defense system and it helped in a large number of projects of the Serbian Ministry of Defense, worth more than four million Euros. (Republic of Serbia Ministry of Defence, 2010b)

When a Serbian citizen, a worker or a farmer, reads this statement made by the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Serbia during his visit to Oslo in October 2010, he could think: “Four million Euros! Well that’s great. The Serbian defense system will be strengthened, and under democratic control. My country, and I, will be more secure. I remember very well how it was when an authoritarian regime had command over the security sector. Moreover, Serbia does not have to spend its limited budget on that area. Perhaps my tax money will be used to improve my standard of living, to build a kindergarten or a hospital, or to build a paved road to my village. Thanks Norway!”

But if a Norwegian fisherman from the High North reads the statement, he could ask himself, and maybe put the question to the Government of Norway, “Why did the tax money that I paid, end up in a country on the other side of the continent? I could understand if that money was spent on humanitarian assistance. But no, the money goes to build a foreign state’s armed forces; money which could have been used to protect the environment, medical research to cure some odd disease, or a new paved road here where I live. What is in it for me? What is in it for Norway?”

Perhaps it is inappropriate to ask questions about relations between states from the standpoint of individuals. But the question remains: why is Norway, or any other developed country, interested in assisting the reform of a foreign state’s armed forces? Why is the Norwegian government willing to spend its own, also limited resources on defense reform in Serbia?

This thesis is about the defense reform concept and seeks to answer these questions.¹ It has a donor-state focus and deals with possible explanations for developed states’ engagement in defense reform processes.²

¹ Defense reform and Security Sector Reform (SSR) concepts are analyzed and presented in chapter two.

² The terms *donor-state* and *donor* in this thesis are used to refer to the state that provides assistance to the state that conducts reforms of its own security sector/armed forces in the SSR/Defense reform process.

Background

Shortly after the breakdown of the Eastern Block and Yugoslavia in early 1990s, it became obvious to the international development community that security sector actors and the armed forces in particular, play an important role in development and democratization of transition-states.³ The main question was how to keep those actors under civilian, democratic control. They were historically often politicized and used as an instrument of authoritarian control. As such, they had a significant role in domestic politics and were tied to the old regime (Edmunds, 2003). These actors were often “a world for itself within the state” with their own chains of command, responsibilities and bureaucratic norms. They also had interests in keeping their privileged position in society.

To prevent negative impact and make the overall development of these countries possible, it was imperative that the armed forces were put under civilian, democratic control. The role of the armed forces, as well as the mechanisms and institutions overseeing them, had to be reviewed or even newly constructed, and adjusted to democratic standards. These steps, as well as many others within other governmental sectors, had to be done to prevent the reversal of the democratization process. All this would be too much for states lacking the capacity, knowledge and/or resources, needed for such comprehensive reforms. Assistance from developed countries was required, and the development of a new concept was necessary. Defense reform concept, as a sub-sector reform of the system-wide Security Sector Reform (SSR), emerged, and many developed states took part in it to assist recipient states.⁴ This internationalization is of great significance to the whole concept of SSR, and especially in the Western Balkan region where “international factors have been especially intrusive in domestic processes of reform” (Edmunds, 2007, p. 40). Due to recent history characterized by conflicts and authoritarianism, Western Balkan region as a whole, provides an important set of defense reforms case studies (ibid, p. 3).

Being the largest country in the Western Balkan, with high stakes in most of the neighboring countries, Serbia is regarded as crucial to regional security and development (Watkins, 2010, p. 15). The Yugoslavia and Milosevic’s authoritarianism left negative

³ The term *transition-states* in this thesis refers to post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies that are developing towards liberal democracies.

⁴ The term *recipient state* in this study is used to refer to a state that conducts the reform of its own security sector/armed forces in the SSR/Defense Reform process. Despite the fact that some scholars and practitioners (such as the OECD) use the term “developing country”, I opt for the term recipient state because Serbia can be viewed as a state in transition rather than as a developing country.

heritage in the armed forces in Serbia, including inter alia the maintenance of large, outdated and heavily militarized force structures and human resource management systems (Edmunds, 2007, p. 152). Serbia's geographical position on the borders of the EU and NATO and its significance for regional stability, influenced Western donor-states to engage in reform processes. Norway was among the first to recognize that external factors may have decisive influence on defense reform in Serbia.

However, donor-states have not been engaged in defense reform processes purely for altruistic reasons. States are organizations, and like any organization they have goals and interests, thus they expect some gains as a result of their actions.

Since early the 1990s, many papers have been written and research done concerning defense reforms and SSR.⁵ Most of these papers strive to explain why reform in recipient states is required, or take a normative approach trying to provide principles for successful implementation and/or evaluation of the reform's results.

Research Question

This thesis' ambition is to provide possible explanations for the defense reform concept from a donor-state's standpoint, and the research was directed to answer the following question:

How can Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform be explained?

From the previous section it is clear that defense reform, as one part of SSR in transition-states, is a twofold process. On one hand the process is, or at least should be, domestically driven. Local commitment is a precondition for sustainable development. Defense reform cannot be imposed from abroad (Edmunds, 2003, p. 23). The process should be locally owned (OECD DAC, 2007, p. 21). On the other hand, external influence and pressure are crucial for success.

Hence, defense reform is a military and political interaction between the donor and the recipient states, and as such it can be studied by International Relations (IR) theory. IR is about international systems and politics; it describes a complex interplay of several international actors. It can be argued that defense reform has little to do with the international system and structures, and hereof is the subject of foreign policy rather than of IR. However, a state does not have one policy towards the international system and another towards states. It has its foreign policy. Foreign policies of states constitute international politics and "if

⁵ The term *Security Sector Reform (SSR)* is the term of choice in this study. Alternative terms are security system reform; security sector transformation; and justice and security sector reform. I have chosen to use SSR because it is the term most commonly used by scholars and practitioners.

actors somehow decided no longer to engage in foreign policy there would be no more international politics either” (Rittberger, 2004, p. 1). Even if IR theory does not aim to explain particular actions of states, it can be used to analyze foreign policy choices and actions, including states’ defense reform engagement.

Therefore this thesis applies IR theory to the defense reform concept. It aims to identify the interests that drive Norway’s engagement in Serbia within contemporary IR theories.⁶

It can be argued that some IR theories may be more suitable to explain donors’ engagement in defense reform, for example utopian (idealist) liberalism or constructivism. Engagement in activities such as SSR and defense reforms, as well as in other activities concerned with development, human rights and peace-building, are often considered to be altruistic and driven by soft, ethical, values-based policies (St.meld. nr. 15 (2008–2009), p. 22). Such explanations are most often used by the media and in public political debate. However, this thesis takes a different approach and looks at the problem from another angle. It explains Norway’s engagement in Serbia based on interests within the IR theories of neorealism and neoliberalism. This does not completely exclude values-based policies from this thesis; they will be considered as part of a state’s broader interests.

To answer the research question the following sub-questions have to be addressed:

1. What is defense reform; which activities do donors usually undertake during defense reform engagement; and in which areas is their assistance possible, needed, and expected for successful defense reform?
2. How can neorealism and neoliberalism explain the external relations and activities of nation-states?
3. What are the interests that drive Norway’s engagement in Serbian defense reform processes?

The Significance of the Study

It is about two decades since the defense reform and SSR concept emerged and became accepted by the scholars. And in all that time, no common model, no generally applicable models and definitions of defense reform and SSR have been developed. The discrepancy

⁶ To say that the thesis applies or aims is to speak metonymically. When we say that the thesis applies, we think, understandably, that researcher applies a specific topic. In a similar way, we say “theory claims” when we think that scholars claim, or “states act” when we think that people in the state act.

between the theoretical underdevelopment and the significance of defense reform and SSR creates a need for further exploration of the concept itself.

Many empirical studies, reports, scholarly papers and much research about the defense reform and SSR concepts can be found. They often explain the (inter-)connections between defense reform and a recipient state's overall development, and use this explanation as a basis to encourage donor-states to engage in the defense reform.⁷ They tend to be policy-oriented and normative, and to provide recommendations about implementation and/or measurement of the results.⁸ In most cases, these papers are written by and for practitioners and are specific to individual cases, or regions.

This thesis analyzes defense reform from a different angle, from a donor-state's point of view. It can be seen as a small contribution to the better understanding of the defense reform concept, and as an academic basis for more normative studies that can result in concrete recommendations.

Limitations

To frame the research question, the research has to be limited in ambition, issue, level of analysis, and in time and space.

This thesis examines the defense reform concept through one case study – Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform. An individual country case study provides rich empirical data on individual reform experiences, but one case study alone cannot be used to generalize findings. Therefore, this thesis does not have an ambition to deliver a new definition of the concept, or a new theory about defense reform. It is limited to providing some possible explanations for one donor-state's engagement in the realm of defense reform.

On issue, this thesis researches defense reform in Serbia which can be seen as a recipient and transition-state. This does not imply that only transition-states conduct a reform of their armed forces. The emergence of new threats and a changed perception of security make reform within the armed forces highly relevant for states considered as consolidated democracies as well. This process is commonly called "transformation". In addition, defense reform has become an integral part of peace support and peace enforcement operations, under the concept of so-called "comprehensive approach". This thesis is about defense reform as component of the broader SSR concept.

⁷ See for example OECD (2005; 2007) and DCAF (2009) papers.

⁸ See Edmunds (2003), Hanggy (2004), Radoman (2008).

Although defense reform is an integral component of the SSR concept, this thesis does not attempt to cover the whole reform of the security sector in Serbia. It is limited to defense reform and in particular the reform of the Serbian Armed Forces (SAF) as the main actor of the defense sector.⁹ This means that legislative bodies and executive authorities, civil defense and other relevant defense bodies, but also police and intelligence services, have been explored only when relevant to illustrate the main focus of the thesis, with one exception. Even though the ministry of defense can be seen as an executive authority of the state, it is considered in this thesis for two reasons. First, the Serbian Ministry of Defense is a body within the defense system that mostly deals with international cooperation, and second, Serbian General Staff, the highest professional and staff organizational element, is a component of the Ministry of Defense.

Further, the thesis focuses on the defense reform concept itself. It is not aimed at providing assessments of defense reform/SSR principles or to make concrete recommendations for implementation or measurement of the defense reform processes results.

On the level of analysis, the most general and comprehensive approach is taken, with the states as primary units of analysis. The states in this thesis are considered as *unitary* actors that consider all options, act rationally and make rational decisions to maximize their utility. This thesis does not include the influence that governmental bureaucracy, type of government, relations between the government and interests groups, as well as individual decision maker's thinking and basic beliefs have on states' actions. This thesis takes the state of Norway as the primary unit of analysis.

The case study here is limited in time and covers the time period 2006 – 2010. Until June 2006 the Republic of Serbia was a part of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. This union was a loose confederation and Serbia and Montenegro were united only in certain realms, such as defense. This led to uncertainty and speculation about the future of the state. The Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro were under the command of the Supreme Defense Council, the political body on the union level, which was not willing to undertake any serious defense reform. The Montenegrin referendum on the independence of the Republic of Montenegro from the State Union that was held on May 21, 2006 ended the uncertainty and speculation about the future of the state and the Armed Forces. After

⁹ Some authors distinguish between the terms *defense-related SSR* (related to the democratic control over military forces) and *defense reform* (related to reform of the armed forces). In this thesis the term Defense Reform refers to both aspects.

Montenegro's independence and adoption of a new Constitution (on November 10, 2006), Serbia assumed full jurisdiction over its Armed Forces. Moreover, on October 17, 2005 the current government of Norway, Stoltenberg's Second Cabinet, was appointed, and with that Norway's defense reforms/SSR efforts have accelerated.

Finally, because the differing views on Kosovo's independence in Norway and Serbia, and although Serbia looks at Kosovo as an integral part of the Republic of Serbia, this thesis does not deal with Norway's efforts related to Kosovo.

Research Design

This thesis is an *intentional explanation* of the problem and it is deductive. Intentional explanations always include a premise that says something about an actor's goals. In this type of explanation the researcher assumes that the actor thinks rationally and puts the actor's reasoning in the context of his actions (Gilje & Grimen, 1993, p. 115). In other words, Norway's engagement in defense reform in Serbia is explained by referring to its intended effects and expected gains.

Strategy of inquiry

To answer the research question, three analyses are conducted: first, in chapter two, focuses on the concept of defense reform and explains donor-states' activities and areas of engagement. The second analysis is theoretical and focuses on IR theory, striving to explain the relations and external activities of nation-states in the light of neorealism and neoliberalism. This is covered in chapter three. Thirdly, the empirical analysis presented in chapter four focuses on the Norwegian rationale for engagement in defense reforms, and in particular on Norway's engagement in Serbia between 2006 and 2010.

While the first and second analyses are based on defense reform/SSR and IR theory papers and texts, the third analysis examines defense reform using one case study through an explanatory model developed in Chapter 3. This means that the thesis combines data-based analysis with theory-based reasoning.

The case study used in this thesis is Norway's contribution to defense reform in Serbia. Although individual case studies alone cannot be used to generalize findings, the focus on Norway's engagement in the defense reform process in Serbia was chosen because Norwegian foreign policy has traditionally been considered, especially by Norwegians themselves, as based on idealistic approaches and practices, especially in relation to transition states. Therefore this case has ability to demonstrate the phenomenon of interest.

Research was directed towards an *understanding* of Norway's contribution to defense reform in Serbia and relies on perspective and subjective opinions of the participants in the reform process. Therefore the qualitative research design is the most appropriate.

Norway has two main ways of contributing to defense reform in Serbia – through Norwegian Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) projects, and both actors are subjects of this research. Yet, because the fact that states in this thesis are considered as unitary actors, the activities of those two ministries are not researched separately, and they are simply referred to as “Norway”.

Research methods and empirical data source review

The empirical data collection, analysis and interpretation in this thesis are based on document analysis and interviews with relevant officials in Norway.

In this research it was necessary to use primary sources, namely official statements in the form of institutional documents from relevant political and military bodies; documentation about defense reform cooperation between Norway and Serbia; officials' statements that can be found in public documents; and interviews with officials that have been involved in defense reform activities. In order to provide a realistic picture this thesis is oriented to explaining the *width*, rather than depth, of Norway's contribution to Serbia.

In order to cover both MOD's and MFA's perspective, five in-depth interviews with relevant representatives from the Norwegian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as with the Norwegian defense attaché in Beograd were conducted.¹⁰ All interviewees have a professional background in the subject under discussion, and none of them expressed a desire for anonymity. The interviews were mostly face-to-face, semi-structured interviews, with open-ended questions brought to the interview in the form of an interview guide. An exception is the interview with Mr. Stian Jensen from the Norwegian MOD. This interview was conducted online because at the time of research the respondent was situated in Brussels.

Positioning of the researcher

The fact that the researcher is a Serbian officer, from a country that belongs to the category of recipient states, can lead to bias when interpreting data related to the situation in Serbia and in the Serbian Armed Forces. But, this should not affect analysis or interpretation of data related to the research question. This is because the Norway–Serbia case is not used to study

¹⁰ The informants are listed after the list of references

what effects the donor-state's contribution had on defense reform in the recipient state, but as the background for the *donor-state's* rationale to contributing in defense reform.

Except for the fact that this thesis is a result of Norway's contribution to defense reform in Serbia, the researcher was not directly involved in the defense reform process. This positioning as a non-practitioner has enabled researcher to be analytical and not constrained by previous experience.

However, the researcher's position as a military officer situated outside of this discourse may mean that the MOD and MFA activities and rationales are asymmetrically represented in favor of the military actors. This can be criticized as a weakness of the research.

Structure

In order to answer the research question this thesis consists of five chapters, organized in the following way.

Chapter 2 describes the thesis' central topic – the defense reform concept, and is based on existing defense reform/SSR studies and papers. It aims first, to introduce SSR and defense reform; and second, to provide one part of the puzzle needed to develop the explanatory model in chapter three, through a review of the activities that donor-states usually undertake, and the areas in which donor-states' assistance is possible, needed, and expected for successful defense reform. As such, the chapter will provide an answer to the first sub-question of this thesis: What is defense reform; which activities do donors usually undertake during defense reform engagement; and in which areas is their assistance possible, needed, and expected for successful defense reform?

Chapter 3 answers the second sub-question: How can neorealism and neoliberalism explain the external relations and activities of nation-states? This chapter is about states and how contemporary IR theories may explain states' external relations and activities. It has three goals. The first goal is to provide an overview of the basis on which the IR theories used in this thesis are constructed. Second, the chapter aims to identify the characteristics within IR that may explain donor-states' rationale for defense reform engagement. And finally, it provides an explanatory model that will be used in chapter four to organize and interpret the collected data.

Chapter 4 narrows the focus to Norway as a donor state and its engagement in Serbian defense reform and answers the thesis' final sub-question: What are the interests that drive Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform processes? In this chapter, empirical

data about the Norwegian view on defense reform; Norwegian foreign policy interests; and Norway's engagement in Serbia, will be applied to the explanatory model. Finally, the explanatory model is implemented, to interpret empirical data about the rationale behind Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform in the light of the IR theories outlined in chapter three, and therefore to answer this thesis' research question.

Chapter 5 summarizes previous chapters' main findings and seeks to extract some assumptions from this case study that can contribute to better understanding of the defense reform concept, and be used as an academic basis for more normative studies that can result in concrete recommendations. The thesis ends with suggestions for further research.

Chapter 2. Defense Reform – a Conceptual Clarification

Transition states need help from mature democracies on their journey towards modern society and democracy. They need assistance in the whole development spectrum, especially in the security area. Security is a complex issue; donation of equipment or financial support are not enough; nor a simple explanation of how security sector is organized in other countries. The holistic and systematic approach, that includes various disciplines and covers many different governmental sectors as well as long-term engagement are needed. In other words, a systematic approach, a whole concept – the defense reform concept is desirable. But what really is defense reform? Is it important for overall development, and why? What are the objectives of defense reform engagement?

This chapter is about the defense reform concept. It aims first, to introduce SSR and defense reform. And second, to provide one part of the puzzle needed to develop the explanatory model in the chapter three, through a review of the activities and areas of donor-states' assistance.

However, defense reform can be seen as one of the sub-reforms which are, or at least should be, closely linked together in the system-wide Security Sector Reform. It is very difficult to present the defense reform concept without understanding the broader concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR). For this reason, this chapter will first introduce SSR and then elaborate defense reform itself.

Disagreement on What Security Sector Reform Is

Security Sector Reform is a relatively new concept, and emerged in policy and academic circles in the 1990s. It seems that a “trigger” for the SSR concept development was the end of the Cold War and Central and Eastern European states' efforts to reject the legacy of communism and authoritarian governance, and to (re)join Western society. The need for such a concept was strengthened by the outbreak of conflicts in the Balkans and the emergence of new, post-conflict states and by donors' recognition that the security environment can contribute to, or undermine development.¹¹

Scholars dealing with the SSR concept agree in one thing – there is no universally accepted definition or set of definitions for SSR. Dissonance in definition emerges for several reasons.

¹¹ This does not mean that the SSR concept is only relevant in the cases of transition societies on the European continent. But, although there were authoritarian and post-conflict states on other continents before the end of the Cold War, SSR emerged as a holistic concept only after events in Europe.

First, SSR agenda builds on the existing literature and debate in many fields, including civil-military relations, police-, security-, and development studies. The term is used by both politicians, professional military officers, scholars, international as well as non-governmental organizations and others. Different actors use the SSR term in different ways. Second, each country has a distinctive security environment and hence the SSR process is different from case to case, from state to state. Each state adopting SSR constitutes a special case because “their own specific national, security and political context” (Radoman, 2008, p. 9). States have different historical circumstances and levels of economic development. Therefore, there are no generally applicable models and definitions. In addition, even the question of which organizations compose the security sector and with that how wide or narrow one should look at SSR is controversial (Edmunds, 2007, p. 22).

Defining Security Sector

Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly after the events of 9/11, the concept of security has expanded and deepened. From the traditionally narrow focus on the defense of states from military threats, the concept of security is being redefined to include traditionally non-military security issues, such as political, economic, societal and environmental aspects (Hänggi, 2004, p. 2). As a consequence some of the actors interested in SSR have extended the understanding of the security sector to include “the whole system of actors working on security-related issues” (OECD DAC, 2005, p. 29). Such an approach should help to “transcend the essentially state-centric nature of the concept” (Hänggi, 2004, p. 3). This view of security sector includes, inter alia, liberation/guerrilla armies, private security companies, customs authorities, non-statutory civil society groups such as the media, research institutions and various non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

From such a view of the security sector, it follows that SSR is

another term used to describe the transformation of the ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework (OECD DAC, 2005, p. 20).¹²

¹² Note that OECD DAC uses the term *security system* reform to describe the whole system of actors working on security related issues, as a broader term than security sector which, according to DAC, refers only to the armed forces.

Scholars, such as Timothy Edmunds and Jelena Radoman, agree that security can be viewed much broader than the defense of the state, but emphasize that it can be very problematic to use such a broad definition and human-focused approach to security to analyze the SSR concept. This is due to the fact that an implementation of a too broad definition may include almost all aspects of society and governance (Edmunds, 2007). Edmunds (2007) takes a means-based approach in defining security sector and identifies “the management and application of coercive force for collective purposes as the unique distinguishing feature of the security sector as a whole” (p.23). The coercive force and authorization to use it are the *differencia specifica* between those institutions that constitute elements of the security sector and other state organizations. According to Edmunds SSR is concerned with those militarized formations authorized by the state to utilize force to protect the state itself and its citizens. This definition limits SSR to armed organizations such as the regular military, paramilitary police forces and the intelligence services (Edmunds, 2003, p. 11).

Notwithstanding differences between broad and narrow definitions, for the purpose of this thesis and in accordance with its research limitations, Edmunds’ definition of the security sector will be used. Organizations with coercive capacity, authorized to use it on behalf of state authority, as well as those institutions of civilian structure which oversee and manage the security sector, constitute the security sector. These are the armed forces, the police force and intelligence organizations as well as the ministries of defense and of the interior. This view is also in accordance with Serbian official documents stating that the Serbian national security system in the narrow sense comprises of “defense system, the Ministry of Interior forces, security-intelligence system and temporarily formed bodies and coordination bodies for some crisis” (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2009, p. 32).

What is Security Sector Reform?

Although there is no consensus on what the security sector and SSR encompasses, for analytical purposes a broad SSR context must be identified. To incorporate both broad and narrow definitions of the security sector within the SSR concept, Edmunds proposes a problem, rather than a institutional, driven approach to SSR (Edmunds, 2003).

We can look at the security sector in general, as those organizations and institutions concerned with the provision of security to, and within the state. If those organizations and institutions do not provide security in an efficient and effective way, and/or if they are the

cause of insecurity, the security sector is dysfunctional. A dysfunctional security sector is the issue SSR is concerned with, and SSR activities are essentially aimed at provision of efficient and effective security. However, it is not enough that the state is safe and secure. Authoritarian regimes also tend to provide security for the state, and some of them do so successfully. Provision of efficient and effective security against external threats to the state does not necessarily imply efficient and effective security within the state – security for the state’s citizens. Security in modern society must be provided in a preferred way, within a framework of democratic governance.

Therefore, taking the problem driven approach, SSR concerns “the provision of security within the state in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control” (ibid, p. 12).

Even though the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has a broader view of the security sector and with that of SSR, if we take away actors we will get a similar, normative SSR definition: “Security system reform is another term used to describe the transformation of the ‘security system’ ... to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance” (OECD DAC, 2005, p. 20).

Both definitions have two key normative elements. They emphasize, first the necessity to develop an effective and efficient security sector. And second, the need to reduce lack of oversight over the security sector with establishment of democratic civilian control. SSR occurs on the basis of specific normative criteria, but an important question is who sets those criteria. Here Western countries and institutions may be of particular significance. They have SSR incorporated in their foreign-, security- and development policies, which have clearly defined normative goals aimed at playing a role in shaping the overall normative criteria for SSR in the recipient state (Edmunds, 2003, p. 40). There are three major donor-states’ engagement objectives: improvement of basic security service delivery; the establishment of effective governance that will oversee the security sector; and the development of local ownership of a reform process (OECD DAC, 2007, p. 10). Regardless of how well the criteria are set there cannot be success in reform of the security sector without commitment on the part of those undertaking the reforms (OECD DAC, 2005, p. 34).

SSR is not just a normative concept; it is also a holistic concept. The holistic approach manifests itself in several ways. First, the SSR concept recognizes the significance of all security actors in overall reform of the society (Edmunds, 2003). Second, SSR aims at

putting all security sector actors under democratic governance. Third, the SSR concept integrates otherwise partial and separate reform processes (Hänggi, 2004). The sub-reforms that reside under the umbrella of system-wide SSR are: civilian oversight and accountability; defense reform; intelligence and security services reform; and policing. In a broader view SSR will include: border management; justice (judicial and legal) reform; prisons, private security and military companies; and civil society (OECD DAC, 2007, p. 12).

To summarize, the SSR concept is aimed at assisting in the creation of a secure environment that fosters development and democracy, and its agenda covers three main challenges: (i) development of institutional security framework that integrates security and development policy and includes all relevant actors; (ii) strengthening oversight over security institutions; and (iii) building capable and professional security forces that are under democratic civil control.

Defining Defense Reform – Building a Bridge While Crossing It

One of the main principles of SSR is that all security actors should be subject to the overall reform. Despite this, it remains a fact that the armed forces are the country's most powerful security actor and have a central role in the state's security. Even the OECD, which has a broad conception of security sector, counts the armed forces as the core security actor (OECD DAC, 2005, p. 6). Therefore, it is reasonable to link defense reform to wider security reform, but it is also reasonable to consider this component of SSR separately.

The armed forces can often be the source of insecurity, used to repress the regime's opposition and to protect authoritarian interests. In some cases they may be neglected, if the police or another security actor is considered as the preferable "protector of the regime", and therefore become a destabilizing factor in the society. For example, for most of the 1990s the Serbian Armed Forces remained out of favor in Belgrade. Milosevic developed alternative allies within the security sector, establishing several militias and paramilitary groups, and by the militarization of the police (Edmunds, 2007, p. 154).

Because of its central position, conditions in the armed forces can affect the reform process of other actors, both in a positive and a negative way. "If the military is not subject to democratic control, there is little likelihood that other security forces will be" (DCAF, 2009, p. 4). Hence, defense reform is very important for overall development, and plays a significant role in the areas of democratization, good governance, economic development, professionalization, conflict prevention and integration with Western institutions (Edmunds, 2003, pp. 13-15).

In accordance with the normative definition of SSR, we can consider defense reform as “a coordinated series of actions designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of a state’s armed forces” (DCAF, 2009, p. 1). In other words, defense reform is the part of SSR aimed at the armed forces.

Although, as SSR, defense reform varies from case to case, two core objectives can be recognized. First, defense reform should ensure that the defense policy and armed forces are effectively overseen and under democratic control (OECD DAC, 2007). This may include: creation of an integrated MOD; changes within the chain of command; creation of a parliamentary defense committee; strengthening the ability of civil society to monitor the military; and review of threat assessment, defense actors’ roles, authorization and responsibilities as well as defense planning, security concepts and national military strategy (DCAF, 2009, pp. 1-2).

Second, the objective is to restructure or build capable and professional defense forces, first and foremost inside the military organization. Defense reform strives for a military component which is: capable of deploying its forces within a multinational framework, even in distant theaters in different operational contexts; able to deal with a range of risks and threats; well-led and managed; able to accept and implement new technologies; respectful of human rights and international humanitarian law; ready to accept a functional division of responsibilities among military and other defense sector actors; understand the role of the media in modern societies and be ready to share information about conflicts and potential for conflicts; and be democratically controlled and effectively overseen (DCAF, 2009, p. 3).

Although efforts to achieve these two core defense reform objectives should ideally be in parallel, SSR and the defense reform process fall into two overlapping and interrelated phases: “first generation” reforms, and “second generation” reforms, as stated by Edmunds (2003, p. 16). The first generation reform is directed more towards achieving the first defense reform core objective. It concerns the establishment of new institutions, structures and chains of responsibility for the defense (security) sector, i.e. establishment of appropriate structures for democratic civilian control; and measures to depoliticize defense actors and separate them from domestic politics. This phase in defense reform is an initial step in the reform process. Second generation reform addresses the consolidation of previous reforms and is directed to improve effectiveness and to build capable and professional defense forces as

well as effective and efficient institutions and procedures to oversee them.¹³ In reality the second generation reform will include inter alia, the development of a civilian cadre capable of providing effective parliamentary control; development of defense sector bureaucracies capable of working in a transparent way, implementing policy and supporting oversight; development of security sector education and training programs; defense actors downsizing; retraining programs for demobilized personnel (Edmunds, 2003, pp. 17-19).

Defense reform is a long-term process and it is hard to define an end point. The armed forces must repeatedly adjust to a changing security environment and new security threats. Moreover, it is a process that has to be conducted within a military organization which cannot cease from providing security just to conduct reforms. It is “like building a bridge while crossing it” (Magnum & Craven, 2010, p. 6).

Donor-states’ activities and areas of assistance

In order to make a basis for development of the explanatory model, this section will present the activities that donor-countries usually undertake during defense reform engagement, and the areas in which donor-states’ assistance is possible, needed, and expected for successful defense reform.

As noted above, defense reform has two main objectives: (i) effectively overseeing and democratic control over the armed forces, and (ii) building capable and professional armed forces. Hence, donors’ assistance should be aimed at achieving those objectives. In addition, defense reform is a part of the wider security reform and overall state development. Therefore, donors’ defense reform activities must be consistent with other development activities in a recipient state.

Hence, donors’ defense reform support may be grouped into the following individual program areas: (i) strengthening democratic governance and civilian control over the armed forces; (ii) strengthening the capability and professionalism of the armed forces and; (iii) integration of defense reform and other development activities.

Assistance in strengthening democratic governance and civilian control of armed forces.

This area of engagement may include assistance in: strengthening the ability of civil society to monitor the military; review of threat assessment; creation of an integrated MOD; changes within the chain of command; creation of a parliamentary defense committee; review of

¹³ The term *effective* in this thesis means equipped and capable for action, while the term *efficient* means acting effectively with a minimum of waste, expense, or unnecessary effort.

defense actors' roles, authorization and responsibilities as well as defense planning, security concepts and national military strategy (DCAF, 2009, pp. 1-2), and also: support for administrative measures in ministries of defense; improvement of the civil audit of defense planning and military spending; and increasing transparency on defense issues through better communication and use of media (UD & FD, 2010, p. 3). Let us take a closer look at some of these activities.

Reinforcing legislative capacity for adequate oversight of defense forces is the most important activity of defense reform. The aim is to build, or increase legislative capacity to conduct effective oversight, and “it is a priority area for development assistance” (OECD DAC, 2005, p. 39). In some cases assistance is needed to build institutions from scratch, for example in Montenegro after its independence in 2006. In other cases the legal framework will exist, institutions and parliamentary defense and security committees are established, but often without the required expertise on defense issues and necessary capacity to oversee security. If, there is one particular activity that is of great help here, it is the activity that pervades through every area, every segment of the defense reform process, and which is the very essence of donor-states assistance. This is consultation with experts from donor-states. They can help by promoting dialogue between civil society and the military to reach agreement about aims, ways and means ahead. They can also support education programs and help relevant actors to clarify the principles and objectives of defense reform. It should be understood that these donor-state experts do not impose a complete solution; rather they give their opinions on, and share their experiences with previous defense reform good practice, they propose and recommend a way ahead. Consultation is important in this area, but more assistance from donor-states is required, such as knowledge transfer, financial support and equipment donations. And, because it takes time to build effective institutions, long-term donor-state engagement is needed.

Consultation with external experts can be very useful in the first practical step towards an overall defense reform, a Defense Review. Defense reviews can be used as the entry point for SSR, and should lay the groundwork for changes in how a recipient state formulates and delivers defense. It is the process by which the government, with the assistance of experts from donor-states, decides upon its overall defense policy and the means and resources necessary to achieve its defense objectives. The first phase of a defense review will in most cases be a security assessment, the analysis of the full range of security threats, both military and non-military, that the recipient state and its citizens can expect to face in the future (OECD DAC, 2005, p. 48). The process continues with the assessment of

forces needed to meet those challenges and the appropriate level and spending on defense. In short, a defense review should provide guidance for development of the right capabilities to meet anticipated challenges.

Increasing transparency on defense issues through better communication and use of media is important for strengthening democratic governance and civilian control over the armed forces. Here several assistance perspectives can be considered. One is assistance in providing information about the results of the reform to the public. The defense reforms' results may not be evident to the public, and "long-term benefits may easily be eclipsed by concerns about short-term human and social costs" (DCAF, 2009, p. 4). Therefore recipient states need assistance in developing an information policy and communication strategy for the armed forces, as well as training of spokespersons and information officers. Donors may also assist in improving the quality of public debate on military issues through support for "think tanks, universities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in research and debate on military policies and practices" (OECD DAC, 2007, p. 130).

Assistance in strengthening the capability and professionalism of the defense sector.

Building capable and professional armed forces is the second major defense reform objective. Professionalization in the defense reform context refers to armed forces that have a clearly state-defined role and that are structured and able to fulfill the demands of the state government in an effective and efficient manner (Edmunds, 2003, p. 14). This helps both to improve conditions for the proper exercise of authority and interoperability (UD & FD, 2010, p. 3). Defense reform strives for a military component which is: capable of deploying its forces within a multinational framework, even in distant theaters in different operational contexts; able to deal with a range of risks and threats; well-led and managed; able to accept and implement new technologies; respectful of human rights and international humanitarian law; ready to accept a functional division of responsibilities among military and other defense sector actors; understand the role of the media in modern societies and be ready to share information about conflicts and potential for conflicts; and be democratically controlled and effectively overseen (DCAF, 2009, p. 3). Measures in this category may include, inter alia, support for the education of military personnel, reform of military education, training and education for participation in peace operations (UD & FD, 2010,p.3).

Military education systems in recipient states are usually developed in an authoritative environment and officers are educated for different roles than those required in the future. Those who remain in the armed forces need re-education and the whole education

system has to be assessed and adjusted to the needs of the reformed armed forces. In most cases, the old military education system will not include gender perspective and little on international humanitarian law and human rights standards. Donor-states can provide support in the reform of the military education system through for example: raising the local instructors' competence; transfer of their perspectives and procedures through lectures by donor-state experts; and by promoting ethnic and social balance, and equal opportunity policies in the defense sector (OECD DAC, 2007). They can invite officers from recipient states into Western staff colleges which will help to raise officers' competence (Edmunds, 2003, p. 23).

Donor-states' assistance in all above mentioned areas leads to changes in another area, namely interoperability – interoperability at home, with other parts of the security sector, and interoperability abroad. Donors can contribute to the development of armed forces in a way that their design, deployment, personnel structure and training enables engagement with other security actors at home and with other armed forces in operations abroad (OECD DAC, 2007, p. 126). This assistance may include for example: assistance in development of language courses for personnel and operational planning systems; rules of engagement and operating procedures introduction; donation of equipment; and external advisers may help in peace-support operations (PSO) training. Trained individual experts, military teams and even whole units from recipient states may be included in exercises organized by donor-states. However, perhaps the best way of developing interoperability is participation in peace-support operations together with a donor's forces. This way, officers and soldiers are directly exposed to the norms and operating procedures used in operations and can transfer that experience to their colleagues back home.

Integration of defense reform and other development activities.

As stated, armed forces play an important role in development and democratization, and defense reform must be seen as a sub-reform of overall societal development. Even successful defense reform “may imply social and economic changes that are often difficult to deal with politically” (DCAF, 2009, p. 4). For example, armed forces in recipient states, and especially in states that have recently been involved in wars, will often have a surplus of manpower, professional officers and non-commissioned officers, which require

downsizing.¹⁴ However, it is not enough through regulation to enable (or to force) early retirement. Downsizing may reduce the defense budget, but at the same time “often this transfers expense to other sectors of government finances such as welfare” (Edmunds, 2003, p. 19). Reduction in personnel may also lead to adverse results such as social and economic changes in local communities. It may lead to unemployment and fuel an economic recession. NATO estimates that in South Eastern Europe approximately 175,000 jobs were eliminated in the armed forces by 2009 (DCAF, 2009, p. 4). In addition, because of their military skills, former military personnel can be employed by criminal gangs to energize international organized crime. Donor-states may help to overcome such problems with financial support to local communities and investment in new jobs. They also may sponsor re-education and re-training programs for those whose careers are cut short. Those programs should prepare former military personnel “for life in the civilian economy” which will “bring benefits to overall economy in the long-term” (Edmunds, 2003, p. 19).

In sum, defense reform may include a range of donor’s activities in a number of areas. The process itself is extensive and thus expensive, resource intensive and takes a long time to bring changes. It requires expertise in a number of areas and the cooperation of a wide range of actors, both military and civilian. There is no generally applicable model of defense reform, and donors should be sensitive to recipient states’ specificity and needs. Not all countries have the same commitment and capacity to integrate changes which forces governments to prioritize their activities in defense reform. In some cases the reform will require priority in the area of governance; but if the country faces major security threats, more attention has to be paid to enhance the operational capacity of the armed forces.

¹⁴ The distinction should be made between armed forces *downsizing* dealt with in this study and the *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration* (DDR) concept, employed by UN. DDR is mostly seen in the context of peacekeeping operations, deals with former combatants, and it is ad hoc in nature. “The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin” (UN, n.d.). On the other hand, armed forces downsizing, as a component of defense reform, is directed towards professional officers and non-commissioned officers and has a long-term perspective. Although these activities may be related, they are separated in time and sequencing.

Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework: Neorealist and Neoliberal Explanations

Defense reform is a military and political interaction between the donor and the recipient states, and as such it can be studied by IR theory. This chapter focuses on how contemporary IR theories can explain states' external relations and activities. It has three goals. The first goal is to provide an overview of the basis on which the IR theories used in this thesis are constructed. Second, the chapter aims to identify the characteristics within IR that may explain donor-states' rationale for defense reform engagement. And finally, it provides an explanatory model that will be used in chapter four to organize and interpret the collected data.

Since IR became an academic subject around the time of the First World War, a range of theories about international politics have been developed.¹⁵ The next passages present the two predominant, most visible and influential contemporary theories; theories used in this thesis, namely neorealism and neoliberalism.

In the era of rapid change it is impossible for an IR theory to remain unchanged over several decades. IR is a constantly evolving academic subject, and has been developed through debates between various groups of scholars, especially between the realists and liberals. Robert O. Keohane, considered as the founder of neoliberalism, has pointed out that "only a very rigid thinker or a fool would fail to change his views on some important points over the course of twenty-one years" (Keohane, 2005, p. xiii). Many diverse alternative approaches, even within the main theories, have been developed. In order to avoid analysis of the large number of individual contributions this chapter will present the basics of neorealism and neoliberalism.

Neorealism: Security in an Unsecure World

Realism as a perspective on politics between states, particular view of the world, or paradigm has a long history. Its primary assumptions can be found in the writings of Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and others. According to realists the world is a dangerous place. Conflicts and threat of violence are a constant phenomenon in international relations. Classical realism prioritizes national interest and security, claiming it is fundamentally the nature of man that pushes states and individuals to act in a way that places interests over ideologies.

¹⁵ IR emerged as an academic discipline in 1918 with the founding of the first professorship in IR - the Woodrow Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth, University of Wales.

On the basis of classical realism Kenneth Waltz, with his famous book “Theory of International politics”, established neorealism as the theory of international relations (Waltz,1979). He accepts some elements of classical realism. For both classical realists and Waltz, states are pre-eminent actors in international politics. They are autonomous political units that decide for themselves how they will cope with internal and external problems (ibid, pp. 95-96). While classical realism claims that the main goal for states in international relations is power,¹⁶ Waltz claims that states have survival as their main goal. Power is just a tool, and not the only one, to achieve security, and “only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power” (ibid, p. 126).

States also exist and operate in a system without central government. There is no global body with a monopoly on the use of force. It is international anarchy. Anarchy in Waltz’s theory does not imply chaos, continuing violence and destruction, but the lack of formally regulated relations of superiority and inferiority. “None is entitled to command; none is required to obey” (ibid, p. 88). Waltz describes international politics as “being anarchic, horizontal, decentralized, homogeneous, undirected, and mutually adaptive” (ibid, p. 113). As states exist in an anarchic international system, they are forced to help themselves, and can rely only on their own power. The core principle in international politics is consequently the principle of self-help.

But, unlike classical realism, Waltz takes no account of human nature. The structure of the international system is the centre of attention. State leaders and their subjective evaluations of international relations are less important because they are forced to act in a particular way. The structure of the system determines their actions. Policymaking can not be independent of the structure of the system. That is why neorealism is also known as structural realism.

Within the structure of the system, the most important feature of international politics is the relative distribution of power among states. In international anarchy, states are seen as similar units. Every state, regardless of size, geographical position, ideology and other attributes, has to perform a similar set of governmental functions. They all have to, protect their territory, population and their way of life, collect taxes and regulate the economy. “International politics consist of like units duplicating one another’s activities” (ibid, p. 97).

¹⁶ For example, Hans Morgenthau defines politics in general, and therefore international politics as a struggle for power (Morgenthau, 1960)

However, in one respect states differ, in their power, in their “greater of lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks” (ibid).

In an international system regarded as anarchic and based on self-help, the most powerful units, the great powers, set the scene for the rest. They are of crucial importance. The structure of the system changes when “great powers rise and fall and the balance of power shifts accordingly” (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 76).

Great powers will always tend to balance each other. Classical realists see the balance of power as a result of a conscious policy – for example the British policy towards Europe in the pre- World War II era. According to Waltz (1979), the balance of power appears automatically, as result of interaction between states. Although states may seek survival through power balancing, balancing is not the aim of that behavior. Balancing is a product of efforts to survive. According to the Waltz interpretation of the balance of power theory, security is the goal, and power is a potentially useful tool for states. States are at risk if they have too much or too little power. The first concern of a state in Waltz’s balance of power world is to maintain its position in the system, not to maximize power. Offensive behavior is self-defeating for states, because it simply causes others to balance. Waltz believes that states can increase their power in two ways: turning to domestic politics, and arming; or turning to the outside world by entering into alliances. Smaller and weaker states will have a tendency to align themselves with great powers in order to preserve their maximum autonomy.

Thus, neorealism is a theory in which states are considered as self-oriented, a theory with emphasis on international anarchy that strongly influences cooperation among states. How may such a theory help us to comprehend donor-states’ engagement in the defense reform concept, which is mainly about cooperation and development?

First, although survival is taken as a basic motive for states’ actions, this assumption “allows for the fact that no state always acts exclusively to ensure its survival some states may persistently seek goals that they value more highly than survival” (Waltz, 1979, p. 92). In other words, neorealists do not deny any possibility for cooperation among states. Self-help is not incompatible with cooperation, but states are reluctant to enter into relations that might undermine their self-help capacity and they will always strive to preserve their autonomy. As classical realists, Waltz also claims that “each state plots the course it thinks will best serve its interests” (ibid, p. 113).

Second, when Waltz argues about states’ power and capabilities, he does not consider only military and political power. For Waltz economic capabilities are a part of states’

overall power and “States use economic means for military and political ends; and military and political means for the achievement of economic interests” (ibid, p. 94).

In addition, neorealists claim that states can mutually enhance their capabilities by sharing labor in the tasks they perform, such as political management and military activities (ibid, p.105). Another prominent neorealist, Stephen M. Walt expands on what Waltz started some years before, and claims that military assistance is a precondition for states to establish a balance of threat (Walt, 1987).¹⁷ Military assistance increases state interaction and thus ability to affect each other, ties the recipient closer to the donor, and evolves a sense of gratitude (Heier, 2006, p. 63). The claim made by Walt is that the more aid a recipient state accepts, and the more valuable (critical) aid is, the greater influence and control the donor enjoys over the recipient’s security policy (Walt, 1987, p. 41).

In other words: Greater security and survival can be achieved not only by maximizing control over one's own resources but also by influencing how others use theirs. That influence can be achieved by intentionally creating relationships of asymmetrical interdependence, when an economically strong state develops and maintains a set of bilateral relationships with weaker states. The recipient’s tie to the donor gives the latter political leverage by being able to freeze or cut economic ties if the recipient’s foreign policies are not in line with the donor’s interests (Rittberger, 2004, p. 13).

The neo-realistic explanatory framework

At this point we can conclude characteristics of the neorealism that can be used to empirically interpret donor-states’ contribution to defense reform processes, in the next chapter.

1. States are autonomous political units, rational and *self-interested actors*.
2. States act in order to achieve or preserve their own interests, *in the first instance state survival*, by maximizing their own power and by influencing how other states use their resources.
3. If it is in their interest, states may use economic means to achieve military and/or political ends, as well as *military and political means for the achievement of economic interests*.
4. Military assistance is one way to achieve *influence over other states’ security policy* and with that their own greater security and survival.

¹⁷ Walt uses “balance of threat” instead “balance of power” in explanation of international politics.

Neoliberalism: International Institutions and the Zone of Liberal Peace

The previous section introduced the neo-realistic view on world politics, with its focus on power and relative gains, and pessimistic view on prospects for progress. This section presents the contrasting, mainly optimistic perspective of neoliberalism. This perspective provides us with an alternative explanatory basis for how donor-states' engagement in defense reform processes may be empirically interpreted.

Development during the three decades after the Second World War was characterized by evolution of new means for travel and communication, higher level of transnational trade, investment and cultural exchange, as well as regional integration in Western Europe. That development provided a basis for a renewed liberal approach, a response to neorealism, which has been labeled neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism is not a coherent view on international relations. It includes at least four approaches: sociological-, interdependence-, institutional- and republican liberalism (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, pp. 43-44). This inter-neoliberal classification is an analytical tool with fully conditional validity. Rarely can an author, who considers himself neo-liberal, position himself strictly within only one of these approaches. However, not all of these approaches are equally useful for explaining donor-state involvement in defense reform. For example, sociological liberalism is mainly concerned with transnational relations between people, groups and organizations belonging to different countries. Similarly, interdependence liberalism is concerned with "complex interdependence" among the variety of actors on the international stage. Having in mind this thesis' level of analysis (states as unitary actors), these brands of neoliberalism, when viewed separately from others, can not provide us with a satisfactory explanation. Therefore, this chapter presents the basic liberal assumptions on which all neo-liberal approaches are constructed, and then focuses on institutional and republican liberalism.

Basic liberal assumptions

Freedom lies at the very root of liberalism. The term liberalism itself is derived from the Latin word "liber" meaning free. Freedom for liberals means above all freedom for individuals; and it should be ensured within, and by the state. For liberals, states are constitutional entities that should establish and impose the rule of law and protect citizens' individual rights. But "we can not be free unless our country is free too" (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 3). States therefore must protect national freedom from the threat of war. The simple absence of war is not enough, as the mere threat of war may threaten freedom.

Only peace fosters freedom and makes progressive change possible. The states, the constitutional entities that respect individual rights should also respect other such states, deal with each other on the basis of mutual recognition, and make peace possible.

The belief in progress and change is another core liberal assumption. The liberals' belief in progress is based on their faith in human reason. Unlike neo-realists who take no account of human nature, liberals generally take a positive view of it. They believe that people have many mutual interests and can employ reason to achieve mutual benefits through cooperation. Rational principles can be applied to international affairs, and conflict and war are avoidable.

Liberalism is sometimes conceived as idealism because of the utopian assumption that the interests of the actors are fundamentally harmonious (Rittberger, 2004, p. 4). Neoliberals reject idealism, and recognize that, depending on the circumstances, actors in world politics can be self-interested and competitive. But neoliberals are also, if not completely optimistic, less pessimistic than realists. They still believe in at least the possibility of progress (Keohane, 1989). They believe that although actors are not always altruistic and motivated by a concern for the common good, they are rational and that while their goals can clash they can also be in accordance with one another.

Neoliberals accept the principle of self-interest as the main purpose for action in international arena, but have a different view than neorealists on what those interests are. They also do not deny anarchy in the international system but argue that even in such a system, cooperation and progressive change are possible and achievable by building and spreading norms, transnational ties, international institutions and democratic ideas.

Institutional liberalism

As a response to neorealist theory, Robert O. Keohane has developed neo-liberal ideas into institutional liberalism, the approach which became the greatest challenge to the neo-realistic approach to IR theory.

Keohane began with the same assumptions used by neorealists. He does not ignore the central problems of international politics – power, the possibility of its abuse, and its distribution; and does not proceed from a pluralistic understanding of the subject of international relations. He accepts the existence of a variety of actors in world politics, but focuses on states as crucial actors (Keohane, 2005, p. 25). Unlike idealists, Keohane recognizes that states do not act and cooperate out of empathy, nor “for the sake of pursuing what they conceive as `international interests`. They seek wealth and security for their own people, and interests” (ibid, p. x). States are rational egoists and they do behave on the

principle of self-interest, which limits the degree of confidence among states, but it does “not render cooperation impossible” (ibid, p. 62). When states have common interests, cooperation emerges. Institutionalist consider that an increasing number of transnational activities generate interdependency which encourages states to develop coinciding interests and hence have more interests for cooperation (Heier, 2006, pp. 69-70). Further, according to Keohane, states’ focus is not on relative gains and potential for conflict, but on absolute gains and the prospects for cooperation.

Institutionalist also accept the realistic concept of anarchy: there is no worldwide governmental hierarchy, no authoritative allocator of resources (Keohane, 2005, p. 18). But they also consider that the international anarchy does not prevent cooperation – it simply makes it more difficult. Anarchy can be mitigated. In the era of modernization and globalization, interdependence between states increases and one state’s challenges affect other states. The issues become linked together and states develop common interests, making a good basis for cooperation.

According to Keohane, “interdependence can transmit bad influences as well as good ones” (ibid, p. 5) and “the mere existence of common interests is not enough: institutions that reduce uncertainty and limit asymmetries in information must also exist” (ibid, p. 12). States create those international institutions to deal with common problems and to “make mutually beneficial agreements that would otherwise be difficult or impossible to attain” (ibid, p. 88). Institutions can be formal international organizations (IOs) such as the UN, EU or WTO, or sets of agreements called regimes that prescribe roles, constrain activity and shape actors’ expectations. They should not be considered as an attempt to create a new international order beyond the state. According to Keohane, “they should be comprehended chiefly as arrangement motivated by self-interest” (ibid, p. 63).

How do institutions help to mitigate international anarchy? They facilitate agreements between states which make cooperation and progress more likely, in several ways. First, institutions provide states with information. They enable a flow of (relatively) symmetrical information between states, upgrade the general level of available information and therefore, reduce the uncertainty and lack of trust between states. The more one state knows what other states are doing and why, the less ‘security dilemmas’ occur between states.¹⁸

¹⁸ Security dilemma is a term that refers to a situation in international relations in which actions taken by one state aimed at heightening its security (such as increasing its military strength) renders other states more insecure and force them to respond with their own military build-up, making absolute security impossible.

Second, institutions are designed not to enforce agreements, but rather to develop working relationships, and to establish principles, rules and standards that define the range of expected behavior, which reduces uncertainty. They send a clear message to those that do not fulfill agreements: they will be caught and punished, and therefore risk future cooperation. A government's reputation becomes "an important asset in persuading others to enter into agreements with it" (ibid, p.94). "A reputation as an unreliable partner may prevent a government from being able to make beneficial agreements in the future" (ibid, p. 258). Institutions, therefore, make states more sensible to cooperate. They "create incentives for compliance to other member states' preferences" (Heier, 2006, p. 71).

Third, institutions alter the relative costs of transactions. They reduce transaction costs of legitimate bargains, by for example performing some of tasks in the name of member states, reducing the costs of negotiation, verification and monitoring of arrangements.

At the same time, institutions construct links between issues making verification and bureaucratic costs lower. Issue-linking facilitates side-payments between issues: "more potential quids are available for the quo" (Keohane, 2005, p. 91). They also raise the costs of deception and irresponsibility as the consequences of such behavior are likely to extend beyond the issue on which they are manifested (Keohane, 2005, p. 97). The individual quest for specific national preferences thereby has repercussions on other states' action on other issues. Issue linking is "one of the most conspicuous mechanisms used to explain states' compliance to each others' preferences" (Heier, 2006, p. 71).

Further, international institutions play an important role in coordinating international cooperation. They provide arenas for mutual planning and a forum for negotiation between states. Institutions facilitate informal contacts among the officials that may lead to "trans-governmental networks of acquaintance and friendship" (Keohane, 2005, p. 101).

And last but not least, Institutions provide continuity and a sense of stability. For example, most countries of Western Europe expect the European Union to last into the future. It is likely that it will be there tomorrow. Many Balkan countries agree with this and make plans to join the European Union. Such a situation affects their current behavior even before they are able to join the Union.

So international institutions encourage cooperation between states, help alleviate the lack of trust between them, and prompt them to refocus and adjust their policies and to adapt their behavior to other states' demands, preferences, initiatives and expectations. Moving beyond egoistic and myopic selfishness may "lead to a more modest interpretation of the

national interests, to more concern for the interests of other nations, to more concessions for the sake of peace” (ibid, p. 121). Such behavior and institutions may be especially important for small states like Norway.¹⁹ This is because they do not have the resources, as major powers do, to achieve their objectives; their security often rests upon international rule of law; and they often see their security situation as more threatened than great powers do. For small states, institutional solidarity and cohesiveness are vital, hence it may be less problematic for them to move beyond egoistic selfishness, to redefine myopic interests and adjust them to overall strategic and long-term interests.

Republican liberalism

Another neo-liberal approach with explanatory potential to the research question is republican liberalism. Michael Doyle’s 1983 article “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs” published in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* had a great influence on the development of this neo-liberal perspective (Doyle, 1983). The approach is built on the idea of “perpetual peace” developed in previous liberal thinking by Immanuel Kant, and gathered momentum after the end of the Cold War with the rapid spread of democracy in East and Central Europe.

The approach’s central hypothesis is: Democracies rarely, if ever, go to war against each other. This is not to claim that democracies do not have conflicts among themselves. They do, but common (democratic) norms, institutional constraints and economic interdependence prevent these conflicts from escalating into war. Concurrently, republican liberals do not claim that democracies never go to war; they have gone to war as often (some claim even more often) as non-democracies have, but they do so towards non-democracies (Doyle, 1983, p. 225). The argument is that democracies enhance peace because they do not fight each other.

Doyle illustrates democratic peace by three pillars: the first is peaceful conflict resolution between democratic states built on domestic political culture. Democratic governments are controlled by their citizens who do not support wars with other democracies. The second is common values among democratic states – a common moral foundation which leads to the Kantian “pacific union”. The final pillar is economic cooperation and interdependence between democracies (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, pp. 111-113).

¹⁹ Small states are “small” compared to former, current, and perhaps future global great powers like USA, UK, Germany, China, and India.

Republican liberalism is the neo-liberal approach with a strong normative element. Doyle is aware that we are not living in fully democratic societies. The “Zone of (liberal) peace” has not yet spread to the whole world. To make the world more stable, a twofold approach is required: first, democracies should joint together to preserve their common, democratic values and keep them safe from attack by authoritarian states (Doyle, 1983, p. 348). Second, liberal communities should be extended (Doyle, 1983, p. 344). This can be done in three ways: by inspiring – encouraging people who live in non-democratic regimes to fight for their freedom; by promotion – it is incumbent on republican liberals to promote democracy worldwide, and therefore cooperation and peace; and by intervention – which is legitimate if the majority of a population shows discontent with their government and if their basic rights are systematically violated. Thus, democratic peace is a dynamic process rather than a fixed condition. Although republican liberals recognize the fragility of democratic process, and that occasional setbacks are possible, they are generally optimistic in their belief that there will be a steadily expanding of “Zone of peace” among liberal democracies which will, ultimately, lead us to long-term world peace.

The neo-liberal explanatory framework

This section will conclude with some characteristics of neoliberalism that provide a basis for explanation of a donor-state’s engagement in defense reform:

1. States are crucial actors in world politics which do not act and cooperate out of empathy for international interests. They are self-interested and competitive, and act in order to achieve or preserve their own interests, *in the first place wealth and security for their own people*. To ensure personal wealth and security, states must also ensure their national security.
2. Increasing the number of transnational activities increases interdependence between states. *Issues become linked together*, one state’s challenges affect other states, and states develop *coinciding and even common interests*, making a good basis for cooperation.
3. International institutions are important in world politics. They encourage cooperation between states, reduce uncertainty, and permit governments to attain objectives that would otherwise be unattainable. *International institutions are especially important for small states* that do not have the same capacity as great powers to achieve their interests. Every vote in favor of the small states’ cause is important, especially when their interests conflict with the interests of great powers.

4. Liberal democracies are more peaceful and law-abiding than other political systems. They enhance peace because they rarely if ever go to war against each other, and peace fosters freedom and makes progressive change possible. To make the world more stable, the liberal community, and the “Zone of liberal peace” should be extended. It is incumbent on liberal democracies themselves to *promote democracy worldwide*, and thus to promote the cooperation and peace.

The Explanatory Model

By combining findings of donors’ activities and the areas of assistance review, processed in chapter 2, with theoretical explanations of the factors within IR which explains the motivation and behavior of the states examined in this chapter, the theoretical framework will be deduced. The combination of these two elements provides the model of donor-states’ engagement in defense reform (Figure 1). Rather than accomplishing a set of tests, this model will be used to better structure empirical interpretation in the next chapter, which will make it easier to identify the mechanism that arises, thus making the analysis more stringent.




Figure 1. Model of donor states’ engagement in defense reform

So far we have seen that in both neorealism and neoliberalism there are theoretical frameworks that allow donor-states to consider their engagement in the defense reform

process in recipient states. If the states decide to engage in this process, they will invest considerable resources through a number of activities in a wide area of effort. They will employ experts and use their time and knowledge to consult, guide, recommend and educate the personnel in recipient states in many areas of defense reform. Donors will also spend part of their own not unlimited funds, and in most cases the assistance will include donations of material resources.

In both IR perspectives we have seen that states do not act in world politics out of empathy or for the “common good”. States are rational egoists and they do behave on the principle of self-interest. Under such conditions, with the existing theoretical framework and available resources, donor-states’ decisions to engage in defense reforms will depend on donors’ anticipated gains of such action. The next chapter explains what those anticipated gains may be, through a case study of Norway’s engagement in Serbian defense reform. With that, the model of donor states’ engagement in defense reform will be completed.

Chapter 4. Empirical Analysis: Explaining Norway's Engagement in Serbia

This chapter narrows the focus to Norway as a donor state and its engagement in Serbian defense reform. The chapter seeks answers to the thesis' final sub-question: What are the interests that drive Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform processes? However, to scrutinize this thesis research question, all sub-questions need to be addressed. In this chapter, empirical data about the Norwegian view on defense reform; Norwegian foreign policy interests; and Norway's engagement in Serbia, will be examined through the explanatory model. Finally, the explanatory model is implemented to interpret empirically Norway's engagement in Serbia. On that basis, we can address the thesis' research question: *How can Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform be explained?*

The Defense Reform Engagement as a Part of Norwegian Foreign Policy

Not all states are able to benefit from globalization, and those that cannot are usually suffering under ethnic, religious and other internal conflicts which may lead to "economic, social and political instability and the collapse of states" (St.meld. nr. 15 (2008–2009), p. 26). Concurrently, as already stated, in today's globalized world geographical distance is no longer of vital importance. Events far beyond Norwegian borders may have a large impact on Norway. When this is combined with the recognition that the armed forces play an important role in a state's development and democratization, it is not surprising that Norway has in recent years put a greater emphasis on defense reform as a security and foreign policy tool.

This does not mean that the Norwegian government will engage in all crises all over the world.²⁰ There may be a number of areas and events that have no, or only limited relevance for Norway. In line with the Norwegian government's principle of "dual priorities", Norway emphasizes "the fields and geographical areas where it has clear moral responsibility, where there is great need, and where Norway's expertise is in demand" (ibid, p. 113).²¹ That is, Norway will engage its resources when and where it is important and relevant for Norwegian society, where it has a role to play and ability to make a difference.

²⁰ The term *Norwegian government* in this thesis refers to the Stoltenberg's Second (2005–2009) and Third (2009–present) Cabinet.

²¹ The Norwegian government's engagement principle of "dual priorities" has two criteria: first is "the degree of importance and relevance for Norwegian society", and second is "the extent to which Norway has the opportunity and ability to make a difference" (St.meld. nr. 15 (2008-2009), p. 96).

The objective of Norway's engagement in defense reform is the same as the two defense reform concept's objectives outlined in chapter two and built in the explanatory model. It aims at "enabling recipient countries to exercise democratic control over their military forces" (ibid, p. 111), and developing military forces that are effective and able to carry out legally-imposed duties, particularly with regard to participation in international peace operations (St.prp.nr. 48 (2007–2008), p. 36).

Support for defense reform is one of the Norwegian Armed Forces' tasks given by the Norwegian government through the Defense White Paper (ibid, p. 58). That indicates the emphasis that Norway puts on defense reform. However, engagement in defense reform also requires the employment of political and humanitarian measures, and the Norwegian Armed Forces is seen and used in close cooperation with other state political institutions (ibid, p. 10). Hence, engagement in the defense reforms can best be described as a "shared responsibility" between the Norwegian MOD and MFA.²² Although there is no official body, permanent or occasional, responsible for coordination of defense reform engagement, these two ministries work very closely together on defense reform issues, and they have a common understanding on what should be done.²³

Norway's defense reform engagement is not only a bilateral issue. Norway is also very active in a number of NATO's defense reform activities. In addition, a regional organization for military cooperation between the Nordic countries – Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support (NORDCAPS) also served as an instrument of support for defense reform (ibid, p. 30).²⁴

Norwegian foreign policy interests

Norway's defense reform engagement serves as a security and foreign policy tool. Given that "the primary objective of Norway's foreign policy is to safeguard Norwegian interests" (St.meld.nr. 15 (2008–2009), p. 93), this means that defense reform engagement is in accordance with basic characteristics of both neorealism and neoliberalism, presented in chapter two: Both theories consider states as rational and self-interested actors which act in order to achieve or preserve national interests.

²² [H. Blankenborg, now Senior Adviser, Western Balkans Section, Norwegian MFA; 2005-2010 Norwegian Ambassador in Belgrade, personal interview, Oslo, April 6, 2011]

²³ [J. Ruge; H. Blankenborg, personal interviews 2011]

²⁴ NORDCAPS member states were Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. On the basis of a new Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Nordic defense ministries on the 4 of November 2009, the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO) is established. The work conducted by NORDCAPS has been transferred to NORDEFECO and NORDCAPS was terminated.

Although states' foreign policy interests are complex and may change over time, the foundation on which Norwegian interests are based remains more or less unchanged. They are, according to the Norwegian MFA "welfare and security of Norwegian society and the political values on which it is based" (ibid, p. 8).

If we look beyond these fundamental interests, it is common to look at foreign policy from two opposing positions. On one hand considerations are linked with economic, security and business interests. On the other hand they are altruistic and value-based policies often linked with, inter alia, development, human rights, peace- and democracy-building, and the international legal order. However, the Norwegian MFA recognized that, as a result of globalization, development in a range of areas of Norwegian society depends on the development of other societies in a number of sectors, and at a number of different levels (ibid, p. 22). This makes the division on interests- and value-based foreign policy less clear, and extends foreign policy to include those areas usually regarded as altruistic.

Therefore, Norwegian foreign policy is based on the principle of "extended self-interest" (ibid, p. 10). There are many different interests that can be considered as a part of extended self-interest, and those interests are in the White Paper No.15 (2008-2009) grouped in the following areas: security, engagement, economy, energy, climate and the environment, and international order (ibid, pp. 11-12). In accordance with the view of most IR scholars that "in most cases no single theory will give clear policy options" (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007, p. 223), Norwegian extended self-interest includes both characteristics of neorealism (security, economy) and neoliberalism (international order). This means that the theoretical explanations developed in chapter three may be applied to the case of Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform.

All these areas are undoubtedly very important for the creation of Norwegian foreign policy, but not all of them are equally applicable to the explanation of Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform. For example, interests related to sea areas and fisheries; oil and gas extraction; or climate and the environment, are very important factors for Norwegian policy, especially in the High North, but they hardly contribute to answering this thesis' research question. However, some Norwegian interests are very interesting for this analysis and they will be analyzed in the following sections.

Norway's Engagement in Serbia

On October 5, 2000, the Republic of Serbia, after almost five decades of socialism and a decade under the authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milosevic, finally got its first

democratically elected government. After democratic changes, reform of the defense sector emerged as a top priority for the new Serbian administration. The Serbian Armed Forces was burdened by heritage of the events in the former Yugoslavia and its own territory, and had a surplus of personnel and weaponry. It was still in the “Cold War mode” and not ready to meet modern challenges and threats. Norway was among the first to recognize that the young Serbian democracy did not have sufficient ability to conduct reforms, and that external actors should have a significant role in Serbian defense reform.

There have been many close contacts between Norway and Yugoslavia, and later Serbia, through the many Yugoslav prisoners of war in Norway during World War II, but also during the 1980s and 1990s through Norwegian assistance to the democratic opposition against the Milosevic regime (Meld. St. 17 (2010–2011), p. 10). Those historical ties provided Norway an entry point into the Serbian government and to the Serbian MOD. They served as a starting point on which the close relations that Norway and Serbia have today, are built on.²⁵

In addition to historical ties, and in accordance with the basic characteristics of both neorealism and neoliberalism, the Norwegian MFA recognized that there are increasing ties between Norway and Western Balkans countries, through increased tourism, labor migration and economic cooperation, and that *development in the Western Balkans region has importance for Norwegian security and economy* (ibid, p. 55). The Norwegian government wanted to “normalize relations between our [Norway and Western Balkans] countries, with emphasis on partnership and equality [author’s translation]” (ibid) and recognized defense reform as area in which Norway can make a difference. Engagement in this area is “the most successful Norwegian contribution areas in the region [author’s translation]” (UD & FD, 2010, p. 1).

However, regardless of how successful this engagement is or how much the Norwegian government wanted to help, Norway had limited resources and had to prioritize its efforts, geographically and functionally (Meld. St. 17 (2010–2011), p. 51). Taking four criteria for prioritizing the Norwegian government recognized Serbia as a “main priority for Norwegian defense reform support in the region [author’s translation]” (UD & FD, 2010, p. 4), founded on two main reasons.²⁶ First, Serbia is “a key country for stability in the region

²⁵ [J. Ruge, Senior Adviser, Department of Security Policy, Norwegian MOD, personal interview, Oslo, February 23, 2011]

²⁶ The four criteria for Norway’s assistance prioritizing are: (i) countries’ progress towards EU integration and access to EU funds; (ii) countries’ political stability; (iii) countries’ potential role for regional stability; and (iv) Norway’s ability to make a difference (Meld. St. 17 (2010–2011), p. 51).

[author's translation]" (ibid; Meld. St. 17 (2010–2011), p. 52). A Serbia that emphasizes EU integration and wants to maintain and further develop democratic institutions, can act as a stabilizing factor in the region (Meld. St. 17 (2010–2011), p. 10). Secondly, Norway's assistance has been portrayed positively in Serbia. Norway's general policy towards Serbia and its defense reform efforts had a high level of public approval in Serbia (Watkins, 2010, p. 26). The positive reputation, the trust that Norway enjoyed in Serbia and the good political relations, offered good prospects that Norway could make a difference (UD & FD, 2010, p.4).

In accordance with prioritizing, since 2000 Serbia has been the biggest recipient of Norwegian assistance, and Norway has been engaged in Serbian defense reform through various MOD and MFA activities. To achieve cooperation between these two ministries, a formalized division of labor has been established. Measures that can be recorded as Official Development Aid (ODA) are covered by the MFA's aid budget, while the MOD finances measures that fall outside assistance criteria (UD & FD, 2010, p. 1).²⁷

Norway's engagement in Serbia was organized along three tracks, in line with our model on page 41. The engagement has been gathered around the following areas, conceptually clarified in chapter two: (i) strengthening democratic governance and civilian control of the armed forces; (ii) strengthening the capability and professionalism of the armed forces and; (iii) integration of defense reform and other development activities.

i) Strengthening democratic governance and civilian control of the armed forces. Activities in this area were funded by the Norwegian MFA. Since 2006, Norway's most prominent activity in this area has been the funding of the Center for Civilian-Military Relations (CCMR) in Belgrade.²⁸ The CCMR is a Serbian think-tank dedicated to strengthening civilian oversight over the entire security sector in Serbia. It conducts research on SSR issues and advocates for public oversight over the security sector, and thus "provides one of the few examples of civil society engagement and constructive contribution to SSR" (NORAD, 2010a, p.61). Norway is financing CCMR's running costs and has also funded a number of individual research projects (ibid, p. 90). Norway's engagement in this area contributed to

²⁷ According to OECD/DAC regulation "assistance that contributes to the strengthening of the military or fighting capacity of the armed forces is excluded" (OECD DAC, 2007). For more information about Official Development Aid visit the OECD web page at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf>

²⁸ Centre for Civil-Military Relations changed its name on June 1, 2010 to Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, but is still usually referred to as "CCMR", and that acronym is in use in this thesis for the sake of convenience.

the necessary dialogue on Serbian defense reform towards modern and democratic armed forces (ibid, p. 92).

ii) Strengthening the capability and professionalism of the defense sector. In compliance with the model on page 41, this is another area of donors' engagement in which Norway was very active. This area falls outside the ODA criteria and much of Norway's assistance went directly through the Norwegian MOD and its' budget. Reform of the Serbian Armed Forces has been a key concern for the Norwegian government (NORAD, 2010b, p.96). The main recipient of Norway's assistance in this area has been the Serbian Armed Forces, but helping the non-kinetic side of the defense sector has also been a substantial part of the Norwegian MOD's cooperation with Serbia.²⁹

Norway's assistance in strengthening the capability and professionalism of the Serbian defense sector since 2006 has been characterized by realization of a number of activities and projects. The main fields of cooperation have been:³⁰

- *Strategic Defense Review.* Norway supported the Serbian MOD in the finalization of the first Strategic Defense Review in line with Serbia's aim of Partnership for Peace (PfP) membership and NATO interoperability. Norway participated with expert advisors in five NATO Defense Reform Working Group Tables: Force Structure, Cost Analysis, Personnel, Education and Public Relations.
- *Military-medical cooperation* included, inter alia, experts meetings, exchange and education of personnel, donation of a light field hospital and a training kit. Cooperation in this field was crowned with co-deployment of the first Serbian military contingent abroad, in an international operation under UN mandate. This was in 2009, in the UN peacekeeping operation in Chad (MINURCAT).
- *Military Education Reform.* Assistance in this field included, inter alia, lectures by prominent Norwegian experts for the Military Academy, the modernization of the Military Academy library, Advanced Distance Learning (ADL) project, and exchange of cadets.³¹

²⁹ [J. Ruge, personal interview, February 23, 2011]

³⁰ Based on Programs for bilateral military cooperation between the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Serbia for the years 2006-2010.

³¹ The lecturers were, inter alia, Mr. Kai Aage Eide, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to Afghanistan and Head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), 2008-2010; and General Sverre Diesen, Chief of Defense of Norway, 2005-2009.

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- *Development of a Defense Research Sector* in Serbia, through support of Serbian Strategic Research Institute's (SRI) capacity building; digitalization of military archives; and a number of seminars and education of SRI personnel in Norway.
 - *International operations*. Assistance in this field included for example organization and realization of Peace Support Operation Courses both in Norway and Serbia and financial support for the Program for English Language Training (PELT) in Serbia.

In addition to these, mostly bilateral engagements, in 2006 Norway played a significant role in Serbia's accession to PfP. Moreover, it was the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Belgrade that initiated the formation of the Serbia – NATO Defense Reform Group (DRG).³² The DRG is a vehicle for defense reform cooperation between Serbia and NATO, established to provide advice and assistance to the Serbian authorities on defense reform issues (NATO, 2009).

Norway's assistance in this area included all the donors' activities presented in our model on page 41. It consisted of donations (mainly in medical and IT equipment) but also in providing technical and policy advice and recommendations, education of Serbian personnel and facilitating entry into new international military arenas (NORAD, 2010b, p.96).

iii) Integration of defense reform and other development activities is the assistance area funded mainly by the MFA aid budget. Norway's assistance in downsizing the Serbian Armed Forces is a very good example of successful defense reform activity that was directly beneficial for both the armed forces and society overall. This assistance has been twofold.

First, Norway assisted in the realization of a "Programme for Resettlement in Serbian Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces" (PRISMA). This program was developed by the Serbian MOD as part of the social programs for military personnel that have been discharged during defense reform. The aim of the program is to provide systematic and organized support in career change for professional members of the MOD and the Serbian Armed Forces. Due to this program 4136 people have found a new job (Republic of Serbia Ministry of Defence, 2010a).

Second, Norway set up and provided 30% of the financing for the NATO Trust Fund earmarked for redundant military personnel made via the PRISMA project. This fund is

³² The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Belgrade was Point of Contact (POC) between Serbia and NATO 2003-2006.

intended for vocational training, job placement and start-up capital for discharged military personnel (NORAD, 2010b, p.88). The fund is supposed to improve NATO's image in Serbia (ibid, p. 60) and to help build a bridge between Serbian and Western militaries (ibid, p. 65). Moreover, this project provided assistance for the Serbian MOD to build its capacity to conduct similar downsizing activities in the future (ibid, p. 97). The project has received praise as a good mechanism to complement other efforts in this field, and mechanisms developed in cooperation between Norway and the Serbian MOD attracted the interest of countries like Japan and Ukraine (ibid).

In sum, Norway in the period 2006 – 2010 was engaged in all the donor's engagement areas in the explanatory model. It has employed its experts' time and knowledge to consult, guide, recommend and educate Serbian personnel in many defense reform segments. Norway has used its limited resources and, according to the Serbian MOD internal documentation, donated approximately 3.450.000,00 € for Serbian defense reform.

Explaining Norway's Engagement

We have seen that development in Serbia may have an impact on Norway's consideration regarding its interests. We have also seen that the primary objective of Norway's foreign policy, to safeguard Norwegian interests, is in accordance with both neorealism and neoliberalism. But how does development in Serbia affect Norway? What has Norway expected to gain from its engagement in Serbian defense reform? How can these expectations be interpreted in the light of neorealism and neoliberalism to explain Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform?

For Amadeo Watkins there is no doubt that the depth and the type of all donors' engagement in Serbia are dependent on donors' foreign policy objectives (Watkins, 2010, p. 26). Norway is not an exception. Although the main rationale behind Norway's engagement in the beginning was altruistic, globalization has provided a new rationale. Engagement helps Norway to achieve goals that are in Norway's interest (St.meld. nr. 15 (2008–2009), p. 95). It has "increasing relevance for Norwegian interests and developments in Norwegian society in terms of realpolitik" (ibid, p. 112).

Neorealist explanation

The results of the theoretical analysis conducted in chapter three showed us that, although it is a theory with emphasis on international anarchy and the principle of self-help, neorealism can provide us with plausible theoretical explanations of donors' engagement in defense reform. These explanations are embedded in the explanatory model on page 41 as the

following three characteristics of neorealism: (i) State survival and citizens' security; (ii) Use of economic means for military ends and vice versa; and (iii) Influence over other states' security policy. Can these three theoretical explanations help us to explain Norway's engagement in Serbia?

Norway's security and survival. At the very basis of the neo-realistic explanation of states' external relations and activities is the state's security. In accordance with this perspective, the Norwegian government has also recognized security as a part of Norwegian extended self-interest (ibid, p. 11). Norwegian security policy is based on values and interests, not only on a short-term military threat (FD, 2007, p. 10). There are several fundamental Norwegian security interests recognized by the Norwegian MFA, but the first one is national security – protection of Norway's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political freedom of action (St.meld. nr. 15 (2008–2009), p. 98). This is in line with the traditional sense of neorealism with an emphasis on state survival, and consequently it may be expected that Norway's external activities should be directed to ensure its security.

But, according to neorealism, states safeguard their security and survival by maximizing their own power and by influencing how other states use their resources. And there is no empirical evidence that Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform is contributing in any way to maximize Norwegian (military) power, or that Norway wanted to influence Serbia on how to use its resources. Moreover, Norway and Serbia are geographically distant countries and potential conflicts on Serbian territory cannot directly spill over to Norway. Hence, in this aspect, Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform cannot be explained in the traditional sense of neorealism, as this *engagement does not contribute directly to Norway's security*.

However, Norway alone is not able to develop a military defense which can meet the full range of challenges (St.prp.nr. 48 (2007–2008), p. 18). Norway has to attach great importance to NATO which is “a cornerstone of Norwegian security policy” (St.meld. nr. 15 (2008–2009), p. 98). Therefore, activities that strengthen NATO also strengthen Norwegian security, indirectly. NATO's PfP program is such an activity. By changing the dynamics of the relationship between NATO and its partners, and enabling partner countries to contribute to NATO operations, this program is beneficial for both partner countries and NATO (Medcalf, 2005, p. 156). That is why Norway's defense reform activities should help to develop a stronger NATO by preparing countries for membership and/or strengthening countries' partnership with the Alliance (UD & FD, 2010, p. 2).

Serbia is not a member of any military alliance, and NATO membership is not on its political agenda. On December 2007, under *Resolution on the Protection of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia* (so-called “Kosovo-Resolution”), the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia declared “the neutral status of the Republic of Serbia towards effective military alliances until a referendum is called” (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, 2007). Thus, Serbia is militarily neutral, not by its Constitution but by a parliamentary decision and, at least theoretically, this decision on neutrality can be altered, if interests change. In the meantime, Serbia continues to develop its cooperation with NATO, although a full membership is not a political goal.

During this research, all the interviewees emphasized that Norway is fully accepting of Serbia’s decision on neutrality, and that Norway does not have an ambition to lead Serbia into NATO membership. Norway’s ambition is Serbia as an active PfP partner, and that explains why Norway was extremely active in pushing for Serbia’s PfP membership.³³ Between 2003 and 2006, the Norwegian Royal Embassy in Belgrade was a contact embassy for NATO in Serbia, and contributed substantially to further contacts and cooperation between NATO and Serbia. Moreover, as the contact embassy is mainly a kind of diplomatic mailbox between NATO and Serbia, Norway added several bilateral elements in this embassy function.³⁴ Norway tried to be more proactive than a contact embassy normally is, and “has been at the forefront of the successful efforts to ensure Serbia’s PfP membership” (Støre, 2007). Norway was very influential in convincing key countries within the NATO about the positive effects of inviting Serbia to join the PfP.³⁵ From the Norwegian point of view, inviting Serbia to join the PfP had positive effects both for Serbia, Norway and NATO.³⁶

Thereafter, Norway continued to play an important role to facilitate Serbia’s further approach to NATO (Meld. St. 17 (2010–2011), p. 52) in ways depending on Serbia’s own priorities (ibid, p. 7). Norway is committed to Serbia’s full engagement as a PfP member, and wants Serbia to be as well prepared as possible for further cooperation with Euro-Atlantic structures.³⁷

³³ [H. Blankenborg, personal interview, April 6, 2011]

³⁴ (ibid)

³⁵ [N. R. Kamsvåg, Ambassador, Royal Norwegian Embassy Belgrade, personal interview, Belgrade, April 18, 2011]

³⁶ (ibid)

³⁷ [J. Ruge, personal interview, February 23, 2011]

In other words, Norway is committed to help further Serbia's cooperation and full partnership with NATO. In doing so, Norway is contributing to strengthening the Alliance, a cornerstone of its security, and therefore *Norway is indirectly strengthening its own security*, which is in line with the neorealist explanation.

In addition, this commitment increases Norway's visibility in the international political arena. It gives Norway greater influence in NATO, and enables Norway to gain access to important international actors that it would otherwise find difficult to engage with (St.meld. nr. 15 (2008–2009), p. 95). Hence, Norway is *strengthening its position in the international system* which is, according to the neorealism, one of states' goals in international relations.

Use of economic means for achievement of military and/or political ends and vice versa. The second neorealist's explanation embedded in the explanatory model is that states may use economic means to achieve military goals, and that they may also use military and political means for the sake of economic interests. In the 1970s, when Waltz wrote his book *Theory of International Politics* that established neorealism as a theory of international relations, the use of military means meant primarily use of hard military power. In today's, globalized world, armed forces may be used in many ways, inter alia, to promote economic interests.

In the post Cold War years, states became increasingly interdependent through economic globalization processes. As a result, the Norwegian economy became increasingly dependent on extensive trade with the rest of the world (St.meld. nr. 15 (2008–2009), p. 124). Norwegian companies, as Telenor and Statoil, expanded their business outside Norway's borders, acting as global actors. Hence, "Norwegian companies have become increasingly important for Norwegian foreign and development policy" (ibid, p. 87). That is why the promotion of economic interests has always been one of the main purposes of Norwegian foreign policy (ibid, p. 11), but also one of the fundamental security interests (ibid, p. 98).

Nevertheless, former Norwegian Ambassador to Belgrade, Mr. Haakon Blankenborg, now senior adviser at the Norwegian MOD, claims that Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform, as well as all other Norwegian government engagement in Serbia, has nothing to do with Norwegian businesses entering the Serbian market (interview April 6, 2011). The Norwegian government looked favorably upon and tried to encourage trade between Norway and Serbia, but "without any kind of political interests" (ibid). And in the research no other empirical data, that would indicate the opposite, was found. It can be

asserted that Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform cannot be explained by a traditional sense of neorealism, *as this engagement does not contribute directly to the promotion of Norwegian economic interests.*

However, the Western Balkans and Serbia could be an interesting market for trade and investment (Meld. St. 17 (2010-2011), p. 44). Some Norwegian companies have recently made significant investments in Serbia, headed by Telenor, which is the largest single foreign investor in Serbia. That is why "it may be natural that the Norwegian authorities consider appropriate measures to assist Norwegian companies with international growth ambitions [author's translation]" (ibid). Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform is contributing to greater stability in Serbia and further integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. With that, although it may not be intentional, Norway is *contributing to a safer business environment in Serbia that may pave the road for increased Norwegian business investment.*

Furthermore, at a time when the Norwegian Armed Forces has limited resources, "the cooperation and contributions provided under the framework of defense reform are a supplement to the force contributions that Norway makes in various operations abroad [author's translation]" (Prop. 1S (2010–2011), p. 50). Norway has been an active contributor to the international peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. More than 18.000 Norwegian soldiers have participated in these operations, at a cost of almost 11 billion NOK (Meld. St. 17 (2010–2011), p. 8). The Norwegian government considers the defense reform engagement as a *very cost efficient contribution to international stability* as "it does not demand that much resources, both personnel and financial resources, as compared to sending troops abroad, which is extremely costly".³⁸ Today there are only a few Norwegian staff officers left in operations in the Balkans, but Norway is very active in defense reform in the region.

In addition, Norway's defense reform engagement "should also develop [recipient states'] national capacities that can be used in international peace operations [author's translation]" (ibid, p. 32). The cooperation between Norway and Serbia in the UN peacekeeping operation in Chad (MINURCAT) supports this statement. Mr. Blankenborg pointed out during his interview that this co-deployment was "not one-way traffic coming from Norway to Serbia"; it was mutually beneficial for Norway and Serbia. Prior to the deployment of the first Serbian contingent to Chad, the Serbian Defense Minister, Mr.

³⁸ [J. Ruge, personal interview, February 23, 2011]

Dragan Šutanovac, pointed out that Serbia views participation in international peacekeeping operations as an opportunity to regain respect and trust in the Serbian Armed Forces, and to present and promote Serbia as a country that is contributing to global peace (Republic of Serbia Ministry of Defence, 2009). Serbia had a high quality and large capacity in the military-medical field, while Norway needed high quality capacity added to its deployment.³⁹ As senior adviser at the Norwegian MOD, Mr. Joachim Ruge stressed, the military-medical cooperation that Norway has developed with Serbia was of enormous help for Norway: “without Serbia we [Norway] would not have been able to deploy to Chad”.⁴⁰ Therefore, the defense reform engagement *enables burden-sharing in international peacekeeping operations* through closer defense cooperation.

As there is no empirical evidence that supports the third neorealist’s theoretical explanation from the explanatory model and which indicates that Norway wanted to use its military assistance to achieve influence over Serbian security policy, we can conclude that Norway’s engagement in Serbian defense reform does not contribute directly to either Norway’s security or to the promotion of Norwegian economic interests.

However, through Serbia’s increased cooperation and partnership, NATO is becoming stronger and that is indirectly strengthening Norway’s security. Meanwhile, engagement in Serbian defense reform increases Norway’s visibility and so Norway attains a stronger position in the international system.

Moreover, through contribution to greater stability in Serbia and further integration of Serbia into Euro-Atlantic structures, Norway contributes to a safer business environment in Serbia which may enable Norwegian companies to expand their businesses and enter into a new market. In addition, engagement in defense reforms is a cost effective supplement to force contributions and enables burden-sharing in international peacekeeping operations.

It can be argued that the Norwegian authorities did not take all these aspects into consideration when the decision on Norway’s engagement in Serbian defense reform was made. It can also be argued that these are effects of Norway’s engagement, rather than gains that Norway expected to get from its engagement. Therefore, perhaps it would be most correct to conclude that *from the neo-realistic standpoint, Norway’s engagement in Serbian defense reform can be justified, rather than indubitably explained*. If the Norwegian government takes

³⁹ [H. Blankenborg, personal interview, April 6, 2011]

⁴⁰ [J. Ruge, personal interview, February 23, 2011]

these aspects into consideration prior to decisions about further defense reform engagement in Serbia, we will have a neo-realistic explanation.

Neoliberal explanation

Unlike neorealism, neoliberalism is not preoccupied with hard power and economy. It has a mainly optimistic view on prospects for progress. As such, neoliberalism provided us with four theoretical explanations of donors' engagement in defense reform, embedded in the explanatory model on page 41: (i) Wealth and security for the people; (ii) Interdependence, issue linking and common interests; (iii) Importance of international organizations; and (iv) Zone of liberal peace.

Extension of Zone of liberal peace. As presented in chapter two, neoliberals believe that, in order to protect personal freedom, states must ensure national freedom. However, neoliberals do not believe that "hard power" is the right way to ensure national interests. According to republican liberalism, the key for lasting peace is in the extension of a "Zone of liberal peace", achieved by promoting democracy worldwide.

Norwegian society is built on democratic values. It has been stressed in this thesis (page 45) that democracy-building is a part of Norway's broader interests. It is a "clear Norwegian self-interest [author's translation]" to develop democracy and political stability throughout Europe, including recently troubled southeast part of the continent (Meld. St. 17 (2010–2011), p. 6). Democracy as such, is a fundamental prerequisite for peaceful and stable development in the region (ibid, p. 7). According to the Norwegian government, a driving force, and hence a guarantor of democratic reform, is EU expansion, and is therefore supported by Norway (ibid, p. 20). Indeed, Norway's assistance increasingly focuses on democracy-building measures, and Euro-Atlantic integration is central to Norway's efforts in the Western Balkans (St.meld. nr. 15 (2008–2009)). Consistent with this standpoint, the purpose of Norway's engagement in Serbia can be viewed in the context of broader efforts to energize a democratic and stable Serbian society and hence to strengthen international order. Facilitating Serbian Euro-Atlantic integration is one of the key Norwegian objectives.⁴¹ The Norwegian government had no doubt that "defense reform measures will help to promote sustainable peace, stability and democratic development in the region" (UD & FD, 2010,p.2).

⁴¹ [S. Jensen, now Assistant Defense Advisor, Permanent Norwegian Delegation to NATO. 2006-2010 Desk Officer responsible for MOD's Defense Reform activities, Department of Security Policy, Norwegian Ministry of Defense. On-line Interview, April 19, 2011]

As a senior adviser, Mr. Joachim Ruge from the Norwegian MOD pointed out, Norway did not intend to directly change Serbian institutions, but to look with a longer perspective, to change the way of thinking, make democracy sustainable, and encourage a mentality for long-term stability in the region.

Norway recognizes that today's threats and problems are rarely only of a local or regional significance. They can arise suddenly and have consequences far beyond the origin of the conflict. The Balkans in the early 1990s and the Afghan-theater are but two examples. In other words, Norwegian security today depends increasingly on international security (St.meld. nr. 15 (2008–2009), pp. 99-100).

Serbia and other West-Balkan countries are still important for European security. Even though significant progress has been made, there are still major challenges remaining after the conflicts in the 1990s. Nationalism and suspicion still affects relations and cooperation in the region (UD & FD, 2010, p. 2). The Norwegian authorities believe that a new conflict in the Balkans is something that has to be avoided at all cost, because it would be very harmful for European stability. For Norway, *engagement in Serbia is an investment in European security*, which is the core security issue for NATO and Norway.⁴² Defense reform engagement is a part of the Government's active European policy (Meld. St. 17 (2010–2011), p. 7).

Hence, from a republican liberalism standpoint, the rationale behind Norway's engagement in Serbia is indisputable, as through its contribution to development of democracy and peace in Europe it extends the "Zone of liberal peace". This explanation can be found in every official document concerning Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform, and has been pointed out in every interview made during this research.

Issue linking and common interests. The second neoliberal explanation from the model on page 41 suggests that increasing the number of transnational activities increases interdependence between states. Issues become linked together, and states develop coinciding and even common interests, forging a good basis for cooperation.

Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform is increasing the number of both official and unofficial contacts between the two states. Not just contacts between the armed forces and defense ministries, but also between various government departments and non-

⁴² [J. Ruge, personal interview, February 23, 2011]

governmental organizations. In just the last year there have been four “high level” visits between Norwegian and Serbian officials.⁴³ Norway is “also trying to build lasting bilateral bonds which may lead to other types of cooperation in the future”.⁴⁴ Hence, in accordance with the neoliberal standpoint presented in the explanatory model, Norway’s engagement in Serbian defense reform *makes cooperation between Norway and Serbia more possible and desirable*.

Strengthening personal freedom and security. Although neoliberals accept that states are self-interested actors in world politics acting in order to ensure national freedom, for them freedom for individuals is still a priority. States are entities that should establish and impose the rule of law and protect individual rights.

In line with this basic liberal idea and with the trend of broadening the security agenda in recent years, protection of individuals with a focus on human rights, the right to life and personal security, or human security, is high on Norway’s security agenda (St.meld. nr. 15 (2008–2009), p. 98). Defense reform engagement contributes to the protection of personal freedom in several ways.

First, the co-deployment in the peacekeeping operation MINURCAT in Chad enabled Norwegian participation in Chad supported by Serbian medical personnel. As Serbian military-medical capacities have been evaluated as highly-competent, Norwegian soldiers that have been part of the contingent in Chad have received high-quality medical care. In addition Norwegian medical personnel had not to be deployed to potentially dangerous environment.

Second, with the development of mass communication, pictures of humanitarian crises and suffering are brought into citizens’ living rooms daily. During the conflicts of the 1990s, a large number of refugees came from the Western Balkans region to Norway.⁴⁵ The large diaspora means that a large number of Norwegian citizens (with immigrant backgrounds) are directly affected by events in Serbia and other countries in the region (Meld. St. 17 (2010–2011), p. 6). This trend moves human rights “closer to the core of

⁴³ President of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Boris Tadić visited Norway in May 2010; Serbian Minister of Defense, Mr. Dragan Šutanovac visited Norway in October 2010; Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jonas Gahr Støre visited Serbia in April 2011; and Norwegian State Secretary in MOD, Mr. Roger Ingebrigstson visited Serbia in November 2010.

⁴⁴ [S. Jensen, on-line interview, April 19, 2011]

⁴⁵ There are 2.748 immigrants from Serbia, 3.117 from Macedonia, 3.244 from Croatia, 12.719 from Kosovo and 15.918 from Bosnia in Norway today. In total there is 37.746 immigrants from ex Yugoslavia or 14,7% of immigrants from Europe in Norway (data from Statistics Norway web page <http://www.ssb.no/innvbef/tab-2010-04-29-04.html>)

Norwegian interests, understood as the political values that make Norway a civilized society” (St.meld. nr. 15 (2008–2009), p. 95).

Finally, as weak states cannot control their borders and allow organized crime to reach far beyond the region, a negative development in the region or in a single country affects also Norwegian interests (Meld. St. 17 (2010-2011), p. 6). State collapse and international boycott created good conditions for organized crime to develop in the Balkans during the 1990s. As democracy is still fragile in Serbia and in other countries in the region, the problem remains. For example, the most common route for heroin smuggling from Afghanistan to Western Europe goes through the region. Although police reform is a more appropriate tool to *address organized crime* (Norway is also a very active partner in the Serbian police reform), defense reform contributes indirectly, as it helps the development of democratic institutions.

International institutions. It is already discussed in chapter three that for neoliberals, and especially for institutional liberals, international institutions are very important for small states. Institutions encourage cooperation between states, reduce uncertainty and enable governments to attain objectives that would otherwise be unattainable. They are particularly important when the interests of small countries do not coincide with the interests of great powers.

Norway has recognized that, as a small country with limited means of enforcing its authority, with an open, trade-based economy, its rich energy resources and border with Russia, is “completely dependent on ... a well-functioning, well-regulated international community” (St.meld. nr. 15 (2008–2009), p. 48). Because “a great deal of Norway’s wealth is a direct result of the existence of an international legal order and international norms” (ibid, p. 47), promoting a stronger legal order which regulates relations between states with binding norms and conventions is in Norway’s interest. And that legal order is dependent on international organizations that are able to deal with challenges in a rapidly changing world (ibid, p. 160). For Norway “there is no alternative to the UN” (ibid, p. 162) with its universal role and its global mandate. That is why the Defense White Paper No. 48 (2007–2008) to Parliament recognizes promoting further development of the UN-led international legal order as one of Norway’s security policy aims (St.prp.nr.48 (2007–2008), p.17). As Norway’s engagement in Serbian defense reform contributes to a political stabilization, it also contributes to *enhancing international organizations*, primarily the UN.

Norway is among the UN's stronger supporters and it is the "seventh largest contributor to the UN and the fifth largest to the UN's operational activities" (St.meld. nr. 15 (2008–2009), p. 163). Concurrently, the Norwegian government calls reforms of UN, emphasizing cooperation between "as many countries as possible on a common policy towards the organization in question" (ibid, p. 162).

Empirical data does not provide us with evidence that Norway has tried to directly impose its views, or to influence Serbian policy towards international organizations. However, defense reform engagement is increasing interdependence between Norway and Serbia, developing coinciding interests, and in a longer perspective affecting the way of thinking in Serbia. Therefore, it can be expected that *Serbia will support Norway in international organizations*, especially if the subject has no direct effect on Serbia, and every vote in favor of a small state's cause is important.

Summarizing the explanatory model

In this chapter we have seen that the objective of Norway's engagement in defense reform is in accordance with objectives outlined in chapter two, and then presented in the explanatory model on page 41. This engagement aims to enable democratic control over military forces and to assist in the development of effective armed forces, particularly with regard to participation in international peace operations.

Defense reform engagement is a tool of Norwegian foreign policy which is based on the principle of extended self-interests. These extended self-interests include both characteristics of neorealism (security, economy) and neoliberalism (international order). This means that the theoretical explanation developed in chapter three may be applied to the case of Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform.

Further, Norway has been engaged in all three areas of donors' engagement, presented in chapter two and applied in the explanatory model. It has employed its experts' time and knowledge to consult, guide, recommend and educate personnel in Serbia, and has used its resources for defense reform in Serbia. In sum, Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform is in accordance with the previously developed conceptual and theoretical aspects of the explanatory model.

Finally, the last section in this chapter provided us with explanations for the rationale behind that engagement, in light of IR theories.

On one hand, there is no empirical evidence which indicates that the Norwegian government took neorealist aspects into consideration when the decision on engagement in Serbian defense reform was made. The Norwegian government did not expect gains

predicted by the neo-realistic theoretical explanation. Therefore, the conclusion has to be that Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform cannot be explained by neorealism. Nevertheless, there are some effects that can justify that engagement.

On the other hand, from the standpoint of neoliberalism, the rationale behind Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform is indisputable, and is best explained by republican liberalism's argument "expansion of Zone of liberal peace".

Chapter 5. Conclusion

Through the case of Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform, this thesis examined the rationale behind donor states' decisions to engage in defense reform processes. With a donor-state focus, the research aimed to find plausible explanations for Norway's engagement in Serbia within the IR theories of neorealism and neoliberalism.

To reach that aim, this thesis combined data-based analysis with theory-based reasoning. Three analyses are accomplished: the first, conducted in chapter two, had a focus on the defense reform concept. In chapter three, theoretical analysis was accomplished with the aim to explain nation-states' external activities in the light of IR theories. Finally, empirical analysis presented in chapter four, examined with one case study the rationale for Norway's engagement in defense reform, and in particular the rationale behind Norway's engagement in Serbia between 2006 and 2010.

Primary data sources for this research were institutional documents from relevant political and military bodies, documentation about defense reform cooperation between Norway and Serbia, statements from public documents, and interviews with officials that have been involved in defense reform activities.

Completing the Model

This thesis started with a question that a Norwegian fisherman from the High North could have asked the Government: What is in Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform for him? What is in it for Norway? At the end, thesis should answer on that question.

To answer the research question four sub-questions had to be addressed.

Chapter two answered the first sub-question: "What is defense reform; which activities do donors usually undertake during defense reform engagement; and in which areas is their assistance possible, needed, and expected for successful defense reform"? Through an analysis of defense reform papers and texts, we came to the conclusion that defense reform is a "coordinated series of actions designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of a state's armed forces". Defense reform is a process in which donor-states' engagement is of great significance. The donor's engagement may include a range of activities in a number of areas. However, the main areas of donors' engagement in recipient states are assistance in: (i) strengthening democratic governance and civilian control over the armed forces; (ii) strengthening the capability and professionalism of the armed forces and; (iii) integration of defense reform and other development activities. To achieve the objectives of their engagement, donors have to employ their experts and apply their time and knowledge

in activities, for example to consult, guide, recommend and educate personnel in the recipient states. Donors will also spend part of their own budgets, and in most cases the assistance will include donations of material resources.

The theoretical analysis conducted in chapter three answered the question: “How can neorealism and neoliberalism explain the external relations and activities of nation-states”? We have seen that, although it emphasizes emphasis international anarchy and the principle of self-help, the theory of neorealism can help us to theoretically comprehend donor-states’ engagement in the defense reform concept. An explanation that would be accepted from neorealist perspective must be consistent with following characteristics:

1. States are autonomous political units, rational and self-interested actors.
2. States act in order to achieve or preserve their own interests, in the first instance state survival; by maximizing their own power and influencing how other states use their resources.
3. States may use economic means to achieve military and/or political ends, and vice versa.
4. Military assistance is one way to achieve influence over other states’ security policy.

Chapter three also provided an alternative theoretical explanatory basis from the contrasting, mainly optimistic perspective of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is not a coherent view on international relations and includes four approaches: sociological-, interdependence-institutional- and republican liberalism. As states in this thesis are considered as unitary actors, sociological- and interdependence liberalisms, when viewed separately, could not provide us with a satisfactory explanation. Therefore, focus fell on institutional and republican liberalism with the following characteristics:

1. States are crucial actors in world politics. They are self-interested and competitive, and act in order to achieve or preserve their own interests, in the first place wealth and security for their own people. To ensure personal wealth and security, states must ensure national security also.
2. Increasing the number of transnational activities increases interdependence between states. Issues became linked together and states develop coinciding and even common interests, making a good basis for cooperation.
3. International institutions are important in world politics, especially for small states that do not have the same capacity as great powers to achieve their interests.

Every vote in favor of a small states' cause is important, especially when their interests conflict with the interests of great powers.

4. To make the world more stable, the liberal community, including the "Zone of liberal peace" should be extended. It is on liberal democracies themselves to promote democracy worldwide, including promotion of cooperation and peace.

Finally, empirical analysis presented in chapter four, answered the third and final sub-question: "What are the interests that drive Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform processes"? In this chapter we have seen that Norwegian foreign policy, based on the principle of extended self-interest includes characteristics of both neorealism and neoliberalism. This allows that the theoretical explanation developed in chapter three may be applied to the model of Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform. Further, Norway has been engaged in all three areas of donor's engagement presented in chapter two, and has employed its experts' time and knowledge to consult, guide, recommend and educate personnel in Serbia. It has used its resources and its funds to assist defense reform in Serbia. Hence, Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform is in accordance with previously developed conceptual and theoretical aspects of the explanatory model.

The thesis has now reached the point where the theoretical and empirical parts can be tied together to answer the research question: *How can Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform be explained?*

This thesis is an *intentional* explanation, and as such it seeks to explain engagement in Serbian defense reform by referring to Norway's intended effects and expected gains. As Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform does not contribute directly to either Norway's security or to the promotion of Norwegian economic interests and there is no empirical evidence which indicates that the Norwegian government expected any gain that is in line with the neo-realistic theoretical explanation, the conclusion has to be that Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform *cannot be explained by neorealism*. Nevertheless, there are some effects that can *justify* that engagement:

- i) Through Serbia's active membership in PfP and increased cooperation with NATO, the Alliance is stronger which indirectly strengthen Norway's security;
- ii) Norway's visibility and access to important international actors increases;
- iii) Due to an improved environment in Serbia, Norwegian businesses may expand their business and enter into new markets; and

- iv) Defense reform engagement is a cost-efficient supplement to force contributions.

On the other hand, neoliberalism provides us with an appropriate explanation for the rationale behind Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform, as this engagement contributes to:

- i) Development of democracy and enables extension of the Zone of liberal peace;
- ii) Increasing the number of contacts between Norway and Serbia which makes cooperation in other areas more possible and desirable;
- iii) Protection of personal freedom;
- iv) Strengthening international institutions, especially the UN.

At this point, we have all the information necessary to complete the model of donors' engagement in defense reform. As this research has examined the defense reform concept in one case study, without the ambition to generalize findings or deliver a new theory, the completed model represents Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform.




Figure 2. Model of Norway's engagement in Serbian defense reform

Implications for the future

Many policy-oriented and normative empirical studies, reports, scholarly papers and research about defense reform can be found. They tend to provide guidance as to how the concept should be implemented, or how the results should be measured. This thesis took a different angle, analyzing defense reform from a donor-state's standpoint. As such, it is a small contribution to a better understanding of the defense reform concept. It can be useful for development of defense reform theory, and can be seen as an academic basis for future studies that can result in concrete recommendations.

However, this thesis examined the defense reform concept through one case study, and although it provided empirical data, it cannot be used alone to generalize the findings. Therefore, future research should be directed towards other cases and compared with this research in order to make new theoretical propositions. Moreover, states in this thesis are considered as unitary actors. But, what effect has government bureaucracy on states' actions? Can individual policy-maker's thinking and beliefs, or relations between the government and various interests groups, influence states' decision to engage in defense reform? Will these perspectives provide us with a plausible neorealist explanation?

Then again, the thesis has identified some effects of donors' engagement which are in line with the neo-realist perspective, and they can be taken into consideration by policy-makers when decisions about future engagement are to be made.

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