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Master's Thesis

International Defence Cooperation;

Trust, Sovereignty and their Implications

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"Alliance forces will be structured to reflect the multinational and joint nature of Alliance missions."

NATO strategic Concept (2010)

"There is no such entity as an international soldier"

Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (2006)

"No sensible person would choose cooperation as a topic of investigation on the grounds that its puzzles could readily be solved".

Robert E. Keohane, After Hegemony (2005)

Abstract

International Defence Cooperation (IDC) is often presented as one of the solutions to the budgetary problems western European states face when maintaining their armed forces. IDC is a defensive strategy, chosen by lack of other options. In reality, IDC is as much a problem as it can be a solution. This thesis investigates if the need to uphold national sovereignty and a lack of international trust are among the factors that hamper states to come to more and closer cooperation and how this mechanism influences international defence cooperation.

After a short analysis of the nature of problems in IDC, the role of trust and sovereignty is explored in three different ways. First, nine cases of IDC are investigated by analyzing the treaties, MoU's and agreements that formalize these multinational initiatives. Secondly, interviews were conducted with officers working at ministerial and defence staff level. Third, theory from the field of international relations was studied to assess if the findings on IDC are in line with theory from other fields of international cooperation.

Most West-European states accept the necessity of IDC. However, effective cooperation is not possible without giving up, at least parts of, national influence and sovereignty. Governments are reluctant to do so, since they wish to maintain control over their armed forces. One reason is domestic political accountability for military actions. The second reason is that governments cannot fully trust each other. They can be forced to change earlier decisions on cooperation or be changed themselves. States therefore wish to maintain flexibility and autonomy in their cooperation and avoid dependence on other states. This leads to suboptimal organization of international cooperation and multinational units.

Acknowledgements

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I owe sincere gratitude to the interviewees, who were willing to spare considerable time from their busy agendas to discuss International Defence Cooperation with me, professors and staff of the Norwegian Defence University College for offering an inspiring program and my colleagues from master-class 2010-2011 for their help and humour. Furthermore I wish to thank Nigel de Lee for his support and help in the writing process. Finally, I especially want to thank my wife Katinka, my family and friends for the support I have received from them during the work on this project.

Oslo, May 2011

Arjen Zwaanswijk

Summary

International Defence Cooperation (IDC) is often presented as the new solution for an old problem. Most European states are not able to maintain a complete and balanced national defence organization. Flat or decreasing budgets, combined with increasing costs of equipment and personnel, lead to restructuring and downsizing. This problem has however existed for many years, and so has the thought of closer cooperation on defence issues in order to achieve savings and synergetic effects. In reality, IDC is a difficult process and there is no overarching plan or roadmap to steer the dozens of binational or multinational initiatives, resulting in a complex and diffuse structures, overlapping and interrelated initiatives and competition for influence.

This thesis investigates if a lack of international trust and the need for upholding national sovereignty can explain limitations and problems of IDC, and if other factors have to be taken into account. After a preliminary analyses of problems related to IDC, the founding documents of nine existing cases of IDC were analysed in order to establish to which extent states are willing to give up control over their armed forces in favour of international cooperation. Interviews were conducted in order to achieve insight in the role of trust and the mechanisms leading to IDC. Thirdly, the findings were placed in the theoretical perspective of International Relations theory on international cooperation.

The document analysis indicates that states need mechanisms or guarantees to control the balance between sovereignty and dependency. More recent agreements contain clauses and articles allowing states to withdraw or to abstain from participation. Sovereignty is a key factor in military cooperation with other states. Interviews connected the factors of trust and sovereignty to domestic political accountability. Governments are responsible for the decision to use military power and the actions of their military forces. In non-existential conflicts these decisions are often disputed domestically or politically controversial. Democratic governments depend on popular support. Decisions on the use of military force are strictly national decisions and should not be the result of international obligations.

As a result, IDC projects are organized in a way that each nation can decide to pull out or abstain from participation in certain actions. This mechanism prohibits specialization

and the economy of scale that could be achieved if states were really willing to trust each other. In other words: sovereignty comes at the price of less efficiency. Vice versa: increased multinational effect and efficiency means that states have to be willing to give up parts of their independence.

Trust has a second role when discussing multinationality of armed forces. In order to achieve their missions in dangerous situations, military at all levels have to be able to trust each other. When states impose caveats on operations in order to limit the risk either for the soldiers, or for the domestic support to the mission, they restrict the freedom of movement of their forces. The willingness and ability to share risks is however an important factor to build up trust among military forces of different nations. This psychological mechanism has implications for organizing IDC. The military have to be able and willing to cooperate with their partners for IDC to be sustainable and effective. Theory from the field of International Relations supports the empirical findings and the relation between cooperation, dependence and trust.

What are the consequences for IDC? Firstly, one should be modest regarding expectations of IDC. When states choose IDC as a means to uphold their defence capability, they have to realize it comes at a price. States, and thus governments, aspiring IDC have to be willing to accept compromises and become dependant on other states. Secondly, it is possible to come to effective forms of IDC, but it means building flexibility into IDC, for example by organizing multinational units in modules. Such a solution does however reduce the synergetic effects of cooperating internationally

International defence cooperation is still considered a second choice compared to national solutions. There is a political scepticism towards IDC, since it means compromising and losing parts of sovereignty. In absence of alternatives, states will have to find a way to cooperate and trust each other. To achieve successful IDC, a state depends on a reputation as trustworthy and politically reliable partner. Trust is built by bottom-up acceptance and willingness to share risks. Top down, trust is mainly built by reliability and successful previous cooperation. Trust can be a catalyst, leading to synergetic effects in multinational cooperation. The absence or breach of trust is difficult to overcome and hard to compensate.

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1. Introduction

Many European states will in future not be able to maintain a complete and balanced national defence organization. International defence cooperation (IDC) seems to be the new miracle drug for the suffering western defence community. By closer cooperation in the development and purchase of equipment, huge savings will be realized. States can supplement each others' defence capabilities and collective solutions will also allow smaller states access to strategic transport and high-tech weapons. IDC will lead to increased output on a smaller budget. At least, that is what visionary leaders and European ministers of defence tell us.

Grete Faremo, the Norwegian Minister of Defence, recently stated that: "Increasingly, we acknowledge that most countries are no longer able to uphold a full range of military capabilities. This invites increased multilateral cooperation, to derive new strength from mutual efforts" (Faremo, 2011b). Yet, if this form of cooperation is so logical and will deliver such excellent results, why was it not done years before? Why have states been so hesitant and why have the many material initiatives hardly ever delivered satisfactory equipment in time?

Today's armed forces, especially in Europe, are already more internationally orientated and organized than ever before (Ulriksen, 2007). Despite this internationalization, politicians as well as academics still claim that IDC is dysfunctional, that it leads to disappointing results and a duplication of defence assets (Solana, 2003). Furthermore, IDC initiatives can be perceived as competition for existing security organizations like NATO (Petersson, 2010).

IDC seems to be surrounded by contradictory views and opposing opinions. Why is IDC in practice so difficult? Is it possible that a lack of trust and the necessity for sovereignty in practice are the limiting factors for further integration and cooperation? The statements by the French President Nicholas Sarkozy and the British Prime-minister David Cameron on the occasion of the recent resumption of the Anglo-French defence cooperation give reason to believe so. This initiative, aiming at practical defence cooperation at various levels, shows that even two of the biggest states in Europe can not maintain their defence structures

nationally. Both saw themselves forced to defend the initiative against critics. David Cameron says that: "It is about defending our national interest. It is about practical, hard-headed cooperation between two sovereign countries." (Burns, 2010). On the same occasion Sarkozy declared that this agreement shows "a level of trust and confidence between our two nations which is unequalled in history." (ibid.).

Sovereignty and trust apparently play an important role when states consider defence cooperation, but do we really trust another state? How important is it to be sovereign and independent? Is this in line with what can be expected using theory from international relations (IR)? And which impact does this have for defence cooperation? This thesis will analyse empirically and theoretically how far trust and sovereignty influence IDC, and if other factors have to be taken into account as well. If a lack of trust and the requirement for sovereignty negatively influence IDC, the implications could be serious. The armed forces' task of serving the state by maintaining its sovereignty would prevent deeper international integration, a better use of resources and better defence cooperation in general. Could it be that IDC is at root unnatural, leading to equivocal solutions or ambiguity?

This thesis builds on the rather non-controversial premise that armed forces first and foremost answer to their national state authority. "…each [officer] remains linked to his or her paymasters at home. The more senior the officer, the more must the national link be expected to be open and working" , Sir Rupert Smith wrote when describing multinational planning and cooperation (Smith, 2006, p. 314). If states really do not fully trust each other and sovereignty is more important than effecting cooperation, this should be visible in current forms of cooperation. The empirical part consists of a descriptive analysis of founding-documents in nine cases of defence cooperation and interviews with four high-ranking officers responsible for implementing IDC at ministerial and defence staff level.

Subsequently, the findings will be compared to theory on international cooperation from the field of International Relations (IR). Within IR, questions regarding state interest, security, conflict, competition and cooperation between states are studied from multiple perspectives. Can existing theory from IR contribute to explaining how trust and sovereignty influence IDC? Answering this question could contribute to explaining the findings, place them in a political perspective and assess the potential for generalization.

1.1 Research question and scope of the thesis

This thesis is based on two assumptions. Firstly, IDC as it is conducted today does not deliver to the expectations of its full potential. Secondly, armed forces serve foremost their own state. Using these two starting points, the following questions will be investigated:

Can a lack of international trust and the need for upholding national sovereignty explain limitations and problems of International Defence Cooperation? Do other factors have to be taken into account?

The following sub-questions will be used to investigate the research question and place the findings in an International Relations perspective?

- − Is IDC really a problem area?

- − Do documents concerning cases of IDC show how far states trust each other?

- − What effect do trust and sovereignty have on defence cooperation?

- − Which other factors could explain limitations in IDC?

- − Are the findings in line with existing theory from IR and do they have a more general value for IDC?

- − What are the consequences for defence cooperation in general?

The intent is to explore the effects that the need for sovereignty and trust have on defence cooperation. These effects should be better recognizable at the lower service and unit levels, where less political influence is present. Hence, it will be necessary to look into the military organizations at a deeper level than the top level which is usually discussed when addressing cooperation between states, as at NATO level. Therefore forms of cooperation at the "service" level, between armies, navies and air forces from different states will be explored.

The research is limited to forms of cooperation in peace-time, although the traditional difference between peace and conflict seems to be weakening during the operations currently being conducted. Second, this is not a study of states' behaviour considering military operations (Ad Bellum) or already at war (In Bello). It is not a study of coalitions conducting military operations, but a study of states and armed forces preparing to do so.

The third limitation concerns the cases that were studied. Only Norwegian and Dutch officers were interviewed and the cases were limited to those where at least Norway or the Netherlands were a partner. The majority of the cases include both. The research is limited to western states; more specifically states within NATO or the Partnership for Peace (PfP) related to NATO. Finally, this is not a historical study: all the cases are actual current partnerships or forms of cooperation. Some are even still in the prepatory phase[1].

1.2 Outline

This thesis is structured in the following way. Chapter one introduces the problem, presents the research question, the build up, limitations and the reasons to apply a theoretic perspective from IR. Chapter two will present the methodology used for the research. Chapter three discusses IDC and civil-military relations. It gives reasons for the assumptions that IDC is a problem area and that there is a close relation between the military and political aspects.

Chapter four first presents which mechanisms states use to regulate trust and sovereignty in defence cooperation, followed by an analysis of written sources like terms of reference (ToR), memoranda of understanding (MoU) and treaties of IDC projects in order to establish the presence or absence of these mechanisms.

Chapter five presents the results from interviews with leading military officers responsible for implementing IDC, with the intent of completing the documented information. Chapter six presents theory from IR on international cooperation in order to establish the relevance in a more general perspective on international cooperation and assess the potential for generalization. Finally the conclusions will be presented in chapter seven.

1.3 International Defence Cooperation & International Relations theory

There are numerous factors that influence success or failure in complicated areas like IDC. One could analyze IDC from the management side or the cultural side. Why choose

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[1] The Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Hungary, intended to operate C-17 strategic transport airplanes, was established in 2008 and the first aircraft was delivered on 27 July 2009.

trust and sovereignty and use international relations as main tool to study it? The most straightforward way would be to make a comparison of IDC projects and analyze what went well and what went wrong. The question would be by which criteria. Furthermore, most involved are not interested in documenting and discussing failure and everyone has his own definition of success. Therefore such an approach would be cumbersome and probably not achievable within the available timeframe. Furthermore the scope of such a multidisciplinary study would be too large. It is therefore necessary to choose a different approach. The choice to use IR theory is made for of several reasons.

Trust and sovereignty have been studied within the field of IR studies on state behaviour. Military services act on behalf of their states. When the military work internationally, one can therefore reasonably assume that the mechanisms of IR will be visible between military services as well. Second, the close relation between military and their state gives reason to believe that the outcome or effects of IDC are not likely to exceed what the state "allows". Inversely: however smart, beneficial and well managed an international military project might be; if it breaks with fundamental rules of national and international political logic it will not succeed. It is therefore so that one will have to establish if IDC is likely to be subordinated to the same logic as international relations in general? If so, one also has to investigate the issue of optimizing results and the chances for success.

A third argument to investigate IDC through the lens of international relations is the increase of internationalization and the attempts to achieve a further integration in Europe. The efforts to come to a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the enlargement of NATO with new member states, both lead to an enhancement of interaction at the military level. Frédéric Mérand describes this as "…a political revolution which forces us to rethink the national state-armed forces nexus and more broadly the interplay of national identity and the state" (Mérand, 2008). Using IR theory, we might be able to analyze what implications the attempts for deepening political integration will have for the armed forces, and vice versa which political conditions have to be met for military integration to succeed.

The increasing multinationality during NATO- and other missions is a fourth argument for looking at military cooperation from an international relations angle. On the ground, in the air and at sea, military forces from dozens of nations work together on a day by day basis. Amongst the effects will be a bottom-up acceptance, appreciation and increase

of multinationality, as officers rise through the ranks[2]. A significant change has occurred in this area during the last decade.

Previously, countries contributed to missions with relatively autonomous force packages, in "national" areas of responsibility, own support and procedures. With the increase of distance and costs, and the simultaneous reduction of the defence forces in Europe, more and more states revert to smaller contributions, which consequently work with military from different countries at a lower level. Instead of contributing with a complete army field hospital one now can find situations where a patient is transported by an American helicopter, treated by a German surgical team and nursed by Lithuanians in a Dutch managed field hospital guarded by the Afghan National Army. Multinationality has become a fact of life at all levels of military operations. It is hard to imagine such cooperation when these soldiers do not trust each other.

IDC is perceived by many as a problematic field. At best it is difficult to achieve concrete results. Simultaneously, many have high expectations of IDC and present it as an inevitable future prospect. Insights and knowledge from IR can probably explain at least some of the problems. Within IR, trust and sovereignty are factors known to restrict, or at least strongly influence, the effects of cooperation between states. Achieving insight in how sovereignty and trust influence IDC can therefore serve two purposes: it can explain some of the problems in IDC and secondly it can help to assess how far IR theory can be used to analyse IDC.

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[2] MG M. de Kruif, Royal Netherlands Army

2. Methodology

The purpose of this chapter is to present the main methodological considerations in the study. Section 2.1 contains a brief overview of the research design. Section 2.2 addresses the used literature and data analyses. In 2.3 the main considerations regarding the interviews will be presented, while section 2.4 discusses the analysis and evaluation of the collected data. Finally I will discuss my own role and its relevance for this study in section 2.5.

2.1 Research design

This study uses a qualitative deductive approach as described by Jacobsen (Jacobsen, 2005) and is of a qualitative nature. It starts with the personal observation that international defence cooperation in itself seems very logical, but often does not deliver the expected results. Theory on more general cooperation between states as described in international relations theory might deliver an explanation for this. In order to select relevant theory and focus the study, a broad research question and a set of sub-questions were formulated, which guided the collection of data (Creswell, 2009).

One of the risks connected to this approach is that one only looks after for that confirms the expectations. In order to avoid this, two methods of data collection have been used: official documents and interviews. During the interviews the research question as such was not explicitly named or discussed. Some of the questions during the interviews had elements from the research question as a theme, but the interviews were deliberately set up and conducted very broadly.

The study is structured in three main steps. First, two assumptions have to be justified: IDC often does not deliver its full potential and military serve first and foremost their own state. The second step is to investigate trust and sovereignty in official documents and with interviews with high ranking officers responsible for coordinating IDC. Third, the findings are related to the relevant mechanisms and dynamics from international relations theory. In this way the relevance and the potential for generalization of the findings will be assessed.

2.2 Written sources

This study is based on academic literature, official documents and documented interviews. As often with an exploratory study, not much scientific literature has been written on the topic itself (Creswell, 2009, p. 26). Preliminary study indicates that at least part of IR literature can also be used to explain phenomena in the different, but related field of IDC. Own experience working in international defence cooperation has triggered curiosity regarding trust, sovereignty and their effect on IDC. Within IR theory, these two factors are recognized as two important factors in the relations between states.

Which academic literature one chooses the basis has a profound impact on the study, especially in a deductive research design. IDC concerns cooperation as well as competition. Furthermore, especially studying IDC between NATO countries, one is often confronted with the presence of a big partner, the US. On other occasions, similar sized states cooperate without a dominating partner. For these reasons I have chosen to use theory from three main schools within IR: Realism, Liberalism and International Society[3].

Kenneth Waltz's neo-realistic *Theory of International Politics* intends to establish general patterns in the behaviour of states. Although written in 1979, it is still seen by many as a cornerstone work on the relations between states. Robert Keohane's *After Hegemony* presents a more liberalist view of international cooperation in absence of a dominant partner and finally, Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler represent the third school within IR; International Society.

The documents analysed are the "founding documents" of nine forms of IDC. They come in the form of international treaties, Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), Technical Agreements (TA) or bilateral documents without specific status. With the exception of certain commercial parts[4], the documents are public and unrestricted. The most recent available versions have been used.

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[3] Jackson and Sørensen also recognize a fourth school within IR: International Political Economy (IPE). The single sided focus on economic relations and welfare makes this school less suited to analyse defence cooperation.

[4] Parts of the SAC / C-17 MoU are restricted for commercial reasons

The studied documents do not provide insight into failed initiatives or projects of IDC. They are therefore not representative of all attempts or initiatives regarding potential IDC. In order to compensate for this, a second method and second set of data were necessary. This was realized by interviewing four high-ranking officers working with IDC at defence staff and ministerial level.

2.3 Interviews

The intent of the interviews was twofold: they provide general insight in the field of IDC and give a second source of data besides the document analyses. This enables confirmation, differentiation or negation of the findings from first analyses as described by Jacobsen (Jacobsen, 2005, p. 229). Furthermore, interviews provide the possibility for more in depth insight into the mechanisms behind IDC and potentially offer new views.

The decision to interview four high ranking officers working in the defence staffs and ministries of Norway and the Netherlands was made for practical as well as methodological reasons. Through existing channels or previous encounters they could be approached without going through too many formalities. Furthermore, these officers all bear responsibility for implementing IDC or are highly qualified because of experience, and could therefore be expected to be able to provide valuable in depth information, also into cases that did not lead to formal cooperation. Only military officers were interviewed; no civilians. This can be perceived as a limitation.

Three of the four interviews were conducted according to an interview protocol (Creswell, 2009, p. 183). This resulted in very open interviews. On occasion the questions were formulated in the form of controversial statements to which the interviewees were requested to react. One officer preferred to give a briefing, followed by a discussion. Three of the four interviews were recorded and transcribed. One officer did not accept the use of a dictaphone. Two of the interviewees requested insight in the transcription. One officer denied publication in the original form because of the possibility of misquotation or abuse of statements made during the interview.

2.4 Collection, evaluation and analysis of the data

The collected data have not been interpreted previously and were collected for the purpose of this project. They can therefore be categorized as primary sources (Jacobsen, 2005). For the analyses of the "founding documents" the most recent and updated versions have been used. Nine projects, partnerships or initiatives of IDC were analyzed. The analysis of the documents focussed on a small number of factors related to trust, sovereignty and autonomy. The documents themselves provide only very limited insight into the decision-making that has lead to the cooperation. They present only the final result.

The interviews, primary data, offered the possibility for an in-depth insight into the mechanisms behind IDC. In this way they compensate for the lack of in-depth insight from the studied documents and contribute to a validation of the results. The interviews were structured to determine the mechanisms behind IDC and to discover which roles the factors of trust and sovereignty play. The analysis of the interviews was conducted by categorizing the answers in a matrix (Creswell, 2009, p. 219). Relevant quotes and answers were grouped according to the questions that were developed to answer the research (sub) questions.

The different purposes of the documental analyses and the interviews, as well as the fact that they investigate different data, are the reasons for presenting the findings according to the source and method.

2.5 Own role and views during the research

I have been involved in IDC for several years and have borne responsibility for forming and the implementation of the cooperation between the Norwegian and Netherlands' armies. This has had an effect on this study. Firstly it has influenced the choice of the subject and the desire to explain why it can be difficult on occasion to implement something that on first glance seems so logical. Secondly it has helped to gain access to the interviewees.

As a result, the example of the Dutch-Norwegian cooperation was frequently used during the interviews; especially the topic of the failed "package deal" was cited by all interviewed, when the role of trust was discussed. Although this example is used during this

study, it has not received extra value or meaning, since it was probably a result of my own background.

3. Background

The intent of this chapter is to achieve insight in IDC and especially the challenges it faces. Using a model from the Norwegian Defence Staff[5], I will address IDC from three angles: security policy, economic and military. In this way a wider background will be created against which the narrower focus on trust and sovereignty will be placed in perspective.

Secondly, this background chapter will address the relation between armed forces and the state. What is the role of armed forces? Which political implications does internationalization have and what are the consequences for IDC?

3.1 International Defence Cooperation: What is the problem?

Defence cooperation has existed for many years. Defence staffs and ministries have developed methods and structures to manage this international cooperation and the many influences affecting it. The model in use with the Norwegian Defence Staff illustrates which factors influence IDC, by grouping factors into those related to defence and security policy, to economic factors and to military requirements. This section will discuss all three and present examples from practice.

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[5] This model was presented by MG Knutsen, Adviser International Engagement, from the Norwegian Defence Staff.

Illustration 3.1: Factors influencing IDC

3.1.1 Defence and Security Policy

The first group of factors is related to a states' defence and security policy. In order to cooperate successfully, a shared view on the security situation will be very beneficial. However, this is not always so.

The change from a bipolar world to one of multi-polarity after the implosion of the Warsaw Pact has had substantial effects on the military and on the ways they cooperate. The stability provided by the Cold War provided a background against which coalitions were able to optimize their capabilities. However, at the level of the forces themselves, nations operated independently (King, 2010).

The reorientation of the US after 9/11 and the absence of an existential threat changed the nature of military cooperation towards an effort to maintain a credible defence capability. "As a result of strategic and budgetary pressures, forces now cooperate with each other at the lowest tactical levels while on operations; multinational battle groups and even companies have become commonplace." (King, 2010, p. 52). Still, states perceive the changes in the security situation in different ways. These differences have an impact on the doctrine, structure and modus operandi of the armed forces of the respective countries.

In cases where military power was employed, it was in "wars of choice", not in "wars of necessity" (Osinga & Lindley-French, 2010). Some states have therefore chosen to organize their defence forces for mainly expeditionary tasks, while others have a general domestic emphasis. Even within the Nordic region, an area seemingly homogenous for many, security perceptions differ substantially according to Håkon Lunde Saxi:

> "There is, however, no shared Nordic view on 'hard security' issues in the Nordic region itself, which suggests that a joint security and defence regime aiming at something close to a Nordic alliance may find it hard to succeed." (Saxi, 2011, p. 4)

These domestic perceptions influence the way states shape their security policy. This contributes to creating dilemmas concerning the role, equipment and main task of the defence organizations. Other domestic factors, like local employment, protection of national defence industry and national pride can enhance this process.

Not only the strategic environment, but also the way the military operate has changed substantially since the end of the cold war. (Matlary & Østerud, 2007). Especially the Western military have increasingly been involved in operations other than traditional war. Furthermore the environments and the countries in which military forces operate, as well as the intended outcome of their actions have changed significantly (Smith, 2006) [6]. These changes in operational patterns and locations of conflict have had a profound impact on the security policy of states and also on IDC.

More complex tasks are conducted, often deeply integrated with military form other nations. This does not only affect on the lower tactical levels. It also requires more international consultation and coordination at the political, the strategic and the operational levels. (Matlary & Østerud, 2007).

3.1.2 Economic factors

Within the used model, the second angle to look at IDC is from an economic perspective. IDC is often cited as one of the ways to achieve budget savings. Politicians as well as military services say that international cooperation will lead to a better output, or

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[6] Although Smith himself describes this book as "an interpretation rather than an academic monograph", it has gained the status of a standard-work concerning the employment of military power..

lower national costs. This view was also stated by the Norwegian former Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen (Diesen, 2010). IDC is considered for potential budget savings not only in Norway. The Netherlands Ministry of Defence has recently conducted a study into IDC with the sole intention of saving money[7].

Under certain circumstances IDC probably can lead to a more efficient use of defence spending. It is however not a given that IDC will have this effect. The following paragraphs will discuss the difficulties related to defence planning and achieving economy of scale by IDC.

Defence planning and defence budgets

In 2009, the countries of Europe spent around 260 billion Euros on defence (SIPRI, 2010). This huge sum is however composed of all the national defence budgets and includes huge overlaps. States do not seem to be prepared for radical solutions like the functional division of tasks when it comes to security and defence, although discussions have been ongoing since the seventies. States claim they want to achieve a better use of resources by coordinating their defence spending, but simultaneous want to keep central elements under national control. The current Norwegian strategic defence concept describes this very accurate:

> "Multinational military cooperation is [therefore] considered as a crucial instrument to develop and ensure the defence capability of the Norwegian Armed Forces. At the same time, it is important to ensure national control over crucial operational capabilities…" (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2009)

States wish to have control over critical capabilities nationally. Critical capabilities are quite often among the most expensive capabilities[8]. The increasing costs of acquiring and maintaining defence equipment, combined with decreasing budgets, will lead to a situation where smaller states can only afford very small defence forces and will lack substantial

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[7] The responsible officer, Cdre. Sijtsma, is one of the interviewed for this study.

[8] Command and control systems, intelligence systems, advanced weapon systems, etc.

structural elements[9]. The alternative would be to have less national control, but to have it over a substantial larger and balanced international organized defence force[10].

The defence planning process is dysfunctional. "European states, especially small and medium-sized states, stand to lose if this bottom-up process continues" (Matlary & Østerud, 2007). A top-down approach would however mean that states would loose control over parts of their defence spending and seems highly unlikely without a form of political integration and combined decision making.

Efforts to come to a better, more efficient organization and tuning of defence budgets within the EU and NATO has been going on for years, although without great success (Wogau, 2003). Also individual states have undertaken a number of initiatives, like the example of France and Britain described earlier. The global economic recession of 2008 has even put more stress on the already tight defence budgets in many more European states, but this has not lead to drastic changes in the organization of armed forces like role specialization or complete abolition of services by states.

Materiel cooperation: expectations of economy of scale.

Multinational development and purchase of defence equipment is often named as a way to save money[11]. Official Norwegian governmental policy states that the highest savings can be expected if countries develop their operational capabilities towards system-likeness (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2009).

In practice this has proven to be very difficult. States are very keen to protect their defence industry and respective defence materiel organizations still intend to procure mainly nationally. Despite more progressive forces, seeing the potential benefit of opening the international market, states can still ignore the Maastricht Treaty rules on a single market and competition when it comes to the "…production of or trade in arms, munitions and war materials." (Merrit, 2003, p. 235).

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[9] Examples of this are the abolition of maritime patrol aircraft or main battle tanks (The Netherlands) or the lack of air defence units in the Norwegian Army

10 Based on an interview with Brigadier Solberg, Norwegian Ministry of Defence.

11 Information MG Knutsen

A second mechanism that could lead to savings is cooperation on the development of new defence equipment. This can be achieved by producing larger numbers of similar equipment and smart solutions for maintenance[12]. However, countries that embarked on developing multinational products face problems like inadequate performance, delays in production or excessive increase in price. Other problems include a lack of standardization, different doctrines leading to different demands on equipment, the protection of national developed knowledge etc. Furthermore, in order to jointly purchase military equipment, all partners have to be in the same phase in time[13]. No one is willing to replace expensive equipment when it is still functional and economical to use it.

The project to develop a new NATO helicopter, the NH-90[14], will illustrate some of the problems. The project started in 1985. France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom jointly intended to develop a NATO battlefield transport and anti-ship/anti-submarine helicopter. The delivery of the helicopter was delayed by several years. It turned out to be more expensive than expected and does not deliver the expected results. And although the NH-90 is considered by some a success with more than 500 ordered worldwide, the original reasons to develop the helicopter multinationally, interoperability, lowering unit costs and reduction of life cycle costs, did not materialize (Uiterwijk & Kappert, 2010).

In 2008, after strong oppositional pressure, the Dutch State secretary for Defence Jack de Vries atmitted to the Dutch parliament that "....de samenwerking tussen Europese industrieën en de partnerlanden weerbarstiger is dan op het eerste oog lijkt.."[15] (Staten-Generaal, 2008). Also in Norway the repeated delays have caused increased costs for maintaining the predecessor of the NH-90 longer than intended. The original contract foresaw delivery between 2005 and 2008. The first NH-90, for testing purposes only, was

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[12] A large part of the costs of new defence equipment are developing costs. Increasing the numbers will therefore lead to lower development costs per item. Maintenance can be organized more efficient, for example by having only one in stead of several locations.

[13] Interview with MG Knutsen

[14] NH-90   Multinationally developed "NATO" helicopter

[15] …that the collaboration between European industries and the partner nations is more difficult than it appears at first glance. Translation by author

however not delivered before the end of 2010. (Finansdepartementet, 2010) and the first "production-helicopter" is expected in spring 2011 (Hannestad, 2011).

Notwithstanding occasional successes, like the materiel F-16 cooperation within the European Participating Air Forces (EPAF), or the international pooling of gas-turbines for helicopters[16], the development of common equipment is very hard and in practice it is difficult to achieve financial or operational benefit[17].

3.1.3 Military requirements

The third source of influence on IDC in the model relates to military requirements. Often the military are the ones confronted with the task of putting IDC into effect. The first important precondition to achieve the effects of IDC is trust, which shall be discussed first. Secondly, the sustainability of IDC will be discussed, since international cooperation is often a matter of many years and long lasting projects. Finally there will have to be a clear added value in the cooperation, not in the least for those that actually have to conduct it.

Trust

The use of armed force is usually seen a means of last resort, and only justified when no other tools, like consultation, diplomacy or economic sanctions have worked. Military power is the states' final resort (Johansen & Staib, 2009). This means also that military organizations have to be able to face and manage high risks when employed. This does not only bring high personal risk to those working in the armed forces, but it also means that high stakes are at risk when a state decides to use the military.

Military organisations are so-called "high reliability organizations". Literature on high reliability organizations emphasizes the creation of a culture of reliability within the operating units (Bijlsma, Bogenrieder, & Baalen, 2010). During operations, military of

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[16] Idem

[17] In order to achieve real synergy one also has to be willing to accept equipment that is "good enough" and not necessarily want "the best or perfect". Development of too many different versions of the same vehicle, ship or other system will lead to loosing the synergetic effects of producing and buying larger numbers. During the development of the "NATO-frigate", which was intended to become a standard naval vessel in use with eight nations, arguments arose concerning the usability, the types of weaponry, the design etc. In the end the original thought of common development and achieving economies of scale were left and all countries pursued their own programmes.

different countries do not, or hardly, meet before they actually find themselves in operational situations. Becoming effective requires multinational partnering and building up trust. This is a time-consuming and difficult process for which the necessary time is not always available.

> "Organizations and people often tend to trust their partners on the grounds of previous experiences or reputation. When partners, for instance, can rely on a trustworthy reputation or satisfactory and pleasant cooperation in the past, it is likely that they will trust their partner in future situations. A lack of experience or a bad reputation, on the contrary, may negatively influence the level of trust partners have in each other. Experience and reputation, or the lack thereof, therefore seem to determine the initial positions of alliance partners" (Bogers, Dijk, & Heeren-Bogers, 2010, p. 165).

When states decide to cooperate on defence in a long term, the military have to be able to trust the partners with different nationalities, since their lives may depend on it (King, 2010). Special attention has to be given to political limitations of military freedom of action. Political caveats can limit the military freedom of action, which again leads to loss of trust and frustration at working level[18].

Sustainability and added value

Structural IDC in practice has to be sustainable over long periods and the benefits of the cooperation have to outweigh involved extra costs. A complicating factor is often that the costs can be easily measured and quantified while the benefits of the cooperation can be very hard to measure. How does one for example quantify increased interoperability with the armed forces of a partner? Or how does one measure the effect of an additional officer in a NATO staff?

Expectations of benefit need to constantly outweigh short term costs and scepticism. If defence units are tasked to participate in an international project but do not experience sufficient benefits themselves, the cooperation is not likely to survive since the unit will

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[18] Information MG de Kruif, former Commander ISAF RC-South

gradually loose interest and not give priority to the task[19]. The cost-structure of implementing IDC is an important factor to consider when planning and implementing IDC.

Interoperability

Military operations require many different sorts of capabilities and units. Very few states are still able to operate completely independently and provide a complete force-package. Countries therefore have to be able to deliver complementary contributions, so that the total force can be effective. Units from different nations have to be interoperable when it comes to communications and command and control. Interoperability is however more than implementing technical solutions. It also requires cultural interoperability with elements like a common doctrine, language and will to cooperate. Creating such interoperability is a lengthy process and a commitment for years (Mérand, 2008). Choosing structural partners makes interoperability easier, but reduces flexibility.

The decision to be interoperable with forces of a different state is usually a choice the smaller partner makes, in order to become interoperable with a bigger partner. It is more a matter of adapting than coming to real cooperation. Interoperability as such therefore does not necessarily lead to immediate savings. It might even cost more to become interoperable, which is an impeding factor especially when the expectation of IDC is that it will lead to savings.

Interoperability can also lead to choosing specific equipment, like choosing a common fighter plane. Such equipment is often in use for decades. Choosing partners for interoperability is therefore a long term choice and has to be closely linked to the foreign and security policy of a country.

3.1.4 The positive side

IDC is not all about problems and failure. In the last decades, military forces from various nations have cooperated well during numerous missions by NATO, EU or the UN. Air forces of several NATO members flew integrated missions over former Yugoslavia,

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[19] The position for a Norwegian officer stationed at the Swedish defence college was cancelled because of this reason, despite the intent as formulated in the NORDEFCO agreement.

multinational naval units have conducted many missions in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean and currently 47 nations contribute to ISAF[20]. At the technical and tactical level soldiers find solutions to "make it work". Major-General Mart de Kruif, who commanded the Regional Command in southern Afghanistan for a year, described it in the following way: "…at the technical level, in operations, we crossed all the existing lines of cooperation". When soldiers have to cooperate, they can. At the technical and tactical level multinational cooperation has become a fact of life for the majority of the soldiers and officers.

3.1.5 IDC: a preliminary conclusion

IDC is often presented as a solution to national capability-shortfalls, a way to save budgets or to increase collective security. Using the model as presented by the Norwegian defence staff, three viewpoints: security policy considerations, military requirements and economic factors, were used to achieve insight in the problems connected to IDC. The track record of IDC can be described as "mixed" at best. IDC is not the simple, quick-fix, solution as it is sometimes presented.

Political diverging views on security in practice can hinder integration and coordination. They lead to different main efforts, discord on defence planning and the multiplication of capabilities. IDC is often named as possibility to achieve economic benefits in procurement of equipment. In reality it is however difficult to achieve savings and practice lags behind the expectations. Higher development- and transaction costs, diverging views on equipment and the protection of national defence industries are among the hampering factors. As a result, projects are delayed, turn out to more expensive, do not deliver the necessary quality or partners withdraw from the project.

The military requirements are the third factor taken into account. Soldiers have to be confident with the increased multinationality. They literally have to trust their colleagues, since their lives and the accomplishment of their mission can depend on it. Furthermore there has to be an expectation of an added value within a reasonable timeframe.

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[20] ISAF   International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan

Military of multiple nations seem to be able to manage multinationality during operations quite well. At the tactical level they find solutions or ways around problems caused by their different nationalities. This gives reason to assume that persistent factors limiting or hampering IDC have to be present at the political or strategic military level.

3.2 Civil-Military relations

This study relates defence cooperation to international state behaviour. Although most consider it normal that military act on behalf of a state authority, it is necessary to look at the relation between the state and its armed forces. What is the nature of this relation and what are the consequences of internationalization for control over the armed forces?

3.2.1 The Sovereign and the Sword

Very few states do not have an army or form of armed forces (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003). Why they so important? The world is anarchic; no higher worldly power exists above the state. In order to protect themselves and enforce their rights, states can make use of force and therefore need armed forces. In his concept of the "social contract" the seventeenth century philosopher Thomas Hobbes describes how the people trade "liberty for safety". In order to avoid chaos, conflict and war, people transfer the right of governing themselves to the sovereign (Born & Metselaar, 2010). The sovereign has the duty to maintain law and order internally and to defend the state against foreign intrusion. The sovereign is also the "supreme commander of the army" (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2011).

Today, as they have done for centuries, soldiers serve their state, to protect it against adversaries. The methods by which the individual soldier was tied to his, and occasionally her, master have differed. What did not change is the fact that these soldiers fought on behalf of their recognized authority. Their basic task of providing security for the state has not changed considerably during almost two millennia. Hobbes was later criticized because of his one-sided emphasis on security. The more modern sociologist Max Weber also emphasizes the role of security when he defines a state: "A state is a group that can claim the monopoly on violence within a certain area" (Moelker & Soeters, 1999). Traditionally as

well as in recent times, the armed forces have been and still are an essential element of the state.

3.2.2 Control over the armed forces

The armed forces and military in the western world derive their legitimacy from the state and they operate on behalf of the state. The application of military power is usually seen as the state's ultimate means of exercising power (Johansen & Staib, 2009). As a consequence, all actions undertaken by armed forces are usually attributed, or connected to, the responsible state. In democratic states the political leadership is placed above the armed forces and has final control over structure, maintenance and use of the armed forces (Born & Metselaar, 2010). The governments bear the political responsibility for the actions of the military and armed forces can only operate with political approval.

The way governments organize and control delegated tasks performed by the military can be roughly divided into three basic forms (ibid). The first form is total control and full centralization of authority. The commander in the field[21] has to receive permission for all decisions. In practice this form is very hard to use because of the overloading of communication systems and unacceptable time delays. The second form is negation. The commander has full authority to take decisions within his mission, but certain actions are specifically forbidden. He has to receive permission for actions that exceed his mission or given boundaries, the so called caveats. This practice is often used when the military perform tasks or missions under the command of an organization like NATO or the UN. The third form is the near absence of all control, where the commander receives total freedom of action, but with a defined mission or objectives.

The political leadership has to decide which authority will be delegated to which level in which situations. Given the fact that situations in military conflicts can change quickly, it is common practice in many countries to develop a set of "Rules of Engagement" for various situations. These describe what authority commanders have in different situations and down to which level responsibilities and decisions can be delegated.

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[21] Or otherwise engaged in performing his task

In practice, the military need freedom of action to be able to fulfil their tasks. How much freedom they receive is a political decision. On the one side the need for political control, enhanced by near-real-time media coverage[22], and internal political controversies, can lead to a tendency towards maximum control and micro-management. On the other hand, factors like chaos, bad communications and the actions of the adversary necessitate freedom of action for the military commander at the lowest possible level.

This dilemma is not solved easily. International cooperation complicates clear lines of responsibility even further and can even be perceived as a threat to state-authority. On certain cases armed forces can be placed under the command of a different nation. This complicates implementing the political responsibility, especially when these forces undertake politically sensitive actions. Domestic popular support, or better: the lack of it, can cause governments to restrict the freedom of action of their military and keep them under tight control. Governments can even be forced to withdraw their forces because of domestic political pressure (Matlary, 2007). International obligations can thus reduce the freedom of governments domestically as well as the much needed freedom of action of the forces conducting the mission. As shown in the first part of this chapter, such caveats can lead to a lack of the much needed trust between the military of different nations.

3.2.3 Internationalization of armed forces

The military more and more have to cooperate with the military of other nations. Sometimes this even includes former adversaries, as we have witnessed when former Warsaw-Pact member states joined NATO. "More than any time in history, military integration in Europe has deepened and widened to an unprecedented level", according to Ulriksen (Ulriksen, 2007). In today's Europe, without a clear and present external threat, a large number of political and military leaders are, in principle, willing to give up a traditional key-element of their state identity: the link between national defence and the state (Mérand, 2008).

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[22] Also known as the "CNN-effect": military actions are shown back home out of the original context and can lead to strong reactions and political intervention in military operations.

Also according to Jackson and Sørensen a change is occurring since the mid-twentieth century. They claim that the developments the institution of the "state" has gone through has had an effect on the way that it deals with security (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003). It includes a change in the perception of sovereignty and autonomy, two fundamental principles connected to statehood. These developments have had their impact on the structure of the armed forces and the way they operate.

During the Cold War, international cooperation was common. In reality however, most armed forces worked largely independently from each other. Especially on land, armies hardly mixed below the level of (nationally organized) corps. There was very little actual cooperation at the tactical level. This situation changed drastically as of the mid-nineties. Multinational formations emerged and forces cooperated at very low tactical levels during missions in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. "Today's multinational forces are characterized not merely by strategic alliance but by close cooperation in-theatre at the tactical level" (King, 2010). States have come to depend on multinational cooperation. International cooperation is hard to imagine if states do not commit themselves to the promised tasks and accept less national influence over their forces.

3.2.4 Political implications

The political leadership is responsible for actions of their armed forces. In western democracies, democratic chosen governments bear this responsibility. The patterns of conflict have changed from defence against an existential threat to expeditionary, multinationally conducted "wars of choice". For a government, participation in such conflicts requires domestic political support.

To keep up political support and appease political opponents, governments are inclined to keep tight control over their forces and restrict certain actions by imposing caveats on the freedom of action of the forces. On the other side, IDC is complicated if states do not commit themselves also to the difficult and high-risk tasks: *pacta sunt servanda*[23]. Furthermore, governments have to accept that other states or multinational commanders task

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[23] Agreements must be kept

their forces. If states take IDC seriously, they have to be willing to accept reduced influence over their military.

3.2.5 Civil-Military relations and IDC: a preliminary conclusion

The second part of this chapter addressed the special relation between a state and its armed forces and the relation between IDC and domestic politic support. Sovereignty, autonomy and political accountability on the one side and internationalization of defence on the other side do not necessarily pull cooperation in the same direction. On the contrary, domestic political factors can even hamper and sometimes stop further defence integration. IDC, both Ad Bellum decisions as well as decisions for permanent peace-time cooperation, restrict the political freedom of governments. If states decide to cooperate they have to be willing to give up parts of their sovereignty.

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that IDC is not the easy solution as it is sometimes portrayed. In practice, IDC is perceived difficult and faces serious challenges and limitations. Among the challenges are transactional costs, diverging views on the right security policy, protection of industrial interests and the complications of having to compromise with multiple partners. Furthermore, the military requirements have to be taken into account, among which trust in partners is essential.

Progress can also be observed, but mainly in supportive and logistical parts of the organization and in fields where purchase or development of capabilities are impossible for a single state. There are indications that at the strategic and political levels, establishing effective and efficient IDC remains difficult, while at the technical and tactical levels, soldiers find solutions and are more internationalized then ever before.

States, their political leadership and the armed forces have a strong relation. Armed forces exist to protect and serve the state by carrying out orders of the government. Domestic political factors, especially governmental accountability, can increase the reluctance to commit forces to international operations or organize forces multinationally. On the other hand is IDC necessary if states want to maintain a serious military capability and

international influence. Which arrangements states make to solve the dilemma of sovereignty versus cooperation will be investigated in chapter four. The international dimension of state relations and the close relation between the state and the armed forces gives relevance for studying IDC in an IR theoretical perspective, as will be done in chapter six.

4. Trust and sovereignty in practice: nine cases of IDC.

Trust and sovereignty are relevant factors in IDC. States can face a choice between keeping full control over their military or increased effectiveness. The price of increased effectiveness is giving up parts of sovereignty. States are only willing to do so if they trust each other. This chapter examines the "founding"-documents of nine cases of military cooperation in order to establish if a pattern can be recognized in how states in practice handle sovereignty and trust[24].

The cases are similar in their intent: to produce increased operational capacity by international cooperation. They vary regarding involved service[25], age, main mechanism and participating nations. Some are "standing" arrangements including peacetime co-location and cooperation and others are "on order" arrangements active only after a political decision.

First the ways and mechanisms which states use to formalize their defence cooperation will be presented. The second part will be the actual analyses of the cases. Each case will be introduced with a short description giving a short history, the intent of the cooperation and the main mechanism by which the desired effect should be achieved. The findings will be presented in an overview, after which these will be analysed. Finally the conclusions will be presented.

4.1 Formalizing international defence relations and agreements

The first form of official agreement between states is the treaty[26]. In most countries treaties have to be ratified by parliament. Agreements on IDC can be formalized through treaties. The treaty on the establishment of the First German-Netherlands Corps in Münster, between

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[24] International Treaties, MoU's, TA's, etc.

[25] Army, Navy or Air force

26 The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines a treaty as: "a contract in writing between two or more political authorities (as states or sovereigns) formally signed by representatives duly authorized and usually ratified by the lawmaking authority of the state." (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2011).

the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is an example of such an agreement (1GNC Corps Agreement, 1997).

A second form of formalizing agreements between international military partners is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). MoU's are less formal than treaties but can still constitute a binding agreement. In general, MoU's do not need parliamentary approval and can be negotiated and signed at a lower level such as ministers or chiefs of defence. This is the most common way to formalize IDC. MoU's can be supplemented with technical arrangements (TA's).

Besides the *way* agreements are formalized, there is also an understanding to arrange *what* can be agreed upon when it comes to command authority. In order to determine what authority military commanders have, and to coordinate their actions and fulfil their tasks, standard command relationships have been developed within NATO. They give commanders the authority to give orders and instructions to assigned units (Koninklijke Landmacht, 2000). These standard command relationships are also used when military forces of various nations work together.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

The following definitions can be derived from these criteria:

FULLCOM	Unlimited authority to employ units for any purpose.
OPCOM	Authority to use units for any purpose, but on the assumption that the duration of the operation is limited. Parts of the attached unit may also be employed for separate missions.
OPCON	Units may be used for any purpose, subject to certain restrictions. These specific restrictions may also relate to the timescale (duration of the hostilities or part of the operation). The use of the unit is in any event limited, as it must be possible to withdraw the attached unit at any given moment for a new mission with another unit or with its parent unit.
TACOM	The unit to be attached is used to carry out orders which it has already received (for example from the higher unit or its parent unit). The receiving commander may be in charge of carrying out these orders and assign (sub-)tasks accordingly.
TACON	The unit to be attached has already received its orders from its parent unit. The receiving commander may only give further orders in respect of manoeuvres, area planning and local protection.

Illustration 4.1: Command relationships

The most inclusive form is full command: unlimited authority to employ units for any purpose. The lowest form of formalized command relationship is tactical control: a commander may only give orders concerning the coordination of movements and local protection[27].

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[27] In the light of this thesis only the command relationships are named. MoU's can be used however for much more than these command relations. Basically anything (international) partners want to make an agreement on can be mentioned. It is a "gentlemen's agreement on paper".

The following indicators are chosen when analyzing trust and sovereignty in IDC:

− The level at which the agreement is formalized (Government, Ministerial level, Chiefs of Defence, staff officer / desk level). The higher the level, the more binding it becomes.

− The way these agreements are formalized (Treaty, MoU, TA or other).

− The level of command authority that is or can be handed over.

− The caveats that states include.

Analyzing what the partners want to achieve and what they have agreed on, can provide insight into how states balance sovereignty and increased effectiveness. It is not necessarily so that the agreed mechanisms are the only ones or the best objectively possible. What matters is if the involved parties agree that the arrangements will work for them on matters of sovereignty and control.

Documented information from other sources, but directly connected to the case and providing additional insight especially about trust and sovereignty will also be used. This provides additional insight which in mechanisms can condition behaviour, especially where states are willing or forced to break an agreement with a partner.

4.2 Cases

The following cases will be examined: the multinational E-3A "AWACS" programme (1978), the Belgian-Dutch navy-cooperation ABNL (1975), The First German-Netherlands Corps Staff (1997), the multinational European Participating Air Forces Expeditionary Air Wing (BEL/DAN/NLD/NOR) (2004), the British-Dutch Amphibious Force (UKNL AF)(renewed 2005), the Norwegian-Dutch Army Cooperation Initiative (2007), the Strategic Air Command (2008), the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) (2009) and the European Air Transport Command (EATC) (2010).

4.2.1 AWACS / E3A cooperation

In 1978, eleven NATO countries decided to purchase and operate a fleet of Boeing E-3A airplanes, later known as AWACS. Basically these are flying radars and air control stations. This capability was necessary to counter the threat of low-flying aircraft in the event of an attack on Western Europe. The 17 NATO-AWACS have been used during all major NATO operations, including control of US airspace after 9/11.

Purchase of AWACS by any single NATO nation, other than the US and the UK, was too expensive. Therefore a program was developed to combine efforts and acquire a commonly owned and operated fleet[28]. The systems are operated by mixed crews with regard to nationality. The agreement was signed on the ministerial level with a multilateral memorandum of understanding[29].

The AWACS is the largest commonly funded acquisition program undertaken by NATO and is the only NATO owned operational force which is fully integrated into the command structure. Operational command of the unit is vested in the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), while the Force Commander of the AWACS-unit exercises day-to-day Operational Control (NATO, 2011).

The use of mixed crews has on several occasions lead to difficult situations. In 2003 Turkey requested AWACS surveillance of its border with Iraq. NATO, including the German government agreed and AWACS systems were deployed, on the premise of "routine flights at the Turkish border". The German parliament appealed against this decision at the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2008). The court ruled that the German government did actually need parliamentary approval for the deployment of the AWACS-crews. The verdict was, inter alia, based on the following considerations:

> "German participation in the overall strategic direction of NATO and in decision-making as to specific deployments of the alliance is quite predominantly in the hands of the Federal Government.(…cont.) But the freedom of the Federal Government to

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[28] See also: Tessmer, Arnold Lee . The Politics of Compromise: A Study of NATO AWACS. Washington: NDU Research Directorate, March 19, 1982.

[29] The MoU is partially classified and available with the author

structure its alliance policy does not include the decision as to who, on the domestic level, is to determine whether soldiers of the Bundeswehr will take part in a specific deployment that is decided in the alliance".(ibid)

In March 2011, again domestic German considerations hampered coalition operations. Initially, Germany opposed NATO action against the actions of the Libyan regime of colonel Khadaffi. NATO however needed the AWACS to enforce the no-fly zone and to direct its own air forces. As a result Germany decided to increase the contribution in Afghanistan, while simultaneously abstaining from participation over Libya.

> "Defence Minister Thomas de Maiziere confirmed that Germans would be withdrawn from AWACS reconnaissance aircraft over the Mediterranean but denied this was a direct exchange. De Maiziere restated Berlin's reservations about the Libyan mission. Taking part in AWACS operations over the Mediterranean -- which would aid strikes on Libya -- would require a mandate from the German parliament." (Stamp, 2011).

The AWACS cooperation exemplifies how cooperation between many smaller states can lead to generation of a collective good otherwise unaffordable. It also shows that national considerations, whether legal or political, can have a negative impact on the operational effectiveness of coalition owned and operated systems.

4.2.2 Admiral Benelux, ABNL

The Netherlands and Belgium have integrated large parts of their naval capabilities. The original BENELUX cooperation from 1944 received new momentum in 1995 when Belgium and the Netherlands agreed to place their naval assets under one unified binational command in peace-time[30]. An agreement to do so in wartime had existed already since 1975. The intent was to increase the operational output by a better use of available resources and avoidance of unnecessary duplication of effort.

The operational headquarters is binational and manned by officers from both nations. Both countries decided to align their courses and training, to operate their fleets combined, to increase cooperation on materiel and logistics and to align programs of purchase and building. In practice this has led to a far reaching specialization. For example has the Netherlands' navy become completely dependant on the Belgian knowledge concerning sea

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[30] Flying and sailing assets under command of NATO are excluded.

mine operations and the Belgian navy has become dependant on Dutch frigate training. A second example is the better use of available helicopter capacity. Belgian helicopters can be stationed on Dutch frigates for missions and vice versa.

The agreement was signed on governmental level (ministers of defence) and formalized in an "agreement". In peacetime, the assets are placed under Operational Command (OPCOM) of the ABNL. Tasking to perform operational missions remains a decision of the national governments. The ABNL is placed under direct command of the Belgian Chief of Staff of the Navy and of the Dutch Commander of the Navy for training and producing units in case of a jointly decided operation. In case of national operations the ABNL is under command of the respective commander from either Belgium or the Netherlands.

The ABNL is organized in a way that it remains possible to perform strictly national tasks independent from the other state. In practice however, the navies can hardly exist without each other anymore[31]. "Despite this far going integration and dependence this does not mean one can speak of one navy. The political decision to employ the armed forces is still limited to the national governments"[32] (Maas, 2011).

The cooperation shows that it is possible to specialize to a certain extent and keep national control, provided the two states can synchronize their security policy. A second factor is the different size and influence of the two states. Although officially they are equal, without the cooperation the Belgian navy would hardly exist or have influence[33]. It has in practice become dependant on the Netherlands and the cooperation is a mechanism enabling its further existence.

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[31] Interview with Cdre Sijtsma.

[32] Translation by author

[33] Interview with Cdre Sijtsma

4.2.3 1 GNC Corps Staff

In 1991 the ministers of defence of Germany and the Netherlands decided to establish a binational Corps Staff and collocated Air Operations Centre. In 1993 the governments of the Netherlands and Germany signed the treaty and the first commander was installed on 30 august 1995. The official intent was to transform the static and relatively slow national forces into more agile and operational reaction units able to cope with the new challenges after the Cold War. In reality it also served as a vehicle to guard the available land forces against further reductions (Deni, 2007).

The original binational corps staff has since developed into a multinational corps staff suited for international operations with multinational forces under command. Germany and the Netherlands are still the lead nations. The corps staff is currently one of NATO's High Readiness Force Headquarters and on a rotational basis performs as Land Component Command of the NATO Response Force.

The treaty, ratified by both parliaments, is supplemented by a specific agreement, signed by the ministers of defence and with a set of MoU's to arrange details. The MoU's are also signed at ministerial level, though not by the ministers personally. Annex B of the corps agreement lists an extensive number of specific authorities vested in the corps commander (1GNC Corps Agreement, 1997). This list goes beyond the normal OPCOM or OPCON arrangements traditionally used in multinational land formations (Young, 1997).

A separate Technical Arrangement concerning command and control arrangements was signed when the corps staff became a NATO rapid deployable corps staff. Signatories are the Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, The Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command Atlantic and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. In practice this means that after a decision by the North Atlantic Council, the corps staff will be available for employment under NATO command (1GNC TA C2 Arrangements, 2002).

When the corps was established, both nations were aware that the right delegated level of command authority was instrumental to achieve a deep integration of the forces under command (Young, 1997). This is reflected in article 6 of the treaty that establishes a command authority that goes further than traditional NATO command relations. (1 GNC

Corps Convention, 1998, p. 4). This so called *Integrated Directing and Control Authority* vests authority in the corps commander for all tasks, except those that are specifically related to national tasks and discipline. The authority includes all German and Dutch subunits.

Despite all agreements, arrangements and combined operational missions, such as in ISAF, not all goes well concerning the planning of activities and responsibilities. Originally the 1 GNC staff was intended to be the land component command for the NATO Response Force(NRF) -18 rotation. In 2009 Germany decided unilaterally to withdraw the offer to NATO. As a result, the corps staff would not be a part of NRF rotations again before 2015. Since the planning for NRF was an important building block for the training and transformation of large parts of the Dutch army, affiliated to the corps staff, after their obligations in Uruzghan, this caused frustration on the Dutch side.

The army had to change substantial parts of their planned training and fewer funds were available. Indirectly this would also affect the Dutch army-cooperation with Norway[34]. The unilateral German decision thus caused undesirable side effects, that would have been absent in the case of a single national headquarters, or could have been mitigated by better communication between the ministries of defence. At the lower levels this was certainly perceived as a breach of trust, since substantial parts of national Dutch planning were based on the earlier agreement with Germany on the planning of the 1 GNC staff.

4.2.4 EPAF expeditionary Air Wing (EEAW)

In the late 1970's the air forces of the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium and Denmark decided to cooperate on the replacement of their fighter capability with the F-16 fighter/bomber airplane. This initiative, with the intent to achieve benefits by economy of scale and collective participation in the development, became known as the European Participating Air Forces (EPAF). For several decades the cooperation developed and did in fact lead to the

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[34] As a result one of the goals defined in the Dutch-Norwegian ACI cooperation became impossible and funding for binational training was cut.

expected benefits. In 2001 Portugal joined the cooperation. The method of cooperation was so successful that the same approach was chosen for replacement of the F-16 by the F-35[35].

The cooperation led to frequent contact between the participants, resulting in operational cooperation. In October 2002 a tri-national detachment of 18 Dutch, Danish and Norwegian F-16 aircraft and one Dutch KDC-10 air-to-air refuelling plane deployed to in Kyrgyzstan in support of ground forces in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. Not all countries participated continuously; which countries participated and exactly with what number of planes varied over time and so did the location.

In 2004, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway Denmark and Portugal decided to formalize this operational cooperation in a MoU, with the intention to have a flexible framework for future operations. The purpose was to "…make optimum use of available and complementary assets in order to improve capabilities, synergy, preparedness and efficiency for deployed air operations involving EPAF members." (EEAW MoU, 2004, p. 3). In February 2006, the Netherlands and Norway each provided four F-16s in the 1st Netherlands-Norwegian European Participating Forces Expeditionary Air Wing (1 NLD/NOR EEAW), now operating from Kabul airfield in Afghanistan, in support of ISAF. When the Netherlands decided to move the F-16's south to Kandahar in summer 2006, Norway did not continue its contribution. For political reasons Norway was not willing to operate in southern Afghanistan.

The cooperation is not the establishment of a permanent unit, but a skeleton-framework for composition of a unit in case the sending states decide to participate in a mission. The command and control arrangements in this MoU reflect the "on call" character. Articles from the sections four, five and six of the MoU state that:

− It is a prerogative of each Participant to define the level of participation (4.1)

− This MoU will under no circumstances preclude the independent execution of the Participants' respective national tasks as well as their other international obligations. (4.2)

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[35] Information from interviews

‒ Nothing in this MoU is intended to conflict with international law or the national law of the Participants. In case of a conflict, international- and national law will prevail. (4.4)

‒ National contributions to the EEAW Detachment will remain under Full Command of the respective Partners. In principal, Partners will delegate Operational Command or Operational Control to the appropriate international commanders in accordance with international procedures. (5.3)

‒ For coordination purposes, the Partners will inform the Planning Cell in writing of any national caveats to the Rules of Engagement to a specific operation or exercise. (6.2)

The EEAW cooperation is an evolution of almost thirty years of cooperation that started with purchase of the same equipment, and the wish to achieve economy of scale. This approach is generally considered a success[36]. Participation in operations is however not mandatory and remains subject to the decision of any single government of the participants. The agreed command and control agreements in the MoU reflect this by mentioning (inter)national law, national caveats and national political autonomy concerning participation. The Dutch national decision to move the F-16's closer to the own ground forces in Uruzghan ended the multinational cooperation of the EEAW in Afghanistan.

4.2.5 UK / NL Amphibious Cooperation

Since 1973, a battalion of the Netherlands Marine Corps has been integrated in the British 3 Commando Brigade during exercises and real conflict situations. Together, these form the UK/NL Amphibious Force. The goal of the cooperation is the "provision of a coherent and interoperable littoral manoeuvre force at the formation level" (UK/NL AF MoU, 2005). This cooperation is the oldest of its kind in Europe (Brinkman, 2006). The UK/NL Amphibious Force specialises in conducting amphibious operations.

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[36] All interviewed agreed this model should be considered a success, although some remarked this has only been possible by the fact that the US used a large number of F-16's.

Dutch Marine infantry battalions are assigned to the UK/NL AF on rotational basis and in practice become a battalion in the 3 Commando Brigade (UK). The cooperation between the Dutch Marines and the Royal Marines has led to extensive integration and interoperability in the areas of operations, training, doctrine and logistics. The UK and The Netherlands have furthermore conducted a close coordination concerning the use of naval assets and transport in support of the amphibious elements. During the Cold War, UK/NL AF was a part of the forces intended to operate on NATO's northern flank, closely allied to US Marine forces. The combined UK/NL AF was deployed combined only once. In 1991 elements deployed to northern Iraq for operation Safe Haven, providing safety for the Kurdish people.

The renewed MoU was signed on ministerial level in 2005. This MoU interestingly specifically states that other states are **not** welcome to participate. "While supporting the development of European amphibious capability, the complexities of coordinating and integrating more than 2 nations mitigate against wider membership." (UK/NL AF MoU, 2005, p. 7). When UK and NL elements are concentrated into the combined taskforce, the command and control arrangements will be established according to task, composition and ratio of forces. The full command is with the national Chiefs of Defence. The (partial) command over the forces will be delegated to subordinate (NATO) commanders depending on the situation. In case of a deployment for the EU, "other command relationships will be established." (UK/NL AF MoU, 2005, p. 10).

4.2.6 Army Cooperation Initiative (ACI)

In the late nineties and early 2000's many countries were still restructuring their armed forces and had a surplus of equipment. Norway and the Netherlands decided to combine efforts and use each others' surplus equipment to fill existing gaps in their defence structures. This resulted in the so called "Package Deal". The deal included artillery- engineer- and air defence equipment. The package deal was part of a bigger effort of both countries to enhance their defence cooperation. The Declaration of Intent from 2002 aimed at a closer cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries involving all services. (DOI Norway and The Netherlands, 2002).

By unilateral Norwegian decision the the package deal was cancelled. The personnel involved were already in place and the two chiefs of the armies decided to continue the cooperation, with the reduced ambition of operational cooperation. As a result the Norwegian Brigade North became affiliated to the training cycle of the first German-Netherlands Corps and the Telemark Battalion became affiliated to the 43 Mechanised Brigade. In 2004 Norway contributed to the Dutch led NRF-4 and in 2005 the 1 GNC conducted a large exercise in Norway. Although the total package deal failed, many projects were continued separately. The Netherlands did purchase the NASAMS system, engineer equipment was exchanged and Norway could make use of the knowledge on RPV systems to acquire the tactical UAV "Raven".

The ACI was formalized in 2007 with a document without legal status, although it in practise was seen as MoU (ACI, 2007). Signatories are the army commanders. Connected to the ACI document were seven different MoU's. In 2010 the set of MoU's was replaced by a new co-signed document (the ACI Roadmap) leading to the formation of a combined Dutch-Norwegian contribution to the NRF-18 Land Component Command (LCC) under the leadership of the 1 GNC. Exchange personnel were stationed in staffs and units in as well the Netherlands as well as in Norway.

Both army-commanders were dedicated to the cooperation, but stressed the need to avoid dependency on each other. Simultaneously they "acknowledge that in the long run restrictive effects may come with intensified co-operation and deepened integration." (ACI, 2007, p. 1). The caution has proved to be justified. A change in the NRF-rotation of LCC's (see also par 4.2.3 on 1 GNC) and massive reductions in the exercise budgets have led to cancellation of the original NRF-18 goal. The frequent cooperation with exercises and the presence of exchange personnel has enabled contacts between commanders at all levels of the Norwegian and Netherlands' armies, thus allowing use of each others' expertise, capabilities and resources.

The unilateral decision of Norway to cancel the package deal has caused disappointment and frustration especially in the Dutch defence staff and ministry. It caused a budget deficit of approximately 100 million Euros and delayed the introduction of much needed systems. As a result the actual implementation of what later became the ACI, as well as new initiatives met much opposition and distrust amongst higher officers and civilian

employees of the Dutch armed forces. The cancellation was perceived as a breach of trust. Norwegian officers were aware of this, but saw themselves faced with a political decision[37].

The ACI also faced limitations caused by the level of cooperation. In Norway as well as in the Netherlands, decisions on budgets, materiel, equipment and personnel are increasingly taken on defence staff or ministerial level. The freedom of action for the army-level has decreased in the last years. The Dutch-Norwegian cooperation, important at army level, did on occasion not receive the same attention and support at the level of defence staff and ministry in both countries. The presence of exchange personnel was a positive factor, enabling an enhanced quality of information and shorter lines of communication[38].

4.2.7 Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC)

One of the military shortfalls in many European countries is the lack of available strategic air and sea transport. At the 1999 NATO summit in Washington the decision was made to improve the collective strategic air- and sealift capabilities. At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, this decision was translated into specific agreements between a number of NATO countries. They agreed to pool their resources and provide NATO with the required air- and sealift capabilities. Ten NATO countries[39] and Sweden and Finland began cooperation to establish and operate the Strategic Air Wing (SAC), with three C-17 transport airplanes.

The twelve partner states have jointly established the NATO Airlift Management Organization (NAMO). NAMO then again has established the NATO Airlift Management Agency (NAMA) which is responsible for building up the organization and the operation of the SAC. The SAC Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW), that actually operates the aircraft, is based in Hungary and in operation since July 2009. Operations have included support to ISAF, humanitarian relief in Haiti and Pakistan and peacekeeping missions in Africa (NATO SAC, 2010). The participating countries receive a number of "flight hours" according to the size of

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[37] Interview with Brig Solberg and MG Knutsen

[38] Based on interviews.

[39] The NATO-participants are Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the United States

their contribution. These flight hours can be used for any purpose in support of national requirements. The unit is multinationally manned.

The initiative for the SAC was taken at the level of the North Atlantic Council. The MoU is signed by the ministers of defence. Concerning command and control it is arranged that the member nationals maintain full command and that operational control over the participating personnel will be given to the commanding officer of the heavy air wing (HAW/CC). Participating nations have the right to deny certain types of cargo and may prohibit crews of their nationality from cooperating in transporting this cargo. The participants are however expected to inform the HAW/CC be forehand of these caveats. (SAC MoU, 2008, p. 33).

The construction of rights and responsibilities in the MoU allows countries to use the flight hours according to their national priorities and needs, as long as this does not break international law and does not have a commercial intent. Rules and regulations have been agreed in order to prioritize competing requests for flight-hours. The HAW/CC is the ultimate authority in de-conflicting competing flight-hour requests (SAC MoU, 2008, p. 34).

The SAC has been established to cater for a much needed, but scarce resource: strategic air transport. All interviewed considered the initiative as a well functioning organization. The partners have succeeded in establishing a multinational unit with capabilities that would not have been able available for a single smaller nation. The high demand for strategic air transport has further has increased the pressure to find a solution and come to cooperation. The fact that two partners are not NATO members (Sweden and Finland) has been a "problem" that could be accepted and managed by establishing the NATO Airlift Management Organisation (NAMO).

4.2.8 Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO)

The Nordic countries, Norway, Sweden, Finland and to a certain extent also Iceland and Denmark, have on several occasions tried to coordinate their security policies and to come to defence cooperation. This has been difficult. The countries have, especially during the Cold War, had different perceptions of security, different defence-traditions and different memberships in international organizations (Saxi, 2011). In 2009, three different forms of

cooperation were brought under one umbrella to increase the effect and streamline the efforts[40]: Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO).

"The main aim and purpose of the Nordic defence Cooperation is to strengthen the participating nations´ national defence, explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions." (NORDEFCO MoU, 2009, p. 3). NORDEFCO does therefore not intend to establish a common unit or capability. It is agreed on governmental level and the MoU is signed by ministers of defence or foreign affairs. In 2007 the Chiefs of Defence of Norway and Sweden (Diesen and Syrén) had already presented a feasibility study on "mutual reinforcing defence structures", which indicated at potential efficiency benefits and increases in operational effect (Innset, 2010).

NORDEFCO is interesting in the light of this study because of the debate it caused. The initiative is not without criticism, although all are in favour of cooperation and increased efficiency. General Diesen was aware of this when he remarked that he had doubts about the political will to actually go so far as to close bases and disband units nationally, in favour of international effects (Diesen, 2010).

This was not the only reason for scepticism. Magnus Petersson argued that the NORDEFCO could be perceived as competition for NATO and that the participating countries might be more culturally different than perceived at first glance (Petersson, 2010). Bjørn Innset came to the conclusion that national sovereignty would set clear limitations on closer defence cooperation and integration (Innset, 2010). Håkon Lunde Saxi claims that certain of the limitations could be mitigated, but only if visible and clear benefits could be achieved and shown in order to overcome domestic opposition (Saxi, 2011).

According to Grete Faremo, Norwegian Minister of Defence, increased cooperation on training, planning, exercises and acquisition, will continue. A Nordic declaration of solidarity was not an option in January 2011 (Faremo, 2011a). One month later however, she stated, although such a declaration would have to be in respect and accordance with NATO commitments, that...

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[40] Peace Support education and training (NORDCAPS), Armament Cooperation (NORDAC) and the Enhanced cooperation (NORDSUP)

> "We are considering to make a joint Declaration of Solidarity between the Nordic countries, confirming the extent to which our partnerships have evolved. The idea is partly to sum up our achievements so far, partly to formalise our mutual support of common values and interests."(Faremo, 2011b)

Clearly the political debate on Nordic defence cooperation is continuing. The academic debate does illustrate the relation between cooperation, autonomy and sovereignty, as shown by Innset and Saxi. There seems to be a serious conviction that cooperation in this form will lead to less national control and independence. The MoU seems to reflect this thought when it states that…

> "Nothing in this MoU will imply any obligation far the Participants to commit themselves to participating in certain activities or projects. Unless otherwise agreed, each Participant retains the right to withdraw at any stage from activities or projects conducted under the auspices of this MoU" (NORDEFCO MoU, 2009).

It is difficult to imagine true benefits of cooperation when there does not have to be a serious commitment and all are free to withdraw from the combined efforts. Presumably smaller beneficial effects could be achieved, but serious gains require serious commitments. As long as the domestic pressure for independency prevails, such cooperation remains unlikely. The NORDEFCO case typifies the central difficulties of IDC.

4.2.9 European Air Transport Command (EATC)

The European Air Transport Command is an evolution of earlier initiatives to make better use of the available air transport assets of the air forces of European states. The original plan is from 1999, when Germany and France decided to cooperate, but it never became effective as a command. In 2002 the initiative was formalized in the European Airlift Co-ordination Cell (EACC). This developed into the European Airlift Centre in 2004. In April 2006 a letter of intent was signed between Germany and France to take the step from coordination to a real command. The EATC concept was agreed between Germany, France, The Netherlands and Belgium. In 2010 the technical agreement (TA) for the EATC was signed (EATC TA, 2010).

The difference between earlier the coordination and the current form, which is a command, is that the EATC actually has peace-time command over the air transport fleets. The participants have agreed to…

"Gradually transfer and integrate within one single **multinational** command all relevant **national** responsibilities and personnel which together direct the force generation and the mission execution of the combined air transport capabilities, thus improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the Participants' military Air Transport (AT) efforts." (Rouceau, 2010, p. 3)

The step to leave international coordination and place the air transport assets under command indicates a high level of trust and confidence in the multinational command, stationed in Eindhoven, The Netherlands. The reasons to come to this solution were, amongst others, cuts in defence budgets, reduction of available personnel, the necessity to decrease the logistic "footprint" during operations and the need for interoperability improvements (ibid).

The member states place their air transport planes, 165 in total[41], under OPCON of the EATC. The planes remain stationed on their national bases, spread across the participating states. The EATC assembles transport needs, formulates tasks and distributes these in the most efficient way to the best suited unit. At all times, the nations have the right to revoke the transfer of authority to the EATC and claim their assets for national use, without stating a reason (EATC TA, 2010). The EATC at Eindhoven is manned by 156 personnel of all participating states. These remain under Full Command of the respective nations regarding individual disciplinary matters, but are otherwise OPCON to the EATC commander.

Besides the operational execution of air transport, the EATC also has the task to develop policies and common standards related to air transport employment, training, technical, and logistical support. These are the so called "functional areas". The recommending, coordinating or commanding authority in this area depends however on the functional domain or subject (Rouceau, 2010). The EATC hierarchically is placed between the four national air force commands and the four national executive air transport units.

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[41] 26 C-130, 100 C-160, 1 Airbus 330, 9 Airbus 310, 3 DC-10, 2 A319, 4 CC-601, 2 A340, 10 CASA 235 and 8 smaller VIP transport.

The EATC does also face challenges. For this study the following are interesting: countries give different levels of transfer of authority concerning the functional area's, there still is no EATC Treaty or MoU and there is no common view on the enlargement policy[42].

4.3 Overview

Placing the cases in an overview gives the following result:

	AWACS 1978	ABNL 1995	1 GNC 1998	EPAF EEAW 2004	UK/NL AF 2005	ACI 2007	SAC C-17 2008	NORDEF CO 2009	EATC 2010
Agreement level	Govt / MoD	Govt / MoD	Govt / Parliament	Govt / MoD	Govt / MoD	Army Chiefs	Govt & NAC	Govt / MoD / FA	Defence Staffs on behalf of MoD
Form	MoU	Agreement at MoD level	Treaty, Agreement & MoU	MoU	MoU	Document	MoU	MoU	TA
Command Authority	OPCOM to SACEUR Crews OPCON	OPCOM with possibility for national use	OPCOM with special binational authority	OPCOM / OPCON with room for caveats	Situation dependant. Appropriate command will be delegated	None	OPCON	None	OPCON for Operations, varying for development
Caveats	Not foreseen	Not foreseen	Not foreseen	Rules to manage caveats. Intent = common ROE's	Different C2 for EU-missions	Both Army chiefs verbally expressed necessity to avoid dependency	Certain crew reservations because of national law	Not foreseen	Mechanism to revoke Transfer of Authority in case of national necessity
Permanent (P) / On order (O/O)	P	P in peace time, O/O for crisis	P	O/O	O/O	-/- Exchange personnel	P	-/-	P
Incidents / Remarks	German crews not allowed missions because of national restrictions	Deep peace-time integration of prepara-tion. Ability to deploy nationally	One-sided German decision to change NRF rotation	One-sided Dutch decision to move to Kandahar influenced Norwegian continuatio n at Kabul	Specific restriction to avoid participa-tion by other countries	One sided NOR decision to cancel "package-deal" Coopera-tion means dependancy	Specific clause regarding national laws on transport of goods	Academic debate on relation security policy and cooperation	Development from coordinating body to a multinational command

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[42] Spain and Luxemburg have the intent of joining and several other European states have signalled interest to do so.

4.4 Analysis

The first factor analysed was the level at which the cooperation was agreed or confirmed. These vary from army–commander level in case of the ACI to ratification by parliament for the 1 GNC. In all cases with the intent of establishing a permanent international military structure but one, governmental or parliamentary confirmation is present. The EATC for now only was confirmed on behalf of the defence staffs, but the necessity for a "higher" level of confirmation is realized. This indicates that International Defence Cooperation is a political issue, or at least requires political approval.

The second factor of analysis was the form of document used to formalize the cooperation. In practice the Memorandum of Understanding is most frequently used. A MoU can however vary from a relative simple and uncontroversial bilateral document to a politically highly debated and contested international agreement between large numbers of states. In the case of the 1 GNC, the German and Netherlands' parliaments have ratified a treaty regarding the cooperation, making it more formal under international law and preventing easy changes. Although the EATC cooperation is formalised only by a technical agreement, this does not seem to affect the build up and operations. The form of agreement is apparently less important than the process of achieving agreement on the contents.

The third element analysed was the level of command authority over their personnel and operations that states were willing to hand over to others. Full command is always retained at the national level. States are willing to delegate operational command or control. The oldest three collaborations all have OPCOM delegated as default, although all have some form of reservation or adaption. Newer forms (since 2004) seem to have OPCON as standard, but depending on the situation this can be amended. The case of 1 GNC is special since Germany and the Netherlands have agreed create an extended command authority for the Corps Commander.

Simultaneously with the change from default OPCOM to OPCON, the documents start to include the formal possibility for states to formulate caveats, use own rules of engagement and possibilities to revoke transfer of authority back to national command. More

recent MoU's explicitly emphasize that the MoU's are not intended to conflict with international or national law of the participants, while this was more implicit in the earlier MoU's. The shift in command authority and the formalized option to have caveats began to appear after the events of 9/11, the beginning of US-led operations in Afghanistan and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. In particular the American decision to invade Iraq led to deep and serious controversies between the US and a number of European allies like France and Germany (Moore, 2007). The German restriction on the use of AWACS crews is a consequence of this division. Possibly governments became more aware of the political risks of coalition operations and wanted to build guarantees against automatic participation into the agreements. The available documents alone however are not enough to conclude these are linked, since they do not state why these restrictions were included.

From analyzing the documents one can conclude that all participating states are committed to making the cooperation work and contribute accordingly. On the other hand one can get the impression all are looking for a guarantee that others will keep their part of the deal as well. Reality shows a different practice. On several occasions states were not able or willing to fulfil their part of the agreement. Germany had to withdraw their AWACS crews from participation over Turkey for domestic reasons. The Dutch decision to move the EEAW contribution caused the termination of the joint effort in Kabul. Norway decided in a late stage to cancel the materiel cooperation "Package Deal" with the Netherlands, although one can say this was not part of a formalized cooperation. In all three cases national interests came first, to the dislike of the partners.

The analyzed documents in themselves do not give conclusive insight into the role of trust. One can explain far-going arrangements concerning authority of each others' personnel and actions as a sign of trust. An example of this is the far-going delegation in the case of the 1 GNC, arranged in a treaty. On the other hand one can argue that "among friends there is no need for too many formalities". An absence of formalities and rules and faith that the right solution will be found according to the situation can also be a sign of trust.

The recent NORDEFCO cooperation stands out because of the presence of an academic and political debate that followed the initiative. This debate includes the question whether, and if yes in how far, national security can become dependant on other states, including non-NATO countries. Besides confirming the relation between sovereignty, trust

and security, it is also an indication that the security policy "tradition" one comes from is important in analyzing the potential for cooperation partners.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the question if a pattern could be established on the practical agreements on the role of sovereignty in the founding documents of cases of IDC, and if the command relations can indicate the level of trust the partners have in each other.

The founding-documents, how these are formulated and the agreed command relations alone do not provide sufficient insight in the role of trust. Incidents concerning the initiatives indicate that trust does play an important part in coming to cooperation, or determining if an initiative will be continued. Whether lack of trust that another state will not fulfil its obligations is one of reasons that make states reluctant to engage in cooperation, or if other factors play a role will be explored further using the interview results in the next chapter.

The analysis indicates furthermore that states need mechanisms or guarantees to control the balance between sovereignty and dependency; although these offer no guarantee and agreements can be changed or neglected for numbers of reasons. States increasingly seem to struggle with collective actions that are not necessarily in line with their national efforts or capabilities. In order to reserve or revoke their control, more recent MoU's, TA's and other agreements contain clauses and articles allowing states to withdraw or to abstain from participation. Sovereignty remains a key factor in military cooperation with other states.

Third, IDC is indeed a political issue, or it can become one when national interests, policies or possibilities conflict with earlier agreements. The academic debate on the NORDEFCO cooperation is quite interesting in this context, especially since the dependency issue is discussed.

5. Trust and Sovereignty at the political-military level.

This chapter will discuss the motives and mechanisms behind IDC in order to realize a better insight into the role of trust and sovereignty at the political-military level. Four high ranking officers working in the defence staffs and Ministries of Defence of Norway and the Netherlands were interviewed. The officers bear responsibility for advice on IDC to the political leadership and for implementing IDC.

The interviews were built up around general questions regarding IDC and hampering factors and mechanisms. The interviewees were asked for their opinion on the role of trust and sovereignty in a broader context of international cooperation in general. The interviews were however not specifically tailored to the cases as presented in chapter five. Some of the cases were discussed as examples. The research question as such was however not presented literally to the officers interviewed in order to avoid biased answers.

First, the reasons why states want to cooperate militarily will be explored. This is followed by an assessment of which forms of IDC are likely and which are unlikely to happen. The motives why cooperation is unlikely or less likely to happen successfully are especially interesting when they include trust as factor. Finding out which factors actually work for and against IDC is the second part of this chapter. Finally the findings will be analyzed and related to the findings from chapters four and five and the conclusions will be presented.

5.1 Motives for conducting IDC

States do not engage in international cooperation without good reason. This applies to IDC as well. There is an agreement among the interviewees that states conduct IDC out of self interest. They expect a form of benefit or return for their efforts. The forms in which this return comes is however diverse and can differ with the situation or cooperation.

The first important reason to cooperate is that it enables achieving more collectively that the single nations would be able to attain. This looks like a very simple explanation, but it lies at the heart of every effort or initiative. The mechanisms that lead to this synergetic

effect are however diverse. They can be roughly divided into two categories: reduced input and increased output. An example of reducing input is the effort to come to cooperation in the development and purchase of equipment. Economy of scale can lead to lower prices per item. This allows for example a higher output (more equipment) for the same budget. A second example is the SAC / C-17 initiative. States cooperating can afford a pool of C-17 planes they otherwise would not have been able to afford and operate.

An example of increasing the collective output is the EATC. The already available air transport capacity of the member states can be used more efficiently when they are under a unified command. Empty return flights can be avoided and the mix of aircraft types allows a more efficient use of assets by better tailoring of transport needs and transport capabilities. Thus the assets already available lead to a higher output in terms of effectiveness as well as efficiency.

A second reason is interoperability with coalition partners. This is particularly important from a small-state perspective. When smaller states wish to participate in international operations, they have to be interoperable with especially the larger partners. Very few states are still able to conduct military operations on their own. Military from smaller states that participate in operations will therefore always do this as part of a coalition with a bigger state like the US, the UK or France. A state that desires to contribute with relevance is therefore required to be interoperable with its partners. Not being able to "plug and play" with leading nations can lead to marginalization and irrelevance. Contrary to most other forms of cooperation this does not necessarily lead to savings. It might even require extra investments to become interoperable.

Interoperability with specific states is strongly connected to the security policy of a state. It can encompass a choice for several decades. Defence equipment is generally in use for a very long time and developing conceptual interoperability, like for example cooperation between air forces, might even entail the education of generations of pilots. The decision to develop and maintain interoperability is therefore a strategic long term choice.

Other reasons named for engaging in structural IDC are common security interests[43], maintaining quality of training and professional standards and maintaining diversity[44] among staff. Furthermore, today's operations in ad-hoc coalitions and with new partners require the capability to adapt and be flexible in order to be able to work together. At the operational, tactical and technical levels the reality of operations is completely multinational. Officers and soldiers need to be prepared and trained for this. Multinationality has therefore to be integrated into training programs and exercises.

Among the reasons given, the most important reason for conducting IDC is very clear according to the interviewees: saving money. The increasing costs of defence equipment and personnel combined with flat or decreasing budgets, force defence organizations to cooperate and where possible increase their efficiency.

5.2 IDC in practice

In order to achieve insight into which factors influence the chance of successful cooperation the interviewees were asked if they saw any areas that were specifically suited or not suited at all for internationalization. The answers to this question varied and do not provide a clear pattern. They do however provide the insight that some areas are probably more open to cooperation than others.

5.2.1 Areas unlikely for multinational cooperation

Only three areas were specifically named as either too difficult or undesirable for IDC. One of the more obvious areas is the field of intelligence. Intelligence is organized mainly nationally and intelligence results are considered nationally owned. Sharing intelligence between states has been highly problematic and difficult for many years. Especially tactical intelligence, necessary to enable operations during missions and necessary also in the light of

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[43] MG Knutsen named NORDEFCO in this context.

[44] MG de Kruif qualified the diversity in the RC South staff as a highly appreciated asset.

force protection of own forces, should always remain under national command[45]. The same reason was given in relation to a possible internationalization of submarines. These were too valuable as national intelligence assets, and therefore should not be considered for international pooling[46].

A second area given as example where internationalization might not be possible or desirable is when systems are very complex, operate in high risk situations and require a very long time to become operational, such as operating submarines[47]. Multinationality on board such a platform would be too complicated.

The third area where multinational cooperation would not be possible is when national laws prohibit certain actions. For example, Norway has signed the Ottawa Convention. A Norwegian flight crew, even when operating a multinationally owned C-17 from the SAC, is therefore not allowed to cooperate in transporting anti personnel mines[48]. A second legal limitation could arise when a state does not allow foreign militaries to participate in the enforcement of national sovereignty.

In general, very few areas for cooperation are not feasible or principally closed for cooperation, although states want to maintain the final say about operations with their military forces[49]. The idea of which capabilities absolutely have to be owned nationally has changed over the years. Multinationality has become the standard in order to maintain a credible defence capability. The development runs parallel to the decreasing budgets and increasing costs[50]. Multinational solutions become more acceptable with the increase of the budgetary problems: less money encourages cooperation[51].

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[45] MG de Kruif

[46] Brig Solberg

[47] Cdre Sijtsma

[48] The Ottawa Convention prohibits the production, transport, use, stockpiling, and transfer of anti-personnel mines.

[49] Cdre Sijtsma

[50] Brig Solberg

[51] Brig Solberg

5.2.2 Areas likely for multinational cooperation

In certain areas IDC is more likely to become a success. All interviewees named cooperation in the development and purchase of equipment as an obvious example. Simultaneously they mentioned the problems in realizing such cooperation. Multinational cooperation in the purchase of equipment can only become beneficial if all are willing to accept certain compromises and do not insist that "their" solution is best. All interviewees agreed that one had to accept a "good enough" solution and not necessarily go for the best possible. If this is not acceptable one should probably decide to organize the development of equipment in such a way that states can diversify some parts or modules, as was finally done in the development of NATO frigates.[52]

The second mentioned field where it is logical to cooperate is in operations. Practice shows that at the technical and tactical level problems can be solved and a far reaching integration is possible, despite differences in tactics, techniques and procedures. Even national caveats can be overcome if states announce these in time so they can be taken into account in the planning of operations. Furthermore a likeminded willingness to share risks is important to achieve mutual trust[53].

A third logical area of cooperation is logistics. Various elements of logistics were given as examples. The EATC was mentioned as an excellent example of how multinational cooperation enables a better use of available resources, while at the same states can always withdraw the planes they might need for strictly national purposes. The area of transport in general is very well suited to cooperation. Other forms of logistical cooperation, like maintenance and supply, could be explored much further than currently is done. A hampering factor is the lack of standardization of equipment.

In areas with a higher level of standardization, international cooperation is easier and becoming more and more the rule. An example is the increasing use of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA). This agency's main task is to assist NATO

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[52] Cdre Sijtsma

[53] MG de Kruif

nations by organizing the common procurement and supply of spare parts and arranging maintenance and repair services. It can work for the support of various weapon systems of member states. NAMSA is available when two or more nations operate the same system and have made the decision to use NAMSA's support facilities[54].

Two of the advantages with logistical cooperation are that it is politically rather uncontroversial and that it can be easily quantified financially. Supply and maintenance are, at least perceived to be less directly connected to the use of weapons. The political debate on responsibility for the effects thus becomes less controversial. Furthermore, logistic cooperation in supply, maintenance and services can lead to direct and visible savings, which makes the cooperation attractive.

The fourth area where IDC is likely to take place successfully is in technically advanced and very expensive and rare capabilities like air- and missile defence, medium and larger unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), command and control systems, guided weapons, etc. These have become so expensive that very few states can afford the development, purchase and maintenance alone[55]. In essence this is the same mechanism that led to the NATO AWACS project and the SAC institutive.

The dilemma with these kinds of systems, especially with the weapons systems, is that it triggers the debate on political responsibility for the decision to use them. The fact that NATO today has ownership over a number of systems for command and control, warning, etc, but does not operate any weapon system illustrates this debate.

Summing up, according to the interviewees no area of IDC is without difficulties or challenges, but the fields best suited would be those of acquisition of defence equipment, operations, logistics and the acquisition of systems that are not affordable for single countries.

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54 NAMSA can also be used for services not related to weapons, like managing field camps and services for deployed forces. A study conducted by the Netherlands Defence Staff showed possible savings up to 50% compared to national management. Info Cdre Sijtsma

55 Brig Solberg

5.3 Which factors influence IDC?

In general, IDC was described as a complex matter. At the same it was recognized as a necessity, especially for smaller states, in order to be able to maintain capabilities, save costs and be able to deploy for "out of area" operations[56]. There is no single answer to the question why IDC is so complicated. The following paragraphs present the most important favorable and hampering factors for IDC derived from the four interviews. They influence decision making at the defence staff and ministerial level when considering IDC. These factors are important to provide insight into especially the role of sovereignty and trust.

5.3.1 Favorable factors

First and foremost, a shortfall in necessary but expensive capabilities increases the willingness for international cooperation. Cooperation can make these capabilities affordable. The flat or decreasing defence budgets, combined with rising costs accelerate the speed and levels at which IDC becomes a realistic option.

The second relevant factor is globalization. This trend affects military operations and in a sense is "inevitable"[57]. Missions are executed with a multitude of participating nations. Also NATO missions include the participation of non-NATO states from all over the world. Furthermore the influence of civil agencies and NGO's on military operations is increasing. These factors contribute to making international cooperation much more normal at a lower level. This will have a psychological effect on the acceptance of international cooperation as "default" modus operandi for the military[58].

The third factor is membership of existing international organizations. Although operations can be conducted with many different partners, the decision to start a long-lasting partnership or cooperation is affected by the fact that a state is member of the same international framework, like NATO or the EU[59]. Being a member of the same organization

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[56] MG Knutsen

[57] MG de Kruif

[58] MG de Kruif

[59] MG Knutsen

is not a guarantee of successful cooperation, but it does make it easier to use existing organizations, frameworks and meeting platforms. For most member states it is difficult to imagine starting new materiel cooperation if it would not be based on NATO standards. Like-mindedness and a shared political view are important factors. The cooperation within NATO has led to a situation where most remaining differences have become manageable. Within NATO, all countries have become potential partners, although not for all forms of cooperation[60].

The fourth factor is closely related to the previous one. Successful earlier cooperation does produce trust in a system and in partners and is likely to be repeated. The EPAF/F-16 cooperation was taken as a model for the JSF/F-35 project, and with some of the same participating partners[61]. The SAC/C-17 cooperation uses a similar business model as the AWACS-cooperation did, although adaptations had to be made since two participating nations are not NATO members. A previous successful history and a proven track record of concrete results and benefits make the decision to start a new program on the same premises easier.

5.3.2 Hindering factors

The interviewees in general had no difficulty naming factors that hampered or negatively influenced the chance of success within IDC. The factors can be categorized into technical reasons and factors regarding content.

Three technical hampering factors were named. The first is the use of different standards, leading to technical incompatibility and additional costs. Second, cooperation becomes more difficult and is less likely to succeed with an increase in the number of participants. Thirdly, transaction costs can sincerely limit the effects gained by cooperation. These costs include decreased effectiveness as result of extra coordination, language, personnel and travelling costs etc. This explains to a certain extent why cooperation between

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[60] Cdre Sijtsma

[61] MG Knutsen

air forces is relatively cheaper to accomplish than between army elements. The air planes can more easily travel the involved distances with fewer additional costs.

Besides these more technical factors, the following four factors negatively influence IDC. Firstly, IDC is considered a political matter. As discussed in chapter three, all military actions are subject to political control. This does complicate cooperation, especially at higher levels. Structural military cooperation takes many years to implement. Most often the military time horizon is beyond the political four year perspective. Governments can change, possibly leading to changes on earlier decisions[62]. This adds uncertainty to the military cooperation efforts. Furthermore, governments depend on domestic political support. They therefore need the possibility to abstain from participating in military actions, or even to reverse earlier taken decisions. This mechanism is has a strong effect on structural cooperation. Political insecurity hampers IDC.

The interviewees in general agreed that a truly deep military integration would probably not be possible without (at least some) political integration. MG de Kruif observes a discrepancy between the reality on tactical and technical levels and on the strategic level. At the lower levels multinational integration is a fact of life, while the strategic level still struggles with it and lacks a clear view or vision on how to handle this development. The formation of multinational units solely based on budgetary arguments was not considered to have a realistic chance of success.

The second factor is the protection of national autonomy and independence. Role specialization within NATO has been discussed for many years. Financially as well as military it would make sense to develop military capabilities multinationally from the start and focus on only certain capabilities per state[63]. The reason is does not happen is that states want to be able to act independently. They do not want to become dependant on other states for deciding to and being able to use their armed forces, even if in reality this use will always be in an international setting[64]. The standard approach is therefore still that states first see if

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[62] Cdre Sijtsma emphasized this point explicitly.

[63] Cdre Sijtsma

[64] Cdre Sijtsma, Brig Solberg, MG de Kruif

they can organize their capabilities along national lines, with international solutions as a second option.

Independence includes the protection of national industrial capabilities and knowledge. For smaller states this form of independence is however not realistic any longer. Most defence equipment producers have merged into a few international conglomerates. According to MG Knutsen defence procurement is the area where probably the most savings could be accomplished. Controversially, producers have little to gain from standardization, but have an interest in producing as many versions of equipment as possible. They are to a certain extent still encouraged to do this by the national defence equipment organizations[65].

The third factor is of a more psychological nature. MG Knutsen and MG de Kruif both stressed the role of trust among the military forces involved in the cooperation. They even went so far as to state that even though political agreement on cooperation might be achieved between partners, for the military forces involved it is necessary to have faith in each other and to be able to trust each other. This is a "bottom-up" requirement from the military side. If the political top-down guidance and the bottom up requirement do not match, or the military do not have faith in each others' capabilities, professionalism and freedom of action, the cooperation is not likely to succeed[66].

A different mechanism involving trust is that states need a certain "minimum level" of trust in the potential partner(s). It does take a long time, and preferably a previous successful cooperation to come a level of trust allowing a deeper integration. A breach of trust will have long lasting effects on the perceived reliability of a potential partner[67].

The fourth factor concerns risk management. Strictly speaking this is both a technical factor and a factor pertaining to content. Cooperation does in almost all cases lead to a form

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[65] MG de Kruif emphasized the still existing role of the military-industrial complex in this context

[66] Military can be faced with a situation where they have the will and means to undertake certain actions, but are restricted by political caveats.

[67] Several interviewed named the failed Netherlands-Norwegian "Package Deal" as an example. This deal intended to exchange superfluous and new equipment of both countries. In the final stages of the negotiations, when the Netherlands perceived the deal as "done" and final agreement as a formality, Norwegian political intervention lead to cancellation. This would have a profound and long lasting negative impact on the willingness of Dutch high military and especially civil employees in the Ministry to engage in future deals with Norway, especially regarding equipment.

of compromise and a favourable outcome is therefore not guaranteed. If a state considers cooperation, it must therefore have a reasonable chance that the compromise is still better than what otherwise could reasonably be expected. It other words: it has to deliver results. States do have a tendency to prefer a "certain" national solution above a "possible" multinational result, even if the national solution would mean less production in absolute terms. Since all states make this judgement, the added insecurity increases and the necessary "win-win-situation" becomes less likely[68].

Summing up, a variety of hampering factors was recognized by the interviewed officers. Among these factors, trust and sovereignty play an important role but so does the national domestic interest in protecting autonomy and political accountability for military actions. To which extent can a state be trusted if governments change or popular support forces a government to change political course? The findings support the mechanism described in chapter three on the relation between domestic political accountability and IDC. The interview results furthermore show that although IDC is almost perceived as "standard" at lower working levels, at the military-strategic and political level it is debatable and controversial. It is still seen as second option compared to a national solution.

5.4 Analysis

The intent of this chapter was to achieve a better insight into the motives and mechanisms behind IDC and thus a better insight into especially the role of trust and sovereignty at the political-military level. How far and in what ways do these influence decision making on IDC?

States have a wish to maintain their independency and autonomy. The extent to which this affects and limits the possibilities for structural permanent cooperation is higher than expected. Despite very high pressure on defence budgets and increasing costs, states are very reluctant to give up their balanced, complete defence organizations. Furthermore one would expect that the practice of multinational operations would lead to a closer non-operational

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[68] A "win-win" situation is one of the guiding principles when considering IDC, at least from the Norwegian perspective. (Briefing by MG Knutsen)

cooperation. States revert to international cooperation in the form of standing units only out of necessity. And even if they manage to create a working system, states include mechanisms that allow strictly national operations.

A second observation is that, with the exception of a few areas, almost all fields are in principle open for cooperation. This seems to be contradictory to the first observation that states wish to maintain their autonomy. A possible explanation is that the boundary for what is an "acceptable" form or area is influenced or determined by the political choice of whether a state chooses to have full control over a very small defence structure, or less control over a larger, but shared, capability.

When states choose, or see themselves forced, to cooperate they seek cooperation with reliable partners. They furthermore prefer a system for the cooperation that has proved to work. Limiting the numbers of partners and choosing "like-minded" partners are other ways of controlling the risk.

Thirdly, although political control over the armed forces is a basic principle in western societies, it is a considerable weakness when considering IDC. This manifests itself in the implementation of national laws and caveats. Furthermore, governments might change political character and decide to change decisions or preferred partners and coalitions. Without political integration, military integration will be less likely to succeed. In the absence of a coherent view and policy, IDC solely based on achieving savings and rationalized self interest is likely to be limited to non-controversial areas such as transport or logistics.

Trust as factor is more complicated to evaluate than autonomy. Previous successful cooperation certainly helps to build trust between states. Also the membership of the same organization, like NATO, can help. It is however no guarantee that two states trust each other. A breach of trust, for example by not delivering promised contributions, can have a very negative impact on the status of a cooperation partner. Most likely the cooperation will not end, but the partner will be less attractive in future projects.

On the other hand it is possible to be a trustworthy partner even when making use of caveats or other restrictions. States have an understanding of that, since they might be required to act in the same way on another occasion. Timely notification and good

communication can remove at least some of the frustrations with cooperation partners. Not surprisingly, states have much to gain from being reliable and predictable partners.

Trust, although in a different form, plays a role in the "bottom-up aspect" of IDC. It is not enough to have political "top down" guidelines. The people that actually have to implement the cooperation, the military at tactical and technical level, need to trust each other as well. This becomes visible through a shared level of professionalism and willingness to take risks. When military forces at that level have different rules or permission on what is acceptable this undermines the willingness to cooperate and the cooperation will not continue in the long term.

5.5 Conclusion

The first conclusion is that IDC has to lead to clear added value in order to prevail against the many difficulties surrounding IDC. Currently, the most important added value is budget savings, as a result of increasing costs and decreasing budgets. IDC can lead to savings in the purchase of defence equipment, provided states are willing to accept compromises and reduce protection of their national defence industries. The formation of multinational units solely based on budget arguments is not likely to succeed.

Secondly, states do wish to maintain control over the actions of their military forces and want to reserve the right to decide on participation in military actions. This complicates the formation of collective multinational units and formations. In cases where multinational formations have been created, diverging views on "ad bellum" and "in bello" decisions can lead to erosion of the collectiveness. A shared common security policy, or even better, political integration based on a common view will enhance the chance of successful IDC. In the absence of such integration, partners will always have to face the possibility that a state is not willing to participate in using the multinational unit.

The main reason for states to be reluctant in committing to multinational cooperation in the form of standing units or formations, at least between NATO countries, seems to be the domestic political accountability and support. The use of multinational units in operations depends on the political approval of all participating members. Since this is not guaranteed, multinational units have to be organized in a sub-optimal way. Essential

elements have to be kept under "own" control, enabling strictly national operations, or with absence of one or more partners. Politically lesser sensitive areas, like logistics, have a better chance of success.

The mechanism is different with multinational materiel cooperation projects, which leads to the third conclusion. Materiel cooperation will most probably only achieve a considerable benefit if states are willing to accept compromise solutions. The presence of a lead nation or main contractor offers smaller partners the opportunity to participate in large programs and achieve considerable benefits in the form of financial savings or interoperability. This comes however at the "cost" of making the important choice to be connected to this main partner over a long time. This choice has to be in line with the states' long term security policy.

Fourthly, it would be a step too far to state that there is a general lack of trust in other states when it comes to IDC. There can however be observed a scepticism towards international cooperation as such, since it means compromising and dependency. Trust is built by bottom-up acceptance and willingness to share risks. Top down, trust is mainly built by reliability and successful previous cooperation. The psychological component of cooperation and dependency should not be underestimated. Trust is a catalyst. Absence or breach of trust is difficult to overcome.

The findings of chapter five indicate that sovereignty and trust are indeed factors that can contribute to the explaining limitations of IDC. Trust and sovereignty are interlinked. Internationally, one can never be sure an IDC partner state will indeed fulfil its obligations. National political reasons can prohibit states from engaging in too restrictive forms of cooperation and encourage them in keeping their options open. As a result, IDC becomes organized sub-optimally since the remaining partners have to build in the capability to act independently.

6. Cooperation in IR theory; motives and mechanisms

The intent of this chapter is to analyze the role of trust and sovereignty as described in IR theory and to scrutinize how well the empirical findings fit to more general interpretations regarding cooperation identified by IR theory. Chapter five indicated that domestic political factors have a significant impact on IDC. This factor will therefore be taken into account separately. Three important theoretical works on international relations, each from a main approach within IDC, will be used as reference to assess the findings and

First, a short general description of states and their relations will be presented in order to place IR theory in perspective. This is followed by three sections, each analyzing classic works of recognized scholars of IR: Waltz, Keohane and Booth and Wheeler on the factors trust and sovereignty, placing the empirical findings in a theoretical perspective. This will be followed by a section on domestic influence in international relations. Finally, the conclusions will be presented.

6.1   States and their relations[69]

Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the state-system has gradually become the global "standard" way to organize our world and society (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003). States can internally be organized in different ways[70], but in general they all have the basic internal tasks of providing security, freedom, order, justice and welfare for their inhabitants. Externally, states are considered to be sovereign; politically independent of all other states. States are the entities that organize life internally as well as internationally.

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[69] State: A form of human association distinguished from other social groups by its purpose, the establishment of order and security; its methods, the laws and their enforcement; its territory, the area of jurisdiction or geographic boundaries; and finally by its sovereignty (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2011).

[70] f.e. republics, dictatorships, democracies, monarchies, one-party democracies, theocracies, etc..

IR studies how states interact and aims to understand the reasons why states act as they do and to explain the mechanisms of interaction and preferably link undertaken courses of action to achieved outcomes. It explores motives, actions and results (ibid.).

IR scholars have also given considerable attention to competition and cooperation between states. Often they have done so emphasizing different core values, different scientific methods and different disciplines. Jackson and Sørensen recognize four main theoretical traditions within IR: Realism, Liberalism, International Society and International Political Economy. The boundaries are diffuse and views can overlap (ibid, p. 68).

IR values and theories

FOCUS	THEORIES
• Security power politics, conflict, and war	• Realism
• Freedom cooperation, peace, and progress	• Liberalism
• Order and justice shared interests, rules, and institutions	• International Society
• Welfare wealth, poverty, equality	• IPE theories

Illustration 6.1: International Relations according

to Jackson and Sørensen

The first three will be used in relation to cooperation in IDC.

6.2 Cooperation in IR

Realism, especially neo-realism, seeks general patterns and laws governing international relations, against the background of anarchy. National security, power and state

survival are the prime goals for states and there is no higher authority above the state. The general setting in international relations is one of conflict and competition, not cooperation. States act out of self interest, which can also mean that practical outcomes of state actions trump principles and earlier agreements. Within realism, states can cooperate, but they will do so only out of self interest.

International Society focuses on human beings and their political values. As in realism, anarchy is the as general background for state relations, but International Society emphasizes general accepted rules of behaviour as tools to regulate interstate behaviour. State sovereignty, security and order are basic values. These can be achieved through agreements and cooperation with states and international institutions. Contrary to realism, no "general laws" are present. The actions of states are a result of the actions of men and women: thoughts and actions of people shape reality. Cooperation of states is the cooperation of humans.

Liberalism within IR takes a generally positive and optimistic view on interstate relations. Economic interdependency and peaceful cooperation will lead to progress and security. In order to achieve security, co-binding international organizations such as NATO play an essential role[71] (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 133). Anarchy does not necessarily mean conflict and also a legitimate authority can exist in international relations. Peace, cooperation and progress between democracies are not only possible, but likely.

6.3 Realism: cooperation by necessity

In *"Theory of International Politics"*, Waltz, explains general principles of state behaviour (Waltz, 1979). This work has become highly influential when it comes to describing general principles of behaviour that govern relations between states in an anarchic international system. Waltz is considered to be "...the leading neo-realist thinker." (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 84). The background for his study is the Cold War and a bipolar world.

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[71] Co-binding = locking states together through binding agreements

Waltz claims that nations *theoretically* could be much better off than they achieve in reality. Cooperation and the division of labour and tasks would enable a better "total" common outcome and states could enrich themselves more than they actually do. This division of labour could actually go further than the production of goods, but could include "…some of the tasks they perform, such as political management and military defence." (Waltz, 1979, p. 105). Two mechanisms prevent a deeper and better cooperation. Firstly, when states cooperate, they are more preoccupied in achieving relative gains, than absolute positions. "Who gains more?" is more important than "Will both of us gain?" (ibid, p. 105). Second, states are afraid of becoming dependant on other states. The more a state specializes, the more it has to rely on others (Waltz, 1979, p. 106). Reliability means weakness.

Waltz emphasizes competition in the relations between states. Cooperation plays a role when it comes to stabilizing the inherently anarchistic system. A key position is given to "the balance of power". Factors leading to a better chance of success, which in Waltz' view is defined as "…preserving and serving the state" (ibid, p. 117), include:

- A smaller number of states in a system increase the chance for success.

- In anarchistic "surroundings", similar units co-act.

- Individual power and influence improve a states' position and increase the chance of success within cooperation. A more powerful state can "afford" mistakes. Smaller states have to be right all the time.

- The chance of successful cooperation is enhanced with the presence of a "leader".

Concerns about the loss of autonomy are the second reason that states do not cooperate as much as would theoretically be possible, when only looking at "profit". The more a state specializes, the more it has to rely on other states to supply materials and services that it cannot provide itself. States however do not like being in a position of increased dependence where they become dependant on other states. With the background that the states' first and foremost task is to provide security to its people, one of the least likely areas to develop cooperation and specialization is therefore the cooperation between the military forces of different states. Military spending is the insurance premium for maintaining autonomy.

Military cooperation can however take place, and even successfully, in fear of a common enemy. "Alliances are made by states that have some, but not all of their interests in common." (ibid, p. 166). When states pool their resources in such a way, they do so based on a common interest, but they run the risk of ending up with the lowest common denominator as basis for their actions. Thus the alliance can become weaker. Furthermore internal alliance politics can surface. Even the allegiance and loyalty of member states can be used to pressure other member states and gain individual benefits.

Sovereignty and anarchy are two sides of the same coin. The consequence of maintaining individual sovereignty is collective anarchy. But even in such a system states can succeed in cooperating. Collective international efforts and common projects are needed in order to solve some of the world problems like poverty or the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A necessary prerequisite in Waltz's analysis is however the presence of a leader, a powerful and dominant state[72].

At first glance, a number of Waltz's findings seem to be in line with the empirical results described earlier in this study. On the other hand is Waltz's general assumption on competition between states, far from how many describe the current security-relation between European states. Western states, and for sure not those allied in NATO, do not pose a serious threat to each other. Caution should therefore be applied in projecting Waltz' general "laws" of interstate relations to IDC.

Four elements can contribute to explaining IDC as studied. Firstly, states can cooperate on even on defence, but it comes at the cost of dependence. When states face a common enemy and they can ally with a friendly partner, this is an acceptable price to pay. Many western countries have done so during the Cold War by allying with the US against the Warsaw Pact. The cooperation-dependence relation was also a part of the empirical findings and a serious impeding factor when considering IDC.

A second important recognition is that states could actually achieve a more efficient organization when they specialize, but that the need for autonomy and sovereignty prevent

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[72] For Waltz this was obviously the United States

such a specialization. This supports the findings from chapter five as described in paragraph 5.3.2: "states want to be able to act independently". Third, presence of a leader can facilitate cooperation, provided the smaller states are willing to accept its leadership. The EPAF F-16 cooperation is an example of such a form of cooperation. Finally, too large numbers of participants are likely to complicate cooperation.

6.4 Liberalism: cooperation by choice

Robert Keohane is considered a main contributor to a more liberalist line of thinking, (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 50), although he builds explicitly on realistic theory as well "…and goes beyond it" (Keohane, 2005, p. X). In *After Hegemony, Cooperation and discord in the world political economy*, he discusses how economic cooperation between states can take place in world politics in the absence of hegemony. "States intend to achieve wealth and security for their own people and search for power as means to these ends." (ibid, p. X). Contrary to Waltz, Keohane claims that cooperation is also possible without one strong leader-state, using international regimes and organizations.

Keohane distinguishes clearly between harmony and cooperation. Harmony is the absence of disagreement. If there is harmony, states do not have to cooperate since their interests or actions do not have negative impact for others. Cooperation is necessary when states pursue a line of action that has, or is perceived to have, negative effects on other states. States have to adapt their policy or actions through a process of negotiation in order to achieve a situation that is acceptable for the involved parties. Cooperation does not imply the absence of conflict. Cooperation is a reaction to conflict or a potential conflict.

Cooperation between states is possible, also in the absence of one dominating power. Positive factors enhancing the chance of success are (amongst others):

- the presence of complementary interests

- states have to balance short term and long term goals

- states have to expect a reasonably positive outcome

‒ satisficing[73] prevails above optimizing; accepting an outcome that answers to expectations is "good enough" and optimizing is often not necessary

Cooperation between states is negatively influenced by the following factors:

‒ The pursuit of flexibility can be self-defeating. Sometimes it is better to share information and accept obligations that restraining one's own freedom of action. Not sharing information and keeping one's options open can be counterproductive.

‒ States have to be aware of their goal and they have to share this with their possible partners. Even if actors have the same goal they can fail to achieve cooperation if they are not aware of each others' intent.

‒ State sovereignty prevents states developing patterns with legally binding agreements as within a single state. Sovereignty limits enforceability of agreements. Instead, attempts to "enforce" agreements often lead to increasing political differences.

‒ Division of responsibilities within one government or state can work negatively. If negotiations in complex matters are dealt with by several institutions of the same government, this will often mean that one of these will have to "give in", standing as a bureaucratic loser. These will be unlikely to be willing to bear the cost of the cooperation and can even "sabotage" the whole effort.

‒ If states intend to cooperate in order to achieve a "collective good", which they cannot achieve alone, they have to be perceived as a serious and responsible partner. States that have acted as "free-riders" or promise-breakers will be less likely to achieve cooperation and their goals.

Concerning trust and sovereignty, Keohane concludes that states have much to gain from being reliable partners. "A reputation as an unreliable partner may prevent a government from being able to make beneficial agreements in the future." (ibid, p. 258).

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[73] Searching until a course of action is found that is at least at the satisfactory level. (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 6)

Reputation is however not enough. States have to be willing to share high value information with intended partners so these can assess their intentions. International regimes can facilitate this process.

Keohane's findings largely support the empirical findings from the earlier chapters. It is interesting is that from a more liberal point of view, it remains necessary to give up (parts of) state sovereignty and parts of your flexibility if you really want to achieve results by international cooperation. State sovereignty as principle is undisputed, either as end or as a means. It can however be in the states' best own interest to give up some of the flexibility provided by sovereignty. "Maintaining unrestricted flexibility can be costly, if insistence on it makes a government an undesirable partner for others." (ibid, p. 259). The inverted consequence is that the more you cooperate, either by choice or by necessity, the more sovereignty you must be willing to give up.

The implications for IDC are considerable. Either a state takes IDC seriously, at the cost of independence, or you hold to independence and have to limit the ambition and expectations regarding IDC. Furthermore, international cooperation is usually not a one-time happening, but often a series of occasions. Keohane's theoretic analysis confirms the importance of being a trustworthy partner when engaging in international cooperation, as concluded from the examples in the chapter four and five. Withdrawing from cooperation might lead to short term gains, but the price is one's trustworthiness in a next round of negotiations or cooperation.

6.5 International Society: trust as a tool

Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler have investigated the roles of fear, cooperation and trust in international politics. They did so by studying the concept of the "security dilemma"[74] (Booth & Wheeler, 2008). They intend to explain actions from an individual state perspective. Giving a relatively important role to trust and fear within international relations also implies that they do not support a strictly rational approach to the mechanisms

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[74] The security dilemma is the phrase used to describe the mistrust and fear which is the inevitable consequence of living in a world of sovereign states. The "dilemma" element describes that the same weapons methods and actions used to defend a state can be perceived as aggressive by the opponent and in that way increase insecurity (Booth & Wheeler, 2008)

of interstate behaviour. They give considerably more importance to the human factor in international relations. The actions of states are often the result of actions and initiatives by individual human beings.

Booth and Wheeler come to the conclusion that international cooperation is structurally fragile. They name six contributing factors[75] of which two are important for this study.

- Rational egoism. "Cooperation cannot survive, and indeed flourish, if it is based on no more than rational egoism." (ibid, p. 131). Without at least some shared values, cooperation is difficult to sustain.

- Lack of communication between states can be a significant source of failure. Specifically named are "…effective signalling, transparency and reassuring words". (ibid, p. 135) Booth and Wheeler specifically discuss this related to "great powers", but communication between lesser states can be equally problematic.

On trust and sovereignty

An essential factor in overcoming fear and in international cooperation, and therefore the key element of Booth and Wheelers' study, is trust[76]. Their study investigates if and how trust is the mechanism that can overcome the security dilemma and enable cooperation. The absence of trust among states can lead to security competition like for example an arms race.

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[75] Rational egoism, future uncertainty, ambiguous symbolism, ideological fundamentalism, great power irresponsibility and communication

[76] Working definition of **trust** according to Booth and Wheeler: "Trust exists when two or more actors, based on the mutual interpretation of each others' attitudes and behaviour, believe that the other(s) now and in the future, can be relied upon to desist from acting in ways that will be injurious to their interests and values. This minimalist conception of trust can be contrasted with a maximalist one where actors mutually attempt to promote ach other's interests and values, including in circumstances that cannot be observed. For trust to become embedded between political units, it is necessary for positive relationships between decision makers to be replicated at the inter-societal level, and vice versa, through a mutual learning process. Trusting relationships of either kind are made possible by the following linked pairs of properties: a leap in the dark / uncertainty, empathy / bonding, dependence / vulnerability and integrity / reliability." (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 230)

There is however always the dilemma of how to interpret the actions and rhetoric of other states. Can the other be trusted? "…by committing to trust, actors expose themselves to severe costs if they are betrayed." (ibid, p. 231) . On the other hand:" Familiarity would breed trust, and when this becomes embedded trust, the pernicious consequences of security dilemma dynamics would be transcended" (ibid, p. 173). Trust, in their analysis, is not the way to solve the security dilemma, but to overcome the dilemma. They recognize that it is very difficult, but not impossible, to overcome mistrust and even old animosity.

Booth and Wheeler recognize four necessary elements or attitudes necessary to achieve trust among political entities. The first of these is a willingness to investigate new possibilities and to accept uncertainty. Changing one's mind about a certain group or potential cooperation-partner is the first step when considering cooperation. Obviously the difficulty of this step varies with the image one has of the potential partner. In cases of like-mindedness and good or neutral feelings it is easier to consider such a change than it is with former enemies.

The second facilitator to building trust is the capacity to empathize with the potential cooperation partner. *"…a capacity to empathize with the fear and suffering of one's adversaries is a critical precondition for building trust."*(ibid, p. 237). This factor is especially important when engaged in reconciliation efforts after conflicts, but certainly also has a role when considering cooperation in other fields, like joint projects in which every partner has its own specific interest.

The third element is accepting the vulnerability following from harm that others can inflict on you. In fact you calculate they will not use the opportunity and capability they gain by reaching an agreement with you. An interesting question is which safety margin you build into your position. Building in a high safety margin can be counter-productive when it comes to building trust. It can also lead to less result and therefore have a negative impact on the possible gains for oneself.

Fourth and finally, partners are expected to behave with integrity and reliability. The partners need to have confidence that the other partner will do what is "right". Reliable and honest behaviour will lead to a reputation of trustworthiness. In international relations this can be a lengthy process. It will be complicated by the fact that state-representatives can

change because of internal political reasons like elections. A second hampering factor can be diverging views, for example by different representatives, from the same state, leading to doubt about the actual position[77].

Although Booth and Wheeler see a much closer relation between human interaction and state interaction, they do share the view that international cooperation is difficult and many pitfalls exist in achieving long-lasting and structural cooperation. The value for this study is their concept of trust. Trust is an essential element in for all international cooperation and they emphasize that "…the history of politics among nations can yet be written in terms of choice rather than tragedy, community rather than anarchy, trust and cooperation rather than fear,…" (ibid, p. 297). Trust is a tool than can be used to live with uncertainty.

This mechanism was also observed when investigating trust empirically: although all states under circumstances can be forced to withdraw from their obligations, defence cooperation was deemed most successful when cooperating with like-minded partners and building on successful previous projects. Cooperation was also more likely to succeed when it was based on a common vision and values, and not solely on short term self-interest.

6.6 National political influence and domestic factors

Chapter five indicated that also domestic factors have a considerable impact on IDC, mainly through democratic political mechanisms. Governments are kept responsible for the actions of their armed forces, which increases reluctance to become dependant on other states or to accept multinational command. Can this mechanism be explained using IR theory?

Realists have been criticized for their assumptions and following theories on international relations and state behaviour. In *World Politics*[78] Helen Milner comments on the general neglect of domestic factors influencing international state behaviour (Milner, 1992). According to Milner the main goals for cooperation mainly depend on internal

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[77] One can think of different delegations, negotiating on behalf of the same government, but having diverging opinions.

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domestic factors. Varying domestic social groups have reasons to influence the goals for the international cooperation their state engages in. Domestic political factors influence a state's international goals and behaviour. "In general, the problem with assessing relative national gains is that one has to add up the net benefits for different domestic groups to arrive at a national assessment" (ibid, p. 491). As discussed earlier, national security policies and the domestic economic situation do impact on defence cooperation. Models developed and used by most realist scholars do not include domestic influence and therefore less suited to describe international behaviour and cooperation. IDC depends on national politics as well.

Liberalist scholars in general include domestic factors in their explanation of a state's international relations and actions (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 133). Nations consist of many different groups of people, which have different ties and different interests. Because individuals and groups within a state can have different interests, the state-leadership has to balance these various interests, they are not completely free to act. This results in compromises that influence the state's international behaviour as well.

Keohane recognizes that *After Hegemony* lacks a theory on how domestic politics and international institutions connect. He "…did not know how to incorporate a sophisticated domestic politics theory into my analysis…" (Keohane, 2005, p. XIII). He recognizes this as a considerable weakness. Domestic factors do play a role in international cooperation in general and he credits Helen Milner for linking domestic and international politics.

Domestic factors and national politics play a less prominent role for International Society theorists than they do for Liberalists. "They are not inclined to investigate the domestic aspects of foreign policy." and "…draw a firm line between international relations and the internal politics of states." (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 167). In this approach of IR, international politics and politicians are not closely related to national politics. The basis for policies and decisions is rather found in values and norms than in domestic internal interests.

6.7 Conclusion

The intent of this chapter was to analyze the role of trust and sovereignty in IR theory and to scrutinize to which extent the empirical findings fit to more general interpretations

concerning cooperation identified by IR theory. So which meaning do the theoretical findings have for this study? Within IR there is no unified coherent view on international cooperation. States can and do cooperate, but out of different motives and with different mechanisms. All three presented schools have useful elements.

Looking at this theoretical level has provided indications that certain empirical findings on IDC are supported by general theoretical insights regarding international cooperation. IR theory confirms the inverse relation between sovereignty and cooperation found during the empirical research. The more you cooperate, the more sovereignty you probably will have to give up. If one wants to remain completely flexible, one should not cooperate. Cooperation means you adapt to each other and therefore will have to make compromises. In terms of IDC: increased cooperation makes the armed forces dependant on other states. It can however enable you to benefit from extra capabilities that can become available through international cooperation.

Second, Booth and Wheeler's observations on trust in international cooperation are, with certain modifications, in line with empirical observations from IDC. States can be forced to come to cooperation and give up parts of their autonomy. If they have to do so, they would better do it with states that have proved themselves reliable partners in the past. For IDC there is however a complicating factor: although military forces and their state level are closely connected, they are not identical. This can result in two-level negotiations and situations, where the military are able and willing to cooperate, but the governmental level is not. This situation is inherent to western democratic systems. Political reliability and stability will strongly influence the prospect of successful IDC.

A further insight concerning the choice of partners is that IR-theory confirms that it is wise to choose like-minded partners, sharing political values. This seems to be an obvious statement, however in the search for saving budgets one has to realize that it is better to achieve an enduring cooperation with fewer saving, than to choose for potential high savings in a cooperation that will not last. Cooperation in known institutions such as within NATO furthermore enables the significant advantage of enhanced interstate communication at both military and political levels.

It is reasonable to assume that IDC is, at least partially, regulated by the same mechanisms that influence general international relations. Theorists from IR do not agree on the role of domestic factors, especially national political factors. For IDC however, empirical findings indicate that these factors are very relevant. Internal political stability makes a partner more trustworthy and therefore more attractive as partner. Shared political values further enhance the chance of successful cooperation, decreasing the chance that a state has to abstain from using an international organized capability for internal political reasons.

7. Conclusion & consequences

In this thesis I have studied whether IDC is a possible answer to some of the challenges that states and their military forces face upholding their defence capabilities, or whether IDC in itself can cause new challenges or problems.

Most states in Europe have passed the point of no return when it comes to IDC and it seems that it will be around for quite some time, because "…for small and medium-sized states the possibility of keeping a national balanced military force that is recognized as credible is diminishing quickly." (Ulriksen, 2007, p. 67). This development has been remarked in the states involved. It has inspired an impressive number of initiatives, co-operations, joint projects and declarations. Still, no overarching plan, either political or military, exists to coordinate all these efforts and make best use of the available resources. Despite the apparent urgent need to come to a solution, there are factors that prevent better structured, deeper and easier international cooperation regarding defence.

This thesis investigated if the following question: *Can a lack of international trust and the need for upholding national sovereignty explain limitations and problems of International Defence Cooperation? Do other factors have to be taken into account?*

Conclusion

The first question investigated is if IDC in practice is really so difficult. In order to establish that IDC indeed is a challenging undertaking, to justify the research question and to achieve insight into what challenges it faces, a model presented by the Norwegian Defence Staff was used. The model uses three perspectives to organize factors influencing IDC: the security-political-, the economical- and the military perspective. The question whether IDC is indeed a problem could be answered positively: IDC is perceived as difficult and faces serious challenges and limitations in all three areas. This initial analysis furthermore indicated that IDC has become more normal at the tactical level then it is at the political-strategic level.

What is the relation between armed forces and state-sovereignty? Armed forces are a part of the executive power of the state. In western democracies they receive legitimacy for their existence and actions through political decisions. Their actions are the actions of the

state. The relation between military forces and their states gives sufficient reason to believe that mechanisms influencing international politics will also influence interaction between military forces from different states. If armed forces of different states cooperate multinationally, they voluntarily reduce their sovereignty; they can be placed under the command of a coalition or a different nation or they otherwise have to compromise their complete independence from other states. Sovereignty and trust are relevant factors to consider and can have substantial influence on the sort of defence cooperation, the partner-choice and the success of the cooperation.

States do already cooperate on defence. The question is therefore relevant if cases of IDC indicate how states solve the sovereignty issue and in how far they trust each other. Analysis of the founding-documents of nine cases of IDC indicates that states indeed include mechanisms or guarantees to control the balance between sovereignty and dependency. In order to reserve or revoke their control, more recent MoU's, TA's and other agreements contain clauses and articles allowing states to withdraw or to abstain from participation. Sovereignty, in the form of deciding nationally on the use of military capabilities, remains an important consideration in IDC.

So what effects do trust and sovereignty have on defence cooperation? Incidents concerning the cooperation-initiatives indicate that trust does play an important role in coming to cooperation, or determining if an initiative will be continued. The document analysis alone did however not provide sufficient insight on the role of trust. Furthermore, IDC is a political issue, or it can become one when national interests, policies or opportunities conflict with earlier agreements. The academic debate on the NORDEFCO cooperation is quite interesting in this context, especially since the relation between dependency and savings is discussed.

In order to achieve insight in trust and the mechanisms behind IDC, interviews were conducted. The results confirm that states on one side are looking for new or better forms of IDC, mainly to save costs, but on the other hand are reluctant to do so. Sovereignty and trust play an important role, but not in the sense that the military do not trust each other. States have to very careful, or mistrustful if one chooses blunter wording, regarding other states because of the political nature of IDC.

Besides investigating sovereignty and trust, this thesis kept the question open whether other factors play a significant hindering role for IDC. An important reason for states to be reluctant in committing to multinational cooperation in the form of standing units or formations is caused by domestic political accountability and support. Political authorities wish to maintain control over the actions of their national military forces. Therefore they reserve the right to decide on participation in military actions. This complicates the formation of collective multinational units and formations. As a consequence, there is reason to be modest regarding promises and expectations concerning the possible gains of IDC. It is not a quick-fix or easy solution to budgetary restrictions.

In cases where multinational formations already have been created, diverging views on "ad bellum" decisions can lead to erosion of the collective effort. The use of multinational units in operations depends on the political approval of all the participating members. Since this is not guaranteed, multinational units have to be organized in a sub-optimal way. Essential elements have to be kept under national control, enabling strictly national operations, or coping with the absence of one or more partners. Politically less sensitive areas, like logistics, have a better chance of success. Consequently, when states choose IDC as a means to uphold their defence capability, they have to realize it comes at a price. They have to be willing to accept compromises and become dependant on others.

Theory from International Relations was the third way to investigate trust and sovereignty. Are the findings on trust, sovereignty and domestic political accountability in line with existing theory from IR and do they have a more general value for IDC? IR offers no unified coherent view on international cooperation, but indicates that the findings on trust and sovereignty in IDC are not unique for defence cooperation alone. Increased cooperation leads to less sovereignty.

If one has to maintain complete flexibility and autonomy this means one should not cooperate. In terms of IDC: increased cooperation makes the armed forces dependant on other states. It can however enable a state and its armed forces to benefit from extra capabilities that can become available through international cooperation. This gives reason to assume that the empirical findings on the reluctance to give up sovereignty are not restricted to the studied cases alone, but can be applied to other cases and forms of international defence cooperation as well. Building flexibility into IDC, for example by organizing

multinational units in modules, can be a prudent way to limit dependence. It also reduces the synergetic effects of such cooperation.

The theoretical perspective on trust as confirms empirical observations from IDC. If states decide to cooperate, they will always become dependant. There is no way to remove this consequence. IDC therefore erodes state sovereignty. When cooperating, states will benefit from choosing partner-states that have proved themselves reliable partners in the past. Secondly, although military forces and their national governments are closely connected, they are not identical. This can result in two-level negotiations and situations, where the military are able and willing to cooperate, but the government is not, or vice versa. This situation is inherent to western democratic systems.

To achieve successful IDC, states depend on a reputation as trustworthy and politically reliable partners. Future IDC projects have a better chance of success if they build on known relations between previous partners and use proven mechanisms. Furthermore, a good internal national coordination between the military and the political authorities in a state, so both levels have the same intent and information, will considerably enhance the chance of success in IDC.

Combining document analysis, interviews and theory from International Relation has shown that, in general, European states seem to be willing to cooperate on defence matters. There can however also be observed a political scepticism towards international cooperation as such, since it means compromising and losing parts of sovereignty. Trust is built by bottom-up acceptance and willingness to share risks. Top down, trust is mainly built by reliability and successful previous cooperation. The mental component of cooperation and dependency should not be underestimated. Trust can be a catalyst, leading to synergetic effects. The absence or breach of trust is difficult to overcome and hard to compensate.

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Annex A: Abbreviations

1 GNC	First German / Netherlands Corps
ABNL	Admiral Benelux (Navy cooperation the Netherlands & Belgium)
ACI	Army Cooperation Initiative (Norway & the Netherlands)
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System (also known as E-3A Cooperative Programme)
BENELUX	Belgium, the Netherlands & Luxembourg
C2	Command and Control
C-17	Boeing Globemaster III
DOI	Declaration of Intent
EATC	European Air Transport Command
EEAW	EPAF Expeditionary Air Wing
EPAF	European Participating Air Forces (F-16 cooperation)
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
F-16	General Dynamics Multirole jet fighter aircraft
FULLCOM	Full Command
HAW	Heavy Air Wing (C-17)
IDC	International Defence Cooperation
IR	International Relations
ISAF	International Security and Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAF	Norwegian Armed Forces
NAMO	NATO Airlift Management Organization
NASAMS	Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System

NAMSA	NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRF	NATO Response Force
NH-90	NATO Helicopter (type 90)
NORDEFCO	Northern Defence Cooperation
NRF	NATO Response Force
OPCON	Operational Control
RPV	Remotely Piloted Vehicle
SAC	Strategic Airlift Capability
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SFOR	Stabilization Force (Bosnia)
TA	Technical Agreement
TACOM	Tactical Command
TACON	Tactical Control
TOR	Terms of Reference
UKNL AF	United Kingdom-Netherlands Amphibious Force
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations

Annex B: Illustrations

Annex C: Interviewed officers

Major General T.H. Knutsen, Norwegian Defence Staff

Adviser International Engagement

Major General Tom Henry Knutsen is adviser international engagement for the Norwegian Chief of Defence. This new post was created in 2011, in order to achieve a coherent approach to international relations on behalf of the Norwegian Defence Staff and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. MG Knutsen has held a number of international posts and is a graduate of the U.S. Air War College. He was the Norwegian Defence Attaché in Washington from 2006 to 2010.

Brigadier B.T. Solberg, Norwegian Ministry of Defence

Deputy Director Department for Security Policy FDII

The Department of Security Policy is responsible for the handling of questions of security policy as well as for the Ministry's international activities and external relations in the field of security policy. The department is responsible for the development and coordination of the Ministry's policy regarding bilateral, regional and international security policy questions, as well as for the development of defence-related cooperation with allied and partner countries. Furthermore, the department takes care of Norway's defence policy relations with NATO, EU, UN and OSCE. From 1993 to 1999 Brigadier Solberg served in the operations and planning braches at the combined NATO and national Norwegian headquarters in North Norway. He has been with the Ministry of Defence since 2001. He was appointed Brigadier and Deputy for Security Policy Department in 2008.

Major General M. de Kruif

Deputy Commander Royal Netherlands Army

Currently MG de Kruif is deputy commander of the Royal Netherlands Army. He is a graduate of the US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania (USA) and holds a Master's degree in Strategic Studies. He was responsible for the formation, training and preparation of Dutch forces designated for participation in ISAF. March 27th, 2008 he was promoted to

major-general. From October 2008 to November 2009 he commanded the Regional Command South, ISAF. with over 45.000 soldiers from the US, the UK, Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, Australia, France, New Zealand, Singapore, Romania and Slovakia. He has a special interest in international cooperation and preparing Dutch officers, soldiers and units for international operations.

Commodore F. Sijtsma

Assistant Chief of Staff International Defence Cooperation, Netherlands Defence Staff

The office for International Defence Cooperation (IMS) supports the Chief of Defence, his deputy and the Netherlands defence Staff regarding international defence cooperation. The office expresses national Dutch policy in international organizations and is the prime point of contact for international affairs in the Defence Staff. Commodore Sijtsma has extensive multinational operational experience. He commanded naval operations in the Caribbean, during several NATO missions and commanded the Dutch Naval Forces Caribbean, the Coast Guard Dutch Antilles and Task Group 4.4. Commodore Sijtsma is in office as ACOS International Defence Cooperation since May 28th, 2010. He is chairman of the working group investigating increased IDC for the Netherlands' Defence Forces as part of the current restructuring project.

Annex D: Interview questions

The interviews were conducted as open conversations. The interviewees had a high influence on the topics and the direction of the conversation. To avoid unnecessary diversions and focus the attention, the following questions were used. Several questions were however a natural part of the conversation and therefore not specifically asked as separate question.

A. General Introduction.
1. About International cooperation in general:
    a. The Netherlands / Norway are internationally orientated. Can you name the most important reasons to conduct IMC?
    b. Which are currently the most important projects?
    c. Do these live up to the expectations?
2. In which form do the Netherlands / Norway benefit from IMC? (Increased output? Budget savings)
3. Under which conditions can IMC become a success?
4. Are all military area's / fields open for cooperation?
5. In which way do political considerations influence IMC?
    a. Top down / bottom up
    b. Life expectancy government vs. duration projects
    c.

B. Specific on IMC and Budget savings:

Especially driven by budget restrictions and increasing costs, IMC is often named as one solution. Theoretically one could imagine a completely "international" defence force or f.e. task specialization.

1. In which way does IMC lead to savings?
2. What "limits" IMC in such a form ?
3. Which mechanisms are used to achieve substantial savings?
4. Are there any specific conditions necessary under which conditions can IMC lead to savings?
5. Strictly economically, it would make sense to leave *national* defence. Benefits of scale would facilitate lower costs in the purchase of equipment and role specialization

would most probably be more cost effective. Why don't we all pool the defence budgets and organizations?

6. Alliance theory states one of the reasons to cooperate is that in that way states are able to afford systems / achieve effect they cannot achieve alone. Collective goods theory. (Example AWACS planes). Defence materiel prices are increasing significantly. Would such an "AWACS" solution be an option for capabilities that are today still "national".

   a. Examples: Submarines? Fighter planes?
   b. Why not?
   c. How to avoid "free riders" & "bandwagoning"

C. Specific questions on "Autonomy" / Sovereignty

1. In which way does the need for autonomy and control influence the possibilities with IMC?
2. Can one IMS deliver substantial savings without giving up autonomy or sovereignty?
3. Would you / NLD / Norway be willing to accept less national control if it would lead to increased international / combined output, even it means giving up full control? Political acceptance?
4. If yes: do you exclude certain areas or capabilities?
5. Can you react on the following statement?
   "Without political international integration, military integration will not work."

D. Trust & Control

When states have to cooperate, especially on sensitive issues, this requires trust.

1. How does one build up trust internationally? And militarily?
2. Defence cooperation project do often exceed the lifetime of a government. Which consequences does this bring?
3. The more important a field or capability is for a state, the less it will be inclined to leave it to a partner. In your opinion, are there limitations what states will be willing to trust to others? Examples?

E. Success and failure

1. Can you define or give examples of "failure" in IMC? Which reasons can you name?

2. What are the most important reasons why IMC does not deliver the expected results?

F. Which documents regulate NLD Security and Defence policy and in which way are these translated into actions or measures?

G. Success or failure (and why)?

- − EPAF / F16
- − NORDEFCO
- − 1 GNC
- − Army Cooperation Initiative
- − Strategic Airlift Command
- − AWACS cooperation.
- − (UK/NL amphibious force)

Can you give examples of failures in defence cooperation? What were the reasons?